DEFENDINGU.S.SOVEREIGNTY,SEPARATIONOF POWERS,ANDFEDERALISMINMEDELLNV.

TEXAS
TEDCRUZ*

n2008,theU.S.SupremeCourtdecidedMedellnv.Texas,1a I case that implicated virtually every conceivable axis of the structural limitations on government. President visvis Con gress,PresidentvisvistheSupremeCourt,internationallaw visvisdomesticlaw,federalgovernmentvisvistheStates, and,withaMbiustwist,Presidentvisvisthestatejudiciary. InMedelln,theStateofTexasvigorouslydefendedU.S.sover eignty,separationofpowers,andfederalism,and,byavoteof 63,Texasprevailed. TheSupremeCourtsresolutionofthiscasepresentsreason forbothcelebrationandgreattrepidation.Weshouldcelebrate because U.S. sovereignty was preserved and because separa tion of powers and federalismboth foundational limits on governmentalauthoritywererespectedandenforced.Eachof these structural limitations on government serves to diffuse powerandtosafeguardthecitizenry,anditisonlybyensuring the vitality of these democratic checks on unilateral authority that liberty can be secured. At the same time, the case invites great trepidation, because it represents an assault on those principlesthatwillcontinueunabatedformanyyearstocome. I. HOWTHECASEAROSE

he principles at stake were monumental, but, as always, the T case arose from concrete facts. And, in this case, the facts were horrific.Onenightin1993,twoteenagegirlswerewalkinghome
Mr.CruzservedastheSolicitorGeneralofTexasfrom20032008.Hehasargued * eight cases before the United States Supreme Court, including Medelln v. Texas. This Essay is adapted from remarks at the TwentyEighth Annual Federalist Society Na tionalStudentSymposium,heldatYaleLawSchool.Thespeechhasbeenmodifiedinto essayformthroughthegenerouseffortsofSusannaDokupil,atalentedlawyer,former AssistantSolicitorGeneralofTexasandformerEditorinChiefofthispublication. 1.128S.Ct.1346(2008).

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inHoustonwhentheyhadtheillfortuneofstumblingintoagang initiation.2Whatensuedwasthebrutalgangrapeandmurderof bothgirls.3EveninHouston,acityhardenedtoviolentcrime,the factsofthiscaseshockedtheconscienceofthecity.4Withindays, police apprehended the gang members, who in turn confessed.5 Jos Ernesto Medelln, the secondincommand of the gang, waived his Miranda rights and wrote a fourpage handwritten confession.6 Displaying no remorse whatsoever, he admitted gangraping both girls, and he described how they pleaded for their lives before he stomped on one girls neck and strangled thembothwithashoelaceandabelt.7Medellncommittedanun speakable crime, confessed to that crime, and, after being vigor ously represented by two statefunded lawyers,8 was convicted andsentencedtodeathbyajuryofhispeers.9 Medellns conviction was affirmed on appeal.10 Then, four years later, he brought a new claim into his case on state ha beas: He alleged that he was denied his rights under the Vi ennaConventiononConsularAffairs.TheViennaConvention, a multilateral treaty ratified in 1969, provides that a foreign national has the right to contact his consulate if arrested in a foreigncountry,andthatthearrestingauthoritiesarerequired to inform the national of that right.11 Although Medelln had livedmostofhislifeintheUnitedStates,hadattendedAmeri canschools,andreadandwroteEnglish,hewasborninMex ico and therefore was technically a Mexican national.12 And, therewasnodisputethatthelocalpolicehadfailedtoinform MedellnofhisrightsundertheViennaConvention.
2.Medelln,128S.Ct.at1354. 3.Id. 4.Mike Tolson, 5 Rapemurder Trials Shake City Inured to Crime, HOUSTON CHRON.,Sept.25,1994,atA1. 5.SeeJohnMakeig&LisaTeachey,Fiveteensindictedforcapitalmurderin2girls deaths,HOUSTONCHRON.,Aug.31,1993,atA15;Tolson,supranote4,atA1. 6.SeeBriefforRespondentat2,Medelln,128S.Ct.1346(No.06984).Thebriefs appendixreproducesthetextoftheconfession.Id.atapp.3236. 7.Id.atapp.35. 8.See Respondents Brief at 3, Medelln v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005) (No. 04 5928)(describingtheaggressivedefensemountedbyMedellnscounsel). 9.Medelln,128S.Ct.at1354. 10.Id.at135455. 11.ViennaConventiononConsularRelationsart.36,Apr.24,1963,21U.S.T.77, 10001,596U.N.T.S.261,292. 12.Medelln,128S.Ct.at1354.

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That,however,wasnottheendofthematter.Itisabedrock principle of American criminal procedure that rights not pre servedattrialcannotlaterbeusedtocollaterallyattackacon viction.13 In this case, Medellns lawyers never raised the Vi ennaConventionattrial,andsothehabeascourtheldthatany claimunderthattreatywasprocedurallydefaulted. TheSupremeCourthaslongheldthatlegalclaimsevencon stitutional claims, which enjoy the highest level of protection in criminal lawgenerally cannot be raised on habeas if they were notraisedfirstattrial.14Andthereisnosoundbasisforaccording treaty claims more force than constitutional claims. For that rea son,in1998theSupremeCourtinBreardv.Greenesquarelyheld that if a defendant does not raise a Vienna Convention claim at trial,thenthatclaimisforfeitedandcannotberaisedonhabeas.15 Thereasonfortheproceduraldefaultrule,theSupremeCourt hasexplained,isthatthetrialshouldbethemainevent16the central moment for determining guilt and resolving all of the legalissuesinthecase.AndMedellnillustrateswellthereason forthatrule:HadMedellnslawyersassertedattrialhistreaty righttocontacttheMexicanconsulate,thetrialjudgecouldhave resolved the issue on the spot, allowing him simply to contact the consulate. The claim would have gone away, and he no doubt would still have been convicted for the brutal crime to which he had confessed. Instead, Medelln urged, the treaty claim that he had never raised should serve as a basis to set aside his longcompleted trial and final conviction. The state courts rejected Medellns claim,17 and, following Breard, the FifthCircuitlikewiserejectedMedellnsfederalhabeasclaim.18 TheSupremeCourtgrantedcertiorariandheardoralargument, but then dismissed the case as improvidently granted because Medellnhadsubsequentlybroughtasuccessivestatehabeaspeti
13.Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998) (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S.72(1977)). 14.See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 452 (2000) (noting that the proce duraldefaultruleappliestoconstitutionalclaims);Breard,523U.S.at376(noting thattheproceduraldefaultruleappliestoprovisionsoftheConstitutionitself); Colemanv.Thompson,501U.S.722,731(1991)(notingthattheproceduraldefault ruleappliestofederalclaims). 15.SeeBreard,523U.S.at37576. 16.Wainwright,433U.S.at90. 17.SeeExparteMedelln,280S.W.3d854,856(Tex.Crim.App.2008). 18.Medellnv.Dretke,371F.3d270,280(5thCir.2004).

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tion,urgingthatarecentmemorandumsignedbyPresidentBush (discussedbelow)supersededstatelaw.19Then,theTexasCourtof CriminalAppealsdeniedthesuccessivepetitionasanabuseofthe writ, and unanimously held that the Presidential Memorandum exceededthePresidentsconstitutionalauthority.20AndsotheSu premeCourtgrantedcertiorarionceagain.21 BeforetheSupremeCourt,Medellnadvancedtwoprincipal arguments: First, he argued that the Avena decision of the World Court constituted a binding judgment, which the Su preme Court was obliged to enforce. And second, he argued thatthePresidentialMemorandumconstitutedbindingfederal law, which trumped all state and federal law to the contrary. Bothargumentshadgraveimplications. II. THEWORLDCOURTDECISION

In 2004, the World Court22 issued its Avena decision, which purportedtoordertheUnitedStatestoreopentheconvictions and sentences of fiftyone Mexican nationals on death row acrossthecountry.23Forthefirsttimeinthehistoryofourna tion, a foreign tribunal attempted to bind the U.S. justice sys tem,andtodisturbfinalcriminalconvictions. Thus,thecentralissueinMedellnwasaquestionofU.S.sov ereigntywho makes the laws that bind the citizens of the United States. Are the American people governed by judges, courts,andlawsofnationsotherthanourown,oraretheygov erned by the United States Constitution, by the U.S. Congress, theUnitedStatesgovernment,andultimatelybyWethePeo ple?Itisdifficulttoimagineamorefundamentalquestion. Medellns answer to this question was straightforward. He arguedthatthejudgmentoftheICJisbindingontheUnit ed States and on all of its [judicial] organs.24 Hence, the Su premeCourtcouldnomoredecidethematterdifferentlyfrom
19.Medellnv.Dretke,544U.S.660,66667(2005)(percuriam). 20.ExparteMedelln,223S.W.3d315,352(Tex.Crim.App.2006). 21.Medellnv.Texas,550U.S.917(2007). 22.The formal name for the World Court is the International Court of Justice (ICJ). It serves as the judicial arm of the United Nations. Statute of the Interna tionalCourtofJusticeart.1,June26,1945,59Stat.1055,1055. 23.Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J.128(Mar.31). 24.BriefforPetitionerat20,Medellnv.Texas,128S.Ct.1346(2008)(No.06984).

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theICJthancouldafederaldistrictcourtdisregardaholdingof theSupremeCourt.Thatunderstandingoftherelationshipbe tweentheU.S.SupremeCourtandtheICJthattheformeris an inferior court bound by the authority of the latteris pro foundlywrong,andtheCourtrightlyrejectedit. Indeed,aquestionatoralargumentillustratesjusthowradi cal Medellns position really was. Chief Justice Roberts asked Medellnslawyerthefollowing:
Suppose,forexample,thattheInternationalCourtofJustice determinedinthiscaseitsjudgmentwasthesame,butthey added:Asamatterofdeterrence,wethinktheofficerswho failedtogiveconsularwarningshouldeachbesentencedto 5 years in jail....So if the ICJ determined that the officers shouldeachgotojailfor5years,[yourpositionisthat]we wouldhavenobasisforreviewingthatjudgment?25

DespiterepeatedquestioningbytheCourt,Medellnscoun selwasneverabletoresponddirectlytothathypothetical,for onesimplereason:Anyanswerhemightgivewouldprovein defensible. An answer in the affirmativethat the Supreme CourtwouldbeobligedtoobeytheWorldCourtandorderpo lice officers imprisoned for five yearswould have been sub ject to withering skepticism by the Court. An answer in the negative would have conceded Medellns central argument aboutthebindingnatureoftheWorldCourtdecision. III. THEPRESIDENTIALMEMORANDUM

On the eve of oral argument in Medelln v. Dretke (Medelln I),26PresidentGeorgeW.BushissuedatwoparagraphMemo randum for the Attorney General, which stated that he had determined that the United States would discharge its in ternational obligations under the decision of the International CourtofJusticein[Avena],byhavingStatecourtsgiveeffectto thedecisioninaccordancewithgeneralprinciplesofcomityin casesfiledbythe51Mexicannationalsaddressedinthatdeci sion.27MedellnssecondargumenttotheCourtwasthatthe Presidential Memorandum constituted binding federal law,
25.TranscriptofOralArgumentat45,Medelln,128S.Ct.1346(No.06984). 26.544U.S.660(2005). 27.BrieffortheUnitedStatesasAmicusCuriaeSupportingRespondentat41 42,Medelln,544U.S.660(No.045928).

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supersedinganycontrarystateorfederallaw.Onthisground, theDepartmentofJusticeagreedwithMedelln. Texas advanced three arguments against the Presidential Memorandum: that it transgressed the authority of Congress, ofthejudiciary,andoftheStates. First,thePresidentialMemorandumimpermissiblyintruded upon the authority of Congress. The Presidential Memoran dumcontradictedtheexpressunderstandingunderwhich the SenateratifiedthethreetreatiesatissuetheViennaConven tion, the U.N. Charter, and the Optional Protocol. The Senate understoodand, until recently, the Executive Branch em bracedthreekeylimitationsonthosetreaties.First,theycre ate no individual rights.28 Second, they are enforceable politi cally and diplomatically through the U.N. Security Council, andnotthroughdomesticcourtsoflaw.29Andthird,theywere notintendedtoalterpreexistingU.S.law. The ICJ statute limits that courts jurisdiction only to disputes between nations,30 and then only when those nations have ex presslyconsentedtoICJjurisdiction.31Thus,theICJsdecisions,by its own governing treaties, have binding force only between the parties,whichmustbesovereignnations,andonlywithrespectto theparticulardispute.32Indeed,theSenatedebatesatthetimeof ratification of the U.N. Charter expressly confirm that it under stoodthattheICJsjudgmentswouldnotbinddomesticcourts.33
28.TheViennaConventionexpresslyprovidesthatthepurposeof[the]privileges andimmunities[discussedintheConvention]isnottobenefitindividualsbuttoen suretheefficientperformanceoffunctionsby consularpostsonbehalfoftheirre spectiveStates[.]ViennaConventiononConsularRelations,supranote11,21U.S.T. at79,596U.N.T.S.at262(emphasisadded).Moreover,theSenatesunderstanding that the Vienna Convention created no individual rights mirrored that of every other signatory. As the United States observed, [n]either petitioners [in Sanchez Llamas]northeiramiciofferasingleunambiguousexampleinthe40yearhistoryof theViennaConventionfromanyofits161partiesofanindividualdefendantbeing affordedaremedyinhiscriminalcaseonthebasisofaViennaConventionviola tion. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 8, SanchezLlamasv.Oregon,548U.S.331(2006)(Nos.0551&0410566). 29.SeeBriefforRespondent,supranote6,at2224&n.19. 30.StatuteoftheInternationalCourtofJusticeart.34,para.1,June26,1945,59 Stat.1055,1059(OnlystatesmaybepartiesincasesbeforetheCourt.). 31.Id.art.36,paras.23,59Stat.at1060. 32.Id.art.59,59Stat.at1062. 33.See, e.g., 92 CONG. REC. 10,694 (1946) ([W]e never intended that the United Nationsand the International Court is a part of the United Nations structure shouldeverhavejurisdictionofessentiallydomesticissues.).AsoneSenatorputit:

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Likewise, the U.N. Charter, the treaty establishing the ICJ, providesthattheonlywaytoenforceICJdecisionsisthrough theU.N.SecurityCouncil,whichmaymakerecommendations ordecideuponmeasurestobetakentogiveeffecttothejudg ment.34 And using the U.N. Security Council to enforce ICJ decisionsmakessense.Thetreatiesatissueareobligationssov ereigntosovereign and nationtonation.35 The enforcement mechanism for these international agreements is designed and intendedforsovereignstoresolvedisputesasamatterofpoliti calanddiplomaticnegotiation.DecisionsoftheICJwerenever intendedtobeenforcedindomesticcourtsoflaw. Moreover,theU.S.StateDepartmenthardlyabastionofcon servativeprincipleshasuniformlymaintainedforthelastforty yearsthattheU.N.treatiesatissuehaveonlydiplomaticremedies and are neither selfexecuting nor enforceable in U.S. courts.36 Even the Clinton Administration embraced that interpretation.37 Unfortunately,thePresidentialMemorandumrejectedthosefour decades of consistent policy and asserted instead the authority singlehandedly to overrule state law in the interest of interna tional comity. As the Department of Justice candidly conceded, thePresidentialMemorandumwasanunprecedentedaction.38 Onapersonallevel,Ifoundmyselfintheunusualpositionof arguing against President George W. Bush, under whom I servedformanyyearsandofwhomIremainastrongadmirer; instead,ironicallyenough,Texas founditselfagreeing withthe ClintonJusticeDepartment.Infact,wequotedextensivelyfrom
Ifitisdecidedthataquestionisdomestic,itthereforemeansthatitisnot a question covered by international law....If the court should commit the error of taking jurisdiction of a case plainly within the domestic jurisdictionof the United States, the United States could on this ground refusetocomplywiththedecision. 92CONG.REC.10,684(1946)(statementofSen.Morse). 34.U.N.Charterart.94,para.2. 35.SeeStatuteoftheInternationalCourtofJusticeart.34,para.1,supranote30, 59Stat.at1059(OnlystatesmaybepartiesincasesbeforetheCourt.). 36.SeeUnitedStatesv.Li,206F.3d56,6364(1stCir.2000)(enbanc)(describing the State Departments consistent position that the Vienna Convention estab lish[es] statetostate rights and obligations and does not require the domestic courts of Stateparties to take any actions in criminal proceedings, either to give effecttoitsprovisionsortoremedytheirallegedviolation). 37.Seeid.at64(quotingtheClintoneraStateDepartmentforthisproposition). 38.BriefforRespondent,supranote6,at12(quotingBrieffortheUnitedStates asAmicusCuriaeSupportingRespondents,supranote28,at29).

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theClinton JusticeDepartmentsbriefintheBreard case,which advocated precisely our positionthat the federal government hadnoauthoritytointerferewithstatejudicialsystems.39 Were Medellns view correct, the implications would be staggering. The President could overturn any law at any time inthenameofenforcinganyvague,aspirational,international obligation the United States might have ratified. For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights guar anteestoeveryindividualtherighttotreatmentinaccordance with the inherent dignity of the human person.40 When the Senate ratified that treaty, it was not selfexecuting, meaning thatnoplaintiffcouldsueincourttoenforcehisrighttoper sonaldignity.41ButiftheCourtadoptedMedellnsview,any future President, in the interest of international comity, could order the state courts to set aside any state laws inconsistent withourinternationalobligationtoensurepersonaldignity. And there are dozens of other treaties, with similar, amor phous,nonselfexecutingprovisions.AnyPresidentcouldfind aninternationalhooktosetasidevirtuallyanystatelawsheor she wished. A host of state lawsincluding state environ mentallaws,limitationsontortdamages,marriageanddivorce laws, adoption laws, and death penalty lawscould all be at risk, if a President who disagreed with them had the ability simplytosetthemaside. Like many Federalists, I am an ardent defender of a strong executive,butnotanexecutivewhocandothis.Regardlessof onessubstantivepolicypreferences,ourconstitutionalsystem simply does not grant the President the power to unilaterally setasidestatelawswithwhichheorshedisagrees. Second, the Presidential Memorandum encroached on power properlybelongingtotheU.S.SupremeCourt.Justtheprevious Term,theCourthaddeclaredinSanchezLlamasv.Oregonthatthe AvenadecisionwasnotenforceableinU.S.courts.42Medellnspo
39.See Brief for Respondent, supra note 6, at 33 (quoting Brief for the United StatesasAmicusCuriaeat51,Breardv.Greene,523U.S.371(1998)(Nos.971390, 978214)). 40.International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 10, Dec. 19, 1966, 999U.N.T.S.171,176. 41.SeeBeazleyv.Johnson,242F.3d248,267(5thCir.2001);138CONG. REC. 8071(1992). 42.548U.S.331,35556(2006).

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sitionandthepositionoftheJusticeDepartmentwasessentially that lower courts should obey the Presidential Memorandum andnottheSupremeCourtsSanchezLlamasdecision. Accordingly,inarguingMedelln,Ihadtheremarkableprivi legeofwalkingintotheSupremeCourtandrelyingasaprinci palauthorityon...Marburyv.Madison.Ourpositionatoralar gumentwasliterallythat[i]tisemphaticallytheprovinceand duty of [this Court] to say what the law is, and it is emphati cally not the province and duty of the President of the United States to set aside this Courts judgments and to bind all the courtsoftheUnitedStateswithdeterminationstothecontrary.43 Medelln argued that the authority to say what the law is couldbegivenbytreatytotheWorldCourt.Anotheroralargu mentquestion,thisonein2005inMedellnI,illustratedjusthow extremethatpositionreallywas.JusticeScaliaposedthefollow inghypothetical:[D]oyouthinkthatthePresidentcanenterinto atreaty,withtheapprovalofCongress,thatwouldprovidethat, in a particular combat, the Commander in Chief will be some bodyotherthanthePresidentoftheUnitedStates?44 In other words, could a treaty delegate the Presidents core constitutional powers? Again, Medellns counsel was unable to answer directly, for the same reason: Any answer was un tenable.IftheanswerwereyesthatatreatycouldnameKofi AnnanastheCommanderinChiefoftheU.S.armedforces thatanswerwouldberoundlyrejectedbytheCourt.Andifthe answer were no, it would immediately beg the question of why,then,couldatreatygiveawaythecoreconstitutionalre sponsibilityoftheSupremeCourttoaforeigntribunal. Theanswer,ofcourse,isthatnotreatycandoso. Third, the Presidential Memorandum intruded on the sover eigntyoftheStates.ThePresidentsMemorandumcommandeered state judges, instructing them to reopen final cases, decide them differently,andsetasideanystatelawtothecontrary.Thisdirec tive conflicts with our constitutional structure, which preserves statesovereigntyandsecurestheStatesauthorityassovereignsto order the processes of [their] own governance.45 Likewise, the
43.Marburyv.Madison,5U.S.(1Cranch)137,177(1803). 44.Transcript of Oral Argument at 1112, Medelln v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005)(No.045928). 45.Aldenv.Maine,527U.S.706,752(1999).

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federal government may not treat the States as mere political subdivisionsoftheUnitedStates.46Thus,thefederalgovernment may not commandeer the machinery of state government to im plement federal policy. Indeed, the Constitution recognizes and preserves the autonomy and independence of the States independence in their legislative and...judicial departments.47 NeitherthePresidentsforeignaffairspowerunderArticleIInor the Supremacy Clause can support an attempt to force Texas to enlarge the jurisdiction of its courts.48 Under longstanding Su premeCourtprecedent,thatexceedstheexecutivesauthority. *** InMedelln,theSupremeCourtheldasfollows:
Insum,whiletheICJsjudgmentinAvenacreatesaninterna tionallawobligationonthepartoftheUnitedStates,itdoes notofitsownforceconstitutebindingfederallawthatpre emptsstaterestrictionsonthefilingofsuccessivehabeaspe titions.AswenotedinSanchezLlamas,acontraryconclusion would be extraordinary, given that basic rights guaranteed byourownConstitutiondonothavetheeffectofdisplacing stateproceduralrules.Nothinginthetext,background,ne gotiating and drafting history, or practice among signatory nations suggests that the President or Senate intended the improbable result of giving the judgments of an interna tionaltribunalahigherstatusthanthatenjoyedbymanyof ourmostfundamentalconstitutionalprotections.49

Thus,theMedellnCourtrightlyheldthatWorldCourtdeci sionsdonothaveauthoritygreaterthanthatofU.S.domestic courts, that the World Court cannot overrule the Supreme Court, and that the executive branch cannot unilaterally set asidestatelawsinconsistentwithitspolicypreferences. And, it should be noted, this holding is consistent with the consideredjudgmentofeveryothernationonearth.Notwith outsomeirony,someninetynationsappearedasamiciagainst
46.NewYorkv.UnitedStates,505U.S.144,188(1992). 47.ErieR.R.Co.v.Tompkins,304U.S.64,7879(1938). 48.SeeGeofroyv.Riggs,133U.S.258,267(1890)(notingthatthetreatypower shallnotauthorizewhattheConstitutionforbids,orachangeinthecharacterof thegovernmentorinthatofoneoftheStates). 49.Medellnv.Texas,128S.Ct.1346,1367(2008)(citationsomitted).

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TexasbeforetheU.S.SupremeCourt.50 Nonetheless,notoneof thosenationsenforcestheViennaConventionorthejudgments of the World Court in its own courts.51 No other nation accords binding force to World Court rulings in its own domestic courts and yet a great many nations wished for the United States to sacrificeitsownsovereigntyandbeboundbytheWorldCourt. heSupremeCourtrightlyrejectedthatinvitation. T Likewise,theSupremeCourtrejectedtheinvitationoftheDe partmentofJusticetosacrificeseparationofpowersandfederal ism to uphold the Presidential Memorandum. As Madison fa mously observed in The Federalist: Power in our government is divided between three branches in the federal government, and betweenthenationalgovernmentandthestates,andbydividing thepower,theConstitutionprotectsthelibertyofeveryone.52 Medelln was a significant victory for U.S. sovereignty, for separation of powers, and for federalism. Yet these fightswill keep on coming. The creep of international law, and the as sertedauthorityofinternationaltribunals,willposeoneofthe greatestchallengesofcomingdecades.Andtherewillremaina continued need to defend our sovereignty, and our structural limitationsongovernment,soastopreserveourliberty.

50.See,e.g.,BriefofAmiciCuriaetheEuropeanUnionandMembersoftheIn ternational Community in Support of Petitioner at 34, Medelln, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (No. 06984) (representing the European Union, its member states, and certain members of the international community); Brief of Foreign Sovereigns as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner Jos Ernesto Medelln at 14, Medelln, 128 S. Ct. 1346(No.06984)(representingArgentina,Bolivia,Brazil,Chile,Colombia,Ecua dor,ElSalvador,Guatemala,Honduras,Peru,Uruguay,andVenezuela). 51.Medelln,128S.Ct.at1363&n.10. 52.THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at357 (JamesMadison)(ClintonRossitered.,1961) (InthecompoundrepublicofAmerica,thepowersurrenderedbythepeopleis firstdividedbetweentwodistinctgovernments,andthentheportionallottedto eachsubdividedamongdistinctandseparatedepartments.Henceadoublesecu rityarisestotherightsofthepeople.Thedifferentgovernmentswillcontroleach other,atthesametimethateachwillbecontrolledbyitself.).