Russell's Sense-Data and Searle's Refutation

Bertrand Russell's The Problems of Philosophy sought to introduce the novice philosopher to some of the difficulties they might face in understanding the world around them, introducing (or rather reintroducing) 'sense-data' as an explanation for how we gain our knowledge, laying a foundation on which we can build the rest of our theories and beliefs. It is almost one hundred years since Problems of Philosophy was written, and the intervening time has seen sense-data has fall out of fashion amongst philosophers, with various forms of direct realism taking its place as the most widely accepted theory of knowledge. In his book Mind, modern philosopher Searle embarked on a scathing attack of sense-data, claiming that it was 'disastrous' for philosophy, as it makes it impossible to give a true account of how humans and other animals relate to the real world. (Searle pp. 269) This essay will assess Searle's attempt to conclusively debunk sense-data, and in doing so will see that his assertions, though vehement, fail to land a fatal blow on Russell's theory of knowledge.

Russell begins by describing the chasm separating appearance and reality by considering what we know of the most unassuming of objects the table. To the eye it is oblong, brown and shiny, to the touch it is smooth and cool and hard - but what do these appearances say of it's nature? Further study would suggest they reveal very little. Moving around, the colours will change with the relationship of the observer to the reflection of light. We may therefore be sure that there is no single colour that can truly be described as the definitive colour of the table. A similar problem impinges upon our perception of it's shape though we have learned to construct a 'real' idea of the table's shape, we never actually observe this shape ourselves (except perhaps in a picture), our position in relation to the table always resulting in the corners appearing slightly distorted from the right angles we know they are. It's texture is arguably the most unreliable yet though it seems

smooth, if we were to shrink ourselves to a microscopic size, we would find ourselves in the midst of wildly varying mountain ranges and valleys, in the grains of the table's wood. (Russell, pp. 3-4) If our perceptions of the table's apparent qualities are so flawed, in what capacity, then, are we aware of the table? It would appear that our perception has an indirect relationship with the external world. The actual objects we are aware of exist (and can only exist) in our mind at the moment of my perceiving them these objects are what we know as sense data. For what we are aware of, rather than a brown table, are the sense data 'brown', 'oblong' and 'smooth' qualities that we have seen do not tell us anything about the nature of the table. (Crane) Whilst the properties (and even existence) of the table are dubitable, we can be certain that the sense data regarding the table we perceive exist at the moment of perceiving them. Their reliance on a 'perceiver', and the perceiver's direct experience of them leave their existence and nature immune to doubt. Does this leave us trapped behind a 'veil of perception', unable to trust anything the sense data tell us about the external world? Russell puts forward the case that though it is necessary to carry a degree of doubt in regards to anything external, there is generally no good reason to believe that our sense data is leading us to false conclusions that is, that there is an external world, that exists independent of our perceiving it. Take, for example, a game of catch between myself and friend. If I were to throw them the ball then close my eyes and stand still with my fingers in my ears, should I be surprised to experience the ball striking me a few seconds later? Has the intervening period consisted of my external world disappearing, only to plunge me back into it with a ball materialising, at velocity, by my nose? Through abduction, Russell argues that the simplest possible explanation is the most preferable in this situation that is that my external world continued to exist during my perceptual absence. Any other explanation, though not disprovable, appears to be unlikely, fanciful and thoroughly unintuitive. (Russell, pp. 17) While not deductively valid (i.e. may have a false conclusion leading from true premises), this is still a legitimate strategy in the absence a superior argument. As such, it is perfectly rational to hold beliefs regarding the external world formed through sense data and abduction.

One notable refutation to this means of understanding the external world comes from John Searle, in his book Mind. He is convinced that sense-datum theory is disastrous for philosophy, as it makes it impossible to give a true account of how human beings and other animals relate to the real world, (Searle pp. 269) ultimately leading to idealism (though Russell also debunks idealism in chapter 4 of Problems of Philosophy). He clearly finds it to be an unacceptable foundation upon which to build a theory of knowledge. His attack focusses on the sense-datum arguments from science and illusion this essay shall turn its attention to the latter. Searle begins his assault by considering MacBeth's hallucinatory dagger, taking objection to the way in which the sense-data theorist would use the word sees in the sentence MacBeth sees the hallucinatory dagger. He claims that when hallucinating an object one does not see it, as there is no object to see that a hallucinatory dagger is not a 'species' of dagger, and that all MacBeth actually saw was his hand (Searle, pp. 271) This definition of seeing is, however, problematic. If one looks at an optical illusion, one often sees dots and lines that are not really there this surely doesn't mean that we do not see lines and dots. It is thus not a question of some species of hallucinatory/illusionary dagger/dot of which we are questioning the existence, but rather a hallucinatory/illusionary species of image, or mental object, that we see. So it would seem that at this point, sense-data remains standing. Searle continues along the same lines when he considers double vision, citing the question When I see my finger double, what do I see two of?, then bluntly answering You do not see two of anything you see one finger and you see it double. (Searle, pp. 272) Again, it doesn't seem that this does much damage to sense-data theory. Of course, the finger and its double are numerically identical. It could easily be argued, however, that you still see two images of a numerically identical finger, and that these two images are two numerically distinct mental objects.

Searle then turns to images, or 'appearances', putting forward the notion that it is self contradictory to say that you do not see objects, but only their appearances, as seeing something's appearance is to see the way it looks, and that it is impossible to see the way something looks if you cannot see the thing. (Searle, pp. 272) However, the sense-data theorist need only point back to back to MacBeth, who sees the appearance of a dagger without seeing a 'thing', i.e. physical object, that is a dagger.

Finally, Searle attacks Russell's famous example of a table that his moving around the table, and his perception of the table changing, does not necessarily suggest that it is not the table he is seeing that he persists in seeing different points of view of the table seems to suggests that he is indeed viewing it. As a direct realist, Searle is also inclined to protest that as one moves round the table, it is not that one perceives bending objects (the sense-data that relate to the angles of the table in one's line of vision), rather that one perceives that something is bending. (Searle, pp. 273) This distinction denies the sense-datum theorist the existence the very non-physical objects he needs to support his agenda. However, he has a refutation of his own to follow this the Phenomenal Principle. When one perceives that a physical object has a particular property, a thing that has this property must exist to be perceived it is implicit in the premisses. (Crane) Thus, the 'thing' that is bending must exist, and that thing is sense-data.

This essay has shown that Searle's assault on sense-data, though impassioned, is actually rather easy to side-step. The critical point comes right at the beginning, where he seems to define what it is to 'see' in unreasonably narrow terms, and in building on this shaky foundation, fails to do any real damage to the theory of knowledge set out by Russell in The Problems of Philosophy.

Bibliography
1. Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1912 2. John R. Searle, Mind, Oxford University Press USA, New York, 2004 3. Tim Crane, "The Problem of Perception", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/perception-problem/>.