CAYETANO VS MONSOD FACTS: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C.

Aquino to the position of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. ISSUE: It is whether the respondent has the ten year practice of law requirement for him to assume such office HELD: Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill. In general, a practice of law requires a lawyer and client relationship, it is whether in or out of court. Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyerentrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. MANIAGO VS DE DIOS Complainant alleged that she filed a criminal case against a Japanese national. The accused was represented by Atty. De Dios. Complainant then learned from the RTC staff that Atty. De Dios had an outstanding suspension order from the Supreme Court since 2001, and was, therefore, prohibited from

appearing in court. Complainant averred that Atty. De Dios ought to be disbarred from the practice of law for her flagrant violation and deliberate disobedience of a lawful order of the Supreme Court. In her Comment, Atty. De Dios admitted that there were cases filed against her client, Miyata. She, however, denied that she was under suspension when she appeared as his counsel in the cases. Respondent explained that an administrative case was indeed filed against her where she was meted the penalty of 6-month suspension. She served the suspension immediately upon receipt of the Courts Resolution on May 16, 2001 up to November 16, 2001. In a Manifestation filed on October 19, 2001, respondent formally informed the Court that she was resuming her practice of law on November 17, 2001, which she actually did. A problem arose when Judge Josefina Farrales, in her capacity as Acting Executive Judge of the RTC, Olongapo City, erroneously issued a directive on March 15, 2007, ordering respondent to desist from practicing law and revoking her notarial commission for the years 2007 and 2008. Knowing that the directive was rather questionable, respondent, nonetheless, desisted from law practice in due deference to the court order. Thereafter, respondent filed a Motion for Clarification with the Supreme Court on account of Judge Farrales letters to all courts in Olongapo City and to some municipalities in Zambales, which gave the impression that Atty. De Dios is not yet allowed to resume her practice of law and that her notarial commission for the years 2007 and 2008 is revoked. Respondent averred that for the period stated in the affidavit of complainant Maniago, during which she allegedly practiced law, she was neither suspended nor in any way prohibited from practice. The complaint, she added, was baseless and malicious, and should be dismissed outright. Thus, according to the OBC, a suspended lawyer must first present proof(s) of his compliance by submitting certifications from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and from the Executive Judge that he has indeed desisted from the practice of law during the period of suspension. Thereafter, the Court, after evaluation, and upon a favorable recommendation from the OBC, will issue a resolution lifting the order of suspension and thus allow him to resume the practice of law. The OBC

alleged that it was unfortunate that this procedure was overlooked in A.C. No. 4943, where Atty. De Dios was able to resume her practice of law without submitting the required certifications and passing through the OBC for evaluation. In order to avoid confusion and conflicting directives from the Court, the OBC recommended that the Court adopt a uniform policy on the matter of the lifting of the order of suspension of a lawyer from the practice of law. The Court notes the Report and Recommendation of the OBC. It must be remembered that the practice of law is not a right but a mere privilege and, as such, must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Supreme Court to exact compliance with the lawyers public responsibilities.[3] Whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of his clients and of the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of the Supreme Court, which made him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw that privilege.[4] However, as much as the Court will not hesitate to discipline an erring lawyer, it should, at the same time, also ensure that a lawyer may not be deprived of the freedom and right to exercise his profession unreasonably. PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW of BENJAMIN M. DACANAY Facts: Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canadas free medical aid program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004. On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice. Issue: WON petitioner may still resume practice? YES Held:

Section 2, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides an applicant for admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character and a resident of the Philippines.5 He must also produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines. Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners. The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]. Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Before he can can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on: o the updating and payment of of IBP membership dues; o the payment of professional tax; o the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioners knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and of the retaking of the lawyers oath. In re: CUNANAN Facts: Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, commonly known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953. In accordance with the said law, the Supreme Court then passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75 percent. After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while other motions for the revision of their examination papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also others who have

sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972. Issue: WON RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid? NO Held: RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation. In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the admission, suspension, disbarment or reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial. The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually exercised by the courts, it having been so generally held that the act of the court in admitting an attorney to practice is the judgment of the court, and an attempt as this on the part of the Legislature to confer such right upon any one being most exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that the licensing of an attorney is and always has been a purely judicial function, no matter where the power to determine the qualifications may reside. On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative departments of the government. It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities may say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license. IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO Facts: This is a disbarment matter with regards to Attorney Victorio Lanuevo, the Bar Confidant for the 1971 Bar Examinations. Supreme Court received a confidential letter that speaks of the

exam notebooks of a examinee named Ramon Galang who has been re-evaluated and recorrected such that he hurdled the Bar Exams and was admitted to the Bar. Lanuevo admitted having brought the five examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang back to the respective examiners for re-evalution or rechecking. The five examiners admitted having reevaluated or re-checked the notebook to him by the Bar Confidant, stating that he has the authority to do the same and that the examinee concerned failed only in his particular subject and was on the borderline of passing. Ramon Galang was able to pass the 1971 bar exam because of Lanuevos move but the exam results bears that he failed in 5 subjects namely in (Political, Civil, Mercantile, Criminal & Remedial). Galang on the otherhand, denied of having charged of Slight Physical Injuries on Eufrosino de Vera, a law student of MLQU. The five examiners were led by Lanuevo to believe that it is the Bar Committees regular activity that when an examinee has failed in one subject alone, the rest he passed, the examiner in that subject which he flunked will review his exam notebook. Afterwards, Lanuevo gained possession of few properties, including that of a house in BF Homes, which was never declared in his declaration of assets and liabilities. Issue: WON Lanuevo was guilty of defrauding the examiners such that Galang passed the Bar? YES Held: It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized respondent Lanuevos wellstudied and well-calculated moves in successively representing separately to each of the five examiners concerned to the effect that the examinee failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing. To repeat, the before the unauthorized reevaluations were made, Galang failed in the five (5) major subjects and in two (2) minor subjects which under no circumstances or standard could it be honestly claimed that the examinee failed only in one, or he was on the borderline of passing. The Bar Confidant has absolutely nothing to do in the re-evaluation or reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to make the passing mark before or after their notebooks are submitted to it

by the Examiners. The Bar Confidant has no business evaluating the answers of the examinees and cannot assume the functions of passing upon the appraisal made by the Examiners concerned. He is not the over-all Examiner. He cannot presume to know better than the examiner. AS TO GALANGS CRIM CASE: The concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of the fact that he had been charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his license to practice law is well settled. The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one who demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of sound discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law. Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was allowed to take the Bar examinations and the highly irregular manner in which he passed the Bar, WE have no other alternative but to order the surrender of his attorneys certificate and the striking out of his name from the Roll of Attorneys. In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION Facts: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues to the IBP since the latters constitution notwithstanding due notice. Edilion contends that the provision providing for the IBP dues constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect. Issue:

WON the payment of IBP dues suffers constitutional infirmity? NO Held: All legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State the administration of justice as an officer of the court. When the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns. To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6 Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the States legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers. Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. Why? The right to practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT

OF IBP DUES Facts: Petitioner sought exemption from payment of IBP dues in the amount of P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid accountability for the years 1977-2005. He alleged that after being admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of the Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to, and worked in, the USA in December 1986 until his retirement in the year 2003. He maintained that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years that he was working in the Philippine Civil Service since the Civil Service law prohibits the practice of ones profession while in government service, and neither can he be assessed for the years when he was working in the USA. He also posits that compulsory payment of the IBP annual membership dues would indubitably be oppressive to him considering that he has been in an inactive status and is without income derived from his law practice. He adds that his removal from nonpayment of annual membership dues would constitute deprivation of property right without due process of law. Lastly, he claims that non-practice of law by a lawyer-member in inactive status is neither injurious to active law practitioners, to fellow lawyers in inactive status, nor to the community where the inactive lawyersmembers reside. Issue: WON petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the time that he was inactive in the practice of law? NO Held: There is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and in the integration of the Philippine Bar which power required members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is, indeed, imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the noble objectives and purposes of integration. Payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no one is

exempt. This means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as ones membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the member is engaged in. There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of membership dues. At most, as correctly observed by the IBP, he could have informed the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his intention to stay abroad before he left. In such case, his membership in the IBP could have been terminated and his obligation to pay dues could have been discontinued. DECISION: DENIED. ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY LABORATORY vs. ATTY. ROLANDO C. DELA CRUZ Facts: This is a disbarment case filed by the Faculty members and Staff of the Saint Louis UniversityLaboratory High School (SLU-LHS) against Atty. Rolando C. Dela Cruz, principal of SLU-LHS, for: (a) pending criminal case for child abuse and a labor case against him in the NLRC (b) contracting a second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage (c) notarizing documents despite the expiration of his commission Issue: WON Atty. Dela Cruz must be disbarred? NO, SUSPENSION ONLY Held: A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not determinative of an administrative case against him, or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect its course, then neither will the judgment of annulment of respondents second marriage also exonerate him from a wrongdoing actually committed. So long as the quantum of proof clear preponderance of evidence in disciplinary proceedings against members of the Bar is met, then liability attaches. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court cites grossly immoral conduct as a ground for disbarment. Immoral conduct is that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the

community and what is grossly immoral, that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree. Yes, there was immoral conduct. But, it was not as gross as to warrant his disbarment because: (a) His second marriage was a show of his noble intentions and total love for his wife (b) He never absconded from his obligations to support his wife and child (c) After his first failed marriage and prior to his second marriage or for a period of almost seven (7) years, he has not been romantically involved with any woman (d) Since then up to now, respondent remained celibate. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. On the contrary, it is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization of a private document converts the document into a public one making it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face and, for this reason, notaries public must observe with the utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. DECISION: 4 YEARS SUSPENSION ONLY. DOROTEO IGOY vs. ATTY. GILBERT SORIANO Facts: Doroteo A. Igoy is one of the petitioners in a civil case entitled Heirs of Gavino Igoy, et al. v. Mactan Shangrila Hotel. Complainant said that while the aforesaid case was still pending before the Court of Appeals, he tried to look for a person in the Supreme Court who may assist him in obtaining justice. A friend introduced complainant to a certain Justice of the Supreme Court, which was Atty. Soriano. He narrated to the said Justice the history of their case. In turn, the said Justice asked for and received from him the sum of P20K. However, the said Justice reminded complainant that he could offer no help while the case was pending before the Court of Appeals. They lost in the CA. So Soriano prepared the petition for review to be filed with the Supreme Court. He asked for another P20K. As promised the money was delivered, which was claimed by Sorianos son.

Soriano denies the money given, saying that it was only a token. Soon, Soriano resigned from his office. Issue: WON Soriano committed acts which will warrant his disbarment? YES Held: The claim of Atty. Soriano that the amount was given gratuitously would not excuse him from any liability. To tolerate such acts would open the floodgates to fraud or graft and corruption to be committed by officials and employees of the Court. It is admitted that respondent offered to resign, however, resignation should not be used as an easy way to escape administrative liability by a court personnel facing administrative sanction. Respondent therefore cannot go scot-free and be simply forgiven for the damage he caused to the institution he was bound by his oath and The Canons of Legal Ethics to serve with utmost integrity. Respondent may have been in the service for 28 years, but he has blemished his record irreparably and under the circumstances, this office believes that dismissal as a penalty is warranted. The nature and responsibilities of public officers enshrined in the Constitution are not mere rhetorical words to be taken lightly as idealistic sentiments but as working standards and attainable goals that should be matched with actual deeds. Those involved in the administration of justice must live up to the strictest standards of honesty and integrity in the public service. What makes his infraction worse is the fact that he is not a mere court employee, but a senior attorney employed in the Highest Court of the Land. He has indelibly sullied his record of government service spanning twenty-eight years, and in so doing he has prejudiced the integrity of the Court as a whole. DECISION: DISBARRED with FORFEITURE OF ALL RETIREMENT BENEFITS MARY MALECDAN vs. PEKAS and KOLLIN Facts: Atty Pekas and Kollin substituted Atty. Bustamante as a counsels for the Fanged Spouses.

Petitioner Malecdan bought a parcel of land located in Baguio City from the Fanged spouses. The money was received by Eliza Fanged and deposited in the account of Atty. Artemio Bustamante, then counsel for the latter. The complainant later found out, however, that the said lot was the subject of a controversy between the former owners and the Fanged Spouses. Then Kollin replaced Bustamante. He filed for a petition for rescission over the contract of sale, without returning the amount of money to Malecdan. While Malecdan was in the US, the Fanged spouses, Atty Bustamante and the PCIB (bank) signed a compromised contract, and Malecdan was not made a signatory to such contract. They caused the transfer of P30K from the account of Bustamante to a separate account for Kollin and Pekas as attorneys fees. Now, Malecdan files a case for disbarment against Kollin and Pekas, because not only was she prejudiced from such withdrawal of money, but they also committed acts against the IBP in contravention/violation to the lawyers oath that they shall uphold the laws of the land. Issue: WON Kollin and Pekas should be suspended? YES Held: The amount of P30K which the respondents took for themselves as attorneys fees belonged to a third person, not their client, as admitted by them in their complaint; the owner was, in fact, an adverse party. It was the possession of the money, its entitlement, which was in fact put in issue in the complaint for rescission of contract, and, if respondent Atty. Kollin is to be believed, prompted the filing of the complaint itself. Atty. Kollin knew that the money did not belong to his client, Eliza Fanged, but still he knowingly withdrew the amount of P30K to serve his interests. Kollin used Pekas inexperience to gain: By having respondent Atty. Pekas sign the Manifestation of Compromise Settlement, it was the intention of respondent Atty. Kollin to distance himself from such pleading and claim no responsibility or participation therein so that the same would not be tainted by his apparent knowledge of the defect in Eliza Fangeds right to claim the sales proceeds. In this respect, respondent Atty. Kollin and his client Eliza [F]anged have succeeded as they have secured

the release of the sales proceeds to the detriment and prejudice of herein complainant. Pekas knew that there was no valid compromise agreement, as one of the parties in the case was absent at the time it was entered into. He knew that no valid notice was given to the complainant, since the signatory to the notice of the manifestation of compromise agreement was a certain Veronica Buking. It is a settled principle that the compensation of a lawyer should be but a mere incident of the practice of law, the primary purpose of which is to render public service. The practice of law is a profession and not a money-making trade. The process of imbibing ethical standards can begin with the simple act of openness and candor in dealing with clients, which would progress thereafter towards the ideal that a lawyers vocation is not synonymous with an ordinary business proposition but a serious matter of public interest. DECISION: Pekas suspended for 6 months, Kollin for 3 years.