Chapter1 General Provisions

BOOK 1V
OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

TITLE I. - OBLIGATIONS
CHAPTER 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Art. 1156. 1
Concepts of Obligations. Evidently, the above definition of
an obligation is adopted from Sanchez Romans classic definition of an
obligation as the juridical necessity to comply with a prestation. 2
Manresa, on the other hand, defines it as a legal relation established
between one person and another, whereby the latter bound to the
fulfillment of a prestation which the former may demand from him. 3
It must be observed, however, that obligation may be either
civil or natural.4 A civil obligation is one which has a binding force in
law, and which gives to the obligee or creditor the right of enforcing it
against the obligor or debtor in a court of justice. This is the obligation
which is defined in Art. 1156 of the Code. A natural obligation, on the
other hand, is one which can not be enforced by action, but which is
binding in the party who makes it in conscience and according to the
natural law.5 Thus, when an action has prescribed in accordance with the
statute of limitations, a natural obligation still subsists, although the civil
obligation is extinguished. This may be illustrated by the following
example: If A has a right of action, evidenced by a promissory note, to
1
New Provision
4 Sanchez Roman 53.
3
8 Manresa, 5th Ed, Bk. 1, p.21
4
Art. 1423, Civil Code.
5
3 Bouviers Law Dictionary 2394-2395.
2
(Art. 1156)
OBLIGATIONS
collect one thousand pesos from B, and such promissory note prescribes
after the expiration of ten years from the time it accrues, 6 although the
latter is no longer bound to pay the obligation in accordance with equity
and natural law.7 It is, therefore, clear that a civil obligation and a
natural obligation may be distinguished from each other as follows:
(1) A civil obligation is based on positive law, while a natural
obligation is based on equity and natural law; and
(2) The former is enforceable in courts of justice, while the
latter is not.8
Requisites of Obligations. An obligation has four essential
requisites. They are:
(1) A juridical or legal tie, which bind the parties to the
obligation, and which may arise from either bilateral or unilateral acts of
persons;
(2) An active subject known as the oblige or creditor, who can
demand the fulfillment of the obligation;
(3) A passive subject known as the obligor or debtor, against
whom the obligation is juridically demandable; and
GENERAL PROVISIONS
essential. Thus, in a contract involving a donation of personal property

whose value exceed P5, 000, the law requires that the donation and the
acceptance shall be made in writing; 10 in a contract of sale of a piece of
land or any interest therein through an agent, the law requires that the
authority of the latter shall be in writing; 11 in a contract of simple loan or
mutuum, the law requires that any agreement with respect to interest
shall be expressly stipulated in writing; 12 in a contract of antichresis, the
law requires that the amount of the principal and of the interest shall be
specified in writing;13 in a contract involving a donation of immovable
property, the law requires that the donation shall be made in a public
document, while the acceptance shall be made either in the same deed of
donation in a separate public document; 14 in a contract of partnership
where immovable property or real estate rights are contributed to the
common fund, the law requires that the contract shall be in a public
instrument to which an inventory of the property or real rights, signed
by the partners, must be attached; 15 in a contract of chattel mortgage, the
law requires that the personal property which is the subject matter of the
contract shall be recorded in the Chattel Mortgage Register as a security
for the performance of an obligation; 16 and in a contract involving the
sale or transfer of large cattle, the law requires that the sale or transfer
shall be registered.17 Non-compliance with such formalities would have
the effect of rendering the contract or agreement void or inexistent.
Classification of Obligations. The following is the primary
classification of obligations under the Civil Code:
(4) The fact, prestation or service which constitutes the object

of the obligation.9
The form in which the obligation is manifested is sometimes
added as a fifth requisite. As a general rule, it can not be considered as
essential. Obligation arising from law, quasi-contracts, acts or omissions
punished by law, and quasi-delicts do not require any form whatsoever,
yet there can be no question regarding their validity or binding force. It
is only in obligation arising from certain contracts that it becomes
6

Agoncillo vs. Javier, 38 Phil. 424; Villaroel vs. Estrada, 71 Phil. 40.
8
9
Giorgi, Teoria de las Obligaciones, Vol.1, p. 13; 3 Castan, 7th Ed., p.20
7
(Art. 1156)
(1) Pure and conditional (Arts. 1179-1192).

(2) With
a period (Arts. 1193-1198).
10

12
13
14
15
Art. 1771, 1773, Civil Code.
16
17
Sec. 22, Act No. 1147; Art. 1581, Civil Code.
11
(Art. 1156)
OBLIGATIONS
(3) Alternative and facultative (Arts. 1199-1206).
GENERAL PROVISIONS
(Art. 1156)
(a) Natural when the obligation is in accordance with the

natural law.
(4) Joint and solidary (Arts. 1207-1222).

(b) Civil when the obligation is in accordance with positive law.
(5) Divisible and indivisible (Arts. 1223-1225).
(6) With a penal cause (Arts. 1226-1230).
There are, however, other classifications of a secondary
character which can be gathered from scattered provisions of the Civil
Code, such as:
(1) Legal, conventional and penal; 18
(2) Real and personal;19
(3) Determinate and generic;20
(4) Positive and negative;21
(c) Mixed when the obligation is in accordance with both

natural and
positive law.
2. As to parties:
(a) Unilateral and bilateral unilateral, where only one party is
bound, and bilateral, where both parties are mutually or
reciprocally bound.
(b) Individual and collective individual, where there is only
one obligor, and collective, where there are several
obligors. The latter may be joint, when each obligor is
liable only for his proportionate share of the obligation, or
solidary, when each obligor may be held liable for the
entire obligation.
(5) Unilateral and bilateral;22

3. As to object:
(6) Individual and collective;
23
(7) Accessory and principal;24

The following, on the other hand, is the classification of
obligations according to Sanchez Roman: 25
1. As to juridical quality:
18
Arts. 1158-1162, Civil Code.

20
21
22
23
Arts. 1207, 1223, Civil Code.
24
Arts. 1166, 1226, et seq., Civil Code.
25
8 Sanchez Roman 20-40.
19
(a) Determinate and generic determinate, when the object is

specific; generic, when the object is designated by its class
or genus.
(b) Simple and multiple simple, when there is only one
undertaking; multiple, when there are several undertakings.
Multiple obligations may be conjunctive, when all of the
undertakings are demandable at the same time, or
distributive, when only one undertaking out of several is
demandable. Distributive obligations, on the other hand,
may be alternative, when the obligor is allowed to choose
one out of several obligations which may be due and
demandable, or facultative, when the obligor is allowed to
(Art. 1156)
OBLIGATIONS
GENERAL PROVISIONS
substitute another obligation for one which is due and

demandable.
(c) Positive and negative positive, when the obligor is
obliged to give or do something; negative, when the obligor
must refrain from giving or doing something.
(d) Real and personal real, when the obligation consists in
giving something; personal, when the obligation consists in
doing or not doing something.
demandable only upon the expiration of the term, or

resolutory or to a day certain, in which case the obligation
terminates upon the expiration of the term.
Art. 1157. Obligations arise from:

1. Law;
2. Contracts;
(e) Possible and impossible possible, when the obligation is

capable of fulfillment in nature as well as in law;
impossible, when the obligation is not capable of
fulfillment either in nature or in law.
(f) Divisible and indivisible divisible, when the obligation is
susceptible of partial performance; indivisible, when the
obligation is not susceptible of partial performance.
(g) Principal and accessory principal, when it is the main
undertaking; accessory, when it is merely an undertaking to
guarantee the fulfillment of the principal obligation.
4. As to perfection and extinguishment:
3. Quasi-contracts;
4. Acts or omissions punished by law; and
5. Quasi-delicts.26
Sources of Obligations. In Roman law, the sources of
obligations are: (1) contractu; (2) quasi-contractu; (3) maleficio; and
(4) quasi-maleficio.27 These sources are preserved in the Civil Code with
the addition of law or lege.28 The addition of lege as an independent
source of obligations, however, has been criticized as theoretically
erroneous. Thus, according to the Supreme Court:
This enumeration of the sources of obligations supposes that the
quasi-contractual obligation and the obligation imposed by law are of
different types. The learned Italian jurist, Jorge Giorgi, criticizes this
assumption and says that the classification embodied in the Code is
theoretically erroneous. His conclusion is that one or the other of these
categories should have been suppressed and merged in the other (Giorgi,
Teoria de las Obligaciones, Spanish Ed., Vol. 5, Arts. 5, 7, 9). The validity
of the criticism is, we think, self-evident and it is of interest to note that
the common law makes no distinction between the two sources of liability.
The obligations which in the Code are indicated as quasi-contracts, as well
as those arising ex lege, are in the common law system merged into the
(a) Pure when the obligation is not subject to any condition

or term and is immediately demandable.
(b) Conditional when the obligation is subject to a condition
which may be suspensive, in which case the happening or
fulfillment of the condition results in the birth of the
obligation, or resolutory, in which case the happening or
fulfillment of the condition results in the extinguishment of
the obligation.
(c) With the term or period (a plazo) when the obligation is

subject to a term or period which may be suspensive or
from a day certain, in which case the obligation is
(Art. 1156-1157)
26
Art. 1089, Spanish Civil Code, in amended form.

8 Manresa, 5th Ed., Bk. 1, p. 35.
28
27
(Art. 1157-1158)
OBLIGATIONS
category of the obligations imposed by law, and all are denominated

implied contracts.29
Art 1158. 30
Obligations Arising from Law. Unlike other obligations,
those derived from law can never be presumed. Consequently, only
those expressly determined in the Civil Code or in special law are
demandable. These obligations shall be regulated by the precepts of the
law which establishes them, and as to what has not been foreseen, by the
provisions of Book IV of the Civil Code. 31
How can we determine whether an obligation arises from law or
from some other source, such as contract, quasi-contract, criminal
offense or quasi-delict? It must be noted that in the birth or generation of
an obligation, there is always a concurrence between the law which
establishes or recognizes it and the act or condition upon which the
obligation is based or predicted. According to Manresa, when the law
establishes the obligation and the act or condition upon which it is based
is nothing more than a factor for determining the moment when it
becomes demandable, then the law itself is the source of the obligation;
however, when the law merely recognizes or acknowledges the
existence of an obligation generated by an act which may constitute a
contract, quasi-contract, criminal offense or quasi-delict and its only
purpose is to regulate such obligation, then the act itself is the source of
the obligation and not the law. 32 Thus, if A loses a certain amount to B
in a game of chance, according to Art. 2014 of the Civil Code, the
former may recover his loss from the latter, with legal interest from the
time he paid the amount lost. It is evident that in this particular case the
source of obligation of B to refund to A the amount which he had won
from the latter is not a contract, quasi-contract, criminal offense of quasi
delict, but the law itself. 33 The same can also be said with regard to the
obligation of the spouses to support each other, 34 the obligations of
GENERAL PROVISIONS
employers under the Labor Code, 35 the obligations of the owners of the
dominant and servient estates in legal easements, 36 and others scattered
in the Civil Code and in special laws.
Art. 1159. 37
Obligations Arising from Contracts. A contract is a meeting
of minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect
to the other, to give something or to render some service. 38 As a rule,
contracts are perfected by mere consent, and from that moment the
parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly
stipulated but also to all of the consequences which according to their
nature may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law. 39 These
contracts are commonly called consensual contracts. There are certain
contracts, however, called real contracts, such as deposit, pledge and
commondatum, which are not perfected until the delivery of the object
of the obligation.40 Whether the contract is consensual or real, the rule is
that from the moment it is perfected, obligations which may be either
reciprocal or unilateral arise. Reciprocal obligations are those where the
parties are mutually of reciprocally obliged to do or to give something;
unilateral obligations, on the other hand, are those where only one of the
parties, the obligor, is obliged to do or to give something.
Unlike other kinds of obligations, those arising from contracts
are governed primarily by the agreement of the contracting parties. This
is clearly deducible not only from the nature of contracts, but also from
Art. 1159 of the Civil Code which declares that such obligation have the
force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied
with in good faith. Consequently, the Code recognizes the right of such
29
35
30
36
Leung Ben vs. OBrien, 38 Phil. 182.

Art. 1090, Spanish Civil Code.
31
32
8 Manresa, 5th Ed., Bk. 1, p. 48.
33
Leung Ben vs. OBrien, 38 Phil. 182.
34
Art. 291, Civil Code; Pelayo vs Lauron, 12 Phil. 453.
(Art. 1158-1159)
Bautista vs. Borromeo, 35 SCRA 119.

37
Art. 1091, Spanish Civil Code, in modified form.
38
39
40
(Art. 1159-1160)
OBLIGATIONS
contracting parties to establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and

conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.41 However,
in default of an agreement, the rules found in the Civil Code regulating
such obligations are applicable.42
Art. 1160. 43
Obligations Arising from Quasi-Contracts. Quasi-contracts
are those juridical relations arising from lawful, voluntary and unilateral
acts, based on the principle that no one shall be unjustly enriched of
benefited at the expense of another.44 The most important of these
juridical relations which are recognized and regulated by the Civil Code
are negotiorum gestio45 and solution indebiti.46 Negotiorum gestio is the
juridical relation which arises whenever a person voluntarily takes
charge of the agency or management of the business or property of
another without any power or authority from the latter.47 In this type of
quasi-contract, once the gestor or officious manager has assumed the
agency or management of the business or property, he shall be obliged
to continue such agency or management until the termination of the
affair and its incidents,48 exercising such rights and complying with such
obligations as provided for in the Code. 49 Solution indebiti, on the other
hand, is the juridical relation which arises whenever a person unduly
delivers a thing through mistake to another who has no right to demand
it.50 In this type of quasi-contract, once the delivery has been made, the
person to whom the delivery is unduly made shall have the obligation to
return the property demivered or the money paid.51
41

Arts. 1305, et seq., Civil Code.
43
New provision.
44
45
46
47
48
Ibid.
49
50
Arts. 2154, Civil Code.
51
Ibid.
42
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Art. 1161. 52
Obligations Arising from Criminal Offenses. As a rule,
every person liable for a felony is also civilly liable. 53 This principle is
based on the fact that, generally, a crime has a dual aspect the criminal
aspect and the civil aspect. Although these two aspects are aeparate and
distinct from each other in the sense that one affects the social order and
the other, private rights, so that the purpose of the first is to punish or
correct the offender, while the purpose of the second is to repair the
damages suffered by the aggrieved party, it is evident that the basis of
the civil liability is the criminal liability itself.
Idem; Enforcement of civil liability. In general, the
following rules shall be observed in the enforcement or prosecution of
civil liability arising from criminal offenses:
(1) Institution of criminal and civil actons. When a criminal
action is nstituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal
action, unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or
reserves his right to institute it separately.
(2) Independent civil action. In the cases provided in Articles
31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an
independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the
criminal case, provided the right is reserved ae required in the
preceeding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.
(3) Other civil actions arising from offenses. In all cases not
included in the preceeding section, the following rules shall be
observed:
52
53
10
(Art. 1161)

Art. 100, Revised Penal Code. This rule, however, is subject to the rules
stated in Arts. 101, 102 and 103, Revised Penal Code.
11
(Art. 1161)
OBLIGATIONS
(a) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense
may be instituted separately, but after the criminal action
has been commenced the civil action can not be instituted
until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal
action;
(b) After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil
action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted, and
the same shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be
found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has
been rendered;
(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the
civil might arise did not exist. In other cases, the person
entitled to the civil action may institute it in the jurisdiction
and in the manner provided by law against the person who
may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or
indemnity for the damaged suffered.
(4) Judgment in civil action not a bar. A final judgment
rendered in a civil action absolving the defendant from civil liability is
no bar to a criminal action.
(5) Suspension by reason of pre-judicial question. A petition
for the suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of the
pre-judicial question in a civil case, may only be presented by any party
before of during the trial of the criminal action.54
Idem; Id. Effect of acquittal. If the accused in a criminal
action is acquitted of the offense charged, can a civil action for damages
based on the same act or omission still be instituted? This question
requires a qualified answer. If the acquittal of the accused is based on
the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a
civil action to recover damages based on the same act or omission may
54
Secs. 2, 3, 4, and 5, Rule 111, New Rules of Court.
12
GENERAL PROVISIONS
(Art. 1161)
still be instituted.55 In such case, mere preponderance of evidence shall

be sufficient in order that the plaintiff will be able to recover from the
defendant.56 On the other hand, if the acquittal is based on the ground
that he did not commit the offense charged, or what amounts to the same
thing, if the acquittal proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment
that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did nit exist, the
subsequent institution of a civil action to recover damages is, as a
general rule, no longer possible.57
Idem; id. Effect of independent civil actions. As a rule,
the civil action to recover damages from the person criminally liable is
not independent from the criminal action. This is true even where it has,
to a certain extent, been separated by the injured party from the criminal
proceedings either by reserving his right to file a separate civil action or
by commencing the action to recover damages ahead of the criminal
action. In the first, the right to file a civil action shall depend upon the
result of the criminal action, while in the second, once the criminal
action is instituted, the action to recover damages shall be suspended. 58
There are, however, certain exceptional cases or instances under the
Civil Code where the civil action to recover damages is entirely separate
and independent from the criminal action, although the act or omission
which is the basis thereof may be a criminal offense. They are: first,
where the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act
or omission complained of as a criminal offense or felony; 59 and second,
where the law grants to the injured party the right to institute a civil
action which is entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. 60
As a matter of fact, we can even go to the extent of saying that these
cases or instances also constitute the exceptions to the rule that if the
accused in the criminal action is acquitted on the ground that he did not
commit the offense charged, the subsequent institution of a civil action
is no longer possible.
55

Ibid.
57
Sec. 3(c), Rule 111, New Rules of Court.
58
Sec. 3(b), Rule 111, New Rules of Court.
59
60
Arts. 32, 33, 34, Civil Code.
56
13
(Art. 1161)
OBLIGATIONS
With regard to the first, it must be noted that where the civil
obligation is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a criminal offense or felony, such action may proceed
independently of the criminal action and regardless of the result of the
latter.61 It is evident that in such case the basis of the civil action may be
an obligation arising from the law, contract, quasi-contract, or quasidelict. Thus, a postmaster, who has been charged criminally for
malversation of government funds under his custody, may still be made
a defendant in a civil case for the recovery of the funds, not on the
ground of malversation, but on the ground that under Sec. 633 of the
Revised Administrative Code, he can be held accountable therefore. 62
The basis of the civil action in such case is not the obligation arising
from the criminal offense of malversation, but the obligation arising
from the law. Similarly, if a passenger in a certain bus institutes a civil
action to recover damages from the operator of the bus line for injuries
sustained in an accident, such action is separate and distinct from the
criminal prosecution of the driver for criminal negligence and may,
therefore, be continued regardless of the result of the latter.
Consequently, he can still recover damages even if the driver is
acquitted in the criminal action, because it is clear that the action in such
case is based on culpa contractual and not on the act or omission of the
driver complained of as felony.63 The same principle is also applicable if
the offense charged constitutes what is known as culpa aquiliana or
quasi-delict under the Civil Code.64 In such case, the injured party can
always institute a civil action to recover damages independently of the
criminal action and regardless of the result of the latter. This is so even
granting that the accused is acquitted in the criminal action either on the
ground of reasonable doubt or on the ground that he did not commit the
offense charged. The reason for this is that the basis of the civil action is
no longer the criminal liability of the defendant, but a quasi-delict or
tort.65
61

Tolentino vs. Carlos, 39 Off. Gaz., No. 6, p. 121.
63
San Pedro Bus Liner vs. Navarro, 94 Phil. 846; Bernaldes vs. Bohol
Land Trans. Co., 7 SCRA 276.
64
Arts. 2176, et seq., Civil Code.
65
Art. 2177, Civil Code; Barredo vs. Garcia and Almario, 73 Phil. 607;
Dyogi vs. Yatco, 100 Phil. 1095; Calo vs. Peggy, 103 Phil. 1112; Stanvac
62
14
GENERAL PROVISIONS
(Art. 1161)
With regard to the second, it must be observed that there are

five exceptional cases or instances, in addition to that which is stated in
Art. 31 of the New Civil Code, where the law itself expressly grants to
the injured party the right to institute a civil action which is entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action. They are: (1)
interferences by public officers or employees or by private individuals
with civil rights and liberties, 66 (2) defamation, 67 (3) fraud,68 (4)
physical injuries,69 and (5) refusal or neglect of a city or municipal
police officer to render aid or protection against danger to life or
property.70 In all of these cases or instances, although the act or omission
may constitute a criminal offense in accordance with out penal laws, the
injured party may institute a civil action to recover damages which is
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. Once the action is
instituted, then it may proceed independently of the criminal action, and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence.71
Idem; id. id. Effect or failure to make reservation.
Section 2 of the Rule 111 of the New Rules of Court states: In the cases
provided for in articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, and independent civil action entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action, may be brought by injured party during
pendency of the criminal case, provided that the right is reserved as
required in the preceding section. The insertion in the foregoing
provision of the phrase provided the right is reserved and required in
the preceding section resulted in a debate among academicians which
vs. Tan, 107.

67
68
Ibid.
69
Ibid.
70
71
Arts. 32, 33, 34, Civil Code.
66
15
(Art. 1161)
OBLIGATIONS
lasted for more than twenty years. Finally, interpreting the above
provision, the Supreme Court, in Garcia vs. Florido,72 declared:
As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing
damages may produce a civil liability arising from crime or create an
action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual. The former is a violation
of criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence,
having always had its own foundation and individuality. Some legal
writers are of the view that in accordance with Article 31, the civil action
based upon quasi-delict may proceed independently of the criminal
proceeding for criminal negligence and regardless of the result of the
latter. Hence, the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with reference to
Articles 31, 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is contrary to the letter and
spirit of the said articles, for these articles were drafted and are intended to
constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in what is now Section 1
of Rule 111. The proviso, which is procedural, may also be regarded as an
unauthorized amendment of substantive law. xxx
Again, in Abellana vs. Marabe,73 the Supreme Court declared:
The restrictive interpretation x x x does not only result in its
emasculation but also gives rise to a serious constitutional doubt. Article
33 is quite clear: In case of x x x physical injuries, a civil action for
damages entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be
brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently
of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only preponderance of
evidence. That is a substantive right not to be frittered away by a
construction that would render it nugatory, if though oversight, the
offended parties failed at the initial stage to seek recovery for damages in a
civil suit. x x x The grant of power to this Court both in the present
constitution and under the 1935 Character does not extend to any
diminution, increase or modification of substantive right. It is a well
settled doctrine that a court is to avoid construing a statute or legal norm in
such a manner as would giver rise to a constitutional doubt. x x x The
law as an instrument of social control will fail in its function if through an
ingenious construction sought to be fastened on a legal norm, particularly
a procedural rule, there is placed an impediment to a litigant being given
an opportunity of vindicating an alleged right.
72
52 SCRA 420. This case was also cited and quoted in Mendoza vs.
Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113.
73
57 SCRA 106.
16
GENERAL PROVISIONS
(Art. 1161-1162)
Thus, in Elcano and Elcano vs. Hill and Hill, 74 where the first
defendant had been previously charged with the criminal offense of
homicide and subsequently acquitted on the ground that is his act is not
criminal, because of lack of intent to kill, coupled with a mistake, the
Supreme Court held, despite the fact that plaintiffs (who are parents of
the alleged victim) failed to make a reservation of their right to institute
the civil action separately, that such acquittal of the defendant in the
criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict under
Art. 2176 of the Civil Code; hence, that acquittal is not a bar to the civil
action against him. The same ruling was applied in Mendoza vs.
Arrieta.75 In effect, we can now say that the procedural retirement
provided for in Section 2 of Rule 111 of the New Rules of Court is not
mandatory; as a matter of fact , it should be eliminated entirely.
Art. 1162. 76
Obligations Arising from Quasi-Delicts. As it is used in this
part of the Civil Code, the term quasi-delicts 77 refers to all of those
obligations which do not arise from law, contracts, quasi-contracts, or
criminal offenses.78 Thus, using Art. 2176 of the Civil Code and decided
cases as bases or anchors, it may be defined as the fault or negligence of
a person, who, by his act or omission, connected or unconnected with,
but independent from, any contractual relation, causes damage to another
person. It is, therefore, the equivalent of the term tort in AngloAmerican law.79
Idem; Persons liable. Obligations arising from quasi-delicts
are demandable not only from the person directly responsible for the
damage incurred,80 but also against the following:
74
77 SCRA 98.
91 SCRA 113.
76
77
In Spanish law, cuasi-delictos is sometimes known as culpa
aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual.
78
Report of the Code Commission, p. 161.
79
See Elcano and Elcano vs. Hill and Hill, 77 SCRA 98.
80
75
17
(Art. 1162)
OBLIGATIONS
GENERAL PROVISIONS
(1) The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother,
with respect to damages caused by the minor children who live in their
company;
(2) Guardians, with respect to damages caused by the minors or
incapacitated persons who are under their authority and who live in their
company;
(3) The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise,
with respect to damages by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their
functions;
(Art. 1162)
(1) The fault or negligence of the defendant;

(2) The damage suffered or incurred by the plaintiff; and
(3) The relation of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff. 83
Idem; Quasi-delicts and crimes. Quasi-delicts and criminal
offenses are sometimes difficult to distinguish from each other.
However, they may be distinguished from each other in the following
ways:
(1) Crimes affect the public interest, while quasi-delicts are only
of private concern;
(4) Employers with respect to damages caused by their

employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business
or industry;
(2) The Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while
the Civil Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the damages
incurred; and
(5) The State, when it acts through a special agent; but not when
the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done
properly pertains; and
(3) Crimes are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former

are punished only if there is a law clearly covering them, while the latter
include all acts in which any kind of fault, or negligence intervenes. 84
(6) Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades,

with respect to damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.81
Idem; Scope of quasi-delicts. - In Elcano and Elcano vs. Hill

and Hill (G.R. No. L-24303, May 26, 1977), the Supreme Court held
that quasi-delicts include acts which are criminal in character or in
violation of the prnal law, whether voluntary or negligent. Using the
exact language of the Court, It is more congruent with the spirit of law,
equity and justice, and more in harmony with modern progress, to hold,
as we do hold that Article 2176, where it refers to fault or negligence,
covers not only acts not punishable by law but also acts criminal in
character, whether intentional or voluntary or negligent.
It must be noted, however, that the responsibility of the above

persons or entities shall cease if they can prove that they have observed
all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.82
Idem; Requisites of liability. In actions based on quasidelicts, before the person injured can recover damages from the
defendant, it is necessary that he must be able to prove the following
facts:
81
82
83

Ibid.
84
18
Taylor vs. Manila Electric Co., 16 Phil. 8

Barredo vs. Garcia and Almario, 73 Phil. 607.
19
(Art. 1162)
OBLIGATIONS
The above pronouncement of the Supreme Court is startling. It

expands the coverage of quasi-delicts beyond what was originally
contemplated by the lawmaker.
Under the general plan of our law on obligations, the scope of
obligations arising from the law, contracts, quasi-contracts, and acts or
omissions punished by law is well defined. Their boundaries are clearly
delineated and drawn with precision. It is only with respect to obligations
arising from quasi-delicts that there is a problem and this is natural because
of the very nature of such obligations. Under our system of liabilities,
quasi-delicts must necessarily be a sort of dumping ground or garbage
can for all kinds of actionable wrongs not falling within the purview of
the other four sources of obligations. As we look at it, the original plan
envisaged by the lawmaker is a follows:
The coverage of quasi-delicts which do not overlap with crimes under
the Revised Penal Code and special laws (and which we can very well call
the general rule) are: first, negligent acts or omissions not punishable by
criminal offenses; second, intentional quasi-delicts or torts, such as those
regulated by Arts. 19, 21, 22, 26, 27, 28 and 1314 of the Civil Code and
third, the so-called strict liability torts where there is neither negligence
nor intent to cause damage or injury, such as in the case contemplated in
Art. 23 of the Civil Code or in the ease of actionable nuisances under Arts.
694 and 705 of the Civil Code.
The coverage of quasi-delicts which overlap with the acts or
omissions punishable under the Revised Penal Code (and which we can
very well call the exceptions) are: first, criminal negligence, and second,
acts or omissions punishable as crimes under the Revised Penal Code but
the Civil Code expressly declares that the civil action arising therefrom is
separate and independent from the criminal action (Arts. 31, 32, 33 and 34
of the Civil Code).
We believe that the arrangement was deliberately planned. Thus,
according to the Code Commission in its Report: The Commission also
thought of the possibility of adopting the word tort from Anglo-American
law. But tort under that system is much broader that the SpanishPhilippine concept of obligations arising from non-contractual negligence.
Tort in Anglo-American jurisprudence includes not only negligence, but
also intentional criminal acts, such as assault and battery, false
imprisonment and deceit. In the general plan of the Philippine legal
system, intentional and malicious acts are governed by the Penal Code,
although certain exceptions are made in the project. (Report, pp. 161-162)
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Idem; Character of Remedy. In Padua vs. Robles,85 in his

concurring opinion, Justice Barredo declared: It is by now beyond all
cavil, as to dispense with the citation of jurisprudence, that a negligent
act such as that committed in this case, gives rise to at least two separate
and independent liabilities, namely (1) the civil liability arising from
crime or culpa criminal and (2) the liability arising from civil
negligence or the so called culpa aquiliana. These two concepts of faults
are so distinct from each other that exoneration from one does not result
in exoneration from the other. Adjectively and substantively, they can be
prosecuted separately and independently of each other, Although Article
2177 of the Civil Code precludes recovery of damages twice for the
same negligent act or omission, which means that should there be
varying amounts awarded in two separate cases, the plaintiff may
recover, in effect, only the bigger amount. That is to say, if the plaintiff
had already been ordered paid an amount in one case and in the other
case the amount adjudged is bigger, he shall be entitled in the second
case only to the excess over the one fixed at the first case, but if he had
already been paid a bigger amount in the first case, he may not recover
anymore in the second case.
The above opinion was confirmed in Elcano and Elcano vs.
Hill and Hill.86 Thus, according to the Supreme Court: Consequently, a
separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether
or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,
provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged
criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in
such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two assuming that the
awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of the
civil liability referred to in par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasidelict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration
in the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed
by the accused.
85
86
20
(Art. 1162)
66 SCRA 485.
77 SCRA 98.
21
(Art. 1162)
OBLIGATIONS
GENERAL PROVISIONS
(Art. 1162)
However, in Menzoza vs. Arrieta,87 a more recent case, there

was a return to the old doctrine of selection of remedies. In this case, the
Supreme Court categorically held that since the offended or injured
party had chosen the remedy of proceeding under the Revised Penal
Code by allowing the civil action to be impliedly instituted in the
criminal action and since the court had expressly declared the fact from
which the civil liability did not exist, therefore, the civil action for
damages subsequently commenced by said injured party against that
defendant has already been extinguished in consonance with Sec. 3 (c),
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. And even if plaintiffs cause of action
against defendant is not ex-delicto, the end result would be the same, it
being clear from the judgement in the criminal case that defendants
acquittal was not based upon reasonable doubt.
plaintiffs for P2, 000 plus legal interest from the date of the complaint.
This decision was modified by the Court of Appeals by reducing the
damages in to P1, 000 with the legal interest from the time the action was
instituted. It is undisputed that the Fontanillass negligence was the cause
of mishap, as he was driving on the wrong side of the road, and at high
speed. As to Barredos responsibility, the court of appeals found:
Thus the problem is still very much with us. The debate rages
The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto Barredo
is governed by the Revised Penal Code; hence the liability is only
subsidiary, and as there has been no civil action against Pedro Fontanilla,
the person criminally liable, Barredo cannot be held responsible in this
case. The petitioners brief states on page 10:
on.
Barredo vs. Garcia and Almario

73 Phil.607
This case come up from the Court of Appeals which held the
petitioner herein, Fausto Barredo, liable in damages for the death of
Faustino Garcia caused by the negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi
driver employed by said Fausto Barredo.
At about half past one in the morning of May 3,1936, on the road
between Malabon and Navotas, Province of Rizal, there was a head on
collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla
and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapilis. The carretela was overturned
and one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia, suffered
injuries from which he died two days later. A criminal action was filed
against Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he was
convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and one
day to two years of prision correccional. The court in the criminal case
granted the petition that the right to bring a separate civil action be
reserved. The court of appeals affirmed the sentence of the lower court of
the first instance of manila against Faustino Barredo as the sole proprietor
of the Malate taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8, 1939,
the court of the first instance of manila awarded damages on favor of the
87
* * * It is admitted that defendant is Fontanillas employer. There is no

proof that he exercised the diligence of a good father of family to prevent
damage. (See p. 22, appellants brief.) In fact it is shown he was careless
in employing Fontanilla who had been caught several times for violation
of the Automobile Law and spending (Exhibit A) violations which
appeared in the records of the Bureau of Public Works available to the
public and to himself. Therefore, he must indemnify plaintiffs under the
provisions of Article 1903 of the Civil Code.
* * * The Court of Appeals holds that the petitioner is being sued for his
failure to exercise all the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of Pedro Fontanilla to prevent damages suffered
by the respondents. In other words, the Court of Appeals insists of
applying in this case Article 1903 of the Civil Code is found in Chapter II,
Title 16, Book IV of the Civil Code. This fact makes said article
inapplicable to a civil liability arising from a crime as in the case at bar
simply because Chapter II of Civil Code itself, is applicable only to those
(obligations) arising from wrongful of negligent acts or omissions not
punishable by law.
The gist of the decision of Court of Appeals is expressed thus:
* * * We cannot agree to the defendants contention. The liability
sought to be imposed upon him in this action is not a civil obligation
arising from a felony or a misdemeanour (the crime of Pedro Fontanilla),
but an obligation imposed in article 1903 of the Civil Code by reason of
his negligence in the selection of the supervision of his servant of
employee.
Speaking through Justice Bacobo, the Supreme Court held:
91 SCRA 113.
22
23
(Art. 1162)
OBLIGATIONS
The pivotal question in this case is whether the plaintiffs may bring
this separate civil action against Fausto Barredo, thus making him
priomarily and directly responsible under Article 1903 (now Art. 2180,
New Civil Code) of the Civil Code as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla.
The defendant maintains that Fontanillas negligence being punishable by
the Penal Code, his (defendants) liability as an employer is only
subsidiary, according to said Penal Code, but Fontanilla has not been sued
in a civil action and his property has not been exhausted. To decide the
main issue, we must cut through the tangle that has, in the minds of many,
confused and jumbled together delitos and cuasi-delitos, or crimes under
the Penal Code and fault or negligence under Articles 1902-1910 (now
Arts. 2176 to 2194, New Civil Code) of the Civil Code. This should be
done, because justice may be lost in labyrinth, unless principles and
remedies are distinctly envisaged. Fortunately, we are aided in our inquiry
by the luminous presentation of this perplexing subject by renown jurists
and we are likewise guided by the decisions of this court in previous cases
as well as by the solemn clarity of the considerations in several sentences
of the Tupreme Tribunal of Spain. Authorities support the proposition
that a quasi-delict or cuplpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution
under the Civil Code, with a substantivity all its own, and individually that
is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime. Upon this
principle, and on the wording and spirit of Article 1903 of the Civil Code,
the primary and direct responsibility of employers may be safely
anchored.
x
It will thus be seen that while the terms of Article 1902 of the Civil
Code seem to be broad enough to cover the drivers negligence in the
instant case, nevertheless Article1093 limits cuasi-delicts to acts or
omissions not punishable by law. But in as much as Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code punishes not only reckless but even simple
imprudence or negligence, the faulr or negligence unger Article 1902 of
the Civil Code had apparently been crowded out this overlapping that
makes the confusion worse confounded However, a closer sudy does not
destroy the distinction between the civil liability arising from a crime and
the responsibility for cuasi-delitos or culpa extracontractual. The same
negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from a
crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action for
cuasi-delito or culpa extracontractual under Articles 1902-1910 of the
Civil Code.
The individuality of cuasi-delito or culpa extracontractual looms
clear and unmistakeable. This legal institution is of an ancient lineage, one
of its early ancestors being the Lex Aquila in the Roman Law. In fact, in
24
GENERAL PROVISIONS
(Art. 1162)
Spanish legal terminology, this responsibility is often referred to as culpa

aquiliana. The partidas also contributed to the genealogy of the present
fault or negligence under the Civil Code; for instance, Law 6, Title 15, of
Partida 7, says: Tenudo es de fazer emienda, porque, como quier que el
dano al otro, pero acaesio por su culpa.
The distinctive nature of cuasi-delitos survives in the Civil Code.
According to Article 1089, one of the five sources of obligations is this
legal institution of cuasi-delito or culpa extracontractual: los actos * *
* en que intervenga cualquier genero de culpa o negligencia. Then Article
1093 provides that this kind of obligation shall be governed by Chapter II
of Title XVI of Book IV, meaning Articles 1902-1910. This portion of the
Civil Code is exclusively devoted to the legal institution of culpa
aquiliana.
Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and
the culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are:
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while quasi-delitos are only
of private concern.
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the
criminal act, while the Civil Code, by means of indemnification, merely
repairs of damage.
3 That delicts are not as broad as quasi delicts, because the former are
punished only if there is penal law clearly covering them, while the latter,
cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which any kind of fault or negligence
intervenes. However, it should be noted that not all violations of the
penal law produce civil responsibility, such as begging in contravention of
ordinances, violation of game laws, infraction of the rules of traffic when
nobody is hurt. (See Colin and Capitant, Curso Elemental de Derecho
Civil, Vol. 3, p. 728.)
x
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate

individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code.
Specifically they show that there is a distinction between civil liability
arising from criminal negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and
responsibility for fault or negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Civil Code, and that the same negligent act may produce either a civil
liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or a separate
responsibility for fault of negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Civil Code. Still more conclude that the employer in this case the
25
(Art. 1162)
OBLIGATIONS
defendant petitioner is primarily and directly liable under Article 1903 of

the Civil Code.
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should
ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are
announcing doctrines that have been little understood in the past, it might
not be inappropriate to indicate their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in Article 365 punishes not
only reckless but also simple negligence. If we were to hold that Articles
1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not
punished by law according to the literal import of Article 1093 of the Civil
Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little
scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage
to property through any degree of negligence even the slightest would
have to be indemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising
from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for
cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? we are loath to impute to the law maker
any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are
we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that
killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal
meaning of the law to smoother and render almost lifeless a principle of
such ancient origin and such full grown development as culpa aquiliana
or cuasi-delitos, which is conserved and made enduring in Articles 1902
to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in the civil case,
preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in
damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not
be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance
of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should be made
responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code.
Otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrong.
Ubi jun ibi remedium.
Thirdly, to hold thet there is only one way to make defendants
liability effective, and that is, to sue the driver and exhaust his ( the latters
) property first, would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow
a devious and cumbersome method of obtaining relief. True, there is such
a remedy under our laws, but there is also a more expeditious way, which
is based on the primary and direct responsibility of the defendant under
article 1903 of the Civil Code. Our view of the law is more likely to
facilitate remedy for civil wrongs, because the procedure indicated by the
defendant is wasteful and productive of delay, it being a matter of
26
GENERAL PROVISIONS
(Art. 1162)
common knowledge that professional drivers of taxis and similar public

conveyances usually do not have sufficient means with which to pay
damages. Why, then should the plaintiff be required in all cases to go
through this roundabout, unnecessary, and probably useless procedure? In
construing the laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and facilitate the
pathways of right and justice.
At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct
responsibility of employers and their presumed negligence and principles
calculated to protect society. Workmen and employees should be carefully
chosen and supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It is the
masters or employers who principally reap the profits resulting from the
services of these servants and employees. It is but right that they should
guarantee the latters careful conduct for the personal and patrimonial
safety of others. As Theilhard has said, they should reproach themselves,
at least, some for their weakness, others for their poor selection and all for
their negligence. And according to Manresa, It is much more equitable
and just that such responsibility should fall upon the principal or director
who could have chosen a careful and prudent employee, and not upon the
injured person who could not exercise such selection and who used such
employee because of his confidence in the principal or director. (Vol. 12,
p.622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also base this primary responsibility of the
employer on the principle of representation of the principal by the agent.
Thus, Oyuelos says in the work already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747) that before
third persons the employer and employee vienen a ser como una sola
personalidad, por refundicion de la del dependiente en la de quien le
emplea y utiliza (become as one personality by the merging of the
person of the employee in that of him who employs and utilizes him.)
All these observations acquire a peculiar force and significance when it
comes to motor accidents, and there is need of stressing and accentuating
the responsibility of owners of motor vehicles.
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both
the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to
the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack
if understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa
aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only by
virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there
is another remedy, which is by invoking Articles 1902-1910 of the Civil
Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by our laws, it has
nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more
expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or extracontractual. In the present case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual
course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the harm done by
such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility of fault for
27
(Art. 1162)
OBLIGATIONS
negligence under Article 1902 et.seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It
is high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to
flow on its own natural channel. so that its waters may no longer be
diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed,
make for the better safeguarding of private rights because it re-establishes
an ancient and additional remedy, depending on the issues, limitations, and
results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party
wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious
redress.
In view of the foregoing, the judgement of the Court of Appeals
should be and is hereby affirmed, with costs against the defendantpetitioner.
Elcano and Elcano vs. Hill and Hill

77 SCRA 98
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City dismissing the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of
damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of
occurrence, and his father, Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and
getting subsisitence, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs,
of which when criminally prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on
the ground that his act was not criminal, because of lack of intent, to kill,
coupled with a mistake. According to the Supreme Court, speaking
through Justice Barredo:
As We view the forgoing background of this case, the two decisive
issues presented for Our resolution are:
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of
Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability was not
reserved?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code be
applied against Atty. Hill, not withstanding the undisputed fact that at the
time of the occurrence complained of, Reginald, though a minor, living
with and getting subsistence from his father, was already legally married?
The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration
and further clarification of the dual character, criminal and civil, or fault or
negligence as a source of obligation which was firmly established in this
jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that case, this Court
postulated, on the basis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice Bacobo on
the nature of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa criminal or delito and
28
GENERAL PROVISIONS
(Art. 1162)
mere culpa or fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme

Court of Spain, the works of recognized civilians, and earlier
jurisprudence of our own, that the same given act can result in civil
liability not only under the Penal Code but also under the Civil Code.
Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading
of x x x Garcia that the concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil
Code therein referred to contemplate only acts of negligence and not
intentional voluntary acts deeper reflection would reveal that the thrust
of the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that in fact it actually
extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in the reference made therein to
the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919, supra,
which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a negligent act. Indeed,
Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force here at time of Garcia,
provided textually that obligations which are derived from acts or
omissions, in which fault or negligence, not punishable by law, intervene
shall be the subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this book (which refers to
quasi-delict.) And it is precisely the underlined qualification, not
punishable by law, that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an
undesirable construction or interpretation of the letter of the law that
killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth life hence, the ruling that We
will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost
lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development
as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring
in Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code. And so, because
Justice Bocobo was Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the
original text of the new Civil Code, it is to be noted that the said Code,
which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term, not
punishable by law, thereby making it clear that the concept o culpa
aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation of
the penal law, whether voluntary or negligent. Thus, the corresponding
provision to said Article 1093 in the new code, which is Article 1162,
simply says, Obligations derived from quasi-delicts shall be governed by
the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this book (on quasi-delicts),
and by special laws. More precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 of the
new code provides:
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the
preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability
arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
According to the Code Commission: The foregoing provision
(Article 2177) though at first sight startling, is not so novel or
extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil
29
(Art. 1162)
OBLIGATIONS
negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is
a culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its
own foundation and individually separate from criminal negligence. Such
distinction between criminal negligence and culpa aquiliana or cuasidelito has been sustained by the decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain
and outstanding Spanish jurists. Therefore, under the proposed Article
2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on
reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not
for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to
a quais-delict or culpa aquiliana. But said article forestalls a double
recovery. (Report of the Code Commission, p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally
refer to only acts of negligence, the same argument of Justice Bocobo
about construction that upholds the spirit that giveth life rather than that
which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be observed
in applying the same. And considering that the preliminary chapter on
human relation of the new Civil Code definitely establishes the
separability and independence of liability in a civil action for acts in
criminal character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil responsibility
arising from crime fixed by Article 100of the Revised Penal Code, and, in
sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), rule III, contemplate
also the same separability, it is congruent with the spirit of law, equity
and justice, and more in harmony with modern progress, to borrow the
felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co., 7
Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to
fault or negligence, covers not only acts not punishable by law but
also acts criminal in character, whether intentional or voluntary or
negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in
a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty
or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is
actually charged also criminally, to recover damage or both scores, and
would be entitled in such eventually only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in two cases vary. In other words, the
extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule III,
refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a
quasi-delict only and not as crime is not extinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not
happened or has not been committed, by the accused. Briefly stated, We
were hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes
voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.
30
GENERAL PROVISIONS
(Art. 1162)
`
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginald Hill in
the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence
that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of
Reginalds emancipation by marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty.
Hill, his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the conclusion of
appellees that Atty. Hill already free from responsibility cannot be upheld.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon
emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397,
emancipation takes place by the marriage of the minor (child), it is,
however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage
of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus, Emancipation by
marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority
over the childs person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property
as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or
encumber real property without consent of his father or mother, or
guardian. He can sure and be sued in court only with the assistance of his
father, mother or guardian.
Now, under Article 2180, The obligation imposed by
Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but
also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and in
case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages
caused by the minor children who live in their company. In the instant
case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living
with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the
occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient
to and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.
It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the
reason behind the joint solidary liability of parents with their offending
child under Article 2180 is that it is the obligation of the parent to
supervise their minor children in order to prevent them from causing
damage to third persons. On the other hand, the clear implication of
Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not
nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that
such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transaction
or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, id., Vol.
II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else invites judicial
action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the
parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not
give cause to any litigation, in the same manner that the parents
31
(Art. 1162)
OBLIGATIONS
are answerable for the borrowing of money and alienation or encumbering

of real property which cannot be done by their minor married child
without their consent. (Ar.t 399; Manresa, supra.)
Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies
Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald.
However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a
matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become merely subsidiary to
that of his son.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and
the trial court is ordered to proceed in accordance with the foregoing
opinion. Costs against appellees.
Mendoza vs. Arrieta
91 SCRA 113
The records show that a three-way vehicular accident occurred
involving a Mercedes Benz owned and driven by Edgardo Mendoza, a
private jeep owned and driven by Rodolfo Salazar and a sand-and-gravel
truck owned by Felipino Timbol and driven by Freddie Montoya. As a
consequence of the mishap, two separate criminal actions for damage to
property through reckless imprudence were instituted. The first was
instituted by Mendoza against Salazar, while the second was instituted by
Salazar against Montoya. There was no reservation made by both
complainants of their right to institute a civil action separately. After
hearing the two cases jointly, the court rendered judgment acquitting
Salazar on the ground that his jeep was bumped from behind by the truck
causing it to collide with the Mercedes Benz. Montoya, on the other hand,
was convicted on the ground that his guilt was established beyond
reasonable doubt. He was ordered to pay to Salazar the amount of Php
972.50 for actual damages to the latters jeep. After the termination of the
criminal cases, Mendoza filed a civil case, against both Salazar and
Timbol, either in alternative or in solidum, for indemnification for
damages. Upon motions of both defendants, the respondent court
dismissed the case. The plaintiff, as a consequence, went up to the
Supreme Court by means of a petition for certiorari seeking a review of
the orders of the dismissal. Speaking through Justice Herrera, the Supreme
Court held:
We shall first discuss the validity of the Order, dated September 12,
1970, dismissing petitioners Complaint against truck-owner Timbol.
GENERAL PROVISIONS
prior joint judgement in Criminal Cases Nos. SM-227 and SM-228,

wherein no reservation to file separate civil case was made by petitioner
and where the latter actively participated in the trial and tried to prove
damages against jeep-driver Salazar only; and that the Complaint does not
state a cause of action against truck-owner Timbol inasmuch as petitioner
prosecuted jeep-owner-driver Salazar as the one solely responsible for the
damages suffered by his car.
Well-settled is the rule that for a prior judgment to constitute a bar to
a subsequent case, the following requisites must concur: (1) it must be a
final judgment; (2) it must have been rendered by a Court having a
jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties; (3) it must be a
judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the first and
second actions, identify of parties, identify of subject matter and identify
of cause of action.
It is conceded that the first three requisites of res judicata are
present. However, we agree with petitioner that there is no identity of
cause of action between Criminal Case No. SM-227 and Civil Case No.
80803. Obvious is the fat that in said criminal case truck-drier Montoya
was not prosecuted for damage to petitioners car but for damage to jeep.
Neither was truck-owner Timbol a party in said case. In fact as the trial
Court had put it the owner of the Mercedes Benz cannot recover any
damages from the accused Freddie Montoya, he (Mendoza) being a
complaint only against Rodolfo Salazar in Criminal Case No. SM-228.
And more importantly, in the criminal cases, the cause of action was the
enforcement of the civil liability arising from criminal negligence under
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas Civil Case No. 80803 is
based on quasi-delict under Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176 of the
Civil Code. As held in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al.
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate
individually of cuasi-delitos or culpa-aquiliana under the Civil Code.
Specifically they show that there is a distinction between civil liability
arising from criminal negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and
responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Civil Code, and that the same negligence act may produce either a civil
liability arising from crime under a Penal Code, or a separate
responsibility for fault or negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Civil Code. Still more concretely, the authorities above cited render it
inescapable to conclude that the employer, in this case the defendantpetitioner, is primarily and directly liable under Article 1903 of the Civil
Code.
In dismissing the complaint against the truck-owner, respondent

Judge sustained Timbols allegations that the civil suit is barred by the
32
(Art. 1162)
33
(Art. 1162)
OBLIGATIONS
The petitioners cause of action against Timbol in the Civil cases is

based on quasi-delict is evident from the recitals in he complaint, to wit:
that while petitioner was driving his car along MacArthur Highway at
Marilao, Bulacan, a jeep owned and driven by Salazar suddenly swerved
to his (petitioners) lane and collided with his car; that the sudden
swerving of Salazars jeep was caused either by the negligence and lack of
skill of Freddie Montoya, Timbols employee, who has then driving a
gravel-and-sand truck in the same direction as Salazars jeep; and that as a
consequence of the collision, petitioners car suffered extensive damage
amounting to Php 12,248.20 and that he likewise incurred actual and
moral damages, litigation expenses and attorneys fee. Clearly, therefore,
the two factors that a cause of action must consist of, namely,: (1)
plaintiffs primary right, i.e., that he is the owner of he Mercedes Benz;
and (2) defendants delict or wrongful act or omission which violate
plaintiffs primary right, i.e., the negligence of lack of skill either of jeepowner Salazar or of Timbols employee, Montoya, in driving the truck,
causing Salazars jeep to swerve and collide with petitioners car, were
alleged n the Complaint.
Consequently, petitioners cause of action being based upon quasidelict, respondent Judge committed reversible error when he dismissed the
civil suit against the truck-owner, as said case may proceed independently
of the criminal proceeding and regardless of the result of the latter.
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not
arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil
action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter.
But it is truck-owe Timbols submission (as well as that of jeepowner-driver Salazar) that petitioners failure to make a reservation in the
criminal action of his right to file an independent civil action bars the
institution of such separate civil action, invoking Section 2, Rule 111,
Rules of Court, which says:
Section 2. Independent civil action. In the cases provided
for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action may be brought by the injured party during the independency of the
criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding
section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Interpreting the above provision, this Court, in Garcia vs. Florido,
said:
34
GENERAL PROVISIONS
(Art. 1162)
As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing

damages may produce a civil liability arising from crime or create an
action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual. The former is a
violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent
negligence, having always had its own foundation and individuality. Some
legal writers are of the view that in accordance with Article 31, the civil
action based upon quasi-delict may proceed independently of the criminal
proceeding from criminal negligence and regardless of the result of the
latter. Hence, the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with reference to x x x
Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the civil code is contrary to the letter and spirit of
the said articles, for these articles were drafted x x x and are intended to
constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in what is now Section 1
of Rule 111. The proviso, which is procedural, may also be regarded as an
unauthorized amendment of substantive law, Article 32, 33 and 34 of the
Civil Cod, which do not provide for he reservation required in the proviso
x x x x.
In his concurring opinion in the above case, Mr. Justice Antonio
Barredo further observed that inasmuch as Articles 2176 and 2177 of the
Civil Code create the liability distinct and different from the civil action
arising from the offense of negligence under the Revised Penal Code, no
reservation, therefore, need be made n the criminal case; that Section 2 of
Rule 111 is inoperative, it being substantive in character is not within the
power of the Supreme Court to promulgate; and even if were not
substantive but adjective, it cannot stand because of its inconsistency with
Article 2177, an enactment of the legislative superseding the Rules of
1940.
We declare, therefore, that in so far as truck-owner Timbol is
concerned, Civil Case No. 80803 is not barred by the fact that petitioner
failed to reserve, in the criminal action, his right to file an independent
civil action based on quasi-delict.
The case as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar, who was acquitted in
Criminal Case No. SM-228, presents a different picture altogether.
At the outset it should be clarified that inasmuch as civil liability
coexists with criminal responsibility in negligence cases, the offended
party has the option between an action for enforcement of civil liability
based on culpa criminal under Article 100 of the Revise Penal Code, and
an action for recovery if damages based on culpa aquiliana under Article
2177 of the Civil Code. The action for enforcement of civil liability based
on culpa criminal under Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court is
deemed simultaneously instituted with the criminal action, unless
35
(Art. 1162)
OBLIGATIONS
expressly waived or reserved for separate application by the offended

party.
The circumstances attendant to the criminal case yields the
conclusion that petitioner had opted to base his cause of action against
jeep-owner-driver Salazar on culpa criminal and not on culpa aquiliana,
as evidence by his active participation and intervention I the prosecution
of the criminal suit against said Salazar. The latters civil liability
continued to be involved in the criminal action until its termination. Such
being the case, there was no need for petitioner to have reserved his right
to file a separate civil action as his action for civil liability was deemed
impliedly instituted in Criminal Case No. SM-228.
Neither would an independent civil action lie. Noteworthy is the
basis of the acquittal of jeep-owner-driver Salazar in the criminal case,
expounded by the trial Court in this wise:
In view of hat has been proven and established during the trial,
accused Freddie Montoya would be held liable for having bumped and hit
the rear portion of the jeep driven by the accused Rodolfo Salazar.
Considering that the collision between the jeep driven by
Rodolfo Salazar and the car owned and driven by Edgardo Mendoza was
the result of the hitting on the rear of the jeep by the truck driven by
Freddie Montoya, this Court believes that accused Rodolfo Salazar cannot
be held liable for the damages sustained by Edgardo Mendozas car.
Crystal clear is the trial Courts pronouncement under the facts of
the case, jeep-owner-driver Salazar cannot be held liable for the damages
sustained by petitioners car. In other words, the fact from which the civil
might arise did not exist. Accordingly, inasmuch as petitioners cause of
action as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is ex-delictu, founded on
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, the civil action must be held to
have been extinguished in consonance with Section 3 (c), rule 111 of the
Rules of Court which provides:
GENERAL PROVISIONS
And even if petitioners cause of action as against jeep-owner-drier

Salazar were not ex-delictu, the end result would be the same, it being
clear from the judgment in the criminal case that Salazars acquittal was
not based upon reasonable doubt, consequently, a civil action for damages
can no longer be instituted. This is explicitly provided for in Article 29 of
the Civil Code quoted hereunder:
Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is
acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission
may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence.
x x x.
If in criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon
reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any
declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision
whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
In so far as the suit against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is concerned,
therefore, we sustain respondent Judges Order dated January 30, 1971
dismissing the complaint, albeit on different grounds.
WHEREFORE, 1) the Order dated September 12, 1970 dismissing
Civil Case No. 80803 against private respondent Felino Timbol is set
aside, and respondent Judge, or his successor, is hereby ordered to proceed
with the hearing on the merits; 2) but the Orders date January 30, 1971
and February 23, 1971 dismissing the Complaint in Civil Case No. 80803
against respondent Rodolfo Salazar are hereby upheld.
Sec. 3. Other civil action arising from offenses. In all cases

not included in he preceding section the following rules shall be observed:
xxx
(c)
Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in
a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not
exist. x x x
36
(Art. 1162)
37

Chapter1 General Provisions

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Chapter1 General Provisions

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

BOOK 1V

OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

essential. Thus, in a contract involving a donation of personal property

(4) The fact, prestation or service which constitutes the object

Art. 1144, Civil Code.

(1) Pure and conditional (Arts. 1179-1192).

a period (Arts. 1193-1198).

Art. 748, Civil Code.

(3) Alternative and facultative (Arts. 1199-1206).

(a) Natural when the obligation is in accordance with the

(4) Joint and solidary (Arts. 1207-1222).

(c) Mixed when the obligation is in accordance with both

(5) Unilateral and bilateral;22

(7) Accessory and principal;24

Arts. 1158-1162, Civil Code.

(a) Determinate and generic determinate, when the object is

substitute another obligation for one which is due and

demandable only upon the expiration of the term, or

Art. 1157. Obligations arise from:

(e) Possible and impossible possible, when the obligation is

(a) Pure when the obligation is not subject to any condition

(c) With the term or period (a plazo) when the obligation is

Art. 1089, Spanish Civil Code, in amended form.

category of the obligations imposed by law, and all are denominated

Leung Ben vs. OBrien, 38 Phil. 182.

Bautista vs. Borromeo, 35 SCRA 119.

contracting parties to establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and

Art. 1306, Civil Code.

Art. 1092, Spanish Civil Code, in amended form.

Secs. 2, 3, 4, and 5, Rule 111, New Rules of Court.

still be instituted.55 In such case, mere preponderance of evidence shall

Art. 29, Civil Code.

Art. 31, Civil Code.

With regard to the second, it must be observed that there are

vs. Tan, 107.

(1) The fault or negligence of the defendant;

(4) Employers with respect to damages caused by their

(3) Crimes are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former

(6) Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades,

Idem; Scope of quasi-delicts. - In Elcano and Elcano vs. Hill

It must be noted, however, that the responsibility of the above

Art. 2180, Civil Code.

Taylor vs. Manila Electric Co., 16 Phil. 8

The above pronouncement of the Supreme Court is startling. It

Idem; Character of Remedy. In Padua vs. Robles,85 in his

However, in Menzoza vs. Arrieta,87 a more recent case, there

Barredo vs. Garcia and Almario

* * * It is admitted that defendant is Fontanillas employer. There is no

Speaking through Justice Bacobo, the Supreme Court held:

Spanish legal terminology, this responsibility is often referred to as culpa

The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate

defendant petitioner is primarily and directly liable under Article 1903 of

common knowledge that professional drivers of taxis and similar public

Elcano and Elcano vs. Hill and Hill

mere culpa or fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme

are answerable for the borrowing of money and alienation or encumbering

prior joint judgement in Criminal Cases Nos. SM-227 and SM-228,

In dismissing the complaint against the truck-owner, respondent

The petitioners cause of action against Timbol in the Civil cases is

As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing

expressly waived or reserved for separate application by the offended

And even if petitioners cause of action as against jeep-owner-drier

Sec. 3. Other civil action arising from offenses. In all cases