The Mindanao Peace Process

Autonomy and Peace Review
INSTITUTE FOR AUTONOMY AND GOVERNANCE KONRAD-ADENAUER-STIFTUNG
CONTENTS
Editorial Q and A: The Mindanao Peace Process Benedicto R. Bacani Identity, Self-Empowerment, Ancestral Domain Grace Jimeno-Rebollos Ancestral Domain, Identity and Right of SelfDetermination: A Moro Perspective Jose Iribani Lorena The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and the Peace Process: Imperatives, Challenges and Prospects Rufa Cagoco-Guiam Charter Change and the Mindanao Peace Process Challenges and Prospects Zainudin Malang Democratic Track to Resolve the Bangsamoro Issue Abhoud Syed M. Lingga 7 17 23
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EDITORIAL
This issue of the Autonomy and Peace Journal focuses on the Mindanao peace process. While the ongoing peace talks between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) currently define the peace process in the southern Philippines, they could not be viewed in isolation with other initiatives for achieving durable peace and development in the region. The 1996 peace agreement Editorial Board between the GRP and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) Benedicto R. Bacani is once again taking the center stage Executive Director Institute for Autonomy and due to the ongoing review of its Governance implementation by the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). Although employing a different Eliseo R. Mercado Jr., OMI Senior Policy Adviser tack, the negotiations with the IAG MILF are focusing on the same issues, territories and people as Suharto Ambolodto those in the 1996 GRP-MNLF Executive Director Final Peace Agreement. The Institute for Strategic Initiatives Mindanao peace process can be fully understood by looking at these Zen Malang two peace processes. The people Executive Director Moro Law and Policy Center to people peace processes taking place in grassroots communities Amina Rasul which resulted in the establishment Convenor of sanctuaries/spaces/zones of Philippine Council for Islam and peace complete the picture of Democracy peace initiatives in the region. Autonomy (as a broad concept less than an independent state) is one that is evolving in the southern
Klaus Preschle Country Representative Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung
Philippines. The future of the existing autonomous region is shaped by the ongoing GRP-MILF peace process and the changes that may take place as a result of the ongoing review of the implementation of the 1996 GRP-MNLF peace pact. The current initiatives to amend or revise the constitution provide an opening to revisit the constitutional provisions on the autonomous region. The challenge is to harness these diverse peace initiatives for sustainable peace and development. This is not an easy task where two parties (GRP and the MILF) are talking about matters that will greatly affect those outside their circles (MNLF, ARMM, local political and traditional leaders and their constituents). The key is to find themes that resonate with all stakeholders and to channel energies into pursuing a common agenda for peace and development. The Institute for Autonomy and Governance (IAG) promotes one such common theme: evolving an effective and accountable political institution for Bangsamoro selfdetermination. The papers in this journal explore the different issues in the GRPMILF talks. Benedicto Bacani provides an overview of the Mindanao peace process. There are two articles on the issue of ancestral domain which is the core of the Moro problem. Grace Jimeno- Rebollos looks at the issue from a general standpoint while Jose Iribani Lorena gives the Moro perspective. Rufa Cagoco-Guiam explores the imperatives, challenges and prospects in the peace process as it relates to the existing autonomous region. Zainudin Malang points to the links between charter change and the peace negotiations while Abhoud Syed Lingga suggests a democratic track to resolve the Bangsamoro issue. These papers make reference to views of participants to the policy discussions that IAG regularly convenes, some of which were conducted with support from the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). IAG acknowledges the continuing support of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in fulfilling its mandate to promote public policy for peace and development.
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Q and A: The Mindanao Peace Process*

Benedicto R. Bacani 1. What is the Mindanao conflict all about? It refers to the struggle of the countrys Muslims or Moros to assert their distinct identity, history and way of life. Before the Philippines was colonized by the Spaniards and later by the Americans, the Muslims had their own political institutions and economic structures in the Sultanates of Sulu and Maguindanao, and the Pat a Pongampong ko Ranao. They consider themselves a free nation assimilated to the Philippines against their will, thereby becoming a minority in their own land. They are fighting against what they consider as discrimination by the national government and the majority population. In 1961, Congressman Ombra Amilbangsa filed a bill in the House of Representatives seeking recognition of the independence of the Muslim province of Sulu. In 1968, the Moro Independence Movement demanded the establishment of an Islamic state in the Muslim areas of Cotabato, Davao, Zamboanga, Zamboanga City, Basilan, Lanao, Sulu and Palawan. In 1972, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) waged an armed struggle to establish a Bangsamoro Republic in Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan. In 1984, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) was formed and it demanded the establishment of an independent Islamic state. The MILF waged an armed campaign against the Armed Forces of the Philippines
* Views expressed in this article are solely of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinion or endorsed by any personality, group, party or instrumentality involved in the Mindanao peace process.
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from 1997 until 2003, when it renewed negotiations with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP). 2. What are the specific issues raised by the MNLF and the MILF? The Bangsamoro right to self-determination is the natural right of every people and this is recognized by the United Nations. The right to self-determination includes the right to a name or a peoples own identity, the right to a territory, the right to the resources of this territory, and the right to self-governance. 3. Did the resort to arms by the MNLF, MILF and the GRP bring us closer to the resolution of the Mindanao conflict? No. On the contrary, the use of force by all sides has made the conflict more difficult to resolve as it never addressed the root causes of the problem. The cost of the war for the inhabitants of the region is staggering. Consider this: in 1971 alone, 1,000 people died. From 1972 to 1976, 100,00 to 120,000 people were killed, 50% from the MNLF, 30% from the AFP and 20% from the civilian population. It is estimated that the cost of the war in the 70s ran up to 73 billion pesos. The 2005 UN Philippine Human Development Report states that, since 1975, the conflict in Mindanao has cost between PHP5-10 billion yearly. Civilians have suffered tremendously from repeated displacement . In battles between the MILF and the AFP, 30,000 internally displaced people (IDP) were recorded in 1997; 1,014,645 in 2000; 24,000 in 2001; and 75,419 in 2003. The huge physical, social and economic costs of the war have in fact deepened the animosity and distrust among the contending parties as well as divisions among peoples along religious lines. Instead of resolving the conflict, the use of force has in fact brought about conditions that have made the dispute more difficult to resolve.
Q and A: The Mindanao Peace Process
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4. So if war has not solved this conflict, do peace talks have a better chance to resolve this problem? While peace talks have not yet fully resolved the conflict, they have slowly but significantly de-escalated the intensity of the fighting as the parties in the talks try to address the root causes of the problem. In 1975-1976, the Tripoli Agreement between the GRP and the MNLF called for autonomy in 13 provinces and cities in the southern Philippines, but the area of autonomy has been reduced to five provinces and one city composing the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) today. In 1996, the GRP and the MNLF signed the Final Peace Agreement to implement the Tripoli Agreement. While the MNLF ended its 25-year armed struggle for Mindanao independence, the MILF continued to fight. It signed a ceasefire the next year, in 1997. The current peace talks seek to finally bring peace to Mindanao by convincing the MILF and GRP that grievances can be resolved peacefully without violence . 5. What are the issues being talked about in the GRP-MILF negotiations? There are three major issues in the talks: 1) security, 2) humanitarian, rehabilitation and development, and 3) ancestral domain. When resolved, these issues would address problems of instability and violence in the region, foster respect for human rights and promote economic development of conflict-affected areas. Ancestral domain is the most critical issue in the negotiations as it refers to Bangsamoro identity, culture, traditional lands, governance and control over economic resources. 6. How sure are we that there will be no more war if the MILF and GRP agree to peace? There is no guarantee that a GRP-MILF peace agreement will end the war forever. But developments in the past five years of negotiations raise hopes that this peace agreement will be more meaningful than previous ones and that a working pact will be implemented to the advantage of the Bangsamoro and other peoples in Mindanao.
First, the ceasefire agreed upon by the GRP and the MILF is holding and armed encounters have been drastically reduced. Second, the parties are making headway in joint programs such as interdicting criminal and terrorist elements in MILF areas and in delivering economic development in conflict-affected areas. Third, there is a strong presence of civil society groups especially in facilitating people-to-people peace processes in the grassroots level. Fourth, there is strong international support for the peace process. Fifth, unlike previous peace talks that were centered on institutions, the ongoing negotiations address head-on basic Moro grievances such as Moro ancestral domain, land and natural resources issues. Sixth, the global war on terror has encouraged the Philippine government into acting more decisively to bring lasting peace and economic progress to Mindanao. 7. What prevents the MILF and even the MNLF and other future insurgent groups from taking up arms once again? That is always a possibility especially when implementation of peace agreements is wanting, as shown by the failed uprising in 2001 and 2005, allegedly by MNLF elements in Sulu. This is why everyone, not only government officials but also ordinary Filipinos, should work for peace. War is never the solution, as we in Mindanao should know. More than 120,000 soldiers and civilians died from 1972 to 1976, the height of the MNLF insurgency, with an estimated 1 million people displaced from their homes and livelihoods. The scars of war remain to this day. Look at the poor and hungry people around you. According to the World Bank, 62.9% of the residents of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao are poor, compared with 34% for the Philippines as a whole. Infant mortality is 72 per 1,000 live births compared to only 42 per 1,000 live births nationally. Men here die at 55.5 years of age, compared with 66.3 years nationwide, while women live to 59.3 years, compared with 71.6 years in the rest of the country. And only 39.2% of youths in the autonomous region are enrolled in high school, versus 72.2% in the Philippines as a whole.
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Among the nations 16 regions, the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao consistently ranks at or near the bottom on indicators of human development. 8. What brought about this terrible state of affairs? The vicious cycle of poverty and displacement in Muslim Mindanao is a result of a complicated history that dates back to Spanish times. Before the Spaniards came in 1565, Islamic communities were already thriving in Sulu, where the first sultan came to power around 1450, and in what is now Maguindanao, which was founded by Sharif Kabunsuan around 1515. For three centuries, the Moros, as the Spaniards called the inhabitants of Mindanao and Sulu, successfully fought off incursions by the foreign colonizers, and kept their religion, lands and way of life intact. All that changed when the Americans defeated the Spaniards in 1898. By 1914, the United States had largely succeeded in subjugating the Moros. The Americans encouraged entire populations in Luzon and the Visayas, mostly landless and ambitious Christians, to migrate to Mindanao. The policy continued after the Philippines regained independence. During the Spanish times, Moros made up 98% of the Mindanao population. Today, Christian migrants account for 80% of the inhabitants and own 93% of the land. Eight out of ten Moros are landless in their own homeland. 9. We are Christian migrants from Iloilo. Does this mean we have to give up our land to the Moros and go back to the Visayas? No, of course not. But it is important for you to acknowledge that the Moros have been systematically discriminated and alienated from the lands they had lived in for centuries. Injustice has clearly been done to the Bangsamoro, but there is nothing to be gained by pointing fingers. The people involved have long been dead. The best thing that we, their descendants, can do is to move forward and correct the injustices of colonization without, however, creating new injustices. This means finding a
formula under which Muslims, Christians and other indigenous groups can live in peace and harmony in Mindanao. 10. Is such a formula possible? Neither the two provisional autonomous regions established by Ferdinand Marcos in the 1970s nor the present ARMM promulgated during Fidel Ramoss presidency in the 1990s has been effective. This is why the current negotiations between the government and the MILF are so important. They represent the third attempt at a lasting solution to the Mindanao problem. The external climate looks exceptionally promising. For example, Malaysia, which used to turn a blind eye to the use of Sabah as a training ground and supply and communications center by Moro fighters, is now an active broker in the peace talks with the MILF. The internal dynamics look positive too. With prodding and support from the international community, the Philippine government appears strongly determined this time to forge a good agreement and, even more important, to implement it effectively. As for the MILF, it has already shown some flexibility by agreeing, for example, to give other indigenous groups the right to decide whether they want to be part of a Bangsamoro juridical entity in the future. 11. What will happen to the rights of the Lumad communities to their ancestral domain/lands? The MILF acknowledges the right of the Lumad to free choice. They are free to join or not join the Bangsamoro. Their right to their domains/lands will also be respected. 12. What has been accomplished by the GRP-MILF peace talks so far? This can be seen in the three aspects in the agenda of the negotiations, namely,

Security, the main component of which is a ceasefire Humanitarian aid, rehabilitation and development Ancestral domain
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A ceasefire agreement has been signed and has been holding. After the all-out war of 2000, the situation has rapidly improved. There were 698 armed encounters in 2002, which fell to 559 incidents in 2003, and only 15 in 2004. Just ten (10) skirmishes were reported from January to March 2005, and none at all from April 2005 to the present. This has been the work of the Joint GRP-MILF Ceasefire Committee. They are working hand in hand with several local monitoring teams all over the 13 conflict-affected provinces and with the International Monitoring Team, consisting of 60 military and civilian contingents from Malaysia, Brunei and Libya. An Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG) has been created to go after criminal elements in the conflict-affected areas, like the kidnap for ransom groups. The AHJAG has solved more than ten cases of kidnapping. A Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA) has been created to determine, lead and manage development activities in Bangsamoro areas. A Joint Needs Assessment for Mindanao Trust Fund completed as early as September 2004 has set aside US$150 million to be released after the signing of a peace agreement between the GRP and the MILF. There is an ongoing capacity-building program for Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA) personnel. There is also a GRP inter-agency Technical Working Group to partner with BDA for projects in MILF communities. And the mechanism for the Bangsamoro Leadership and Management Institute is being put in place as the main instrument for capacity building of leaders and professionals. 13. OK, so what will an agreement with the MILF look like? The agreement will surely acknowledge the unique history and identity of the Bangsamoro people, recognize and protect Bangsamoro rights to their land and natural resources, ensure the Bangsamoros direct participation in socio-economic development efforts within their ancestral domain, and will include a workable formula for genuine Bangsamoro selfgovernance.
The boundaries of the Bangsamoro Ancestral Domain shall be jointly determined by the GRP and the MILF. There will be measures agreed upon to address legitimate grievances arising from unjust dispossession and/or marginalization. 14. How will Cha-Cha the proposed changes in the Philippine Constitution affect the talks with the MILF? The proposed changes to the Constitution will take a long time to be acted on, and there is no guarantee that they will be passed or that Filipinos will ratify the changes in a plebiscite. If the peace agreement with the MILF is signed before Cha-Cha, then it is expected that its provisions would be taken into account in the Cha-Cha deliberations, along with the issue of the ARMM. If no peace agreement with the MILF is signed before the final draft of the new constitution is finalized, the expectation is that the Cha-Cha will be formulated in such a way that would flexibly cover the future outcome of the peace process. 15. What can we do to support the peace process? It is important especially for the Christian majority to acknowledge that everyone is part of the problem and the only way we can resolve this conflict is for the whole nation to support the formula agreed upon in the peace talks. The formula will call for sacrifices from all sides, and we should be able to accept our share in making compromises for the sake of peace. One of the immediate things we can do is to stop and think before uttering anything derogatory about an institution or a person, based on religion. We should set aside religious and cultural prejudices in our everyday lives. Christians and Muslims alike should not speak negatively about each other, especially in front of their children, because this perpetuates the misunderstanding and hostility that have led us to our present problems. This is not easy to do. The slurs we utter against each other do not sound bad after a while because we have grown used to them, because these are things that we heard our parents and
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grandparents say and which we, in turn, transmit to our own children and grandchildren, whether we mean to or not. Moros are treacherous. Christians are thieves. Stated enough times, these dubious opinions become stereotypes that we sadly accept as true. 16. What can social institutions do for the peace process? Schools, churches, mosques and the media have a role to play in reinforcing positive, rather than negative, images of Muslims and Christians in Mindanao. In the classroom and from the pulpit, teachers and religious leaders can reinforce the values of tolerance for diversity and differences. The media can be extra careful in reporting Christian-Muslim conflicts to avoid inflaming passions. Politicians should resist the temptation to use the religion card to win elections. And everyone should step away from the extremists on both sides the hardliners in government who preach that only force can keep Muslim Mindanao part of the Philippines, and the Islamic militants who would burn everything to the ground to exact revenge for the sins of colonialism and to create their own narrow and insular state. 17. Should we not be actively part of the talks as its outcome will directly affect us? The issues in the negotiations are complex and difficult. Negotiators should be given the opportunity to freely explore options, which would be extremely difficult if the conflicting positions of all stakeholders are brought to bear on the talks. However, the two parties periodically conduct briefings and consultations. When they finally forge an agreement, both sides will fully disclose all its provisions, explain them to the public, and strongly campaign to persuade everyone to support the pact. In time, the citizens of Muslim Mindanao will be asked to vote on the accord in a plebiscite. We should vote one way or the other only after a thorough and objective study. We should always remember that the real issue here is the long term. Will
voting yes or voting no ensure a peaceful and prosperous future for our children and grandchildren without repeating the injustices of the past and without creating new problems? The answer is in our own hands.
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Identity, Self-Empowerment, Ancestral Domain

Grace Jimeno Rebollos*
Introduction Questions on the identity, ancestral domain, and selfempowerment of Mindanaos peoples continue to be at the heart of their quest for peace. Within the socio-political dynamics characterizing their relationships, a focus has been placed especially on the indigenous peoples and the Bangsa Moro communities in their struggle to name their respective spaces in ways that assert recognition and respect for the integrity of their cultures, historical experiences, and aspirations. The discourse for this has brought to the fore many notions which are crucial to an understanding of the social constructions defining and being defined by local realities, including the potential for peace and violence. These realities, among others, include the sense and expression of the collective self, majority-minority interaction, the pursuit of rights that may overlap with those of others, and criteria for asserting various claims, from territory to the use of natural resources. They also give flesh to an array of conventions and laws such as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) that now need to be reviewed and interpreted in light of emerging developments. Many of these applications have been long overdue.
*Grace Jimeno-Rebollos is Vice President for Research, Extension and Development, Western Mindanao State University, Zamboanga City.
These concerns inform the deliberations by the negotiating panels of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). But as they craft the features of a new peace agreement, it continues to be the conviction of the Mindanao Study Group (MSG) that, in the final analysis, the agenda should be owned by the communities that will live with the critical local arrangements. Questions about governance, territoriality and resources, for example, cannot simply constitute questions of pro and con, or good versus evil. Instead, they may encompass two or more starkly contrasting and even competing interpretations of the very same concepts, including their objectives, their elements, and their actual and potential impact. It has thus become imperative to locate these constructs within the general framework of human beings in the community, and thence situate them within the often intersecting social milieus of the Bangsa Moro and indigenous peoples. For this purpose, the MSG has requested Professor Ponciano Bennagen of the Department of Anthropology, University of the Philippines, and a member of the 1987 Constitutional Convention, to provide beginning insights. Identity and Self-Empowerment Human Universals Drawing from his Mindanao experience, albeit his IlocanoKankaney origins, Prof. Bennagen set his presentation within the context of shifting identities and the human evolutionary framework. He cited Donald Browns compilation of some 200 human universals, so called because they are found in all societies. He also termed them surface universals in the sense that they are external, and include, among others, the tendency to make classifications especially between the out-group and the in-group, choice-making, collective identities, classification of space, territoriality, conflict, cooperation, inequality, and so on. These are some characterizations: While found in all societies, even those based on simple hunting and gathering, universals can become problematic, especially when they threaten the entire fabric of social life. Yet they may also contain some hope in that they may be human traits that are the exact opposites of those that are
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negative. Consider the Irish Republican Army decommissioning itself, or the GRP and MILF deciding to talk. The surface expressions of universals also differ depending on a constellation of social and even biological forces. This process is being speeded up by the rapid flow of goods and services, technology, and, in a significant way, by information. Within the present knowledge-based society, one bit of information can alter social dynamics. Carried to the public domain, amendments in information can affect the social dynamics of the current GRP-MILF negotiations. In all cases, the human universal of identifying oneself is rooted in places, localities, communities. All identities are local but eventually may be regionalized, nationalized, and even internationalized. For instance, the Bangsa Moro and Filipino started with local identities. Identity is obvious in the way individuals and communities name themselves. There is a propensity to publicly claim an identity based on place of origin. One notes, for instance, the use of prefixes -i, -ti, -on, and then the geographic space, whether sea, hill, mountain or river. In a way, this links the issue of identity to territory, ancestral domains, and the right of self-determination. Thus, the human trait of individually or collectively identifying oneself, the determination of where one should be or how one should behave, and ones claim to a certain piece of the surface of the earth, i.e., ancestral territory or ancestral domain, all somehow fall into place within the human evolutionary framework.
The Rights-Based Context of Universals Human universals expressed in the context of rights are now partly the arena of struggle in all sorts of stakeholders rights indigenous peoples rights, Bangsa Moro rights, minority rights. They may be referred to as natural human rights. Over time, during the course of human history and as recently within the 18th century, these became political rights as exercised by disadvantaged and oppressed groups against established governments. The most popular example would be the overthrow of the French Ancien Regime and the Declaration of the Rights of Man by the
French National Assembly in 1789. Basic human rights eventually became part of the UN Charter with its approval in 1945. In its preamble, as well as in a series of other international covenants, reference is made to peoples. In the Philippine case, with the 1973 Constitution and the facilitation of Atty. Michael Mastura and Bishop Francisco Claver, the so-called Marcos Constitution took notice of the rights of cultural communities. Those rights included those of the indigenous peoples1, though the term Moro was evidently not yet acceptable. With the declaration of martial law and the increasing push toward developmentalism of the Marcos type (which tried to extract as much as it could from the rich natural resources of the country), great pressure was exerted on indigenous communities and even the Bangsa Moro communities, which incidentally occupied most of the areas that were richly endowed with natural resources. This gave rise to the struggles at Chico Dam, Agus River, and all other struggles against the development aggression of market forces organized by the state, including the use of the military. All these efforts of the indigenous peoples, the Bangsa Moro peoples - came to be within the ambit of the international human rights movement. These became an entry point for the campaign against those who threatened marginalized communities, and support for the local and national struggles for the protection of their human rights. Contact was made with advocates of human rights elsewhere, all over the world, so the struggle for local rights became nationalized and then internationalized. A third generation of human rights has emerged. These are collective rights that include the right to the environment and the right to self-determination. But with so many rights being pushed for inclusion in the rubric of human rights, there has been a call for some kind of quality control. And to do that, there is a need to return to the UN Charter and the UN Bill of Rights, which incidentally are premised on at least two things: equality and non-discrimination.
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Self-determination and Self-Governance Prof. Bennagen cited Erica-Irene Daes (Chair-Rapporteur of the International Working Group on Indigenous Populations) who has enumerated the various nuances of the collective right to selfdetermination, thus: The right of an entity to determine its international status (or external self-determination, which begins with the community of nations); The right of a state population to determine the form of government and to participate in the government, sometimes extended to include democratization, or majority rule (internal self-determination); The right of a state to maintain national unity and territorial integrity and to govern its affairs without external interference and without violation of its boundaries (e.g. the GRP); The right of a state and of a state population to cultural, social, and economic development (especially claimed by less developed countries and is embodied in the Bill of Rights); The right of a minority or an indigenous group or nation, mainly within state boundaries, to special rights related not only to protection and non-discrimination, but also to the right to cultural, educational, social, and economic autonomy, for the preservation of group identity (identity, territory, selfgovernance are relevant here).
Bennagen further framed the questions of identity, territory, selfgovernance, and rights of minority peoples within the possibilities that are now being offered to various communities in some of our laws, those derived from our practical experiences in the Philippines and the experiences from others. He also referred to Richard Falks paper on the Evolving Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which discusses a whole range of options for self governance short of secession. Among others, the options include: the case of the Greenland Home Rule Government, which involves a state of partnership that is subject to a treaty with Denmark. The treaty provides for a sharing of resources , including strategic natural resources like uranium, gold, oil,
and other sub-surface resources. the case of Canada, in which smaller units like councils operate within a federal structure, states within the federation, and an aboriginal government. self-management of the type that is more sociological than territorial, where one does not have to have a specific territory with specific boundaries. This may be the case for many indigenous persons who have migrated into the urban areas and can no longer claim a form of territory. They go into some kind of self-management which, in effect, works like a cooperative. This may be exemplified by Muslim communities which evolve into a kind of self-managing entity within the urban milieu. tribal barangays as provided in the IPRA.
Harnessing Positive Universals and Multiple Stakeholders for Conflict Management There continues to be an effort to operationalize other possibilities of self-governance following the IPRA, recognizing that this law assimilated many of the provisions embodied in the UN Bill of Rights, including the Draft Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Populations (DDRP). To provide closure to the discussion on human universals, Prof. Bennagen revisited the concepts of self-determination, territory, and identity including the human othering potential2. He identified other entries in the list of universals, such as choice making, cooperation and conflict management, as part of a broad range of positive universals that may be harnessed for affirmative action to address key issues and concerns affecting the Bangsa Moro and indigenous peoples of Mindanao. He also recalled the Computational Theory of Social Action, which draws on an understanding of the computer. This theory likens the mind to the computer (but is more than a computer), and posits that the whole process of thinking and acting, proceeds from a system of collecting information, making the computation, i.e., influential processing, and - depending on the information and programming feedbacking. The theory also says that there are different modules, and depending on how you program the modules, then you would have different outputs. In
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political terms, some would call it a kind of dialectic. In computerese, this is garbage in, garbage out. The theory also argues for smooth tracking and a multi-agent system that allows local efforts to be carried out on all fronts. Taken to social terms, this applies the Stakeholders Theory of Conflict Management and Negotiations and implies questions on the ownership of the GRP-MILF process by the multi-stakeholders of Mindanao. With stakeholder analysis, one is able to generate a listing of stakeholders, identify those who are key or primary, or those who are not as immediate or are far away (but who nonetheless play a role) like the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). All of these are information that would be critical for planners and decision-makers who must address policy, program, and project questions. On the other hand, one must be sensitive to informational changes. With the volatility of the social situation, predictability has almost gone out of the window. Social Science does not cope with the idea of making probability statements, and one cannot make predictions on limited parameters, especially if one were looking at a long term. For example, with respect to charter change (cha-cha), there are no guarantees that: (a) cha-cha proceeds, or (b) if cha-cha proceeds and if one considers amendments, that so called pro-social justice, pro-poor, promarginalized, pro-democracy provisions will be incorporated. The chacha-related developments will depend on the dynamics that will be influenced, among others, by: (a) whoever is elected, if a constitutional convention were to be called, (b) the numbers, if decision-making will still be majoritarian. Thus, it will be difficult to predict. Yet, this does not mean to negate any efforts to plan. In fact, it is all the more reason to plan. In summary, Prof. Bennagen stressed the importance of addressing questions of identity (including shifting identity) and territoriality as emanating from the local. All knowledge and information have local roots, and they only become globalized depending on the forces that bring them out. Terms have also shifted. What is now considered indigenous knowledge used to be regarded as superstitious belief. Because of the UNCED - Rio de Janeiro Process3, there is now appreciation for the significant contribution of indigenous knowledge (which is local knowledge) to sustainable development. Indigenous
knowledge is knowledge that has been developed over long periods by local peoples in almost marginal environments. If these indigenous knowledge systems (e.g., of property, including notions of social justice) survived in spite of all the assaults on local communities, then they have a message for all peoples. They have much to contribute for the sustainability not only of the human species, but also of planet earth. On a wistful note, Prof. Bennagen ended with the vista of planet earth as the ancestral domain of homo sapiens. In pursuing relationships among the species and even with the possibility of outer space/interstellar/ interplanetary travel, earthlings must take care of planet earth as their ancestral domain. They can confront those who pose threats to it with the knowledge preserved and carried through by the local people, especially the indigenous people. Hence, his exhortation: Let us globalize the earth from below. The Discussion The distinction between the Bangsa Moro peoples and the indigenous peoples identities and claims to ancestral domains and selfdetermination constituted the specific theme for discussion. Further probes were made on the application of core or shifting identities, including the misuse and abuse of said identities for certain purposes. The group drew from the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act and the corresponding interpretation as gleaned from the congressional deliberations, the Expanded Organic Act of 2001 Implementing the Final Peace Agreement (Republic Act 9054), and even the Philippine Constitution. Evolving Identities and Problems of Hybridization and Differentiation The initial question had to do with whether there are interlocking/ overlapping rights among minority groups. Prof. Bennagen confirmed the existence of tensions arising from ones identity, with this being made more conflictive because of the process of hybridization of identities. He observed that problems emerged in the case of some groups that, after denying their identity, restored their indigenous status (everybody becomes a katutubo) - with the coming of the IPRA and its material incentives. Hence, they would return to do some kind of tribal dealership as opposed to tribal leadership, and are even able to get
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titles. Conflicts would often arise as people assert their differences. These misunderstandings result from placed-based identities, or from affiliation with particular clan organizations. Among the Manobos, for example, the Manobo identity becomes a unifying identity. However, differences are expressed as one goes down the grassroots. Given the limitations of their experience, the grassroots limit their movements to the boundaries of their territory. These conflicts have further become complicated by the problems that have had to do with labor issues at the banana plantations in Davao or with land tenure, which are residues of the Ilaga problem in the 1970s. Bennagen also introduced the distinction between identity-initself and identity-for-itself. Identity-in-itself is ones name, not something one is willing to fight for like land rights. There are people who go willy-nilly through life and are not willing to put up a fight in case they are threatened. However, once they have that consciousness in relation to others and that relationship is characterized by domination or accommodation, then they make a stand. Bennagen pointed to the possibility that collective identities can either be red flags of aggression, white flags of peace, or no flags at all. The question is what turns the color from red to white, from white to red. It is interesting to know who the people are, what their stakes are, the stakeholders at work, the interests they represent, and the values they hold. These are important for the emotional loading that goes into the concept. Cohesion, the Collective Consciousness, and Self-Ascription As observed by Atty. Benedicto Bacani, identity has served as a point of cohesion for individuals rallying around a common affinity with Mindanao. The One Mindanao and One People Mindanao movement indicate this evolving construct. Prof. Bennagen likened this development to the use of the term Filipino or Bangsa Moro. Whereas in the past there was aversion to the latter, now it is like a badge of courage. On the other hand some groups would rather be identified by their ethnic appellation. Atty. Jose Lorena also added the Social Construct Theory to help make sense of how identities are formed. When a person embraces
the ways of a group of people, and is willing to sacrifice and die with them, his identity evolves into being of that group. The bottom line is a consciousness, said Prof. Rufa Guiam - the collective consciousness of a people belonging to one group. It is not a matter of others ascribing to you an imposed identity. It is a matter of self-ascription. Prof. Abhoud Lingga noted the application of self-ascription in the 2000 census, observing that there were separate categories of Tiruray and Teduray. This was similarly seen by Prof. Rodil, who had learned earlier that raw responses to the census-taking were taken verbatim, and not classified according to preset categories. Hence, the difference. He felt that the work of making the necessary combinations and interpretations lay on the social scientist. According to Bennagen, this difference in self-ascription is because some persons usually absorb the name that is imposed on them by outsiders and thus identify themselves the way others identify them. In analyzing the organization of the Mindanao One movement, Guiam said that these developments are usually spurred by the presence of a challenge on identity. For example, the Mindanao One identity may be attributed to the widespread perception of the many peoples in Mindanao that the national government has not given fair treatment to Mindanao, especially with respect to central development funds. Mindanao contributes 75% of the national revenue, but gets back only a miniscule portion of it. The continuous negligence of the Manila-centric national government to accord Mindanao its proper place in the whole national body politic has become the challenge for the consciousness to unite, to express a common aspiration, and to take pride in ones Mindanao origins. Bangsa Moro and Indigenous Peoples: Identity Dilemmas Prof. Rudy Rodil presented maps showing the distribution of the 12 Moro ethnic groups across the current political boundaries of Mindanao, based on the 2000 census and a minimum population of 100 per area. He explained that these had been originally 13 tribes, due to the mistake of considering the Palawanen and the Molbog as two separate ethnic groups. The number was reduced to 12 when it was learned that the two were one and the same.
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He drew attention to the Bangsa Moro identity and attributed it to two elements - the ethnic element and the element of the political struggle. He referred to the latter in terms of a political situation corresponding to the existence of a state which the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) transformed into the Bangsa Moro. This, in effect, was a claim for political territory. Thus he noted the premise of Moro cohesiveness to be political dominance, rather than the existence of ethnic identity. Are the Bangsa Moro considered indigenous people? Are the indigenous people parts of the Bangsa Moro? In the Mindanao Study Groups search for the basis for defining the Bangsa Moro identity, ARMM Deputy Governor Fatima Kanakan cited key officials who had made public pronouncements considering the Bangsa Moro as indigenous people. On the other hand, Lorena added that in the MNLF Manual of Political Cadres, the Moro is identified to include Lumad. There were even Lumad representatives in the council of the MNLF. The Expanded ARMM Law (R.A. 9054) separately cites the Bangsa Moro people and the tribal (indigenous) people. In determining the identity of the Bangsa Moro vis-a-vis the indigenous people, reference was made to Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) which defines Indigenous Peoples (also Indigenous Cultural Communities) as: a group of people or homogeneous societies identified by self-ascription and ascription by others, who have continuously lived as organized community on communally bounded and defined territory, and who have, under claims of ownership since time immemorial, occupied, possessed and utilized such territories, sharing common bonds of language, through resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, nonindigenous religions and cultures, became historically differentiated from the majority of Filipinos. A suggestion was made to verify the definition from the transcript of proceedings within the course of deliberations to pass the law. In sum, various inputs led to the interpretation that the Bangsa Moro are not included among the indigenous people. On the other hand, a position
was expressed by Santos Unsad, a Teduray leader, relative to the Bangsa Moro. They have declared their affiliation with the Bangsa Moro state, but wish to assert their identity, ancestral domain, and system of governance as Teduray. Lorena, thus, revisited Rodils early thoughts on the Bangsa Moro and Lumad identities, placing them in the context of ancestral domains claims and suggested the ethnic or socio-cultural element as appropriate to the Lumad. On the other hand, he extended the political element to the perspective of self-determination as claimed by the Sultanate and which has also been invoked by the Moro rebels. This perspective of self-determination emphasizes the point of sovereignty. To a certain extent, it holds that there must be a continuity of sovereignty because the Sultanate had acquired sovereignty over specific areas, even before Philippine independence. Rodil, however, pointed out that in the sphere of the political domain, many changes have happened. There had been a movement from the sultanate to the Moro province, and with practically each major change, there was a loss of sovereignty. Even as these changes were going on, the Lumads have awakened and begun to assert their own identity and right to selfdetermination separate from the Bangsa Moro. Some have even gone on to question why they were included in the Bangsa Moro. Recalling the time immemorial criterion, Lingga further expressed the opinion that that the Bangsa Moro people as Bangsa Moro - cannot claim it as a basis for their identity and their ancestral domain claims. He clarified that this criterion should be used only as a reference in the GRPMILF talks so that the negotiators can make the adjustments. Hence, they cannot be rigid in its use. Still, the Bangsa Moro people may apply as specific tribal groups. Malang focused on the treatment of the concept of selfdetermination in the IPRA, declaring that the state recognizes the inherent right of the indigenous peoples to self-government and self-determination, and respects the integrity of the valid subjects and institutions. But Lorena, recalling lapses in the implementation of the GRP-MNLF peace agreement and the pursuit of autonomy for the Bangsa Moro, pointed
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out that even in the constitution, there are provisions that have militated against the full implementation of the agreement. For example, provisions like Article XII, National Economy and Patrimony, particularly, Sec. 2, Sec 5, to Sec 20-21, need to be reviewed, including the transcript of discussions that transpired in Congress and the Senate. Echoing this, Rodils impression was that the full satisfaction of the right to self-determination is not possible under the Constitution. However, it does not mean that the possibility of other options cannot be explored to the fullest extent possible under the law. A key factor already being seen as contributing to the success of the peace agreement is that it must be crafted by those who will implement it. The Rights-based Context of Identity and Recognition for the Minority Given the rights-based context, Bennagen again made reference to the guiding principles of non-discrimination, equality, and the maintenance of group identity. Whatever the institution in place, if these are addressed, the solution of the problems is automatic. The institutions themselves deal with the core issues. There are likewise the ironies of globalization. When there was recognition of rapid globalization, there was fear that some kind of homogenization would take place. But the reverse has been taking place, with the locals asserting their identity. One then sees identity politics at play. As the variances that come out of these concerns translate to claims over specific territories, ground quarrels can happen. Lingga noted that conflicts often arising from these overlapping claims or interlocking rights at all times require judiciousness and sensitivity in the use of terms or in matters of reporting. Yet Bennagen pointed to the reality of ground level reports about particular groups that whether accurate or not are circulated as factual. These are indications of how it can happen on the ground. He further asserted the entitlement of stakeholders to correct information that could be factored into decisions being made at various fronts affecting peace and sustainable development in Mindanao, including the GRP-MILF negotiations. How then is identity maintained? Bennagen asked. He situated these concerns within the context of the evolving notion of human rights,
while posing the caveat that these rights have become so numerous that some sectors have called for some form of quality control. Expressions of identity are interpretations of all those rights that have emerged. Among them is also the right of a community with a distinct character to have this character reflected in the institution of government under which it lives whether IP, Moro, or whatever group. However, it becomes more complicated and problematic in communities where hybridization is strong and, Prof. Guiam adds, in communities that are able to leverage more benefits from existing policies. Still arguing from the human rights framework, Bennagen recalled that the UN Charter has always been for peace and equality and non-discrimination. Invoking the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), Atty. Zen Malang introduced the question of majority-minority relations and the regard for the minority. How much recognition is the majority willing to confer on the minority? Bennagen pointed to three sources of recognition: (a) the state (as defined in the IPRA), (b) civil society , and (c) the indigenous people themselves. Apparently, there is a need to do a lot of triangulation in establishing the notion of indigenous peoples. Usually, the notion of peoples is defined by international instruments where language, race religion, and collective psychology are considered. In the IPRA, the modifiers include ethnolinguistic grouping, primary language, and other cultural attributes that are expressed in external markers. Nevertheless, if there were a Bangsa Moro Juridical Entity, asked Malang, do the Moros become the majority and indigenous peoples the minority? Bennagen admitted that at the ground level there is the reality that the Bangsa Moro are the majority. This is realpolitik. But within the human rights context, indigenous rights must also apply. The point, according to Lingga, is that it is not a majority-minority question. The bottom line is the rights and welfare of the people. One might be a minority, but one might be a privileged minority. For example, in Tanzania, the Christians are a minority but they are in the ruling class. What is important are the laws and institutions and their provision of equal opportunity. Responses to the Bangsa Moro Identity There was consensus in the impression that, for the Bangsa Moro, the assertion of their identity is problematic. The term Bangsa Moro is
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still not that popular. The accepted terms are Muslim and, if at all, Moro. Simply listening to the radio, one realizes that the discrimination against Muslims is intense. Guiam traced this back to the SPCPD. She cited various cases of Christian leaders religious and local government - who had been publicly censured for their pro-Muslim stance. One of these was Rosalita Nunez, former mayor of General Santos City, whose research revealed that while Christians did not approve of and were unimpressed with Muslim leaders, Muslims, on the other hand, did not mind the religion of their leaders. Guiam recalled the anti-Muslim lobby in Congress led by three women leaders of Mindanao, a parish priest who used the pulpit to campaign against Mayor Nunez, and the hometown crusade of local politicians against the candidacy of the same mayor. Apparently, these gestures were effective. Relevant to the discussion of anti-Muslim bias is a UNDP study that showed Christians in Mindanao having stronger biases against Muslims, compared to their counterparts in Luzon. This attitude was traceable not only to differences in religion but also to the sense of competition over opportunities to exercise power and use resources. On the other hand, there is a sense of wonder at how Muslims are able to penetrate uncharted territory. Prof. Bennagen found them, for example, in Kalinga in the persons of Maranaw traders who did not seem to have any political affinities. An indication of possibilities, these observations led him to also wonder why at that level of dealing with hard realities of everyday life - like commodity exchanges and trading there seems to be no problem with majority-minority relations and the situation is relatively peaceful. This finding was affirmed by Lorena who also saw growing Muslim communities in Baguio, Pangasinan, Tarlac, and Zambales. Aside from the traders, these places were influenced by overseas contract workers who had gone to Muslim states like Saudi Arabia, Brunei, and Malaysia, and converted to Islam. They themselves became agents of hybridization, professing their new faith and influencing their relatives. Some Muslims were also noted to rise to prominence like a Maranaw councilor in the City of Tagbilaran or the Maranaw Regional Director of the NCIP in Region 3.
Education and the Advocacy for Cultural Sensitivity, Peace and Development By way of conclusion, the discussions shifted to the issues and concerns of action appropriate to the role of the participants as a study group. With the realities of Mindanao and the country, education and advocacy were seen as ways of engendering inter-cultural sensitivity, respect, and dialogue. The issues of content, material, and processes of inter-agency collaboration and peace championing by strategic community members and institutions suggest a multi-pronged approach. The Curriculum. The group referred to curriculum offerings in Mindanao universities, noting that it is only the MSU system that offers a course on Mindanao history. They found this lacking in Catholic-owned institutions. The advantage of said course would have been the exposure of students to the existence of the Moro people and Moro culture. Popularizing the issues and expanding levels of social discourse on the manner will create a civic consciousness in the young. Textbooks. Gross inaccuracies are often found in textbooks that, in effect, give rise to discrimination of Muslims by the Christian majority. The use of Muslim as a label for the cultural artifacts and practices of Moro tribal groups is flawed. It is questionable to say Muslim dance, Muslim boat (referring to the vinta), Muslim dress, Muslim food. There has also been a consistent observation of being excluded from the core definition of what is being Filipino, e.g., the reference to lechong baboy as the national food when that is proscribed for a segment of the Philippine body politic. Mention was made of the chance given by the Department of Education for ARMM to write their own books, i.e., materials that were meant to be culture-friendly. Yet the editors only changed the characters names to Muslim-sounding names, e.g., Abdul. Apparently, the changes made by the editors showed inadequate capacity to present and appreciate Mindanao culture and history. The books were then returned to Manila. Concern was expressed for the dilemma of certain Manila-based writers and media persons dealing with the educational needs of school children. While they wish to contribute to the improvement of education for ARMM and Mindanao, they are unfamiliar with the local setting for
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which they mean to produce multi-level packages of learning materials. Strategic Personalities in Media, Local Government, Church, and Community. More targeted approaches are suggested for strategic media stations and persons. There are strong, vocal opponents of the peace process in the media, LGUs, the church, and the community. There is dire need for champions who can influence the tide of public opinion. The problem is that those who are for the peace process are not strategically positioned. Bacani observed that even in the Catholic Church, peacebuilding is not mainstreamed. Even among the ranks of church organizations, there are many who are anti-Muslim. Among media practitioners there are attempts to inculcate more responsibility in reportage. Yet the problem is the publishers, editors, owners and managers of the print and broadcast who dictate the substance of news that is released from their outlets. Unfortunately, any news that sells, even if sensational, inaccurate or divisive, will be preferred. Endnotes
1
Irene Erika Daes, Rapporteur of the International Working Group on Indigenous Persons stresses the distinction between indigenous rights and minority rights. She defines indigenous persons as the dependents of a people which have lived in the region prior to the invasion of colonizers or foreign settlers who in many cases have since become the dominant population. In this respect, the number of the indigenous peoples does not constitute substantive criteria. The capacity of human beings to consider others as other; indicated by the propensity to name I, us, and them. UN Conference on Environment and Development, also called The Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, June 1992
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Ancestral Domain, Identity and Right of Self-Determination: A Moro Perspective

Jose Iribani Lorena*
Introduction From the Moro perspective, understanding the concepts of ancestral domain, identity and the right to self-determination is crucial in finding a just, lasting and comprehensive solution to the age-old Mindanao problem. After all, these issues have invariably been the core and critical agenda in all the negotiations between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro rebel movements, first with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and now with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). In particular, self-determination as an attendant right and in whatever degree (autonomy, federalism and outright independence) has always been the primary negotiating interest articulated by the Moro rebel movements. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the last round of the GRP-MILF talks in Malaysia, the technical working groups of both panel worked exhaustively on this issue. The Mindanao Study Group held a roundtable discussion on ancestral domain, identity, and self-determination on February 21-22, 2006 at the Renaissance Hotel in Makati City. The forum was part of the groups initiatives to assist in building a wider constituency to support the ongoing GRP-MILF peace process.
*Jose Iribani Lorena is former Solicitor-General of the ARMM.
General Concepts In introducing the subject Ancestral Domain, Identity and the Right to Self-Determination of the Bangsa Moro People, Professor Abhoud Syed Lingga underscored one truism: Many of the armed conflicts that have raged in the world this century, and the vast majority of those that have taken place since the end of the cold war and continue today center around peoples drive to self-determination. Professor Lingga noted that international law is unclear with respect to the nature and scope of the right to self-determination. There is common acceptance, however, of the idea of self-determination as the collective right of peoples to determine their own future free of any outside interference or coercion, and participate in decision making that affects them. Self determination, he stressed, includes the right to determine political status and to freely pursue economic, social, spiritual and cultural development. Significantly, the United Nations has, in no uncertain terms, recognized the right to self-determination. The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political rights as well as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights are categorical in stating that all peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. On ancestral domain, Professor Lingga ventured to say that control and management of land and other natural resources within the territorial space claimed by the people is integral to the right of selfdetermination. In concluding his presentation, he cited historical bases and precedent covenants such as the Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 and the GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement of 1996 to declare that the Bangsa Moro as a people have a right to self-determination.
Ancestral Domain, Identity and Right of Self-Determination
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Discussion The discussion on ancestral domain, as anchored on present realities grounded on conflicting claims, led the panel to analyze issues as the ancestral domain of indigenous people enshrined and reorganized under existing law (The Indigenous Peoples Act), and its implication on the of the Bangsa Moro over ancestral domains. Right of Indigenous People to Ancestral Domain vis-a-vis Bangsa Moro Right to Political Territory From the discussion, it became clear that the Bangsa Moro claim for their ancestral domain with the attendant right to self-determination is distinct and separate from the claim of the indigenous people to their ancestral domain. As articulated by Fatima Kanakan, the Deputy Governor for the Indigenous People (IP) in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, and by other IP representatives, the claim of the IP to their ancestral domain is now enshrined and well recognized under the Indigenous Peoples Right Act (IPRA). This pertains particularly to IPs land tenural rights, which are based on the concept of time immemorial possession of certain lands by the IPs. Title to land under this theory draws authority from the maxim prior in time, prior in rights. Ancestral domain under IPRA must not be equated with the Bangsa Moro peoples claim to political territory, as the two concepts are distinct and separate, although not exclusive of one another. As passionately emphasized by Bangsa Moro representatives in the roundtable, including this writer, the Bangsa Moro claim to ancestral domain or what the Moro call their political territory, is not at all anchored on the time immemorial doctrine. Rather, it is based on the truism that the Bangsa Moro people have historically exercised sovereignty over this portion of a territory they call their homeland or ancestral domain. Bangsa Moro sovereignty over the areas which originally comprised the Moro province during the American period is not only a reality, but is recognized by other people of the world. This is aptly captured in many international agreements, among them the Kiram-
Bates Treaty. What can perhaps be equated in parallel with the IPs ancestral domain, with respect to the Moro people, are the rights of the various ethno-linguistic Moro tribes to their ancestral domain. The Regalian Doctrine: Its Implication There is, however, a congruence in opinion among the participants that the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia) enshrined in the 1987 Philippine Constitution and particularly defined in Section 2, Article XII, is one major obstacle to the full recognition and even enforcement of Governments commitment to faithfully observe the right to ancestral domain be that of the Indigenous People more so, the Bangsa Moro claim to political territory or homeland. (Sec. 2, Article XII, states: All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of energy, fisheries, forest or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the state.) For a full realization of the peoples right to the control, management and utilization of their ancestral domain, the Regalian Doctrine, a thesis which originated from the universal feudal theory that all lands were held from the crown (Carino vs. Insular Government, 1909) must be relaxed or even removed from the constitution. ARMM Power on Ancestral Domain Other related issues, such as the power of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) to formulate its own IPRA, were also discussed. The participants were all of the view that the provision in Section 1, Article X, of Republic Act No. 9054 (Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao) is ambiguous with respect to the delineation of the concept of the ancestral domain of indigenous people and the ancestral domain of the Bangsa Moro people. Section 1 grants the autonomous regional government the power to protect the ancestral domain and ancestral lands of indigenous cultural communities. This power has yet to be exercised. According to Commissioner Lingatin of the National Commission on the Indigenous People (NCIP), the ARMMs Regional Legislative Assembly has not yet passed any
Ancestral Domain, Identity and Right of Self-Determination
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regional IPRA. While there is still no such regional law, the NCIP is exercising concurrent jurisdiction with the ARMM with regard to ancestral domain claims of IPs in the autonomous region, in accordance with a resolution passed by the regional legislative assembly. One Mindanao Identity In the midst of the talks on ancestral domain, identity and the right to self-determination, both informal and formal, there is an emerging consensus for a Mindanaoan identity. There is groundswell of inter-people dialogue in Mindanao going beyond the rhetoric to collectively assert a One Mindanao identity. Conclusion and Recommendation The participants in the February 21-22, 2006 Mindanao Study Group roundtable discussion reached some consensus, although with some reservations. One key point is that, in order to accommodate any agreement on ancestral domain both for the indigenous people and the Bangsa Moro people, inclusive of the grant of self-determination, the constitutional framework must necessarily be revised. The current move for constitutional change, if it succeeds, is a window of opportunity. The proponents of constitutional change must recognize the fact that the Philippines is a multi-ethnic and multi-nation state. Any change in the Constitution must, therefore, move towards the accommodation of all interests. In particular, it must provide for a system of political governance that enhances the exercise of self-determination by all peoples of the country, but without breaking the unity and solidarity of the Philippine state. The norm on the Regalian Doctrine in the Constitution must be relaxed and liberalized to address long standing discrimination, especially in ownership, control and management of the ancestral domain resource. Specifically, the roundtable discussants recommended a continuing discourse on ancestral domain, identity and self-determination as a means of clearly defining their limits and provide a clear understanding of the concepts of identity, ancestral domain and self-determination from the perspectives of the various stakeholders. The panelists also
recommended transparency in the negotiations, and urge the negotiating panels (both GRP and MILF) to engage with multi-sectoral organizations, including the Mindanao Study Group.
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The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and the Peace Process: Imperatives, Challenges and Prospects
Rufa Cagoco-Guiam*
Introduction No other region in the Philippines is mired in lowest levels of poverty as the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Its five provinces and one city have consistently occupied the bottom ranks of the countrys Human Development Index (HDI). No less than a World Bank report confirmed the state of abject poverty in the region in its 2003 report, Human Development for Peace and Prosperity in the ARMM. World Bank analysts stressed that the ARMM has the poorest human development outcomes compared to other regions in the country (World Bank, 2003). Aside from having higher incidence of poverty, many communities in the region are also ravaged by internecine armed conflict for more than three decades, further aggravating the deterioration of quality of life of many of the regions residents. For many in the ARMM, evacuation has become an intermittent experience. Some of them have become permanently displaced as they refuse to return home for fear that armed conflict will recur and they will again be caught in a war not of their own making.
*Rufa Cagoco-Guiam is Associate Professor in Public Administration and Coordinator of the Graduate Program in Public Administration at the Mindanao State University-General Santos City.
This briefing paper on governance and institution-building in the ARMM is basically a synthesis of the discussions in the 13-14 January meeting of the Mindanao Study Group in Cotabato City. It is augmented by the writers notes and insights culled from her experiences as a social development worker and professional researcher in the region for the last two-and-a-half decades. Regional autonomy in the ARMM from a historical perspective The ARMM is a creation of the Organic Act (Republic Act 6734 of 1987) that was intended to address grievances of the Bangsamoro against the national government. These grievances had fueled an armed revolutionary movement among young Moro intellectuals and professionals belonging mainly to three (Maranaw, Maguindanawon and Tausug) of the 12 Moro ethno-linguistic groups. This was the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), a movement that became a popular rallying symbol of the Moro struggle for self-determination by 1975. Two years earlier, in 1973, the Bangsa Moro Army (BMA) was formally organized to lead the MNLFs military engagements with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Prior to the creation of the ARMM, the Philippine national government had already started a process of laying the foundation of an autonomous government in the areas identified by the MNLF as part of the Bangsamoro homeland. This process was the result of a series of negotiations between the GRP and the MNLF that culminated in the signing of the very first Peace Agreement the Tripoli Agreement of 1976. The Tripoli Agreement of 1976 provided for the establishment of autonomy in southern Philippines within the realm of Philippine sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines Consequently, then president Ferdinand Marcos signed Presidential Decree 1618 that formally created two autonomous regions in Mindanao Region IX, based in Zamboanga City, and Region XII, based in Cotabato City. As provided for in the Tripoli Agreement, 13 provinces in southern Philippines were identified as the areas of autonomy, namely:
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Basilan Sulu Tawi-tawi Zamboanga del Sur Zamboanga del Norte North Cotabato Maguindanao Sultan Kudarat Lanao del Norte Lanao del Sur Davao del Sur South Cotabato and Palawan
In these specified areas of autonomy, Muslims were to be given the right to set up their own courts that will implement the Islamic Shariah laws. Muslims were to be represented in all courts, including the Supreme Court. Moreover, authorities in the areas of autonomy shall have the right to set up schools, colleges and universities as well as their own administrative system in compliance with the objectives of autonomy and its institutions (Articles 4 and 5). In other words, the Agreement provided for an autonomous arrangement with its own administrative, economic and financial systems. The Tripoli Agreement was quite significant in its provisions for a political settlement between the Bangsamoro nation and the Philippine state. More importantly, it also provided for the compensation to the widows and orphans of martyred mujahideen and to communities which have been displaced and impoverished as a consequence of the armed struggle. However, as it turned out, this provision along with others were not implemented by the national government. Presidential Decree 1618 fell short of MNLF expectations of genuine autonomy. Instead, Regions IX and XII became mere additional bureaucratic layers in the administration of the 13 provinces, part of a strategy to window-dress Marcoss repressive and dictatorial military rule.
After President Marcos was ousted from office through a bloodless People Power coup in 1986, Cory Aquino, widow of the late Sen. Benigno Aquino, assumed the presidency. Early in her term, Aquino immediately arranged for a meeting with MNLF chairman Nur Misuari and the MNLF in Sulu. This meeting paved the way for a series of negotiations with the MNLF during the Aquino administration. However, it took another ten years to forge an agreement. On September 2, 1996, under the presidency of Fidel V. Ramos, the Final Peace Agreement (FPA) was signed. In 1987, a landmark change in Philippine governance took place with the signing of a new Philippine Constitution. This major change in the national charter provided for the creation of a Regional Commission that formulated the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). This is Republic Act 6734. Voters in four of the 13 provinces covered by the two former autonomous regions (IX and XII) chose to be included in the ARMM in a plebiscite held in 1989 to ratify RA 6734. These provinces were Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Tawi-tawi and Sulu. As stipulated in RA 6734, the seat of government of the fledgling autonomous region was Cotabato City. Ironically, the voters in this city did not vote for inclusion in the ARMM. While the national government viewed RA 6734 as a blueprint for peace in Mindanao, the MNLF rejected it. The MNLF leadership and members were totally excluded from the process of formulating the autonomy law. To make matters worse, the ARMM had negligible powers there were far more restrictions rather than actual powers devolved to it. The ARMM was also hostage to the power-brokers in Manila. Since it was created, the ARMM had been led by local politicians anointed by whoever sat in the presidential palace. The first regional governor was the local stalwart of Pres. Aquinos Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP). The second one was a Maranaw protg of Pres. The FPA with the MNLF had just been signed when the third ARMM elections were held. MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari was
persuaded by Pres. Ramos to run for ARMM governor. Virtually unopposed, Misuari won the race in 1998. By then Ramoss term had ended and the country had a new president in Joseph Estrada. But his term was cut short by another People Power mass action at EDSA in 2001 as a result of a popular perception that Estrada plundered and committed other crimes against the Filipino nation. Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took over the reins. Like her predecessors, Arroyo lost no time in directing who becomes the new ARMM governor. Along with her power-brokers, she made possible the (in)famous break-up of the MNLF Central Committee, easing out Misuari as its chairman. A so-called Council of 15 was organized, with Dr. Parouk Hussin as its leader. Eventually, the presidential palace also anointed Hussin to be the new ARMM governor. In elections last year, a new face in regional politics surfaced as the winner in the contest for the ARMM governors post Gov. Datu Rizaldy Puti Ampatuan. Despite the declaration of the ARMM as a free zone in terms of the most likely to be elected regional governor, the belief is that the new ARMM governor is also a presidential bet he is the son of Maguindanao governor Andal Ampatuan, widely known as Pres. Arroyos favorite local political ally. The Final Peace Agreement of 1996 was considered a breakthrough in the protracted peace process between the MNLF and the Philippine government. The FPA provided for a transition phase (Phase I) and an expanded autonomous region (Phase II). In Phase I, the ARMM, together with 10 other provinces and nine cities were designated the Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD). A new structure, the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) was established to oversee peace and development efforts within the SZOPAD. In addition to SPCPD, a Consultative Assembly of 81 members was mandated to be a forum for consultation and ventilation of issues and concerns. (Muslim, 1999). It was tasked to conduct public hearings, recommend policies to the President through the SPCPD chairman, and make rules and regulations for the effective and efficient administration of the SZOPAD.
All the efforts of these newly created bodies and administrative structures were designed to create some kind of an enabling environment for a New Regional Autonomous Government (NRAG), envisioned to be an expanded ARMM that would cover clusters of contiguous communities with predominantly Muslim populations. For this purpose, the Philippine Congress was tasked to formulate a law to create the NRAG and amend the Organic Act for the existing ARMM. The enabling environment was not attained as envisioned. Even the time frame for the formulation of the Expanded ARMM law did not take place as scheduled. The bill creating an Expanded ARMM passed in Congress only in the latter part of 2001 and was not signed into law by President Arroyo. It became a law after the period for the presidential imprimatur lapsed after 30 days, thus becoming Republic Act 9054 or the Expanded ARMM Law. A plebiscite was scheduled toward the end of 2002. Despite government campaigning for a yes vote in many provinces in the former SZOPAD, only one more province (Basilan) and an additional city (Marawi) voted to be included in the expanded ARMM. Current realities in the ARMM issues and challenges raised in the MSG discussion In 2000, the five provinces and one city in the ARMM had a population of 2,876,077. (Please refer to Table 1 for a breakdown of the total population by component province and city). As the
Table 1: ARMM population by component province and city, NSO, 2000
Component Province Maguindanao Lanao del Sur Sulu Tawi-tawi Basilan Total Total Philippine Population Population as of May, 2000 801,102 669,072 619,668 322,317 332,828 2,876,077 76,498,735
name of the region suggests, the ARMM population is predominantly Muslim of various ethno-linguistic groups. There are 12 such groups. The most populous include the Maranaw (of the two Lanao provinces); the Maguindanawon from the Cotabato provinces, including Maguindanao; and the Tausug of the Sulu archipelago. The other groups are the following: Sama (Tawi-tawi); Yakan (Basilan); Sangil (Sarangani); Iranun/Illanun (between Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur); the Palawani (Palawan); Kalibugan (Zamboanga peninsula); Kalagan (Davao provinces); Jama Mapun (Cagayan de Sulu island); and Badjaw of Sulu archipelago. Since its creation in 1986, the ARMM has been beset with myriad problems as it struggled to address long-standing grievances among the minority Muslim population. Such grievances include the clamor of Muslims to be considered as a distinct nation, and as such, entitled to the right to self-determination. According to MNLF and MILF leaders, armed struggle has been waged to achieve this right, which has long been denied by the central government. Protracted armed conflict between Philippine government forces and those of the MNLF (from 1970s to early 1990s) have compounded the already negative impact of long years of government neglect of and socially exclusive policies in the predominantly Muslim communities in the region. Many of these communities have known nothing else but poverty, sporadic armed conflict and a life of misery in various evacuation centers. A number of initiatives have been put in place in the ARMM to address the massive needs of its impoverished communities. The signing of the Final Peace Agreement on September 2, 1996 ended more than two decades of armed conflict in various parts of Central and Western Mindanao, including the Sulu archipelago. This landmark event paved the way for various assistance programs to the region, especially from the international donor community. Despite almost a decade of mainly externally-funded development assistance regime, the ARMM still has to exhibit improvements in over-all human development indices. A participant in
Mindanao Study Group estimated that development funds from the central government and external donors roughly total PhP 23 billion every year. But the ARMM has not shown any improvement; instead, it has been pushed further into dismal levels of poverty. It used to be the 4th poorest region in the country, but now it holds the distinction of being no. 1 in terms of the poverty rate! From 1994 to 2000, the regions gross domestic product (GDP) increased by 27%, but poverty levels within that period also went up by 40%. Table 2 below shows the levels of poverty in the ARMM compared with the averages in the country. This is what Atty. Ambolodto refers to as the unbroken thread of impoverishment in the region. From 1997 to 2003, basic human development indicators in the region, as shown in the performance of its component provinces, have steadily deteriorated. Throughout a span of almost ten years, the ARMMs poverty levels have shown that the grant of meaningful autonomy, from the perception of the Philippine national leadership, has not translated to higher per capita income levels to the constituents of the region.
Table 2: Poverty incidence, HDI ranks, and other selected socio-economic indicators in ARMM provinces (culled from Philippine Human Development Report, 2005)
Region/Province Poverty Incidence HDI Rank Per capita income Life Expectancy 1997 2000 2003 1997 2000 2003 1997 2000 2003 1997 2000 2003 Philippines 25.1 27.5 25.7 26,881 27,442 68 69.3 67/72 Basilan 30.2 63.0 65.6 69 74 74 13,026 13,265 59.8 60.2 60.6 Lanao del Sur 40.8 48.1 38.8 73 72 68 15,211 20,016 56 56.9 57.9 Maguindanao 24 36.2 55.8 72 75 76 15,508 14,198 53.2 52.6 52 Sulu 87.5 92.0 88.8 77 77 77 7,675 8,430 51.9 52.3 52.8 Tawi-tawi 52.1 75.3 69.9 75 76 75 11,121 10,780 50.4 50.8 51.2
The ARMM has the worst human development indicators among the 16 regions in the country. In a 2003 World Bank report, the ARMM falls behind the rest of the country in terms of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) introduced by the United Nations in 2000. These goals relate to addressing challenges of poverty, low literacy levels, poor maternal health, gender inequality, and so on. Table 3 (on the next page) shows how the ARMM measures up.
The ARMM & the Peace Process: Imperatives, Challenges & Prospects [49] Table 3. MDG and other indicators of human development in the ARMM (from Human Development for Peace and Prosperity in the ARMM, World Bank, 2003.)
MDG or other indicator Poverty incidence, 2000 Average household income, 2000 (PhP) Life expectancy among women (years) Life expectancy among men (years) Infant mortality, 1995 (per 1000 live births Maternal mortality, 1995 (per 100,000 live births) Net enrolment rate in primary education, 2001 (%) Net enrolment rate in secondary education, 2001 (%)
ARMM 62.9 81,519 59.3 55.5 63 320 82.0 39.2
Whole country 34.0 144,039 71.6 66.3 49 180 96.4 72.2
Rank among 16 regions 16 15 15 15 14 15 15 15
Note: A rank of 1 is the most desirable outcome. Data come from 16 regions; there is no data yet for Region XIII (Caraga).
Issues related to land continue to haunt the ARMM. Land is a substantive item on the agenda of the current peace talks since the 1996 Final Peace Agreement did not address this issue. For example, how do we deal with military settlements like Awang and Camp Abubakar in Maguindanao? As one participant opined, it seems that every time there is a peace accord, it leads to the loss of Moro lands or lands the Moro peoples have traditionally occupied or settled. Another issue has to deal with the perception widely held by Bangsamoro intellectuals on whether the creation of the ARMM is legitimate. Since the creation of the ARMM is attributed largely to the national government, many Bangsamoro think of it as an imposition by an alien government, or what is being referred to in the Maguindanawon vernacular as gubilnu a sarewang a tau, (a government of strange people). Corollary to this is another perception that the Bangsamoro will not work in such a way to make the ARMM fully functional, even for their own ends. After all, the creation of the region is not the handiwork of the Bangsamoro, but of the national government. Let the national government make it work then.
The Organic Act that created the ARMM in 1987 (RA 6734) listed or enumerated the regions powers. In the latter RA 9054 that expanded the areas covered by the ARMM, the powers not entitled to the autonomous region are specified. This implies that residual powers are with the region and NOT with the national government in Manila. Moreover, there is a question about the proper interpretation of RA 9054. Does the Act provide for a mere decentralization or is it devolution? RA 9054 also clearly stipulates renunciation of armed struggle as a political option. Despite its shortcomings, RA 9054 deserves to be given more careful study since it seems that both Regional Legislative Assembly (RLA) members and other key ARMM officials have failed to maximize whatever benefits or opportunities were made available by this law. Imperatives and Prospects It is widely recognized that the ARMM needs all the help it can get to put its act together and showcase the benefits of decentralization and strengthening of local government institutions toward sustainable development. There is an urgent need to forge a better system of governance for the Bangsamoro. As one participant stressed, there is not much room for repeating the mistakes of the past. What forms of outside pressure could be used to improve governance in the ARMM? One participant answered with another question: Should national government and aid agencies threaten to turn off the spigot of assistance? This is because the control of funds is critical in making sure the funds are used for genuine value-added projects and other concerns that redound to the welfare of the regions impoverished constituents. For the Mindanao Study Group, there is a need to synthesize ideas and previous studies on the ARMM, especially those that look at the experience of autonomy over the years. This project could look at what has worked and not worked, lessons learned and best practices, if ever there are, in running an autonomous region.
Despite the dark clouds, so to speak, there is still a lot of silver lining for the ARMM. Basically, we can look at two windows of opportunities in improving governance in the region. First is the overwhelming victory of Datu Zaldy Puti Ampatuan as the new regional governor. Atty. Ambolodto argues that Datu Putis victory was a manifestation of consensus among the highest echelon of local government units, i.e. the provincial levels. Whatever the means by which this consensus was forged, either by preponderance of the forces of Datu Putis powerful political family or by gentle persuasion from the presidential palace, is no longer an issue. What is important is that this consensus can be a building block for some positive developments in the beleaguered region. For instance, Datu Puti is said to be the only regional governor to have required that the Regional Legislative Assembly members draft a specific and responsive legislative agenda. Because of the enormous support given to him by the RLA it is most likely he will get the RLA members moving quickly to accede to his request. Still, there are some misgivings. Some observers question whether Datu Putis election as governor is a real opportunity for reforms. One participant argued that it might be that everyone is afraid of Datu Puti or the political clan he represents. There is a need to know what his real intentions are, what skills and abilities he has and whether on the whole, he will deliver the goods for ARMMs improvement. The current peace process between the MILF and the GRP is the second window of opportunity for ARMMs deliverance. Such a process, which is touted to be a much improved version of the first one with the MNLF, could create a stronger structure of autonomy and could possibly bring greater honesty and competence. However, we need to look at the track record of MILF in governance. Dr. Jose Abueva has defined good governance as the sustained capacity of the government and related political institutions to make and carry out timely policies and decisions that effectively respond to our problems, challenges and goals as a nation. In this context, can we apply the concept of good governance to the MILF? What has been its
track record at Camp Abubakar and other areas under its influence? How does it govern the territories under its control? Will it govern differently than the previous leadership in the ARMM? If the MILF fails, will the discontentment created by failure in governance find new channels among lawless elements like the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)? The MILF does have a governance structure and even a system of justice. Still, when the group talks about the corruption of the moral fiber as one of the serious problems besetting the Bangsamoro people, its meaning is not quite clear. In taking a deeper look at governance, we need to examine other factors or indicators. What has been the role, for example, of religion in promoting good governance? Among the Ulama (Council of Learned Men in Islam), secular issues like politics and governance are not given emphasis in the khutbah (sermons during Friday congregational prayers). The Ulama in general are not politicized. Political Islam is not a problem in southern Philippines. The great scholar Cesar Adib Majul once remarked that Islam is primitive in the Philippines. Islamic governance is a notion that is not quite clear to many Muslims. Moreover, there are existing clan-related issues like rido that the Ulama have to take into consideration; they tend to shun criticism of clan members who are known to be stealing government funds. In many cases, they might even justify stealing government funds because it is money from an alien government. However, some Ulama members did play a big role during the last elections. They reminded people about honesty and integrity of their votes in their khutbah before the elections. They exhorted the faithful to vote and guard their votes for any possibility of cheating. This point led the discussion to a point raised about the possibility of engaging the religious sector among the Bangsamoro to get involved and advocate for temporal issues like good governance and political reforms. One experience that can be used as a point of reference is the fatwa (decree) issued by some members of the Ulama on the advocacy for reproductive health. It was packaged not so much as a reproductive
health advocacy but as promoting maternal health to be more acceptable. In Islam, mothers are given a very prominent position in terms of respect and honor from family members. As expected, some ulama were not quite happy about the fatwa. However, this experience showed it is possible to engage the Ulama with advocacies of highly temporal or secular issues. But a caveat must be observed in engaging them. We must consider the hierarchy of the Ulama (from the Grand Mufti down) and the messages for the advocacies must be packaged appropriately, taking into account cultural and religious sensitivities. There is also a need to look at all these issues in relation to the proposed Charter Change. For example, the 1987 Philippine Constitution stipulates the separation of Church and State. In Islam, there is no such separation. Moreover, tensions that have arisen from the provisions included in the proposed Charter Change especially those that create friction among Muslims must be addressed. If and when the MILF is given the chance to govern the autonomous region under a new set-up, there is a need for its members to guard against a club mentality and to be conscious of the principles of inclusion, i.e. the inclusion of other groups in the new governance structure. Such a structure could be a possible Bangsamoro Juridical Entity but as of now, this is still a concept that needs to have a form and essence. But this concept is worth considering in the light of a possible final peace agreement to be signed between the MILF and the GRP. Increasing the levels of public discourse on this concept can lead to a possible fleshing out of the basic elements of this proposed governance modality. The participants in the MSG discussion arrived at the following consensus points to make the ARMM move forward to improve governance and achieve a more politically and economically stable region: Maximize the opportunities provided by RA 9054. Assert all rights of the Bangsamoro under this organic law. The powers granted to ARMM in RA 9054 are so much better than those proposed under a future federal law. There is a serious need to consider generating more revenue
for the region. Regional officials cannot talk about reforms if they are not assured they have enough money of their own. They cannot be begging for development funds all the time. They should come up with mechanisms for economic selfreliance. To start with, the ARMM has resource-rich land and water, and has enormous human resources, but these have not been tapped to their full potential. Agriculture and fisheries should be among the priority areas for development. There is also a need for all the external support in terms of development aid to succeed. Along this line, a study could be made on the best practices and lessons learned in development assistance. The region has a good mid-level bureaucrat profile, whose talents and energies need to be fully tapped. These midlevel bureaucrats are quite idealistic, have deep commitment and eager for real work. Some of them have undergone all sorts of training, even with elite institutions like the Asian Institute of Management in Makati. Thus there is a need to maximize the full potentials of these middle level managers to push the region to attain sustainable peace and development. One problem: their bosses tend to spend most of their time doing a lot of politicking in the corridors of power in Metro Manila, instead of development work at home.
Toward a framework for good governance in the ARMM The ARMM, both in its original and expanded forms, manifests the envisioned decentralization of local or regional units of the Philippine national bureaucracy. As such, it holds much promise for improving regional governance as well as developing the only autonomous regional government structure in the country. However, such a special position is also fraught with myriad problems. Many bureaucracies in newly democratizing Third World countries are currently experiencing crisis after crisis attributable mainly to weak governance and the lack of political will as well as massive allegations of graft and corruption among leaders of these countries. In
a paper on the role of civil society in democratic countries, John Clark (2003) refers to these negative phenomena as democracy deficits. Clark argues that it is these so-called democracy deficits that have made civil society organizations popular these organizations are the ones performing functions that are otherwise the mandate of line agencies within the government bureaucracy. To address such deficits, Clark posits the four pillars of good governance in any bureaucracy. These are: transparency, accountability; a sound judicial system, and people participation. The first two pillars relate to the extent to which those in power must justify, substantiate and make known their actions and decisions. It also includes government mechanisms that promote devolution, following the principle of subsidiarity and the responsiveness of socio-political structures that elicit and promote community involvement in the affairs of the local government structure whether it is a barangay, municipality, province or a regional government, as in the case of the ARMM. The third pillar relates to the creation of structures that promote social justice and equity, and provision of sanctions for both government functionaries and constituents alike who violate the rules and regulations of these structures. People participation in governance is both a means and an end in creating a sense of ownership among constituents, thereby leading to a healthy relationship between the governed and those who govern. It redounds to improved governance since maximum participation of the governed means that they are willing to commit to make government work efficiently and effectively. It is also a fulfillment of the rights of the people to participate in political processes that will contribute to their own welfare. Participation supports the criteria of transparency and accountability since it allows citizens to make their own decisions at the village, municipality, province or regional levels. In this sense, making people participate in the processes of governance will lead to their empowerment. According to Friedman (in Gardner and Lewis, 1996: 117-118) empowerment is fundamental to an alternative development
that placesemphasis on autonomy in the decision-making of territorially organized communities, local self-reliance (but not autarky), direct (participatory) democracy, and experiential social learning. Its starting point is the locality, because civil society is most readily mobilized around local issues. For the ARMM, there is a need to use a framework that captures the unique situation of the region vis--vis the Philippine national government. The ARMM was created not only to distribute power from a highly centralized national government but more importantly to address centuries-old grievances among the marginalized Muslims and other indigenous groups in the region. These populations have long been excluded from the mainstream through various policies of exclusion and discriminatory legislations that go way back to the two colonial administrations of Spain and the US. There is a need to recognize these realities in framing good governance for the ARMM. A more appropriate framework for good governance in the ARMM needs to consider two important additional points first, the regions rich cultural diversity and second, gender issues and concerns. The former is an imperative in a region that has seen so much conflict and divisiveness. Armed non-state actors among the Bangsamoro have challenged the highly centralized Philippine nation-state since the unilateral inclusion of the Bangsamoro homeland by the colonial masters. Failure to understand the root causes of the Bangsamoro resistance that continues to the present will lead to unresponsive regional governance. The issues associated with gender in the bureaucracy are quite controversial, as far as the predominantly male bureaucrats in the region are concerned. This, however, is not unique to the ARMM; the Philippines as a country has not been known to give prominence to womens issues and concerns despite the fact that a special body has been organized at the national level to look into these concerns the National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women. The country has produced a good number of female bureaucrats. And it is one of only two countries in Southeast Asia that have had a woman leader, two of them, in fact. Interestingly, both women assumed the presidential post after the ouster of their discredited male predecessors.
Despite this rather impressive record, the Philippines gender empowerment indicators still tip the balance in favor of the males of its population. It was only in 1937 that Filipino women were granted the right to vote (Pongsapich, 2005). The present Philippine House of Representatives (Lower House) is predominantly male only 12.5% are women, out of more than 200 members. The 23-member Senate (Upper House) has only four women senators. In the ARMM, a regional counterpart of NCRFW has been established the Regional Commission on Bangsamoro Women (RCBW). Both bodies aim to increase womens participation in governance and to mainstream gender concerns in the bureaucracy. Sadly, up to this writing, such aims still remain elusive dreams for half of the population of the region. The regional public administration, like that of the national government, is still pervaded by a culture that reflects and promotes the interests of men rather than women. Structurally and ideally, the ARMM is a good example of a decentralized mechanism toward the broad distribution of political power, enabling the regional government to be more responsive to the needs of the poor and the disadvantaged in the region. Local representatives and administrators are in the best position to know the exact nature of the needs of local people, including most especially the needs of marginalized and impoverished indigenous cultural communities and how these needs can be met in the most cost-effective way (see Turner and Hulme, 1997). These attributes could have paved the way for ARMM to develop more rapidly and thus become politically stable. As it turned out, past ARMM administrations fell short of the goals of democratic decentralization. Using Clarks framework for good governance, the ARMM, both in its original and expanded forms, is replete with the so-called democracy deficits weak governance has led to abject poverty of its peoples and very low levels of human development indicators like literacy, access to basic social and health services, and opportunities to catch up with the majority Filipino population (see World Bank report, 2003). Its lack of political will has paved the way for a mendicancy mode prevailing among regional bureaucrats, whose behavior appears to be aimed more at pleasing the
powers-that-be in Manila rather than their constituencies at home. To top it all, allegations of widespread graft and corruptin among regional officials have led to massive cynicism (Ambolodto, 2006), both among local and national opinion makers. In terms of practicing cultural diversity, the ARMM has made strides in recognizing the important role of indigenous peoples and the lowland Christians of different ethnicities who have made the region their homeland too. Thus the ARMM has offices for the deputy governor for indigenous peoples (IPs) and another deputy governor for the Christians. However, appointing persons to these positions is not enough. There is a need to provide financial, administrative and over-all logistical and technical support to the offices of these deputy governors if they are to carry out programs to improve governance among their respective sectors. It can be argued that as a decentralized structure, the ARMM is only as good as the national government bureaucracy that engendered it. When assessed using Clarkes criteria and using the additional requirements of cultural diversity and gender, the national government clearly falls short of all these. Transparency, accountability, stringent and sound judicial systems and procedures and people participation in governance are practiced more in the breach than in performance. There is wide public outcry on the lack of all these things in the national government and a massive pessimism pervades among the majority and minority populations. The MILF-GRP Peace process is proceeding in earnest, despite some setbacks and allegations of ceasefire violations on both sides. Just recently, some armed encounters took place in at least four municipalities in Maguindanao, and the MILF had been singled out to be one of the protagonists in this new round of hostilities. Even so, the signing of a Peace Agreement between the two parties is now considered highly imminent. Prof. Aboud Syed Lingga has noted that the peace process is an opportunity to negotiate with the national government for things that the ARMM can do, rather than being given a listing of restrictions. In
this way, the ARMM can negotiate for other possible areas of practicing genuine autonomy. This optimism is quite laudable still, it remains to be seen whether the things touted to be quite innovative in the administration of Datu Puti will translate into over-all good governance in the region. There are too many intervening variables that might scuttle these two windows of opportunities for better governance in the ARMM. At this stage, it is still too early to tell. In addition, there is a bright prospect for a more rationalized governance structure that can be forged out of the floated concept of a Bangsamoro Juridical Entity. However, this is contingent on the signing of an MILF-GRP Final Peace Agreement. References Cited Ambolodto, Suharto (2006). Politics and Governance in Muslim Mindanao, a paper presentation at the January 13 meeting of the Mindanao Study Group, Estosan Hotel, Cotabato City. Clark, John (2003). Governance and Civil Society in a Globalized World. Paper delivered at the International Conference on Public Administration Plus Governance. 21-23 October, Manila Hotel, Philippines. Gardner, Katy and David Lewis. Anthropology, Development and the Post-Modern Challenge. London: Pluto Press, 1996. Muslim, Macapado and Rufa Cagoco-Guiam (1999). Mindanao Land of Promise in Compromising on Autonomy Mindanao in Transition in Accord An International Review of Peace Initiatives. London: Conciliation Resources. Pongsapich, Amara (2005). Gender Scorecard and Human Development in Southeast Asia, a paper presented at the Fourth ASEAN Peoples Assembly. 11-13 May, EDSA Shangri-La Hotel, Mandaluyong
City, Philippines. . The World Bank Human Development Sector Unit. East Asia and Pacific Region (2003). Human Development for Peace and Prosperity in the ARMM. Turner, Mark and David Hulme (1997). Governance, Administration and Development. Making the State Work. Connecticut, USA: The Kumarian Press. United Nations Development Programme (2005). The Philippine Human Development Report. Manila, Philippines: UNDP.
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Charter Change and the Mindanao Peace Process

Zainudin Malang* Introduction The past year has seen important, even dramatic, developments on two processes of utmost national importance. One process seeks to revise the fundamental law of the land, the form of government, and the structure of the republic. The other process seeks to resolve the longest running armed conflict in the country. On December 16, 2005, after three months of deliberations and consultations and almost four months after it was created, the 55-member ConCom1 submitted to President Gloria Macapacal-Arroyo (PGMA) its proposed revisions to the 1987 Constitution.2 Thereafter, PGMA was supposed to transmit the revisions to Congress for the latters consideration3 since she has manifested her preference for a Constituent Assembly as the mechanism for Cha-Cha.4 Supporters of Cha-Cha are seeking to have a revised constitution already in effect before the scheduled 2007 elections, notwithstanding the many opponents of ChaCha, including those in the upper house of Congress or Senate. Amidst all the developments over the past half-year relating to Cha-Cha initiatives, the Mindanao Peace Process has likewise seen dramatic developments, particularly the negotiations between the respective panels of the government (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). As early as April of 2005, both panels had
*Zainudin Malang is Executive Director, Moro Law and Policy Center.
announced a breakthrough in their negotiations.5 In October, a leaked agreement or consensus points gave the public an idea of how much headway the parties had achieved and how close they were to a peace agreement, particularly on the single most contentious substantive item in their negotiations - ancestral domain and its four strands (concept, territory, resources, and governance). In statements to the press and public, both panels predicted the signing of a peace agreement as early as mid-2006. These two processes, which will undeniably have a direct impact on the lives of the peoples of Mindanao, actually overlap with regard to the issues and policy areas they seek to resolve.6 The proposed constitutional provisions on federalism, autonomy, parliamentary form of government, and natural resources contain concepts that are closely related to the issues of self-determination, ancestral domain, and resources, which are subject of GRP-MILF negotiations. The Mindanao Study Group (MSG) has therefore seen fit to discuss Cha-Cha with the following questions in mind: Cha-Cha and its impact on the Mindanao Peace Process, and vice-versa Cha-Cha and its impact on the present autonomous set-up in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Cha-Cha and its impact on the resources of the Bangsamoro
To provide the group with insights on the ConComs deliberations, dynamics, and final report, the MSG requested Dr. Jose Abueva, who chaired the ConCom, to be its resource speaker. Soliman Santos was asked to give the reaction. Concoms Proposed Changes in the Charter Concom Chair Jose Abueva focused on the provisions of the Proposed Revisions to the 1987 Constitution pertaining to autonomy and the shift to a federal structure of the republic. As envisioned under the ConComs Proposed Constitution, the establishment of a federal republic would be the result of a long-process.
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The first stage involves an exercise of self-determination, where contiguous provinces petition the parliament to declare them an autonomous territory. Thereafter, parliament will enact an organic act devolving powers to that territory. Parliament has no discretion on what shape to give the autonomous territories. The Proposed Constitution would mandate that parliament grant primary legislative powers to the autonomous territories over the following policy areas: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. administrative organization, planning, budget and management; creation of sources of revenues and finance; agriculture and fisheries; natural resources, energy, environment, indigenous appropriate technologies and inventions; trade, industry, and tourism; labor and employment; public works, transportation, except railways, shipping and aviation; health and social welfare; education and the development of language, culture and the arts as part of the cultural heritage; ancestral domain and natural resources; housing, land use and development; urban and rural planning and development; and, such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the autonomous territory.
When 60% of the countries provinces, and highly urbanized and component cities have been autonomized, parliament is mandated to enact a federal law whereby such autonomous territories will become federal states.7 The process which the Philippines will have to go through to set-up a federal republic is unconventional. Under the conventional process, several states establish themselves or have established
themselves first before they decide to federate (or confederate) and establish a federal republic. The unconventional process involves a country already existing as a unitary republic to transform by splitting itself up into several states, and then coming together again as a federation. Since the Philippines already exists as a unitary state, its transformation into a federal republic will not be direct, but will be preceded by a decision of the regions of this unitary state to become autonomous. Only when 60% of the country has become autonomous can it transform itself into a federal republic. Absent this requirement, the original proposal was to provide for a ten-year transition period after the ratification of the Proposed Constitution for the formation of a federal republic. But the members of the ConCom eventually decided to make the transformation conditional rather than time-bound. The proposal for a federal set-up was not without obstacles during the deliberations and consultations of the ConCom. First, although the President created the body to support her agenda for a shift to a parliamentary federal form of government, the members she appointed to the ConCom were not necessarily in favor of federalism. When they made a head-count, there were more anti-federalism members than those who favored it. The two-tiered shift to a federal republic under the Proposed Constitution was a concession to the anti-feds. Second, the ConCom encountered a lot of opposition from local government units (LGUs) while it was conducting its consultations. LGUs feared that regional power centerseither autonomous territories or federal stateswill dilute their powers and add another layer between them and the national government. They were unsure as to how the regional powers were to be constituted and how it will affect their own powers. The federalists offered the clarification that the purpose of either autonomous or federal set-up was to enhance local autonomy and devolution of powers. Parliament would not have any discretion on what shape to give to either the autonomous territory or the federal state. The Proposed Constitution enumerates the powers which parliament is mandated to give to the territories under its organic act.
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Charter Change and the Mindanao Peace Process Soliman Santos focused on the provisions of the Proposed Constitution pertaining to the shift from unitary to federal structure of the republic8 , looking at these provisions from the perspective of the Mindanao Peace Process9 . By asking how do the proposed changes in the Structure of the Republic relate positively or negatively to the Mindanao Peace Process, he offered the following insights: Federalism Bearing in mind that the shift to federalism is mainly a question of central-regional relations encompassing the whole country and only addresses only secondarily the question of Republic-Bangsamoro relations, advocates of federalism as a possible solution to the Mindanao conflict must not readily assume that a federal shift per se will help settle the conflict. Granted, there is a need to dovetail Cha-Cha and the peace process, but whether or not federalism under the Cha-Cha will actually reinforce the peace process depends on the specific constitutional arrangements of a federal set-up. New constitutional arrangements are required to restructure the relationship between the Republic and the Bangsamoro. However, the Proposed Constitution does not go into the specific arrangements of federalism, leaving it to be determined by a basic law to be enacted by parliament. In fact, the center of gravity for shaping the federal set-up is parliament, not the constitution. In effect, the federal states, including the Bangsamoro, will be at the mercy of parliament because it can amend that law anytime. On the other hand, prescribing federalism as a new constitutional arrangement to restructure the relationship between the Republic and the Bangsamoro even while the GRP-MILF negotiations are ongoing is a cause of concern. It implies unilateralism on the side of the GRP that may actually preempt agreements between the GRP-MILF panels or prejudice the political solutions which they have yet to agree upon.
Autonomy Although envisioned as a stepping stone to federalism, autonomy may have other merits. It is good that autonomy is being considered for other regions, not just to the Bangsamoro and the Cordilleras. However, autonomy and federalism can be combined not just sequentially but also spatially. The former can be a sub-set of the latter or vice-versa, e.g. federalism for the whole country and autonomy for a unique region like Muslim Mindanao. With regards to the ARMM, of utmost concern is the risk of diminution of its powers under the Proposed Constitution since the Autonomous Territories (AT) contemplated will enjoy less powers than those currently enjoyed by the ARMM. Since the ARMM already exists as an autonomous region with its own Organic Act, the provisions on AT of the Proposed Constitution should not apply to it. Further, given that the GRP and MNLF did not contemplate federalism, what will happen to the 1996 peace agreement under Cha-Cha? Although the ongoing GRP-MILF negotiations and the forging of a new constitutional arrangement may or may not lead to federalism, the evident failures and inadequacies of the peace agreement and the ARMM as instruments of peace and development should be studied and its lessons identified. And should the shift to federalism advance, there should be an in-depth assessment of the ARMM experience to inform the first phase of that shift, i.e., the formation of autonomous territories for other regions of the country. Other Cha-Cha Concerns The whole proposed revised constitution will have to be viewed and the best possible proposals for Cha-Cha will have to be made from the perspective of the Mindanao Peace Process, especially since the clash between Islamic concepts and existing constitutional principles has yet to be resolved. Alternative constitutional approaches should be explored. Adopting the concepts of one country, two systems (as in Hong Kong and China) and treaty constitutionalism, which gives peace agreements a constitutional status, are some of the proposals.
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There are three sets of best possible proposals for Cha-Cha from the Mindanao Peace Process: new constitutional policies that confer importance to peace processes and cultural diversity, e.g. separation of church and state; new provisions for special arrangements, e.g. affirmative action; political-electoral reforms that have a bearing on the MPP, e.g. referenda or plebiscites. The different dynamics, key actors, and time frames of three parallel and converging tracks the MPP (both with the MILF and the MNLF), Cha-Cha, and the political crisis besetting President Macapagal-Arroyo - will have to be resolved. For instance, if the GRP-MILF negotiations cannot be completed before the final draft of the new constitution is prepared, perhaps Cha-Cha can be formulated in a way that would flexibly cover future outcome of the peace process. Discussion Cha-Cha and its Impact on the Mindanao Peace Process, and ViceVersa Echoing Santos comment, Astrid Tuminez and Abhoud Lingga opined that moves towards federalism might pre-empt the Bangsamoros exercise of the right to self-determination. Lingga said that instead of rushing Cha-Cha, we should follow the Bougainville formula of waiting for the peace pact first and then incorporating it in the charter change. Santos added that if the Cha-Cha is not informed by the peace process, the resulting constitution may contain provisions inconsistent with, and therefore problematic to, the peace pact. Suharto Ambolodto noted that the GRP-MILF panels have yet to agree on what shape to give to the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) that is mentioned in their interim agreements. He suggested a generally worded provision providing for either incorporation or recognition of a future peace pact in the new constitution. Amina Rasul-Bernardo recalled that in consultations she conducted in the ARMM, the consensus was that there must be further consultations on Cha-Cha with the two liberation fronts, the MILF and MNLF. Abueva replied that the MILF did not want to show their
hand in the negotiations; hence, they did not provide the ConCom with guidance that the latter could have factored in its work. Elaborating on his earlier comments about the need to redefine or restructure relations between the Republic and the Bangsamoro, Santos suggested that the Cha-Cha should be seized as a forum to confront the majority with the concept of two-nations, one country. Zainudin Malang added that past and existing constitutions suffered from a democratic deficit because of the failure to adopt this concept. The one-nation country concept adopted by past constitutions made the minority peoples subservient to the political decisions of the majority. This prevented the formulation of a viable constitutional framework that defined the relations of the Bangsamoro as a distinct nation not only with the Philippine state but also with the Christian majority. However, Tuminez thought that its a losing strategy to concentrate on the fight for a constitutional provision denoting the Bangsamoro as a nation distinct and separate from other Filipinos. Although this is a worthy goal, it will likely whip up further prejudice and anger among the majority and hurt Moro chances of advancing their concrete interests. To this, Abueva added that even within the ConCom, the shift to federalism itself was opposed by those who feared that it would fragment the country and encourage secession. On the issue of a forging a multicultural constitution, Rufa Guiam and Abueva suggested that maybe the Philippines needs to adopt the example of China, where the plurality of nations within the country is recognized. Guiam, observed during her trips to China that leaders there had the political will to recognize social and cultural diversity. Along that line, Abueva wondered if the definition of Indigenous Peoples (IP) in the Philippines includes the Bangsamoro; if so, the Proposed Constitution provides for a certain degree of flexibility in recognizing the rights of IPs. Ambolodto clarified that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, ConCon Delegate Michael Mastura tried to introduce a provision that would have recognized Islamic traditions and beliefs, but this was voted down. Fatima Kanakan added that acceptance of the Bangsamoro as a distinct nation and identity among Filipinos still has a long way to go. She recalled that in one forum in Thailand that she attended, the delegates from Luzon were shocked when she identified herself as a Moro.
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Procedural or methodology issues also elicited some comments. Rasul-Bernardo opined that a Constitutional Convention (ConCon) is better than a constituent assembly that is likely to be dominated by business interests and big landowners. In addition, the ConCom as well as the Constituent Assembly (ConAss) to be convened are, and will be mired in the existing political crisis besetting PGMA. Abueva replied that it will not make any difference even if the Cha-Cha methodology is through a ConCon because it is still the local power structures and their relatives that will get elected as delegates to the convention. In fact, the entire country is ruled by an oligarchy and Cha-Cha, though not a panacea, is the first step in redistributing power. On the shift to federalism, Santos was concerned that its the parliament, rather than the constitution, that will define the federal setup, thereby reducing federalism to a mere legislative enactment rather than organic to the polity10 If the federal set-up cannot be enshrined in the Constitution itself, Bacani and Ambolodto suggested that a bottomup shift to federalism be adopted, i.e., let the legislatures of the autonomous territories draft the federal design or charter. Abueva replied that given the fear within ConCom and Congress that federalism will lead to fragmentation, demanding that the federal set-up be enshrined in the constitution or a bottom-up process be adopted would be tantamount to asking for the moon. In any case, the presence of local representatives or members in parliament will ensure that local sentiments will inform the drafting of a future federal structure. Cha-Cha and its impact on the present autonomous set-up in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) After pointing out that the enumeration of powers under the Proposed Constitution11 essentially copies that of Batas Pambansa Blg. 20,12 Ambolodto raised his concern that the Proposed Constitution may unintentionally reduce the powers already enjoyed by the ARMM. The ARMM presently enjoys plenary legislative powers under its Organic Act.13 Further, although there is an enumeration of excepted powers,14 this is qualified by a phrase which says that notwithstanding the limitation on the powers of the Regional Assemblyit may enact laws that promote the general welfare of the people of the autonomous region.15 On the
other hand, the ConCom adopted the reverse approach by enumerating the powers that will be enjoyed by the ATs. Outside of that enumeration, the ATs have no power to legislate. Echoing this observation, Santos added that it would have been better if the Proposed Constitution contained a general recognition of autonomy with a bill of exceptions. Abueva replied that the whole spirit behind federalism is to enhance regional or local autonomy, not to diminish it. So the ARMM will continue to enjoy the powers it presently possesses. In fact, there is a provision in the Proposed Constitution to that effect.16 In addition, the ConCom made sure that the ATs would be powerful vis--vis the national government. The enumeration of legislative powers of ATs is basically a draft of the organic act of the ATs that parliament cannot derogate. However, the ConCom refrained from proposing details about the structure of the governments of the ATs. Abueva mentioned that there was a panel of ARMM representatives in the consultation they held in Davao City. Lingga noted that under the Proposed Constitution, the creation of ATs is initiated through a petition filed with parliament by contiguous LGUs.17 He preferred the use of the term negotiate rather than petition to which Abueva agreed. The former term connotes parity between those who aspire to be ATs and parliament because when you negotiate, you negotiate as equals. Cha-Cha and its impact on the resources of the Bangsamoro Expressing her concerns about economic liberalization, Guiam asked Abueva to confirm if there are any changes to the 1987 Constitution on economic liberalization under the ConComs Proposed Constitution. He replied that public utilities, land ownership, higher learning, advertising and mass media, and natural resources would be opened up to foreigners. Although the ARMM gets a share in the proceeds of exploitation of natural resources within its domain, Rasul-Bernardo pointed out that the ARMM still lacks ownership over its strategic natural resources. Thus, she is concerned that the ARMM would lose out in the proposed constitutional change to open up ownership of natural resources and
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land to foreigners. Tuminez, however, suggested that the country should not be too reluctant to take in foreign capital because ARMM and the Philippines as a whole are capital-starved. Assets lay dormant and investment is needed to pu these assets to use. The key is for government, including the ARMM, to tax the productivity resulting from foreign investment and use the proceeds honestly and effectively to improve the lives of common citizens. Bacani asked the body to consider the possible impact of these economic provisions on the peace process and the ARMM. Given that the displacement of the Bangsamoro from their lands is one of the main causes of the conflict, he asked what impact these provisions might have on resolving the GRP-MILF the conflict. Malang pointed out that there is a clash between the Regalian doctrine and the Bangsamoros indigenous concepts of land ownership and utilization. That doctrine has been used as a basis for the governments resettlement program. Thus, he is concerned that this concept has been retained without qualification under the Proposed Constitution.18 Continued adherence to the Regalian doctrine would preclude the Bangsamoro from controlling the natural resources within their ancestral domain. Tuminez wondered if the present laws on ancestral domain are sufficient to address the grievances of the Bangsamoro over their land claims. Kanakan replied that the government itself is an instrument of land divestment against indigenous peoples. Even the system of recognizing ancestral domain is not sensitive to the limited capabilities of IPs to meet the requirements for the issuance of titles and imposes an undue burden on them. She also cited instances of abusing the system through the bribery of IP communities. Tuminez opined that these problems may be due to the heavy reliance of the titling procedure on documentation. That may in turn be due to the legalistic mentality of the bureaucracy, Abueva added. Consensus Points 1. Dovetailing Cha-Cha and the Mindanao Peace Process To prevent the Cha-Cha from pre-empting the Peace Process,
the group adopted a two-pronged approach in their advocacy. The first approach is to advocate for a catch-all provision that would allow the incorporation or accommodation of a future peace agreement in the Proposed Constitution. Santos proposed provision is worded as follows: Notwithstanding the provisions of this constitution and national laws, there should be accommodated and implemented the comprehensive peace agreements between the Government of the Philippines and the recognized representatives of the Bangsamoro people, which peace agreement shall have constitutional status as defining, among others, the relations of constitutional association between the Republic and the Filipino people, on one hand, and the Bangsamoro people, on the other hand. The second approach, assuming the catch-all provision is not adopted, is to strengthen the provisions of the Proposed Constitution to favor the ATs, even if it means examining each and every provision that has an impact on the peace process. For instance: replace the word petition with negotiate as the operative act that will initiate the establishment of ATs; replace the enumeration of powers of the ATs with a bill of excepted powers; qualify the constitutional separation of church and state to accommodate Islamic principles on church/state relations.
2. Method of Engaging the Cha-Cha and Peace Process Given that the members of Congress, sitting as a Constituent Assembly, will most likely be the ones to prepare a final draft of the Proposed Constitution, and given their role in the implementation of a future GRP-MILF peace agreement, the group agreed that it would be important to mobilize Mindanao legislators and elicit their support.
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3. The MSG as a study group and not a lobby group. In mobilizing Mindanao legislators, the Mindanao Study Group does not intend to form a lobby. Instead, its purpose is to conduct serious research and analysis, and seek to inform legislators and the public at large of findings and recommendation relevant to the constitutional debate in the Philippines. The members of the group may nonetheless advocate for specific positions in their capacity as individuals.
Endnotes Presidential Consultative Commission to Propose the Revision of the 1987 Constitution (ConCom). The CONCOM was created by virtue of Executive Order No. 453, signed by the President on August 19, 2005, with an express mandate to conduct consultations and studies and propose amendments and revisions to the 1987 Constitution. See Sec. 8, E.O. 453. The Committee on Constitutional Amendments of the House of Representatives seems to have started its deliberations on Cha-Cha but in preparing its working draft of the proposed Constitution, it did not limit itself to the proposals of the ConCom which it treated as mere reference material but utilized other sources as well. The House of Representatives had earlier echoed this preference in a resolution passed on November 29, 2005. The 1987 Constitution allows Congress to convene itself as a Constitutent Assembly by a vote of three fourths of its members. The other mechanisms to propose constitutional changes to the people are Constitutional Convention and Peoples Initiative although the latter still requires an enabling law which the Supreme Court declared has yet to be enacted. See Secs. 1 & 2, Article XVII, 1987 Constitution. Joint Statement of the Peace Panels on the 7th Round of GRP-MILF Exploratory Talks in Malaysia, April 20, 2005, Port Dickson, Malaysia.
5 4 3 2 1
Principally, the Concom was to look at the following proposals: (a) the shift from the presidential-unitary system to a parliamentary-federal system of government; (b) to refocus economic policies in the Constitution to match the countrys vision for global competitiveness; (c) to review economic policies which tend to hinder the countrys global competitiveness and adversely affect the peoples welfare. See Sec. 1, E.0. 453.
7
Sec. 15, Article XX, Proposed Constitution.
As contained in Articles X and XX of the Proposed Constitution. Atty. Santos offered the caveat that these provisions have yet to be processed either by Congress sitting as a Constituent Assembly or by a Constitutional Convention and may therefore still go through some modifications. Atty. Santos uses the phrase Mindanao Peace Process to refer specifically, but not exclusively, to the ongoing GRP-MILF negotiations and the implementation of the 1996 GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement. Santos prefers the draft constitution prepared by the Citizens Movement for a Federal Philippines (CMFP) and wonders why its provisions were not incorporated in the ConComs Proposed Constitution notwithstanding the presence of many CMFP members in the ConCom.
11 10 9
See Sec. 16, Art. XII, Proposed Constitution.
B.P. 20 provided for the creation of the Sangguniang Pampook for Regions IX and XII, which was part of a series of steps taken by the GRP in its unilateral implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement. The Sangguniang Pampook was the putative regional legislature. All of the present ARMM provinces were part of then-Region IX and XII.
13
12
Republic Act No. 9054. Sec. 3, Art. IV, R.A. 9054. Sec. 4, Art. IV, R.A. 9054.
14
15

16
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Sec. 14, Art. XX of the Proposed Constitution provides that the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao shall exercise the powers and shall be entitled to benefits given to autonomous territories.
17
See Sec. 12, Art. XII, Proposed Constitution.
All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. (Sec. 1, Art. XIV, Proposed Constitution)
18
Discussion References: 1987 Constitution. Executive Order No. 453, August 19, 2005. Presidential Consultative Commission to Propose the Revision of the 1987 Constitution, Proposed Revision of the 1987 Constitution. Committee on the Form of Government, Presidential Consultative Commission to Propose the Revision of the 1987 Constitution, Highlights on the Proposed Amendments to Article VI (The Legislative Department) and Article VII (Executive Department) of the 1987 Constitution. Committee on the Structure of the Republic, Presidential Consultative Commission to Propose the Revision of the 1987 Constitution, Highlights on the Proposed Amendments to Article X (Local Government) of the 1987 Constitution. Committee on National Patrimony and Economic Reforms, Presidential Consultative Commission to Propose the Revision of the 1987 Constitution, Highlights on the Proposed Amendments to Articles II, XII, XIV, and XVI of the 1987 Constitution. Sub-Committee on Transitory Provisions, Presidential Consultative
Commission to Propose the Revision of the 1987 Constitution, Highlights on the Proposed Amendments to Article XVIII Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Soliman M. Santos, Charter Change Proposals of the Constitutional Commission: A Comment from the Perspective of the Mindanao Peace Process. Rudy Rodil, Updates on the GRP-MILF Peace Process.
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Democratic Track to Resolve the Bangsamoro Issue

Abhoud Syed M. Lingga * The Bangsamoro, as a people with a distinct identity and common culture, and with a long history of political independence in the same territory they presently occupy, continuously assert their right to freedom and independence as an expression of their right to self-determination. For more than three decades the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) have waged an armed struggle against the Philippine government as a means to liberate the Bangsamoro people and their homeland from Philippine colonialism. The repressive reactions of the government have resulted in a series of wars that have caused the death of thousands, displacement of millions of people, and destruction of properties. This paper explores the democratic track to find an alternative to war to address that deep-seated sentiment for freedom and independence. Right of Self-determination The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights expressly provide that All peoples have the right of selfdetermination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
*Abhoud Syed M. Lingga is Executive Director, Institute of Bangsamoro Studies based in Cotabato City.
In the exercise of that right, people who are entitled to right of self-determination have wide latitude of choice. At one end, they can demand and pursue within the nation state more political power, active participation in the decision making and administration of government affairs, equitable redistribution of economic benefits, and appropriate ways of preserving and protecting their culture and way of life. On the other end, they have also the right to organize their own sovereign and independent government, or reclaim their lost freedom and independence. In pursuing that right to self-determination the Bangsamoro people are opting, as manifested both by the liberation movements and civil society, for the restoration of their freedom and independence that they have enjoyed for more than six centuries. History of Independence The historical experience of the Bangsamoro people in statehood and governance started as early as the middle of the 15th century when Sultan Sharif ul-Hashim established the Sulu Sultanate. This was followed by the establishment of the Magindanaw Sultanate in the early part of the 16th century by Sharif Muhammad Kabungsuwan. The Sultanate of Buayan and the Pat a Pangampong ko Ranao (Confederation of the Four Lake-based Emirates) and other political subdivisions were organized later. By the time the Spanish colonialists arrived in the Philippines the Muslims of Mindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi archipelago and the islands of Basilan and Palawan had already established their own states and governments with diplomatic and trade relations with other countries including China. Administrative and political systems based on the realities of the time existed in those states. In fact it was the existence of the wellorganized administrative and political systems that the Bangsamoro people managed to survive the military campaign against them by Western colonial powers for several centuries and preserve their identity as a political and social organization. For centuries the Spanish colonial government attempted to conquer the Muslim states and add the territory to the Spanish colonies
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in the Philippine Islands but history tells us that it never succeeded. The Bangsamoro states with their organized maritime forces and armies succeeded in defending the Bangsamoro territories, thus preserving their independence. That is why Bangsamoro nationalists always argue that the Bangsamoro territories are not part of what were ceded by Spain to the United States in the Treaty of Paris of 1898 because Spain had never exercised effective sovereignty over these areas. The Bangsamoro resistance continued even when US forces occupied some areas in Mindanao and Sulu. Though the resistance was not as fierce as during the Moro-Spanish wars, group-organized guerrilla attacks against American forces and installations reinforced what remained of the sultanates military power. Even Bangsamoro individuals showed defiance against American occupation of their homeland by attacking American forces in operations called prang sabil (martyrdom operation). Opposition to Annexation When the United States government promised to grant independence to the Philippine Islands, the Bangsamoro leaders registered their strong objection to be part of the Philippine republic. In a petition to the President of the United States dated June 9, 1921, the people of Sulu archipelago said that they would prefer being part of the United States rather than be included in an independent Philippine nation. In their Declaration of Rights and Purposes, the Bangsamoro leaders meeting in Zamboanga on February 1, 1924, proposed that the Islands of Mindanao and Sulu, and the Island of Palawan be made an unorganized territory of the United States of America in anticipation that in the event the US would decolorize its colonies and other non-self governing territories the Bangsamoro homeland would be granted separate independence. Had it happened, the Bangsamoro people would have regained by now their independence under the UN declaration on decolonization. Their other proposal was that if independence to be granted would include the Bangsamoro territories, a plebiscite would be
held in Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan 50 years after the grant of independence to the Philippines to decide by vote whether the territory incorporated by the government of the Islands of Luzon and Visayas, would be a territory of the United States, or become independent. The 50-year period ended in 1996, the same year the MNLF and the Philippine government signed the Final Agreement on the Implementation of the Tripoli Agreement. The leaders warned that if no provision of retention under the United States would be made, they would declare an independent constitutional sultanate to be known as Moro Nation (Bangsamoro). In Lanao, the leaders who were gathered in Dansalan (now Marawi City) on March 18, 1935 appealed to the United States government and the American people not to include Mindanao and Sulu in the grant of independence to the Filipinos. Continuing Assertion for Independence Even after their territories were made part of the Philippine republic in 1946, the Bangsamoro people have continued to assert their right to independence. They consider the annexation of their homeland as illegal and immoral since it was done without their plebiscitary consent. Their assertions manifest in many forms. The armed resistance of Kamlon, Jikiri and Tawan-Tawan were protests against the usurpation of their sovereign right as a people. Those who joined the Philippine government used the new political system to pursue the vision of regaining independence. Congressman Ombra Amilbangsa filed House Bill No. 5682 during the fourth session of the Fourth Congress. The bill sought the granting and recognition of the independence of Sulu. As expected, the bill found its way into the archives of Congress since there were few Muslim members of Congress. Then on May 1, 1968, the then provincial governor of Cotabato, Datu Udtog Matalam, made a dramatic move. He issued the Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM) manifesto calling for the independence of Mindanao and Sulu to be known and referred to as the Republic of Mindanao and Sulu.
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When it became evident that it would not be possible to regain independence within the framework of the Philippine nation state system, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was organized to wage an armed struggle to regain independence. When the MNLF accepted autonomy within the framework of Philippine sovereignty a faction of the MNLF separated and formed the Moro Islamic Liberation Front to continue the armed struggle for independence. The MILF is still fighting the government forces. The clamor for independence is not only among the liberation fronts but also among other sectors of the Bangsamoro society. The 1,070,697 delegates to the First Bangsamoro Peoples Consultative Assembly (BPCA) held on December 3-5, 1996 in Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao were unanimous in calling for reestablishment of the Bangsamoro state and government. The hundreds of thousands of Bangsamoro who participated in the Rally for Peace and Justice held in Cotabato City and Davao City on October 23, 1999, in Marawi City on October 24, 1999 and in Isabela, Basilan on December 7, 1999 issued a manifesto stating, we believe that the only just, viable and lasting solution to the problem of our turbulent relationship with the Philippine government is the restoration of our freedom, liberty and independence which were illegally and immorally usurped from us, and that we be given a chance to establish a government in accordance with our political culture, religious beliefs and social norms. Bangsamoro leaders headed by Sultan Abdul Aziz Guiwan Mastura Kudarat IV of the Sultanate of Magindanaw meeting in Cotabato City on January 28, 2001 expressed their strong desire to regain the Bangsamoro independence. Their Declaration of Intent and Manifestation of Direct Political Act they assert for an OIC-sponsored or UNsupervised referendum to decide once and for all whether the Bangsamoro territory shall remain as autonomous region, shall form a state of federated union with the Philippines, or to become an independent state. The Second Bangsamoro Peoples Consultative Assembly held on June 1-3, 2001 at the same place, this time attended by 2,627,345 delegates from all over the Bangsamoro homeland, including
representatives of non-Muslim indigenous communities, unanimously declared that the only just, meaningful, and permanent solution to the Mindanao Problem is the complete independence of the Bangsamoro people and the territories they now actually occupy from the Republic of the Philippines. Repression When the Bangsamoro revolutionary leaders went for armed struggle to pursue their right for freedom and independence, the Philippine government responded with repression. The military suppression of the legitimate struggle of the Bangsamoro people resulted in the off and on war that has caused tens of thousands of deaths, displacement of millions of people (hundreds of thousands are still in the neighboring Malaysian state of Sabah), and destruction of properties worth billions of dollars. In addition, military spending to wage the war has reached billions of dollars, a huge amount that would have been better spent for basic infrastructure like farm-to-market roads, school buildings, hospitals, and other social services badly needed by the people. The military solution did not work and will not put an end to the Bangsamoro struggle. The government may succeed in suppressing one generation of fighters, but a new generation will succeed them. Even autonomy, which was a product of the negotiations between the MNLF and the government, fails to address the aspiration of the Bangsamoro people for freedom and independence, thus the struggle continues. Referendum To address the political issue of the problem without resorting to war is to give the Bangsamoro people a chance to choose their political status with respect to their relation with the Philippine government through a referendum. They shall choose whether they want to remain part of the Philippines or to be free and independent. To accommodate other proposals, questions whether to retain the existing autonomous region, or to be changed to a federated relationship, or free association with the
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Philippines can also be included. Referendum would give the Bangsamoro people the opportunity to make the decision on their political status, not just their leaders. It is the democratic and peaceful way of resolving political conflicts. It has been used in many countries, like Czechoslovakia, the Canadian province of Quebec, and East Timor. Countries that refuse to use this internationally accepted democratic mechanism suffer the consequences of war, like the former Yugoslavia, the Philippines, and others. The proposed referendum shall be held in areas where the Bangsamoro people presently occupy. This includes the provinces of Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, and the cities of Cotabato, Marawi and Isabela. There are also towns in the provinces of Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, South Cotabato, Sarangani, Davao del Sur, Davao Oriental, Lanao del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga Sibugay and Palawan that should be included, subject for discussion with the people in the areas. The referendum has to be supervised by the United Nations in order that the result will be acceptable to all parties. Common sense dictates that a party to a conflict, like the Philippine government, would not have the credibility to conduct or supervise such political exercise. The UN is the best body to oversee the referendum to ensure that whatever will be the result will be respected by all parties and implemented. If there are groups that would not respect the result of the referendum, the UN can organize its forces to disarm them. Conclusion If we have to resolve peacefully the violent conflict between the Government and the Bangsamoro liberation fronts, and to avoid future violent conflict, referendum is the best political option. The Philippine government and the Bangsamoro liberation fronts have to agree to a referendum if their leaders are indeed statesmen. Statesmanship of leaders is not measured by how much blood is shed and how long they can suppress the peoples right to self-determination but how they can ensure that the people enjoy this fundamental human right. History has never
been kind to leaders who do not hesitate to use military might to suppress the peoples aspiration to be free.

The Mindanao Peace Process

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The Mindanao Peace Process

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Autonomy and Peace Review

INSTITUTE FOR AUTONOMY AND GOVERNANCE KONRAD-ADENAUER-STIFTUNG

Q and A: The Mindanao Peace Process*

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Q and A: The Mindanao Peace Process

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Q and A: The Mindanao Peace Process

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Q and A: The Mindanao Peace Process

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Q and A: The Mindanao Peace Process

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Identity, Self-Empowerment, Ancestral Domain

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Identity, Self-Empowerment, Ancestral Domain

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Identity, Self-Empowerment, Ancestral Domain

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Identity, Self-Empowerment, Ancestral Domain

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Identity, Self-Empowerment, Ancestral Domain

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Identity, Self-Empowerment, Ancestral Domain

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Identity, Self-Empowerment, Ancestral Domain

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Identity, Self-Empowerment, Ancestral Domain

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Identity, Self-Empowerment, Ancestral Domain

Ancestral Domain, Identity and Right of Self-Determination: A Moro Perspective

*Jose Iribani Lorena is former Solicitor-General of the ARMM.

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Ancestral Domain, Identity and Right of Self-Determination

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Ancestral Domain, Identity and Right of Self-Determination

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ARMM 62.9 81,519 59.3 55.5 63 320 82.0 39.2

Whole country 34.0 144,039 71.6 66.3 49 180 96.4 72.2

Rank among 16 regions 16 15 15 15 14 15 15 15

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Charter Change and the Mindanao Peace Process

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Charter Change and the Mindanao Peace Process

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Charter Change and the Mindanao Peace Process

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Charter Change and the Mindanao Peace Process

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Charter Change and the Mindanao Peace Process

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Charter Change and the Mindanao Peace Process

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Charter Change and the Mindanao Peace Process

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Sec. 15, Article XX, Proposed Constitution.