CAN MAHYNA VIEWS ON PERSONS BE RECONCILED WITH THE LIBERALS TALK OF SEPARATE PERSONS?

The problem of opposing views of persons for the reconciliation of Buddhist and liberal approaches to ethics.

Durham University, MA in Philosophy Module: MA Dissertation

ABSTRACT In this essay I will argue that owing to the differences between Buddhist and liberal views of persons, Buddhist and liberal approaches to ethics are practically, if not metaphysically, incompatible. Garfield (1998) has plausibly argued that Buddhist and liberal approaches to ethics compatible. Using an argument from the limitations of each approach, Garfield argues that any synthesis between the two approaches must be founded upon the Buddhist compassion-based approach. Whilst Buddhists such as Ngrjuna and ntideva criticize views that presuppose the existence of substantial, metaphysically-discrete and enduring selves, liberals such as John Rawls and Robert Nozick have criticized utilitarians for not taking seriously the distinction between persons. The general problem, then, that my dissertation addresses is that Buddhists apparently deny what liberals seem to affirm; namely, the separateness of persons. I propose that if we consider this problem (what I call the problem of the separateness of persons), a suggestion for its solution (what I call the two-truths solution), and a number of replies to this solution, then we will see that the claim that Buddhism and liberalism are practically, if not metaphysically, incompatible is supported, whereas Garfields assessment that Buddhist and liberal approaches to ethics are compatible and mutually complimentary is undermined. To that end, I examine a number of replies from the metaphysical commitments and practical ramifications of each tradition. I conclude that liberal and Mahyna views on persons cannot be practically reconciled with the liberals talk of the separateness of persons.

I declare that this essay is 15000 words long. Marc Christian Eriksson

Tutors Name: Dr Simon James Journal Conventions Followed: Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements 14th September, Summer, 2011

INTRODUCTION

Whilst Buddhists such as Ngrjuna and ntideva criticize views that presuppose the existence of substantial, metaphysically-discrete and enduring selves, liberals such as John Rawls and Robert Nozick have criticized utilitarians for not taking seriously the distinction between persons. In this essay, I shall examine whether the Mahyna view that there do not exist any ultimate distinctions between conventionally separate persons can be reconciled with the liberal view that persons are separate, possessing an individual dignity which stands in need of safeguarding through a system of individual rights and liberties. The specific problem, then, that this essay addresses is that Mahyna Buddhists apparently deny what liberals seem to affirm; namely, the separateness of persons.

What is the precise nature of this disparity between Buddhist and liberal views on persons? Does this mean that they are ultimately incompatible conceptions of persons that can never be fruitfully conjoined? Or is this opposition only apparent, and both views can provide insights into one anothers conceptions of persons that each tradition has so far overlooked? Or do both views of persons operate at two distinct and mutually-exclusive levels of discourse, under a different set of assumptions, so that their views on persons cannot be fruitfully compared?

The question is significant for a number of reasons: Firstly, in recent years there has been much debate concerning the relationship between Buddhism and liberalism, and evaluating how compatible their views on persons are will constitute an important part of that debate.1 Secondly, the increasing demand for political liberties at the local, national and international levels, and increasingly in the Buddhist world, makes the question of the compatibility of Buddhist and liberal views on persons practically - that is, morally, politically and soteriologically - significant. Thirdly, liberals typically defend the use of rights as an instrument for conceiving of and securing liberties. The question of whether Buddhists ought to adopt the language of human rights has been the subject of much recent discussion.2 The task of determining whether and in what respects human rights talk is independent of any particular view on persons can help settle the question of human

See Garfield (1998, 2000) and Goodman (2009, chapters 8, 9 and conclusion) for philosophical treatments

of these issues.
2

See the collection of essays on this topic in Keown et al (1998) and Goodman (2009, pp.215-217).

rights in Buddhism. Fourthly, the perennial debate between those claiming that liberalism is a universal vision fit for the whole of humanity, and those claiming that liberalism is a neo-colonial western export can be re-invigorated by determining the extent to which the views of persons in each tradition diverge.

In this essay I shall be arguing that although Buddhist and liberal views on persons are not metaphysically incompatible, Mahyna Buddhists will have substantial disagreements over how persons are viewed within the liberal framework. Their views on persons are practically, if not metaphysically, incompatible. This poses a problem to those who claim that Buddhism and liberalism can be reconciled, and that they can therefore be made to work together in the service of one anothers faults. Among those who make such a claim is Jay Garfield (1998, 2000). Garfield argues that not only are Buddhist and liberal approaches to ethics compatible, but a synthesis between the two has the enviable result of resolving a number of problems unique to each tradition, problems that are currently insoluble within the framework of either tradition in isolation. For Garfield, Buddhist ethics and liberalism are mutually complimentary.

Since we shall be comparing Mahyna and liberal views on persons, it is helpful to understand what is meant by these terms generally. Although both terms encompass a vast array of differing theoretical, cultural and conceptual underpinnings and backgrounds, and to use either term in too general a way would be a foolish and misguided course of action, there are, to be sure, a common set of allegiances and concepts within each tradition which warrants the use of either term in such a general way. By Mahyna I mean the tradition of Buddhist metaphysics and ethics which takes as its starting point a collection of texts - the Prajpramit stras - that outline the bodhisattva ideal as the balancing of two requirements; attaining metaphysical insight (praj3) and cultivating of number of worldly perfections (pramit). It is generally agreed that this tradition reached its philosophical maturity in the Mdhyamaka philosophy of Ngrjuna and ryadeva, to be taken up some centuries later by Candrakrti and ntideva.

By liberalism I mean the social contract tradition of political philosophy that thinks of persons as possessing a degree of dignity for which only a high degree of personal liberty is appropriate. Prominent liberals include Locke, Kant, Mill, Rawls and Nozick. They typically argue
3

Unless otherwise noted, all bracketed translations are in Sanskrit.

that these liberties ought to be safeguarded through a system of rights and correlative duties ensuring that persons are able to pursue their own conception of the good free from the interference of others. Liberals have also defended the need for political institutions such as the minimal nightwatchman state, representative government, democratic rule with free elections, etc. Many liberals have been social contract theorists, and have used the concept of a hypothetical agreement between members of society to defend their general theories of justice. 4 Hobbes, Locke and Rawls stand out as prominent contractarians.

I begin by considering Garfields argument that Buddhism and liberalism are compatible and mutually complimentary (section I). I then move on to consider the argument that Garfields assessment is implausible (or at least optimistic), since he has overlooked the striking disparities between Buddhist and liberal conceptions of persons (section II). If the disparity between their views of persons is a genuine problem for Garfield's argument, then the project of reconciling Buddhism and liberalism is jeopardized. This is particularly problematic since Garfields argument is both compelling and possess obvious merit. I therefore move on to consider a possible solution to the differences in Mahyna and liberal views on persons; in one sense, Mahyna Buddhists think that it is conventionally true that separate persons exist (section III). I consider two replies to the proposed solution; one semantic and one metaphysical. For these objections to be sustained we must examine the precise nature of the disparity between Buddhist and liberal views of persons. I therefore proceed to explore the metaphysical presuppositions behind the liberals and Buddhists views of the separateness of persons (sections IV). I continue to consider the practical ramifications of talk of the separateness of persons (section V), before concluding by turning the insights we have gained through these discussions back upon Garfields argument, and assess whether it remains compelling (section VI).

There has been some debate as to whether early Buddhism contains elements of a social contract theory.

The debate has focused upon passages in the Aggaasuttanta (Dghanikya III 85-97) that satirize the divine pretensions of the Brahmanical caste. These passages present an alternative picture of how the Indian caste system came about, one that traces origins of the royal class back to the people agreeing to appoint a person to protect the rice fields from thieves. See Lang (2003, pp.91-92), Collins (1993), Collins (1996) response to Huxley (1996), and Goodman (2009, pp.165-166), who thinks that whatever we conclude on this issue, it is hard to ignore the liberal-democratic elements of these passages since the first appointee (and those subsequent) ruled, it is said, by the consent of the governed, rather than by divine decree.

As far as I am aware, my discussion is unique in centering upon the compatibility of Buddhist and liberal views on persons. However, the lack of such discussion might simply reflect prima facie opposition of Buddhist and liberal views on persons that we have already mentioned. It will be my task, then, to discern the true extent of their opposition.

GARFIELDS ARGUMENT

The argument from the mutual limitations of Buddhist and liberal approaches to ethics

Garfield (1998) has argued that a synthesis between Buddhist compassion-based and liberal rights-based ethics is both possible and necessary if we consider the limitations of both approaches. He claims that each approach proves the others natural complement. For example, a problem faced by liberal rights-based approaches to ethics is the problem of the sanction of rights and duties; that is, on what, if anything, do we found the concept of human rights and our duties to respect them? Garfield claims that this problem is currently insoluble within the framework of liberal ethics; there is no agreement among liberals as to where rights derive from.5 In another example, a problem faced by Buddhist compassion-based approaches to ethics is the problem of the limits of compassion. Given the typical shortfalls of compassion, rights should be seen as a device for extending the reach of natural compassion and for securing the goods that compassion enables to all persons in a society (pp.124). Buddhist compassion-based ethics and liberal ethics can in fact be reconciled to supplement their respective shortcomings, therefore helping to advance both Buddhist and liberal ends. Although compassion is the innate attitude we have to relating toward those close to us, Garfield notes, to extend it far enough to ensure necessary social goods [to those not in our immediate circle], we need a mechanism - a human convention. Conferring rights is simply the best mechanism we have devised to this end (pp.124).

Garfield can now claim that owing to the limitations of liberalism, and to the problem of the sanction of rights and duties, compassion is the appropriate moral capacity upon which to found
5

MacIntyres (1981, pp.69) famous remarks on this issue are instructive: The best reason for asserting so

bluntly that there are no such rights is indeed of precisely the same type as the best reason which we possess for asserting that there are no witches and the best reason which we possess for asserting that there are no unicorns: every attempt to give good reasons for believing that there are such rights has failed.

rights. Garfield claims, furthermore, that compassion is just as useful as rights in criticizing social institutions that violate basic liberties, and such criticisms on compassionate grounds remain just as universalist. From the perspective of compassion, institutions and practices are not deemed wrong because they violate some right [...] but rather simply because they are harmful [that is, they cause suffering] to people; because they are not expressive of individual or collective compassion, and because they do not foster it among the citizens exposed to those institutions (pp.122).

Garfields argument has obvious merit. It synthesizes two approaches to ethics which some have thought irreconcilable.6 And it does so with theoretical economy and through a close reading of both Buddhist and liberal traditions. Furthermore, his argument is plausible, as the shortcomings of both Buddhist and liberal approaches to ethics have long been recognized. His conclusions are on the whole warranted, and no obvious flaws or objections spring to mind. Nonetheless, his argument overlooks one fundamental issue; that is, the difference in Buddhist and liberal views of persons.

II

THE PROBLEM

Broadly, then, the problem is that liberal and Mahyna views on persons are on the face of it diametrically opposed. In general, Buddhist thinkers tend to believe that references to persons are problematic, and references to the separateness of persons especially so. Spatio-temporally discrete and enduring persons do not appear under ultimate analysis, and no abiding selves underwrite our convention of talking about distinct, isolable and unitary persons. In other words, Buddhists reject any substantialist views of the self or personhood that think of spatio-temporally discrete and enduring persons as ultimate existents (dravya7).

Most Buddhists cash out the doctrine of non-self in terms of the skandha theory of personal identity. Persons, on this view, are composite, and can be divided into five basic psycho-physical constituents (skandha): matter (rpa), sensation (vedan), perception (saj), intellect (saskra)

6 7

For example Baier (1992, 1994), Tronto (1993), Noddings (1984) and Garner (1994). A term which describes the principal category of Vaieika ontology, one broadly equivalent to substance.

Among Buddhists, Mdhyamikas argue against the metaphysical foundationalism of Nyya-Vaieika, and instead sought to defend an anti-foundationalist ontology, particularly as an account of personal identity.

and consciousness (vijna).8 This division of the self into its composite parts is meant to be exhaustive. It catalogues all the places in which a substantial abiding self - if we are tempted to think that there could be such a thing - could potentially reside. Mahyna Buddhist have argued from this basis that it is therefore irrational to extend compassion to some forms of sentient life and not to others. However, if there are no ultimate spatio-temporal distinctions between persons, how then can it be rational to be prudentially concerned for ones future self? In others words, if Plutarchs notion that Yesterdays man has died in todays, today's dies in tomorrows9 is correct, then why should we care for ourselves? The Buddhist answers this objection by suggesting that although it is only conventionally true that we are identical with our future selves, it will nonetheless be a continuing skandha stream, rather than a numerically identical substantial self, that inherits any present neglect of rpa-skandha streams. If I - or, rather, the current skandha streams that conventionally constitute me - neglect physical exercise, then the health problems that this neglect results in will be inherited by a single set of continuing skandha streams that will, conventionally at least, be me.10

In contrast, the liberal thinks that we can only safeguard the basic liberties and rights appropriate to human dignity if we take seriously the separateness of and distinction between persons11. More specifically, then, the problem faced is that Buddhists apparently deny what liberals seem to affirm; namely, the separateness of persons. From Locke onwards, there has been a presumption in liberalism that persons are spatio-temporally discrete from one another and their environment. This isolation is thought of both as the source of moral and political struggle to which liberalism poses an answer and the feature of personhood from which the liberals moral injunction that we ought to respect the dignity of persons is derived. Persons have unique concerns and interests - interests which are reflected in the way liberals think each person strives, or is entitled to strive, for their own unique conception of the good. As such, conflict and disagreement is inevitable. Furthermore, liberals have typically argued that a just society is one that enshrines a

See Siderits (2007, pp.35-37) and Westerhoff (2009, pp.154). A detailed analysis of the skandhas appears in

chapter 14 of the Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosa (1991).

9

Of El at Apollos Temple at Delphi, 18; following Borges (1950, pp.349). For an in depth treatment of this issue, see Siderits (2007, pp.35-37, 81). See Mill (1861, pp.247, 250; chapter 5), Rawls (1971, pp.24; 5, 6 and 30) and Nozick (1974, pp.33-34;

10 11

chapter 3).

recognition of the fact of separateness at the constitutional level via a system of rights and correlative duties.

This problem, if it is a genuine one, poses a difficulty for Garfields argument. If both approaches to ethics are premised, as some think, upon their respective views on persons,12 how can Garfields conclusion - that Buddhist and liberal approaches to ethics can be reconciled - be secured? Garfield nowhere acknowledges this difference in views on persons. If we are to secure his conclusions then we must re-evaluate his arguments from the perspective of their views on persons. Thus, my general task will be to discern whether and in what respects the problem of opposing views on persons is a genuine problem. But there is the issue of how this general task is to be achieved. Let us turn, next, to examine the method I will employ for this task.

A note on methodology

Deciding whether and in what respects the problem outlined above is a genuine one requires that we examine Mahyna and liberal views on persons. My task, then, in the second section will involve deciding on the compatibility of these views on persons through an examination of the metaphysical presuppositions of talk of the separateness of persons. By compatible I mean a strictly formal notion; two views are compatible if and only if there are charitable interpretations of both views such that both can be true together. Thus a general answer to the question of the compatibility of any two views can be arrived at by the method of counterexample; that is, by searching for charitable interpretations of either view such that both can no longer be true together. If no such counterexample is found after what we deem to be a sufficient number of attempts then we have grounds for concluding that our two views are compatible. If, on the other hand, a genuine counterexample is found then so long as our interpretation has been charitable, we have grounds for concluding that our two views are not compatible.

Therefore, the procedure I shall employ in deciding on the compatibility of these two views is twofold. Firstly, I shall consider a suggestion that I think is the most charitable interpretation on

12

See Gaus (2005) for an argument that liberalism is premised upon a shared view of persons, and Harvey

(2000, pp.36-37) for the view that non-self is a support for Buddhist ethics.

which both views on persons can be reconciled - the two-truths solution (section III). Secondly, I shall evaluate two replies to the solution I suggest, replies which require that we examine the metaphysical commitments and practical ramifications of talk of the separateness of persons (sections IV and V, respectively). If either of the two objections I consider can be sustained, then we have grounds for deeming both views on persons incompatible. For now, let us turn to consider a solution to our problem, a solution that suggests that appearances notwithstanding, Buddhist and liberal views on persons can be reconciled.

III

A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM

In this section - after sketching the solution - I proceed to outline two possible and related replies; the objection from semantic constraints to the two-truths theory and the objection from the difference in metaphysical commitments of both traditions that will be fully examined in the next section (IV). After rejecting the former reply, I conclude that we need to examine the metaphysical presuppositions of the talk of separateness of persons in greater detail if the latter objection is to be sustained.

The two-truths solution

One response to the problem of the seemingly opposed views of persons would be to point out that Buddhists do affirm the separateness of persons - in a sense. Buddhists think that the proposition separate persons exist is a conventional truth. In what follows, I shall canvas the Buddhist two category theory of truth, and show how we might use this to accommodate the liberals concept of the separateness of persons.

The Buddhist two-truths theory is a form of semantic dualism. It states that propositions can be true in two distinct manners, when viewed from two depths of analysis. On this view, true propositions are either true conventionally or ultimately. Any proposition that reflects our pragmatic common sense is a conventional truth (savti-satya). These truths are truths that reflect our common sense modes of dealing with one another and our environment, ensuring that we can

pragmatically get along in the world. Siderits expresses this notion thus: A statement is conventionally true if and if only if it is acceptable to common sense and consistently leads to successful practice (2007, pp56). Any proposition that reflects the real mode of an entities existence, on the other hand, is an ultimate truth (paramrtha-satya). Siderits expresses this notion thus: A statement is ultimately true if and only if it corresponds to the facts and neither asserts nor presupposes the existence of any conceptual fictions (ibid). Most schools of Buddhism are in agreement that the stability of our experience of the world is the explanadum for which an ultimate truth must be offered as explanans. Examples of conventional truths are propositions such as wholes enjoy an existence greater than the sum of their parts or persons are metaphysically discrete spatial unities that endure throughout their lifetime- such truths allow us to pragmatically navigate our way around our physical and social environments. For example, Durham University is made up many buildings and colleges, there is no one building which fully constitutes the university. If we take Durham University to refer to an single object then we shall never find it. Rather, the term is a useful fiction which designates a whole number of buildings, sites, practices, student bodies, clubs, and so on. Buddhists think a similar analysis applies to the self. We are constituted by a coalition of moving skandha streams, not one substantial and abiding self. If we take Christian Eriksson to refer to a single hidden essence of the author of this essay, then we shall never find him. As Daniel Dennett (1991, pp.101138, chapter 5) has argued, there is no Cartesian theatre of consciousness, no single point at which the many and diverse impressions which constitute our experience all come together, in front of which sits the self. The self, Buddhists think, is ultimately a convenient fiction, but one that nevertheless allows us, for example, to talk about universities and award their students a degree for the work they have done. In other words, thinking of persons as separate consistently leads to successful practice.

Examples of ultimate truths, on the other hand, vary according to school. For bhidhrmikas, they are propositions such as wholes do not exist above their constituent parts or only the dharmas have svabhva, to which Yogcrins, supplement such propositions as rpa dharmas lack svabhva and argues instead that the storehouse conscious (laya-vijna) is the only ultimate existent (dravya). For Mdhyamikas, however, things are a little more complex. However, we will have to hold out until the last part of section IV to explain why. It suffices to note that these ultimate truths are attempts to explain the pragmatic utility of believing in the various convenient fictions to which statements of conventional truths refer.

So, if all schools of Buddhism agree on the phenomena that need accounting for - and for our purposes that means the pragmatic utility of referring to separate persons - then couldnt we think of the liberals concept of the separateness of persons as a statement of the Buddhists conventional truth? Such a solution certainly has a number of merits. Firstly, it allows two traditions to be resolved at the level of views on persons, an especially important step if we think that the solutions offered by both traditions for various practical (moral, political, soteriological) problems is to some degree dependant upon their views on persons.13 Secondly, it is economical for both the Buddhist and the liberal, since it does not require any more conceptual tinkering than inserting the liberals view into an already existing place within the Buddhists semantic hierarchy.

Nevertheless, there are two significant replies that need to be considered before we can judge their views on persons compatible. The first concerns an important qualification that the Buddhist adds to his two-truths theory. Thus, what is at issue here is the semantic constraints of the twotruths theory, constraints that could prevent the Buddhist from accepting the liberals view of the separateness of persons as a proposition of conventional truth. The second reply concerns the difference in metaphysical background commitments of each tradition, background commitments that could prevent either Buddhist or liberal from accepting the further moral, political and soteriological claims that are, to certain extents, founded upon their respective views on persons. If these objections can be sustained, then the solution I have been considering fails, and we might have grounds for concluding that, pace Garfield, Buddhist and liberal approaches to ethics are incompatible. But let us consider the first reply.

The objection from semantic constraints to the two-truths theory

In summary of the theory of the two-truths, Buddhists think that conventional truths are those common sense notions that track the principles upon which our usual worldly affairs are based. That is what the Buddhist means by his concept of conventional truth; truths which structure how we
13

This view, however, is not uncontroversial. Hamilton (2000), for one, has questioned the extent to which

the ethics of early Buddhism rests upon the view of persons early Buddhists were advocating. We can largely sidestep the implications of this view, however, since our focus in the present discussion is upon later Mahyna views on persons.

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relate to our environment and to one another. But the Buddhist qualifies his account of conventional truth in one significant fashion:

Standing behind every conventionally true statement must be some (much longer) ultimately true statement that explains why accepting the conventionally true statement leads to successful practice14

Persons are ultimately constituted by an overlapping stream of skandhas that divide between them the tasks for which we commonly think a unitary, enduring and abiding self (such as an tman, a soul or a Kantian transcendental self) is responsible, and this accounts for why it consistently leads to better practice to accept that phenomena and persons have svabhva.15 So, for the liberal and Buddhist views of persons to be reconciled, then it must be shown that believing that persons exist separately consistently leads to successful practice. In other words, the problem we face now is that Buddhists will allow the liberals concept of separateness of persons into his category of conventional truth if and only if it can be shown that accepting the liberals concept of the separateness of persons consistently leads to successful practice.

The objection from the difference in metaphysical commitments of both traditions

What is the nature of the metaphysical commitments of each tradition? And what would the discovery of certain classes of metaphysics commitments in either tradition do for the solution that we are currently considering? Any objection to the solution from these concerns will point to some disparity between the metaphysical commitments of either tradition and seek to argue on that basis that some feature of both traditions (their views on persons or approaches to ethics, for example) are incompatible. Even if no objection like this can be sustained, any substantial difference in the metaphysical commitments of each tradition will be something to consider before we can answer whether Buddhism and liberalism are compatible.

14 15

Siderits (2007, pp.58). See Siderits (2007, pp.64) for a detailed discussion of this point, what he calls the shifting coalitions

response to the substantialist view of the self as executive function.

11

Now as we have touched upon, Buddhists and liberals have different views on what it means to be a person. On the one hand, Buddhist thinkers tend to believe that references to persons (especially to separate persons) are deeply problematic since there do not exist ultimate boundaries which mark off any one person from another. Liberals, on the other hand, have not tended to dedicate much time to advocating any particularly deep view on the nature of persons; none, that is, beyond either assuming that persons are separate or that they need political protection as though they were separate. The difference between these two positions, if indeed there is one, is not entirely clear. What is clear, however, is that persons are assumed to exist in a radical state of moral and political isolation from one another, and it is natural to assume that they are thought of as radically separated from one another in the aforementioned respects because of a presumption of their metaphysical separation from one another. But before we can explore the exact nature of the liberals presumption of separation, let us examine to what, if any, background metaphysical views the Mahyna Buddhist is committed in his analysis of persons.

Thus, it is rather premature to accept the argument as it stands, that Buddhists may have doubts about substantial, abiding and metaphysically-discrete selves; however, they think it is conventionally true that substantial, abiding and metaphysically-discrete selves exist: Therefore, Buddhists will have no problem with liberal talk about separate persons. To accept this argument as proof of the compatibility of Buddhism and liberalism is to ignore a number of theoretical differences between each tradition. Firstly, we have to decide whether accepting the liberal separateness of persons consistently leads to successful practice. As we saw, this concern lies at the heart of the objection from the semantic constraints of the two-truths theory. Secondly, we have yet to ask whether there are some differences in the fundamental (or ultimate) metaphysical commitments of Buddhists and liberals. And as we saw, the objection from the difference in metaphysical commitments of both traditions is an expression of this very concern.

Thus, I shall begin by tackling the metaphysical objection first (section IV), and then move on to evaluate semantic objection (section V). This order is suitable since it enables us to get a handle upon some of the finer points of Mahyna views of persons before we turn to examine the semantic and practical issues.

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IV

METAPHYSICAL COMMITMENTS

What metaphysical presuppositions underlie the liberals concept of the separateness of persons? Is this compatible with what the Buddhist thinks about persons? For example, what metaphysical reasons might the Buddhist have for objecting to the liberals view? Are there any background presuppositions of the liberals view to which the Buddhist might object? Equally, does the liberal have any metaphysical disagreements with the Buddhists commitments, whether those commitments are explicit ones or implicit in the contextual background?

These are the sorts of questions we need to ask before we can respond to the objection from the difference in metaphysical commitments of both traditions, and judge whether our two truths solution will work. But first, we must begin by outlining how we might arrive at an answer to these questions, and what form an answer might take. We might, for example, choose to evaluate a number of claims that would suggest, if they were true, that Buddhist and liberal views on persons are incompatible, and that our two-truths solution was incorrect. If none of these claims turned out to be correct, then we would have grounds for concluding that Buddhist and liberal views on persons are not incompatible, and our two truth solution is one step closer to being affirmed. Indeed, this is the very strategy we have agreed to use (section II). But before we take a first look at these issues, we must first ask what is the precise nature of the claims we shall be evaluating?

They will of course all be possible counterexamples to the compatibility of Buddhist and liberal views on persons. But will they all be of the same type of claim? The answer is no. To show why, we must distinguish between two types of metaphysical commitment; background and theoretical commitments. The background commitments of a tradition are any further views that are largely implicit in that tradition. In the case of liberalism, for example, candidates for implicit background commitments could be such views as the belief in human dignity. In the case of Buddhism, they might be such views as the belief in karma and rebirth. The theoretical commitments, on the other hand, are those views that are largely explicit in a theory.

In the case of both liberal and Buddhist views on persons, I shall examine the background metaphysical commitments before I examine their more explicit theoretical commitments. The claims, then, that I shall be evaluating in this sections are that:

13

1. All liberals share a background commitment to a metaphysically substantial self. 2. All Mahyna Buddhists share a background commitment to rebirth and karma. 3. All liberals are explicitly committed to substantial metaphysical claims about the nature of persons. 4. All Mahyna Buddhists are explicitly committed to substantial metaphysical claims about the nature of persons.

These are the claims that if they were true would be fatal to the project of reconciling Buddhist and liberal views on persons, and would mean that our two-truths solution could not be secured. Let us begin, then, by examining the commitments of the liberals concept of the separateness of persons.

1.

All liberals share a background commitment to a metaphysically substantial self

The first thing to note is that, partly because liberalism developed alongside a background context that was emerging from the theological period of Thomism in which the concepts of free will and just deserts occupied a central place, the liberals concept of the separateness of persons has, historically at least, been bound together with the concept of human dignity.16 We know that for something to have dignity it must be worthy of respect. But then we might ask, what it is it about humans in particular that makes them worthy of respect? The Thomistic theological tradition from which the concept of dignity was arising would have pointed to a divine substance; the soul, understood as mans rational capacity.17 The liberal, on the other hand, answers by pointing to the fact that persons are in possession of a high degree of conscience, moral autonomy and agency. Now, it is owing to these qualities that liberals think man is worthy of respect, the very respect that the liberal thinks stands in need of safeguarding through a system of rights. Whether or not persons actually possess these qualities (and whether all persons possess them in equal measure), is not an issue for the liberal his defence begins and ends at the fact that his view is now largely

presupposed by various systems of retributive justice the world over. But for now let us examine how the concept of human dignity expands to reveal these three further concepts.

16 17

The following discussion owes much to James Griffins (2008) treatment of these issues. See Griffin (2008, pp.9-10).

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First of all, we can only hold persons to account if we think of them as in possession of qualities of moral autonomy and agency. Likewise, moral rehabilitation - as the aim of retributive justice - is only possible if the institutions of justice deal with subjects who possess conscience enough so that they have the ability to freely consider amending their ways. It makes little or no sense to hold entities to account for their actions if they do not posses moral autonomy or agency, just as it makes little or no sense to punish those who stand no chance of amending their behaviour, especially if the punishment is exacted because we wish to undergo reform.18 James Griffin (2008, pp.26) has described the issue of conscience in the following manner; we cannot be autonomous unless we exercise our own individual consciences. There is no dignity to mere submission to authority (ibid). Indeed, such a conception of persons underlies the anti-paternalistic arguments we find in John Stuart Mills On Liberty. These three concepts are central to much western moral and political philosophy.

Before we move on to decide whether the proposition all liberals share a background commitment to a metaphysically substantial self is true or not, it helps to briefly summarize what we have gained through this discussion. The liberal thinks of persons as moral agents that are worthy of respect because they have the autonomy to be able to act with conscience. This is what is meant by the concept of human dignity. Thus, the liberal converts the concept of human dignity into a feature of political life which is to be upheld - he moves from concept to political conception. 19 Now, whether or not persons actually act conscientiously ought not to detract from the respect they are owed in principle. The liberal view on persons is more a view on the ideal, hypothetical nature of political subjects than it is on the actual nature of metaphysical subjects. Therefore, liberals are not implicitly committed to the existence of metaphysically substantial selves (such as an tman, a soul or a Kantian transcendental self). This is good news for the project of reconciling liberal and Buddhist views on persons, of course, since much of the Buddhists project amounts to a rejection of such substantialist views on the self. Therefore, our two-truths solution has not yet been dealt a fatal blow. 2. All Mahyna Buddhists share a background commitment to rebirth and karma

18

The various animal trials of medieval Europe spring to mind as an interesting example of the error of

holding to account beings that stand no chance of reforming their behaviour. See Evans (1906) and Kadri (2006).
19

See Rawls (1971, pp.1-5).

15

The first thing to note is that the question of how far we can extricate the Buddhist philosophical innovations from a background commitment to karma and rebirth is far from settled. Regarding the relationship between Buddhist ethics and such background metaphysical commitments, Goodman notes that certain Buddhist normative commitments may seem to be justifiable only if we assume the truth of such teachings as karma and rebirth (2008, pp.217). So, the question of the extent to which the tenets of Buddhist ethics can be disentangled from the background metaphysical commitments of the Buddhist context is one that needs to be addressed if we are to decide on the compatibility of Buddhist and liberal views on persons, and make a judgement on the validity of our two-truths solution. I therefore begin by examining whether Buddhists are implicitly committed to the doctrines of karma and rebirth in the same manner as I did for claims about the liberals background commitments. I conclude, however, by suggesting a new way of looking at the issue of background metaphysical commitments of a particular philosophical view, one which is particularly helpful in deciding whether their two views of persons are compatible.

As we saw with the conceptual background of liberalism, the concepts of conscience, moral agency and autonomy have historically not simply been a matter of holding persons to account in this life and this life only. In a similar fashion, doctrines of karma and rebirth actively encourage Buddhists to think about the effects their actions might have upon lives they are not currently living; whether their own future lives, or the lives of conventionally separate others. When considered together, then, these doctrines provide a starting point for morality in the sense that they are a tactic for ensuring that persons act in moral ways throughout their lives by considering the effects of their actions upon the future.

Now, the role that rebirth plays within the skandha theory of personal identity has some rather strange implications. It is thought that any skandha streams that remain after a persons bodily death will be taken up by a new form appropriate to the karma accrued throughout the persons previous lives. As a consequence, the resultant person is conventionally the same one as before. Ultimately, of course, the Buddhist thinks that one set of skandhas has initiated a change in another, causallyconnected set. But conventionally, any resultant person will be the same one as before even if their new form is radically different in type from the form they inhabited previously. But if the subject of punishment is the same person who committed the crime, and the person that is reborn is the same

16

one as before, then should we punish persons for their moral transgressions in previous lives? It certainly seems that if we are committed to retributive justice, then we should punish persons for their transgression in previous lives. Now the liberal, remember, conceives of persons as worthy of respect because they have the autonomy to be able to act with conscience. And this means being fully responsible for their intentional action. For the liberal, then, a persons action is therefore metaphysically attributable to them and them only, in this life and this life only. So, what is equally clear this time, as far as the liberal is concerned, is that the responsibility for the actions of those who are now deceased cannot fall to those who are currently living. If the currently living can be held accountable for the moral transgressions of the deceased, then the conventions of retributive justice are threatened.

If we are agreed that a person alive today is constituted by skandha streams that once belonged to Adolf Hitler, for example, then it seems that by Buddhist principles that person ought to stand trial for the Holocaust. But even if we grant that it is possible to determine that such a person indeed was Hitler, such a state of affairs is patently absurd for another reason, one that liberals can countenance; it refuses to take seriously the distinction between persons, across space and across time. For the liberal, then, individuals whose lifetimes do not overlap are just as separate as individuals who have lived contemporaneously. For this reason, then, Buddhist and liberal views on persons are incompatible.

Now given such differences in background assumptions which inform their respective views on persons, it appears unlikely that our two-truths solution will be a happy one, for both the Buddhist and the liberal. However, there are two more suggestions to consider before settling with this rather pessimistic conclusion. The first, the place of human dignity within Buddhism; the second, whether we need even consider background commitments for an evaluation of the compatibility of Buddhist and liberal views on persons.

Beginning with the place of human dignity within Buddhism. Although the Buddhist conception of persons does include moral autonomy in the sense that agents are morally responsible for those actions of theirs that generate merit, it is another matter whether the remaining two concepts comprising the liberals concept of human dignity (that is, conscience and moral agency) can be found in the Mahyna conception of persons. It is rather implausible that Buddhists could

17

deny either of these. For one thing, throughout his Bodhicaryvatra, 20 ntideva puts the guilt he feels for his prior lack of moral rectitude to service in committing himself ever more firmly to the bodhisattva path. Conscience, then, allows us to develop our spiritual resolve. Nor do Buddhists deny moral agency, as can be seen in the following aphorism: I am the result of my own deeds [...] whatever deed I do, whether good or bad, I shall become heir to it!21 Thus, the Buddhists conception of persons does not radically differ from that of the liberals in the sense that both views presume some form of human dignity. Their views on persons, at least, are looking more compatible, despite the Buddhists presuppositions on karma and rebirth remaining a stumbling block to their full compatibility.

But do we even need to consider background commitments at all if we are evaluating the compatibility of Buddhist and liberal views on persons? Consider the nineteenth century British biologist J.B.S. Haldane. Discussing the Christian concept of immortality, Haldane considers the argument that we should believe in the souls immortality because it was a teaching that Jesus preached. Jesus was a great spiritual teacher and had a subtle understanding of psychology. This, Haldane concludes, is a better reason for believing in the souls immortality than any other reason Christians have proffered (that it is the testimony of the bible, for example). Haldane points out that we should be careful to distinguish between the teaching that was original to Jesus and the teaching that was part of the given set of beliefs that Jesus, and many spiritual teachers of his day besides, took for granted; the characteristic part of any mans teaching is what is novel and heretical in it, and not what he and his audience take for granted (1927, pp.205). What was novel and heretic in the case of Jesus teachings was his pronouncement that we ought to love our enemies, and when he proclaims that persons shall rise from the grave, or that madness is a product of demoniacal possession, he is merely repeating the common set of assumptions of his day.

Now, the same form of argument can be applied, first of all, to Buddhist beliefs in karma and rebirth. Like Haldane does for the Christian belief in immortality, we should be careful to distinguish between the views of Buddhist philosophers that were novel and heretical, and the views that were taken for granted by their audience and the many other philosophers of their age. Clearly, karma and rebirth have been taken for granted by most, if not all, Buddhists and Buddhist
20 21

See Crosby and Skiltons (1995) translation, from which all subsequent translations are taken from. Aguttaranikya V 57 (vii, VI, 57). The translation is Hare and Woodwards (1973, pp.59).

18

philosophers. And in this respect we have less reason to think that because certain Buddhist claims presuppose a background commitment to karma and rebirth they cannot be reconciled with other claims which do not presuppose the same, or similar, background commitments. This argument can equally be applied to any other philosophical tradition - liberalism, Mdhyamaka Buddhism, Thomism, and so forth. The commitments we should focus upon as relevant to assessing the compatibility of two systems are those that were original - heretical, in Haldanes manner of speaking - to each system. In other words, the explicit theoretical commitments of each tradition.

Now, at any rate, even Buddhists will not have a problem with dismissing the doctrines of karma and rebirth in such a way, since many schools of Mahyna think the teaching of these doctrines should be considered instances of skilful means (upya); that is, as provisional truths that will nevertheless consistently lead some people into better practice. They are doctrines that aim at giving persons with little or no regard for their own and others future- the hedonist - pause for thought, by suggesting that their actions will have consequences for them. Thus, the differences in background commitments of Buddhist and liberal views on persons have not posed any serious objection to our two-truths solution.

3.

All liberals are explicitly committed to substantial metaphysical claims about the nature of

persons

In contrast to Mahyna Buddhists, liberals often assume persons are distinct from one another and their environment. John Stuart Mill observed that the phenomenon of injustice presupposes both a wrong done and some assignable person who is wronged (1861, pp.247). The infringement of rights, in other words, presupposes some definite person who suffers the infringement (pp.250). But it is unclear whether Mills definite person must be understood in any strong metaphysical way.

We find another statement of the liberal view of separateness of persons, however, not in support, but used in criticism, of utilitarian principles. Liberals such as John Rawls and Robert Nozick have both charged utilitarianism with ignoring the moral significance of the separateness of persons. Rawls contrasts the classical utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham and Henry Sidgwick with

19

his own formulation of justice as fairness. He argues that whilst his theory of justice takes seriously the distinction between persons, classical utilitarianism does not.22 Furthermore, his original position thought experiment provides a further reason for rejecting utilitarian principles. If we were put in the position of having to decide the principles upon which our community will be based but without knowing each others particularities (because we have to decide from behind a veil of ignorance), then, Rawls argues, we would reject utilitarianism. This is because we would not wish to risk being part of an oppressed minority once the veil of ignorance was lifted, and classical utilitarianism provides a premise for oppression of minorities if it results in a greater good for a greater number of people. But to reject utilitarian principles is not to automatically commit oneself to Kantian transcendental selves. Like Mill, Rawls separateness of persons does not amount to an explicit commitment to substantive metaphysical claims about the nature of persons.

Finally, we find Nozicks notion of the separateness of persons, like Rawls, in the context of a criticism of utilitarian principles. Nozick thought that an end-state view of social welfare such as utilitarianism will allow the minimal night-watchman state to mask its illegitimate use of some persons for the sake of others in the name of aggregate welfare. Nozick thinks that we have to look closer at how persons have arrived at their material circumstances before we can make a judgment on the fairness of such a situation. Nozick argues that utilitarianism prevents this sort of reflection on how we came to be in our material circumstances. If a state informed by utilitarian principles redistributes a persons wealth for welfare provision without taking account of how he arrived at his wealth, then this does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person (1974, pp.33), and instead thinks of him merely as a resource that the state can use to the benefit of everyone else.

Now, whilst for Mill and Rawls the separateness of persons is no more than a brute reality of political life, a reality that any adequate theory of justice must contend with, for Nozick, on the other hand, the commitment to the separateness of persons can be seen as a function of Kantianism. Persons ought not to be treated merely as means to an end, but as ends in themselves, both at the level of interpersonal morality, and at the level of the state. Although it is unclear whether Nozicks view of the separateness of persons reflects the belief in Kantian transcendental selves, at the very least his view reflects his moral commitments. Furthermore, as a liberal Nozick would presumably
22

See Rawls (1971, pp.24).

20

want his political theory to float free of any explicit metaphysical commitment to a substantive view on persons. Others have done a good job in contrasting the conception of persons in Kantian and Buddhist metaphysics23, so I shall not repeat them here.

What is clear, then, is that liberals do not need to buy into any metaphysically substantive claims about the nature of persons, particularly those regarding the separateness of persons in any substantial metaphysical sense. Mill, for example, thought that the conceptual apparatus of liberalism could float free of any commitment to substantive metaphysical claims about the nature of persons. For Mill, the claim that rights are owed to persons simply in virtue of their being human could not be substantiated. Natural rights, as Bentham had put it, were nonsense on stilts. Instead, Mill thought that any rights we might have were to be founded upon the notion of moral utility: Having a right to something means having something which society ought to defend me in the possession of. If the objector goes on to ask why it ought, I can give him no other reason than general utility. (1861, pp.250) By founding his liberalism upon a principle of utility rather than, say, upon any theological views on persons or natural law - a feature of Lockean liberalism that sees rights as founded upon our ownership of our own bodies (as we shall see when analysing the next claim), Mill avoids commitment to any substantive metaphysical claims about the nature of persons.24

To conclude, then, the claim we have been treating is false, since the liberals we have examined do not presume any substantive metaphsyical claims about the self or about the nature of persons. Rather, liberals need not be committed to any ultimate metaphysical claims about the nature of persons, as Mills strategy testifies. Thus, liberal and Buddhist views on persons are not incompatible, and our two-truths solution has survived another objection.

23 24

See, for example, Cumminsky (forthcoming). Furthermore, Mills strategy is particularly conducive towards bridging the gap between Buddhist and

liberal approaches to ethics since some have argued that Buddhist ethics should be thought of as consequentialist. This is the view of Goodman (2009). It is not our current purpose, however, to evaluate whether this view is correct.

21

4.

All Mahyna Buddhists are explicitly committed to substantial metaphysical claims about

the nature of persons

Whilst it might be the case that bhidharmikas, Sarvstivdins, Pudgalavdins or Yogcrins are committed to metaphysical claims about the nature of persons (this is especially true in the case of the Pudgalavdin), it is not the case that all Buddhists see the skandha theory of personal identity as making ultimate claims about the nature of persons. Some Buddhists, for example, have denied that the doctrine of non-self advances a positive metaphysical claim about persons. Ngrjuna and his followers claim to avoid any commitments to positive metaphysical views since nothing, not even the momentary dharmas, exist by svabhva. Indeed, Mdhyamikas try not to put too much ontological stock even in the skandha theory of personal identity. Of course, there is much still that needs to be said regarding how exactly the Mdhyamikas position works. However, we will forgo this discussion until it is time to evaluate the soteriological ramifications of the talk of separate persons (in section V). For now, it suffices to say that Mdhyamikas claim, at least, not to advance any substantial metaphysical claims about the nature of persons. This means that both Buddhist and liberal need not be committed to any substantive claims about the nature of persons. Therefore, Buddhist and liberal views on persons are not incompatible and no fatal objection to our two-truths solution has so far been sustained.

However, Mdhyamaka and liberal views on persons can be reconciled in another, more substantive, fashion, through a consideration of Lockes discussion of natural rights and Candrakrtis discussion of the unintelligibility of change. From the liberal side, Locke suggested that our rights flow from the fact that we have human bodies. All men have claim to natural rights over their own bodies, according to Locke, because of the sole ownership they have over it: Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own person. This nobody has any right to but himself.25 All other rights, for Locke, flow from this fundamental fact. But let us move on to consider Candrakrtis exposition of essence, first of all, before considering its relation to Lockes theory of natural rights.

25

See his Second Treatise on Civil Government, V,27 (1689, pp.130). Locke derives the further right to

private property from the fact of our ownership of our bodies; by expending our labour in the production of an artefact or by working upon an unclaimed land, we thereby claim that artefact or land as our own.

22

In his commentary on Ngrjunas MlaMdhyamakakrik (XIII.4), Candrakrti defends Ngrjunas view of the unintelligibly of change (If there is an essential nature what would this becoming other be of?) from the reply that if phenomena were empty of svabhva, then nothing would posses any properties, and change would be impossible. If phenomena possessed svabhva, Candrakrti retorts, then neither would there be the appearance of change since to possess svabhva means to be invariable, and an invariable thing could neither come to change nor effect a change in another thing. This is particularly problematic if we think of the self as substantial and invariant, since how could such a self be causally efficacious?26 Candrakrti suggests that although all phenomena are empty of svabhva, this does not imply that certain qualities are not essentially associated with certain phenomena. His solution involves distinguishing between (the putative) invariant intrinsic natures (svabhva) of phenomena and the inherent qualities proper to it (svalakaa). Candrakrti uses the example of fire to illustrate his point:

Heat is said to be the essential nature of fire because in all experience it invariably accompanies fire. [...] But if this invariable nature is something real, then because of its invariableness it could not become other. After all coldness cannot become a property of fire.27

Here Candrakrti agrees that the essence of fire is heat, in the sense that there are certain qualities essentially associated with fire, such that it cannot lose those qualities without ceasing to be fire. But crucially, this does not mean that fire is not empty. Rather, the kind of essence he is talking about in this case happens not to conflict with the notion of emptiness, fire is hot by svalakaa and not by svabhva.

Similarly, one might argue, human beings have some essential properties because they are human animals, and human rights are results of these properties. If we recall, this is precisely what Locke had in mind when he argued that we are owed rights simply as a consequence of owning our bodies, of our being corporeal. However, non-human animals have bodies too, but Locke did not
26

See ntidevas Bodhicaryvatra VI.29: If the Self is eternal and without thought process, then it is

evidently inactive, like space. Even in contact with other factors, what activity can there be of something which is unchanging?
27

Prasannapad XII, 4cdff. The translation is Sprungs (1979, pp.147), pp.241 of La Valle Poussin's

edition.

23

accord the same rights onto animals simply because of that fact. Instead, animals for Locke were only owed respect as the property of other humans, whose property was owed respect in turn because of the fact of their owning their own human bodies. But if we ignore the Christian assumptions of mans rightful ownership of and dominion over the natural world which lie in the background of Lockes thought, and if we recall Haldanes solution to the problem of background commitments, then not applying the same rights onto non-human animals, the same rights that one applies onto human animals, does not prove fatal to the line of argument we had previously been considering. This suggestion is therefore valid, and has the dual benefit of reconciling Buddhist and liberal views on persons and approaches to ethics. Furthermore, this synthesis is neutral enough in regards to metaphysical commitments, thereby potentially avoiding the problem of the sanction of rights and duties, since on this view rights flow from the simple fact of our possessing human bodies, but bodies understood in a manner which does not require any deeper metaphysical commitments. Thus, far from suggesting that our two truths solution is incorrect, we have shown how the theories of both traditions could be more substantively reconciled.

Conclusion

To summarize what we have gained throughout this section. It appeared, first of all, that Buddhism and liberalism are metaphysically incompatible since the former presupposes background commitments to karma and rebirth. By adopting Haldanes strategy, however, we have shown that considerations of implicit background commitments are of little or no value in settling the question of whether two views on persons are compatible or not.

We responded to the view that liberalism presupposed substantive metaphysical claims about the nature of persons by pointing out that the strategy that Mill adopts in defending his liberal theory floats free of any substantial metaphysical commitment claims about the nature of persons. Likewise, we responded to the view that Buddhist views on persons presupposed substantive metaphysical claims about the nature of persons by pointing out that the claims advanced by Mdhyamikas such as Ngrjuna and Candrakrti as not meant to be understood as committing them to substantial metaphysical claims about the nature of persons (amongst other phenomena). We suggested that Lockes theory of natural rights could be reconciled with Candrakrtis thoughts

24

of the distinction between possessing invariant intrinsic natures (svabhva) and the inherent qualities proper to phenomena (svalakaa), where humans have the feature of being essential corporeal, and so possessing natural rights in virtue of their corporeality, by svalakaa.

Liberals and Mahyna Buddhists, then, need not be committed to any substantive metaphysical claims about the nature of persons. We can now respond to the replies we first encountered in section III by rejecting the proposal that because Buddhism and liberalism presuppose metaphysically substantive conceptions of personhood they cannot be reconciled. As we have seen, neither an adherence to Mahyna Buddhism nor liberalism need necessarily come with substantive metaphysical commitments (whether to Kantian selves, rebirth and karma, for example). The objections to our two truths solution from the difference in metaphysical commitments of Mahyna Buddhists and liberals has failed. We can now reasonably claim that Mahyna Buddhist and liberal views on person are not metaphysically incompatible.

Our discussion thus supports Garfields assessment of the compatibility of Buddhist and liberal approaches to ethics, at least at the level of the metaphysical commitments of their respective views on persons. Let us therefore turn now to evaluate the objection from the semantic constraints of the two truths theory and examine whether it is true that believing in the liberals concept of the separateness of persons will consistently lead to successful practice.

PRACTICAL RAMIFICATIONS

Even if, as we have so far been arguing, Buddhist and liberal views are not metaphysically incompatible, there might still remain substantial practical disagreements over the view of persons the other defends. The Buddhist - even a Mdhyamaka Buddhist - might still have reservations about the soteriological, political and moral implications of insisting on the separateness of persons. Their concern would be that accepting the liberals concept of the separateness of persons might not consistently lead to successful practice. As such, it has to do with the pragmatic utility of certain views. Besides referring to our ability to navigate our way through the world using common sense notions, the Buddhists concept of successful practice implies a set of issues specific to soteriological, political and moral spheres - issues such as how compassionate relations are to be

25

successfully maintained, how disputes are to be successfully settled, and how we can be successful in attaining release from suffering. Our method in this section, then, will be to ask whether accepting the liberals concept of the separateness of persons will consistently lead to successful practice in these three spheres. If it can be shown that accepting the liberals concept of the separateness of persons does not diminish our ability for successful practice in these spheres, then we have reason for concluding both that Buddhist and liberal views on persons are not incompatible and our two truths solution to the problem of the separateness of persons remains valid. Since we have determined already that the philosophy of Mdhayamaka can be metaphysically reconciled with liberal views of persons, the following discussion will treat the practical ramifications of the separateness of persons from a Mdhayamaka standpoint. Let us turn, then, to examine the soteriological ramifications of the liberals concept of separateness of persons.

Soteriological ramifications of talk of separate persons

As we touched upon in section III, it is a difficult task to describe the Mdhyamikas ultimate truth in terms of an ultimate truth that underwrites why accepting a conventionally true statement consistently leads to successful practice. This is because Mdhyamikas deny that there is any ultimate truth distinct from conventional truth. In this respect, Mdhyamikas have been interpreted as being semantic non-dualists; that is, they collapse the distinction between conventional and ultimate truth, and suggest instead that there is only conventional truth. 28 We might conclude that this proves problematic for our two-truths solution, since according to Mdhyamikas there is only one truth, the merely conventional. And if there is only one type of truth, then we have lost the very place in the semantic hierarchy into which we suggested the liberals view of separate persons might slot. However, before we rescue our two-truths solution from this objection we must take a closer look at the implications of the Mdhyamikas semantic non-dualism. This will involve a substantial digression, given the complexities of these issues.

The Mdhyamaka view of semantic non-dualism is a consequence of their interpretation of the doctrine of emptiness (nyat). For the Mdhyamika, not only are persons, as composite entities, empty (nya) of svabhva, but the dharmas, the substance out of which our skandhas are
28

See Siderits (2007, pp.203-204) for a fuller discussion of this interpretation.

26

said to be ultimately constituted, are themselves empty of svabhva. Nothing has svabhva since the entire concept of svabhva is incoherent. Thus, Mdhyamikas defend an anti-foundationalist ontology. Entities exists, but without any primary ontological level that provides an ontological support for entities. Our theories, then, fail to gain traction at any ultimate level of description, since there is no ultimate level. Thus, the purpose of language is not to describe the true nature of entities since, for the Mdhyamika, entities do not have ultimate natures. Mdhyamikas interpret the doctrine of emptiness as not describing any entity. Instead, Mdhyamikas argue that thinking that the term entity describes something that is metaphysically-discrete and isolable from its environment is a confusion. Rather, emptiness should be understood as the exposition of the incoherence of the very notion of an entity.29

Now since the Mdhyamika interpretation of emptiness does not describe a condition of entities so much as alert us to the confusion of thinking in terms of entities, our perception of discrete entities of any kind presupposes the activity of consciousness that discriminates substantial entities where ultimately there are none. Mdhyamikas attribute the proliferation of what look like substantial entities in the world to a process of conceptual imputation (prajapti) for which our consciousness is responsible. This explains why the converse - that imputing consciousness presupposes metaphysically-discrete entities - is false.

But crucially, the nature of this discriminating consciousness is nowhere explained by reference to an abiding substantial self. The ongoing stream of experiences through which we apprehend what we take to be a consciousness-independent world is itself part of a complex set of causal and ontological relations which have no foundational level. The Mdhyamika view of the self - that is, their interpretation of non-self - is, as Westerhoff (2009, pp.162) explains, that of

[...] a sequence of events which stand in close temporal and causal relations. Physical processes cause sensory events, which are then framed by concepts, used as the basis of decisions, which give rise to actions, which in turn set physical processes in motion, which cause new sensory events, and so forth. The self is seen not as a cognitive nucleus that stays constant amid the stream of changing sensory impressions and mental

29

Garfield (1996, pp.66).

27

deliberations, but rather as the entire set of such sensory and mental events which are interconnected in complicated ways.

Still, the view that there is some abiding, metaphysically-discrete referent of the indexical pronoun I that remains numerically identical throughout our lives has undeniable intuitive appeal. It certainly seems as though there is something that remains constant throughout our lives. Here, Buddhists like Ngrjuna frequently compare the intuitively appealing conception of a substantial, agentive self to an illusion (nirmita): As a magician creates a magical illusion by the force of magic, and the illusion produces another illusion, in the same way the agent is a magical illusion and the action done is the illusion created by another illusion.30

However, one response to the Mdhyamikas view must be examined. If Mdhyamikas claim that they do not advance any positive metaphysical claims, how are we meant to understand the claim, central to semantic non-dualism, that there is no distinction between ultimate and conventional truth, if not as a claim about the nature of language-independent reality? If the Mdyamika denies there is any ultimate truth, then are we not committed to semantic relativism? And in that case, what reason do we have to believe the Mdyamikas account of personal identity over, say, that of the Thomist, given that in the absence of any ultimate truth neither account can be more correct than the other?

One reply is to note that Mdhyamaka has been classified a therapeutic philosophy31. All Buddhists think that certain unwholesome desires (Sanskrit, t; Pli, tah) need to be extinguished before we can attain, or even aspire to, metaphysical insight and moral rectitude. Whilst ignorance of the metaphysical nature of reality was for the most part compared to an affliction or a poison (klea) in the early Buddhism, the tenets of Mdhyamaka philosophy have

30

Ngrjuna MlaMdhyamakakrik 17: 31-32. The translation is Westerhoffs (2009, pp.163). Compare

this with the following passages from Candrakrtis commentary on ryadevas Catuataka: Since an ordinary thing appears different from what it is due to such an illusion, it is only after understanding that it must be repudiated that Buddhahood will be attained. (1) Illusion means perceiving something as being exactly the opposite of what it really is. (229) The translations are Langs (2003, pp.111, 158). See also Sayuttanikya, III 14243: Karmic formations are like a banana trees core. And consciousness is like a magical illusion.
31

See, for example, Burton (2010).

28

been compared to a purgative medicine, one that must itself be ejected along with the poison it removes if it is to be effective. If a doctor gives a patient medicine, and this medicine cures all of his illness, but stays in his stomach, do you think that suffering will not arise [...]? Do you think this man will be relieved of this illness in his belly? No way, blessed one! If the medicine, having cured his illness stays in his stomach, this man will certainly become seriously ill. [...] You should see this insistence on any view in just this way. If emptiness is like that, [...] whoever sees emptiness like that, will be incurable.32 On this interpretation, Mdhyamaka theories do not, all things considered, advance ultimate metaphysical claims, but aim instead to extinguish the very urge for metaphysical system-building once the aspirant bodhisattva has reached a certain level of philosophical proficiency. Certain views, among them the skandha theory of personal identity, are still correct in the sense that it explains how we are constituted without making any reference to fictional entities, and account for why its acceptance consistently leads to successful practice, but the difference is now that the skandha theory is no longer held to be a theory against which all other views on persons must be measured. Accepting the skandha theory is only one further step higher in a pedagogical ladder which leads, eventually, to the extinction of suffering, the final step being that one abandons the very ladder which one used to climb up to the extinction of suffering.33

We might still respond here by questioning how exactly does abandoning our belief in ultimate truth have the result of alleviating our suffering? Siderits (2007, pp.205) responds with an example of the staunch believers in ultimate truth who, when faced with evidence that there might be alternative way of understanding a phenomena, resorts to table-banging. Pounding the table in this way, Siderits claims, as well as being a way of drawing attention to incontrovertible facts (such as the solidity of the table), is also a form of self-assertion, one that betrays an implicit commitment to oneself as an substantial and separate entity, an entity who finds it necessary to assert ones firmly held views on others, without regard for the ability of others to understand them. The Buddhist thinks that such a creature will not be best equipped to experience the more profound realizations of impermanence that come from the exercise of meditation, and relaizations upon which ones wider soteriological opportunities are based.
32

Candrakrtis commentary on Ngrjunas Mlamdhyamakakrik XIII 7-8 (Prasannapad 83b84a).

The translation is Garfields (1996, pp.67). See also Siderits (2007, pp.191), and Burton (2010).
33

Compare with the penultimate words of Wittgensteins Tractatus 6.54: My propositions are elucidatory

in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.)

29

The above therapeutic interpretation of semantic non-dualism does not commit the Mdhyamika to semantic relativism; on the contrary, it signals that the manner of our holding a doctrine is as important as recognizing that doctrines truth. If unwholesome desire is to be extinguished, then we have to eliminate the pride we may feel when we arrive at an ultimate truth. As Burton notes, right views as much as wrong views can be the focus of ones clinging (2010, pp.209, 207-209). In this manner, the central claim of semantic non-dualism that there is no ultimate truth must be understood soteriologically; that is, as another method at the Buddhists disposal for alleviating the suffering caused by grasping at our metaphysical theories.

To summarize, then, Mdhyamikas do not prefer any one view of persons over another because that view is more true (in any ultimate sense), but because that view consistently leads, on balance, to successful practice. And if we consider successful practice to include the alleviation of our own suffering, then, the Mdhyamika cliams, accepting that the use of the pronoun I does not refer to a substantial, abiding self does in fact, on balance, consistently lead to successful practice. The liberal, on the other hand, does not place any soteriological significance upon abandoning our metaphysical commitments. As far as he is concerned, the Buddhist is free to pursue his or her own conception of the good, free from the interference of others.

We can return now to the objection we voiced in the beginning of this section - that semantic non-dualism proves problematic for our two-truths solution, since according to Mdhyamikas there is only one truth, the conventional. The concern was that if there is only one type of truth, then we have lost the very place in the semantic hierarchy into which we suggested the liberals view of separate persons might slot. We can now reply that Mdhyamikas neither hold that the skandha theory of personal identity and the liberals view of separate persons are meaningless, and nor do they think that their most sophisticated interpretation of emptiness should be the only view taught. Semantic non-dualism should be understood as making claims that are relevant only at the very highest level of ontological realization, claims that help to overcome the soteriological difficulties associated with the complex metaphysical theorizing with which one has to engage in order to attain this level. On the contrary, both views - the liberals and the Mdhyamikas - are appropriate to certain persons at different levels of understanding. The Mdhyamaka can still understand the liberals separateness of persons as having a place within his gradual teaching, but one that is

30

superseded once non-self and emptiness are fully realized. We must first be able to think of persons as separate before we can think of them as ontologically and causally interdependent, and in that respect the separateness of persons is at least a first step towards the realization of non-self.

Now that we have dismissed this objection, and have gained a deeper understanding of Mdhyamaka views on persons in the process, we can return to the task of reconciling Buddhist and liberal views on persons. The question is, then, does accepting the liberals concept of the separateness of persons consistently lead to more, or less, successful soteriological practice? The answer is both more and less, depending on the circumstances. On the one hand, it leads to more successful practice to teach the liberals separateness of persons to those who are not yet capable of understanding non-self and its soteriological implications, since it is a step in the right direction at least. On the other hand, it leads to less successful practice to teach the liberals separateness of persons to those who have already grasped non-self.

With these considerations in mind, the Buddhist does not object that accepting the liberals concept of the separateness of persons leads to successful soteriological practice, in some respects. Accepting the separateness of person leads, provisionally at least, to good soteriological practice. However, for consistently successful practice one has to achieve a realization of non-self and emptiness. Therefore the Mahyna Buddhist can object to our two-truths solution on practical soteriological grounds.

Political ramifications of talk of separate persons

We can similarly ask, does accepting the liberals concept of the separateness of persons consistently lead to more, or less, successful political practice?

Now, thinking in terms of separate persons might be particularly useful, and lead to consistently successful political practice, when persons are in what Rawls calls the circumstances of justice; that is, in a political circumstance between the extremes of abundance and shortage of resources, a condition of moderate scarcity under which human co-operation is both possible and necessary (1971, pp.109). Such circumstances contain conflict as well as an identity of

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interests (ibid). These are, then, the circumstances in which most persons find themselves today. In such circumstances, it would be politically useful to think of persons as existing separately since there are many conflicts stemming from resource shortages and differences in opinion.

However, if this circumstance means that we should take sole refuge in a system of rights and correlative duties, then Buddhists might have concerns. They might worry that although talk of the separateness of persons has the beneficial political effect of safeguarding the rights one is owed in the circumstances of justice, such talk might still have the effect of promoting various forms of selfgrasping. We can see how the Buddhist might think this through a consideration of Karl Marxs criticism of liberalism.

Criticizing his friend and colleague Bruno Bauer for failing to distinguish between human and political emancipation, Marx launches a ferocious attack upon the theoretical underpinnings of liberal rights-based approaches to ethics. As we have seen, liberalism claims to safeguard the liberties and rights that are appropriate to human dignity. In this respect, liberalism only aims at political emancipation of man; that is, to satisfy the demand for equal rights. With its focus on rights and liberties, liberalism does not, however, aim at full human emancipation. A society can bestow equal rights on its citizens and yet the daily private activities of its citizens could still be replete with discrimination and bigotry on grounds of religion, ethnicity, gender, and so on. Through an examination of the principle rights of liberalism - those to liberty, property, equality and security - Marx argues that:

[...] the liberty we are here dealing with is that if man as an isolated monad who is withdrawn into himself [...] [whose equal right to property] leads each man to see in other men not the realization but the limitation of his own freedom [...] [Mans equality] simply means equal access to liberty as described above, namely that each man is equally considered to be a self-sufficient monad [...] [Whilst the right to security] does not enable civil society to rise above its egoism. On the contrary, security is the guarantee of its egoism. (1843, pp.229-230)

Thus, the basic rights of liberalism, according to Marx, are egoistic rights of separation: But the right of man to freedom is not based on the association of man with man but rather on the

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separation of man from man. It is the right of this separation, the right of the restricted individual, restricted to himself (pp.229). Marxs idea is that liberalism promotes an attachment to the notion of persons as separate and isolated from one another, and actually perpetuates the very conflicts, antagonisms and egoism which it claims to prevent.

If we remember that Buddhists of all schools are concerned with alleviating suffering, and if we agree that Marxs criticism of liberalism is fair, then it is tempting to think that Buddhists will come down more on the side of Marx than on liberalism. If liberalism does promote the view of persons as separate and in eternal conflict with one another, rather than seeing persons as chances for the realization of one anothers abilities and talents, then Buddhists ought to reject liberalism outright. This is especially the case since all Buddhists think of persons in a manner similar to Marx; that is, as opportunities to realize one anothers ethical capacities, rather as stumbling blocks to realizing our own individual projects. The aspiring bodhisattva cannot hope that only developing his capacity for compassion, for example, will be enough to secure his release from suffering. Rather, he must put his compassion to actual use, and that requires other persons, even if both he and the subjects of his compassion are illusory:

If you argue, for whom is there compassion if no being exists? [our response is] For anyone projected through the delusion which is embraced for the sake of what has to be done. [Objection] Whose is the task to be done, if there is no being? [Mdhyamika] True, Moreover, the effort is made in delusion, but, in order to bring about an end to suffering, the delusion of what has to be done is not prevented.34

Furthermore, if liberal rights-based approaches to ethics do in fact promote egoism whilst at the same time claiming to alleviate it, then Buddhists ought to outright reject any liberal rightsapproach to ethics. Although the accepting the separateness of person is first step in the right direction, it is step that must be followed by a few more if we are to avoid the attachment to self that liberal rights-based ethics might promote.

34

ntidevas Bodhicaryvatra IX.75-76.

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Although our discussion of Marxs criticism of liberalism is currently only a suggestion, and much more work must be done to properly defend this claim, we are justified in concluding that the Buddhist will, at the very least, find it hard to agree that accepting the liberals concept of the separateness of persons consistently leads to successful political practice, if we define successful political practice as promoting human, rather than merely political, emancipation. Therefore the Mahyna Buddhist can object to our two-truths solution on practical political grounds.

The moral ramifications of talk of separate persons

This now leaves one last question to ask, does accepting the liberals concept of the separateness of persons consistently lead to more, or less, successful moral practice?

As we have noted from previous sections, accepting the liberals concept of the separateness of persons will consistently lead to more successful soteriological practice if we are not yet able to grasp the doctrine of non-self or emptiness, since it is a step in the right direction. However, it is step that must be followed by a few more if we are to avoid the attachment to self that liberal rightsbased ethics might promote. Furthermore, accepting the separateness of persons is for the Buddhist, at the very least, a step in the right direction since thinking of persons as separate at allows us, in the primary stages of realization, to focus our compassion onto one person at a time. But this view of the moral function of non-self meets some objections.

According to the standard Mahyna interpretation of non-self, persons (or what we conventionally take to be persons) are constituted by a sequence of mutually dependant set of causal and ontological relations so that no ultimate boundaries can be drawn between one person and the next. As a moral consequence, hedonistic regard for ones own pleasure and self-centred disregard for the well-being of others is not considered merely imprudent or callous, but deeply irrational. 35 However, the interpretation of emptiness which the Mdhyamika defends could actually be seen as denying the Mahyna interpretation of non-self. If there is no ultimate truth, then it is neither true that persons are separate, nor that they are part of a complex web of mutually-dependant ontological

35

See for, example, ntidevas Bodhicaryvatra VIII, IX, particlaulrly VIII.97-103, Siderits (2007, pp.82)

and Williams (1998, Ch. 5).

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and causal relations. Furthermore, if there is no ultimate truth, there could neither be an ultimate perspective from which actions could be or fail to be rational, and nor could there be ownership of suffering, by either conventionally separate or ultimately dependent persons, so that it would neither be rational nor irrational to help to alleviate the suffering of others, impartially or otherwise. And crucially, it would not matter for our moral practice whether we accepted the separateness of persons or non-self; since no one view is correct, our practice would be equally unsuccessful.

One response that we have briefly touched upon already is that far from denying the ultimate truth of non-self, the Mdhyamikas notion of emptiness can be seen as a tool for removing subtle suffering that forms an obstacle to the proper realization of non-self and the full ethical agency that comes with its realization. As Siderits suggests, the Mdhyamika interpretation of emptiness might represent the culmination of the realization of non-self (2007, pp.205), rather than its denial. If there is no ultimate truth, then non-self is itself only a conventional truth. However, this is unproblematic since all we have to show is that the belief that persons do not possess substantial selves is, on balance, more likely to consistently lead to moral success than is the belief in separate persons.

One way that a realization of non-self is conducive to success at moral practice is by reducing the often irrational resentment and anger to which we are are prone. Buddhists think resentment and anger are large stumbling blocks to be able to acting out of good intention. Mahyna Buddhists argue that the realization that persons neither possess substantial nor fully autonomous selves should result in our feeling less resentment over a persons misdeeds. Indeed, this is precisely what ntideva argues for during an elaborate description of the moral implication of the theory of dependent origination.36 ntideva questions the accuracy of common sense psychology, what today is called folk-psychology: Since like a magical display, phenomena do not initiate activity, at what does one get angry [...]? Therefore, even if one sees a friend or an enemy behaving badly, one can reflect that there are specific conditioning factors that determine this, and thereby remain happy.37 ntideva thinks that although we can hypothetically hold persons to account for their actions, we must nevertheless do so compassionately. Holding a person to account might lead us to

36 37

See Bodhicaryvatra VI.24-33. Bodhicaryvatra VI.31-33.

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blame them for their actions, and blaming persons runs the risk of thinking that they have acted out of who they are , which might reinstate thinking of persons in absolute, substantialist terms.

On this point, there has been some recent debate regarding over what, if anything, the Buddhist stance on free will is. Siderits (1987, pp.149) has argued that early Buddhists are, or should be, compatibilists, whereas Goodman (2009, Chapter 8) argues rather more plausibly that Buddhists are hard determinists of the Strawsonian kind. Buddhists, Goodman claims, seem to have a response to the objection that if free will does not exist, then it will be necessary to abandon the practice of ascribing moral responsibility; namely, that abandoning this practice will actually help people achieve the compassion, generosity, and forbearance needed to make themselves, and others, happy. (pp.162). The thought here is that if our actions are conditioned by a vast network of disparate causes, most of which are rarely (if ever) under our direct control, then it is neither absolutely warranted nor appropriate to level moral opprobrium towards those who transgress moral boundaries, particularly if we do so in an aggressive fashion. In this respect, compassion is the appropriate response to moral transgressions.

As we saw, accepting the liberals concept of the separateness of persons will lead to more successful moral practice if we are not yet able to grasp the doctrine of non-self. However, accepting non-self consistently leads to more successful moral practice by allowing us to put our resentment and anger anger into perspective. Therefore the Mahyna Buddhist can object to our two-truths solution on practical moral grounds.

VI

IMPLICATIONS FOR GARFIELDS ARGUMENT

We can now finally come full circle to see what bearing our discussion has on Garfields claim of the compatibility of Buddhist compassion-based and liberal rights-based approaches to ethics. Our discussion initially supported Garfields assessment of the compatibility of Buddhist and liberal approaches to ethics, at least at the level of the metaphysical commitments of their respective views on persons. However, through our examination of the practical ramifications of the talk of separate persons, Garfields assessment of their compatibility is somewhat undermined. His assessment that Buddhist and liberal approaches to ethics are mutually complementary ignores three

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substantial practical problems (corresponding to the three practical domains we have been discussing):

Firstly, Garfields argument ignores the soteriological ramifications of the liberals separateness of persons. Whilst the liberal does not have much to say about the soteriological use of his concept of the separateness of persons, for the Mdhyamika, however, accepting this view leads to successful soteriological practice at the beginning of a persons moral career. However, consistently successful soteriological practice requires a realization of non-self and emptiness, rather than merely our having our rights supplemented with compassion.

Secondly, Garfields argument ignores the political ramifications of liberals separateness of persons. Buddhist compassion-based ethics and liberal ethics can be reconciled to supplement their respective shortcomings looks rather optimistic when we consider the well-founded concern Buddhists will have that rights presuppose and promote attachment to separate and isolable selves who see other persons as limitations to their freedoms, rather than opportunities for the expression of compassion. Furthermore, Garfield claims that owing to the limitations of liberalism, and to the problem of the sanction of rights and duties, compassion is the appropriate moral capacity upon which to found rights. But as we saw in some detail when we suggested our Locke/Candrakrti synthesis, our theory of rights need not be based on any metaphysical commitments, thus avoiding much of the disputes around their sanction.

Thirdly, Garfields argument ignores the moral ramifications of the liberals separateness of persons, in that it consistently leads to more successful moral practice if we accept non-self than the liberals separateness of persons. As before, any synthesis based upon a view that promotes attachment to substantial, politically and morally-isolated and conflicting persons, will prove problematic for the Buddhist to fully accept.

CONCLUSION

We began by considering Garfields argument that Buddhism and liberalism are compatible and mutually complimentary, and moved on to consider the argument that Garfields assessment

37

was implausible (or at least optimistic), since he has overlooked the striking disparities between Buddhist and liberal conceptions of persons. We noted that if disparity between their views of persons is a genuine problem for Garfield's argument, then the wider project of reconciling Buddhism and liberalism might be jeopardized. We then continued to consider the two-truth solution to the differences in Mahyna and liberal views on persons, and then considered two replies to this solution; one semantic and one metaphysical. For either of these objections to be sustained we needed to examine the metaphysical presuppositions behind the liberal and Mahayana views on persons. This lead us to eventually reject the proposal that Buddhism and liberalism presuppose metaphysically substantive conceptions of personhood that cannot be reconciled. Armed with this insight, we had a reason for concluding that Buddhist and liberal views on person are not metaphysically incompatible. We moved on to consider the practical ramifications of talk of the separateness of persons, concluding that although Buddhist and liberal views on persons are not metaphysically incompatible, they are, unfortunately, practically incompatible. We saw that a number a solutions worked at the theoretical level - for example, the two-truths solution, the Mill/ Mdhyamaka synthesis and the the Locke/Candrakrti synthesis. However, we saw that there was much to prevent these types of synthesis at the practical level. My argument was that liberal talk of separate persons must be considered the first of many steps toward full moral capability, one that the Mdhyamika thinks must eventually be rejected if we are to avoid promoting the sorts of selfcentred attachment to substantial selves that Buddhists, for moral reasons, cannot countenance. This posed a problem both for our two-truth solution and for Garfields argument, since accepting the separateness of persons will probably, on balance, not lead consistently to successful practice.

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