This article shows how recessions, changes in demand and mass layoffs effect productivity more over the short term than than changes in workers' ability. It also discusses the influence of lobbying and money contributions on government performances: - under the following headings:
1. The Best Governments Money Can Buy
2. Demand, productivity and employment and its effect on economic growth
Original Title
Part v- The Dominant Causes of the Credit Crisis. Why Bad Governments and Productivity Are Not Our Greatest Concern
This article shows how recessions, changes in demand and mass layoffs effect productivity more over the short term than than changes in workers' ability. It also discusses the influence of lobbying and money contributions on government performances: - under the following headings:
1. The Best Governments Money Can Buy
2. Demand, productivity and employment and its effect on economic growth
Copyright:
Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
Available Formats
Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
This article shows how recessions, changes in demand and mass layoffs effect productivity more over the short term than than changes in workers' ability. It also discusses the influence of lobbying and money contributions on government performances: - under the following headings:
1. The Best Governments Money Can Buy
2. Demand, productivity and employment and its effect on economic growth
Copyright:
Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
Available Formats
Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
arL v 1he uomlnanL Causes of Lhe CredlL Crlsls Why 8ad
CovernmenLs and roducLlvlLy are noL our greaLesL concern 19 november 2011 8y uavld ColleLL
1he 8est Governments Money Can 8uy Demand product|v|ty and emp|oyment and |ts effect on econom|c growth
1he economlc physlclans of Lhe world economy are desperaLe uesplLe all Lhelr exLenslve efforLs uslng every medlclne aL Lhelr dlsposal Lhe frall paLlenL has suffered anoLher seLback ln 2011 WhaL concerns mosL ls Lhe reallsaLlon LhaL Lhe vlrus LhaL lnfecLs Lhe world economy has become reslsLanL Lo all Lhe convenLlonal LreaLmenLs Any addlLlonal doses of Lhe medlclne seem Lo weaken Lhe paLlenL even furLher 1he world economy has become so fraglle LhaL any ma[or shock Lo lLs sysLem may well cause lrreparable harm LconomlsLs and markeL commenLaLors have become desperaLe ln Lhelr efforLs Lo deLermlne Lhe underlylng causes of a worsenlng economy Some grasps aL sLraws ln an efforL Lo unravel Lhe mysLerlous lllness of Lhe economy buL few waver Lo propose a prescrlpLlon whlch Lhey belleve would heal Lhe paLlenL CLhers slmply deny LhaL Lhe economy ls unhealLhy unforLunaLely Lhe dlagnoses and prescrlpLlons are ofLen vlewed Lhrough pollLlcal and ldeologlcal lenses Some of Lhe more perslsLenL vlews are as follow 1 CovernmenLs lack leadershlp are lneffecLlve and musL geL ouL of Lhe way of Lhe prlvaLe secLor 2 1he corporaLe secLor does noL wanL Lo lnvesL lLs Lrllllons of dollars ln cash because of uncerLalnLles Lhe governmenL musL Lherefore acLlvely pursue pollcles Lo creaLe cerLalnLy 3 CaplLallsm has been sold ouL Lo soclallsm 4 Plgher growLh can only be achleved by an lncrease ln producLlvlLy 3 1he corporaLe secLor produces specLacular proflLs proof LhaL Lhe paLlenL ls well 2
Many of Lhese vlews have some merlL buL by no means do Lhey address Lhe underlylng problems of Lhe world economy nelLher does lL prescrlbe any new medlclne whlch has a reallsLlc change of heallng Lhe paLlenL 1o face Lhe Lrue naLure of Lhe underlylng problem ls Lo look ln Lhe mlrror Lo know Lhe spreadlng vlrus ls us 8y naLure we refuse Lo accepL dlagnosls or prescrlpLlons whlch are noL ln llne wlLh our ldeologles our belleve sysLems and our sLaLus ln llfe
1he 8est Governments Money Can 8uy 1hls lssue has been ralsed before buL Lhe slgnlflcance of lL ls ofLen losL when economlsLs and Lhe prlvaLe secLor crlLlclze governmenLs for our currenL economlc predlcamenL 1he LruLh ls LhaL many developed counLrles especlally Lhe uSA have Lhe besL governmenL LhaL money can buy lf we Lake sLock of Lhe large amounLs of money LhaL Lhe prlvaLe secLor Lhlnk Lanks and oLher lnLeresLed groups have spenL on Lhe elecLlon campalgns of sLaLe and federal governmenL represenLaLlves and Lhe cosLs of lobbylng Lhese offlclals Lo lnfluence and dlcLaLe Lhe dlrecLlon of leglslaLlon subsldy schemes governmenL conLracLs regulaLory overslghL economlc pollcles eLc lL ls dlfflculL Lo see how Lhey can acL lndependenLly leL alone glve sLrong leadershlp
Can we expecL Lhese puppeLs Lo show leadershlp? 3
1he lnsurance commerclal banklng accounLlng and securlLles lndusLrles made nearly 1 bllllon ln campalgn conLrlbuLlons Lo Amerlcan pollLlclans over Lhe lasL decade and pald [usL over $2 bllllon for lobbylsL Lo acL on Lhelr behalf accordlng Lo Lhe CenLre for 8esponslble ollLlcs 1here are around 17000 lobbylsLs worklng ln WashlngLon uC ouLnumberlng lawmakers ln uS Congress by abouL 30 Lo one 1he ClassSLeagull AcL whlch lnLroduced Lhe separaLlon beLween commerclal and lnvesLmenL banklng was a llkely casualLy of such lobbylng by Lhe flnanclal lndusLry We all know by now how Lhe ensulng consolldaLlon or merglng of commerclal banks lnvesLmenL banks securlLles flrms and lnsurance flrms ended ln a wldespread banklng crlsls ln 2008 and how governmenLs had Lo ball Lhem ouL ln a deLalled sLudy Lhe 8esearch ueparLmenL of Lhe lMl found LhaL lobbylng was assoclaLed wlLh more rlskLaklng lenders durlng Lhe 2000's Where Lhe lenders were more llkely Lo beneflL from lax regulaLlon Lhey lobbled mosL aggresslvely whlch allowed Lhem Lo engage ln rlskler LransacLlons and consequenLly exposed Lhem Lo worse ouLcomes durlng Lhe banklng crlsls noL surprlslngly Lhese lenders also beneflLLed mosL from subsequenL governmenL ballouLs
LxLenslve lobbylng also applles Lo oLher corporaLe secLors lncludlng members from Lhe oll and energy secLor whlch LogeLher wlLh some parLles from Lhe flnanclal secLors pay llLLle or no Laxes desplLe bllllons of dollars ln proflL Accordlng Lo AcLlonald lnLernaLlonal Lhe pharmaceuLlcal lndusLry by Lhemselves spenL over $1 bllllon lobbylng ln Lhe uS ln 2004 alone ln Lurope Lhe laLesL scandal ls Lhe doozy" where members of Lhe Luropean arllamenL showed a wllllngness Lo accepL cash for requesL by lobbylsL Lo make amendmenLs Lo leglslaLlon ln Lhe doozy case" Lhe lobbylsL" Lurned ouL Lo be [ournallsLs from a newspaper lnvesLlgaLlng how much lnfluence Lhey could buy lnLeresLlngly such accepLance of cash by members of Lhe Luropean arllamenL for amendlng leglslaLlon ls apparenLly perfecLly legal 1here ls dlfferenL ways Lo vlew Lhe above Cne vlew ls LhaL such lobbylsLs supply pollLlclans and governmenLs wlLh valuable lnformaLlon Lo make lnformed declslons AnoLher vlew ls LhaL lobbylng has become a sophlsLlcaLed form of brlbery whereby Lhe lobbylng parLy galns an unfalr advanLage Lo Lhe deLrlmenL of lLs compeLlLors and Lhe communlLy aL large 8oLh vlews may have 4
some LruLh Lo lL lrrespecLlve of one's vlew lL's hard Lo deny LhaL ln a sysLem where corporaLe buslnesses spend huge amounLs of money (sometlmes mote tboo tbe tox poyoble by tbem) on lobbylng Lhey do so Lo lnfluence Lhe pollLlcal sysLem and economlc pollcles ln order Lo galn a beneflL from such lnfluence rlvaLe enLerprlse would noL lnvesL ln such acLlvlLles lf lL dld noL Lurn a proflL one way or Lhe oLher uue Lo Lhe slze of Lhelr conLrlbuLlons blg buslness obvlously has a sLrucLural advanLage ln Lerms of Lhelr access Lo and lnfluence on declslonmakers AlLhough Lhere ls compeLlLlon beLween varlous corporaLe lnLeresLs when Lhey acLlvely pursue publlc supporL durlng elecLlon campalgns Lo geL Lhelr ALeam lnLo power lL does noL make much of a dlfference lf Lhe 8Leam wlns no lndependenL or unsponsored parLy has any reallsLlc chance Lo geL elecLed as Lhe malnsLream medla wlll slmply crowd Lhem ouL" Cf course Lhe elecLoraLe musL carry an equal parL of Lhe blame as Lhey have overwhelmlngly re[ecLed candldaLes who are noL parL of Lhe ALeam or 8Leam lrom a pracLlcal polnL of vlew one has Lo accepL LhaL Lhe hlghesL bldders wlll be Lhe wlnners and LhaL Lhey wlll conLlnue Lo be Lhe domlnanL lnfluence on governmenLs and lLs economlc pollcy ln Lhe foreseeable fuLure Small buslness and members from less wealLhy communlLles have become relaLlvely less lnfluenLlal and relevanL ln Lhls lobbylng game Many governmenLs have become corporaLe agenLs" under Lhe conLlnuous guldance of Lhe corporaLe world and oLher lnfluenLlal groups lew of Lhese guldlng groups lf any harbour soclallsL ldeals CovernmenLs are largely conLrolled by caplLallsL who are commlLLed Lo Lhelr brand of free enLerprlse lL's Lherefore lronlc LhaL many of Lhe economlsL and markeL commenLaLors who conslder Lhemselves as free markeL champlons or pure caplLallsL now call on Lhe governmenL Lo sLep aslde" and heap crlLlclsm on Lhem for lack of leadershlp creeplng soclallsm bad economlc pollcles and Lhe lnablllLy Lo acL coheslvely ln an efforL Lo save Lhe economy Pow can one expecL sLrong leadershlp from elecLed offlclals when Lhey are conLlnuously pressured and gulded" by selflnLeresLed parLles LhaL heavlly conLrlbuLed Lo Lhelr elecLlon campalgns? 3
CovernmenLs' agendas have become lndlsLlngulshable from LhaL of prlvaLe enLerprlse uld Lhey noL accede Lo vlrLually all demands ln Lhe ballouLs LhaL followed Lhe 2008 credlL crlsls? uld Lhey noL help Lhe blg corporaLes Lo soclallse Lhelr losses when Lhey needed governmenL asslsLance and allow Lhem Lo prlvaLlse Lhelr proflLs when condlLlons became more favourable? uld Lhey noL exerclse pressure Lo lnsure LhaL accounLlng boards relax Lhe mark Lo markeL" accounLlng rules whlch some lncorrecLly advocaLed as a ma[or cause of Lhe crlsls? uld Lhey noL lower Laxes over Lhe lasL Lhree decades especlally for Lhe Lop lncome earners so LhaL Lhe wealLh lL promlsed Lo creaLe could Lrlckle down Lo all Lhe clLlzens? Can anyone honesLly deny LhaL Lhese demands came from anyone buL Lhe purlsL of caplLallsLs? 1he accusaLlon LhaL governmenLs have become more soclallsLlcally orlenLed and are waglng class warfare agalnsL Lhe rlch ls somewhaL amuslng and counLerproducLlve for Lhose who wanL Lo furLher Lhe course of caplLallsm lf governmenLs would sLop faklng some sympaLhy for small buslnesses and Lhe less wealLhy groups or refraln from sofLly slapplng Lhe reckless enLrepreneur or banker on Lhe wrlsL lL would render Lhem less effecLlve ln glvlng blg buslness and many oLher members from prlvaLe enLerprlse whaL Lhey wanL lf economlsLs or markeL commenLaLors really wanL any ma[or change convlnce blg buslness and/or Lhe powerful lobby groups LhaL lL's ln Lhelr or Lhelr cllenL's lnLeresL Lo do so and Lhe [ob wlll mosL llkely geL done 1hose wlLh Lhe blggesL budgeLs wlll wln more ofLen Lhan noL 1haL ls Lhe caplLallsLlc way 1here are also many supporLers of free enLerprlse LhaL are of Lhe oplnlon LhaL democracy should rule and regulaLe caplLallsm Lo ensure a measure of rlsk conLrol and a level playlng fleld for all parLlclpanLs 1he enormous lnfluence exerclsed on declslonmakers by members from Lhe corporaLe world and oLher powerful lobby groups makes Lhls lmposslble Some of Lhe sLrongesL supporLers of caplLallsm have acknowledged LhaL Lhey cannoL be expecLed Lo dlsclpllne Lhemselves ln Lhe pursulL of proflL We need sLrong lndependenL governmenLs Lo do LhaL unforLunaLely LhaL ls noL Lhe way lL works aL presenL and Lhe sLaLus quo ls probably golng Lo conLlnue for some Llme Lo come ln Lhe meanLlme Lhe ldenLlLy of Lhe vlrus LhaL aLLacks Lhe world economy wlll noL be admlLLed nor wlll we admlnlsLer Lhe blLLer medlclne requlred Lo heal Lhe paLlenL
Demand product|v|ty and emp|oyment and |ts effect on econom|c growth Some argue LhaL producLlvlLy growLh raLes musL lmprove before Lhe economy wlll regaln lLs prevlous robusL growLh lnnovaLlon and lncreased producLlvlLy are seen as an essenLlal prerequlslLe Lo hlgher growLh Many are alarmed by Lhe relaLlve lower producLlvlLy whlch has befallen Lhe developed world ln 2011 LeL us look aL Lhe problem of Lhe unlLed SLaLes 1he uS 8ureau of Labor SLaLlsLlcs (8LS) produces quarLerly flgures for labour producLlvlLy growLh for Lhe manufacLurlng secLor and nonfarm buslnesses Labour producLlvlLy ls calculaLed as Lhe ouLpuL per labour hours worked When we look aL hlsLorlcal producLlvlLy Lrends downward movemenLs ln producLlvlLy growLh seem Lo colnclde wlLh ma[or slowdowns ln Lhe economy 1he currenL low producLlvlLy (1 sL and 2 nd quarLer of 2011) flgures are malnly a byproducL of a slowlng economy and noL Lhe cause of lL or a slgn LhaL workers have become less efflclenL When Lhe economy slows demand drops followed by a drop ln ouLpuL and a reducLlon ln labour hours and employmenL A drop ln producLlon (due Lo a drop ln demand) whlch ls fasLer Lhan a drop ln hours worked and/or layoffs wlll always resulL ln a lower and ofLen negaLlve growLh ln producLlvlLy 1he opposlLe ls also Lrue lf producLlon lncreases fasLer Lhan employmenL (hours worked) producLlvlLy growLh wlll lncrease 1hls seems obvlous enough buL lL's Lhe lnLerpreLaLlon of Lhe daLa whlch causes some Lo come Lo Lhe wrong concluslon LeL's look aL some charLs whlch cover Lhe perlod from 2004 Lo 2011 and analyse Lhe relaLlonshlp beLween demand employmenL producLlon (supply) and producLlvlLy ln Lhe flrsL charL we compare real reLall sales (88SlS 8lue llne) Lo nonfarm payrolls (A?LMS 8ed llne) 1he shaded area lndlcaLes Lhe Llme perlod for Lhe recesslon LhaL sLarLed ln 2007
7
lrom Lhe above charL lL's clear LhaL demand represenLed here by reLall sales (lnflaLlon ad[usLed) sLarLed Lo decllne before Lhe recesslon began LmploymenL conLlnued Lo grow Llll !anuary of 2008 before lL sLarLed Lo descend lnLo a sLeep decllne unLll Lhe end of 2009 Whlle reLall sales made an upward move ln Lhe second quarLer of 2009 neL layoffs conLlnued lnLo Lhe 2010 calendar year When lL sLarLed Lo recover ln Lhe beglnnlng of 2010 lLs pace of recovery dld noL maLch LhaL of reLall sales ln Lhe nexL charL we compare Lhe ouLpuL of Lhe manufacLurlng secLor (Cu1MS) wlLh real reLall sales (88SlS) 1he close correlaLlon beLween Lhe Lwo ls obvlous 8
lL ls noLable LhaL ouLpuL (green llne) made a small surge upwards [usL before Lhe recesslon sLarLed and LhaL lLs decllne lagged reLall sales (blue llne) by a few monLhs CuLpuL Lhen descended wlLh reLall sales buL lL sllghLly lagged reLall sales ln Lhe recovery phase whlch sLarLed ln 2009 1he above charL lndlcaLes LhaL reLall sales (demand) was a leadlng lndlcaLor aL boLh Lhe sLarL and end of Lhe recesslon lor Lhls reason lL's noLeworLhy LhaL real reLall sales flaLLened somewhaL ln 2011 and Lurned marglnally negaLlve ln AugusL of 2011 roducLlon and manufacLurlng reporLs show a slgnlflcanL slowdown ln nonfarm and manufacLurlng ouLpuL growLh for Lhe 2 nd quarLer lf real reLall sales conLlnue Lo decrease ln Lhe comlng monLhs lL's vlrLually a glven LhaL ouLpuL wlll follow lL Lo lower levels ln Lhe charL below we compare lndusLrlal producLlon (lnu8C 8ed llne) wlLh nonfarm payroll employees (A?LMS 8lue llne)
9
MosL noLable lndusLrlal producLlon's (8ed llne) decllne was sLeeper Lhan LhaL of nonfarm payrolls (8lue llne) and lL recovered upwards earller and aL a much sLeeper lncllne Lhan nonfarm payrolls 1herefore one would expecL a decllne or slowdown ln Lhe growLh of producLlvlLy ln Lhe 2008 calendar year followed by a sLeep lncrease ln producLlvlLy from Lhe second half of 2009 and LhroughouL 2010 1he 8LS producLlvlLy growLh flgures show LhaL labour producLlvlLy dld acL accordlngly 1he above charLs followed Lhe expecLed paLLern lL sLarLed wlLh a drop ln demand (real reLall sales) followed by a drop ln producLlon and followed by a reducLlon ln employmenL As long as Lhe reducLlon ln employmenL (LoLal hours worked) lags decreaslng producLlon ln a recesslon Lhe raLe of producLlvlLy growLh wlll Lend Lo slow or go negaLlve 1he opposlLe ls Lrue ln economlc recovery when producLlon recovers aL a fasLer pace Lhan employmenL producLlvlLy wlll Lend Lo lncrease ln Lhe followlng charL we compare manufacLurlng ouLpuL (Cu1MS) wlLh employmenL (MAnLM) wlLhln Lhe manufacLurlng secLor 1he relaLlonshlp beLween Lhese Lwo seLs of daLa as shown on Lhe charL closely slmulaLe Lhe 10
relaLlonshlp beLween 8LS flgures for manufacLurlng ouLpuL hours worked and Lhe resulLanL labour producLlvlLy
Labour producLlvlLy slowed ln 200 when producLlon and employmenL moved parallel for a perlod of Llme 1hen producLlvlLy sLarLed Lo acceleraLe before Lhe onseL of Lhe recesslon (shaded area) ln 2007 as producLlon lncreased and employmenL sLarLed Lo decrease uurlng Lhe recesslon perlod producLlon drop aL a fasLer raLe Lhan employmenL causlng a slgnlflcanL reverse ln producLlvlLy growLh raLes LhaL moved lnLo negaLlve LerrlLory for much of 2008 lL dld noL happen because workers suddenly became less producLlve buL slmply because demand plunged followed by a fasLer decrease ln producLlon Lhan employmenL 1he opposlLe happened when producLlon boLLomed aL Lhe end of 1 sL quarLer of 2009 and moved sharply upwards whlle employmenL was sLlll decreaslng LmploymenL boLLomed aL beglnnlng of 2010 buL lLs raLe of lncrease was much slower Lhan LhaL for producLlon resulLlng ln lncreased producLlvlLy Cnce demand sLarLed Lo slow down ln 2011 employmenL sLarLed Lo caLch up wlLh producLlon and Lhe producLlvlLy growLh raLe sLarLed Lo slow 1he charL below whlch Llmeframe lncludes Lhe 1973 and early 1980 recesslons shows Lhe close relaLlonshlp beLween reLall sales producLlvlLy 11
(nonfarm all persons) and subsequenL recesslons lL seems Lo lndlcaLe LhaL slgnlflcanL changes ln reLall sales do have a dlrecL and near lmmedlaLe lmpacL on producLlvlLy As reLall sales slow so does producLlvlLy 1hls relaLlonshlp weakened ln subsequenL decades probably because employers could respond more swlfLly Lo a drop ln demand by reduclng Lhe work force and worklng hours aL a fasLer pace
lrom Lhe above lL seems obvlous LhaL Lhe slgnlflcanL lncreases and decreases ln Lhe growLh raLe of producLlvlLy can hardly be aLLrlbuLed Lo any sudden and slgnlflcanL changes ln Lhe producLlveness of labour 1he plunge ln producLlvlLy growLh ln 2008 (and prlor recesslons) ls closely relaLed Lo Lhe facL LhaL producLlon can be shuL down fasLer Lhan employmenL 1he opposlLe ls also Lrue producLlon can be lncreased (aL leasL for a whlle) wlLhouL lncreaslng employmenL aL Lhe same pace by uslng Lhe ldle Llme of exlsLlng workers beLLer and secondly Lo expecL more from exlsLlng workers who are under severe pressure Lo hold on Lo a [ob Cnce employers formed Lhe oplnlon LhaL demand growLh had reLurned ln 2010 Lhey sLarLed Lo employ agaln buL Lhey were wary of Lhe susLalnablllLy of demand and reemploymenL occurred aL a much slower 12
pace Whlle Lhls gap beLween producLlon and employmenL lncreased producLlvlLy lncreased LhaL's pure loglc Powever when demand (as shown here ln Lhe real reLall sales charLs above) sLarLed Lo sLagnaLe Lhe gap beLween producLlon and employmenL sLopped growlng resulLlng ln lower producLlvlLy growLh
Jhat does the above te||s us about product|v|ty and econom|c growth 1 Weak producLlvlLy dld noL cause Lhe recesslon ln 2007 nor was lL Lhe cause of prevlous recesslons or Lhe currenL slowdown ln 2011 As shown above producLlvlLy was growlng aL a hlgh raLe [usL before Lhe onseL of Lhe CreaL 8ecesslon 1he drop ln demand as reflecLed ln real reLall sales" caused producLlon Lo fall followed by a drop ln producLlvlLy 1he same scenarlo may be unfoldlng ln 2011 alLhough on a more mundane scale
2 A rlse ln producLlvlLy wlll noL solve Lhe slow growLh problem wlLhouL removlng or ad[usLlng Lhe sLrucLural consLralnLs LhaL llmlLs growLh ln demand ln facL Lhe relaLlve hlgh growLh ln producLlvlLy ln 2009 and 2010 raLher conLrlbuLed Lo Lhe wldenlng lmbalance beLween supply and demand because Lhe frulLs of lncreased producLlvlLy were noL evenly dlsLrlbuLed beLween workers and employer corporaLes roflLs of mosL of Lhe blg uS corporaLes lncreased qulckly from Lhe end of 2009 noL only because of lncreased producLlvlLy (ouLpuL/labour hours) buL also from Lhe beneflL of lower real wages LmploymenL dld noL only lag Lhe lncrease ln producLlon slnce early 2009 buL Lhe real medlan lncome of Amerlcan workers decreased aL Lhe same Llme causlng a chaln of evenLs LhaL wlll evenLually show up ln falllng demand MosL of Lhe frulLs of hlgher producLlvlLy are locked up ln corporaLe proflLs 1hese proflLs are noL lnvesLed ln producLlve capaclLy nor ls lL spenL on labour or consumables 1hls may be good for sLock prlces ln Lhe shorL run buL noL for Lhe economy as a whole Cnce governmenL sLlmulus Lapers off and unemploymenL beneflLs are reduced or llmlLed Lhe negaLlve effecLs from Lhe above wlll show up ln demand
13
3 SlgnlflcanL changes ln demand are Lhe prlmary drlvers of mosL recesslons and recoverles roducLlvlLy ls an lmporLanL facLor ln Lhe long Lerm growLh and a counLry's relaLlve compeLlLlveness buL a susLalnable recovery or change Lo fasLer growLh wlll mosLly depend on rlslng medlan lncomes and [ob growLh
4 1he currenL hype over low producLlvlLy ls mlsplaced and lL focuses Lhe aLLenLlon on lssues LhaL have llLLle Lo do wlLh Lhe currenL slow growLh uS producLlvlLy growLh ln Lhe lasL decade has ouLperformed Lhe prevlous flve decades yeL lL resulLed ln Lhe decade wlLh Lhe lowesL growLh
3 1he facLors LhaL lnfluence producLlvlLy mosL over Lhe shorL Lerm ls lncreaslng or decreaslng demand whlch have a dlrecL lmpacL on producLlon volumes Cnce a sLeady lncrease ln demand can be esLabllshed an lncrease raLe of producLlvlLy growLh ls llkely Lo follow lnnovaLlon mechanlsaLlon and Lechnology cannoL become Lhe prlmary drlvers of growLh whlle demand ls sLagnaLlng
Conc|us|on rlvaLe enLerprlse has only lLself Lo blame for Lhe currenL economlc crlsls and governmenLs' flawed pollcles Lo solve lL Cur aLLempLs Lo lnfluence and conLrol governmenLs has come full clrcle CovernmenLs Loday don'L have Lhe lndependence of mlnd and lnLegrlLy Lo do whaL ls rlghL for Lhe naLlon as a whole 1o crlLlclze and blame Lhem ls meanlngless We are all compllclL ln creaLlng mlndless puppeLs and Lhere ls no lndlcaLlon LhaL compeLlLlon for Lhe puppeL masLer has abaLed Crowlng demand ls probably Lhe only force LhaL can pull us ouL of Lhe currenL slow growLh envlronmenL SusLalnable growLh ln demand cannoL be achleved by hlgher producLlvlLy more publlc debL ballouLs money creaLlon or governmenL sLlmulus 1he soluLlon ls Lo creaLe a susLalnable lncrease ln demand wlLhouL a comparable lncrease ln Lhe supply of goods and servlces 14
1haL unforLunaLely cannoL be achleved by prlvaLe lnvesLmenL rlvaLe enLerprlse does noL easlly lnvesL wlLhouL Lhe promlse of a relaLlve qulck reLurn rlvaLe lnvesLmenL alms Lo produce and sell goods and servlces (new supply) aL a hlgher value Lhan whaL Lhey wlll pay for wages (new demand) or any oLher lnpuL 1he end resulL wlll be an lncrease ln unuLlllsed capaclLy and a larger lmbalance beLween supply and demand lL ls up Lo governmenLs Lo do Lhe [ob buL Lhey have nelLher Lhe lndependence of mlnd Lo Lackle Lhe much needed sLrucLural reforms nor Lhe money Lo lnvesL ln selecLlve caplLal pro[ecLs 1helr publlc debL has already reached unsusLalnable levels and lL would be unwlse Lo lncrease lL CreaLlng more [obs and llfLlng consumpLlon expendlLure wlLhouL a slgnlflcanL lmpacL on governmenL debL wlll be dlfflculL Lo achleve We have reached a sLalemaLe poslLlon klcklng Lhe can down Lhe road has now become Lhe defaulL soluLlon We wlll dlscuss posslble soluLlons ln laLer blogs buL noLe LhaL Lhe besL soluLlons may noL be Lhe mosL popular wlLh blg buslness lf lL was lL would have been pursued by Lhe lobbylsL and lmplemenLed long ago Powever before we pursue Lhese unpopular soluLlons Lo map a way Lo recovery we have Lo face up Lo Lhe underlylng and domlnanL causes of Lhe economlc crlsls LhaL sLarLed long before Lhe beglnnlng of Lhe CreaL 8ecesslon of Lhe 2000's Slnce Lhe boomlng decades of Lhe 1930' and 190's Lhe uS and world economy are ln a downward growLh Lrend weakenlng wlLh each passlng decade Cne of Lhe mosL relevanL quesLlons musL be where dld Lhe demand go? ln our nexL blog we wlll expand on Lhe above Lrend and lLs relaLlonshlp wlLh producLlvlLy dlsLrlbuLlon of producLlvlLy galns and LaxaLlon coverlng Lhe perlod from 1920 Lo 2010
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