Pangasinan Transport Co. vs. Public Service Commission GR NO.

47065, June 26, 1940 FACTS: This is a case on the certificate of public convenience of petitioner Pangasinan Transportation Co. Inc (Pantranco). The petitioner has been engaged for the past twenty years in the business of transporting passengers in the province of Pangasinan and Tarlac, Nueva Ecija and Zambales. On August 26, 1939, Pantranco filed with the Public Service Commission (PSC) an application to operate 10 additional buses. PSC granted the application with 2 additional conditions which was made to apply also on their existing business. Pantranco filed a motion for reconsideration with the Public Service Commission. Since it was denied, Pantranco then filed a petition/ writ of certiorari. ISSUES: Whether the legislative power granted to Public Service Commission: - is unconstitutional and void because it is without limitation - constitutes undue delegation of powers HELD: The challenged provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 454 are valid and constitutional because it is a proper delegation of legislative power, so called Subordinate Legislation. It is a valid delegation because of the growing complexities of modern government, the complexities or multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation and the increased difficulty of administering the laws. All that has been delegated to the Commission is the administrative function, involving the use of discretion to carry out the will of the National Assembly having in view, in addition, the promotion of public interests in a proper and suitable manner. The Certificate of Public Convenience is neither a franchise nor contract, confers no property rights and is a mere license or privilege, subject to governmental control for the good of the public. PSC has the power, upon notice and hearing, to amend, modify, or revoked at any time any Certificate issued, whenever the facts and circumstances so warranted. The limitation of 25 years was never heard, so the case was remanded to PSC for further proceedings. In addition, the Court ruled that, the liberty and property of the citizens should be protected by the rudimentary Requirements of fair play. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights that he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. When private property is affected with a public interest, it ceased to be juris privati or private use only. [G.R. No. L-10520 | February 28, 1957] TAADAvs. CUENCO FACTS: Senate chose respondents Senators Mariano J. Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado as members of the same Electoral Tribunal. Respondents allege that: (a) this Court is without power, authority of jurisdiction to direct or control the action of the Senate in choosing the members of the Electoral Tribunal; and (b) that the petition states no cause of action, because "petitioner Taada has

exhausted his right to nominate after he nominated himself and refused to nominate two (2) more Senators." RULING: We cannot agree with the conclusion drawn by respondents from the foregoing facts. To begin with, unlike the cases of Alejandrino vs. Quezon (46 Phil., 83) and Vera vs. Avelino (77 Phil., 192)-relied upon by the respondents this is not an action against the Senate, and it does not seek to compel the latter, either directly or indirectly, to allow the petitioners to perform their duties as members of said House. Although the Constitution provides that the Senate shall choose six (6) Senators to be members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the latter is part neither of Congress nor of the Senate. Secondly, although the Senate has, under the Constitution, the exclusive power to choose the Senators who shall form part of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the fundamental law has prescribed the manner in which the authority shall be exercised. As the author of a very enlightening study on judicial self-limitation has aptly put it: "The courts are called upon to say, on the one hand, by whom certain powers shall be exercised, and on the other hand, to determine whether the powers possessed have been validly exercised. In performing the latter function, they do not encroach upon the powers of a coordinate branch of the, government, since the determination of the validity of an act is not the same, thing as the performance of the act. In the one case we are seeking to ascertain upon whom devolves the duty of the particular service. In the other case we are merely seeking to determine whether the Constitution has been violated by anything done or attented by either an executive official or the legislative." Again, under the Constitution, "the legislative power" is vested exclusively in the Congress of the Philippines. Yet, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. And, since judicial power includes the authority to inquire into the legality of statutes enacted by the two Houses of Congress, and approved by the Executive, there can be no reason why the validity of an act of one of said Houses, like that of any other branch of the Government, may not be determined in the proper actions. In fact, whenever the conflicting claims of the parties to a litigation cannot properly be settled without inquiring into the validity of an act of Congress or of either House thereof, the courts have, not only jurisdiction to pass upon said issue, but, also, the duty to do so, which cannot be evaded without violating the fundamental law and paving the way to its eventual destruction. As already adverted to, the objection to our jurisdiction hinges on the question whether the issue before us is political or not. In short, the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their

sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here, we are called upon to decide whether the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias-a member and spokesman of the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate-on behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate that said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination .. of the party having the second largest number of votes" in the Senate, and hence, is null and void. This is not a political question. The Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate prove of the judicial department to pass upon the validity the proceedings in connection therewith. Whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law is for the judiciary. Moreover, where the legislative department has by statute prescribed election procedure in a given situation, the judiciary may determine whether a particular election has been in conformity with such statute, and, particularly, whether such statute has been applied in a way to deny or transgress on the constitutional or statutory rights .." (16 C.J.S., 439; emphasis supplied.). It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction, but, also, the duty, to consider and determine the principal issue raised by the parties herein. Is the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Electoral Tribunal, valid and lawful? Section 11 of Article VI of the 1935 Constitution, reads: "The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The Senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman."

Petitioners maintain that said nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado-who belong to the Nacionalista Party-as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, are null and void and have been made without power or color of authority, for, after the nomination by said party, and the election by the Senate, of Senators Laurel, Lopez and Primicias, as members of said Tribunal, the other Senators, who shall be members thereof, must necessarily be nominated by the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate, and such party is, admittedly, the Citizens Party, to which Senator Taada belongs and which he represents. Respondents allege, however, that the constitutional mandate to the effect that "each Electoral Tribunal shall be compose of nine (9) members," six (6) of whom "shall be members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be", is mandatory; that when-after the nomination of three (3) Senators by the majority party, and their election by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal-Senator Taada nominated himself only, on behalf of the minority party, he thereby "waived his right to no two more Senators;" that, when Senator Primicias nominated Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and these respondents were chosen by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, Said Senator Primicias and the Senate merely complied with the aforementioned provision of the fundamental law, relative to the number of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal; and, that, accordingly, Senators Cuenco and Delgado are de jure members of said body, and the appointment of their co-respondents, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes is valid and lawful. What has been said above, relative to the conditions antecedent to, and concomitant with, the adoption of section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, reveals clearly that its framers intended to prevent the majority party from controlling the Electoral Tribunals, and that the structure thereof is founded upon the equilibrium between the majority and the minority parties therein, with the Justices of the Supreme Court, who are members of said Tribunals, holding the resulting balance of power. The procedure prescribed in said provision for the selection of members of the Electoral Tribunals is vital to the role they are called upon to play. it constitutes the essence of said Tribunals. Hence, compliance with said procedure is mandatory, and acts performed in violation thereof are null and void. It is true that the application of the foregoing criterion would limit the membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, in the case at bar, to seven (7), instead of nine (9), members; but, it is conceded that the present composition of the Senate was not foreseen by the framers of our Constitution.

Furthermore, the spirit of the law prevails over its letter, and the solution herein adopted maintains the spirit of the Constitution, for partisan considerations can not be decisive in a tribunal consisting of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court, three (3) members nominated by the majority party and either one (1) or two (2) members nominated by the party having the second largest number of votes in the House concerned. Upon the other hand, what would be the result of respondents' contention if upheld? Owing to the fact that the Citizens Party has only one member in the Upper House, Senator Taada felt he should nominate, for the Senate Electoral Tribunal, only said member of the Citizens Party. The same is, thus, numerically handicapped, vis-a-vis the majority party, in said Tribunal. Obviously, Senator Taada did not nominate other two Senators, because, otherwise, he would worsen the already disadvantageous position, therein, of the Citizens Party. Indeed, by the aforementioned nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, if the same were sanctioned, the Nacionalista Party would have five (5) members in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, as against one (1) member of the Citizens Party and three members of the Supreme Court. With the absolute majority thereby attained by the majority party in said Tribunal, the philosophy underlying the same would be entirely upset. The equilibrium between the political parties therein would be destroyed. What is worst, the decisive moderating role of the Justices of the Supreme Court would be wiped out, and, in lieu thereof, the door would be thrown wide open for the predominance of political considerations in the determination of election protests pending before said Tribunal, which is precisely what the fathers of our Constitution earnestly strove to forestall. In view of the foregoing, we hold that the Senate may not elect, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, those Senators who have not been nominated by the political parties specified in the Constitution; that the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate may nominate not more than three (3) members thereof to said Electoral Tribunal; that the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate has the exclusive right to nominate the other three (3) Senators who shall sit as members in the Electoral Tribunal; that neither these three (3) Senators, nor any of them, may be nominated by a person or party other than the one having the second largest number of votes in the Senate or its representative therein; that the Committee on Rules for the Senate has no standing to validly make such nomination and that the nomination of Senators Cuenco and Delgado by Senator Primicias, and the election of said respondents by the Senate, as members of said Tribunal, are null and void ab initio. As regards respondents Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, we are not prepared to hold, however, that their appointments were null and void. Although recommended by Senators Cuenco and Delgado, who are not lawful members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, they

were appointed by its Chairman, presumably, with the consent of the majority of the de jure members of said body 14 or, pursuant to the Rules thereof. At any rate, as held in Suanes vs. Chief Accountant (supra), the election of its personnel is an internal matter falling within the jurisdiction and control of said body, and there is every reason to believe that it will, hereafter take appropriate measures, in relation to the four (4) respondents abovementioned, conformably with the spirit of the Constitution and of, the decision in the case at bar. Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that, respondents Senators Mariano Jesus Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado have not been duly elected as Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, that they are not entitled to act as such and that they should be, as they are hereby, enjoined from exercising the powers and duties of Members of said Electoral Tribunal and from acting in such capacity in connection with Senate Electoral Case No. 4 thereof. With the qualification stated above, the petition is dismissed, as regards respondents Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes. Tanada vs angara 272 SCRA 18 FACTS: The suit was filed to nullify the concurrence of the Philippines Senate to the Presidents Ratification of the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization. It was contended that the agreement places nationals and products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products in contravention of the Filipino First Policy. Petitioners maintained that this Agreement was an assault on the sovereign powers of the Philippines because it meant that Congress could not pass legislation that would be good for national interest and general welfare if such legislation would not conform to the WTO Agreement. ISSUE: Whether the provisions of the WTO Agreement and its annexes limit, restrict, or impair the exercise of legislative power by Congress. HELD: While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and allencompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject to limitations and restrictions voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines as a member of the family of nations. One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties xxx. A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislation such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken. By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of

their state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals live with coequals, and in pursuit of mutuality covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise absolute rights. The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality be considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the picture: (1) limitations imposed by the very nature of membership in the family of nations and (2) limitations imposed by treaty stipulations. Daza vs. Singson, G.R. No. 86344, Dec. 21, 1989 FACTS: Petitioner Daza, a Liberal Party member, was given a seat in the Commission on Appointments. However, after the reorganization of the LDP, which resulted in a political realignment in the House. 24 members of the Liberal Party formally resigned and joined the LDP, thereby welling its number to 159 and correspondingly reducing their former party to only 17 members. On the basis of this development, the House revised its representation in the Commission by withdrawing the seat occupied by petitioner and giving this to the newly-formed LDP, who was represented by Respondent Singson. ISSUES:

Whether or not the reorganization of the House representation in the Commission is based on a permanent political realignment as to warrant petitioners removal therein

RULING: In the case of Cunanan v. Tan, the Court noted that the Allied Majority was a merely temporary combination as the Nacionalista defectors had not disaffiliated from their party and permanently joined the new political group. Officially, they were still members of the Nacionalista Party. The reorganization of the Commission on Appointments was invalid because it was not based on the proportional representation of the political parties in the House of Representatives as required by the Constitution. The Court held: ... In other words, a shifting of votes at a given time, even if du to arrangements of a more or less temporary nature, like the one that has led to the formation of the so-called "Allied Majority," does not suffice to authorize a reorganization of the membership of the Commission for said House. Otherwise the Commission on Appointments may have to be reorganized as often as votes shift from one side to another in the House. The framers of our Constitution could not have intended to thus place a constitutional organ, like the Commission on Appointments, at the mercy of each House of Congress. The petitioner's contention that, even if registered, the party must still pass

the test of time to prove its permanence is not acceptable. Under this theory, a registered party obtaining the majority of the seats in the House of Representatives (or the Senate) would still not be entitled to representation in the Commission on Appointments as long as it was organized only recently and has not yet "aged." The Liberal Party itself would fall in such a category. That party was created in December 1945 by a faction of the Nacionalista Party that seceded therefrom to support Manuel A. Roxas's bid for the Presidency of the Philippines in the election held on April 23, 1946. The Liberal Party won. At that time it was only four months old. Yet no question was raised as to its right to be represented in the Commission on Appointments and in the Electoral Tribunals by virtue of its status as the majority party in both chambers of the Congress. The LDP has been in existence for more than one year now. It now has 157 members in the House of Representatives and 6 members in the Senate. Its titular head is no less than the President of the Philippines and its President is Senator Neptali A. Gonzales, who took over recently from Speaker Ramon V. Mitra. It is true that there have been, and there still are, some internal disagreements among its members, but these are to be expected in any political organization, especially if it is democratic in structure. In fact even the monolithic Communist Party in a number of socialist states has undergone similar dissension, and even upheavals. But it surely cannot be considered still temporary because of such discord. If the petitioner's argument were to be pursued, the 157 members of the LDP in the House of Representatives would have to be denied representation in the Commission on Appointments and, for that matter, also the Electoral Tribunal. By the same token, the KBL, which the petitioner says is now "history only," should also be written off. The independents also cannot be represented because they belong to no political party. That would virtually leave the Liberal Party only with all of its seventeen members to claim all the twelve seats of the House of Representatives in the Commission on Appointments and the six legislative seats in the House Electoral Tribunal. It is noteworthy that when with 41 members the Liberal Party was alloted two of the seats in the Commission on Appointments, it did not express any objection. Inconsistently, the petitioner is now opposed to the withdrawal from it of one seat although its original number has been cut by more than half. As for the other condition suggested by the petitioner, to wit, that the party must survive in a general congressional election, the LDP has doubtless also passed that test, if only vicariously. It may even be said that as it now commands the biggest following in the House of Representatives, the party has not only survived but in fact prevailed. At any rate, that test was never laid down in Cunanan. KINDS OF APPOINTMENT:

Regular requires concurrence of CA; if revoked by CA, can return to his old post but cannot be reappointed; if bypassed by CA, reappointment is allowed Ad Interim permanent and effective until revoked or disapproved by CA; if revoked by CA, cannot return to his old post or be reappointed; if bypassed, the appointment shall only last until the next adjournment of Congress and official may be reappointed to the same position Temporary appointments in acting capacity; no need for concurrence of CA and shall last only for a period not exceeding one year

ALEJANDRINO VS QUEZON Facts: "Resolved: That the Honorable Jose Alejandrino, Senator for the Twelfth District, be, as he is hereby, declared guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant violation of the privileges of the Senate for having treacherously assaulted the Honorable Vicente de Vera, Senator for the Sixth District on the occasion of certain, phrases being uttered by the latter in the course of the debate regarding the credentials of said Mr. Alejandrino. Issue: Whether resolution above quoted is unconstitutional and entirely of no effect, for five reasons. He prays the court: (1) To issue a preliminary injunction against the respondents enjoining them from executing the resolution; (2) to declare the aforesaid resolution of the Senate null and void; and (3) as a consequence of the foregoing, to issue a final writ of mandamus and injunction against the respondents ordering them to recognize the rights of the petitioner to exercise his office as Senator Held: As it is unlikely that the petition could be amended to state a cause of action, it must be dismissed without costs. Such is the judgment of the court. So ordered. Ratio: We rule that neither the Philippine Legislature nor a branch thereof can be directly controlled in the exercise of their legislative powers by any judicial process. The court accordingly lacks jurisdiction to consider the petition and the demurrer must be sustained. The power to control is the power to abrogate and the power to abrogate is the power to usurp. Each department may, nevertheless, indirectly restrain the others. It is peculiarly the duty of the judiciary to say what the law is, to enforce the Constitution, and to decide whether the proper constitutional sphere of a department has been transcended. The courts must determine the validity of legislative enactments as well as the legality of all private and official acts. To this extent, do the courts restrain the other departments. In view of the propriety of mandamus Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its members, or its officers, to compel the performance of duties purely legislative in their

character which therefore pertain to their legislative functions and over which they have exclusive control. The final arbiter in cases of dispute is the judiciary, and to this extent at least the executive department may be said to be dependent upon and subordinate to the judiciary. . . . It is not the office of the person to whom the writ of mandamus is directed, but the nature of the thing to be done, by which the propriety of issuing a mandamus is to be determined." In view of the Organic Law vs Power to Discipline House Members On the merits of the controversy, we will only say this: The Organic Act authorizes the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands to appoint two senators and nine representatives to represent the non-Christian regions in the Philippine Legislature. These senators and representatives "hold office until removed by the Governor-General." (Organic Act, secs. 16, 17.) They may not be removed by the Philippine Legislature. However, to the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, is granted the power to "punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel an elective member." (Organic Act, sec. 18.) Either House may thus punish an appointive member for disorderly behavior. Neither House may expel an appointive member for any reason. As to whether the power to "suspend" is then included in the power to "punish," a power granted to the two Houses of the Legislature by the Constitution, or in the power to "remove," a power granted to the GovernorGeneral by the Constitution, it would appear that neither is the correct hypothesis. The Constitution has purposely withheld from the two Houses of the Legislature and the Governor-General alike the power to suspend an appointive member of the Legislature. In view of effects of punishment Punishment by way of reprimand or fine vindicates the outraged dignity of the House without depriving the constituency of representation; expulsion, when permissible, likewise vindicates the honor of the legislative body while giving to the constituency an opportunity to elect anew; but suspension deprives the electoral district of representation without that district being afforded any means by which to fill the vacancy. By suspension, the seat remains filled but the occupant is silenced. Suspension for one year is equivalent to qualified expulsion or removal. In view of no remedy Conceding therefore that the power of the Senate to punish its members for disorderly behavior does not authorize it to suspend an appointive member from the exercise of his office for one year, conceding what has been so well stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner, conceding all this and more, yet the writ prayed for cannot issue, for the allconclusive reason that the Supreme Court does not possess the power of coercion to make the Philippine Senate take any particular action. If it be said that conclusion leaves the petitioner without a remedy, the answer is that the judiciary is not the repository of all wisdom and all power.

OSMENA VS PENDATUN Facts: On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr., submitted to this Court a verified petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Congressman Salipada K. Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59. He asked for annulment of such Resolution on the ground of infringement of his parliamentary immunity; he also asked, principally, that said members of the special committee be enjoined from proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the portion authorizing them to require him to substantiate his charges against the President, with the admonition that if he failed to do so, he must show cause why the House should not punish him. "The people, Mr. President, have been hearing of ugly reports that under your unpopular administration the free things they used to get from the government are now for sale at premium prices. They say that even pardons are for sale, and that regardless of the gravity or seriousness of a criminal case, the culprit can always be bailed out forever from jail as long as he can come across with a handsome dole. I am afraid, such an anomalous situation would reflect badly on the kind of justice that your administration is dispensing. . . ." Resolved by the House of Representatives, that a special committee of fifteen Members to be appointed by the Speaker be, and the same hereby is, created to investigate the truth of the charges against the President of the Philippines made by Honorable Sergio Osmea, Jr., in his privilege speech of June 23. Issue: Whether the Resolution violated petitioners constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House; Whether petitioners words constituted actionable conduct;

Whether petitioner is protected by Rule XVII Sec. 7 of the Rules of the House provides that if other business has intervened after the Member had uttered obnoxious words in debate he shall not be held to answer therefore nor be subject to censure by the House. Held: Accordingly, the petition has to be, and is hereby dismissed. So ordered. Ratio: On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly conduct for which Osmea may be disciplined, many arguments pro and con have been advanced. We believe, however, that the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly

behaviour, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. Our refusal to intervene might impress some readers as subconscious hesitation due to discovery of impermissible course of action in the legislative chamber. Nothing of that sort: we merely refuse to disregard the allocation of constitutional functions which it is our special duty to maintain. VERA VS AVELINO FACTS: Commission on Elections submitted last May 1946 to the President and the Congress of the Philippines a report regarding the national elections held the previous month. It stated that by reason of certain specified acts of terrorism and violence in the province of Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac, the voting in said region did not reflect the true and free expression of the popular will. During the session, when the senate convened on May 25, 1946, a pendatum resolution was approved referring to the report ordering that Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero who had been included among the 16 candidates for senator receiving the highest number of votes, proclaimed by the Commissions on Elections shall not be sworn, nor seated, as members of the chamber, pending the termination of the of the protest lodged against their election. Petitioners thus immediately instituted an action against their colleagues responsible for the resolution, praying for an order to annul it and compelling respondents to permit them to occupy their seats and to exercise their senatorial prerogative. They also allege that only the Electoral Tribunal had jurisdiction over contests relating to their election, returns and qualifications. respondents assert the validity of the pendatum resolution. ISSUES: 1.Whether the Commission on Elections has the jurisdiction to determine whether or not votes cast in the said provinces are valid. 2.Whether administration of oath and the sitting of Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose Romero should be deferred pending hearing and decision on the protests lodged against their elections. RULING: The Supreme Court refused to intervene, under the concept of separation of powers, holding that the case was not a contest, and affirmed the inherent right of the legislature to determine who shall be admitted to its membership.

Case dismissed. SANIDAD VS. COMELEC PABLITO V. SANIDAD - petitioner; newspaper columnist of the "OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, a weekly newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras COMELEC Type of respondent; petition filed: through its SolicitorFOR General CERTIORARI

PETITION

ISSUE: Whether Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 is constitutional or not. FACTS: COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 was promulgated due to the enacted RA No. 6766 (An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region) last October 23, 1989, which paved for a call of a plebescite fo its ratification (original schedule was reset from December 27, 1989 to January 30, 1990. Allegations of Sanidad:

1.Unconsitutional as it it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press 2.Constitutes a prior restraint on his constitutionally-guaranteed freedom of the press bause of its penal provsions in case of violation Responses of COMELEC

-Not violative of the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press but only a valid implementation of the power of the Comelec to supervise and regulate media during election or plebiscite periods as enunciated in Article IX-C, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of RA 6646 -Does Not absolutely bar petitioner from expressing his views and/or from campaigning for or against the Organic Act. He may still express his views or campaign for or against the act through the Comelec space and airtime (magazine/periodical in the province) HELD: Petiton is GRANTED- Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 is declared

null and void and unconstitutional . TRO made permanent due to the follwing reasons: 1. It has no statutory basis 2. Form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of petitioner's freedom of expression for no justifiable reason 3. affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be exercised.

AVELINO VS CUENCO Facts; Senator Cuenco was elected Senate President after the seat being declared vacant resulting to the other senators including the Senate President Avelino's walk-out.

Issue; WON there's quorum, enough to conduct business and therefor legitimizing Senator Ruling; The Supreme Court held that twelve is a majority of 24 enough to conduct business taking into consideration the absence of Senator Confessor being out of the country and jurisdiction, and Senator Sotto who's in the hospital. BARCELON VS BAKER Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ Habeas Corpus as a Political Question being a Prerogative by the President In the early 1900s in Batangas, Barcelon was detained by orders of Baker. Barcelons lawyers petitioned before the court for a writ of habeas corpus demanding Barcelon and Thompson, one of his men, to explain why Barcelon was detained. They alleged that there is no legal authority behind Barcelons arrest and it was w/o due process. The Atty-Gen averred that Baker et al acted only pursuant to the Gov-Gens resolution in 1905 which suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Cavite and Batangas (Sec 5 of The cuenco's election as Senate President.

Philippine Bill). Barcelon argued that there is no rebellion or invasion or insurrection during his arrest hence he should be set free. ISSUE: Whether or not Barcelon was arrested w/ due process. HELD: The SC held that the issue is a political question. Only the president can determine the existence of the grounds specified in the Constitution for the suspension o the privilege o the writ of habeas corpus. This power is discretionary and therefore not justiciable. The president has superior competence to assess the peace and order condition of the country. Hence, the determination held by the president (GG) of the Philippines of the existence of any of the grounds prescribed by the Constitution for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus should be conclusive upon the courts. The justification was that the president (GG), with all the intelligence sources available to him as commander-in-chief, was in a better position than the SC to ascertain the real state of peace and order in the country. MONTENEGRO VS CASTANEDA Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ Habeas Corpus as a Political Question being a Prerogative by the President In October 1950, Montenegros son was arrested by military agents. Three days after the arrest, PP 210 was proclaimed suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Montenegro then filed before the court to have his son be set free for his arrest was w/o cause and that the said PP should not be applied retroactively to his son for it would then constitute a violation of the constitutional prohibition against bill of attainders. Montenegro then filed a petition for the writ of habeas corpus demanding the detainers to bring his sons body and explain his detention. Castaeda et al argued that the court has no judicial authority over the matter invoking the PP and the previous ruling in Barcelon vs Baker. ISSUE: Whether or not Montenegros petition should be granted. HELD: As ruled by the SC in the Barcelon case, Montenegros petition is likewise denied. The constitutional authority of the President to suspend in case of imminent danger of invasion, insurrection or rebellion under Article 7 may not correctly be placed in doubt. LANSANG VS GARCIA Abandonment of the Doctrine Held in the Barcelon Case & the Montenegro Case Due to the throwing of two hand grenades in a Liberal Party caucus in 1971 causing the death of 8 people, Marcos issued PP 889 which suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Marcos urged that there is a need to

curtail the growth of Maoist groups. Subsequently, Lansang et al were invited by the PC headed by Garcia for interrogation and investigation. Lansang et al questioned the validity of the suspension of the writ averring that the suspension does not meet the constitutional requisites. ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension is constitutional. HELD: The doctrine established in Barcelon and Montenegro was subsequently abandoned in this case where the SC declared that it had the power to inquire into the factual basis of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by Marcos in Aug 1971 and to annul the same if no legal ground could be established. Accordingly, hearings were conducted to receive evidence on this matter, including two closed-door sessions in which relevant classified information was divulged by the government to the members of the SC and 3 selected lawyers of the petitioners. In the end, after satisfying itself that there was actually a massive and systematic Communistoriented campaign to overthrow the government by force, as claimed by Marcos, the SC unanimously decided to uphold t5he suspension of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus. JOSEFINA GARCIA-PADILLA VS ENRILE Reversal of the Lansang Doctrine & Reinstatement of the Montenegro Doctrine In July 1982, Sabino Padilla, together w/ 8 others who were having a conference in a house in Bayombong, NV, were arrested by members of the PC. The raid of the house was authorized by a search warrant issued by Judge Sayo. Josefina, mother of Sabino, opposed the arrest averring that no warrant of arrest was issued but rather it was just a warrant of arrest hence the arrest of her son and the others was w/o just cause. Sabino and companions together with 4 others were later transferred to a facility only the PCs know. Josefina petitioned the court for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. ISSUE: Whether or not the arrests done against Sabino et al is valid. HELD: In a complete about face, the SC decision in the Lansang Case was reversed and the ruling in the Barcelon Case & the Montenegro Case was again reinstated. The questioned power of the president to suspend the privilege of the WoHC was once again held as discretionary in the president. The SC again reiterated that the suspension of the writ was a political question to be resolved solely by the president. It was also noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must, indeed, carry with it the suspension of the right to bail, if the governments campaign to suppress the rebellion is to be enhanced and rendered effective. If the right to bail may be demanded during the continuance of the rebellion, and those arrested, captured and detained in the course thereof will be released, they would, without the least doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field thereby

jeopardizing the success of government efforts to bring to an end the invasion, rebellion or insurrection. NOTE: This ruling was abrogated by Sec 18, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution which expressly constitutionalized the Lansang Doctrine. Note as well that under Art 3 (Sec 13) of the Constitution it is stated that the right to bail shall not be impaired even if the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. ENDENCIA VS DAVID Separation of Powers Saturnino David, the then Collector of Internal Revenue, ordered the taxing of Justice Pastor Endencias and Justice Fernando Jugos salary pursuant to Sec 13 of RA 590 which provides that SEC. 13. No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law. According to the brief of the Solicitor General on behalf of appellant Collector of Internal Revenue, our decision in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, was not received favorably by Congress, because immediately after its promulgation, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590. To bring home his point, the Solicitor General reproduces what he considers the pertinent discussion in the Lower House of House Bill No. 1127 which became Republic Act No. 590. ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 13 of RA 590 is constitutional. HELD: By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, Republic Act No. 590, Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease of compensation. This is a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office, found in section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the welldefined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary. The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial function in defining a term. ** The reason behind the exemption in the Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Federal Supreme Court and this Court, is to preserve the independence of the Judiciary, not only of this High Tribunal but of the other courts, whose present membership number more than 990 judicial officials. The independence of the judges is of far greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries.

In conclusion we reiterate the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to the effect that the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution. We further hold that the interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, especially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land