THE DIALECTIC AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CONTRADICTION Author(s): C. L.

Michelet and Louis Soldan Source: The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. 5, No. 4 (October, 1871), pp. 319-337 Published by: Penn State University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25665766 . Accessed: 11/06/2011 10:14
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( 319 ) THE DIALECTIC AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CONTRA

DICTION*
Translated from theGerman of Dr. C. L. Michelet by Louis Soldan.

When

self against priests and

Hegel

condescended some

on one occasion

to defend

him

given toHegel to have an opponent of equal rank to contend with, such as Plato found inAristotle or Fichte in Schelling.
The feet of those unhurt who were

state, Frederic II., who to one of his generals after the battle of Kunnersdorf: said " It was not Just see, with such a rabble I have to scuffle!"

quite other persons, self to the hero of war of the Prussian

to wit, of Catholic inferior attacks, this hero of science compared him

Under the cross-fireof the pigmies which creep up to him, he

stands And sea. like a rock in the roaring and unshaken, of the one, nor the obscu the public reputation least of all rity of the other?both internally worthless?nor neither though the latter may have helped very much to con

to carry him

out, failed

to come.

the potent disfavor of the governing class, could shake his

with any teacher of philosophy"

he

of his labors, by patronizing hero, and even the effectiveness his adversaries. " Herr v. Hartmann never come into personal has contact

fine to narrower limits for a time the appreciation of this

fame,

an end to make again a lance, and as a brave champion was over Kant's the giddy sham that to rise tomb" If others, as Mr. Bergmann for instance, (p. 23). repeating call the philosophical merely Trendelenburg's assertion, sys tems after Kant an "intoxication," itmay be said that the ex break with " pression
* A cal Inquiries.

"far from the strife of philosophical ventures, schools," a very detailed and is upon Dialectic, critique of the Hegelian not afraid merely to repeat what has been said before, though other opponents?Trendelenburg to begin with?spring forth scores like mushrooms. Because have not yet suffi by they the common enemy?as to it certainly appears ciently killed the author?he feels himself the man to enter the lists again, to

(Pref. p. iii). Nevertheless

ugiddy"
By E.

is no very original
"On Berlin,

one,

inasmuch
Method.

as giddi

critique

on the publication, v. Hartmann.

the Dialectic 1868.

Historical-Criti by Carl Duneker."

Published

320
ness

Review ofHartmann
is commonly the first natural

on the Dialectic.
consequence of intoxica

presuming," other piety

tion. But although our author does not feel giddy at the apprehension "that the present undertaking might appear "
to yet he wishes toward the heroes more call to mind that of science" than to there is no " examine their productions carefully than anybody else's" (p. v).

Whereupon we have only to remark that if but one fourth of what Hegel is reproached with be true?if indeed Mr.
Hartmann could with "crack-brained Hegel would good statements" reason point out in the Dialectic

?then 75), "tricks" (p. 79), "hushing of facts" (pp. 80-81),

not be the hero

(pp. 52-54),

"sophisms"

(pp. 71,

even his assailant at all, whom embittered animosities wishes (his most notwithstanding) to acknowledge him to be. By this, of course, and is obliged

the

"

mere

Still itmust be acknowledged phrase. does not ignore altogether that Mr. Hartmann the dialectic as others have done in their attacks, but magnanim method

piety

"

conversational

displayed before, comes down to the level of a

the Hegelian and logic are lost for the philosophy against even his critic of the dialectic and consequently method," own book would have to find its way into the waste-basket. " is still at this mo For itmight well be that this instrument for the artist who will make the proper use of ment waiting it."

ously stoops to an ample refutation of it. ? an op the confession of Weisse himself In this attempt, ? that "Hegel's achievement" is "the of Hegel ponent only to our of the true method," invention proves very offensive so if this were the case, the calamity, author (p. iii). For, " to our author, will all attacks that happen deplorable

Yet

to the results of Hegel's philosophy (aside from themethod by which they have been gained) a necessary place in the development of philosophy. Principiis obsta is his motto.
at p. 119 Mr. Hartmann his mind, and will changes not only to the principal results that necessary place " fundamental but also to its of Hegelian princi philosophy, a contradiction! as the fundamental principles ples." What no! allow

on the contrary,

Weisse follow (who rejected only the results of Hegel's Dia in taking hold of the nag by the tail. He undertakes, lectic)
to seize the bull by its horns in " assigning

To keep

off such a horror, Herr

v. Hartmann

declines

to

Review ofHartmann
the results.

on the Dialectic.

321

can be nothing else than the method, the way of gaining The whole of the present book is divided into two parts, one historical (pp. 1-34) and the other polemical (pp. 35-124),
we will now pass under review. I.

which

Hegel out from the connection of the history of philosophy?

to isolate him. Of course his method merely

In the first part,

the author's

attempts

are designed

to tear

was given to that which themajority of great philosophers

that by ; for if "Hegel's assertion, the form of exact science and perfection

before with more or less consciousness," attempted happened our author's whole enterprise would again fall to the to be true, seems not to be equal to the Hercu For he himself ground. lean task of impeaching tolerable swindling the entire gallery of heroes or underhand tricks. And of science so he en

with

Dialectic at quite a differentthing fromwhat Hegel purposed

with his. close

to show in this most concise outline of the merely an uncommonly of philosophy, which manifests de history of it, and particularly ficient knowledge of great ignorance were driving with their its original, that Hegel's predecessors deavors

Even wThen he is not able to efface the quite obvious relation between Hegel and three or four other philoso : i. e. Heraklitus, and Nicolas Cusanus Plato, Proklus, phers, he nevertheless tries now this shift, and then some other, to Let us briefly go over the also from these. separate Hegel
four.

" our author, as the considers the process Mr. Hart true! Of this principle, principal thing." Very " mann will admit only that is a transition of every change or state into its opposite"; one condition but agrees with Heraklitus, says Aristotle's violated the principle that "Heraklitus objection, when he asserted of contradiction that everything has always same

and hinting time"; and thinks most wisely, squinting " at Hegel, that the outgrowths of this abortion do not offer to the products of our century which require the any support Now here only the length of time highest mental maturity." as the con is represented to separate Heraklitus and Hegel,
Vol. 5?21

the opposite in it,and that everything is and is not at the

322

Review ofHartmann

on tlie Dialectic.

tents will by no means allow of such a separation. But with this Mr. Hartmann has laid bare the very centre of his bat antitheses

tery of attack against Hegel.

change into each As

of contradiction.

tained in the other,because thiswould exclude the principle

if antitheses could pass into each other

other, but

For he is ready to admit that

not that one is con

without being developed from each other. As ifnot also the identity of antitheses expressed in this could preserve their difference,and thus not at all conflictwith the principle of
contradiction. bolder

manifests Even

itself only with Mr. Hartmann. where

losophy the prodigious task of denying that the understand ing is governed by logical laws; or what with Mr. Bergmann
as a suspicion, has become a certainty is com the author must with Plato, Plato admit that Heraklitus therefore

as it appears, Mr. Hartmann, even Mr. Bergmann, who allots than

is a great to German

deal phi

pletely a dialectician in theHegelian

gel's and agreement and wants

sense, he grudges He both in substance

" that an idea to distinguish on p. 8,

essentially Plato's dialectic fromHegel's '6

language. denies," it says

might by itself pass into another, or that it might contain

at the same time and in the same relation. antitheses Now it is but these latter two points that separate Hegel's Dialectic from sound common sense." Against this pert assertion stands according to the author's own confession, at least

however,

passage

to identify his dialectic turn: Hegel, with Plato's, rests on a single obscure and disputed of the Sophist, which, passage in whatever construe it grammatically, will at way you may

in Plato over which he wishes toget by the following "

one

any rate exclude theHegelian interpretation" (Soph. p. 259). It is incredible that aftermy correspondence with the author on this passage, it should still appear to him obscure and
doubtful, sessing

one passage in Plato, but upon his whole dialectic in connec " to furnish the sun-clear that Plato tion, pronounces proof to be the true dialectic" the same which Hegel has in mind.

cline to show him also in its proper light the formerpassage of the Sophist, about which he seems to ask also my opinion inhis last letter; and merely say that itdoes not depend upon

which it never has been even but a fair knowledge

nor can be of Greek.

to any one pos I therefore de

Review ofHartmann
According to Plato, Dialectic

on the Dialectic.

323

?or

this case it would be Many and not One; and as infinitely small, it is Nothing. Thus theOne is in the same respect One and Many, Nothing and the Infinite. At the same time the
two are not in the same way For Being (bpoUos) identical. One and Many, form also an absolute antithe and Nothing, In this way Plato not sin against the principle sis. does of both

But inasmuch again has two others, and so on ad infinitum. as One is One, it has conversely not many in parts, because

And as the ideas are themselves the divine, they and pass through each other the idea (Ao?-oc)?intermingle auvcov ecz the One (dc avzd), they are also in the same respect are the other (ozav rrc <pjj zauzbv 8v izepov ixebjj in which they xcd xaz Ixecvo o ip^oc zouzcov Tzszovdiisa: zbzspov). for in Thus, is One is the infinite Many because each ; stance, the One and for this reason has two parts, Being and One ; each part themselves.

theProcess of the sensuous things,but of the Ideas in and for

is no longer, as with Heraklitus,

contradiction and just as little does Hegel, as they do justice

to the antithesis be outflanked to the unity. the antithesis by as in such a manner and and small But the unity w^ould in case wTe held asun them to predicate

however

Six great against Four one of Seven, but Many term prating and Hegel

One thing only in some wrayor other (<fyrij jttj):as in calling ys

or Socrates against Eight; This is what Plato and by his parts. the work of a tyro, while the author (p. this very thing true dialectic. In the applica 62) pronounces tion of the ideas to sensuous the separation and final things

der the antitheses

of

of opposites takes place, while in their state of disjunction into each other. Yet wher pure being-in-itself they change ever in the sphere of the Finite the Infinite as a resemblance to the ideas is bursting through, there will also exist an inter so nature is Becoming, of ideas: be Life, Activity, mingling are united in her cause Being and Non-being so inseparably; are harmony and beauty, because in them the music, virtue, Definite are Plato's and the Indefinite These (dneipov and xepa$) blend. own words, taken faithfully from the Parmenides,

Sophist, Philebus, and other dialogues. And the thorough knowledge of thePlatonic dialectic depends neither upon the interpreting ingenuity of a model professor of philology nor
the impotency of an amateur-bungler. Thus even Mr. Hart

324

Review ofHartmann

on the Dialectic.

mann does not wish to deny the possibility "that already Plato had before his mind as a distant ideal the identification of opposites in theHegelian sense " (p. 7). This is perfectly
sufficient To

name the ignoble motive of indolence imputed tohim.

alienate Proklus from Hegel, is called and the lv in Proklus, Zeller to aid, "who.liimself

for us, and we

reject most

emphatically

in Plato's

undeniable development of theworld out of the conception of from theHegelian school, deserted it in later times." This incident, instead of serving his purpose, should have been the
arisen

to counterpoise

the

on his very thing to put Mr. Hartmann guard against Zeller. Zeller accuses Proklus of scholasticism, and "sterile and mo notonous formalism" it is only (p. 12). Whereby astonishing, as the same reproach has been made that Mr. against Hegel, Hartmann has not seen even in this a sort of a resemblance between takes

at variance. and Hegel On Nicolas Cusanus' views, whom Hegel strangely enough not to have known, he says on p. 17: "If this doctrine appears reason and intellect, and the between has in its discrimination principle

and Hegel. Proklus So greatly Mr. Hartmann mis the advantage offered to him by Mr. Zeller's weapons and those of other predecessors; but he does not want to see he is bent upon similarity at any rate, because setting Proklus

infinite process of ascent": which two deviations of the dialectic the similarity of the two. finds a still greater resemblance to Then Mr. Hartmann as the latter set Bruno inasmuch in Giordano (p. 18), Hegel the impotent do not lessen at all

larity to Hegel, it is still essentially distinguished from it both by the highest stage placed above the intellect and by

of the coincidentia

contrariorum,

the greatest

simi

forth with special emphasis, that only inGod himself all an

titheses are at the same time and without any difference consisted

of

Bruno, thephilosopher has to develop the idea out of its an

only in this, that each and every thing can each and everything in the course of time become " as the peculiar and deep Bruno has also pronounced else. " from the point of union also its est secret of art" to develop It is very droll, of course, how there should still antithesis." " the two," that, with enormous difference between the exist fection and must

time united; that, on the contrary, in all worldly things per

Review ofHartmann

on the Dialectic.

325

tithesis,but with Hegel the idea itself." To which we have only to reply, that the philosopher would act very wrongly ifhe performed this development when the idea refused to do mann that in this the philosopher and the idea go hand in hand; that the idea is but the personified philosopher. And " thus in his shortdescription of the dialectic method" he
himself it itself. By the way of consolation, we may assure Mr. Hart

ment of the idea is just as much the objective course of the thing itself as it is the thinkingprocess in thephilosopher's head" (p. 37). The exposition, finally, of the philosophical systems of Kant, Fichte, and Schelling, as being perfectly separated
from the Hegelian greatest ignorance phy, as everybody dialectic, bears moreover testimony of the of this part also of the history of philoso who has lived through it, or has restored

paints

it quite

correctly

in this way:

The

self-move

fore his very eyes the gradual dialec growth of the Hegelian tic from those stand-points. By which, of course, we do not mean to deny that Hegel added to it the keystone of perfec tion by his own efforts?the essential which our author point either would not or could not appreciate. We will ask him, " if he is unable to find of Hegel's dia however, something gories ?are

it to new lifewithin himself by study,will have seen also be

in Kant's lectic principles" that the first two cate assertion, of each class?thus, for instance, Reality and Negation in the third category, Limitation? the opposites united While the result of this dialectic as an asser Kant presents tion merely without to deduce it, Fichte under attempting takes this, as the author states it himself by quoting Fichte's " We must ask ourselves, how can words, as follows (p. 25): A and ?A, and Non-being, and Negation, be Being Reality and cancelling each thought together without annihilating Limitation, same way, has almost

his cue, who says, in the given Hegel in the Becoming, are and Non-being that, Being e. not annihilated) both preserved and cancelled. Neither (i. of these philosophers, thinks that he has cancelled however, by

other?" Fichte finding the solution, like Kant, in the idea of

sees this in it,but he charges only Hegel with it (p. 78). *

this the principle

of contradiction.

Mr. Hartmann

alone

326

Review ofHartmann
********** pretends to see and no

on the Dialectic.
But in Fichte only sober while and

Mr. Hartmann

superabundance in lavishing considerate seems him at Hegel's as the author to agree with expense, Herbart's in the same who throws Fichte much very opinion, ? this should also have made with his successors; category over more considerate Mr. Bergmann before giving himself to the extravagancies of the intellectual intuition. Herbart's " words are these : Fichte retained the unthinkable (undenk an intellectual intuition: that ever existed became ment which and

healthy understanding, he should have *been more

of reason, on praise

baren) thought; he gave it authority by the assumption of

thus one of the greatest thinkers of a visionary move the originator the it chose for its central-point thereafter, when one did not want have to lose one's reason about

circle, because the intellectual

so-called absolute identity,banished philosophy froma wide

intuition." Such classical referred sobriety Hegel's hitherto, wants When he ought to absolve speaks but

we two opposers, to which an example! have taken for At the close

to

also Schelling, the originator of the absolute identity, from "

any he does

of this part Mr. Hartmann with Hegel, in saying:

the identity of opposites, it is only a misuse of the word; for

not at all mean by it Oneness

community

of

too. And the author Hegel means this in part: however uses, "Hegel sometimes in Schelling's, Identity sion."

ganic unity" (pp. 29-30). Now

this is the very thing that

to admit is naive enough as we shall see, the word sometimes in its proper

or Sameness,

or

(Aristotelian) meaning, producing thereby unlimited confu

to speak more unreasonably Is it possible about And Aristotle? does the "unlimited confusion" in Mr. Hartmann's and the Particular, brain ? As in the original and this not sys

modern

lie rather Universal

tem Schelling's

identity of the Infinite and theFinite, the

the Essence the Form, the himself with

Ideal and theReal, conveyed too undeniably the fusion of the Hegel by thepolemic ofNew-Schellingism against the dialec
tic method; which, of course, is not a too difficult undertaking Mr. Hartmann contents opposites, to demonstrate the contradistinction between Schelling attempting and

Review ofHartmann

on the Dialectic.

327

was Hegel's peer fromallowing himself to be dazzled by his

dialectic"

" So far," after all, and affords an extremely easy triumph. " was the only contemporary who he exclaims pathetically, (p. 31). But it is a mistake places of Mr. Hartmann's in the year

to

place this polemic of Schelling in his early period, as the edi

tor of Schelling's works it expressly 1827,

intheMunchen period (Schelling'sWorks 1.10, p. vi); where as Schelling himself, in the essay from which this polemic is the differencebetween positive and negative philosophy is mentioned (p. 126). Nevertheless it is highly characteristic
the very latest of having to the old prejudice of absolute science, that itwas pos and of having arrived at the better knowledge an inductive procedure, to learn any sible, only by following that words of Schelling become unfaithful that the latter was ashamed peer," whom from him. Mr. Hartmann will read from even taken, already calls Hegel's Philosophy an episode, and even

who was Hegel's this "only contemporary Hegel Mr. Hartmann is bent so eagerly on separating
ii.

thing towhich there is a content. Thus was still clinging to

most

al greater part of the treatise is devoted " to the of the Dialectic Method." critique exclusively " " to the dialectic method To define his Mr. Hart position mann begins his critique by a critique of my critique on Tren " in the Mr. Trendelenburg Gedanke." said had delenburg to the second Aristotelian that Hegel infers, according figure, second and

The

is the Indeterminate; is the Indeterminate, Nought "Being as if a man and a goose were the is Nought": therefore Being same because I had replied to this, that both have two legs. in common besides, other predicates both have conceptions as simplicity, In the same abstraction. pure immediateness, respect therefore in which But as it is also

abstraction, want of content. is to be

tradiction,Being is simply opposite toNought, this Identity

conceived transition into

is, for instance, the purest Being ? of its that is, on account nought to the principle of con as, according in the Becoming. Such a even Mr. Hartmann other,

finds unobjectionable (p. 7). Why, then, does he blame the Hegelian Dialectic for the same thing ?When he puts to the latter the alternative that the Identity ofBeing and Nought

changing

of opposites

each

328
must

Review ofHartmann

on the Dialectic.

or a total one (pp. 39-40), be either a partial I answer: rest outside it is partial when these categories of each then as opposites, outside of each other, because they then fall, other.

become

In theBecoming, however, the Identity of the opposite has

a total one, because they form there the inseparable of a new idea. These are facts of our thinking, and how Mr. Hartmann delusion and will manage to get round consists of contra

Moments them.

I do not know

The monstrous

error of the author the existence

in

in maintaining thinking that Hegel, in declaring all things diction?nay, negated he this very doctrine himself who admits who asserts however, contradictions. selves?has the principle

everywhere this circumstance it would make Though our to Mr. Hartmann's according opinion (p. 31), impossible the book from ex nevertheless shall not preclude judgment with contra Just in the same way history abounds istence. ? it progresses. dictions ; still it exists nay, for this reason an impossibility, is not Nought, but rather For contradiction the former negates the source of motion, by which itself, even is created. So it is indeed a mis this a new difficulty " when Mr. Hartmann that the nega charges understanding of contradiction is the conditio sine qua tion of the principle if by

what is contradictory. book that Mr. Hartmann's

for them contradictory of contradiction, while by it. Not he contradicts acknowledged the existence of contradictions, but he We shall see presently, swarms with

non for the existence of theDialectic"

is to negate the princi contradictories (horse and non-horse) never does; he only iden this Hegel ple of contradiction: or Light and White, and tifies contraries, as in Grey, Black An atom of salt is to us base and acid in Color. Darkness sure the Understanding in inseparable union, against which side in the salt. But as we

(p. 41).

To identify

enough says that atoms of base and of acid are only side by " theDialectic
and call

do not at all knows

the difference knows

is caught in its own net" (p. 43); and yet he

between also contrary that we make and contradictory too. the distinction lives in himself.

see the opposites in One and still terms this Mr. Hartmann it a contradiction,

very well, Such contradiction

Review ofHartmann
Since

on the Dialectic.

329

dialectician in an absurdity ; but thatwith the non-dialectic

critic it will be as with one hunting spectres (pp. 43-44).?

as from an arse from this one misunderstanding, of arms of attack is whole Mr. Hartmann's apparatus nal, I might be content with this and save myself reitera taken, confirms me himself when he is In this Mr. Hartmann tion. naive enough to admit that one can never detect the genuine

Therefore I shall have tomention of such a critique only what besides thiswill perhaps be found prominent in theway of
unusual solecisms. For sidered refutation indeed! inconsequent of such attacks have All it is, properly in a dialectician from his opptment communicated already "to be con speaking, in the M he engages (p. 44). Yes, to the author,

ad marginem.

but about track.

and to-criminal to mathematics diction, become dangerous of this and the follow law (p. 92), and the other absurdities the reader curious to ing page, which I skip in order to make correct explanation,that them. Even Kuno Fischer's read quite " wras not about the question the identity of contradictories, the Oneness

the remained without however, warnings, even that the dia slightest effect; he prints the entire trash, the principle of contra lectic must necessarily, by negating

inwriting, all my objections against his whole manuscript

Besides,I

whom

It applies, than thosG at. therefore, to other people " Mr. Hartmann has aimed can that contradiction it, one has fallen into it before" be found where only (pp. 94 Now he has, before the eyes of the public at to 95). large, stand the reproof which I first sent him in a confidential letter. The next point to which that Mr. Hartmann says: I wish to call special " the essential task attention of the is, critic

opment" (p. 109), could not bring Mr. Hartmann

of the opposites

in the dialectic

devel

to the right

tres in very truth, which he is hunting also in the remaining of his publication, up to the very end, faithfully and in part
defatigably. termediate Mr. Bergmann between position was at least looking for an in common logic and speculative

of the principle of contradiction" negation (p. 45). But as wre do not at all negate the principle of contradiction, nothing ma terial remains, but something quite immaterial; hence spec

of the dialectic method is to exhibit the consequences

of the

330

Review ofHartmann

on the Dialectic.
resolutely comes only for Hegel aground on the of the

remains dialectic. Mr. Hartmann secure sands of the former. Where the author afterwards

to a refutation

Hegelian
an

receive

we read the following: "Any idea idea of Infinity,

the predicate side" (p. 4'9); infinite "but in so far as it has a there is no quanti

tative infinityat all in the true sense of theword" (p. 48). But two pages before, it is: The infinitely great is an impos sible idea, because it represents the Infinite as really exist given as finished. That there is no quantitative infinity,for
which he does ing, and therefore has in'itself the contradiction of an infinity is reproved call two pages after, the author here avers

quantitative

to be true; to him, therefore,theFalse

not negation

Hegel

is the True?and

this

Hegel, he further thinks, knows only qualitative

adds and, to refute these, Mr. Hartmann " nonsense to say bare-footed infinitely " that

of the principle

of contradiction. it would

infinities;
be all Does?

perchance, the expression "infinitely silly" suit him better? with Hegel comes in but with As far as we know, the infinity
author the

(pp. 48-49).

with the totality and ideality of thequalities. While fore "

attributes Indeterminateness" One who to Hegel's self-determining. what thus kicks at random

the negation

of limit,

i. e. of the

one-sided

qualitative,

there

the

this infinityis just the opposite of indeterminateness, as it is

at a to criticise to learn he neither nor seems able ever understands, of contra the principle But so much commences to totter, that he says in

Infinity,

noble philosophy should first learn the facts before he dares

diction with to understand. our author

determinateness, ; that it preserves this is even minateness,

another minate

the same breath the opposite fromwhat he has said about the " that the idea indeterminateness inHegel: precipitates into
not into the negative indeter in each determinateness the qualitative infinitude its indeter of Hegel."

which

ex before Hegel, asserts Mr. Hartmann that nobody in antagonism has placed understand Nicolas Cusanus, cept in his later writings, ing and reason, I refer to Kant, to Jacobi or dedvota and kTzioTrjp.rj i>o5c, to Aristotle's to Plato's incar^fxrj in to voix; or vorjacz. This is the way in >i7:odecxT?xij oppositon When Mr. Hartmann .knows the history of philosophy! In

(p. 50.)

Review ofHartmann

on the Dialectic.

331

this way he forgets the lamentations which he has uttered himself thatKant distinguishes between understanding and
reason. If Mr. Hartmann wonders number

to so few" (p. 55), it remained but with him to increase this

instead of siding with
ended

that

"

reason

is known

the unreasoning
and

multitude.

The Have

few who

ever knew, on the cross

for knowledge's sake on the stake.

If he furthermore they live, act, and

pervaded by it, still deny its existence; he ought to have re membered theword of the other of these Dioscuri of poetry, thatTruth walks ghostlike through the unknowing multi
The very thing does not even suspect her presence. " as the author mentions, to Hegel, consti which, according in tutes man's is but scantily nature, Reason, represented to use an expression of mine, men the great majority"; and, tude, which as again Schiller the gods," because says, among mankind, and only a few, "prizes." the greater part are "blanks," The Indeterminateness of the Infinite?so often and falsely "

wonders that the majority of' men, though are in it, and should necessarily be wholly

tioned by the author, is seized upon only by the "favorites of

to ex absolute wants Hartmann fluidity of the idea"?Mr. on one side in stating that it this Indeterminateness plain by less repulsive to think the unity of contradiction? appears indeterminateness nay, that in the pure every contradiction had to vanish, so to say; on the other side,he directly denies as this Indeterminateness, " contradiction is preserved on the contrary, in the absolute, in its entire antithesis." Conse the Indeterminateness (in which every con

imputed to Hegel

by the author, which he also terms the

quently, making tradiction disappears) this

rather to make the principle, means as the antitheses not the principle, Indeterminateness are to be preserved. We from the author a await anxiously solution of this absolute But even now it ap contradiction. pears, from several but Mr. Hartmann that not Hegel quoted above, examples is guilty of negating of con the principle in the most innocent way in the world, as tradiction, though he has not the least idea of the reach of his accusations. That allows the contradiction posits and Indeterminate, to exist, and in the absolute the totality of all things engulfs

Hegel

332
Hartmann

Review ofHartmann

on the Dialectic.

As to the legitimation of themethod (p. 66), the author imputes to it that it draws its justification out of itselfr being unable to justify itselfbefore the understanding (p. 67). We ask whether it is possible to justify one of the antitheses
before That case the tribunal arises of the other. The

seen as we have is hunting. This contradiction, in the principled is solved inas self-determination, above, much as all the instances of ideal determinateness {Bestimmt as the moments of the absolute. heiten) are therein posited

existing (p. 76), is again one of those spectres which Mr.

the other, and will certainly not yield and be fused into it.
Unity from opposites, and the latter from the for itself. The process of things, like that of thoughts, must in experience. This internal has been traced

one, of course,

rejects

mer, can be justified itself only froma consideration of the

be

in this very fact lies the confidence of the is its own proof. of being this science which dialectic method it depen would make from outside criterion adduced Each dent : the criterion would have to be proven again, and so on in science. And ad Yet

as

rhythmus of the thing itself,which the philosopher is called to witness without influencing it (p. 37), is consummated by itself in thedialectic of theworld, as Schelling calls it,as well

traced

and

Mr. Hartmann and

the sup the principal stated before, among thing, we have There the same. and considered tricks of dialectic posed " meaner which order" are only a few left of tricks' of the accuses pass the dialectic method other (p. 79). I will

in the air unsupported. the proof would hang infinitum; Veritas est index sui et falsi. to intends From the chapter on The Con tradiction, which in all and every the contradiction exhibits show how Hegel

not deny that the dialectic by which Hegel makes Equality 42-43) is an impure one like thatwith which Hegel reproaches Mr. Hartmann had reproached Plato is as little justified as if
it, if he had known that passage. I, for one, should have cannot at all posit two things as equal which are not un not be Two, otherwise at the same time, as they would in Parmenides in the passage with But to reproach Hegel into changes an "artificial confusion" where One Inequality over into each (Works, IV., pp.

Plato

Many. with We

given the dialectic of Equality and Inequality in this way:

equal

Review ofHartmann

on the Dialectic.

333

but only One. And Similarity is just the idea in which Equality and Inequality while perfect antitheses, yet are sim
ply one. If this assertion we would Equality triangles,
however,

tion, the fault would

wash and as
two.

our hands of it. In mathematics, of course, are separate, as two equal inasmuch Similarity ideal similar ones, things, are in fact but one; counted

lie with the idea of similarity itself;

negated

the principle

of contradic

It is furthermore " A because assert, rather

in the assertion, that the difference is not an attribute For the difference, according to Mr. Hartmann, is only "to express the relation in which both are considered The relation hovers between the process. by the thinking two as a thing added from outside" The amount (pp. 83-84). of it is that ideas do not contain in themselves what the phi thinks about a monstrous thein ? if the losopher sophism, of A itself. thoughts has our ascribing were

the difference on itself" (p. 84); the sophism appears to be

as a sophism to against Hegel and B are different that A has therefore

much

of course, be a contradiction But inas would, (p. 85). as cause is only cause by having an effect, and this effect will not appear if it does not react against the cause ? well break an oak but not a reed, because (Boreas may only the one and not the other offers resistance); ? therefore the effect is only possible i. e. the cause is the by the reaction, effect of its own effect, the effect the cause of its own cause. " Are here the ideas of cause and effect inseparable only in the thinking process," or are not rather so in they reality which

difference to Identity because it is different from while this is an expression to Plato: difference, very common which is further testimony the author's above-men against tioned efforts to separate Plato's and Hegel's Dialectics. which each other, as cause and effect, demand Opposites the author further says, presuppose each other as separate, even if they cannot be separated in the thinking process, while the dialectic gives rise to the misrepresenting appear ance as if each side contained or possessed its own contrast;

correct. So the dialectic method unmercifully " on the hip," and critic him back into the pushes snare which he has laid for others. accuses He wTith Hegel

too ? Will

not the author reconcile himself, as he styles it,

334

Review ofHartmann

on the Dialectic.

to think the contradiction? Or does he rather choose not to think the causality? The same quantity ofmotion is in the
impelling hand-cause, tity for this reason opines in the impelled Is quan object-effect. a contradiction? Here, too, the author (p. 86) that the contents of cause and effect are not iden

tical. Yet

to this they are cause and effect. They solely are not at all cause and effect in what they are besides, flesh, In reciprocal the identity of cause wood, &c. action, where in reference words, and consolation away with therefore cannot finds ignored, Mr. Hartmann " that Schopenhauer hhs done forever" (!?). But what category be preference is not also

the quantity of motion

is identical in both, and

exhibits itself stillmore plainly and lies in thevery and effect

in the statement this monstrous an undeserved

author

is the use of this doing away, if the Reaction

towhich the
thrown

gives ? overboard has

Finally, it is stated that Hegel, in his view of the logical

judgment, 86), for the purpose ment a contradiction offence, ful " confusion " (p. 88), of mistaking Unity and Identity (p. of being between able to discover in each its general form and judg its content committed the terrible made the dread

is construed into ced, and from this point of view the copula a sign of identity between the several parts of the sentence nest of contradictions in (p. 90). Here we find again a whole the author's that he perceives them attacks, while he believes

(p. 89). Into the idea ofUnity the idea of Identity is introdu

on the other side. The

of mathematical

ment is E = A or S= P. Now Hegel says nothing else but this: "That the form of the judgment expresses what the
content does not at all assert Hegel the same, or, as the author that subject and predicate " to unity without united contradic says, that they become does at all." are not mean

equality,

as

of the copula is no doubt the sign

in every logic the form of judg

who Hartmann means exactly

which Mr. have committed the contradiction tion, he would is One, to see avoided. For what Hartmann wishes is not It is therefore again Mr. therefore quite Two; coinciding.

tion" (p. 88). Then only, if Hegel had really made this asser

the same time. Hegel only knows of the Identity of different

For Identity mistakes Unity and Identity. the combination of two which are different at

Review ofHartmann
ones and of the difference

on the Dialectic.
ones. What

335
he means

difference

to say is therefore this: that even the quite shallow logical form of a judgment cannot kill wholly the speculative thought, the formbearing in itself the identity towhich the
of contents This between subject and predicate does not more is equalized and the predicate express

of identical

non-corresponding correspond. more in the higher forms of judgment, the assertorical ence will not by accusing have one its idea, though,

ing in the categorical judgment the genus of the subject, in

for all that, the differ

IfMr. Hartmann thinks thatHegel

it of denying shown him

wholly

disappear.

(pp. 71,100), he ought tohave consulted history,which would

as Locke

the supersensuous

is wronging Empiricism
and freedom

materialism of the 18th, and the German materialism of the

19th century. Trendelenburg, in believing," as If, nevertheless, for instance, this must consequence considered in Mr. has produced empiricism not materialism but "happiness for as inconsequence be accounted in this

Empiricism,

that these were indeed the consequences of was succeeded the French by Condillac,

and not were to be

amusement, (pp. 63-64, 71-72, 77, 120.) Mr. Hartmann goes a good deal farther than Mr. Bergmann: " to come to a content; is the only possible way Experience is an individual Mr. for mystic (p. 111). conception rarity" reader intellectual intuition, which derives Bergmann's be pronounced from the thought, will probably mann a fantastic If Mr. Hartmann conceit. caught rebuke use his the relation to which own of dialectic Mr. and I subjected easy empiricism, Trendelenburg sensuousness

belief Otherwise empiric. as experience; which has been done For the but never by philosophers. heretofore by mystics, " " and its Dialectic that Hegel's absolute attempted proof arose from a sensuous mysticism is such a magnificent piece that I cannot help referring the of Hartmann-like deduction, to it for his

by Mr. Hart not yet has even after the in the "Ge he again

danke," if he still sees in their unity nothing but wind, to

rather

diction.

stirred this wind himself, forgetfulof the principle of contra

For, to refute my admits arguments, thing he says: "Michelet we the very about which

expression

(pp. 113-15),

Mr. Hartmann

forgets that empiricism includes thought." Consequently,

care,

336
and which cannot

Review ofHartmann
he has have

on the Dialectic.

it is one with it. Thinking, I stated before toMr. Bergmann, is in itself experience : and thoughtless empiricism is not a thingbelonging to us, or with which we should like to deal.
to strike upon his me how Hegel the question: happened the author falls into an entirely unwor thod" (p. 117). Here After having stated quite the contradiction. correctly thy from the character of the thing, of the method absolute origin to trace back

to us, and which we consequently imputed For if empiricism includes forgotten. thinking,

ceding pages the dialectic method, the author finally proposes "

Fancying

to have

thoroughly

and

fully refuted

in the pre

he undertakes

world"; but which "can only as the question is now about whole the dialectic method

to merely this necessity contin " In the first respect, he says: It seems gent circumstances. of the world's that an apriori reproduction process must be " itmight before the individual consciousness," yet possible with the temporal of the bear little resemblance genesis strengthen an eternal the hope genesis?a

thoughtwhich is the course of the thing itself. Thus on the

arises from

for success, process of of the (p.

Hegelian

into the very afterwards Talis immediately of representing of the understanding, the stupidity impure of the system, in which indeed the Necessary historic genesis as a mere disease enters under the appearance of Chance, of un evident that his pretended fashion: by this it becomes that the author willingness of to criticise is mere

118). Very well!

the method

system,which is not to be criticised here. And here

exhibits

the principle

To thepure all things are pure. It is a pity

itself, mark

well,

in its pure

shape"

endeavoring in his historical part todispute away thegenesis

the Hegelian stand-point from the necessary evolution

irony.

For

if the author,

after

the history of philosophy in our century, is pricked too deeply by his historical conscience; he has no choice but
to transmute and value. to denounce into historical necessity ? it as mere fashion: historical "It was attribute incident, to fashion even a positive,

of

an excessive, to Kant's Antinomies to consider the so-called It was fashion since Fichte as the main of categories of theoretical deduction subject

philosophy.
rhythm

It was

of thesis,

fashion to philosophize
and synthesis.

in the triadic
fashion

antithesis,

It was

Review to misunderstand

of Hartmann

on tlw Dialectic.

337

to pass transcendental intuition; Schelling's manner for the science of the in a pompous off philosophy a straining to de of history and so forth. What absolute, nounce three prede the fundamental points of Hegel's just ' cessors as to saw off from Hegel external incidents,' merely re of the Hegelian If the "jargon and gibberish" language to Mr. Hartmann, he would have done mained unintelligible to sound more of instead better closely this rugged depth about after some superficial its unintelligibility complaining over the pages. at least has gone This complaint skipping of the He out of fashion long ago, after the rich development

'the pillars to his method'!

"

(p. 119.)

those depths without school has unlocked reducing as the author to shallowness, at some places imputes in parenthesis to the school (p. 95). If, aside from humanely gelian them

" this, Hegel's merits in philosophy of rights, aesthetics,phi losophy of religion, philosophy of history, and history of
the whole philosophy indeed, are not to be esti

mated lightly, I should like verymuch to know how Hegel managed to accomplish this in spite of his method, which "

philosophy,"

in everywhere and confusion, made the brought obscurity farther plain difficult, and removed the dark and problematic can merit be possible, How from its solution" (pp. 119-20). a single step without never made as Hegel his method ? Or be quite exorbitant, this merit must of necessity superhuman, as he had to overcome the difficulties which his method had for him. prepared "

The resume and the end of my critique is therefore: Not the Hegelian dialectic embraces the spectres of its merely own imagination"; it is not "the dialectic that suffers of mor on the con bid excess of irritation" (p. 120). Mr. Hartmann, " this with his own state of mind, can which trary, describes only show a contradiction in those

ried it in" (p. 123). These

themselves into such a "head" crammed for (p. 121) perhaps "has never come into personal the reason that Mr. Hartmann contact with a teacher of philosophy," and even a teacher's letters have remained without any influence on him.

contradictions have lodged and

places

where

it has

car

Vol.

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