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MARBURY V MADISON MARSHALL; February 1803 ANGARA V ELECTORAL COMMISSION LAUREL; July 15, 1936 VARGAS V RILLORAZA HILADO, February 26, 1948 OCCENA V COMELEC FERNANDO; April 2, 1981
NATURE - two prohibition proceedings against the validity of three Batasang Pambansa Resolutions proposing constitutional amendments - decision EN BANC FACTS - Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution, are suing as taxpayers. - Resolution No. 1 proposes an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for residential purposes (approved by the vote of 122 to 5) - Resolution No. 2 deals with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly (vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention) - Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections (vote of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention) - The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law - The suits were filed March 3, 6 and 12, 1981, respectively ISSUES 1. WON the 1973 Constitution is valid and in effect 2. a. WON the Interim Batasang Pambansa has the power to propose amendments and how such may be exercised if ever. (More specially as to the latter, the extent of the changes that may be introduced, the number of votes necessary for the validity of a proposal, and the standard required for a proper submission.) b. WON the propositions proposed were too extensive that they go beyond the limits of authority conferred on

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the Interim Natl Assembly as success of the interim Natl Assembly HELD - all petitions dismissed Ratio 1. It is the ruling of the Court, as set forth at the outset, that the petitions must be dismissed; it is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution. - In the dispositive portion of Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, this Court stated by a vote of six7 to four: "This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect." - Such a statement served a useful purpose. It made manifest that as of January 17, 1973, the present Constitution came into force and effect. - Thereafter, as a matter of law, all doubts were resolved. The 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law. - On the function of judicial review: has both a positive and a negative aspect; the Supreme Court can check as well as legitimate. In declaring what the law is, it may not only nullify the acts of coordinate branches but may also sustain their validity. In the latter case, there is an affirmation that what was done cannot be stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. - The' mere dismissal of a suit of this character suffices. That is the meaning of the concluding statement in Javellana. Since then, this Court has invariably applied the present Constitution. 2. a. - "The Interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its Members shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the Members thereof." - One of such powers is precisely that of proposing amendments. - The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its members to be ratified in accordance with the Article on Amendments. - When, therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent body, it acted by virtue of such competence. Its authority to do so is clearly beyond doubt. It could and did propose the amendments embodied in the resolutions now being assailed b.

PROF.
- It suffices to quote from the opinion of Justice Makasiar, in Del Rosario v. Commission on Elections to dispose of this contention: "And whether the Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the Constitution or entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose an entirely new Constitution based on an ideology foreign to the democratic system, is of no moment; because the same will be submitted to the people for ratification. - "The fact that the present Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one is no argument against the validity of the law because 'amendment' includes the 'revision' or total overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate, whether the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or totally changed would become immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the sovereign people." - popular American principle: a constituent body can propose anything but conclude nothing. - On the number of votes required to propose amendments.The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can propose amendments. In that capacity, only a majority vote is needed. - It is not also a requirement as in this case, that the Interim Batasang Pambansa exercises its constituent power to propose amendments. - Moreover, even on the assumption that the requirement of three-fourth votes applies, such extraordinary majority was obtained. - On the requisite standard for a proper submission 2 considerations: (1) the period that must elapse before the holding of the plebiscite and (2) from the standpoint of such amendments having been called to the attention of the people so that it could not plausibly be maintained that they were property informed as to the proposed changes. - As to the period, the Constitution indicates the way the matter should be resolved. "Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment or revision." - The three resolutions were approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981. In the Batasang Pambansa B1g. 22, the date of the plebiscite is set for April 7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-day period provided by the Constitution. - As for the people being adequately informed, it cannot be denied that this time, the proposed amendments have "been intensively and extensively discussed at the

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Interim Batasang Pambansa, as well as through the mass media

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Petitioners' Claim 1. They deprive owners of schools and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of law; 2. They deprive parents of their natural right and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency; 3. Their provisions conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power. Respondents' Comments 1. The matter constitutes no justiciable controversy; 2. The petitioners are in estoppel to challenge the validity of the said acts; 3. The acts are constitutionally valid. ISSUES Procedural WON the case is justiciable Substantive WON Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3025 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 is unconstitutional HELD Procedural Ratio The court, notwithstanding the fact that the petitioners did not present an actual case or controversy, and did not have standing to sue, decided to look into the matter. Reasoning - Petitioners contend that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school is guaranteed by the Constitution, and section 3 of Act No. 2706 which provides that before a private school may be opened to the public it must first obtain a permit from the Secretary of Education, amounts to censorship of previous restraint, a practice abhorrent to our system of law and government. - None of the petitioners has cause to present this issue, because all of them have permits to operate, and are actually operating. They also do not assert that the Secretary of Education has threatened to revoke their permits. They have suffered no wrong under the terms of the lawand naturally, need no relief. - Mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education might under the law withdraw the permit of one of petitioners does not constitute a justiciable controversy. Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest therein. - The above notwithstanding, the court decided to look into the matter, to see if there was a violation of fundamental personal rights of liberty and property. Substantive

PROF.
Ratio Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3025 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 is not unconstitutional. Reasoning a. The requirement that before opening a school the owner must secure a permit from the Secretary of Education is within the police power of the State. Art.XIV, sec.5 of the Constitution provides that All educational institutions shall be under the supervision and subject to regulation by the State. The power to regulate implies the power to require a permit or license. b. Petitioners contend that the statutes conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute an unlawful delegation of power. - Petitioners argue that nowhere in the Act can one find any description of what constitutes general standard of efficiency, or adequate instruction to the public. Neither does it provide any statement of conditions or factors which the Secretary of Education must take into account to determine the efficiency of instruction. (as used in sec.1 of Act No. 2706) - Petitioners also attacked sec 6 of the same article saying that the section leaves everything to the uncontrolled discretion of the Secretary of Education or his department. - The Court answered this by saying that despite alleged vagueness, the Secretary of Education has fixed standards to ensure adequate and efficient instruction, and the system of private education has been satisfactorily in operation for 37 years, which only shows that the Legislature did and could, rely upon the training and educational experience of those in the Dept of Education to ascertain and formulate minimum requirements of adequate instruction. - Also, petitioners do not show how these standards have injured them. c. Petitioners also contend that the assessment of 1 per cent levied on gross receipts of all private schools for additional government expenses in connection with their supervision and regulation is unconstitutional, because it is a tax on the exercise of a constitutional right. This issue is not within the jurisdiction of the SC but of the CFI. d. Petitioners questioned the validity of RA No. 139, section 1 of which allows the government, through the Board on Textbooks, to regulate what textbooks may be used by private schools. - The Court noted that no justiciable controversy has been presented regarding this matter considering that the Court has not been informed that the Board on Textbooks has prohibited this or that text, or that petitioners refused or intend to refuse to submit some

SEPARATE OPINION TEEHANKEE [dissent]

- Consistently with his dissenting opinion in Sanidad vs. Comelec - I the transcendental constituent power to propose and approve amendments to the Constitution as well as to set up the machinery and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of the amendments proposals has been withheld by the Constitution from the President (Prime Minister) as sole repository of executive power - the proposed amendments to be valid must come from the constitutional agency vested with the constituent power to do so, i.e. in the Interim National Assembly provided in the Transitory Article XVII which would then have to be convened and not from the executive power as vested in the President from whom such constituent power has been withheld. - the October 1976 constitutional amendments which created the Interim Batasang Pambansa in lieu of the Interim National Assembly were invalid and the proposed amendments at bar having been adopted by the Interim Batasang Pambansa are also invalid - Teehankee also reiterates his stand in Sanidad that the doctrine of fair and proper submission required constitutional twothirds majority vote of the Court (of eight votes, then) in Tolentino is fully applicable in the case at bar. - the word 'submitted' can only mean that the government, within its maximum capabilities, should strain every effort to inform every citizen of the provisions to be amended, and the proposed amendments and the meaning, nature and effects thereof

PACU V SECRETARY OF EDUCATION BENGZON; October 31, 1955

NATURE Original action in the Supreme Court. Prohibition. FACTS - Petitioning colleges and universities assailed the constitutionality of Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3025 and Commonwealth Act No. 180.

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textbooks, or are in danger of losing substantial privileges or rights for so refusing. - The court also said that with the States power of regulation and supervision, it may prohibit the use of textbooks that are illegal or offensive to the Filipinos or adverse to governmental policies.

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filed before the COMELEC to disqualify Dumlao. What the petrition does then is to simply seek an advisory opinion. 2. No, neither Igot nor Salapantan fall under the requisite criteria for disqualification. They are not adversely affected through which there are no personal nor substantial interest at stake. Neither is it a taxpayers suit for it does not directly involve the disbursement of public funds. 3. No, Dumlao, Igot, and Salapantan are without any cause of action. 4. Yes, because the case is of paramount public interest for the elctions are to be held a few days away. Substantive 1. No. Classification is reasonable and is based upon substantial distinctions. It is not arbitrary and unreasonable. The disqualification is not based solely on age but also about the retirement of the person in office. 2. Yes. The provision places an accused on the same level as that of the convicted. It becomes a step on the assumption of innocence of the accused. Although it is but prima facie evidence, time constraints affect the accused from disproving such charges. Disposition 1st paragraph of Sec. 4 of BP No. 52 is valid while the 2nd paragraph of Sec. 4 of BP No. 52 is null and void.

PROF.
ISSUE WON BP Blg. 883 is unconstitutional and should this Court therefore stop and prohibit the holding of the election. HELD By a 7-to-5 vote the SC decided to uphold the constitutionality of said law. Reasoning (deduced from the opinions of the Justices) 1. There is no clear case has been made of an absolute void of power and authority that would warrant its nullification and that prohibition is not a remedy for acts done that can no longer be undone (Teehankee). 2. It is a political question. 3. An examination of the Constitution, particularly Art. VII, Section 9, does not yield the conclusion that BP Blg. 883 is offensive to its provisions. What is clear is that the Consitution does not prohibit the President from tendering a resignation that is not immediately effective. Indeed, there is no provision whatsoever regarding such kind of resignation. 4. The enactment of BP 883 falls within the legislative authority of the Batasang Pambansa. Disposition The case is dismissed and the prayer for the issuance of an injunction restraining respondents from holding the election on February 7, 1986 is denied.

DUMLAO V COMELEC MELENCIO HERRERA;1980

NATURE Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction FACTS - This is a case filed by Patricio Dumlao and Romeo Igot and Alfredo Salapantan who seek to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 51, 52, and 53. Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Viscaya while Igot is a tax payer, as well as Salapantan. - Dumlao questions the constitutionality of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as it is discriminatory and contrary to the constitutional clause on Equal Protection. The provision disqualifies retired elective provincial, city, or municipal officials who have already received their retirement benefits who are aged 65 or older at the time of the commencement of the term of office. Igot and Salapantan on the other hand, questions the validity of Provisions on Sec. 7 and 4 of the BP No. 52 which disqualifies candidates for any office or their participation in political activities when they commit acts of disloyalty to the state (subversion, insurrection, or other similar crimes) given that a judgment of conviction shall be a conclusive evidence and filing of charges after preliminary investigations shall be prima facie evidence of such fact. ISSUES Procedural 1. WON it is an actual case 2. WON the petitioners are proper parties in the case 3. WON the review of constitutionality is the lis mota of the case 4. WON it should be heard Substantive 1. WON Sec. 4 of BP No. 52 is unconstitutional 2. WON Sec. 7 of BP No. 52 is unconstitutional HELD Procedural 1. No, it is not. Dumlao is not adversely affected by the application of that provision. No petition has yet been

PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION (PBA) V COMELEC CLERK; December 19, 1985

NATURE Petition for Prohibition FACTS - The constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 883 calling for a special (snap) election for President and Vice President was assailed by PBA, et al. They contend that it is violative of the Constitution because the office is not vacant. Then President Marcos, although tendered a letter of resignation, gave condition that his resignation will be effective only when the election is held and after the winner is proclaimed and qualified as President by taking his oath of office ten (10) days after his proclamation. The plaintiff contends that vacancy must be real and in esse, not a parody or shadow of the real thing. In the same way that death, disability, or removal from office must be actual and permanent before the pertinent provisions of Section 9, Art. VII of the Constitution (1973) may come into play, so must a resignation be real and irrevocably permanent.

ROMULO V YIGUEZ PATAJO; February 4, 1986

NATURE Petition for prohibition to review the judgment of the Batasan Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government. FACTS - Petitioners, more than 1/5 of all members of the Batasan, filed Resolution No. 644 calling for the impeachment of President Marcos, w/ a verified complaint for impeachment. The Speaker referred the matter to the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government. The Committee found the complaint insufficient in form and substance, disapproved the Resolution and dismissed all charges. - Ramon Mitra filed a motion praying for recall from the archives of the Resolution and verified complaint. Motion was disapproved by the Batasan. - Petitioners also claim that sections of the Rules on Impeachment are violative of the Constitution bec:

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- they empower smaller body to supplant complaint to impeach endorsed by 1/5 of all members of Batasan - they vest in Committee the power to impeach/not to impeach when such is vested only in the Batasan ISSUES Procedural WON SC can order Committee to recall fr the archives the Resolution and complaint Substantive WON Sections 4, 5, 6, 8 of Batasan Rules on Impeachment is unconstitutional and WON the Committee Report dismissing the Resolution should be declared null and void HELD Procedural No. - Resolution of the constitutionality of the questioned provisions of the Rules is not even necessary. What petitioners want is for SC to compel Batasan to hear the impeachment case. - When Batasan denied motion of Mitra to recall fr the archives, it in effect confirmed the action of the Committee. It follows that a majority vote of the members of Batasan confirming the act of the Committee makes impossible the required at least 2/3 vote of all members to support conviction. - Dismissal by the Batasan is beyond the power of SC to review. SC cant also order the Committee bec an order to the Committee is an order to the Batasan itself. Substantive No. - The Batasan pursuant to its power to adopt rules of proceedings may adopt rules of procedure on impeachment proceedings. These rules are not inconsistent with the Constitutional provisions. - Also, while the Batasan assigned to the Committee the task of determining whether petition is sufficient, the Committee is still required to submit its report to the Batasan. The report may be approved or not. - That the rules on impeachment of the Interim Batasan are better is no argument against the validity of the Rules on Impeachment of the Batasan. The Rules are always within the power of the Batasan to modify. These are merely procedural and not substantive. Also, generally, courts may not take cognizance of matters regarding rules of public deliberative bodies. Petition is dismissed.

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FERNANDEZ V TORRES FELICIANO; 1992
FACTS - Petitioners are seven qualified entertainers between the ages of 18 and 22 who are questioning DOLE Circular No. 01-91 (Prescribing Additional Requirements, Conditions and Procedures for the Deployment of Performing Artists). They attack it for violating the equal protection clause, the due process clause and the state policy on protection of labor. - The circular limits Filipino entertainers to be deployed outside the Philippines to those who have a reputable track record for at least one year and should be at least 23 years old. Exemptions are possible for justifiable reasons. - They seek to prevent the POEA and DOLE from implementing the said circular. - This circular aims to prevent abuse of foreign workers, adopting a selective prohibition of Filipino entertainers from performing abroad. ISSUES 1. WON the court has jurisdiction 2. WON the DOLE circular HELD - The petition must fail for prematurity because the first step should be the application for exemption with the Secretary of Labor, which the petitioners did not do. - The exemption in the circular is not absolute and comprehensive. - The discretionary authority of the DOLE is not unlimited and arbitrary. - Petitioners have failed to allege that they had previously applied for the exemption and have been arbitrarily denied. - Two applicable presumptions: o Administrative orders and regulations are entitled to presumption of constitutionality. o Official duty has been or will be regularly performed.

PROF.
Two (2) petitions were filed assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7854, entitled "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati", on the following grounds: 1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code; 2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three consecutive term" limit for local elective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution. Petitioners stress that under these provisions, elective local officials, including Members of the House of Representative, have a term of three (3) years and are prohibited from serving for more than three (3) consecutive terms. They argue that by providing that the new city shall acquire a new corporate existence, section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 restarts the term of the present municipal elective officials of Makati and disregards the terms previously served by them. In particular, petitioners point that section 51 favors the incumbent Makati Mayor, respondent Jejomar Binay, who has already served for two (2) consecutive terms. They further argue that should Mayor Binay decide to run and eventually win as city mayor in the coming elections, he can still run for the same position in 1998 and seek another three-year consecutive term since his previous three-year consecutive term as municipal mayor would not be counted. Thus, petitioners conclude that said section 51 has been conveniently crafted to suit the political ambitions of respondent Mayor Binay. 3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for: (a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the Charter) in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three (3) years following the return of every census; (b) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only 450,000. ISSUES 1. WON Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code; 2. WON the Court can entertain the challenge to the constitutionality of section 51.

MARIANO, JR. V COMELEC PUNO; March 7, 1995

NATURE Petitions to declare certain provisions of R.A 7854 unconstitutional. FACTS

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3. WON Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 violates Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution HELD 1. No. The territorial boundaries of a local government unit must be clear for they define the limits of the its territorial jurisdiction. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the people's welfare. This is the evil sought to avoided by the Local Government Code in requiring that the land area of a local government unit must be spelled out in metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. Given the facts of the cases, it cannot be perceived how this evil can be brought about by the description made in section 2 of R.A. No. 7854, Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. The delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established land area of Makati. In language that cannot be any clearer, section 2 stated that, the city's land area "shall comprise the present territory of the municipality." 2. No. The Court cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of section 51. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.

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3. No. These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias v. Abalos. In said case, the court ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. The intolerable situations will deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty. Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not sovereignty. Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative. Disposition The petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit
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PROF.
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari to partially set aside the June 28, 1996 Decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS - In the last quarter of 1995, the NBI conducted an investigation on the alleged participation and involvement of national and local government officials in "jueteng" and other forms of illegal gambling. - Potenciano Roque, claiming to be an eyewitness to the networking of national and local politicians and gambling lords, sought admission into the Government's "Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Program." Allegedly, he gained first-hand information in his capacity as Chairman of the Task Force Anti-Gambling (TFAG) during the term of former President Corazon C. Aquino. - Convinced of his compliance with the requirements of Republic Act No. 6981, otherwise known as the "Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act," the Department of Justice (DOJ) admitted Roque to the program. - Roque executed a sworn statement before NBI agents alleging that during his stint as Chairman of the TFAG, several gambling lords, including private respondent Rodolfo Pineda, and certain politicians offered him money and other valuable considerations, which he accepted, upon his agreement to cease conducting raids on their respective gambling operations. - The DOJ Task Force on Illegal Gambling (composed of the petitioner-prosecutors), created by petitioner Secretary Teofisto Guingona conducted a preliminary investigation of the case and subpoenaed all the respondents. - Pineda filed a Petition for Reconsideration of Admittance of Potenciano A. Roque to the Witness Protection Program, which was denied by petitioner. - Pineda filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction with the respondent Court of Appeals. - Private respondent contended that Roque's admission was illegal on two grounds: first, his testimony could not be substantially corroborated in its material points; and second, he appeared to be the most guilty or at least more guilty than private respondent, insofar as the crimes charged in the Informations were concerned. Court of Appeals Ruling - Respondent Court found that private respondent sought to bribe Roque several times to prevent him from conducting raids on private respondent's gambling operations. Such "passive participation" in the crimes did not make him more guilty than private respondent.

BOARD OF OPTOMETRY V JUDGE COLET DAVIDE; July 30, 1996 GUINGONA, JR. V COURT OF APPEALS PANGANIBAN; July 10, 1998

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- Respondent Court initially ruled that, by express provision of Sections 3 and 10, the requirement of corroboration is a condition precedent to admission into the Program. However, it upheld petitioners' alternative position that substantial corroboration was nevertheless actually provided by Angelito Sanchez' and retired Gen. Lorenzo M. Mateo's testimonies. Hence, it disposed in favor of the government. - Despite ruling in their favor, Respondent Court is assailed by petitioners for opining that admission to the Program requires prior or simultaneous corroboration of the material points in the witness' testimony. Petitioners Claim - Petitioners contend that said provisions merely require that the testimony of the state witness seeking admission into the Program "can be substantially corroborated" or is "capable of corroboration." So long as corroboration can be obtained when he testifies in court, he satisfies the requirement that "his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points." ISSUE WON the facts and the issue raised by petitioners warrant the exercise of judicial power. HELD NO. The Court found the petition fundamentally defective. Ratio Judicial review demands the following: (1) there must be an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the question must be ripe for adjudication; and (3) the person challenging must have "standing"; that is, he has personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury. The first requisite is that there must be before a court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power. An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal rights or an assertion of opposite legal claims, which can be resolved on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. A justiciable controversy admits of specific relief through a decree that is conclusive in character, whereas an opinion only advises what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. Closely related to the requirement of an "actual case," is the second requirement that the question is "ripe" for adjudication. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. Reasoning It is apparent that petitioners are not requesting that the Court reverse the ruling of the appellate court and disallow the admission in evidence of Respondent Roque's testimony, inasmuch as the

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assailed Decision does not appear to be in conflict with any of their claims. Petitioners filed this suit out of fear that the assailed Decision would frustrate the purpose of said law, which is to encourage witnesses to come out and testify. But their apprehension is neither justified nor exemplified by this particular case. A mere apprehension, does not give rise to a justiciable controversy. - After finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the government prosecutors, Respondent Court allowed the admission of Roque into the Program. In fact, Roque had already testified in court against the private respondent. Thus, the propriety of Roque's admission into the Program is already a moot and academic issue that clearly does not warrant judicial review. - The petition involves neither any right that was violated nor any claims that conflict. In fact, no affirmative relief is being sought in this case. The Court concurs with the opinion of counsel for private respondent that this action is a "purely academic exercise," which has no relevance to the criminal cases against Respondent Pineda. After the assailed Decision had been rendered, trial in those cases proceeded in earnest, and Roque testified in all of them. Said counsel filed his Memorandum only to satisfy his "academic interest on how the State machinery will deal with witnesses who are admittedly guilty of the crimes but are discharged to testify against their coaccused." Petitioners failed not only to present an actual controversy, but also to show a case ripe for adjudication. Hence, any resolution that this Court might make in this case would constitute an attempt at abstraction that can only lead to barren legal dialectics and sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Disposition The petition was DENIED.

PROF.
-The NHA undertook the implementation of P.D. 1315 in 7 phases called the Bagong Barrio Project (BBP). The properties covered by Phases 1 to 6 were acquired in 1978 and 1979. BBP Phase 7, which includes petitioner's land remained unacquired due to insufficient funds. -Sept 11, 1979: PN1893 declared the entire Metro Manila area as Urban Land Reform Zone. This was amended on May 14, 1980 by PN1967 which identified 244 sites in Metro Manila as Areas for Priority Devt and Urban Land Reform Zones. -Sept 24, 1981: petitioner sought declaration of noncoverage from the Urban Land Reform Program of the government. This was granted on Oct 2, 1981. With this certificate, petitioner asked the NHA to relocate the squatters on his land. A census was conducted; the squatters were invited to a dialogue but none attended. NHA recommended the issuance of a demolition clearance. This was granted; a clearance addressed to Mayor Asistio also granted for the relocation of the 24 families to the Sapang Palay Resettlement Project. But the demolition did not take place. -4 years later, (1986) NHA started negotiations with petitioner, but they did not reach any agreement on the price. -Sept 8, 1990: Militante requested for a revalidation of his demolition clearance and relocation of the squatters. This was also granted by NHA, informing Mayor Asistio that the NHA was making available enough serviced home lots in Bagong Silang Resettlement Project for the 24 families. -Respondent Annabelle Carangdang, NHA Project Manager in Bagong Barrio, refused to implement the clearance to eject the squatters on petitioner's land. She claimed that petitioners land had already been declared expropriated by P.D. 1315. -Petitioner then filed with CA a "Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with Declaration as Inexistent and Unconstitutional PD1315" against the NHA and Carangdang. -CA dismissed the petition and held that petitioner failed to overcome the presumption of the decree's constitutionality. MFR was also denied. ISSUES 1. WON petitioner is entitled to the writ of prohibition. 2. WON he is entitled to the writ of mandamus. 3. WON his procedure in assailing constitutionality of PD1315 is proper. 4.WON he is estopped from assailing the constitutionality of PD1315. HELD

MILITANTE V COURT OF APPEALS PUNO; April 12, 2000

NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of CA decision upholding constitutionality of PD 1315. FACTS -Petitioner Pilo Militante is the registered owner of 3 contiguous parcels of land all derived from TCT No. 71357, which is part of 40 hectares of land in Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City expropriated by PD 1315 issued in 1975 by Pres. Marcos. These lots were occupied by 24 squatter families.

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1. Ratio NO. Prohibition is a preventive remedy. It seeks for a judgment ordering the defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal. Reasoning Petitioner challenges Carangdang's refusal to implement the demolition clearance issued by her administrative superiors. The remedy for a refusal to discharge a legal duty is mandamus, not prohibition. 2. Ratio NO. Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that may be availed of only when there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A petition for mandamus is premature if there are administrative remedies available to the petitioner. Reasoning There is no direct order from the NHA General Manager addressed to Carangdang to evict the squatters and demolish their shanties on the subject property. Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. He may seek another demolition order from the NHA General Manager this time directly addressed to Carangdang or the pertinent NHA representative. Or he should have brought Carangdang's inaction to the attention of her superiors. There is therefore no extreme necessity to invoke judicial action as the administrative set-up could have easily corrected the alleged failure to act. 3. Ratio NO. The privilege of assailing the constitutionality of an act should not serve a petty purpose. Reasoning Petitioner's principal concern is the relocation of the squatters on his land. If he could attain this aim, petitioner himself admits in his petition that there may not be a need for declaring PD1315 null and void. -Moreover, petitioner's land is not in clear danger of expropriation. Considering the long lapse of time (PD1315 was issued in 1975), it is doubtful if the government would still desire to expropriate petitioner's lot which only measures 1,590 sq. m. -Also, HSRC has already certified that petitioner's lot is outside the declared Urban Land Reform Zone. Taking petitioner's tiny lot of 1,590 sq. m. will serve no social purpose. 4. Ratio Questions of constitutionality have to be raised at the earliest possible opportunity. Estoppel may operate to prevent a party from asserting that an act is unconstitutional Reasoning Petitioner did not question PD1315s constitutionality when it was decreed in 1975. In 1987, he even negotiated with NHA for the price of his land. Implicitly but clearly, he recognized the validity of the decree. The negotiation unfortunately fell and the government did not take any further step to expropriate

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his land. It was only in 1991 after respondent Carangdang refused to eject the squatters in petitioner's land that he questioned the acts constitutionality. Disposition Petition dismissed. No costs. Voting 10 concur fully. 2 concur in the result. 1 concur & dissent. 2 no part.

PROF.
resources offices for the identification, delineation and recognition of ancestral land claims nationwide - DAO 2: Implementing Rules and Guidelines of Special Order no. 25 The same year SO 31 was issued, relatives of petitioners filed separate applications for Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim (CALC) for the land they occupy inside the Camp John Hay Reservation. -These petitions were denied. Also pursuant to the SOs, the heirs of Apeg Carantes filed application for CALC for some portions of land in the Camp John Hay Reservation, overlapping some of the land occupied by the petitioners. The petitioners contend that if not for the respondents timely resistance to the Orders, the petitioners would be totally evicted from their land. - Petitioners filed in the CA petition to enjoin respondents from implementing Orders on ground that they are void for lack of legal basis. CA ruled that SO31 has no force and effect for preempting legislative prerogative for it was issued prior to the effectivity of RA7586 (National Integrated Protected Systems), but it sustained SO25 and DAO 2 on the ground that they were issued pursuant to powers delegated to DENR under RA7586. - Petitioners now contend that CA erred in upholding the validity of SO25 and DAO 2 and seek to enjoin the DENR from processing the application of CALC of Heirs of Carantes. ISSUE WON SO 25 and DAO 2 are valid HELD Not a justiciable controversy Ratio The petition was prematurely filed. There is yet no justiciable controversy for the court to resolve. The adverse legal interests involved are the competing claims of the petitioners and heirs of Carantes to possess a common piece of land. Since the CALC application of the Heirs of Carantes has not yet been granted or issued, and which the DENR may or may not grant, there is yet no actual or imminent violation of petitioners asserted right to possess the disputed land. - Definition of justiciable controversy: a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests which may be resolved by a court of law through the application of a law. - Subject to certain well-defined exceptions, the courts will not touch an issue involving the validity of a law unless there has been a governmental act accomplished or performed that has a direct adverse effect on the legal right of the person contesting its validity.

SEPARATE OPINION MENDOZA [concur in the result]

-Petitioner has no cause of action fro prohibition or mandamus against respondents. What he should do is to bring an action for ejectment against the squatters and, as an incident thereof, raise in issue the constitutional validity of PD1315.

DE LEON, JR. [dissent and concur]

-It is an ejectment case that he should file in the MTC. -PD1315 is unconstitutional for inherently violating the due process and just compensation guarantees in the Constitution. -Petitioner is not estopped from assailing the constitutionality of PD1315. -If property is taken by the government without the benefit of the proper expropriation proceedings and is devoted for public use for many years, the property owner may no longer bring an action for recovery of his land but may only demand payment of just compensation thereof. BUT any action for recovery of those other lots purchased and acquired by the government in 1978 and 1979 and/or for just compensation has already prescribed.

CUTARAN V DENR GONZAGA-REYES; 2001

NATURE Petition for certiorari of decision of CA FACTS - Cutaran et.al. assails the validity of DENR Special Order 31, Special Order 25, and Department Administrative Order 2 for being issued without prior legislative authority. - Special Order (SO) 31 (1990): Creation of a Special Task force on acceptance, identification, evaluation and delineation of ancestral land claims in the Cordillera Administrative Region - Special Order (SO) 25: Creation of Special Task Forces provincial and community environment and natural

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- This Court cannot rule on the basis of petitioners speculation that the DENR will approve the application of the heirs of Carantes. There must be an actual governmental act which directly causes or will imminently cause injury to the alleged legal right of the petitioner to possess the land before the jurisdiction of this Court may be invoked. There is no showing that the petitioners were being evicted from the land by the heirs of Carantes under orders from the DENR.

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solely of district representatives belonging to the different political parties. - Art. VI, Sec. 17. Congress shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shal be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election xxx. Xxx Each ET shall be composed of nine Members xxx who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. - There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of xxx twelve Senators and twelve Members of HoR, elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. Petitioners Claim - Under the Constitution and the Party-List System Act, ,party-list representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in HRET, and 2.4 seats in the CA. Petitioners charge that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to act positively on the letter of Senator Pimentel. - Sen. Pimentel filed the instant petitions on the strength of his oath to protect, defend, and uphold the Constitution and in his capacity as taxpayer and as a member of the CA. Respondents Comments - At the time the petitioners filed the instant petitions the House had 220 members, 14 of whom were party-list representatives, constituting 6.37% of the House. ISSUES Procedural 1. The SG argues that the instant petitions are procedurally defective and substantially lacking in merit for having been filed prematurely Substantive 1. WON the present composition of the HRET and CA violates the constitutional requirement of proportional representation because there are no party-list representatives in the HRET. 2. WON the refusal of the HRET and the CA to reconstitute themselves to include party-list representatives constitutes grave abuse of discretion. HELD Ratio The procedural questions that petitioners want the Court to brush aside are not mere technicalities but substantive matters that are specifically provided for in constitutional provisions cited by petitioners.

PROF.
Reasoning The Constitution expressly grants to the HoR the prerogative, within constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA. Art. VI Sec. 18 of the Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate and on the House the authority to elect among their members those who would fill the seats for House members in the CA. Rule 3 of the 1998 Rules of the HRET: Rule 3. Composition. The Tribunal shall be composed of 9 Members xxx the remaining six shall be Members of the HoR who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties of organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. Rule 4. Organization. (a) upon the designation of the Justices of the Supreme Court and the election of the Members of the House of Representatives who are to compose the HRET xxx. - Even assuming that party-list representatives comprise a sufficient number and have agreed to designate common nominees to the HRET and the CA, their primary recourse clearly rests with the House of Representatives and not with this Court. Only if the House fails to comply with the directive of the Constitution on proportional representation of political parties in the HRET and the CA can the party-list representatives seek recourse to this Court under its power of judicial review. There is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; prior recourse to the House is necessary before petitioners may bring instant case to the court. - Also, under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not interfere with the exercise by the House of this Constitutionally mandated duty, absent a clear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. - The five party-list representatives who are petitioners in the instant case have not alleged that they are entitled to, and have been unlawfully deprived of, seats in the HRET and CA. Neither have they claimed that they have been nominated by the party-list groups in the House to the HRET or the CA. NO LOCUS STANDI.

PIMENTEL, JR. V HRET CARPIO; 2002

NATURE Before this Court are two original petitions for prohibition and mandamus with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners pray that respondents alter, reorganize, reconstitute, and reconfigure composition of HRET and CA to include party-list representatives. Petitioners further pray that HRET and CA b enjoined from exercising their functions until they have been reorganized. FACTS - Art.VI, SEC. 5 of the 1987Constitution provides for a party-list system in the House as follows: (1) The HoR shall be composed of xxx and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected though a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations. (2) The party-list representatives shall constitute 20% of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list. - On May 11, 1998, in accordance with Party-List System Act, national elections were held which included, for the first time, the election through popular vote of party-list groups and organizations whose nominees would become members of the House. - Subsequently, the House Constituted its HRET and CA contingent by electing its representatives to these two constitutional bodies. The procedure involves the nomination by the political parties of House members who are to occupy seats in HRET and CA. From available records, it does not appear that after the May 11, 1998 elections the party-list groups in the House nominated any of their representatives to the HRET or the CA. As of the date of filing of the instant petitions, the House contingents to the HRET and the CA were composed

ATLAS FERTILIZER CORP. V SEC. OF DAR ROMERO; June 19, 1997

NATURE

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Consolidated petitions questioning the constitutionality of some portions of Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law) FACTS -The petitioners Atlas Fertilizer Corporation, Philippine Federation of Fishfarm Producers, Inc. and petitioner-inintervention Archies Fishpond, Inc. and Arsenio Al. Acuna are engaged in the aquaculture industry utilizing fishponds and prawn farms. Petitioners Claim Petitioners assail constitutionality of Secs. 3(b), 11, 13, 16,(d), 17 and 32 of RA 6657 as well as of Administrative Order Nos. 8 and 10 Series of 1988 issued by the respondent secretary on the following grounds: 1. Sections 3 (b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of CARL extend agrarian reform to aquaculture lands [violates Section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution w/c limits extend agrarian reform only to agricultural lands]. -Court has already impliedly ruled in Luz Farms, Inc. v. Secretary of Agricultural Reform that lands devoted to fishing are not agricultural lands -only 5% of the total investment in aquaculture activities, fishponds, and prawn farms, is in the form of land (so cant be classified as agricultural activity) -there are no farmers, farm workers who till lands, no agrarian unrest so no beneficiaries under Sec 4, Art XIII 1987 Consti 2. Provisions similarly treat of AQUAculture lands and AGRIculture lands when they are differently situated, and differently treat AQUAculture lands and other INDUSTRIAL lands, when they are similarly situated in violation of the constitutional guarantee of the equal protection of the laws. -Constitutional Commission debates show that lands devoted to aquaculture, fishponds, and fish farms belong to INDUSTRIAL LANDS, not to AGRICULTURAL LANDS so treating the said lands as under AGRICULTURAL LANDS violate EPC 3. Provisions distort employment benefits and burdens in favor of AQUAculture employees and against other INDUSTRIAL workers [violate Sections 1 and 3, Article XIII of the Constitution State promotion of equality in economic and employment opportunities]. 4. Provisions deprive petitioner of its governmentinduced investments in aquaculture [violates Sections 2 and 3, Article XIII of the Constitution State to respect the freedom of enterprise and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments and to expansion and growth]. On A.O. Nos. 8 and 10: void as they implement the assailed provisions of CARL. ISSUE WON the case is justiciable

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PROF.
officers and employees whether in the classified civil service or not and a penalty of dismissal from employment is imposed for violation. - Certain employees of the executive branch of the Federal Government and a union of such employees sued to enjoin the members of the Civil Service Commission from enforcing the provision of Section 9 (a) of the Hatch Act, which forbids such employees to take any active part in political management or in political campaigns and for a declaratory judgment holding the Act unconstitutional. The District Court dismissed the suit. Petitioner appealed. ISSUES 1. WON the complaint state a controversy cognizable in this Court. 2. WON such a breach of Hatch Act and Rule 1 of the Commission can, without violating the Constitution, be made the basis for disciplinary action against Poole. HELD 1. For adjudication of constitutional issues, concrete legal issues, presented in actual cases, not abstractions, are requisite. Reasoning They declare a desire to act contrary to the rule against political activity but not that the rule has been violated. In this respect, the case at bar differs from the type of threat adjudicated in Railway Mail Association v. Consi. In that case, the refusal to admit an applicant to membership in a labor union on account of race was involved. Admission had been refused. In the Hill case an injunction had been sought and allowed against Hill and the union forbidding Hill from acting as the business agent, the union and the union from further functioning as a union until it complied with the state law. The threats here in the case at bar are closer to a general threat by officials to enforce those laws which they are charged to administer than they are to the direct threat if punishment against a named organization for a completed act that made the Mail Association and the Hill case cases justiciable. These appellants seek advisory opinions upon broad claims of rights protected by the Constitution. The generality of the objection is an attack on political expediency of the Hatch Act, not the presentation of legal issues. Such is beyond the courts competence to render a decision. Should the Courts seek to expand their powers so as to bring under their jurisdiction ill-defined controversies over Constitutional issues, they would become the organ of political theories. The determination of the trial court that the individual appellants other than Poole, could maintain

HELD NO, the question concerning the constitutionality of the assailed provisions has become MOOT and ACADEMIC with the passage of RA No. 788 Ratio While the court will not hesitate to declare a law or an act void when confronted squarely with constitutional issues, neither will it preempt the Legislative and the Executive branches of the government in correcting or clarifying, by means of amendment, said law or act. Reasoning On February 20, 1995, Republic Act No. 7881 (An Act Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act No. 6657) was approved by Congress, exempting fishponds and prawn farms from the coverage of CARL, providing processes for the exclusion to be applied to those already subjected to the CARL, removing lands devoted to AQUACULTURE from the classification of Commercial Farms, and providing incentives for fishponds and prawn farms workers organizations. Dispositon The petition is dismissed Voting Narvasa, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganipan and Torres, Jr. concur Padilla, Bellosillo, Kapunan, Francisco on leave

UNITED PUBLIC WORKERS V MICHELL REED; October 1946

NATURE Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia FACTS - The Hatch Act enacted in 1940 declares unlawful certain specified political activities of federal employees. Section 9 forbids officers and employees in the executive branch of the Federal Government, with exceptions, from taking any active part in political management or in political campaigns. Section 15 declares that the activities theretofore determined by the United States Civil Service Commission to be prohibited to employees in the classified civil service of the United States by the Civil Service Rules shall be deemed to be prohibited to federal employees covered by the Hatch Act. These sections cover all federal

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this action was erroneous (The court dismissed it though for finding the Act Constitutional). 2. Congress may regulate the political conduct of government employees within reasonable limits. Reasoning The determination of the extent to which political activities of governmental employees shall be regulated lies primarily with Congress. It is only partisan political activity that is interdicted. It is active participation in political management and political campaign. Disposition Affirmed

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PROF.
the Municipal Court. Those reasons comprise not only obstacles of prematurity and comparative abstractness but also include related considerations growing out of uncertainties resulting from the volume of legislative provisions possibly involved, and their intricate interlacing not only with each other on their face but also in the California Supreme Courts dispostion of them Disposition The appeal is dismissed, without prejudice to the determination in the future of any issues arising under the Federal Constitution form further proceedings in the Municipal Court.

ISSUES WON the Court should exercise its jurisdiction over the appeal at bar. HELD Ratio The Constitutional issues come to the Court in highly abstract form. Record presents only bare allegations that Murdock was charged criminally with violating Sections 44.09 (a), 44.09 (b), 44.12, and that those sections are unconstitutional, as applied to his alleged solicitations. The Court is therefore without benefit of the precision which would be afforded by proof of conduct made upon trial. - The Courts doubts as to the lower courts meanings, and the other uncertainties in this cause, may be removed in the municipal court proceedings yet to take place. - Consistently with the policy, jurisdiction here should be exerted only when the jurisdictional question presented by the proceeding prohibition tenders the underlying constitutional issues in clean-cut and concrete form, unclouded by any serious problem of construction relating either to the terms of the questioned legislation or to its interpretation by the state courts. Reasoning - Note the Courts policy of refusal to render advisory opinions and the necessity for reasonable clarity and definiteness, as well as for timeliness, in raising and presenting constitutional questions.

RESCUE ARMY ET AL V MUNICIPAL COURT OF LOS ANGELES RUTLEDGE; June 9, 1947

NATURE Appeal from the California Supreme Courts judgment denying appelants application for writ of prohibition to test the jurisdiction of the municipal court to try appellants for alleged violations of a municipal code governing the solicitation of contributions for charity, which they challenge as unduly abridging the free exercise of their religion contrary to the First and Fourteenth Amendments. FACTS - The Rescue Army is a religious group engaged in solicitation for charity. - Such solicitation is governed by Article 4 Chapter IV of the Municipal Code of the City of Los Angeles. Its purpose is to make available to all persons solicited detailed information concerning the persons soliciting, their causes, and the uses to which donations will be put. - Murdock, an officer of the Rescue Army, has been charged in the municipal court for three cases, of which he has had two convictions and with respect to the third case trial has not been had pending the writ prayed for in the present case. - He has been charged with violating sections 44.09 (a), 44.09 (b), 44.12 of the Municipal Code together with the other provisions necessarily incorporated in them by reference (i.e. because the provisions are very intricately interrelated, not only on their face, but also in the California Supreme Courts disposition of them). - It is not clear from the briefs received by the Court which particular charges he has been found guilty of in which specific case, or if charged on the basis of more than one provision, whether conjunctively or alternatively.

EDU V. ERICTA FERNANDO; OCTOBER 24, 1970

NATURE Petitioner Romeo F. Edu, the Land Transportation Commissioner, in a proceeding for certiorari (to demonstrate that the Reflector Law was not constitutionally invalid ) and prohibition against respondent Judge Ericta, to annul and set aside Erictas order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction directed against Administrative Order No. 2 of petitioner. FACTS - Other respondent Galo on his behalf and that of other motorists filed on May 20, 1970 a suit for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction assailing the validity of the Reflector Law as an invalid exercise of the police power, for being violative of the due process clause. This he followed with a manifestation wherein he sought as an alternative remedy that, in the event that respondent Judge would hold said statute constitutional, Administrative Order No. 2 of Edu, implementing such legislation be nullified as an undue exercise of legislative power. Respondent Judge ordered the issuance of a preliminary injunction directed against the enforcement of such administrative order. Motion for its reconsideration was filed by the SolicitorGeneral representing Edu. The answer before the lower court was filed by petitioner Edu on June 4, 1970. Respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration of the order of injunction. Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition. - The Reflector Law reads in full: "(g) Lights and reflector when parked or disabled. Appropriate parking lights or flares visible one hundred meters away shall be displayed at a corner of die vehicle whenever such vehicle is parked on highways or in places that are not well-lighted or is placed in such mariner as to endanger

Deciding this cannot be reduced to any precise formula. They are of the same nature as the case and controversy limitation, differing only in degree. To the more usual considerations of timeliness and maturity, of concreteness, definiteness, certainty, and of adversity of interests affected, are to be added in cases coming from state courts involving state legislation those arising when questions of construction, essentially matters of state law, remain unresolved or highly ambiguous. They include, of course, questions of incorporation by reference and severability, such as this case involves. Necessarily, whether decision of the constitutional issue will be made must depend upon the degree to which uncertainty exists in these respects. Here, relief is neither sought nor needed beyond adjudication of the jurisdictional issue. The writ seeks only, in substance, a judicial declaration that jurisdiction does not exist in

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passing traffic. Furthermore, every motor vehicle shall be provided at all times with built-in reflectors or other similar warning devices either pasted, painted or attached at its front and back which shall likewise be visible at night at least one hundred meters away. No vehicle not provided with any of the requirements mentioned in this subsection shall be registered." - Administrative Order No.2 which took effect on April 17, 1970. has a provision on reflectors in effect reproducing what was set forth in the Act, Thus: "No motor vehicles shall he registered if not equipped with reflectors The luminosity shall have in intensity to he maintained visible and clean at all times such that if struck by beam of light shall be visible 100 meters away at night." Then came a section on dimensions, placement and color. Penalties resulting front a violation thereof could be imposed. Non-compliance with the requirements shall be sufficient cause to refuse registration of the motor vehicle affected and if already registered, its registration may be suspended. ISSUES Procedural WON this case is ripe for adjudication. Substantive: 1. WON the Reflector Law and Administrative Order No. 2 violate the due process clause 2. WON there was a violation of the principle of nondelegation of legislative power. HELD Procedural The case is ripe for adjudication. The main thrust of the petition is to demonstrate that the challenged legislation does not suffer from alleged constitutional infirmity. Since the special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by Galo before respondent Judge would seek a declaration of nullity of such enactment by the attribution of the violation on the face thereof of the due process guarantee in the deprivation of property rights, it would follow that there is sufficient basis for the Court to determine which view should prevail. Moreover, any further hearing by respondent Judge would likewise be limited to a discussion of the constitutional issues raised, no allegations of facts having been made. The question of validity is ripe for determination. *There is a great public interest to be served by the final disposition of such crucial issue. Substantive: 1. Was there a violation of the Due Process clause

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Ratio No. It is obvious that the challenged statute is a legislation enacted under the police power to promote public safety. Justice Laurel, in the case of Calalang v. Williams, identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. - The attack on the challenged statute ostensibly for disregarding the due process safeguard is singularly unpersuasive. It would be to close one's eyes to the hazards of traffic in the evening to condemn a statute of this character. Such an attitude betrays trick of concern for public safety. No constitutional objection to regulatory measures adversely affecting property rights, especially so when public safety is "it aim, is likely to be heeded, unless of course on the clearest and most satisfactory proof of invasion of rights guaranteed by the Constitution. On such a showing, there may be a declaration of nullity, but not because, the laissez-faire principle was disregarded but because the due process, equal protection, or non-impairment guarantees would call for vindication. Obiter Rejection of Laissez-fair concept and expansion of Police Power: For a long time, legislation lending to reduce economic inequality foundered on the rock that was the due process clause, enshrining as it did the liberty of contract, based on such a basic assumption.Undeniable is that by 1943, laissez-faire was no longer the dominant theory. Justice Jackson in the leading case of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette stated:" the laissez-faire concept or non-interference has withered at least as to economic affairs, and social advancements are increasingly sought through closer integration of society and through expanded and strengthened governmental controls."The Constitutional Convention saw to it that the concept of laissez-faire was rejected. Our Constitution which took effect in 1935 erased whatever doubts there might be on that score. Its philosophy is a repudiation of laissezfaire. One of the leading members of the Constitutional Convention, Manuel A. Roxas: the "vast extensions in the sphere of governmental functions" and the "almost unlimited power to interfere in the affairs of industry and agriculture as well as to compete with existing business" as "reflections of the fascination exerted by [the then] current tendencies" in other jurisdictions.) - Reflector Law is thus immune from the attack so recklessly hurled against it can survive, and quite easily too, the constitutional test. It is not to be lost sight of that under Republic Act No. 4136, of which the Reflector Law is an amendment, petitioner, as the Land Transportation Commissioner, may, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications,

PROF.
issue rules and regulations for its implementation as long as they do not conflict with its provisions. 2. Ratio No. What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. The legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be clone, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. - To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. - The standard may be either express at implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be is safe transit upon the roads. - The rule is that, if the law authorizing the delegation furnishes a reasonable standard which 'sufficiently marks the field within which the Administrator is to act so that it may be known whether he has kept within it in compliance with the legislative will. - The Reflector Law construed together with the Land Transportation- Code, Republic Act No. 4136, of which it is an amendment, leaves no doubt as to the stress and emphasis on public safety which is the prime consideration in statutes of this character. There is likewise a categorical affirmation of the power of petitioner as Land Transportation Commissioner to promulgate rules and regulations to give life to and translate into actuality such fundamental purpose. His power is clear. There has been no abuse. His Administrative Order No. 2 can easily survive the attack, far-from-formidable, launched against it by respondent Galo. Disposition The writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for are granted.

TAN V MACAPAGAL FERNANDO; February 29, 1972

FACTS

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- Petitioners Eugene Tan, Silvestre Acejas and Rogelio Fernandez filed a five-page petition assailing the validity of the Laurel-Leido Resolution which dealt primarily with the scope of authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. They sought declaration from the Court that the said Convention is without power, under Art. XV Sec.1 of the Constitution and under R.A. 6132. They claimed that the Convention is merely empowered to propose improvements to the present Constitution; it cannot alter its general plan. They asked the Court therefore to consider, discuss and adopt other proposals which seek to revise the Constitution by adopting a form of government other than the one outlined in the present Constitution. The Court dismissed their petition for being devoid of merit, taking exception to the no. of pages petitioners used to express a plea of utmost seriousness. - Petitioners now filed this case, a 32-page motion for reconsideration relying mainly on American jurisprudence which the Court considered as merely secondary authority. As regards the object of the petition, the Court invoked the principle of separation of powers saying that it cannot exercise the competence petitioners erroneously assumed it possesses. ISSUES 1. WON petitioners had legal standing to seek a declaration of the alleged nullity of a resolution of the Constitutional Convention 2. WON the case is ripe for adjudication HELD 1. No. A taxpayer has standing to nullify a law providing for the disbursement of public funds for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act which would constitute a misapplication of funds, through a taxpayers suit. The Court however has the discretion as to whether or not such a suit should be entertained. In this case, the Court held that the petitioners have no cause for legitimate resentment. Moreover, where a constitutional question is raised, a Senator has usually been considered as possessed of the requisite personality to bring a suit as it held in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito and likewise in Tolentino v. Comelec. Petitioners in the present case cannot be heard to assert that they do qualify under such a category. 2. No. The requisite for judicial inquiry is that something must have been accomplished or performed by either branch of Govt before a court may come into the picture and even then, it may pass on the validity of what was done only when properly challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding. The Constitutional Convention is a

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coordinate agency whose powers are transcendent and as such not to be interfered with until the appropriate time comes. Courts are devoid of jurisdiction as long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by it. Only after it has made concrete what it intends to submit for ratification may an appropriate case be instituted. The Court here cited petitioner Gonzales (in Gonzales v. Comelec) who had the good sense to wait until after the enactment of the statute for the submission to the electorate of certain proposed amendments to the Constitution before filing his suit, thereby making his case ripe for adjudication. Disposition MFR is denied

PROF.
3. WON Sec 8 of the Resolution is violative of the constitutional guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press, and of expression. HELD Pre-Ratio - Solgen contends that the resolution is only establishes guidelines to be followed in connection with the procurement of COMELEC space. Even if it were mandatory, is would still be valid in the exercise of the police power of the state, and that Sec 8 is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision and regulation of the COMELEC to ensure fair and impartial elections. - Even if COMELEC promulgated Resolution 2772-A to clarify the questioned provisions and which rendered the petition moot and academic, the Court still deliberated on the constitutional issues to prevent repetition and to put the issue to rest Ratio 1. Compelling print media companies to donate COMELEC space amounts to the taking of private personal property intended for public use or purpose, even if there were no sanctions to be imposed if the ordered not be followed. The extent of the taking is substantial as the monetary value of the donated COMELEC space may be very substantial A. Requites for expropriation for public use of private property necessity for the taking and the legal authority to effect the taking. The necessity element has not been shown by the COMELEC, notwithstanding its inability to show a reasonable relationship between the power of eminent domain and the enforcement and administration of election laws by the COMELEC. This cannot simply be assumed. B. Taking private property for public use with just compensation is authorized by the Constitution but this just compensation is exactly what the COMELEC sought to avoid by requiring the publishers to donate free print space. 2. The police power has not been delegated to the COMELEC, nor can does the Resolution fit the requisites of a lawful taking under the police power. There was no showing of a national emergency, impetuous public necessity to warrant the disregard of individual business conditions of the newspapers. 3. Section 8 seems to represent the effort of the COMELEC to incorporate the distinction and doctrine given by the NPC case, distinguishing paid political advertisements and news reports, commentaries and the like. But this distinction can only be given operative

PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE V COMELEC FELICIANO; May 22, 1995

NATURE Special Civil Action in the SC. Certiorari and Prohibition FACTS - PPI challenges the constitutionality of Resolution No.2772 issued by the COMELEC that (Section2) the Commission shall procure free print space of not less than in at least one newspaper of general circulation in every province or city as use as COMELEC space xxx and that the (Sections 3 and 4) COMELEC space shall be allocated, by the Commission, free of charge, among all the candidates within the are in which the newspaper, magazine or periodical is circulated to enable candidates to make known their qualifications, stands on issues, platforms of government. More so, Sec. 8 of the Resolution prohibits news articles, opinions and features which would manifestly favor or oppose a candidate or a political party. - Commissioner Maambong sent letters to Business World, Malaya, PhilStar and Philippine Times Journal etc. directing them to provide free print space of not less than page for use as COMELEC space, pursuant to the Resolution No.2772, notwithstanding informing the candidates that election materials pertinent to the COMELEC space be submitted directly to the newspapers. ISSUES 1. WON Resolution violates prohibition that government shall not take private property for public use without just compensation 2. WON Resolution constitutes a valid exercise of the police power of the state

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meaning in actual cases or controversies, on a case-tocase basis, in terms of very specific sets of facts A. As the PPI has not alleged COMELEC action to this end that one of its members has suffered direct or imminent injury, this issue is not ripe for review for lack of an actual case or controversy involving, as the very list mota thereof, the constitutionality of Sec 8

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1993, expressing therein its absolute concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7227, to join the Subic Special Economic Zone, On September 5, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong submitted Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993 to the Office of the President. - On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia, Calimbas and their companions filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993. - Not satisfied, and within 30 days from submission of their petition, respondents resorted to their power of initiative under the Local Government Code of 19914 Sec. 122 paragraph (b) of which provides: "Sec. 122. Procedure in Local Initiative. - (b) If no favorable action thereon is taken by the sanggunian concerned, the proponents, through their duly authorized and registered representatives, may invoke their power of initiative, giving notice thereof of the sanggunian concerned. - On July 6, 1993, COMELEC, En Banc, in Comelec Resolution No. 93-1623 denied the petition for local initiative by private respondents on the ground that the subject was merely a resolution (pambayang kapasyahan) and not an ordinance. On July 13, 1993, public respondent Comelec, En Banc, (thru Comelec Resolution no. 93-1676) further directed its Provincial Election Supervisor to hold action on the authentication of signatures being solicited by private respondents. - On August 15, 1993, private respondents instituted a petition for certiorari and mandamus before this Court against the COMELEC and the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan, to set aside Comelec Resolution No. 931623 insofar as it disallowed the conduct of a local initiative to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993, and Comelec Resolution No. 93-1676 insofar as it prevented the Provincial Election Supervisor of Bataan from proceeding with the authentication of the required number of signatures in support of the initiative and the gathering of signatures. - On February 1, 1995, pursuant to Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7227, the President of the Philippines issued Proclamation No. 532 defining the metes and bounds of the SSEZ. Said proclamation included in the SSEZ all the lands within the former Subic Naval Base, including Grande Island and that portion of the former naval base within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Morong. - On June 18, 1996, respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845, adopting therein a "Calendar of Activities for local referendum on certain municipal ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong,

PROF.
Bataan," and which indicated, among others, the scheduled Referendum Day (July 27, 1996, Saturday). - On June 27, 1996, the Comelec promulgated the assailed Resolution No. 2848 providing for "the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan." - On July 10, 1996, petitioner instituted the present petition for certiorari and prohibition contesting the validity of Resolution No. 2848 and alleging, inter alia, that public respondent "is intent on proceeding with a local initiative that proposes an amendment of a national law x x x." ISSUES 1. WON this petition seeks to overturn a decision which has long become final and executory; namely, G.R. 111230, Enrique Garcia vs. COMELEC. 2. WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating and implementing its Resolution No. 2848. 3. WON the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the powers of the people of Morong to enact; i.e., whether such initiative seeks the amendment of a national law. HELD 1. No. Ratio A prior decision is not a bar to a new one if the issue raised in the former is different from the questions involved in the latter. Reasoning Our decision in the earlier Garcia case is not a bar to the present controversy as the issue raised and decided therein is different from the questions involved here. The only issue resolved in the earlier Garcia case is whether a municipal resolution as contradistinguished from an ordinance may be the proper subject of an initiative and/or referendum. In the present case, petitioner is not contesting the propriety of a municipal resolution as the form by which these two new constitutional prerogatives of the people may be validly exercised. What is at issue here is whether Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, as worded, is sufficient in form and substance for submission to the people for their approval; in fine, whether the Comelec acted properly and juridically in promulgating and implementing Resolution No. 2848. Moreover, we reviewed our rollo in G.R. No. 111230 and we found that the sole issue presented by the pleadings was the question of whether or not a Sangguniang Bayan Resolution can be the subject of a valid initiative or referendum. 2. Yes.

SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC PANGANIBAN; September 26, 1996
NATURE Action for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the respondent Commission on Elections' Ruling dated April 17, 1996 and Resolution No. 2848 promulgated on June 27, 1996 denying petitioner's plea to stop the holding of a local initiative and referendum on the proposition to recall Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan. FACTS - On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7227 (The Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992), which among others, provided for the creation of the Subic Special Economic Zone, thus: "Sec. 12, Subic Special Economic Zone. - Subject to the concurrence by resolution of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Olongapo and the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipalities of Subic, Morong and Hermosa, there is hereby created a Special Economic and Free-port Zone consisting of the City of Olongapo and the Municipality of Subic, Province of Zambales, the lands occupied by the Subic Naval Base and its contiguous extensions as embraced, covered and defined by the 1947 Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of America as amended, and within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipalities of Morong and Hermosa, Province of Bataan, hereinafter referred to as the Subic Special Economic Zone whose metes and bounds shall be delineated in a proclamation to be issued by the President of the Philippines. Within thirty (30) days after the approval of this Act, each local government unit shall submit its resolution of concurrence to join the Subic Special Economic Zone to the Office of the President. Thereafter, the President of the Philippines shall issue a proclamation defining the metes and bounds of the zone as provided herein." - In April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye

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Ratio Initiative is a process of law-making by the people themselves without the participation and against the wishes of their elected representatives, while referendum consists merely of the electorate approving or rejecting what has been drawn up or enacted by a legislative body. Reasoning While initiative is entirely the work of the electorate, referendum is begun and consented to by the lawmaking body. Initiative is resorted to (or initiated) by the people directly either because the lawmaking body fails or refuses to enact the law, ordinance, resolution or act that they desire or because they want to amend or modify one already existing. The process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent Comelec made preparations for a REFERENDUM only. 3. Premature/Not Ripe. Ratio Courts may decide only actual controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases. Reasoning The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an approved law. Should the people reject it, then there would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is only when the people have voted for it and it has become an approved ordinance or resolution that rights and obligations can be enforced or implemented thereunder. At this point, it is merely proposal and the writ of prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or possibility. While regular courts may take jurisdiction over "approved propositions" per Sec. 18 of R.A. 6735, the Comelec in the exercise of its quasijudicial and administrative powers may adjudicate and pass upon such proposals insofar as their form and language are concerned, and, even as to content, where the proposals or parts thereof are patently and clearly outside the capacity of the local legislative body to enact. The question of whether the subject of this initiative is within the capacity of the Municipal Council of Morong to enact may be ruled upon by the Comelec upon remand and after hearing the parties thereon. Disposition Petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. 2848 is ANNULLED and SET aside. The initiative on Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 is REMANDED to the Comelec for further proceedings.

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PROF.
NO. (1) LEGAL STANDING: -Sec. 2 Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, and all persons having interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs. The art pieces were donated by private entities around the world to the non-stock, non-profit corporation, the Metropolitan Museum of Manila Foundation and thus belongs to the foundation and its members. The antique silverware pieces were given to the Marcos couple as gifts from friends and foreign dignitaries on their silver wedding anniversary. Petitioners failed to show that they were the legal owners of the items in question and thus do not possess the requisite standing to raise these issues -there are exceptions to the rule on legal standing, namely mandamus and taxpayers suits -the action does not fulfill the criteria for a mandamus suit since the public right it seeks to enforce and the attendant duty of the state is not unequivocably stated it the Constitution -neither can it be a taxpayers suit since petitioners are not challenging any expenditure involving public funds but the disposition of what they admit to be public properties (2) ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY: -since the paintings and silverware had long been auctioned off, the case had been rendered moot and academic. The court finds no paramount public interest to justify its taking cognizance of the case -RA 4846 known as The Cultural Properties Preservation and Protection Act, as furthered by the Director of the Museum, shows that the Italian paintings auctioned off do not constitute cultural properties which are to be protected by the State, and thus their disposition merits no public interest as to justify this petition. -for lack of merit, the petition for prohibition and mandamus is DISMISSED

FACTS 8/14/90: former Pres. Aquino, through former Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, authorized then chairman of PCGG Mateo Caparas to sign a Consignment Agreement allowing the auction house, Christies of New York, to auction off 82 Old Masters Paintings (Italian) and antique silverware seized from Malacaang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila, alleged to be part of Marcos ill-gotten wealth, in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines -COA chairman Domingo submitted to Pres. Aquino audit findings and observations to the effect that: (a) the PCGG chairmans authority to sign the agreement was of doubtful legality (b) the contract was disadvantageous to the government (c) PCGG had a poor track record in asset disposal by auction in the US (d) the assets to be disposed were historical relics 11/15/90: the next PCGG chairman David Castro wrote Pres. Aquino, defending the agreement. Hence, this petition filed by former UP Fine Arts Dean Jose Joya, Carmen Nakpil, Armida Siguion Reyna and several other artists of various fields. -after the oral arguments, the court denied the application for preliminary injunction 1/11/91: the sale proceeded and the P13M proceeds were turned over to the Treasury Petitioners raise the ff issues: (a) whether the petitioners have legal standing to file the petition (b) whether the pieces sold are considered cultural treasures under the Constitution or cultural properties under RA 4846 (c) whether said art pieces are of the public dominion and may be disposed of by joint concurrence of the President and Congress (d) whether PCGG has the authority to enter such an agreement w/ Christies (e) whether PCGG has complied w/ the due process clause (f) whether the sale has rendered the case moot and academic ISSUES WON the instant petition complies w/ the requisites for the Court to exercise judicial review

JOYA V PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT BELLOSILLO; August 24, 1993

NATURE Special civil action for prohibition and mandamus to enjoin the Presidential Commission on Good Government to proceed with an auction sale

KILUSANG MAYO UNO (KMU) V. GARCIA, JR. KAPUNAN; December 23, 1994
NATURE Petition for Certiorari FACTS - The instant petition for certiorari assails the constitutionality and validity of certain memoranda, circulars and/or orders of the Department of

HELD

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Transportation and Communications (DOTC) and the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB)2 which, among others, [1] authority provincial bus and jeepney operators to increase or decrease the prescribed transportation fares without application therefor with the LTFRB and without hearing and approval thereof by said agency in violation of Sec. 16(c) of Commonwealth Act No. 1461, as amended, otherwise known as the Public Service Act, and in derogation of LTFRB's duty to fix and determine just and reasonable fares by delegating that function to bus operators, and [2] establish a presumption of public need in favor of applicants for certificates of public convenience (CPC) and place on the oppositor the burden of proving that at there is no need for the proposed service, in patent violation not only of Sec. 16(c) of CA 146, as amended, but also of Sec. 20(a) of the same Act mandating that fares should be "just and reasonable." It is, likewise, violative of the Rules of Court which places upon each party the burden to prove his own affirmative allegations. Petitioner KMU anchors its claim on two (2) grounds. [a] the authority given by respondent LTFRB to provincial bus operators to set a fare range of plus or minus 15%, later increased to plus 20% and minus 25%, over and above the existing authorized fare without having to file a petition for the purpose, is unconstitutional, invalid and illegal. [2] the establishment of a presumption of public need in favor of an applicant for a proposed transport service without having to prove public necessity, is illegal for being violative of the Public Service Act and the Rules of Court. In its Comment, private respondent PBOAP, while not actually touching upon the raised by the petitioner, questions the wisdom and the manner by which the instant petition was filed. It asserts that the petitioner as no legal standing to sue or has no real interest in the case at bench and in obtaining the reliefs prayed for. ISSUES 1. WON petitioners have no legal standing 2. WON the authority given by LTFRB to provincial bus operators to set a fare range is unconstitutional and invalid

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3. WON the establishment of a presumption of public need in favor of an applicant for a proposed transport service without having to prove public necessity is violative of the Public Service Act and the Rules of Court HELD 1. Ratio One who is directly affected by and whose interest is immediate and substantial in the controversy has the standing to sue Reasoning The rule requires that a party must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision so as to warrant an invocation of the court's jurisdiction and to justify the exercise of the court's remedial powers in his behalf. Petitioner has shown that it has a clear legal right that was violated and continues to be violated with the enforcement of the challenged memoranda, circulars and/or orders. KMU members, who avail of the use of buses, trains and jeepneys everyday, are directly affected by the burdensome cost of arbitrary increase in passenger fares. They are part of the millions of commuters who comprise the riding public. Certainly, their rights must be protected, not neglected nor ignored. Assuming arguendo that petitioner is not possessed of the standing to sue, this court is ready to brush aside this barren procedural infirmity and recognize the legal standing of the petitioner in view of the transcendental importance of the issues raised 2. Ratio The authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators to set a fare range over and above the authorized existing fare, is illegal and invalid as it is tantamount to art undue delegation of legislative authority. Reasoning Potestas delegata non delegari potest. What has been delegated cannot be delegated. This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another. A further delegation of such power would indeed constitute a negation of the duty in violation of the trust reposed in the delegate mandated to discharge it directly. Under Sec. 16(c) of the Public Service Act, the Legislative delegates to the LTFRB the power of fixing the rates of public services, of implementing broad policies laid down in a statute by filling in the details which the Legislature may neither have time nor competence to provide. But nowhere under the aforesaid provisions of law say that LTFRB or regulatory bodies are authorized to delegate that power to a common carrier, a transport operator, or other public service.

PROF.
3. Ratio In case of conflict between a statute and an administrative order, the former must prevail. Reasoning LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. 92-009, Part IV is entirely incompatible and inconsistent with Section 16(c)(iii) of the Public Service Act which requires that before a CPC will be issued, the applicant must prove by proper notice and hearing that the operation of the public service proposed will promote public interest in a proper and suitable manner. On the contrary, the policy guideline states that the presumption of public need for a public service shall be deemed in favor of the applicant. Moreover, the offending provisions of the LTFRB memorandum circular in question would in effect amend the Rules of Court by adding another disputable presumption in the enumeration of 37 presumptions under Rule 131, Section 5 of the Rules of Court. Such usurpation of this Court's authority cannot be countenanced as only this Court is mandated by law to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. Disposition 1. Petitioners have legal standing. 2. The authority given by LTFRB to provincial bus operators to set a fare range is unconstitutional and invalid. 3. The establishment of a presumption of public need in favor of an applicant is violative of the Public Service Act and the Rules of Court

THE ANTI-GRAFT LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC V SAN JUAN ROMERO; August 1, 1996
NATURE Petition for Certiorari to review a compromise agreement entered by Province of Rizal FACTS - Anti- Graft League of the Philippines a self-confessed non-governmental, non-stock and non-profit organization, which was constituted to protect the interest of the Republic and its instrumentalities and political subdivisions and its constituents against abuses of its public officials and employees filed this petition as a taxpayer. - This taxpayers suit is against the Provincial Board of Rizal because it allegedly disbursed public funds in transactions involving four parcels of land in Ugong Norte, Pasig. - PD No. 674 directed the Board to provide funds for the purchase of a site and the construction of the necessary

Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act prescribes the following for the fixing and determination of rates-(a) the rates to be approved should be proposed by public service operators; (b) there should be a publication and notice to concerned or affected parties in the territory affected; (c) a public hearing should be held for the fixing of the rates.

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structures of the Technological Colleges of Rizal that would be established. - The Board was able to negotiate with respondent, Ortigas to buy the said 4 parcels of land. - Ortigas transferred ownership to the Province at Php 110 per square meter but the construction never materialized. - 12 years later, the land being idle and the Province needing the funds, the Board passed a resolution authorizing the Governor to sell the same. - The said property was sold to Valley View Realty Development Corporation. - After learning of the sale, Ortigas filed an action for the recission of contract plus damages with preliminary injunction on the grounds that the Province violated one of the terms of its contracts with Ortigas by selling the subject lots which were intended solely for the construction of the said colleges. - There were new provincial officers who assumed office. They adopted a resolution rescinding the deed of sale between the Province and Valley View on the grounds that the sale price was exceedingly low and prejudicial to the Province. - Valley View filed for specific performance and damages because of the rescission. - The Province and Valley View eventually had a settlement where the former would return the Php 30 million downpayment given by the latter. - A settlement was also reached between the Province and Ortigas wherein the Province agreed to reconvey the 4 parcels of land to Ortigas at Php 432 million payable within 2 yrs. - Petitioner now wants to nullify said compromise agreement and the approval of the same by the respondent Judge Migrio. ISSUES 1. WON the present action is a taxpayers suit. And if so, does the petitioner have the legal standing to question the said transaction between the Provincial Board and Ortigas? 2. WON the SC is the proper forum for the instant petition. 3. Assuming that the SC is the proper forum, WON the present action is barred by laches. HELD 1. To constitute a taxpayers suit, the 2 requisites are: - Public funds are disbursed by a political subdivision or instrumentality and in so doing, a law is violated or some irregularity is committed

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- The petitioner is directly affected by the alleged ultra vires act. > Legal standing requisite is relaxed when there are important issues involved. > In the present case, there is no constitutional issue involved so standing shouldnt even be made an issue here. > Also, the first requisite is absent in this case to make it a taxpayers suit. (as to 2nd requisite see underlined below) > Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato (citing Baker v. Carr): Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Hence the question in standing is whether such parties have alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. > When no unlawful spending has been shown, as in the case at bar, the petitioner, even as a taxpayer cannot question the transaction validly executed by and between the Province and Ortigas since it is not privy to the said contract. Therefore, petitioner HAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION AND NO LOCUS STANDI IN THIS CASE. 2. Petitioner committed procedural error by filing its petition with the SC. The proper remedy should have been to file a petition for review of the trial courts decision before the CA because the petitioner is questioning the wisdom of the TCs decision which calls for a factual determination of the feasibility of an amicable settlement bet the litigants. 3. Even assuming that the SC is the proper forum and that they have a legal standing, the petition would not prosper as it was filed out of season meaning the assailed decision was final and executory from the day it was promulgated since no appeal was made except at present which is two years later. - Not only does the petitioner lack the legal personality to file this so-called taxpayers suit but that it filed the same beyond the reglementary period. The Court no longer finds any reason to delve into the merits, or the lack of it, of the instant petition. Disposition Petition DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioner.

PROF.
DEL MAR V PAGCOR PUNO; Nov. 29, 2000
NATURE Special Civil Action in the SC. Quo Warranto. Petitioners (consolidated petitions): a. Raoul del Mar- initially filed a Petition for Prohibition; then a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari b. Federico Sandoval II and Michael Defensor filed a Petition for Injunction c. Juan Miguel Zubiri filed a Petition in Intervention FACTS - Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) is a GOCC organized and existing under PD 1869, enacted on July 11, 1983 - Pursuant to Sec. 1 and 10 of said PD, PAGCOR asked for legal advice from the Secretary of Justice as to whether or not it has the authority to operate and manage jai-alai frontons. - The Secretary of Justice said that the authority of PAGCOR to operate and maintain games of chance or gambling extends to jai-alai which is a form of sport or game played for bets and that the Charter of PAGCOR amounts to a legislative franchise for the purpose, - Other favorable opinions came from the Solicitor General and the Office of the Govt Corp. Counsel - Thus, PAGCOR started the operation of jai-alai frontons - Petioner del Mar initially filed a Petition for Prohibition on the ground that the act of PAGCOR is patently illegal and devoid of any basis from the Consti or PAGCORs own Charter - however, PAGCOR entered into an agreement with private respondents Belle Jai Alai Corporation (BELLE) and Filipinas Gaming Entertainment Totalizator Corporation (FILGAME) wherein it was agreed that BELLE will provide for the infrastructure facilities and funding for operations, with no financial outlay from PAGCOR. PAGCOR handles the actual management and operation of jai alai - because of the agreement, del Mar filed a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari questioning the validity of the agreement on the ground that PAGCOR is without jurisdiction, legislative franchise, authority or power to enter such agreement - Sandoval and Defensor filed a Petition for Injunction to enjoin PAGCOR from operating/managing the jai alai or Basque pelota games on the ground that it is patently illegal, having no basis in the law or the Consti, and in usurpatin of the authority that properly pertains to the legislature

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- Zubiri intervened alleging that the act is illegal because it is not included in the scope of PAGCORs franchise which only covers games of chance - all petitioners are suing as taxpayers and in their capacity as members of the House of Representatives Petitioners Claim - del Mar: PAGCOR has no jurisdiction or legislative franchise or acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jusrisdiction, in arrogating unto itself the authority or power to open, pursue, conduct, operate, control and manage jai alai game operations in the country. It has no jurisdiction or authority to execute its agreement with Bell and Filgame, to enter into a business arrangement with them (an agreement entered into through manifest partiality and evident bad faith), to award them the right to avail of the tax benefits, to award them the agreement without public bidding, and to cause the disbursement of funds. - Sandoval and Defensor: Operation of jai alai by PAGCOR is illegal in that the franchise of PAGCOR does not include the operation of jai alai since jai alai is prohibited under RPC, that it is not a game of chance. A franchise is a special privilege that should be construed against the grantee. And to allow PAGCOR to operate jai alai is tantamount to a license to PAGCOR to legalize and operate any gambling activity. Respondents Comments - the petition states no cause of action and the petitioner has no cause of action, not being a real party in interest. The petition cannot be maintained as a taxpayer suit, there being no illegal disbursement of public funds involved. The petition is essentially an action for quo warranto and as such, may only be commenced by the SolGen. The operation of jai alai is within PAGCORs authority to operate and maintain, PAGCORs franchise is intended to be wide in its coverage, and the agreement with Belle and Filgame is not covered by the laws requiring public bidding. - PAGCOR avers that an action for injunction is not among the cases or proceedings originally cognizable by the SC, and even assuming that were, the petition should be dismissed for failure of the petitioners to observe the doctrine on hierarchy of courts. The petitioners have no legal standing as taxpayers based on their cause of action. PAGCORs franchise includes the operation of jai alai. ISSUES Procedural 1. WON the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a petition for injunction

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2. WON the petitioners have legal standing as taxpayers and as legislators Substantive WON the franchise granted to PAGCOR includes the right to manage and operate jai alai

PROF.
conditions of the grant are unequivocably defined by the grantor. Reasoning A franchise is a special privilege conferred upon a corporation or individual by a govt duly empowered legally to grant it. It is a privilege of public concern, reserved for public control and administration. It emanates from a sovereign power and the grant is inherently a legislative power. It may, however, be derived indirectly from the state through an agency to which the power has been clearly and validly delegated. In the absence of these defining terms (conditions, manner and to whom franchise is granted, mode of conducting and character and quality of service, and duty of grantee), any claim to a legislative franchise to operate a game played for bets and denounced as a menace to morality ought to be rejected. A historical study of the creation, growth and devt of PAGCOR will readily show that it was never given a legislative franchise to operate jai alai. PD 1869 is the consolidation of previous PDs that created PAGCOR and defined its nature, scope, policy and term of franchise. In this consolidated decree, the nature and scope of PAGCORs existing franchise to maintain gambling casinos (not to operate jai alai) was merely reiterated, not changed. In all the PDs, what was mentioned was the rights, privilege and authority to operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs and other recreation or amusement places, sports, gaming pools, ie basketball, football, lotteries, etc. There was no mention of operation of jai alai frontons. Also, it cannot be said that in issuing PD 1869 President Marcos intended to grant PAGCOR a franchise to operate jai alai because a year and a half before it was chartered, he granted the Phil. Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation (a company owned by the Romualdezes) a 25-year franchise to operate jai alai in Manila. And during Pres. Aquinos term, the franchise was revoked, PAGCORs franchise to operate gambling casinos was not revoked, but it was not given a franchise to operate jai alai. Jai alai operations and gambling casinos are distinct from each other. The PDs seek to enforce the policy of the State to minimize the evils, malpractices and corruptions that normally are found prevalent in the conduct and operation of gambling clubs and casinos without direct govt involvement. It did not address the moral malevolence of jai alai games and the need to contain it thru PAGCOR. Lastly, the so-called legislative grant to PAGCOR did not come from a real congress, but from Marcos who assumed legislative power under Martial Law. Thus,

HELD Procedural Ratio 1. Even assuming that the petition is an action for injunction, the Court has the discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant the immediate exercise of its jurisdiction. 2. Taxpayers are allowed to sue where there is a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds. Be that as it may, in line with the liberal policy of the Court on locus standi when a case involves an issue of overarching significance to the society, the petitioners have legal standing as members of the House of Representatives. Reasoning 1. It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action and the jurisdiction of the Court are the allegations of the pleading and character of the relief sought. It is shown that the petition is actually one for Prohibition. The Courts taking cognizance of the petition is in consonance with case law that rules of procedure are but tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice such that when its rigid application tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, the Court has the duty to suspend their operation. 2. A party suing as a taxpayer must prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation. In the present case, however, the agreement with Belle and Filgame states that there shall be no cost to PAGCOR for all capital expenditures. Thus, there is no showing that there is expenditure of public money involved. However, petitioners contend that there is infringement of the legislatures power to grant franchise. It is now settled that a member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Consti in his office. Substantive Ratio The Charter of PAGCOR does not give it any franchise to operate and manage jai alai. It is abundantly clear from the previous laws, EOs and decrees that the legislative practice is that a franchise to operate jai alai is granted solely for that purpose and the terms and

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CARMELO SISON

there is a need to be extra cautious in treating this alleged grant of franchise as a grant by the legislature, as a grant by the representatives of our people, for plainly it is not. Disposition The petitions are granted. Respondents are enjoined from managing, maintaining and operating jai alai games, and from enforcing the agreement entered into by them for that purpose.

A2010
-The rule that this Court does not have jurisdiction over original actions for injunction still holds. However, it may issue preliminary writs of injunction in cases on appeal before it or in original actions commenced pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. - A cursory reading of Sec.11 of PD1869 would readily show that the extent and nature of PAGCORs franchise is so brad that literally all kinds of sports and gaming pools, including jai alai, are covered therein. - under said section games of skill have been lumped together with the word lotteries just before the word etc. and after the words gaming pools, it may be deduced from the wording of the law that when bets or stakes are made in connection with games of skill, they may be classified as games of chance under the coverage of PAGCORs franchise. Jai alai, while in itself is not per se a game of chance, may be categorized as a game of chance when bets are accepted as a form of gambling. - where the franchise contains no words either defining or limiting the powers which the holder may exercise, such holder has, by implication, all such powers as are reasonably necessary to enable it to accomplish the purposes and object of its creation. - the mere granting of a franchise does not amount to an implied contract on the part of the grantor that it will not grant a rival franchise to a competing corporation or enter into a competition itself in reference to the subject franchise (in relation to the franchise granted to the Romualdezes company) - in the interpretation of statutes, it is not proper or permissible to inquire into the motives which influenced the legislative body, except insofar as such motives are disclosed by the statute itself - the powers granted to PAGCOR is broad enough to include the power to enter into a joint venture agreement with private corporations relating to the operation, management and conduct not only of gambling casinos but also those relating to Jai alai as legalized gambling. - while jai alai, as a form of legalized gambling, does not promote good morals, it is expected to provide entertainment to the public and much needed revenues to the government, and in balancing these two apparently conflicting interests, courts are not supposed to pass upon and do not pass upon questions pf wisdom or expediency of legislation, for it is not within their province to supervise and keep legislation within the bounds of propriety.

PROF.

NATURE Special civil action in the Supreme Court. Prohibition. FACTS Petitioner, ElpidioG. Soriano, filed instant petition as a member of the IBP and as a tax payer. He is questioning the constitutionality and legality of the permanent appointments made by President GMA, of public respondents to different positions in the Philippine Coast Guard and their subsequent assumption of office without confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. (see case for list of appointees and positions). Petition also impleads Sec. Boncodin of the DBM claiming that there is no legal basis for the DBM to allow the disbursement of the salaries and emoluments of respondent officers of the PCG. According to petitioner, the appointments are illegal and unconstitutional for failure to undergo the confirmation process in the CA. ISSUES 1. WON the petitioner have legal personality 2. WON the petition can be classified as a taxpayers suit 3. WON the appointments by the president are constitutional and legal HELD 1. NO. Court finds petitioner without legal personality. A private citizen is allowed to raise constitutional questions only if he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government. In the case at bar, petitioner has failed to clearly show that he has personally suffered actual or threatened injury. A party bringing a suit challenging the constitutionality of an act or statute must show not only that the act is invalid but also that he has sustained or is in immediate, or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement. 2. NO. petitioner has no interest as such and this case does not involve the exercise by Congress of its taxing power. 3. YES. PCG used to be administered and maintained as a separate unit of the Philippine Navy (sec. 4 of RA 5173). It was subsequently placed under the Secretary of the DND (sec 4 of PD601). Eventually it was integrated into the AFP as a major subordinate unit of the Navy. However under Pres. FVR, PCG was transferred to the Office of the President, and then transferred again to the DOTC. Now that the PCG is under the DOTC, the promotions and appointments of respondent officers of the PCG, or any PCG officer from the rank of Captain or

SEPARATE OPINION DAVIDE

Jai alai is not a game of chance, but a sport based on skill. Betting on the results thereof can only be allowed by Congress, and I am not aware of any new law authorizing such betting. My reading of the PAGCOR fails to disclose a grant of a congressional authority to allow betting on the results of jai alai. All that the PAGCOR may do is operate and conduct the jai alai, but in no case can it allow betting on the results thereof without obtaining a statutory authority for the purpose.

VITUG
- Gambling, universally regarded to be a threat to the moral fiber of any society, is aptly a prohibited activity in the Philippines. A statute which is sufficiently clear and free from serious ambiguity can only be given its literal meaning and simply be applied. However, PAGCORs power to enter into joint venture agreements in the operation and management of such games is a different matter. Without a congressional franchise of its own, neither Belle nor Filgame can lawfully engage into the activity. While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter to enter into agreements in its authorized operations, that power, upon the other hand, cannot be so construed as to permit it to likewise grant a veritable franchise to any other person, individual or firm. The broad authority of PAGCOR to enter into agreements could not have been meant to empower PAGCOR to pass on or to share its own franchise to others. -vote to grant the petitions to enjoin PAGCOR from operating jai alai through Bell and Filgame or through any other agency - BUT vote to deny the petitions insofar as they seek to prohibit PAGCOR from itself managing or operating the game.

DE LEON [dissent]

SORIANO III V. LISTA CORONA; March 24, 2003

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CARMELO SISON

higher, do not need confirmation of the CA pursuant to Section 16, Article 7 of the Constitution. Under said provision, only appointed officers from the rank of colonel or naval captain in the armed forces require confirmation of the CA. accordingly, Court declares that no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction was committed by respondent officers of the PCG. Their assumption to office as well as salaries and disbursements made by the DBM are valid and legal.

A2010
envelopes (Prequalification Documents, Technical Proposal, Financial Proposal by September 20, 1996 - August 16, 1996 amendment to Bid Documents > aside from fixed Annual Guaranteed Payment, include additional percentage of gross revenue (first 5 years 5%, next 10 years 7.5%; next 10 years 7.5%) > amount of fixed Annual Guaranteed Payment subject to price challenge > adequate capability to sustain the financing requirement (minimum amount for equity; letter of testimonial from reputable bank attesting good financial standing) > minimum amount of equity shall be 30% of Project Cost > Amendments to draft Concession Agreement shall only cover items that would not materially affect the preparation of the proponents proposal - September 20, 1996 Peoples Air Cargo and Warehousing Co., Inc (Paircargo), Philippine Air and Ground Services, Inc. (PAGS) and Security Bank Group [collectively Paircargo consortium] submitted proposal to PBAC - during opening of the three envelopes, AEDC informed PBAC of their reservations regarding Paircargos lack of corporate approval and financial capability, prohibition of BOT Law to amount of Security Bank can legally invest on project. Inclusion of Siemens and Lufthansa as contractor and facility operator respectively - PBAC accepted Paircargos price proposal (P17.75B) and AEDC (P135M) failed to match such proposal - February 27, 1997 Paircargo incorporated to PIATCO - July 12, 1997 DOTC Sec Arturo Enrile and PIATCO Pres Henry Go signed 1997 Concession Agreement that granted PIATCO the franchise to operate, and maintain the said terminal during the concession period and to collect the fees, rentals and other charges in accordance to rates and schedules in the agreement; concession period is 25 years from the in-service date and can be renewed at the option of the government for a period not exceeding 25 years; at the end of the concession period, PIATCO shall transfer the development facility to MIAA - November 26,1998 signed ACRA where amendments made on > definition of certification of completion > Special Obligations > exclusivity of franchise given to concessionaire > taxes, duties, and other imposts > periodic adjustment of public utility fees and charges > termination of contract > venue of arbitration proceedings - First Supplement

PROF.
> defining Revenues and Gross Revenue > MIAA to provide sufficient funds for the upkeep, maintenance, repair and/or replacement of airport facilities and equipment > additional special obligations > construction of surface road to connect NAIA II to NAIA III in lieu of proposed access tunnel > improvement of Sales Road > changes in timetable > Disposition of terminal fees > payments of percentage share in gross revenues - Second Supplement > clearing, removal, demolition and disposal of subterranean structures uncovered or discovered > time extensions, incremental and consequential costs and losses consequent - Third Supplement > obligation of concessionaire to construct surface road connecting II and III - MIAA is charged with maintenance and operation of NAIA I and II, had existing concession contracts with various service providers such as in-flight catering, passenger handling, ramp and ground support, aircraft maintenance and provisions, cargo handling and warehousing, etc by Miascor Group, DNATA-Wings Aviation Systems, and MacroAsia Group - September 17, 2002 workers or international airline service providers stand to lose employment upon implementation of questioned agreements - October 15, 2002 service providers join cause - October 24, 2002 congressmen Baterina, Martinez and Jaraula filed similar petition - November 29, 2002 GMA in her speech in 2002 Golden Shell Awards said she will not honor PIATCO contracts bec null and void - March 4, 2003 PIATCO commenced arbitration proceedings before International Chamber of Commerce, International Court of Arbitration against the Philippine Government ISSUES Procedural 1. WON petitioners have legal standing to file 2. WON SC has jurisdiction over the case 3. WON commencement of arbitration proceedings has any legal effect Substantive 1. WON PIATCO is a qualified bidder 2. WON 1997 Concession Agreement is valid a. modification on public utility revenues and nonpublic utility revenues that maybe collected by PIATCO

AGAN, JR. V PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO., INC (PIATCO) PUNO; May 5, 2003
NATURE Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court, Prohibition (under Rule 65 of Revised Rules of Court) form implementation agreements executed by Philippine Government through DOTC and MIAA and PIATCO 1) Concession Agreement signed July 12, 1997 2) Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ACRA) dated November 26, 1998 3) First Supplement to ACRA dated August 27, 1999 4) Second Supplement to ACRA dated September 4, 2000 5) Third Supplement to ACRA dated June 22, 2001 [collectively, PIATCO contracts]

FACTS - August 1989 DOTC engaged service of Aeroport de Paris to conduct comprehensive study of the NAIA including traffic forecasts, capacity of existing facilities, etc - 1993 business leaders Gokongwei, Gotianun, Sy, Tan, Ty and Yuchengco met with Pres. Ramos to explore the possibility of investing in the construction and operation of a new international airport terminal; they formed Asias Emerging Dragon Corp (AEDC) - October 5, 1994 AEDC submitted unsolicited proposal to govt through DOTC/MIAA for development of NAIA III under build-operate-and-transfer agreement pursuant to RA 6957 amended by RA 7718 (BOT Law) - December 2, 1994 prequalification bids and awards committee (PBAC) for implementation of NAIA III - March 27, 1995 DOTC Sec Jose Garcia endorsed AEDC proposal to NEDA - February 13, 1996 NEDA approved NAIA III - June 1996 invitation for competitive or comparative proposals on AEDCs unsolicited proposal to submit 3

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CARMELO SISON

b. assumption of government of the liabilities of PIATCO in the event of PIATCOs default 3. WON direct government guarantee in PIATCO contracts is valid 4. WON PIATCO can impose government payment on losses during temporary takeover 5. WON monopoly of PIATCO is subject to regulation

A2010
significantly changed from the draft agreement which constitute added benefit not available at time of bidding b. NO bec contrary to public policy - attendant liabilities: amounts recorded from time to time in books of concessionaire as owing to unpaid creditors who have provided, loaned, or advanced funds actually used for the project including interests, penalties, etc - dependent on existence and availability of qualified operator who is willing to take over rights and obligations of PIATCO thus not entirely within the control of government - Public Bidding is a standard practice for procuring government contracts for public service and for furnishing supplies and other materials. It aims to secure for the government the lowest possible price under the most favorable terms and conditions, to curtail favoritism in the award of government contracts and avoid suspicions of anomalies and it places all bidders in equal footing 3. NO. - if PIATCO fails to pay Senior Lenders, government must pay termination payment equal to the appraised value of the project of the value of the attendant liabilities whichever is greater - direct guarantee, subsidy and equity by the government in these projects are strictly prohibited. This is logical for if the government would in the end still be at the risk of paying the debts incurred by the private entity in the BOT projects, then the purpose of the law is subverted 4. NO. - AXII Sec17 national emergency, temporary takeover of business that affect public interest - temporary takeover by govt extends to operation of business and not ownership therefore govt is not required to compensate the private entity-owner of the said business as there is no transfer of ownership whether permanent or temporary; also this is in the exercise of police power 5. YES. - a monopoly is a privilege or peculiar advantage vested in one or more persons or companies, consisting in the exclusive right (or power) to carry on particular business or trade, manufacture a particular article, or control the sale of a particular commodity - AXII Sec19 regulates and prohibits monopolies when public interest so requires. This does not prohibit monopolies per se but MIAA has the right and duty to ensure that it is done in accord with public interest TF it cannot violate rights of third parties

PROF.
Dispositive 1997 Concession Agreement, ACRA and Supplements are null and void

SEPARATE OPINION VITUG [dissent]

- SC no jurisdiction; although denominated to be petitions for prohibition, actually pray for nullification of PIATCO contracts - Rule 65 of Revised RoC is explicit; a petition for prohibition may be filed against a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions; this case may be resolved on the basis of undisputed facts - more appropriate to bring action in RTC

HELD Procedural 1. YES. - Employees Agan, et al and service providers MIASCOR, et al have legal standing to sue as taxpayers and as parties whose rights and interests stand to be violated by the implementation of the PIATCO contracts; services or operations will not be carried over to the NAIA III and PIATCO has no obligation to permit such carry over except by separate agreement TF there is no assurance that subsisting contracts with MIAA will be respected; they stand to lose their employment - members of HoR Baterina et al also have legal standing as legislators, citizens and taxpayers bec of disbursement of unappropriated amounts (AVI Sec29(1)) 2. YES. - crux of the instant controversy involves significant legal questions - facts necessary to resolve legal questions are well established and need not be determined by a trial court 3. NO. - arbitration proceedings could be called for but ONLY with respect to the parties to the contract in question - parties in this case have legitimate interest in the resolution of the controversy and are not parties to the PIATCO contracts TF they cannot be bound by such proceedings Substantive 1. NO. - entire net worth of Security Bank should not be considered bec according to the General Banking Act that a commercial bank cannot invest in any single enterprise in an amount more than 15% of its net worth 2. a. NO. - changes must not constitute substantial, material amendments that would alter the basic parameters of the contract and would constitute a denial to the other bidders of the opportunity to bid on the same terms - First (reduced number of fees that are subject to MIAA approval), Second (without approval of MIAA on changes in fees only an explanation and justification), and Third (fees not subject to MIAA regulation) category of fees

PANGANIBAN [dissent]
- five contracts for construction and operation of NAIA III are replete with outright violations of the law, public policy, and the Constitution TF they are null and void ab initio - Fiat iustitia ruat coeum let the chips fall where they may be - ISSUES Procedural 1. WON SC has original jurisdiction 2. WON petitioners have locus standi 3. WON this case should be decided without any mandatory referral to arbitration Substantive WON PIATCO contracts violated the Constitution, the laws and public policy to render them void and inexistent Jurisdiction, Standing and Arbitration - transcendental importance and national interest - ought to be settled without delay TF direct resort to special civil action of prohibition is justified - ultimately turns to question of law not factual questions - Chavez v PCGG void agreement will not be rendered operative TF it vests no rights, creates no obligations, no legal effect - arbitration cannot bind bec they are not parties to the PIATCO contracts - locus standi: as taxpayers and members of HoR valid bec PIATCO contracts creates obligations on government to disburse public funds without prior congressional appropriations Violations of the Constitution and the Law - From Outset, Bidding Process Flawed and Tainted - AEDC was deprived right to match PIATCOs price challenge

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CARMELO SISON

- delayed issuance of the notice of award violated BOT Law and the IRR - further amendments resulted in substantially different contract and awarded without public bidding - PIATCOs concession agreement was further amended (ARCA) again without public bidding - three supplements imposed new obligations on government, also without prior public bidding - government directly quarantees PIATCO debts - contract termination provisions in the PIATCO contracts are void - a prohibited direct government subsidy, which at that time as an assault to national honor - exclusive right granted to PIATCO to operate a public utility is prohibited by the Constitution - PIATCO contracts violate time limitation on franchises - contracts create two monopolies for PIATCO - contracts encourage monopolistic pricing - PIATCO contracts violate constitutional prohibitions against impairment of contracts and deprivation of property and liberty without due process - by creating new financial obligations for government, supplements to ARCA violate constitutional ban on disbursement of public funds without valid appropriation - infringes on the legislative prerogative and power over the public purse What do we do now? - now that NAIA III already built and is almost finished, payment to builders, funders, investors, and contractors will be staggered and scheduled

A2010
Rep. Dilangalen expressed objection. But upon viva voce voting, majority of HR approved return of report to BCC. - HR elected anew its conferees to the BCC; then again, for unclear reasons, HR elected another set of conferees. - 02/07/2001. Rep. Bunye moved that House consider BCC report. Dilangalen said report had been recommitted to the BCC. Chair responded that BCC report was a new one. House deferred approval of the report until other members were given a copy. - House approved report w/ 125 affirmative, 3 negative, no abstention. Reps. Farinas and Garcia said Sec.14 was a rider. Rep. Escudero expressed doubts on its constitutionality. Dilangalen observed that no senator signed BCC report. - On same day, Senate approved BCC report. - It was duly signed by Senate President Pimentel and House Speaker Belmonte and was duly certified by Senate Secretary & Sec. Gen. of HR. - 02/12/2001. GMA signed RA 9006. Petitioners' Claim (They constitute minority bloc in House of Representatives) - Sec.14 of RA 9006, insofar as it repeals Sec.67 of Omnibus Election Code is unconstitutional for violating Art.VI, Sec.26(1). It constitutes a proscribed rider because of the dissimilarity in subject matter of RA 9006 and Sec.67 of Omnibus Election Code. - RA 9006 primarily deals with lifting of ban on use of media for election propaganda and elimination of unfair election practices, while Sec.67 imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for office other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso facto resigned upon filing of certificates of candidacy (COC). - Repeal is not embraced in title and is not germane to subject matter. - It also violates equal protection clause by leaving intact Sec.662 which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials. - RA 9006 is null and void in its entirety as irregularities attended its enactment into law. Even Sec.16 which provides that Act shall take effect upon approval is a violation of due process clause. - Sec.67 of Omnibus Election Code is a good law and should not have been repealed. Dimaporo v Mitra ruling stated that the provision was based on constitutional mandate on the accountability of public officers.
2

PROF.
- Speaker and Sec. General of HR acted with grave abuse of discretion for not considering those members of the House who ran for Senate during May 2001 elections as ipso facto resigned. Respondents' Comments - Petitioners have no legal standing. They have not shown that they have suffered harm as a result of passage of RA 9006. They have no interest as taxpayers since statute does not involve exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. - Invoking the enrolled bill doctrine, respondents refute allegations that irregularities attended the enactment of RA 9006. - Sec.14 of RA 9006 is not a rider nor does it violate Art.VI, Sec.26(1) of Constitution. Title is so broad that it encompasses all processes involved in an election exercise, including filing of COC by elective officials. - Repeal of Sec.67 is germane to the general subject of RA 9006 as it eliminates effect of prematurely terminating term of an elective official. With its repeal, all elective officials are now placed on equal footing as they are allowed to finish their respective terms even if they run for office. - Such repeal need not be expressly stated in the title. - Repealing Sec.67 and leaving Sec.67 of the Omnibus Election Code does not violate equal protection clause. - Sec.16 of RA 9006 does not violate due process clause as it does not entail any arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty and property. The section providing for penalties presume that formalities of the law would be observed. Also, issue about lack of due process is premature as no one has been charged with violation of RA 9006. - Speaker and Sec. General of HR did not commit grave abuse of discretion in not excluding from the Rolls those members who ran for Senate during May 2001 elections. They merely complied with RA 9006, which enjoys presumption of validity. ISSUES Procedural WON the petitioners have locus standi. Substantive 1. WON Sec.14, the repealing clause of RA 9006 is a rider. 2. WON Sec.14 of RA 9006 violates Equal Protection clause. 3. WON RA 9006 is null and void. 4. WON Sec.16 of RA 9006 is defective. HELD Procedural

FARINAS V THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY CALLEJO; December 10, 2003

NATURE Special Civil Actions in the Supreme Court for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking to declare as unconstitutional Sec.14 of RA 9006 (The Fair Election Act) as it expressly repeals Sec.67 of BP 881 FACTS - RA 9006 entitled An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices is a consolidation of House Bill 9000 and Senate Bill 1742 - Bicameral Conference Committee with 8 Senators & 16 members of HR - 11/29/2000. BCC submitted its Report. - 02/05/2001. Rep. Paras proposed an amendment to the BCC report. Rep. Dilangalen said House could no longer submit an amendment. Rep. Apostol moved that House return report to BCC in view of proposed amendment.

Sec. 67. Candidates holding appointive office or position. Any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the AFP, and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 CARMELO SISON

Ratio A party who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. (People v Vera) This is to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. (Baker v Carr) However, being merely a matter of procedure, the court may adopt a liberal stance on standing if the case involves issues of overarching significance to our society. Reasoning In previous rulings, the Court has taken cognizance of petitions filed by Members of Congress assailing validity of acts, decisions, rulings or orders of various government agencies or instrumentalities. The principal issue posed by present petitions is one of overarching significance that justifies Courts adoption of liberal stance. - With the national elections barely seven months away, Court must confront the issue now and resolve it. This is also to prevent multiplicity of suits. All await the decision of this Court on the constitutional question. . . the exceptional character of the situation that confronts us, paramount public interest, undeniable necessity for a rulingreinforce our stand. (Gonzalez v Comelec) - Courts have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit imposed by Constitution. Substantive 1. No Ratio The title and objectives 3 of RA 9006 are comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Sec.67 of Omnibus Election Code. Reasoning It would be sufficient if the title is comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect. The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act. - Legislators considered Sec.674 as a form of discrimination that had to be repealed, which the Executive concurred with by signing it into law. But the
3

A2010
Court cannot look into the wisdom of the law since it is not concerned with policy matters. - Congress is not precluded from repealing Sec. 67 by the Dimapora v Mitra ruling which upheld the validity of such provision and pronounced that it had a laudable purpose. - The purpose of Art.VI, Sec.26(1) is to apprise legislators of the purpose, nature and scope of provisions of the bill. In this case, legislators were undoubtedly aware of the existence of the repealing provisions. 2. No Ratio Classification as regards elective and appointive officials is based upon material distinctions and as long as all persons belonging under the same classification are similarly treated, then the equal protection clause is not infringed. Reasoning Elective officials occupy office by virtue of mandate of the electorate; appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation by an appointing authority. Another substantial distinction is found in Administrative Code of 1987 wherein appointive officials are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity, but under the same provision, elective officials are expressly allowed to take part. - By repealing Sec.67 but retaining Sec.66 (Omnibus Election Code), the legislators deemed it proper to treat these 2 classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their tenure in office of filing of certificates of candidacy for any position other than those occupied by them. It is not within power of SC to pass upon wisdom of such classification. 3. No Ratio The enrolled bill doctrine applies. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no concern. (Osmena v Pendatun) Reasoning Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of a bill by the House Speaker & the Senate President and the certification of Secretaries of both Houses that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment. Even if irregularities attended the passage of the law, the Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of these internal rules of Congress, whether House or Senate. 4. Yes Ratio Effectivity clause which provides that RA 9006 shall take effect immediately upon its approval is defective, but does not render entire law invalid. Requirement of publication cannot in any event be omitted. (Tanada v Tuvera) Reasoning Following Art.2 of Civil Code, RA 9006 took effect fifteen days after its publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation. Disposition Petitions dismissed.

PROF.

PASCUAL V SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS CONCEPCION; December 29, 1960

NATURE Appeal from a judgrment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig) dismissing the above entitled case and dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction therein issued. FACTS - On August 31, 1954 petitioner Wenceslao Pascual, as Provincial Governor of Rizal, instituted this action for declaratory relief, with injunction, upon the ground that RA 920 (An Act Appropriating Funds for Public Works) contained in, in section 1-C (a) thereof, an item (43[h]) of P85,000.00 for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals; that, at the time of the passage and approval of said Act, the feeder roads were nothing but projected and planned subdivision roads, not yet constructed, within the Antonio Subdivision situated at Pasig, Rizal, which projected feeder roads do not connect any government property or any important premises to the main highway; that the Antonio Subdivision was private property of respondent Jose C. Zulueta, who, at the time of the passage and approval of said Act, was a member of the Senate of the Philippines; that respondent Zulueta addressed a letter to the Municipal Council of Pasig, Rizal, offering to donate said projected feeder roads to the municipality; that inasmuch as the projected feeder roads in question were private property at the time of the passage and approval of RA 920, the appropriation of P85,000.00 therein made, for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement of said projected feeder roads, was illegal and, therefore, void ab initio; that said appropriation of P85,000.00 was made by Congress because its members were made to believe that the projected feeder roads in question were public roads and not private streets of a private subdivision; that, in order to give a semblance of legality to the aforementioned appropriation, respondent Zulueta executed, while he was a member of the Senate of the Philippines, an alleged deed of donation of four parcels of land constituting said projected feeder roads, in favor of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines; that being subject to an onerous condition said donation partook of the nature of a contract; that, as such, said

Sec. 2. Declaration of Principles. The State shall, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of media of communication or information to guarantee or ensure equal opportunity for public service, including access to media time and space, and the equitable right to reply, for public information campaigns and fora among candidates and assure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. The State shall ensure that bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination. 4 Sec. 67. Candidates holding elective office. Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

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donation violated the provision of our fundamental law prohibiting the members of Congress from being directly or indirectly financially interested in any contract with the Government, and, hence, is unconstitutional, as well as null and void ab initio, for the construction of the projected feeder roads in question would greatly enhance or increase the value of the aforementioned subdivision of respondent Zulueta, aside from relieving him from the burden of constructing his subdivision streets or roads at his own expense; that the construction of said projected feeder roads was then being undertaken by the Bureau of Public Highways; and that, unless restrained by the court, the respondents would continue to execute, comply with, follow and implement the aforementioned illegal provision of law, to the irreparable damage, detriment and prejudice not only to the petitioner but to the Filipino nation. Respondents' Comments - Respondents move to dismiss the petition upon the ground that petitioner had no legal capacity to sue and that the petition did not state a cause of action. - In support to this motion, Zulueta alleged that the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, not its provincial governor, should represent the province of Rizal, pursuant to section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code; that said respondent is not aware of any law which makes illegal the appropriation of public funds for the improvement of private property; and that, the constitutional provision invoked by petitioner is inapplicable to the donation in question, the same being a pure act of liberality, not a contract. - Other respondents maintained that petitioner could not assail the appropriation in question because there is no actual bona fide case in which the validity of RA 920 is necessarily involved and petitioner has not shown that he has a personal and substantial interest in said Act and that its enforcement has caused or will cause him a direct injury. -The trial court ruled: 1) since the suit involves public interest, petitioner can question the constitutionality of RA 920 2) the legislature has no power to appropriate public revenues for anything but a public purpose 3) the construction and improvement of the feeder roads in question, if such roads were private property, would not be a public purpose 4) the donation being onerous is a contract 5) said donation or contract is absolutely forbidden by the Constitution and consequently, illegal, for Article 1409 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, declares inexistent and void from the very beginning contracts

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whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals or public policy 6) the legality of said donation may not be contested, however, by petitioner herein, because his interests are not directly affected thereby 7) accordingly, the appropriation in question should be upheld and the case dismissed ISSUES Procedural WON the petitioner has locus standi. Substantive WON the legislature can appropriate public funds for a private purpose HELD Procedural Ratio Taxpayers have the right to assail the constitutionality of a legislation appropriating public funds. Reasoning Although it is well settled that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury in consequence of its enforcement, there are many decision nullifying, at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the expenditure of public fund for an unconstitutional act amounts to a misapplication of such funds. Petitioner is not merely a taxpayer, he represents a province which bears a substantial portion of the burden of taxation. Substantive Ratio The legislature is without power to appropriate public revenues for anything but a public purpose. Reasoning The rule is set forth in Corpus Juris Secundum : In accordance with the rule that the taxing power must be exercised for public purposes only, money raised by taxation can be expended only for public purposes and not for the advantage of private individuals. Disposition WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the records are remanded to the lower court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this decision, with the costs of this instance against respondent Jose C. Zulueta. Voting Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Gutierrez David, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.

PROF.

NATURE Petition to review the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City FACTS The City of Dagupan awarded a lease contract in favor of respondent P&M Agro-Development Corporation over a city lot called the Magsaysay Market area. By reason of P&Ms failure to comply with the conditions of the contract, the City filed an action to rescind the lease contract. The case was decided in favor of the City. Upon motion of the City, a writ of execution was immediately issued ordering the immediate delivery of the possession of the premises of the movant city. Thereafter, P&M filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision. During the pendency of the resolution on the motion for reconsideration filed by P&M, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of the City of Dagupan adopted a resolution authorizing the city mayor to enter into a contract of lease with Bugnay Construction and Development over the same parcel of land in litigation. P&M, through its counsel Ravanzo, filed an injunction against the City, its official, and petitioner. Ravanzo, professedly in his capacity as a resident and taxpayer of Dagupan City, filed with the RTC of Dagupan an action for injunction. Respondent judge Laron issued a restraining order enjoining petitioner from continuing with the construction of the Magsaysay Market Building. The City and its acting mayor filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that Ravanzo is not the real party in interest; the complaint states no cause of action; there is another action pending between the same parties involving the same subject matter, issues, purpose, and prayer; and in effect, there was forum-shopping. The motion to dismiss was denied as well as the motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, respondent judge granted the filing of a bond by Ravanzo as a consequence of which a writ of preliminary injunction was issued. ISSUE WON the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion when he denied the motion to dismiss by refusing to recognize that Ravanzo does not have any personality to file a taxpayers suit because he has no cause of action against the defendants in the court a quo HELD Yes. Objection to a taxpayers suit for lack of sufficient personality standing or interest are procedural matters. Considering the importance to the public of a suit

BUGNAY CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT V LARON REGALADO; 1989

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assailing the constitutionality of a tax law, and in keeping with the Courts duty, specially explicated in the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of the Government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Supreme Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure and take cognizance of the suit. - However, for the above rule to apply, the taxpayer must sufficiently show that he would be benefited or injured by the judgment or entitled to the avails of the suit as a real party in interest. Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditures of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public. Further, only when the act complained of directly involves a illegal disbursement of public funds raised by taxation will the taxpayers suit be allowed. - On its face, and there is no evidence to the contrary, the lease contract entered into between petitioner and the City shows that no public funds have been or will be used in the construction of the market building. The terms of contract reveal that petitioner will finance the project, the capital investment to be recovered from the rental fees due from the stallholders. Also, petitioner undertook, at its own expense, to insure the building, to have the site cleared for construction, and to hire personnel necessary to prevent unfair competition to its stallholders. It was also agreed that suits arising from and in connection with said construction shall be at the expense of petitioner without right of reimbursement. Finally, the building shall be turned over at the end of the lease period to the City of Dagupan as its exclusive owner, also without right of reimbursement. No disbursement of public funds, legal or otherwise, being involved in the challenged transaction, the locus standi claimed by plaintiff Ravanzo in Civil Case No. D-8696 is nonexistent.

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- Jan 20, 1982, President Marcos issued Letter of Instruction (LOI) 1190 withholding the grant of new licenses to operate agencies for overseas employment effective Jan 1 1982 except as he may otherwise direct. (note: during this time, Marcos was clothed with legislative power) - March 19, 1991, President Aquino issued Executive Order (EO) 450 lifting the ban on new applications for licenses to operate recruitment agencies subject to guidelines and regulations the Sec of Labor may promulgate. (note: Aquino had already lost her lawmaking powers at this time, as Congress convened on July 27, 1987) - April 8, 1991, the Sec of Labor and Employment (Torres) promulgated Department Order (DO) No. 9 series of 1991, entitled guidelines Implementing Executive Order No. 450. May 14, 1991, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc (PASEI), Philippine Entertainment Exporters and Promoters Association (PEEPA), and Association of Filipino Overseas Workers, Inc. (AFOWI) filed a Petition for Prohibition with preliminary Injunction/Restraining Order and prayed that EO 450 be declared invalid for being contrary to LOI 1190. Their thesis is that LOI 1190 was issued pursuant to the law making power of Marcos under Sec 6 of the 1976 Amendments to the 1973 Constitution, and should be considered as part of the law of the land. Petitioners argue that because of its repealing/modifying effect on Art 35 of the L:abor Code, LOI 1190 could be valid only if treated as a law. - The Court issued a temporary restraining order directing Sec of Labor and Employment to cease and desist from enforcing EO 450 and DO 9 until further orders. ISSUES 1. WON petitioners have standing 2. WON an Executive Order can repeal a Letter of Instruction or Is the repeal of LOI No. 1190 by EO No. 450 valid HELD 1. The court reiterated that the proper party requirement is satisfied if it is alleged that petitioners and intervenors have sustained or are in danger of sustaining immediate injury resulting from the acts or measures complained of. - Petitioners PASEI and PEEPA allege that their member agencies, which enjoy protection against competition by new licenses pursuant to LOI 1190, will suffer irreparable injury with the repeal of LOI 1190 by EO 450, considering

PROF.
further that there is no additional demand for Filipino workers abroad. Any gain made by the new agencies on the supposed exclusive preserve of existing agencies necessarily results in the latters loss. - The Court, as regards Petitioner AFOWI, on the other hand, is not persuaded that the proliferation of recruitment agencies will necessarily result in exposure of workers to exploitation by unscrupulous recruiters, because the stiffer competition may compel these agencies to seek better terms and conditions for overseas workers. Their petition is being founded on mere speculation and should be dismissed for want of valid cause of action. 2. Yes. LOI 1190 simply imposes a presidential review of the authority of the Minister of Labor and Employment to grant licenses, hence directed to him alone. Since this is an administrative action, LOI 1190 should properly be treated as an administrative issuance. To be considered part of the law of the land, petitioners must establish that LOI 1190 was issued in response to a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasan Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter. - LOI 1190 did not suspend nor repeal that enforcement of Art 25 of the Labor Code; it merely added another level of administrative review. - EO 450, also an administrative directive, may accordingly repeal, alter or modify LOI 1190, as it is as well a mere administrative directive. Disposition Petition dismissed. The TRO issued on May 16, 1991 is lifted and set aside. EO No. 450 and DO No. 9 of DOLE are sustained. LOI No. 1190 is declared repealed and superseded by EO No. 450.

TATAD V GARCIA, JR. QUIASION; 1995

FACTS - This is a petition to prohibit respondents from further implementing and enforcing the Revised and Restated Agreement to Build, Lease and Transfer a Light Rail Transit System for EDSA and the Supplemental Agreement to the Revised and Restated Agreement to Build, Lease, and Transfer a Light Rail Transit System for EDSA - 1989 DOTC planned to construct a light railway transit line along EDSA - March 3, 1990 a letter of intent was sent by the Eli Levin Enterprises, Inc. to DOTC Secretary Oscar Orbos proposing to construct the EDSA 3 on a Build-OperateTransfer (BOT) basis

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. V TORRES BELLOSILLO; 1993

FACTS - Article 25 of the Labor Code of the Philippines encourages private sector participation in recruitment and placement of workers under guidelines, rules and regulations to be issued by the Sec of Labor.

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- March 15, 1990 Secretary Orbos invited Levin to send a technical team to discuss the project with DOTC - July 9, 1990 RA 6957 entitled An Act Authorizing the Financing, Construction, Operation and Maintenance of Infrastructure Projects by the Private Sector, and For Other Purposes, was signed by President Corazon C. Aquino. Referred to as the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Law, it took effect on October 9, 1990 - RA 6957 provides for two schemes of the financing, construction and operation of government projects through private initiative and investment: Build-OperateTransfer (BOT) or Built-Transfer (BT) - January 22. 1991 and March 14, 1991 DOTC issued Department Orders creating the Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) and the Technical Committee - March 21, 1991 extended to April 1, 1991 deadline for submission of prequalification documents. Five groups responded and after evaluating the prequalification bids, the PBAC issued a Resolution declaring that only the EDSA LRT Consortium met the requirements - July 1991 Executive Secretary Orbos acting on instructions of the President, issued a directive to the DOTC to proceed with the negotiations. - July 16, 1991 EDSA LRT Consortium submitted its bid proposal to DOTC - March 13, 1992 Executive Secretary Franklin Drilon informed Secretary Pardo that the President could not grant the requested approval: 1. that DOTC failed to conduct actual public bidding in compliance with Section 5 of the BOT Law 2. that the law authorized public bidding as the only mode to award BOT projects and the prequalification proceedings was not the public bidding contemplated under the law 3. that Item 14 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the BOT Law was of doubtful legality 4. that congressional approval of the list of priority projects under the BOT or BT Scheme provided in the law had not yet been granted at the time the contract was awarded - In view of the comments of Exec. Sec. Drilon, the DOTC re-negotiated the agreement - April 22, 1992 the parties entered into a Revised and Restated Agreement to Build, Lease, and Transfer a Light Rail Transit System for EDSA - May 6, 1993 President Ramos approved the said Agreement - Private respondent shall undertake and finance the entire project required for a complete operational light rail transit system

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- Upon full or partial completion and viability thereof, private respondent shall deliver the use and possession of the completed portion to DOTC which shall operate the same - DOTC shall pay private respondent rentals on a monthly basis through an Irrevocable Letter of Credit. The rentals shall be determined by an independent and internationally accredited inspection firm to be appointed by the parties - Private respondents capital shall be recovered from the rentals to be paid by the DOTC which, in turn, shall come fro the earnings of the EDSA LRT 3 - May 5, 1994 RA 7718, amending RA 6957 was signed into law by the President Petitioners 1. The Agreement of April 22, 1992 as amended by supplemental agreement of May 6, 1993 violates the Constitution insofar as it grants EDSA LRT Corporation, Ltd., a foreign corporation, ownership of EDSA LRT 3, a public utility 2. The Build-Lease-Transfer scheme provided in the agreements is not defined nor recognized in RA 6957 3. The award of the contract on a negotiated basis violates RA 6957 4. The award of the contract in favor of respondent violates the requirements provided in the implementing rules and regulations of the BOT Law 5. The agreements violate EO 380 for their failure to bear presidential approval 6. The agreements are grossly disadvantageous to the government Respondent 1. Petitioners are not the real parties-ininterest and have no legal standing to institute the present petition; 2. The writ of prohibition is not the proper remedy and the petition requires ascertainment of facts 3. The scheme adopted in the Agreements is actually a build-transfer scheme allowed by the BOT Law 4. The nationality requirement for public utilities mandated by the Constitution does not apply to private respondent 5. The Agreements executed by and between respondents have been approved by President Ramos and are not disadvantageous to the government

PROF.
6. The award of the contract to private respondent through negotiation and not public bidding is allowed by the BOT Law 7. Granting that the BOT Law requires public bidding, this has been amended by RA 7718 passed by the Legislature which provides for direct negotiation as a mode of award of infrastructure projects ISSUES 1. WON petitioners have legal standing to initiate instant action 2. WON private respondent may own EDSA 3, a public utility 3. WON the BLT scheme is recognized in the BOT Law 4. WON the award of the contract on a negotiated basis is lawful 5. WON the agreement is disadvantageous to the government HELD 1. Yes. The prevailing doctrines in taxpayers suits are to allow taxpayers to question contracts entered into by the national government or GOCCs allegedly in contravention of the law and to disallow the same when only municipal contracts are involved. The ruling in Kilosbayan v. Guingona on locus standi upholds the legal standing of petitioners as taxpayers to institute the present action 2. Yes. The Constitution only prohibits operation of a public utility by a foreign-owned corporation. In this case, private respondent is only the owner of the facilities necessary to operate the EDSA LRT 3, and it admits that it is not enfranchised to operate it as a public utility 3. Yes. There is no mention in the BOT Law that the BOT and BT schemes bar any other arrangement for the payment by the government of the project cost. The BLT scheme in the challenged agreements is but a variation of the BT scheme under the law. 4. Yes. Only one applicant passed the prequalification process. To conduct public bidding in accordance with Section 5 of the BOT Law for that lone participant will be an absurd and pointless exercise. 5. No. Government officials are presumed to perform their functions with regularity and strong evidence is necessary to rebut this presumption. The matter of valuation is an esoteric field which is better left to the experts and which the Court is not eager to undertake.

SEPARATE OPINION

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FELICIANO AND DAVIDE [dissent]
a. it is an ultra-vires act of the DOTC sicne under RA 6957 the DOTC has no authority to enter into a BLT contract b. even assuming that it has, the contract was entered into without complying with the mandatory requirements of public bidding.

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violate the residency requirement of Sec2 ArtV of the Consti? Petitioners' Claim - Sec5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates Sec1 ArtV Consti requiring the voter to be a resident in the Philippines - In Caasi v CA, the Court held that a green card holder is deemed to have abandoned his domicile or residence in the Philippines - Sec1 ArtV Consti does not allow provisional registration to perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a political exercise. Right to suffrage should not be granted to anyone who, on the date of election, does not possess the qualifications provided for. Solicitor General's Comments - The constitutional challenge cannot hold absent the clear and unmistakable showing that said provision of law is repugnant to the Consti. There is a presumption of constitutionality. - Sec1 ArtV is a verbatim reproduction of the 1935 and 1973 Consti. Residence and domicile have been used synonymously. In the previous rulings of the Court, Filipinos who are immigrants or permanent residents abroad may have in fact never abandoned their Philippine domicile. - Sol Gen suggests that the Court may have to discard the Caasi ruling in so gar as it relates to immigrants and permanent residents in foreign countries who have conformed to the affidavit in Sec5 b. Does Sec 18.56 empowering COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates foe national offices and party-list representatives including the President and Vice President violate the constitutional mandate under Sec4 ArtVII of the Consti that winning candidates for Pres and VP shall be proclaimed by Congress? Solicitor Generals Comments The provision must be harmonized with Par4, Sec4, ArtVII of the Consti and should be taken to mean that
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PROF.
COMELEC can only proclaim the winning Senators and party-list representatives but not the Pres or VP c. May Congress, through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee (JCOC) created in Sec257 exercise the power to review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations that the COMELEC shall promulgate without violating the independence of the COMELEC in Sec1 ArtIX-A of the constitution? Petitioners' Claim JCOC intrudes into the independence of the COMELEC which, as a constitutional body, is not under the control of the executive or legislative departments of government. Only the COMELEC itself can promulgate rules and regulations which may be changed or revised only by the majority of its members. Respondents' Comments COMELEC agrees that Sec 19 and 25 are unconstitutional. It also includes that Sec17 on voting by mail, which is subject to the approval of the Congressional Oversight Committee, is also unconstitutional for violating Sec1, ArtIX-A ISSUES

MENDOZA standi]

[concur

except

for

locus

a. no infringement of legislative power b. did not allege unconstitutional spending of public funds.

MACALINTAL V COMELEC AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; July 10, 2003

NATURE Special civil action for certiorari and prohibition seeking to declare certain provisions if RA 9189 (The Overseas Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity. FACTS - The case discussed that it is a taxpayers suit as it involves the appropriation of funds under Sec29. Since the case involves a public right, affecting a great number of citizens, it was considered an issue of transcendental public importance. - More than 15 years after the ratification of the 1987 Consti, Congress provided for its constitutional duty of providing for a system fro absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. - Petitioners raised 3 principal questions: a. Does Sec 5(d)5 of RA 9189 allowing the registration of voters who are immigrants of permanent residents in other countries by merely executing an affidavit expressing their intention to return to the Philippines,
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Section 5(d) provides: Sec. 5. Disqualifications. The following shall be disqualified from voting under this Act: d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country, unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of his/her registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.

Section 18.5 provides: SEC. 18. On-Site Counting and Canvassing. 18. 5 The canvass of votes shall not cause the delay of the proclamation of a winning candidate if the outcome of the election will not be affected by the results thereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Commission is empowered to order the proclamation of winning candidates despite the fact that the scheduled election has not taken place in a particular country or countries, if the holding of elections therein has been rendered impossible by events, factors and circumstances peculiar to such country or countries, in which events, factors and circumstances are beyond the control or influence of the Commission. (Emphasis supplied)

R.A. No. 9189 created the JCOC, as follows: SEC. 25. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. A Joint Congressional Oversight Committee is hereby created, composed of the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Constitutional Amendments, Revision of Codes and Laws, and seven (7) other Senators designated by the Senate President, and the Chairman of the House Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, and seven (7) other Members of the House of Representatives designated by the Speaker of the House of Representatives: Provided, That, of the seven (7) members to be designated by each House of Congress, four (4) should come from the majority and the remaining three (3) from the minority. The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee shall have the power to monitor and evaluate the implementation of this Act. It shall review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Commission. (Emphasis supplied) SEC. 19. Authority of the Commission to Promulgate Rules. The Commission shall issue the necessary rules and regulations to effectively implement the provisions of this Act within sixty (60) days from the effectivity of this Act. The Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior approval.

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1. WON Sec 5(d)8 of RA 9189 allows the registration of voters who are immigrants of permanent residents in other countries by merely executing an affidavit expressing their intention to return to the Philippines, violate the residency requirement of Sec2 ArtV of the Consti 2. WON Sec 18.59 empowsCOMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates foe national offices and party-list representatives including the President and Vice President violate the constitutional mandate under Sec4 ArtVII of the Consti that winning candidates for Pres and VP shall be proclaimed by Congress 3. WON Congress, through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee (JCOC) can created in Sec2510
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Section 5(d) provides: Sec. 5. Disqualifications. The following shall be disqualified from voting under this Act: d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country, unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of his/her registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.

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exercise the power to review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations that the COMELEC shall promulgate without violating the independence of the COMELEC in Sec1 ArtIX-A of the constitution? HELD Ratio 1. A constitutional provision should function to the full extent of its substance ad its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of the Constitution. RA9189 was enacted in obeisance to the mandate of Sec2 ArtV Consti. Sec2 does not provide for the parameters of the exercise of legislative authority in enacting said law. Absent restrictions, Congress is presumed to have exercised its functions. The intent of the Constitutional Commission is to entrust to Congress the responsibility of devising a system of absentee voting. With the use of the term qualified Filipinos abroad the assumption is that they have the qualifications and none of the qualifications to vote. According to Sen Angara, the reason Sec2 was placed immediately after the residency requirement is to show that Sec2 is an exception to the residency requirement. Sec5(d) specifically disqualifies an immigrant or permanent resident as it implies renunciation of ones residence in his country of origin , unless he executes an affidavit to show that he has not abandoned his domicile. The affidavit is not only proof of the immigrant or permanent resident to go back and resume residency in the Philippines, but also an explicit expression that he has not abandoned his domicile of origin. Without the affidavit, the presumption of abandonment of Philippine domicile shall remain. 2. Sec 18.5 RA 9189 is repugnant to the Consti insofar as the said Section disregards the authority given to Congress by the Consti to proclaim the winning candidates for Pres and VP. 3. The parties are unanimous in claiming that Sec19, 25 and portions of Sec17.1 are unconstitutional, however the court expounds on the role of Congress through the JCOC. There is no question as to the authority of Congress to monitor and evaluate the implementation of
amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Commission. (Emphasis supplied) SEC. 19. Authority of the Commission to Promulgate Rules. The Commission shall issue the necessary rules and regulations to effectively implement the provisions of this Act within sixty (60) days from the effectivity of this Act. The Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior approval.

PROF.
RA9189 is geared toward possible amendments or revision of the law itself and may be performed in aid of legislation. Disposition The constitutionality of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is UPHELD with respect only to the authority given to the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for the Senators and party-list representatives but not as to the power to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates for President and Vice-President which is lodged with Congress under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. - The constitutionality of Section 5(d) is UPHELD. - Pursuant to Section 30 of R.A. No. 9189, the rest of the provisions of said law continues to be in full force and effect.

BAGATSING V COMMITTEE ON PRIVITIZATION QUAISON; July 14, 1995

Section 18.5 provides: SEC. 18. On-Site Counting and Canvassing. 18. 5 The canvass of votes shall not cause the delay of the proclamation of a winning candidate if the outcome of the election will not be affected by the results thereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Commission is empowered to order the proclamation of winning candidates despite the fact that the scheduled election has not taken place in a particular country or countries, if the holding of elections therein has been rendered impossible by events, factors and circumstances peculiar to such country or countries, in which events, factors and circumstances are beyond the control or influence of the Commission. (Emphasis supplied)

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R.A. No. 9189 created the JCOC, as follows: SEC. 25. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. A Joint Congressional Oversight Committee is hereby created, composed of the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Constitutional Amendments, Revision of Codes and Laws, and seven (7) other Senators designated by the Senate President, and the Chairman of the House Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, and seven (7) other Members of the House of Representatives designated by the Speaker of the House of Representatives: Provided, That, of the seven (7) members to be designated by each House of Congress, four (4) should come from the majority and the remaining three (3) from the minority. The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee shall have the power to monitor and evaluate the implementation of this Act. It shall review, revise,

FACTS - this is a petition to nullify the bidding conducted for the sale of a block of shares of Petron Corporation and the award made to Aramco Overseas Company as the highest bidder and to stop the sale of said block of shares to Aramco - PETRON was originally registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1966 under the corporate name Esso Philippines, Inc. - In 1973, the Philippine government acquired ESSO through the PNOC and became a wholly-owned company of the government under the corporate name PETRON and as a subsidiary of PNOC. - On December 8, 1986, President Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 50 entitled Proclaiming and Launching a Program for the Expeditious Disposition and Privatization of Certain Government Corporations and/or the Assets thereof and creating the Committee on Privatization and the Asset Privatization Trust in the exercise of her legislative power under the Freedom Constitution. - Implicit in the proclamation is the need to raise revenue for the government and the ideal of leaving business to the private sector. - December 2, 1991, President Ramos deemed the privatization program to be successful and beneficial. - September 9, 1992, the PNOC Board of Directors approved Specific Thrust No. 6 and moved to bring the attention of the administration to the need to privatize Petron. - October 21, 1992, Sec. Del Rosario, as Chairman of the Committee on Privatization, endorsed to President Ramos the proposal of PNOC.

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- January 4, 1993, a follow-up letter was sent by Secretary Del Rosario to President Ramos. - January 6, 1993, Secretary Lazaro of the Dept. of Energy endorsed for approval - January 12, 1993, the Cabinet approved the privatization of Petron as part of the Energy Sector Action Plan. - March 25, 1993, the Government Corporate Monitoring and Coordinating Committee recommended a 100% privatization of Petron. - March 31, 1883, the PNOC Board of Directors passed a resolution authorizing the company to negotiate and conclude a contract with the consortium of Salomon Brothers of Hongkong Limited and PCI Capital Corporation for financial advisory services to be rendered to Petron. - April 1, 1993, President Ramos approved the privatization of Petron up to a maximum of 65% of its capital stock. - August 10, 1993, President Ramos approved the 40%40%-20% privatization strategy of Petron. - Invitation to bid was published. - The floor price bid for the 40% block was fixed at US$400 million. - The bids of Petroliam Nasional Berhad (PETRONAS), ARAMCO, and WESTMONT were submitted while the floor price was being dicussed. - ARAMCO was declared the winning bidder at US$502 million - December 16, 1993, Monino Jacob, President and Chief Executive Officer of PNOC, endorsed to COP the bid of ARAMCO for approval. And was approved on the same day. Also on the same day, WESTMONT filed a complaint questioning the award of shares to ARAMCO. - February 3, 1994, PNOC and ARAMCO signed the Stock Purchase Agreement - March 4, 1994, the two companies signed the Shareholders Agreement ISSUES 1. WON the petitioner have locus standi 2. WON the inclusion of Petron in the privatization program contravened the declared policy of the State 3. WON the bidding procedure was valid 4. WON Petron was a public utility HELD 1. YES. In PHILCONSA v MACARAIG, the Court held that members of Congress have the legal standing to question the validity of acts of the Executive which injures them in their person or the institution of Congress to which they belong. In the latter case, the

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acts cause derivative but nonetheless substantial injury which can be questioned by members of Congress (Kennedy v. James, 412 F. Supp. 353 [1976]). In the absence of a claim that the contract in question violated the rights of petitioners or impermissibly intruded into the domain of the Legislature, petitioners have no legal standing to institute the instant action in their capacity as members of Congress. However, as taxpayers, they may question contracts entered into by the national government or governmentowned or controlled corporations alleged to be in contravention of the law. 2. YES. The decision of PNOC to privatize Petron and the approval of the COP of such privatization, being made in accordance with Proclamation No. 50, cannot be reviewed by the Court. Such acts are exercises of the executive function as to which the Court will not pass judgment upon or inquire into their wisdom. 3. YES. The interpretation of an agency of its own rules should be given more weight than the interpretation by that agency of the law it is merely tasked to administer. 4. NO. A public utility under the Constitution and the Public Service Law is one organized for hire or compensation to serve the public, which is given the right to demand its service. Petron is not engaged in oil refining for hire and compensation to process the oil of other parties. Disposition Petitions dismissed

PROF.
of the Filipinos and the need for Filipino participation in the industry. It was at this time that Marcos created the Philippine National Oil Corporation (PNOC) which eventually took over the ownership of ESSO and FILOIL. It also acquired the largest oil refinery in the country, the Bataan Refining Corporation. Also established was Petron Corporation to serve as PNOCs marketing subsidiary. - In 194, Marcos, through PD 1956, established the Oil Price Stabilization Fund with the end in view of cushioning the effects of frequent changes in the price of oil caused by the currency exchange rate adjustments or in the fluctuations in world market prices of crude oil and imported petroleum products. - In 1987, Aquino signed EO 172 creating the Energy Regulatory Board which had essentially the same functions as the Oil Industry Commission. With the OPSF, prices of petroleum and petroleum products were thus artificially stabilized. - In 1992, congress enacted RA 7638 which created the Department of Energy with the objective of ultimately privatizing government agencies related to energy, deregulation of the power and energy industry within four years from the effectivity of the said law, and the reduction of dependence on oil fired plants. In line with the privatization objective, 40% of Petron was sold to Aramco. - In 1996, Congress enacted RA 8180 as a further step in deregulating the downstream oil industry. In essence the law opened the industry to all and any comers subject only to the monitoring of the Department of Energy. The deregulation process as embodied in RA 8180 was to be accomplished in two phases. First is the transition phase, which was to begin on August 1996, where all the non pricing aspect of the industry were to be lifted. Second is full deregulation, which was to take place not later than March 1997, where controls on the price of oil and the foreign exchange cover were to be lifted and the OPSF was to be abolished. - On Feb. 1997, Ramos implemented the full deregulation of the downstream industry. While RA 8180 stated that the timing of the full deregulation should be at the time when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are in decline and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable, Ramos included the depletion of the OPSF as also a reason for the full deregulation Petitioners' Claim - Section 15 of RA 8180 constitute undue delegation of legislative power to the President and to the Secretary of Energy because it does not provide a determinate or determinable standard to guide them in determining

TANADA V SECRETARY OF ENERGY PUNO; 1997

NATURE Original action on the constitutionality of certain sections of both RA 8180 and EO 372 which embodied the Oil Industry Deregulation . FACTS - Prior to 1971 there was no government agency regulating the oil industry. Hence, entry to or exit from the industry was unimpeded. - In 1971 due to the world wide energy crisis, the government, to protect general interest and national security and ensure continuing supply of petroleum and petroleum based products at reasonable prices, enacted the Oil Industry Commission Act which created the Oil Industry Commission and vested the same to regulate the various faces of the oil industry. - The government likewise encourage participation of Filipinos in the oil business, which was fully owned by multinationals. It was felt that the economic interest of these multinationals did not always coincide with those

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when to implement full deregulation of the downstream oil industry. Further, the law does not provide any specific standard to determine when the prices of crude oil in the world market are considered to be declining nor when the exchange rate of the peso to the dollar is considered stable. - Section 5 of the same act which imposes different tariff rates on crude oil (3%) and on imported refined petroleum products (7%) violates the equal protection clause in that the lower tariff unduly favors the existing oil refineries and discriminates against prospective investors - The tariff differential does not deregulate the industry as it bars the entry of other players as it protects the interest of the oil companies with existing refineries. - Section 6s requirement that refiners and importers maintain a minimum inventory equivalent to ten percent of their respective annual sales volume or 40 days of supply, whichever is lower, is a barrier to the enrty of new players to the industry as this entail prohibitive costs. - The inclusion of the tariff provision in Section 5 violates Section 26 (i) Article VI of the Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which shall be expressed in the title. Respondents' Comments - The issues raised are non justiciable as they pertain to the wisdom of the law. - The petitioners have no locus standi as they did not nor will they sustain direct injury as a result of the implementation of RA 8180. ISSUES Procedural 1. WON the petitions raise a justiciable controversy 2. WON the petitioners have locus standi. Substantive 1. WON Section 5(b) violates the one title-one subject requirement of the Constitution 2. WON the same section violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution 3. WON Section 15 violates the prohibition on undue delegation of legislative power 4. WON EO 392 is arbitrary and unreasonable 5. WON RA 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition against monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition HELD Procedural Ratio

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1. The courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law. Hence, judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts to sttle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. 2. Lack of standing is a procedural issue that can be dispensed with or brushed aside considering the transcendental importance to the public of of the cases at bar. Reasoning 1. The facts show that the petitioners are assailing RA 8180 because it infringes the Constitution and not because it lacks wisdom. The principle of the separation of power mandates that challenges on the constitutionality of a law should be resolved in the courts of justice while doubts on its wisdom should be debated in the halls of Congress. From time to time, a law may be denounced in court as both unconstitutional and bereft of wisdom. In such cases, the Court will continue to exercise its duty to set the metes and bounds of the laws constitutionality while prudentially refusing to pass on its wisdom. 2. The Court found the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people. The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take advantage of Substantive Ratio 1. As a policy the Court has adopted a liberal construction of the one title-one subject rule. It has ruled consistently that the title need not mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and minute details of a law. A law having a single general subject indicated in the title may contain other provisions which should generally be consistent with or germane with the general subject. Hence, the provision on the tariff differential is considered germane to the subject of the law. 2. The power of Congress to delegate the execution of laws has long been settled by the Supreme Court. Valid delegation can be determined by two accepted tests , the completeness and the sufficient standards tests. Under the first test, the law must be complete in itself such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the second test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegates

PROF.
authority. In the case of Section 15, the completeness and sufficient standards tests are met. 3. In considering and adding the depletion of the OPSF as a factor in the hastening of the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry, the Executive, via EO 392, failed to follow faithfully the standards set by RA 8180. The Executive is bereft of any right to alter either by subtraction or addition the standards set in RA 8180 for it has not power to make laws. Hence, the early deregulation under EO 392 constitutes a misapplication of RA 8180. 4. Sections 5(b), 6, and 9(b) are unconstitutional as they are contrary to Section 19 of Article XII of the Constitution which mandates : the State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed. 5. RA 8180, despite the presence of a separability clause, is ruled unconstitutional since the sections violative of the constitution are the main provisions which Congress used to deregulate the industry. Reasoning - The full deregulation of the downstream oil industry was meant to encourage the entry of new players in the oil industry. New barriers to the industry were erected. Among these were the tariff differentials of 4% between importation of crude oil and refined oil. This differential immediately places those new entrants at a disadvantage since the old players which have refineries acquire a price advantage equal to the 4% differential. - The imposition of a minimum inventory level provides another barrier as new entrants would have to incur such cost as storage and holding cost. The new players would have to incur additional cost to put up their own storage facilities and also would require more funds to hold such inventories. - Given the cost advantage to the existing players, the provision on predatory pricing may work to their advantage in that the barriers erected already have given them the cost advantage. - The provisions of Section 19 of Article XII of the Constitution is meant to encourage free enterprise while not per se prohibiting the operation of monopolies. these monopolies however, are meant to be regulated in the public interest. - In the same vain, the same section prohibits combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition. The desirability of competition is the reason for the prohibition against restraint of trade. As already stated, the provisions in RA 8180 instead of encouraging new entrants, makes it even harder for new

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entries and results in perpetuating the oligopoly already in existence. - While it is true that the three main players had no real competitor prior to the deregulation act, the same were regulated as the government controlled both the pricing and non-pricing aspects of the industry. With the deregulation and considering the questioned sections of RA 8180 are in fact discouragements to new entries (thus impairing competition), the government effectively gave the free run of the market to the three existing players. Disposition Petitions are granted. RA 8180 is declared unconstitutional and EO 372 void.

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- With regard the one title-one subject question, the enrolled bill theory is conculsive upon the courts of its provisions and of is due execution. - No undue delegation as the law delegated the mere implementation of the law. - RA 8180 is not violative of the Constitution > Tariff differential does not necessarily make the importation of refined oil a losing proposition. The difference is for cost of putting up the refineries and the additional cost of actually converting the crude oil to refined products. Hence, it just might turn out that the resultant cost of locally refined products and imported finished products are the same > The minimum inventory requirement should not affect new entrants as they have no track record from which to base the so called minimum. > The prohibition against predatory pricing protects the new players by preventing the more established players from driving away any potential or actual competitor by taking advantage of their size and relative financial stability. With regard the cartelization of the industry, the Supreme Court is not the trier of facts and as such cannot resolve this issue. - The current flurry of activities with regard to amendments to RA 8180 only indicates that Congress is the proper forum for remedies aimed to correct alleged defects in the law. - The direction of the ponente for the Oil companies to direct their petition for oil increase to the former Energy Regulation Commission may be misplaced considering that said agency is not in existence, having been abolished by the assailed law.

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depriving any person of life without due process. Appellant alleged that the if applicable to him, the statute would prevent his giving professional advice concerning the use of contraceptives to three patients whose lives are endangered by child-bearing, and that appellees, law enforcement officers of the state, intend to prosecute any offense against the statute and claim or may claim that the proposed professional advice would constitute such an offense. The state superior court ordered these questions of law reserved for the consideration and advice of the Supreme Court of Errors, which in turn ruled that the statutes prohibit the action proposed to be done by appellant and are constitutional. ISSUES WON the case was an appropriate one for declaratory judgment. HELD Ratio The proceedings in the state courts present no constitutional question which appellant has standing to assert. Reasoning The sole constitutional attack upon the statutes under the 14th Amendment is confined to deprivation of lifenot appellants but his patients. There is no allegation or proof that appellants life is in danger. His patients are not parties to the proceedings and there is not basis on which to base his standing to secure an adjudication of this patients constitutional right to life, which they do not assert on their own behalf. Disposition Dismissed on the ground that appellant has no standing

SEPARATE OPINION KAPUNAN, J [concur]

- The objective of the deregulation rule is to foster a truly competitive market which can better achieve the social policy objectives of fair prices and adequate, continuous supply of environmentally-clean and high quality petroleum products. The key is free competition. - The assailed sections are barriers to entry into the industry. These barriers stifle the competition and encourage instead the cartelization of the oil industry.

PANGANIBAN [concur]
- The Supreme Court is not questioning the wisdom of the legislation. The question being resolved is whether the law as crafted is valid and constitutional. In striking down RA 8180, the SC is merely invalidating a pseudo deregulation law which in reality restrains free trade and perpetuates a cartel, an oligopoly.

MELO [dissent]
- The issues raised are not justiciable controversies. The issues are clearly policy issues which are in the province of the political department of the government. A political question refers to a question of policy which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. - The petitioners-lawmakers do not have locus standi as the assailed law is the very act of Congress itself . Hence there is no impairment of the power of Congress snd the legislators have no standing to question the validity of their own act. - As there is no tax money involved, a taxpayer or citizen suit cannot be given due course.

TILESTON V ULLMAN PER CURIAM; FEB. 1, 1943

NATURE Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut holding a state statute applicable to appellant and sustaining its constitutionality FACTS Appellant, a registered physician, prayed for a declaratory judgment as to whether 6246 and 6562 of the General Statutes of Connecticut of 1930prohibiting the use of drugs or instruments to prevent conception, and the giving of assistance or counsel in their useare applicable to him and if so, whether they constitute a valid exercise of constitutional power within the meaning and intent of Amendment XIV of the Constitution of the United States prohibiting a state from

HUNT V WASHINGTON APPLE ADVERTISING COMM BURGER; February 22, 1977

FACTS - A statutory agency for the promotion and protection of the Washington State apple industry and composed of 13 state growers and dealers chosen from electoral districts by their fellow growers and dealers, brought this suit challenging the constitutionality of a North Carolina statute. - The statute requires all apples sold or shipped into North Carolina in closed containers be identified by no grade on the containers other than the applicable federal grade or a designation that the apples are not graded.

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ISSUES 1. WON appellee has standing to sue in a representational capacity 2. WON the North Carolina statute violates the Commerce Clause HELD 1. YES. An association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when (1) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (2) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation in the lawsuit of each of the individual members. - The prerequisites to associational standing described in Warth are clearly present here: (1) At the risk of otherwise losing North Carolina accounts, some Washington apple growers and dealers had obliterated Washington State grades from the large volume of North Carolina-bound containers; and they had stopped using preprinted containers, thus diminishing the efficiency of their marketing operations; (2) appellee's attempt to remedy these injuries is central to its purpose of protecting and enhancing the Washington apple market; and (3) neither appellee's constitutional claim nor the relief requested requires individualized proof. - Though appellee is a state agency, it is not on that account precluded from asserting the claims of the State's apple growers and dealers since for all practical purposes appellee performs the functions of a traditional trade association. They possess all the indicia of organization membership and it is of no consequence that membership assessments are mandatory. - Appellee's own interests may be adversely affected by the outcome of this litigation, since the annual assessments that are used to support its activities and which are tied to the production of Washington apples could be reduced if the market for those apples declines as a result of the North Carolina statute. 2. YES. The North Carolina statute violates the Commerce Clause by burdening and discriminating against the interstate sale of Washington apples. - The statute raises the costs of doing business in the North Carolina market for Washington growers and dealers while leaving unaffected their North Carolina counterparts, who were still free to market apples under the federal grade or none at all. - The statute strips the Washington apple industry of the competitive and economic advantages it has earned for itself by an expensive, stringent mandatory state

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inspection and grading system that exceeds federal requirements. By requiring Washington apples to be sold under the inferior grades of their federal counterparts, the North Carolina statute offers the North Carolina apple industry the very sort of protection against out-ofstate competition that the Commerce Clause was designed to prohibit.

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joinder as defendants of the state agencies that administer the benefit program in question. HELD 1. YES a. association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when (Hunt v. Washington) 1) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right - whether there are union members who have yet to receive benefits or a final judgment that will preclude further consideration of their claims 2) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the org's purpose - obviously purpose of this action is germane to the org's purpose of obtaining benefits, including unemployment benefits, for its members 3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit - though the unique facts of each union member's claim will have to be considered before the member may receive state benefits, the union can litigate this action without those individuals' participation and still ensure that a remedy, if granted, would benefit those members actually injured. All three conditions were met in this case. b. principles of Associational Standing (Hunt) reaffirmed. - recognizes that the reason people join orgs is to create effective vehicle for vindicating interests shared with others (as opposed to class actions, where plaintiffs may be linked only by their common claims). So they don't need to proceed only pursuant to provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. 2. YES. - The TRA requires that state procedural rules applicable to the review of individual entitlement determination be applied under the TRA. The CA thus applied it in this case, and said that since, under state law, review of an individual's eligibility determination cannot be had without the joinder of the state agency that made that determination, the CA reasoned a plaintiff could not pursue the claims raised here without the state agency joined as defendant. The CA's application was founded on a mischaracterization of this lawsuit. The action is not an appeal from adverse benefit determinations, but is a challenge to the actual federal guidelines that required that determination. - The CA also reasoned that without the joinder of the state agencies needed to effect the relief granted by the court, the granted relief would be ineffective. However, the SC believes that state agencies would obey the Secretary's directive to process anew any TRA claims wrongfully denied as a result of the 1975 handbook's

AUTOMOBILE WORKERS V BROCK, MARSHALL; October 1985

NATURE Certiorari to the United States A for the District of Columbia Circuit FACTS - Trade Act of 1974 provides allowance benefits to workers laid off because of competition from imports. As authorized by the TRA, the Secretary of Labor has contracted out to state unemployment insurance agencies the job of determining individual eligibility for the benefits. - To qualify, a worker must have at least 26 weeks employment in the 52 weeks immediaetly preceding his layoff. Secretary advised, in a 1975 policy handbook, that they shouldn't count leaves of absence, sick leaves, vacations, military leaves in its computations. These guidelines were superseded by a 1981 amendment allowing the inclusion of such periods in determining a worker's period of employment. This was only applicable for weeks of unemployment beginning after September 30, 1981. - Petitioner and petitioner unions (some of whom had been denied benefits because of the 1975 guidelines, and some of whom were defending the award of benefits against appeals by their state agencies) filed an action in Federal District Court against the Secretary, saying that his interpretation of the Act in the 1975 guidelines was incorrect, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The Court held that the guidelinse were inconsistent with the Act, and granted the relief. - Without reaching the merits, the CA reversed, holding that the union had no standing to bring the action. The court also held that no relief to be awarded because the plaintiffs had failed to join as party-defendants the state agencies that had denied their claims. ISSUES 1. WON petitioner union has standing to sue on behalf of its affected members 2. WON such a suit can be maintained without the

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interpretation of the TRA. The state agencies are not "indispensable parties" whose absence rendered the District Court unable to grant in full the relief sought by petitioners. Dispositive Petitioner union has standing to proceed in this case. It remains for the CA to consider the merits of the District Court's decision. Case is remanded to the CA for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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"person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position unlawfully held or exercised by another". 2. No. Congress cannot by law expand the confirmation powers of the Commission on Appointments and require confirmation of appointment of other government officials not expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution. Disposition Case dismissed. Petition is DENIED.

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TARROSA V SINGSON QUIASON; May 25, 1994

NATURE This is a petition for prohibition filed by petitioner as a taxpayer, questioning the appointment of respondent Gabriel Singson as Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas for not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The petition seeks to enjoin respondent Singson from the performance of his functions as such official until his appointment is confirmed by the Commission on appointments and respondent Salvador M. Enriquez, Secretary of Budget and Management, from disbursing public funds in payment of the salaries and emoluments of respondent Singson. FACTS Respondent Singson was appointed Governor of the Bangko Sentral by President Fidel V. Ramos on July 2, 1993, effective on July 6, 1993. Petitioner argues that the appointment is null and void, citing the provisions of Section 6 of R.A. No 7653. Respondents claim that Congress exceeded its legislative powers in requiring the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the appointment of the Governor of the Bangko Sentral. They contend that an appointment to the said position is not among the appointments which have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, citing Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution. ISSUES 1. WON petitioner has standing to sue 2. WON the appointment requires confirmation HELD 1. No. The instant petition is in the nature of a quo warranto proceeding as it seeks the ouster of respondent Singson and alleges that the latter is unlawfully holding or exercising the powers of Governor of the Bangko Sentral. Such a special civil action can only be commenced by the Solicitor General or by a