Discuss the notions of political clientilism and neo-patrimonialism in African state systems.

The famous definition of politics is who gets what, when and how in society. Clientelism is at its core a means for setting policy about who gets what. In understanding who get what in society it is important to conceptualize clientalism and neopatrimonalism in this framework. During the early 1990s more than half of Africas fifty two governments responded to domestic and international pressure made the difficult transition to democracy by holding competitive presidential elections and numerous reforms were necessary in the realm of governance. Reformers within the African state attempted to reconfigure their public institutions by trying to build systems that are responsive and accountable to citizens, and that effectively support economic investment and growth. Such reform efforts tend to concentrate on formal institutions, rules and procedures. Nonetheless, as ODonnell (1996:40) points out, formal rules about how political [and administrative] institutions are supposed to work are often poor guides to what actually happens. In many cases, informal systems of clientelism and neopatrimonialism are key contributors to stifling popular participation, subverting the rule of law, fostering corruption, distorting the delivery of public services, discouraging investment and undermining economic progress. Because they are deeply entrenched, seldom authorized or openly acknowledged, and take different forms depending on their context, clientelistic and neopatrimonial networks can be both difficult to detect and to remove. According to Van de Walle (1992), The dynamics and outcomes of these transitions have been highly variable which in some cases, a competitive election has led to an alternation of political leaders and the emergence of a fragile democratic regime; more often the transition has been flawed (with the incumbent stealing the election),

blocked (with the incumbents and opposition deadlocked over the rules of the political game), or precluded (by widespread civil unrest). However these transitions to democracy served mainly as a faade of institutional respectability behind which deeply rooted patterns clietelistic and neopatrimonial big man governance continue to dominate. In many African state systems, there is a facade of liberal democratic institutions (like a parliament, an executive Cabinet, or a court system). However, upon closer inspection, these institutions are nothing like those found in the West. Simply put, they lack legitimacy because no one believes they are fulfilling a social contract to serve impersonally on behalf of all citizens. African governments also have a civil service, or bureaucracy (big ones), but again, they are "patrimonialized" to the core, and few (if any) bureaucrats put society's interests above their own personal gain. In short, there is no separation of the public from the private in African politics. One can speculate on why this is so. It could be that the colonial

powers never left sufficient liberal democratic institutions in place, or it could be that the independent states moved too quickly toward authoritarian rule. Opinions vary, and nobody has the definite answer. What is indisputable, however, is that African governments are very highly centralized. Power is not diffused or dispersed properly among the separate branches of government. There are no "checks-and-balances." African politics is quite commonly characterized as systematically and inherently clientelistic within the post-colonial era. Within the clientelistic framework, African rulers,
whether self-appointed or democratically elected, rely on the distribution of personal favors to selected members of the electorate in exchange for ongoing political support.

When most African countries moved to multi-party democratic competition, it would now be the voters, rather than the ruler, who would provide office to politicians. Nevertheless, the central idea that political power would come from direct, personal exchanges continued. Van de Walle argued that political authority in Africa is based on the giving and granting of favors, in an endless series of dyadic exchanges that go from the village level to the highest reaches of the central state (van de Walle 2001: 51). Further clarifying clientelism in Africa's multi-party era, Lindberg noted that patron-client relations are primarily about providing material resources in exchange for personal loyalty, and refers to African MPs as needing to employ such practices as attending to individuals' school fees, electricity and water bills, funeral and wedding expenses; or distributing cutlasses and other tools for agriculture, or even handing of `chop-money' (small cash sums) to constituents (Lindberg 2003: 123-4). In most accounts, public jobs, medicines and food are the main goods traded in clientelistic exchanges, but public infrastructure may also be traded in.
Clientelism is defined as transactions between politicians and citizens whereby material favors are offered in return for political support at the polls. Thus, clientelism is a form of interest-group. while the standard interest-group politics takes place in the context of organized competition among groups that could eventually lead to the representation of a variety of interests by one political party, clientelism is characterized by the representation of narrow corporatist and local interests. In addition, while the influence of interest groups tends to be filtered by the mechanisms of checks and balances, those mechanisms tend to be absent or ineffective in the context of clientelism.

According to WANTCHEKON clientelism is thrive best in conditions of low productivity, high inequality and starkly hierarchial social relations.

Within the clientelistic framework there is usually the generation of excessive redistribution at the expense of the provision of public goods, as politicians wastefully divert government resources to favored segments of the electorate. The patron has disproportionate power and thus enjoys wide latitude about how to distribute the assets under his control.
Clientelism is usually seen as lying at the far end of the institutional spectrum from democracy. Quite often,

the budgetary procedures in many of the states lack transparency as result clientelism tends
to favor those already in control of the government and therefore consolidates incumbency advantage in democratic elections. According to WANTCHEKON

such advantage and the ensuing decline in political competition could incite the
opposition to political violence, thereby generating political instability and possibly the collapse of the democratic process. Essentially the discretion over when and how to spend government resources allows the incumbent leader to undermine the credibility of the opposition candidates by, for example, making upfront payments to voters Furthermore, often time the incumbent would seek to maximize votes by allocating distributive benefits primarily to their core voter (i.e voters who are predisposed in favor of the party) in order to secure their vote. On the other hand, they would target those (swing) voters who are not ideologically predisposed to either of the competing parties.

Unlike clientelism, neopatrimonialism is a mixed system of government administration with a rational-legal veneer overlaying a web of personalistic ties charteristic of patrimonial rule. Neopatrimonialism is commonly understood as a hybrid regime consisting of, on the one hand, an exterior modern, formal, rational-legal state like apparatus (the neo), and on the other hand,

a patrimonial spoils network in which centralized elites mobilize political support by using their public position to distribute jobs, rent-seeking opportunities, and resources as personal favors (Bratton & van de Walle 1997). Bratton and van de Walle (1997: 277) for instance maintain that the distinctive institutional hallmark of African regimes is essentially neopatrimonialism. They state categorically that while neopatrimonial practices can be found in almost all political institutions, it at the core of politics in Africa They maintain that, the interaction between the "big man and his extended retinue defines African politics, from the highest reaches of the presidential palace to the humblest village assembly. The basis assumption is that of the heuristic concept is that informal, particularistic politics of rulers pervade formal state institutions. As such, analysts of African politics have embraced the neopatrimonial model. In this sense its proponents perceive it to have particular value in explaining Africas state weakness, democratic deficiencies and economic crisis. Within the neopatrimonial system social unrest are common. Neopatrimonial leaders construct particularistic networks of personal loyalty that grant undue favor to selected kinship, ethnic, or regional groupings. Taken together, shrinking economic opportunities and exclusionary patterns of reward are a recipe for social unrest. Mass popular protest is likely to break out, usually over the issue of declining living standards, and to escalate to calls for the removal of incumbent leaders. This economical crisis undercuts the capacity of rulers to manage the process of political change. When the public resources dwindle to the point where the incumbent government can no longer pay civil servants, this in turn builds a tension and the civil servants join anti-regime

protesters. With the inability to maintain politicial stability through the distributions of material rewards, the neopatrimonial leaders resort to coercion which in turn further undermines the regimes legitimacy. . The showdown occurs when the government is unable to pay the military. Furthermore, the personal rulers are sensitive to threats to their authority, as a result they weakening all independent centers of powers. In turn the fear of threat to their authority drives dictators to emasculate the very institutions that could institutionalize rule. According to Van, the same irrational logic of political survival informs the attitudes of personal rulers towards institutions of civil society. Most African leaders have demobilized voters and eradicated popular associations except those headed by hand-picked loyalists. Therefore, when political protest does erupt in neopatrimonial regimes, it is usually spontaneous, sporadic, disorganized, and unsustained. Because civil society is underdeveloped, the completion of the transition and the consolidation of any subsequent democratic regime are problematic. Furthermore within the neopatrimonial regime elites fracture over access to patronage. Neopatrimonial rulers frequently rotate the political elite in order to prevent any potential opponent from developing his or her own power base and also in order to extend the clientelist network. According to Van, Neopatrimonial regimes are characterized by rapid turnover of political personnel. To regulate and control rent seeking, to prevent rivals from developing their own power base, and to demonstrate their own power, rulers regularly rotate officeholders. Within this framework, there is a long term president and short tenure of key government members, therefore suggests a neopatramonial power concentration. This is exactly the case in Zambia. Since independence in 1964 the country has seen only three presidents. According to Soest (2006), The first President Kaunda served for 27 years in office and entrenched his power with a corps of personal advisors which in turn reduced the influence of the cabinet and other

units of the ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP). He not only gained from particular legitimacy as Zambias founding President who had led the struggle for independence but also augmented his control of the political process by promulgating the one-party state in December 1972. However unlike the president who has a long tenure in there is a frequency of change in ministers. Soest (2006), maintain that the average tenure of key ministers from independence until today stands at only 2.4 years. Consequently, the most important cabinet members have exercised their functions for only half of a legislative period on average. This pattern of elite circulation (Burnell 2001b: 241) has shown a high degree of consistency and has endured during Zambias one-party Second Republic (from end of 1972 to 1991) and during the multi-party Third Republic (since November 1991). With an average tenure of less than two years, the ministerial game of musical chairs is a feature of neopatrimonialism. Moreover, few rulers tolerate dissent; they typically expel potential opponents from government jobs, from approved institutions like ruling parties, or even from the country itself. In a major cabinet reshuffle in April 1993 for instance, President Chiluba removed those reform-minded ministers he perceived to be a threat to his rule from office. Others were frustrated to the extent that they resigned from government (Soest, 2006). Van maintained that even if most individuals can expect eventually to be forgiven and brought back into the fold, such practices establish a zero-sum, non-accommodative pattern of politics. Whereas insiders enjoy preferential access to state offices and associated spoils, outsiders are left to languish in the wilderness.