POWER OF GENERAL SUPERVISION

G.R. No. 112497 August 4, 1994 HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, VICE-MAYOR JOSE L. ATIENZA, CITY TREASURER ANTHONY ACEVEDO, SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNSOD AND THE CITY OF MANILA, respondents. The City Legal Officer for petitioner. Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for Caltex (Phils.). Joseph Lopez for Sangguniang Panglunsod of Manila. L.A. Maglaya for Petron Corporation.

CRUZ, J.: The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local Government Code reading as follows: Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof; Provided, further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction. Pursuant thereto, the Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy. 1 In a petition for certiorari filed by the City of Manila, the Regional Trial Court of Manila revoked the Secretary's resolution and sustained the ordinance, holding inter alia that the procedural requirements had been observed. More importantly, it declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the power of control over local governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution and of the specific provision therein conferring on the President of the Philippines only the power of supervision over local governments. 2 The present petition would have us reverse that decision. The Secretary argues that the annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the Local Government Code had indeed not been observed. Parenthetically, this petition was originally dismissed by the Court for non-compliance with Circular 1-88, the Solicitor General having failed to submit a certified true copy of the challenged decision. 3 However, on motion for reconsideration with the required certified true copy of the decision attached, the petition was reinstated in view of the importance of the issues raised therein. We stress at the outset that the lower court had jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Section 187, this authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law. Specifically, BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, 4 even as the accused in a criminal action has the right to question in his defense the constitutionality of a law he is charged with violating and of the proceedings taken against him, particularly as they contravene the Bill of Rights. Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and

orders of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration of unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of separation of powers. As the questioned act is usually the handiwork of the legislative or the executive departments, or both, it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the higher judgment of this Court in the consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a thorough deliberation by a collegiate body and with the concurrence of the majority of those who participated in its discussion. 5 It is also emphasized that every court, including this Court, is charged with the duty of a purposeful hesitation before declaring a law unconstitutional, on the theory that the measure was first carefully studied by the executive and the legislative departments and determined by them to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally approved. To doubt is to sustain. The presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached by the required majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act must be struck down. In the case before us, Judge Rodolfo C. Palattao declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code unconstitutional insofar as it empowered the Secretary of Justice to review tax ordinances and, inferentially, to annul them. He cited the familiar distinction between control and supervision, the first being "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter," while the second is "the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions in accordance with law." 6 His conclusion was that the challenged section gave to the Secretary the power of control and not of supervision only as vested by the Constitution in the President of the Philippines. This was, in his view, a violation not only of Article X, specifically Section 4 thereof, 7 and of Section 5 on the taxing powers of local governments, 8 and the policy of local autonomy in general. We do not share that view. The lower court was rather hasty in invalidating the provision. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be. He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis for its annulment. He did not say that in his judgment it was a bad law. What he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government under the Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an act not of control but of mere supervision. An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. In the opinion of the Court, Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less than this, and so performed an act not of control but of mere supervision. The case of Taule v. Santos 9 cited in the decision has no application here because the jurisdiction claimed by the Secretary of Local Governments over election contests in the Katipunan ng Mga Barangay was held to belong to the Commission on Elections by constitutional provision. The conflict was over jurisdiction, not supervision or control. Significantly, a rule similar to Section 187 appeared in the Local Autonomy Act, which provided in its Section 2 as follows: A tax ordinance shall go into effect on the fifteenth day after its passage, unless the ordinance shall provide otherwise: Provided, however, That the Secretary of Finance shall have authority to suspend the effectivity of any ordinance within one hundred and twenty days after receipt by him of a copy thereof, if, in his opinion, the tax or fee therein levied or imposed is unjust, excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory, or when it is contrary to declared national economy policy, and when the said Secretary exercises this authority the effectivity of such ordinance shall be suspended, either in part or as a whole, for a period of thirty days within which period the local legislative body may either modify the tax ordinance to meet the objections thereto, or file an appeal with a court of competent jurisdiction; otherwise, the tax ordinance or the part or parts thereof declared suspended, shall be considered as revoked. Thereafter, the local legislative body may not reimpose the same tax or fee until such time as the grounds for the suspension thereof shall have ceased to exist.

That section allowed the Secretary of Finance to suspend the effectivity of a tax ordinance if, in his opinion, the tax or fee levied was unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. Determination of these flaws would involve the exercise of judgment or discretion and not merely an examination of whether or not the requirements or limitations of the law had been observed; hence, it would smack of control rather than mere supervision. That power was never questioned before this Court but, at any rate, the Secretary of Justice is not given the same latitude under Section 187. All he is permitted to do is ascertain the constitutionality or legality of the tax measure, without the right to declare that, in his opinion, it is unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. He has no discretion on this matter. In fact, Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code only on two grounds, to with, the inclusion therein of certain ultra vires provisions and non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in its enactment. These grounds affected the legality, not the wisdom or reasonableness, of the tax measure. The issue of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code is another matter. In his resolution, Secretary Drilon declared that there were no written notices of public hearings on the proposed Manila Revenue Code that were sent to interested parties as required by Art. 276(b) of the Implementing Rules of the Local Government Code nor were copies of the proposed ordinance published in three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation pursuant to Art. 276(a). No minutes were submitted to show that the obligatory public hearings had been held. Neither were copies of the measure as approved posted in prominent places in the city in accordance with Sec. 511(a) of the Local Government Code. Finally, the Manila Revenue Code was not translated into Pilipino or Tagalog and disseminated among the people for their information and guidance, conformably to Sec. 59(b) of the Code. Judge Palattao found otherwise. He declared that all the procedural requirements had been observed in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code and that the City of Manila had not been able to prove such compliance before the Secretary only because he had given it only five days within which to gather and present to him all the evidence (consisting of 25 exhibits) later submitted to the trial court. To get to the bottom of this question, the Court acceded to the motion of the respondents and called for the elevation to it of the said exhibits. We have carefully examined every one of these exhibits and agree with the trial court that the procedural requirements have indeed been observed. Notices of the public hearings were sent to interested parties as evidenced by Exhibits G-1 to 17. The minutes of the hearings are found in Exhibits M, M-1, M2, and M-3. Exhibits B and C show that the proposed ordinances were published in the Balita and the Manila Standard on April 21 and 25, 1993, respectively, and the approved ordinance was published in the July 3, 4, 5, 1993 issues of the Manila Standard and in the July 6, 1993 issue of Balita, as shown by Exhibits Q, Q-1, Q-2, and Q-3. The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved but this omission does not affect its validity, considering that its publication in three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation will satisfy due process. It has also not been shown that the text of the ordinance has been translated and disseminated, but this requirement applies to the approval of local development plans and public investment programs of the local government unit and not to tax ordinances. We make no ruling on the substantive provisions of the Manila Revenue Code as their validity has not been raised in issue in the present petition. WHEREFORE, the judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the challenged decision of the Regional Trial Court insofar as it declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code unconstitutional but AFFIRMING its finding that the procedural requirements in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code have been observed. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 102782 December 11, 1991 THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, RODOLFO A. MALAPIRA, STEPHEN A. MONSANTO, DAN R. CALDERON, and GRANDY N. TRIESTE, petitioners vs. THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AUTHORITY and the MUNICIPALITY OF MANDALUYONG, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:p In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, G.R. No. 91023, promulgated on July 13, 1990, 1 the Court held that the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605 and was permitted only under the conditions laid dowm by LOI 43 in the case of stalled vehicles obstructing the public

streets. It was there also observed that even the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations was not directly prescribed by the decree nor was it allowed by the decree to be imposed by the Commission. No motion for reconsideration of that decision was submitted. The judgment became final and executory on August 6, 1990, and it was duly entered in the Book of Entries of Judgments on July 13, 1990. Subsequently, the following developments transpired: In a letter dated October 17, 1990, Rodolfo A. Malapira complained to the Court that when he was stopped for an alleged traffic violation, his driver's license was confiscated by Traffic Enforcer Angel de los Reyes in Quezon City. On December 18,1990, the Caloocan-Manila Drivers and Operators Association sent a letter to the Court asking who should enforce the decision in the above-mentioned case, whether they could seek damages for confiscation of their driver's licenses, and where they should file their complaints. Another letter was received by the Court on February 14, 1991, from Stephen L. Monsanto, complaining against the confiscation of his driver's license by Traffic Enforcer A.D. Martinez for an alleged traffic violation in Mandaluyong. This was followed by a letter-complaint filed on March 7, 1991, from Dan R. Calderon, a lawyer, also for confiscation of his driver's license by Pat. R.J. Tano-an of the Makati Police Force. Still another complaint was received by the Court dated April 29, 1991, this time from Grandy N. Trieste, another lawyer, who also protested the removal of his front license plate by E. Ramos of the Metropolitan Manila AuthorityTraffic Operations Center and the confiscation of his driver's license by Pat. A.V. Emmanuel of the Metropolitan Police Command-Western Police District. Required to submit a Comment on the complaint against him, Allan D. Martinez invoked Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, of Mandaluyong, authorizing the confiscation of driver's licenses and the removal of license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations. For his part, A.V. Emmanuel said he confiscated Trieste's driver's license pursuant to a memorandum dated February 27, 1991, from the District Commander of the Western Traffic District of the Philippine National Police, authorizing such sanction under certain conditions. Director General Cesar P. Nazareno of the Philippine National Police assured the Court in his own Comment that his office had never authorized the removal of the license plates of illegally parked vehicles and that he had in fact directed full compliance with the above-mentioned decision in a memorandum, copy of which he attached, entitled Removal of Motor Vehicle License Plates and dated February 28, 1991. Pat. R.J. Tano-an, on the other hand, argued that the Gonong decision prohibited only the removal of license plates and not the confiscation of driver's licenses. On May 24, 1990, the Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, authorizing itself "to detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila." On July 2, 1991, the Court issued the following resolution: The attention ofthe Court has been called to the enactment by the Metropolitan Manila Authority of Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, providing inter alia that: Section 2. Authority to Detach Plate/Tow and Impound. The Metropolitan Manila Authority, thru the Traffic Operatiom Center, is authorized to detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila. The provision appears to be in conflict with the decision of the Court in the case at bar (as reported in 187 SCRA 432), where it was held that the license plates of motor vehicles may not be detached except only under the conditions prescribed in LOI 43. Additionally, the Court has received several complaints against the confiscation by police authorities of driver's licenses for alleged traffic violations, which sanction is, according to the said decision, not among those that may be imposed under PD 1605. To clarify these matters for the proper guidance of law-enforcement officers and motorists, the Court resolved to require the Metropolitan Manila Authority and the Solicitor General to submit, within ten (10) days from notice hereof, separate COMMENTS on such sanctions in light of the said decision.

In its Comment, the Metropolitan Manila Authority defended the said ordinance on the ground that it was adopted pursuant to the powers conferred upon it by EO 392. It particularly cited Section 2 thereof vesting in the Council (its governing body) the responsibility among others of: 1. Formulation of policies on the delivery of basic services requiring coordination or consolidation for the Authority; and 2. Promulgation of resolutions and other issuances of metropolitan wide application, approval of a code of basic services requiring coordination, and exercise of its rulemaking powers. (Emphasis supplied) The Authority argued that there was no conflict between the decision and the ordinance because the latter was meant to supplement and not supplant the latter. It stressed that the decision itself said that the confiscation of license plates was invalid in the absence of a valid law or ordinance, which was why Ordinance No. 11 was enacted. The Authority also pointed out that the ordinance could not be attacked collaterally but only in a direct action challenging its validity. For his part, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the ordinance was null and void because it represented an invalid exercise of a delegated legislative power. The flaw in the measure was that it violated existing law, specifically PD 1605, which does not permit, and so impliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates and the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila. He made no mention, however, of the alleged impropriety of examining the said ordinance in the absence of a formal challenge to its validity. On October 24, 1991, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted a motion for the early resolution of the questioned sanctions, to remove once and for all the uncertainty of their vahdity. A similar motion was filed by the Metropolitan Manila Authority, which reiterated its contention that the incidents in question should be dismissed because there was no actual case or controversy before the Court. The Metropolitan Manila Authority is correct in invoking the doctrine that the validity of a law or act can be challenged only in a direct action and not collaterally. That is indeed the settled principle. However, that rule is not inflexible and may be relaxed by the Court under exceptional circumstances, such as those in the present controversy. The Solicitor General notes that the practices complained of have created a great deal of confusion among motorists about the state of the law on the questioned sanctions. More importantly, he maintains that these sanctions are illegal, being violative of law and the Gonong decision, and should therefore be stopped. We also note the disturbing report that one policeman who confiscated a driver's license dismissed the Gonong decision as "wrong" and said the police would not stop their "habit" unless they received orders "from the top." Regrettably, not one of the complainants has filed a formal challenge to the ordinances, including Monsanto and Trieste, who are lawyers and could have been more assertive of their rights. Given these considerations, the Court feels it must address the problem squarely presented to it and decide it as categorically rather than dismiss the complaints on the basis of the technical objection raised and thus, through its inaction, allow them to fester. The step we now take is not without legal authority or judicial precedent. Unquestionably, the Court has the power to suspend procedural rules in the exercise of its inherent power, as expressly recognized in the Constitution, to promulgate rules concerning "pleading, practice and procedure in all courts." 2 In proper cases, procedural rules may be relaxed or suspended in the interest of substantial justice, which otherwise may be miscarried because of a rigid and formalistic adherence to such rules. The Court has taken this step in a number of such cases, notably Araneta vs. Dinglasan, 3 where Justice Tuason justified the deviation on the ground that "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure." We have made similar rulings in other cases, thus: Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment ofjustice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided. (Aznar III vs. Bernad, G.R. No. 81190, May 9, 1988, 161 SCRA 276.) Time and again, this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the higher interests of justice so require. In the instant petition, we forego a lengthy disquisition of the proper procedure that should have been taken by the parties involved and proceed directly to the merits of the case. (Piczon vs. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 31). Three of the cases were consolidated for argument and the other two were argued separately on other dates. Inasmuch as all of them present the same fundamental question

which, in our view, is decisive, they will be disposed of jointly. For the same reason we will pass up the objection to the personality or sufficiency of interest of the petitioners in case G.R. No. L-3054 and case G.R. No. L-3056 and the question whether prohibition lies in cases G.R. Nos. L-2044 and L2756. No practical benefit can be gained from a discussion of these procedural matters, since the decision in the cases wherein the petitioners'cause of action or the propriety of the procedure followed is not in dispute, will be controlling authority on the others. Above all, the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. (Avelino vs. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2821 cited in Araneta vs. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368.) Accordingly, the Court will consider the motion to resolve filed by the Solicitor General a petition for prohibition against the enforcement of Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, of the Metropohtan Manila Authority, and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Mandaluyong. Stephen A. Monsanto, Rodolfo A. Malapira, Dan R. Calderon, and Grandy N. Trieste are considered co-petitioners and the Metropolitan Manila Authority and the Municipality of Mandaluyong are hereby impleaded as respondents. This petition is docketed as G.R. No. 102782. The comments already submitted are duly noted and shall be taken into account by the Court in the resolution of the substantive issues raised. It is stressed that this action is not intended to disparage procedural rules, which the Court has recognized often enough as necessary to the orderly administration of justice. If we are relaxing them in this particular case, it is because of the failure of the proper parties to file the appropriate proceeding against the acts complained of, and the necessity of resolving, in the interest of the public, the important substantive issues raised. Now to the merits. The Metro Manila Authority sustains Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, under the specific authority conferred upon it by EO 392, while Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, is justified on the basis of the General Welfare Clause embodied in the Local Government Code. 4 It is not disputed that both measures were enacted to promote the comfort and convenience of the public and to alleviate the worsening traffic problems in Metropolitan Manila due in large part to violations of traffic rules. The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate such measures, it appearing that the requisites of such delegation are present. These requisites are. 1) the completeness of the statute making the delegation; and 2) the presence of a sufficient standard. 5 Under the first requirement, the statute must leave the legislature complete in all its terms and provisions such that all the delegate will have to do when the statute reaches it is to implement it. What only can be delegated is not the discretion to determine what the law shall be but the discretion to determine how the law shall be enforced. This has been done in the case at bar. As a second requirement, the enforcement may be effected only in accordance with a sufficient standard, the function of which is to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and thus "prevent the delegation from running riot." This requirement has also been met. It is settled that the "convenience and welfare" of the public, particularly the motorists and passengers in the case at bar, is an acceptable sufficient standard to delimit the delegate's authority. 6 But the problem before us is not the validity of the delegation of legislative power. The question we must resolve is the validity of the exercise of such delegated power. The measures in question are enactments of local governments acting only as agents of the national legislature. Necessarily, the acts of these agents must reflect and conform to the will of their principal. To test the validity of such acts in the specific case now before us, we apply the particular requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by the accepted principles governing municipal corporations. According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy. 7 A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the measures under consideration do not pass the first criterion because they do not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the following provisions of the decree authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission (and now the Metropolitan Manila Authority) to impose such sanctions: Section 1. The Metropolitan Manila Commission shall have the power to impose fines and otherwise discipline drivers and operators of motor vehicles for violations of traffic laws, ordinances, rules and regulations in Metropolitan Manila in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed. For this purpose, the powers of the Land Transportation

Commission and the Board of Transportation under existing laws over such violations and punishment thereof are hereby transferred to the Metropolitan Manila Commission. When the proper penalty to be imposed is suspension or revocation of driver's license or certificate of public convenience, the Metropolitan Manila Commission or its representatives shall suspend or revoke such license or certificate. The suspended or revoked driver's license or the report of suspension or revocation of the certificate of public convenience shall be sent to the Land Transportation Commission or the Board of Transportation, as the case may be, for their records update. xxx xxx xxx Section 3.` Violations of traffic laws, ordinances, rules and regulations, committed within a twelve-month period, reckoned from the date of birth of the licensee, shall subject the violator to graduated fines as follows: P10.00 for the first offense, P20.00 for the and offense, P50.00 for the third offense, a one-year suspension of driver's license for the fourth offense, and a revocation of the driver's license for the fifth offense: Provided, That the Metropolitan Manila Commission may impose higher penalties as it may deem proper for violations of its ordinances prohibiting or regulating the use of certain public roads, streets and thoroughfares in Metropolitan Manila. xxx xxx xxx Section 5. In case of traffic violations, the driver's license shall not be confiscated but the erring driver shall be immediately issued a traffic citation ticket prescribed by the Metropolitan Manila Commission which shall state the violation committed, the amount of fine imposed for the violation and an advice that he can make payment to the city or municipal treasurer where the violation was committed or to the Philippine National Bank or Philippine Veterans Bank or their branches within seven days from the date of issuance of the citation ticket. If the offender fails to pay the fine imposed within the period herein prescribed, the Metropolitan Manila Commission or the law-enforcement agency concerned shall endorse the case to the proper fiscal for appropriate proceedings preparatory to the filing of the case with the competent traffic court, city or municipal court. If at the time a driver renews his driver's license and records show that he has an unpaid fine, his driver's license shall not be renewed until he has paid the fine and corresponding surcharges. xxx xxx xxx Section 8. Insofar as the Metropolitan Manila area is concerned, all laws, decrees, orders, ordinances, rules and regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. (Emphasis supplied). In fact, the above provisions prohibit the imposition of such sanctions in Metropolitan Manila. The Commission was allowed to "impose fines and otherwise discipline" traffic violators only "in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed," that is, by the decree itself. Nowhere is the removal of license plates directly imposed by the decree or at least allowed by it to be imposed by the Commission. Notably, Section 5 thereof expressly provides that "in case of traffic violations, the driver's license shall not be confiscated." These restrictions are applicable to the Metropolitan Manila Authority and all other local political subdivisions comprising Metropolitan Manila, including the Municipality of Mandaluyong. The requirement that the municipal enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature (except only that the power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). 8 They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal. In the case before us, the enactments in question, which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute. The self-serving language of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance is worth noting. Curiously, it is the measure itself, which was enacted by the Metropolitan Manila Authority, that authorizes the Metropolitan Manila Authority to impose the questioned sanction. In Villacorta vs, Bemardo, 9 the Court nullified an ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board of Dagupan City for being violative of the Land Registration Act. The decision held in part: In declaring the said ordinance null and void, the court a quo declared:

From the above-recited requirements, there is no showing that would justify the enactment of the questioned ordinance. Section 1 of said ordinance clearly conflicts with Section 44 of Act 496, because the latter law does not require subdivision plans to be submitted to the City Engineer before the same is submitted for approval to and verification by the General Land Registration Office or by the Director of Lands as provided for in Section 58 of said Act. Section 2 of the same ordinance also contravenes the provisions of Section 44 of Act 496, the latter being silent on a service fee of P0.03 per square meter of every lot subject of such subdivision application; Section 3 of the ordinance in question also conflicts with Section 44 of Act 496, because the latter law does not mention of a certification to be made by the City Engineer before the Register of Deeds allows registration of the subdivision plan; and the last section of said ordinance impose a penalty for its violation, which Section 44 of Act 496 does not impose. In other words, Ordinance 22 of the City of Dagupan imposes upon a subdivision owner additional conditions. xxx xxx xxx The Court takes note of the laudable purpose of the ordinance in bringing to a halt the surreptitious registration of lands belonging to the government. But as already intimated above, the powers of the board in enacting such a laudable ordinance cannot be held valid when it shall impede the exercise of rights granted in a general law and/or make a general law subordinated to a local ordinance. We affirm. To sustain the ordinance would be to open the floodgates to other ordinances amending and so violating national laws in the guise of implementing them. Thus, ordinances could be passed imposing additional requirements for the issuance of marriage licenses, to prevent bigamy; the registration of vehicles, to minimize carnapping; the execution of contracts, to forestall fraud; the validation of parts, to deter imposture; the exercise of freedom of speech, to reduce disorder; and so on. The list is endless, but the means, even if the end be valid, would be ultra vires. The measures in question do not merely add to the requirement of PD 1605 but, worse, impose sanctions the decree does not allow and in fact actually prohibits. In so doing, the ordinances disregard and violate and in effect partially repeal the law. We here emphasize the ruling in the Gonong case that PD 1605 applies only to the Metropolitan Manila area. It is an exception to the general authority conferred by R.A. No. 413 on the Commissioner of Land Transportation to punish violations of traffic rules elsewhere in the country with the sanction therein prescribed, including those here questioned. The Court agrees that the challenged ordinances were enacted with the best of motives and shares the concern of the rest of the public for the effective reduction of traffic problems in Metropolitan Manila through the imposition and enforcement of more deterrent penalties upon traffic violators. At the same time, it must also reiterate the public misgivings over the abuses that may attend the enforcement of such sanction in eluding the illicit practices described in detail in the Gonong decision. At any rate, the fact is that there is no statutory authority for and indeed there is a statutory prohibition against the imposition of such penalties in the Metropolitan Manila area. Hence, regardless of their merits, they cannot be impose by the challenged enactments by virtue only of the delegated legislative powers. It is for Congress to determine, in the exercise of its own discretion, whether or not to impose such sanctions, either directly through a statute or by simply delegating authority to this effect to the local governments in Metropolitan Manila. Without such action, PD 1605 remains effective and continues prohibit the confiscation of license plates of motor vehicles (except under the conditions prescribed in LOI 43) and of driver licenses as well for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: (1) declaring Ordinance No.11, Seriesof l991,of theMetropolitan Manila Authority and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988 of the Municipality of Mandaluyong, NULL and VOID; and (2) enjoining all law enforcement authorities in Metropolitan Manila from removing the license plates of motor vehicles (except when authorized under LOI 43) and confiscating driver licenses for traffic violations within the said area.

SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 93252 August 5, 1991 RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS T. SANTOS, respondents. G.R. No. 93746 August 5,1991 MARY ANN RIVERA ARTIEDA, petitioner, vs. HON. LUIS SANTOS, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Local Government, NICANOR M. PATRICIO, in his capacity as Chief, Legal Service of the Department of Local Government and SALVADOR CABALUNA JR., respondents. G.R. No. 95245 August 5,1991 RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS T. SANTOS, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Local Government, respondents. Nicolas P. Sonalan for petitioner in 93252. Romeo A. Gerochi for petitioner in 93746. Eugenio Original for petitioner in 95245.

SARMIENTO, J.:p The petitioners take common issue on the power of the President (acting through the Secretary of Local Government), to suspend and/or remove local officials. The petitioners are the Mayor of Iloilo City (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) and a member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod thereof (G.R. No. 93746), respectively. The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of administrative complaints, ten in number, filed against him by various city officials sometime in 1988, on various charges, among them, abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution, and arbitrary detention. 1 The personalities involved are Joceleehn Cabaluna, a clerk at the city health office; Salvador Cabaluna, her husband; Dr. Felicidad Ortigoza, Assistant City Health Officer; Mansueto Malabor, Vice-Mayor; Rolando Dabao, Dan Dalido, German Gonzales, Larry Ong, and Eduardo Pefia Redondo members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod; and Pancho Erbite, a barangay tanod. The complaints against the Mayor are set forth in the opinion of the respondent Court of Appeals. 2 We quote: xxx xxx xxx In her verified complaint (Annex A), Mrs. Cabaluna, a clerk assigned to the City Health, Office of Iloilo City charged that due to political reasons, having supported the rival candidate, Mrs. Rosa 0. Caram, the petitioner City Mayor, using as an excuse the exigency of the service and the interest of the public, pulled her out from rightful office where her qualifications are best suited and assigned her to a work that should be the function of a non-career service employee. To make matters worse, a utility worker in the office of the Public Services, whose duties are alien to the complainant's duties and functions, has been detailed to take her place. The petitioner's act are pure harassments aimed at luring her away from her permanent position or force her to resign. In the case of Dra. Felicidad Ortigoza, she claims that the petitioner handpicked her to perform task not befitting her position as Assistant City Health Officer of Iloilo City; that her office was padlocked without any explanation or justification; that her salary was withheld without cause since April 1, 1988; that when she filed her vacation leave, she was given the run-around treatment in the approval of her leave in connivance with Dr. Rodolfo Villegas and that she was the object of a well-engineered trumped-up charge in an administrative complaint filed by Dr. Rodolfo Villegas (Annex B).

On the other hand, Mansuelo Malabor is the duly elected Vice-Mayor of Iloilo City and complainants Rolando Dabao, Dan Dalido, German Gonzales, Larry Ong and Eduardo Pefia Pedondo are members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of the City of Iloilo. Their complaint arose out from the case where Councilor Larry Ong, whose key to his office was unceremoniously and without previous notice, taken by petitioner. Without an office, Councilor Ong had to hold office at Plaza Libertad, The Vice-Mayor and the other complainants sympathized with him and decided to do the same. However, the petitioner, together with its fully-armed security men, forcefully drove them away from Plaza Libertad. Councilor Ong denounced the petitioner's actuations the following day in the radio station and decided to hold office at the Freedom Grandstand at Iloilo City and there were so many people who gathered to witness the incident. However, before the group could reach the area, the petitioner, together with his security men, led the firemen using a firetruck in dozing water to the people and the bystanders. Another administrative case was filed by Pancho Erbite, a barangay tanod, appointed by former mayor Rosa O. Caram. On March 13, 1988, without the benefit of charges filed against him and no warrant of arrest was issued, Erbite was arrested and detained at the City Jail of Iloilo City upon orders of petitioner. In jail, he was allegedly mauled by other detainees thereby causing injuries He was released only the following day. 3 The Mayor thereafter answered 4 and the cases were shortly set for hearing. The opinion of the Court of Appeals also set forth the succeeding events: xxx xxx xxx The initial hearing in the Cabaluna and Ortigoza cases were set for hearing on June 20-21, 1988 at the Regional Office of the Department of Local Government in Iloilo City. Notices, through telegrams, were sent to the parties (Annex L) and the parties received them, including the petitioner. The petitioner asked for a postponement before the scheduled date of hearing and was represented by counsel, Atty. Samuel Castro. The hearing officers, Atty. Salvador Quebral and Atty. Marino Bermudez had to come all the way from Manila for the two-day hearings but was actually held only on June 20,1988 in view of the inability and unpreparedness of petitioner's counsel. The next hearings were re-set to July 25, 26, 27,1988 in the same venue-Iloilo City. Again, the petitioner attempted to delay the proceedings and moved for a postponement under the excuse that he had just hired his counsel. Nonetheless, the hearing officers denied the motion to postpone, in view of the fact that the parties were notified by telegrams of the scheduled hearings (Annex M). In the said hearings, petitioner's counsel cross-examined the complainants and their witnesses. Finding probable grounds and reasons, the respondent issued a preventive suspension order on August 11, 1988 to last until October 11,1988 for a period of sixty (60) days. Then the next investigation was set on September 21, 1988 and the petitioner again asked for a postponement to September 26,1988. On September 26, 1988, the complainants and petitioner were present, together with their respective counsel. The petitioner sought for a postponement which was denied. In these hearings which were held in Mala the petitioner testified in Adm. Case No. C-10298 and 10299. The investigation was continued regarding the Malabor case and the complainants testified including their witnesses. On October 10, 1988, petitioner's counsel, Atty. Original moved for a postponement of the October 24, 1988 hearing to November 7 to 11, 1988 which was granted. However, the motion for change of venue as denied due to lack of funds. At the hearing on November 7, 1988, the parties and counsel were present. Petitioner reiterated his motion to change venue and moved for postponement anew. The counsel discussed a proposal to take the deposition of witnesses in Iloilo City so the hearing was indefinitely postponed. However, the parties failed to come to terms and after the parties were notified of the hearing, the investigation was set to December 13 to 15, 1988. The petitioner sought for another postponement on the ground that his witnesses were sick or cannot attend the investigation due to lack of transportation. The motion was denied and the petitioner was given up to December 14, 1988 to present his evidence.

On December 14,1988, petitioner's counsel insisted on his motion for postponement and the hearing officers gave petitioner up to December 15, 1988 to present his evidence. On December 15, 1988, the petitioner failed to present evidence and the cases were considered submitted for resolution. In the meantime, a prima facie evidence was found to exist in the arbitrary detention case filed by Pancho Erbite so the respondent ordered the petitioner's second preventive suspension dated October 11, 1988 for another sixty (60) days. The petitioner was able to obtain a restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Iloilo City. The second preventive suspension was not enforced. 5 Amidst the two successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzon instituted an action for prohibition against the respondent Secretary of Local Government (now, Interior) in the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City, where he succeeded in obtaining a writ of preliminary injunction. Presently, he instituted CA-G.R. SP No. 16417, an action for prohibition, in the respondent Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, on May 3, 1990, the respondent Secretary issued another order, preventively suspending Mayor Ganzon for another sixty days, the third time in twenty months, and designating meantime Vice-Mayor Mansueto Malabor as acting mayor. Undaunted, Mayor Ganzon commenced CA-G.R. SP No. 20736 of the Court of Appeals, a petition for prohibition, 6 (Malabor it is to be noted, is one of the complainants, and hence, he is interested in seeing Mayor Ganzon ousted.) On September 7, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment, dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 16417. On July 5, 1990, it likewise promulgated a decision, dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 20736. In a Resolution dated January 24, 1990, it issued a Resolution certifying the petition of Mary Ann Artieda, who had been similary charged by the respondent Secretary, to this Court. On June 26,1990, we issued a Temporary Restraining Order, barring the respondent Secretary from implementing the suspension orders, and restraining the enforcement of the Court of Appeals' two decisions. In our Resolution of November 29, 1990, we consolidated all three cases. In our Resolutions of January 15, 1991, we gave due course thereto. Mayor Ganzon claims as a preliminary (GR No. 93252), that the Department of Local Government in hearing the ten cases against him, had denied him due process of law and that the respondent Secretary had been "biased, prejudicial and hostile" towards him 7 arising from his (Mayor Ganzon's) alleged refusal to join the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino party 8 and the running political rivalry they maintained in the last congressional and local elections; 9 and his alleged refusal to operate a lottery in Iloilo City. 10 He also alleges that he requested the Secretary to lift his suspension since it had come ninety days prior to an election (the barangay elections of November 14, 1988), 11 notwithstanding which, the latter proceeded with the hearing and meted out two more suspension orders of the aforementioned cases. 12 He likewise contends that he sought to bring the cases to Iloilo City (they were held in Manila) in order to reduce the costs of proceeding, but the Secretary rejected his request. 13 He states that he asked for postponement on "valid and justifiable" 14 grounds, among them, that he was suffering from a heart ailment which required confinement; that his "vital" 15 witness was also hospitalized 16 but that the latter unduly denied his request. 17 Mayor Ganzon's primary argument (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) is that the Secretary of Local Government is devoid, in any event, of any authority to suspend and remove local officials, an argument reiterated by the petitioner Mary Ann Rivera Artieda (G.R. No. 93746). As to Mayor Ganzon's charges of denial of due process, the records do not show very clearly in what manner the Mayor might have been deprived of his rights by the respondent Secretary. His claims that he and Secretary LuisSantos were (are) political rivals and that his "persecution" was politically motivated are pure speculation and although the latter does not appear to have denied these contentions (as he, Mayor Ganzon, claims), we can not take his word for it the way we would have under less political circumstances, considering furthermore that "political feud" has often been a good excuse in contesting complaints. The Mayor has failed furthermore to substantiate his say-so's that Secretary Santos had attempted to seduce him to join the administration party and to operate a lottery in Iloilo City. Again, although the Secretary failed to rebut his allegations, we can not accept them, at face value, much more, as judicial admissions as he would have us accept them 18 for the same reasons above-stated and furthermore, because his say so's were never corroborated by independent testimonies. As a responsible public official, Secretary Santos, in pursuing an official function, is presumed to be performing his duties regularly and in the absence of contrary evidence, no ill motive can be ascribed to him. As to Mayor Ganzon's contention that he had requested the respondent Secretary to defer the hearing on account of the ninety-day ban prescribed by Section 62 of Batas Blg. 337, the Court finds the question to be moot and academic since we have in fact restrained the Secretary from further hearing the complaints against the petitioners.
19

As to his request, finally, for postponements, the Court is afraid that he has not given any compelling reason why we should overturn the Court of Appeals, which found no convincing reason to overrule Secretary Santos in denying his requests. Besides, postponements are a matter of discretion on the part of the hearing officer, and based on Mayor Ganzon's above story, we are not convinced that the Secretary has been guilty of a grave abuse of discretion. The Court can not say, under these circumstances, that Secretary Santos' actuations deprived Mayor Ganzon of due process of law. We come to the core question: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the President's alter ego, can suspend and/or remove local officials. It is the petitioners' argument that the 1987 Constitution 20 no longer allows the President, as the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions did, to exercise the power of suspension and/or removal over local officials. According to both petitioners, the Constitution is meant, first, to strengthen self-rule by local government units and second, by deleting the phrase 21 as may be provided by law to strip the President of the power of control over local governments. It is a view, so they contend, that finds support in the debates of the Constitutional Commission. The provision in question reads as follows: Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions. 22 It modifies a counterpart provision appearing in the 1935 Constitution, which we quote: Sec. 10. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all Local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. 23 The petitioners submit that the deletion (of "as may be provided by law") is significant, as their argument goes, since: (1) the power of the President is "provided by law" and (2) hence, no law may provide for it any longer. It is to be noted that in meting out the suspensions under question, the Secretary of Local Government acted in consonance with the specific legal provisions of Batas Blg. 337, the Local Government Code, we quote: Sec. 62. Notice of Hearing. Within seven days after the complaint is filed, the Minister of local Government, or the sanggunian concerned, as the case may be, shall require the respondent to submit his verified answer within seven days from receipt of said complaint, and commence the hearing and investigation of the case within ten days after receipt of such answer of the respondent. No investigation shall be held within ninety days immediately prior to an election, and no preventive suspension shall be imposed with the said period. If preventive suspension has been imposed prior to the aforesaid period, the preventive suspension shall be lifted. 24 Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension. (1) Preventive suspension may be imposed by the Minister of Local Government if the respondent is a provincial or city official, by the provincial governor if the respondent is an elective municipal official, or by the city or municipal mayor if the respondent is an elective barangay official. (2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, when the evidence of culpability is strong, when the gravity of the offense so warrants, or when the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. In all cases, preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension. (3) At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended official shall be deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings against him until its termination. However ' if the delay in the proceedings of the case is due to his fault, neglect or request, the time of the delay shall not be counted in computing the time of suspension. 25 The issue, as the Court understands it, consists of three questions: (1) Did the 1987 Constitution, in deleting the phrase "as may be provided by law" intend to divest the President of the power to investigate, suspend, discipline, and/or remove local officials? (2) Has the Constitution repealed Sections 62 and 63 of the Local Government Code? (3) What is the significance of the change in the constitutional language? It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitutional language, the charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right or the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local officials. It is our opinion that the omission (of "as may be

provided by law") signifies nothing more than to underscore local governments' autonomy from congress and to break Congress' "control" over local government affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in particular, concerning discipline. Autonomy does not, after all, contemplate making mini-states out of local government units, as in the federal governments of the United States of America (or Brazil or Germany), although Jefferson is said to have compared municipal corporations euphemistically to "small republics." 26 Autonomy, in the constitutional sense, is subject to the guiding star, though not control, of the legislature, albeit the legislative responsibility under the Constitution and as the "supervision clause" itself suggest-is to wean local government units from over-dependence on the central government. It is noteworthy that under the Charter, "local autonomy" is not instantly self-executing, but subject to, among other things, the passage of a local government code, 27 a local tax law, 28 income distribution legislation, 29 and a national representation law, 30 and measures 31 designed to realize autonomy at the local level. It is also noteworthy that in spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local government under the general supervision of the Executive. It is noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congress to include in the local government code provisions for removal of local officials, which suggest that Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the existing Local Government Code has done, delegate its exercise to the President. Thus: Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units. 32 As hereinabove indicated, the deletion of "as may be provided by law" was meant to stress, sub silencio, the objective of the framers to strengthen local autonomy by severing congressional control of its affairs, as observed by the Court of Appeals, like the power of local legislation. 33 The Constitution did nothing more, however, and insofar as existing legislation authorizes the President (through the Secretary of Local Government) to proceed against local officials administratively, the Constitution contains no prohibition. The petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally, "supervision" is not incompatible with disciplinary authority as this Court has held, 34 thus: xxx xxx xxx It is true that in the case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, 51 Off. Gaz., No. 6 p. 2884, this Court had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by the President over local government officials in contrast to the power of control given to him over executive officials of our government wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in meaning and extent. Thus in that case the Court has made the following digression: "In administration law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter." But from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President over local government officials does not include the power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires, as postulated in Section 64(c) of the Revised Administrative Code. ... 35 xxx xxx xxx "Control" has been defined as "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for test of the latter." 36 "Supervision" on the other hand means "overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. 37 As we held, 38 however, "investigating" is not inconsistent with "overseeing", although it is a lesser power than "altering". The impression is apparently exacerbated by the Court's pronouncements in at least three cases, Lacson v. Roque, 39 Hebron v. Reyes, 40 and Mondano v. Silvosa, 41 and possibly, a fourth one, Pelaez v. Auditor General. 42 In Lacson, this Court said that the President enjoyed no control powers but only supervision "as may be provided by law," 43 a rule we reiterated in Hebron, and Mondano. In Pelaez, we stated that the President "may not . . . suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding provincial board." 44 However, neither Lacson

nor Hebron nor Mondano categorically banned the Chief Executive from exercising acts of disciplinary authority because she did not exercise control powers, but because no law allowed her to exercise disciplinary authority. Thus, according to Lacson: The contention that the President has inherent power to remove or suspend municipal officers is without doubt not well taken. Removal and suspension of public officers are always controlled by the particular law applicable and its proper construction subject to constitutional limitations. 45 In Hebron we stated: Accordingly, when the procedure for the suspension of an officer is specified by law, the same must be deemed mandatory and adhered to strictly, in the absence of express or clear provision to the contrary-which does not et with respect to municipal officers ... 46 In Mondano, the Court held: ... The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over municipal officials in the provincial governor who is authorized to "receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude." And if the charges are serious, "he shall submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge by one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question." Section 86 of the Revised Administration Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be exercised by the Department Head over the administration of ... municipalities ... . If it be construed that it does and such additional power is the same authority as that vested in the Department Head by section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, then such additional power must be deemed to have been abrogated by Section 110(l), Article VII of the Constitution. 47 xxx xxx xxx In Pelaez, we stated that the President can not impose disciplinary measures on local officials except on appeal from the provincial board pursuant to the Administrative Code. 48 Thus, in those case that this Court denied the President the power (to suspend/remove) it was not because we did not think that the President can not exercise it on account of his limited power, but because the law lodged the power elsewhere. But in those cases ii which the law gave him the power, the Court, as in Ganzon v. Kayanan, found little difficulty in sustaining him. 49 The Court does not believe that the petitioners can rightfully point to the debates of the Constitutional Commission to defeat the President's powers. The Court believes that the deliberations are by themselves inconclusive, because although Commissioner Jose Nolledo would exclude the power of removal from the President, 50 Commissioner Blas Ople would not. 51 The Court is consequently reluctant to say that the new Constitution has repealed the Local Government Code, Batas Blg. 37. As we said, "supervision" and "removal" are not incompatible terms and one may stand with the other notwithstanding the stronger expression of local autonomy under the new Charter. We have indeed held that in spite of the approval of the Charter, Batas Blg. 337 is still in force and effect. 52 As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means "a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization." 53 The Constitution as we observed, does nothing more than to break up the monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local governments and as put by political adherents, to "liberate the local governments from the imperialism of Manila." Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the relation of partnership and inter-dependence between the central administration and local government units, or otherwise, to user in a regime of federalism. The Charter has not taken such a radical step. Local governments, under the Constitution, are subject to regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose than precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance self- government. As we observed in one case, 54 decentralization means devolution of national administration but not power to the local levels. Thus: Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable," and "ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more

effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress." At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous, In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency. 55 The successive sixty-day suspensions imposed on Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon is albeit another matter. What bothers the Court, and what indeed looms very large, is the fact that since the Mayor is facing ten administrative charges, the Mayor is in fact facing the possibility of 600 days of suspension, in the event that all ten cases yield prima facie findings. The Court is not of course tolerating misfeasance in public office (assuming that Mayor Ganzon is guilty of misfeasance) but it is certainly another question to make him serve 600 days of suspension, which is effectively, to suspend him out of office. As we held: 56 2. Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. His term of office does not expire until 1986. Were it not for this information and the suspension decreed by the Sandiganbayan according to the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, he would have been all this while in the full discharge of his functions as such municipal mayor. He was elected precisely to do so. As of October 26, 1983, he has been unable to. it is a basic assumption of the electoral process implicit in the right of suffrage that the people are entitled to the services of elective officials of their choice. For misfeasance or malfeasance, any of them could, of course, be proceeded against administratively or, as in this instance, criminally. In either case, Ms culpability must be established. Moreover, if there be a criminal action, he is entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence. A preventive suspension may be justified. Its continuance, however, for an unreasonable length of time raises a due process question. For even if thereafter he were acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold office had been nullified. Clearly, there would be in such a case an injustice suffered by him. Nor is he the only victim. There is injustice inflicted likewise on the people of Lianga They were deprived of the services of the man they had elected to serve as mayor. In that sense, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted continuance of this preventive suspension had outrun the bounds of reason and resulted in sheer oppression. A denial of due process is thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such an unconstitutional application that the order of suspension should be lifted. 57 The plain truth is that this Court has been ill at ease with suspensions, for the above reasons, 58 and so also, because it is out of the ordinary to have a vacancy in local government. The sole objective of a suspension, as we have held, 59 is simply "to prevent the accused from hampering the normal cause of the investigation with his influence and authority over possible witnesses" 60 or to keep him off "the records and other evidence. 61 It is a means, and no more, to assist prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against an erring local official. Under the Local Government Code, it can not exceed sixty days, 62 which is to say that it need not be exactly sixty days long if a shorter period is otherwise sufficient, and which is also to say that it ought to be lifted if prosecutors have achieved their purpose in a shorter span. Suspension is not a penalty and is not unlike preventive imprisonment in which the accused is held to insure his presence at the trial. In both cases, the accused (the respondent) enjoys a presumption of innocence unless and until found guilty. Suspension finally is temporary and as the Local Government Code provides, it may be imposed for no more than sixty days. As we held, 63 a longer suspension is unjust and unreasonable, and we might add, nothing less than tyranny. As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a remote possibility Mayor Ganzon is to all intents and purposes, to make him spend the rest of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and purposes, his suspension permanent. It is also, in fact, to mete out punishment in spite of the fact that the Mayor's guilt has not been proven. Worse, any absolution will be for naught because needless to say, the length of his suspension would have, by the time he is reinstated, wiped out his tenure considerably. The Court is not to be mistaken for obstructing the efforts of the respondent Secretary to see that justice is done in Iloilo City, yet it is hardly any argument to inflict on Mayor Ganzon successive suspensions when apparently, the respondent Secretary has had sufficient time to gather the necessary evidence to build a case against the Mayor

without suspending him a day longer. What is intriguing is that the respondent Secretary has been cracking down, so to speak, on the Mayor piecemeal apparently, to pin him down ten times the pain, when he, the respondent Secretary, could have pursued a consolidated effort. We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of Interior from exercising a legal power, yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary of Interior is exercising that power oppressively, and needless to say, with a grave abuse of discretion. The Court is aware that only the third suspension is under questions, and that any talk of future suspensions is in fact premature. The fact remains, however, that Mayor Ganzon has been made to serve a total of 120 days of suspension and the possibility of sixty days more is arguably around the corner (which amounts to a violation of the Local Government Code which brings to light a pattern of suspensions intended to suspend the Mayor the rest of his natural tenure. The Court is simply foreclosing what appears to us as a concerted effort of the State to perpetuate an arbitrary act. As we said, we can not tolerate such a state of affairs. We are therefore allowing Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon to suffer the duration of his third suspension and lifting, for the purpose, the Temporary Restraining Order earlier issued. Insofar as the seven remaining charges are concerned, we are urging the Department of Local Government, upon the finality of this Decision, to undertake steps to expedite the same, subject to Mayor Ganzon's usual remedies of appeal, judicial or administrative, or certiorari, if warranted, and meanwhile, we are precluding the Secretary from meting out further suspensions based on those remaining complaints, notwithstanding findings of prima facie evidence. In resume the Court is laying down the following rules: 1. Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere decentralization of administration, not of power, in which local officials remain accountable to the central government in the manner the law may provide; 2. The new Constitution does not prescribe federalism; 3. The change in constitutional language (with respect to the supervision clause) was meant but to deny legislative control over local governments; it did not exempt the latter from legislative regulations provided regulation is consistent with the fundamental premise of autonomy; 4. Since local governments remain accountable to the national authority, the latter may, by law, and in the manner set forth therein, impose disciplinary action against local officials; 5. "Supervision" and "investigation" are not inconsistent terms; "investigation" does not signify "control" (which the President does not have); 6. The petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon. may serve the suspension so far ordered, but may no longer be suspended for the offenses he was charged originally; provided: a) that delays in the investigation of those charges "due to his fault, neglect or request, (the time of the delay) shall not be counted in computing the time of suspension. [Supra, sec. 63(3)] b) that if during, or after the expiration of, his preventive suspension, the petitioner commits another or other crimes and abuses for which proper charges are filed against him by the aggrieved party or parties, his previous suspension shall not be a bar to his being preventively suspended again, if warranted under subpar. (2), Section 63 of the Local Government Code. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued is LIFTED. The suspensions of the petitioners are AFFIRMED, provided that the petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may not be made to serve future suspensions on account of any of the remaining administrative charges pending against him for acts committed prior to August 11, 1988. The Secretary of Interior is ORDERED to consolidate all such administrative cases pending against Mayor Ganzon. The sixty-day suspension against the petitioner, Mary Ann Rivera Artieda, is AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED. .R. No. 120082 September 11, 1996 MACTAN CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs.

HON. FERDINAND J. MARCOS, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Cebu City, THE CITY OF CEBU, represented by its Mayor HON. TOMAS R. OSMEA, and EUSTAQUIO B. CESA, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.: For review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of law are the decision of 22 March 1995 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 20, dismissing the petition for declaratory relief in Civil Case No. CEB-16900 entitled "Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority vs. City of Cebu", and its order of 4, May 1995 2 denying the motion to reconsider the decision. We resolved to give due course to this petition for its raises issues dwelling on the scope of the taxing power of local government-owned and controlled corporations. The uncontradicted factual antecedents are summarized in the instant petition as follows: Petitioner Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) was created by virtue of Republic Act No. 6958, mandated to "principally undertake the economical, efficient and effective control, management and supervision of the Mactan International Airport in the Province of Cebu and the Lahug Airport in Cebu City, . . . and such other Airports as may be established in the Province of Cebu . . . (Sec. 3, RA 6958). It is also mandated to: a) encourage, promote and develop international and domestic air traffic in the Central Visayas and Mindanao regions as a means of making the regions centers of international trade and tourism, and accelerating the development of the means of transportation and communication in the country; and b) upgrade the services and facilities of the airports and to formulate internationally acceptable standards of airport accommodation and service. Since the time of its creation, petitioner MCIAA enjoyed the privilege of exemption from payment of realty taxes in accordance with Section 14 of its Charter. Sec. 14. Tax Exemptions. The authority shall be exempt from realty taxes imposed by the National Government or any of its political subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities . . . On October 11, 1994, however, Mr. Eustaquio B. Cesa, Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Treasurer of the City of Cebu, demanded payment for realty taxes on several parcels of land belonging to the petitioner (Lot Nos. 913-G, 743, 88 SWO, 948-A, 989-A, 474, 109(931), I-M, 918, 919, 913-F, 941, 942, 947, 77 Psd., 746 and 991-A), located at Barrio Apas and Barrio Kasambagan, Lahug, Cebu City, in the total amount of P2,229,078.79. Petitioner objected to such demand for payment as baseless and unjustified, claiming in its favor the aforecited Section 14 of RA 6958 which exempt it from payment of realty taxes. It was also asserted that it is an instrumentality of the government performing governmental functions, citing section 133 of the Local Government Code of 1991 which puts limitations on the taxing powers of local government units: Sec. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units. Unless otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangay shall not extend to the levy of the following: a) . . . xxx xxx xxx o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and local government units. (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent City refused to cancel and set aside petitioner's realty tax account, insisting that the MCIAA is a government-controlled corporation whose tax exemption privilege has been withdrawn by virtue of Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Governmental Code that took effect on January 1, 1992: Sec. 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privilege. Unless otherwise provided in this Code, tax exemptions or incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons whether natural or juridical, including government-owned or controlled corporations, except local water districts, cooperatives duly registered under RA No. 6938, non-stock, and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code. (Emphasis supplied) xxx xxx xxx Sec. 234. Exemptions from Real Property taxes. . . . (a) . . . xxx xxx xxx (c) . . . Except as provided herein, any exemption from payment of real property tax previously granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical, including government-owned or controlled corporations are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code. As the City of Cebu was about to issue a warrant of levy against the properties of petitioner, the latter was compelled to pay its tax account "under protest" and thereafter filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 20, on December 29, 1994. MCIAA basically contended that the taxing powers of local government units do not extend to the levy of taxes or fees of any kind on an instrumentality of the national government. Petitioner insisted that while it is indeed a government-owned corporation, it nonetheless stands on the same footing as an agency or instrumentality of the national government. Petitioner insisted that while it is indeed a government-owned corporation, it nonetheless stands on the same footing as an agency or instrumentality of the national government by the very nature of its powers and functions. Respondent City, however, asserted that MACIAA is not an instrumentality of the government but merely a government-owned corporation performing proprietary functions As such, all exemptions previously granted to it were deemed withdrawn by operation of law, as provided under Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code when it took effect on January 1, 1992. 3 The petition for declaratory relief was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-16900. In its decision of 22 March 1995, 4 the trial court dismissed the petition in light of its findings, to wit: A close reading of the New Local Government Code of 1991 or RA 7160 provides the express cancellation and withdrawal of exemption of taxes by government owned and controlled corporation per Sections after the effectivity of said Code on January 1, 1992, to wit: [proceeds to quote Sections 193 and 234] Petitioners claimed that its real properties assessed by respondent City Government of Cebu are exempted from paying realty taxes in view of the exemption granted under RA 6958 to pay the same (citing Section 14 of RA 6958). However, RA 7160 expressly provides that "All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decress [sic], executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly." ([f], Section 534, RA 7160). With that repealing clause in RA 7160, it is safe to infer and state that the tax exemption provided for in RA 6958 creating petitioner had been expressly repealed by the provisions of the New Local Government Code of 1991. So that petitioner in this case has to pay the assessed realty tax of its properties effective after January 1, 1992 until the present.

This Court's ruling finds expression to give impetus and meaning to the overall objectives of the New Local Government Code of 1991, RA 7160. "It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Towards this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed from the national government to the local government units. . . . 5 Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the trial court in its 4 May 1995 order, the petitioner filed the instant petition based on the following assignment of errors: I RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN FAILING TO RULE THAT THE PETITIONER IS VESTED WITH GOVERNMENT POWERS AND FUNCTIONS WHICH PLACE IT IN THE SAME CATEGORY AS AN INSTRUMENTALITY OR AGENCY OF THE GOVERNMENT. II RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER IS LIABLE TO PAY REAL PROPERTY TAXES TO THE CITY OF CEBU. Anent the first assigned error, the petitioner asserts that although it is a government-owned or controlled corporation it is mandated to perform functions in the same category as an instrumentality of Government. An instrumentality of Government is one created to perform governmental functions primarily to promote certain aspects of the economic life of the people. 6 Considering its task "not merely to efficiently operate and manage the Mactan-Cebu International Airport, but more importantly, to carry out the Government policies of promoting and developing the Central Visayas and Mindanao regions as centers of international trade and tourism, and accelerating the development of the means of transportation and communication in the country," 7 and that it is an attached agency of the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC), 8 the petitioner "may stand in [sic] the same footing as an agency or instrumentality of the national government." Hence, its tax exemption privilege under Section 14 of its Charter "cannot be considered withdrawn with the passage of the Local Government Code of 1991 (hereinafter LGC) because Section 133 thereof specifically states that the taxing powers of local government units shall not extend to the levy of taxes of fees or charges of any kind on the national government its agencies and instrumentalities." As to the second assigned error, the petitioner contends that being an instrumentality of the National Government, respondent City of Cebu has no power nor authority to impose realty taxes upon it in accordance with the aforesaid Section 133 of the LGC, as explained in Basco vs. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation; 9 Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original character, PD 1869. All its shares of stock are owned by the National Government. . . . PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and regulate gambling casinos. The latter joke is governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local government. The states have no power by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden or in any manner control the operation of constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the federal government. (McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316, 4 L Ed. 579). This doctrine emanates from the "supremacy" of the National Government over local government. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court, make references to the entire absence of power on the part of the States to touch, in that way (taxation) at least, the instrumentalities of the United States (Johnson v. Maryland, 254 US 51) and it can be agreed that no state or political subdivision can regulate a federal instrumentality in such a way as to prevent it from consummating its federal responsibilities, or even to seriously burden it in the accomplishment of them. (Antieau Modern Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, p. 140)

Otherwise mere creature of the State can defeat National policies thru extermination of what local authorities may perceive to be undesirable activities or enterprise using the power to tax as "a toll for regulation" (U.S. v. Sanchez, 340 US 42). The power to tax which was called by Justice Marshall as the "power to destroy" (McCulloch v. Maryland, supra) cannot be allowed to defeat an instrumentality or creation of the very entity which has the inherent power to wield it. (Emphasis supplied) It then concludes that the respondent Judge "cannot therefore correctly say that the questioned provisions of the Code do not contain any distinction between a governmental function as against one performing merely proprietary ones such that the exemption privilege withdrawn under the said Code would apply to all government corporations." For it is clear from Section 133, in relation to Section 234, of the LGC that the legislature meant to exclude instrumentalities of the national government from the taxing power of the local government units. In its comment respondent City of Cebu alleges that as local a government unit and a political subdivision, it has the power to impose, levy, assess, and collect taxes within its jurisdiction. Such power is guaranteed by the Constitution 10 and enhanced further by the LGC. While it may be true that under its Charter the petitioner was exempt from the payment of realty taxes, 11 this exemption was withdrawn by Section 234 of the LGC. In response to the petitioner's claim that such exemption was not repealed because being an instrumentality of the National Government, Section 133 of the LGC prohibits local government units from imposing taxes, fees, or charges of any kind on it, respondent City of Cebu points out that the petitioner is likewise a government-owned corporation, and Section 234 thereof does not distinguish between government-owned corporation, and Section 234 thereof does not distinguish between government-owned corporation, and Section 234 thereof does not distinguish between government-owned or controlled corporations performing governmental and purely proprietary functions. Respondent city of Cebu urges this the Manila International Airport Authority is a governmental-owned corporation, 12 and to reject the application of Basco because it was "promulgated . . . before the enactment and the singing into law of R.A. No. 7160," and was not, therefore, decided "in the light of the spirit and intention of the framers of the said law. As a general rule, the power to tax is an incident of sovereignty and is unlimited in its range, acknowledging in its very nature no limits, so that security against its abuse is to be found only in the responsibility of the legislature which imposes the tax on the constituency who are to pay it. Nevertheless, effective limitations thereon may be imposed by the people through their Constitutions. 13 Our Constitution, for instance, provides that the rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable and Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation. 14 So potent indeed is the power that it was once opined that "the power to tax involves the power to destroy." 15 Verily, taxation is a destructive power which interferes with the personal and property for the support of the government. Accordingly, tax statutes must be construed strictly against the government and liberally in favor of the taxpayer. 16 But since taxes are what we pay for civilized society, 17 or are the lifeblood of the nation, the law frowns against exemptions from taxation and statutes granting tax exemptions are thus construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayers and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. 18 A claim of exemption from tax payment must be clearly shown and based on language in the law too plain to be mistaken. 19 Elsewise stated, taxation is the rule, exemption therefrom is the exception. 20 However, if the grantee of the exemption is a political subdivision or instrumentality, the rigid rule of construction does not apply because the practical effect of the exemption is merely to reduce the amount of money that has to be handled by the government in the course of its operations. 21 The power to tax is primarily vested in the Congress; however, in our jurisdiction, it may be exercised by local legislative bodies, no longer merely by virtue of a valid delegation as before, but pursuant to direct authority conferred by Section 5, Article X of the Constitution. 22 Under the latter, the exercise of the power may be subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide which, however, must be consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. There can be no question that under Section 14 of R.A. No. 6958 the petitioner is exempt from the payment of realty taxes imposed by the National Government or any of its political subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities. Nevertheless, since taxation is the rule and exemption therefrom the exception, the exemption may thus be withdrawn at the pleasure of the taxing authority. The only exception to this rule is where the exemption was granted to private parties based on material consideration of a mutual nature, which then becomes contractual and is thus covered by the nonimpairment clause of the Constitution. 23 The LGC, enacted pursuant to Section 3, Article X of the constitution provides for the exercise by local government units of their power to tax, the scope thereof or its limitations, and the exemption from taxation. Section 133 of the LGC prescribes the common limitations on the taxing powers of local government units as follows:

Sec. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Power of Local Government Units. Unless otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the levy of the following: (a) Income tax, except when levied on banks and other financial institutions; (b) Documentary stamp tax; (c) Taxes on estates, "inheritance, gifts, legacies and other acquisitions mortis causa, except as otherwise provided herein (d) Customs duties, registration fees of vessels and wharfage on wharves, tonnage dues, and all other kinds of customs fees charges and dues except wharfage on wharves constructed and maintained by the local government unit concerned: (e) Taxes, fees and charges and other imposition upon goods carried into or out of, or passing through, the territorial jurisdictions of local government units in the guise or charges for wharfages, tolls for bridges or otherwise, or other taxes, fees or charges in any form whatsoever upon such goods or merchandise; (f) Taxes fees or charges on agricultural and aquatic products when sold by marginal farmers or fishermen; (g) Taxes on business enterprise certified to be the Board of Investment as pioneer or non-pioneer for a period of six (6) and four (4) years, respectively from the date of registration; (h) Excise taxes on articles enumerated under the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and taxes, fees or charges on petroleum products; (i) Percentage or value added tax (VAT) on sales, barters or exchanges or similar transactions on goods or services except as otherwise provided herein; (j) Taxes on the gross receipts of transportation contractor and person engage in the transportation of passengers of freight by hire and common carriers by air, land, or water, except as provided in this code; (k) Taxes on premiums paid by ways reinsurance or retrocession; (l) Taxes, fees, or charges for the registration of motor vehicles and for the issuance of all kinds of licenses or permits for the driving of thereof, except, tricycles; (m) Taxes, fees, or other charges on Philippine product actually exported, except as otherwise provided herein; (n) Taxes, fees, or charges, on Countryside and Barangay Business Enterprise and Cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6810 and Republic Act Numbered Sixty nine hundred thirty-eight (R.A. No. 6938) otherwise known as the "Cooperative Code of the Philippines; and (o) TAXES, FEES, OR CHARGES OF ANY KIND ON THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, ITS AGENCIES AND INSTRUMENTALITIES, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS. (emphasis supplied) Needless to say the last item (item o) is pertinent in this case. The "taxes, fees or charges" referred to are "of any kind", hence they include all of these, unless otherwise provided by the LGC. The term "taxes" is well understood so as to need no further elaboration, especially in the light of the above enumeration. The term "fees" means charges fixed by law or Ordinance for the regulation or inspection of business activity, 24 while "charges" are pecuniary liabilities such as rents or fees against person or property. 25 Among the "taxes" enumerated in the LGC is real property tax, which is governed by Section 232. It reads as follows:

Sec. 232. Power to Levy Real Property Tax. A province or city or a municipality within the Metropolitan Manila Area may levy on an annual ad valorem tax on real property such as land, building, machinery and other improvements not hereafter specifically exempted. Section 234 of LGC provides for the exemptions from payment of real property taxes and withdraws previous exemptions therefrom granted to natural and juridical persons, including government owned and controlled corporations, except as provided therein. It provides: Sec. 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. The following are exempted from payment of the real property tax: (a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof had been granted, for reconsideration or otherwise, to a taxable person; (b) Charitable institutions, churches, parsonages or convents appurtenants thereto, mosques nonprofits or religious cemeteries and all lands, building and improvements actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious charitable or educational purposes; (c) All machineries and equipment that are actually, directly and exclusively used by local water districts and government-owned or controlled corporations engaged in the supply and distribution of water and/or generation and transmission of electric power; (d) All real property owned by duly registered cooperatives as provided for under R.A. No. 6938; and; (e) Machinery and equipment used for pollution control and environmental protection. Except as provided herein, any exemptions from payment of real property tax previously granted to or presently enjoyed by, all persons whether natural or juridical, including all government owned or controlled corporations are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of his Code. These exemptions are based on the ownership, character, and use of the property. Thus; (a) Ownership Exemptions. Exemptions from real property taxes on the basis of ownership are real properties owned by: (i) the Republic, (ii) a province, (iii) a city, (iv) a municipality, (v) a barangay, and (vi) registered cooperatives. (b) Character Exemptions. Exempted from real property taxes on the basis of their character are: (i) charitable institutions, (ii) houses and temples of prayer like churches, parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, and (iii) non profit or religious cemeteries. (c) Usage exemptions. Exempted from real property taxes on the basis of the actual, direct and exclusive use to which they are devoted are: (i) all lands buildings and improvements which are actually, directed and exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational purpose; (ii) all machineries and equipment actually, directly and exclusively used or by local water districts or by government-owned or controlled corporations engaged in the supply and distribution of water and/or generation and transmission of electric power; and (iii) all machinery and equipment used for pollution control and environmental protection. To help provide a healthy environment in the midst of the modernization of the country, all machinery and equipment for pollution control and environmental protection may not be taxed by local governments. 2. Other Exemptions Withdrawn. All other exemptions previously granted to natural or juridical persons including government-owned or controlled corporations are withdrawn upon the effectivity of the Code. 26 Section 193 of the LGC is the general provision on withdrawal of tax exemption privileges. It provides:

Sec. 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges. Unless otherwise provided in this code, tax exemptions or incentives granted to or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical, including government-owned, or controlled corporations, except local water districts, cooperatives duly registered under R.A. 6938, non stock and non profit hospitals and educational constitutions, are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code. On the other hand, the LGC authorizes local government units to grant tax exemption privileges. Thus, Section 192 thereof provides: Sec. 192. Authority to Grant Tax Exemption Privileges. Local government units may, through ordinances duly approved, grant tax exemptions, incentives or reliefs under such terms and conditions as they may deem necessary. The foregoing sections of the LGC speaks of: (a) the limitations on the taxing powers of local government units and the exceptions to such limitations; and (b) the rule on tax exemptions and the exceptions thereto. The use of exceptions of provisos in these section, as shown by the following clauses: (1) "unless otherwise provided herein" in the opening paragraph of Section 133; (2) "Unless otherwise provided in this Code" in section 193; (3) "not hereafter specifically exempted" in Section 232; and (4) "Except as provided herein" in the last paragraph of Section 234 initially hampers a ready understanding of the sections. Note, too, that the aforementioned clause in section 133 seems to be inaccurately worded. Instead of the clause "unless otherwise provided herein," with the "herein" to mean, of course, the section, it should have used the clause "unless otherwise provided in this Code." The former results in absurdity since the section itself enumerates what are beyond the taxing powers of local government units and, where exceptions were intended, the exceptions were explicitly indicated in the text. For instance, in item (a) which excepts the income taxes "when livied on banks and other financial institutions", item (d) which excepts "wharfage on wharves constructed and maintained by the local government until concerned"; and item (1) which excepts taxes, fees, and charges for the registration and issuance of license or permits for the driving of "tricycles". It may also be observed that within the body itself of the section, there are exceptions which can be found only in other parts of the LGC, but the section interchangeably uses therein the clause "except as otherwise provided herein" as in items (c) and (i), or the clause "except as otherwise provided herein" as in items (c) and (i), or the clause "excepts as provided in this Code" in item (j). These clauses would be obviously unnecessary or mere surplusages if the opening clause of the section were" "Unless otherwise provided in this Code" instead of "Unless otherwise provided herein". In any event, even if the latter is used, since under Section 232 local government units have the power to levy real property tax, except those exempted therefrom under Section 234, then Section 232 must be deemed to qualify Section 133. Thus, reading together Section 133, 232 and 234 of the LGC, we conclude that as a general rule, as laid down in Section 133 the taxing powers of local government units cannot extend to the levy of inter alia, "taxes, fees, and charges of any kind of the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalties, and local government units"; however, pursuant to Section 232, provinces, cities, municipalities in the Metropolitan Manila Area may impose the real property tax except on, inter alia, "real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions except when the beneficial used thereof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person", as provided in item (a) of the first paragraph of Section 234. As to tax exemptions or incentives granted to or presently enjoyed by natural or juridical persons, including government-owned and controlled corporations, Section 193 of the LGC prescribes the general rule, viz., they are withdrawn upon the effectivity of the LGC, except upon the effectivity of the LGC, except those granted to local water districts, cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938, non stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, and unless otherwise provided in the LGC. The latter proviso could refer to Section 234, which enumerates the properties exempt from real property tax. But the last paragraph of Section 234 further qualifies the retention of the exemption in so far as the real property taxes are concerned by limiting the retention only to those enumerated there-in; all others not included in the enumeration lost the privilege upon the effectivity of the LGC. Moreover, even as the real property is owned by the Republic of the Philippines, or any of its political subdivisions covered by item (a) of the first paragraph of Section 234, the exemption is withdrawn if the beneficial use of such property has been granted to taxable person for consideration or otherwise.

Since the last paragraph of Section 234 unequivocally withdrew, upon the effectivity of the LGC, exemptions from real property taxes granted to natural or juridical persons, including governmentowned or controlled corporations, except as provided in the said section, and the petitioner is, undoubtedly, a government-owned corporation, it necessarily follows that its exemption from such tax granted it in Section 14 of its charter, R.A. No. 6958, has been withdrawn. Any claim to the contrary can only be justified if the petitioner can seek refuge under any of the exceptions provided in Section 234, but not under Section 133, as it now asserts, since, as shown above, the said section is qualified by Section 232 and 234. In short, the petitioner can no longer invoke the general rule in Section 133 that the taxing powers of the local government units cannot extend to the levy of: (o) taxes, fees, or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies, or instrumentalities, and local government units. I must show that the parcels of land in question, which are real property, are any one of those enumerated in Section 234, either by virtue of ownership, character, or use of the property. Most likely, it could only be the first, but not under any explicit provision of the said section, for one exists. In light of the petitioner's theory that it is an "instrumentality of the Government", it could only be within be first item of the first paragraph of the section by expanding the scope of the terms Republic of the Philippines" to embrace . . . . . . "instrumentalities" and "agencies" or expediency we quote: (a) real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines, or any of the Philippines, or any of its political subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person. This view does not persuade us. In the first place, the petitioner's claim that it is an instrumentality of the Government is based on Section 133(o), which expressly mentions the word "instrumentalities"; and in the second place it fails to consider the fact that the legislature used the phrase "National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities" "in Section 133(o),but only the phrase "Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivision "in Section 234(a). The terms "Republic of the Philippines" and "National Government" are not interchangeable. The former is boarder and synonymous with "Government of the Republic of the Philippines" which the Administrative Code of the 1987 defines as the "corporate governmental entity though which the functions of the government are exercised through at the Philippines, including, saves as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through which political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous reason, the provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivision or other forms of local government." 27 These autonomous regions, provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions" are the political subdivision. 28 On the other hand, "National Government" refers "to the entire machinery of the central government, as distinguished from the different forms of local Governments." 29 The National Government then is composed of the three great departments the executive, the legislative and the judicial. 30 An "agency" of the Government refers to "any of the various units of the Government, including a department, bureau, office instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein;" 31 while an "instrumentality" refers to "any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy; usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned and controlled corporations". 32 If Section 234(a) intended to extend the exception therein to the withdrawal of the exemption from payment of real property taxes under the last sentence of the said section to the agencies and instrumentalities of the National Government mentioned in Section 133(o), then it should have restated the wording of the latter. Yet, it did not Moreover, that Congress did not wish to expand the scope of the exemption in Section 234(a) to include real property owned by other instrumentalities or agencies of the government including government-owned and controlled corporations is further borne out by the fact that the source of this exemption is Section 40(a) of P.D. No. 646, otherwise known as the Real Property Tax Code, which reads: Sec 40. Exemption from Real Property Tax. The exemption shall be as follows: (a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions and any government-owned or controlled corporations so exempt by is charter: Provided, however, that this exemption shall not apply to real property of the above mentioned entities the beneficial use of which

has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person. Note that as a reproduced in Section 234(a), the phrase "and any government-owned or controlled corporation so exempt by its charter" was excluded. The justification for this restricted exemption in Section 234(a) seems obvious: to limit further tax exemption privileges, specially in light of the general provision on withdrawal of exemption from payment of real property taxes in the last paragraph of property taxes in the last paragraph of Section 234. These policy considerations are consistent with the State policy to ensure autonomy to local governments 33 and the objective of the LGC that they enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them effective partners in the attainment of national goals. 34 The power to tax is the most effective instrument to raise needed revenues to finance and support myriad activities of local government units for the delivery of basic services essential to the promotion of the general welfare and the enhancement of peace, progress, and prosperity of the people. It may also be relevant to recall that the original reasons for the withdrawal of tax exemption privileges granted to government-owned and controlled corporations and all other units of government were that such privilege resulted in serious tax base erosion and distortions in the tax treatment of similarly situated enterprises, and there was a need for this entities to share in the requirements of the development, fiscal or otherwise, by paying the taxes and other charges due from them. 35 The crucial issues then to be addressed are: (a) whether the parcels of land in question belong to the Republic of the Philippines whose beneficial use has been granted to the petitioner, and (b) whether the petitioner is a "taxable person". Section 15 of the petitioner's Charter provides: Sec. 15. Transfer of Existing Facilities and Intangible Assets. All existing public airport facilities, runways, lands, buildings and other properties, movable or immovable, belonging to or presently administered by the airports, and all assets, powers, rights, interests and privileges relating on airport works, or air operations, including all equipment which are necessary for the operations of air navigation, acrodrome control towers, crash, fire, and rescue facilities are hereby transferred to the Authority: Provided however, that the operations control of all equipment necessary for the operation of radio aids to air navigation, airways communication, the approach control office, and the area control center shall be retained by the Air Transportation Office. No equipment, however, shall be removed by the Air Transportation Office from Mactan without the concurrence of the authority. The authority may assist in the maintenance of the Air Transportation Office equipment. The "airports" referred to are the "Lahug Air Port" in Cebu City and the "Mactan International AirPort in the Province of Cebu", 36 which belonged to the Republic of the Philippines, then under the Air Transportation Office (ATO). 37 It may be reasonable to assume that the term "lands" refer to "lands" in Cebu City then administered by the Lahug Air Port and includes the parcels of land the respondent City of Cebu seeks to levy on for real property taxes. This section involves a "transfer" of the "lands" among other things, to the petitioner and not just the transfer of the beneficial use thereof, with the ownership being retained by the Republic of the Philippines. This "transfer" is actually an absolute conveyance of the ownership thereof because the petitioner's authorized capital stock consists of, inter alia "the value of such real estate owned and/or administered by the airports." 38 Hence, the petitioner is now the owner of the land in question and the exception in Section 234(c) of the LGC is inapplicable. Moreover, the petitioner cannot claim that it was never a "taxable person" under its Charter. It was only exempted from the payment of real property taxes. The grant of the privilege only in respect of this tax is conclusive proof of the legislative intent to make it a taxable person subject to all taxes, except real property tax. Finally, even if the petitioner was originally not a taxable person for purposes of real property tax, in light of the forgoing disquisitions, it had already become even if it be conceded to be an "agency" or "instrumentality" of the Government, a taxable person for such purpose in view of the withdrawal in the last paragraph of Section 234 of exemptions from the payment of real property taxes, which, as earlier adverted to, applies to the petitioner. Accordingly, the position taken by the petitioner is untenable. Reliance on Basco vs. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation 39 is unavailing since it was decided before the effectivity of the LGC. Besides, nothing can prevent Congress from decreeing that even instrumentalities or agencies

of the government performing governmental functions may be subject to tax. Where it is done precisely to fulfill a constitutional mandate and national policy, no one can doubt its wisdom. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The challenged decision and order of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 20, in Civil Case No. CEB-16900 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

DECENTRALIZATION, LOCAL AUTONOMY

G.R. No. 80391 February 28, 1989 SULTAN ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA, petitioner, vs. CONTE MANGELIN, SALIC ALI, SALINDATO ALI, PILIMPINAS CONDING, ACMAD TOMAWIS, GERRY TOMAWIS, JESUS ORTIZ, ANTONIO DELA FUENTE, DIEGO PALOMARES, JR., RAUL DAGALANGIT, and BIMBO SINSUAT, respondents. Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioner petitioner. Makabangkit B. Lanto for respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.: The acts of the Sangguniang Pampook of Region XII are assailed in this petition. The antecedent facts are as follows: 1. On September 24, 1986, petitioner Sultan Alimbusar Limbona was appointed as a member of the Sangguniang Pampook, Regional Autonomous Government, Region XII, representing Lanao del Sur. 2. On March 12, 1987 petitioner was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly for brevity). 3. Said Assembly is composed of eighteen (18) members. Two of said members, respondents Acmad Tomawis and Pakil Dagalangit, filed on March 23, 1987 with the Commission on Elections their respective certificates of candidacy in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections for the district of Lanao del Sur but they later withdrew from the aforesaid election and thereafter resumed again their positions as members of the Assembly. 4. On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited Mr. Xavier Razul, Pampook Speaker of Region XI, Zamboanga City and the petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly, Region XII, in a letter which reads: The Committee on Muslim Affairs well undertake consultations and dialogues with local government officials, civic, religious organizations and traditional leaders on the recent and present political developments and other issues affecting Regions IX and XII. The result of the conference, consultations and dialogues would hopefully chart the autonomous governments of the two regions as envisioned and may prod the President to constitute immediately the Regional Consultative Commission as mandated by the Commission. You are requested to invite some members of the Pampook Assembly of your respective assembly on November 1 to 15, 1987, with venue at the Congress of the Philippines. Your presence, unstinted support and cooperation is (sic) indispensable.

5. Consistent with the said invitation, petitioner sent a telegram to Acting Secretary Johnny Alimbuyao of the Assembly to wire all Assemblymen that there shall be no session in November as "our presence in the house committee hearing of Congress take (sic) precedence over any pending business in batasang pampook ... ." 6. In compliance with the aforesaid instruction of the petitioner, Acting Secretary Alimbuyao sent to the members of the Assembly the following telegram: TRANSMITTING FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM SPEAKER LIMBONA QUOTE CONGRESSMAN JIMMY MATALAM CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON MUSLIM AFFAIRS REQUESTED ME TO ASSIST SAID COMMITTEE IN THE DISCUSSION OF THE PROPOSED AUTONOMY ORGANIC NOV. 1ST TO 15. HENCE WERE ALL ASSEMBLYMEN THAT THERE SHALL BE NO SESSION IN NOVEMBER AS OUR PRESENCE IN THE HOUSE COMMITTEE HEARING OF CONGRESS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER ANY PENDING BUSINESS IN BATASANG PAMPOOK OF MATALAM FOLLOWS UNQUOTE REGARDS. 7. On November 2, 1987, the Assembly held session in defiance of petitioner's advice, with the following assemblymen present: 1. Sali, Salic 2. Conding, Pilipinas (sic) 3. Dagalangit, Rakil 4. Dela Fuente, Antonio 5. Mangelen, Conte 6. Ortiz, Jesus 7. Palomares, Diego 8. Sinsuat, Bimbo 9. Tomawis, Acmad 10. Tomawis, Jerry After declaring the presence of a quorum, the Speaker Pro-Tempore was authorized to preside in the session. On Motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant, all Assemblymen in attendance voted in the affirmative, hence, the chair declared said seat of the Speaker vacant. 8. On November 5, 1987, the session of the Assembly resumed with the following Assemblymen present: 1. Mangelen Conte-Presiding Officer 2. Ali Salic 3. Ali Salindatu 4. Aratuc, Malik 5. Cajelo, Rene 6. Conding, Pilipinas (sic) 7. Dagalangit, Rakil 8. Dela Fuente, Antonio 9. Ortiz, Jesus 10 Palomares, Diego

11. Quijano, Jesus 12. Sinsuat, Bimbo 13. Tomawis, Acmad 14. Tomawis, Jerry An excerpt from the debates and proceeding of said session reads: HON. DAGALANGIT: Mr. Speaker, Honorable Members of the House, with the presence of our colleagues who have come to attend the session today, I move to call the names of the new comers in order for them to cast their votes on the previous motion to declare the position of the Speaker vacant. But before doing so, I move also that the designation of the Speaker Pro Tempore as the Presiding Officer and Mr. Johnny Evangelists as Acting Secretary in the session last November 2, 1987 be reconfirmed in today's session. HON. SALIC ALI: I second the motions. PRESIDING OFFICER: Any comment or objections on the two motions presented? Me chair hears none and the said motions are approved. ... Twelve (12) members voted in favor of the motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant; one abstained and none voted against. 1 Accordingly, the petitioner prays for judgment as follows: WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays that(a) This Petition be given due course; (b) Pending hearing, a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining respondents from proceeding with their session to be held on November 5, 1987, and on any day thereafter; (c) After hearing, judgment be rendered declaring the proceedings held by respondents of their session on November 2, 1987 as null and void; (d) Holding the election of petitioner as Speaker of said Legislative Assembly or Batasan Pampook, Region XII held on March 12, 1987 valid and subsisting, and (e) Making the injunction permanent. Petitioner likewise prays for such other relief as may be just and equitable. 2 Pending further proceedings, this Court, on January 19, 1988, received a resolution filed by the Sangguniang Pampook, "EXPECTING ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA FROM MEMBERSHIP OF THE SANGGUNIANG PAMPOOK AUTONOMOUS REGION XII," 3 on the grounds, among other things, that the petitioner "had caused to be prepared and signed by him paying [sic] the salaries and emoluments of Odin Abdula, who was considered resigned after filing his Certificate of Candidacy for Congressmen for the First District of Maguindanao in the last May 11, elections. . . and nothing in the record of the Assembly will show that any request for reinstatement by Abdula was ever made . . ." 4 and that "such action of Mr. Lim bona in paying Abdula his salaries and emoluments without authority from the Assembly . . . constituted a usurpation of the power of the Assembly," 5 that the petitioner "had recently caused withdrawal of so much amount of cash from the Assembly resulting to the non-payment of the salaries and emoluments of some Assembly [sic]," 6 and that he had "filed a case before the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on question which should have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly," 7 for which the respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot and academic". 8 The first question, evidently, is whether or not the expulsion of the petitioner (pending litigation) has made the case moot and academic. We do not agree that the case has been rendered moot and academic by reason simply of the expulsion resolution so issued. For, if the petitioner's expulsion was done purposely to make this petition moot and academic, and to preempt the Court, it will not make it academic. On the ground of the immutable principle of due process alone, we hold that the expulsion in question is of no force and effect. In the first place, there is no showing that the Sanggunian had conducted an investigation, and whether or not the petitioner had been heard in his defense, assuming that there was an investigation, or otherwise given the

opportunity to do so. On the other hand, what appears in the records is an admission by the Assembly (at least, the respondents) that "since November, 1987 up to this writing, the petitioner has not set foot at the Sangguniang Pampook." 9 "To be sure, the private respondents aver that "[t]he Assemblymen, in a conciliatory gesture, wanted him to come to Cotabato City," 10 but that was "so that their differences could be threshed out and settled." 11 Certainly, that avowed wanting or desire to thresh out and settle, no matter how conciliatory it may be cannot be a substitute for the notice and hearing contemplated by law. While we have held that due process, as the term is known in administrative law, does not absolutely require notice and that a party need only be given the opportunity to be heard, 12 it does not appear herein that the petitioner had, to begin with, been made aware that he had in fact stood charged of graft and corruption before his collegues. It cannot be said therefore that he was accorded any opportunity to rebut their accusations. As it stands, then, the charges now levelled amount to mere accusations that cannot warrant expulsion. In the second place, (the resolution) appears strongly to be a bare act of vendetta by the other Assemblymen against the petitioner arising from what the former perceive to be abduracy on the part of the latter. Indeed, it (the resolution) speaks of "a case [having been filed] [by the petitioner] before the Supreme Court . . . on question which should have been resolved within the confines of the Assemblyman act which some members claimed unnecessarily and unduly assails their integrity and character as representative of the people" 13 an act that cannot possibly justify expulsion. Access to judicial remedies is guaranteed by the Constitution, 14 and, unless the recourse amounts to malicious prosecution, no one may be punished for seeking redress in the courts. We therefore order reinstatement, with the caution that should the past acts of the petitioner indeed warrant his removal, the Assembly is enjoined, should it still be so minded, to commence proper proceedings therefor in line with the most elementary requirements of due process. And while it is within the discretion of the members of the Sanggunian to punish their erring colleagues, their acts are nonetheless subject to the moderating band of this Court in the event that such discretion is exercised with grave abuse. It is, to be sure, said that precisely because the Sangguniang Pampook(s) are "autonomous," the courts may not rightfully intervene in their affairs, much less strike down their acts. We come, therefore, to the second issue: Are the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao, as they are now constituted, subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts? In other words, what is the extent of self-government given to the two autonomous governments of Region IX and XII? The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions IX and XII by Presidential Decree No. 1618 15 promulgated on July 25, 1979. Among other things, the Decree established "internal autonomy" 16 in the two regions "[w]ithin the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines and its Constitution," 17 with legislative and executive machinery to exercise the powers and responsibilities 18 specified therein. It requires the autonomous regional governments to "undertake all internal administrative matters for the respective regions," 19 except to "act on matters which are within the jurisdiction and competence of the National Government," 20 "which include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) National defense and security; (2) Foreign relations; (3) Foreign trade; (4) Currency, monetary affairs, foreign exchange, banking and quasi-banking, and external borrowing, (5) Disposition, exploration, development, exploitation or utilization of all natural resources; (6) Air and sea transport (7) Postal matters and telecommunications; (8) Customs and quarantine; (9) Immigration and deportation; (10) Citizenship and naturalization; (11) National economic, social and educational planning; and (12) General auditing. 21

In relation to the central government, it provides that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over the Autonomous Regions ..." 22 Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable," 23 "and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress." 24 At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" 25 over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." 26 He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. 27 Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declare to be autonomous . In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency. 28 But the question of whether or not the grant of autonomy Muslim Mindanao under the 1987 Constitution involves, truly, an effort to decentralize power rather than mere administration is a question foreign to this petition, since what is involved herein is a local government unit constituted prior to the ratification of the present Constitution. Hence, the Court will not resolve that controversy now, in this case, since no controversy in fact exists. We will resolve it at the proper time and in the proper case. Under the 1987 Constitution, local government units enjoy autonomy in these two senses, thus: Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. Here shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao ,and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. 29 Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy. 30 xxx xxx xxx See. 15. Mere shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. 31 An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), art. X, sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the national government acting through the President (and the Department of Local Government). 32 If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense, that is, in which the central government commits an act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions." 33 In the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to discharge chiefly administrative services, thus: SEC. 7. Powers of the Sangguniang Pampook. The Sangguniang Pampook shall exercise local legislative powers over regional affairs within the framework of national development plans, policies and goals, in the following areas: (1) Organization of regional administrative system; (2) Economic, social and cultural development of the Autonomous Region; (3) Agricultural, commercial and industrial programs for the Autonomous Region; (4) Infrastructure development for the Autonomous Region; (5) Urban and rural planning for the Autonomous Region;

(6) Taxation and other revenue-raising measures as provided for in this Decree; (7) Maintenance, operation and administration of schools established by the Autonomous Region; (8) Establishment, operation and maintenance of health, welfare and other social services, programs and facilities; (9) Preservation and development of customs, traditions, languages and culture indigenous to the Autonomous Region; and (10) Such other matters as may be authorized by law,including the enactment of such measures as may be necessary for the promotion of the general welfare of the people in the Autonomous Region. The President shall exercise such powers as may be necessary to assure that enactment and acts of the Sangguniang Pampook and the Lupong Tagapagpaganap ng Pook are in compliance with this Decree, national legislation, policies, plans and programs. The Sangguniang Pampook shall maintain liaison with the Batasang Pambansa. 34 Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker. Briefly, the petitioner assails the legality of his ouster as Speaker on the grounds that: (1) the Sanggunian, in convening on November 2 and 5, 1987 (for the sole purpose of declaring the office of the Speaker vacant), did so in violation of the Rules of the Sangguniang Pampook since the Assembly was then on recess; and (2) assuming that it was valid, his ouster was ineffective nevertheless for lack of quorum. Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is true that under Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook," 35 but it provides likewise that "the Speaker may, on [sic] his discretion, declare a recess of "short intervals." 36 Of course, there is disagreement between the protagonists as to whether or not the recess called by the petitioner effective November 1 through 15, 1987 is the "recess of short intervals" referred to; the petitioner says that it is while the respondents insist that, to all intents and purposes, it was an adjournment and that "recess" as used by their Rules only refers to "a recess when arguments get heated up so that protagonists in a debate can talk things out informally and obviate dissenssion [sic] and disunity. 37 The Court agrees with the respondents on this regard, since clearly, the Rules speak of "short intervals." Secondly, the Court likewise agrees that the Speaker could not have validly called a recess since the Assembly had yet to convene on November 1, the date session opens under the same Rules. 38 Hence, there can be no recess to speak of that could possibly interrupt any session. But while this opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called the "recess," it was not a settled matter whether or not he could. do so. In the second place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a plausible reason for the intermission sought. Thirdly, assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it does not appear that the respondents called his attention to this mistake. What appears is that instead, they opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good faith. It does not appear to us, moreover, that the petitioner had resorted to the aforesaid "recess" in order to forestall the Assembly from bringing about his ouster. This is not apparent from the pleadings before us. We are convinced that the invitation was what precipitated it. In holding that the "recess" in question is valid, we are not to be taken as establishing a precedent, since, as we said, a recess can not be validly declared without a session having been first opened. In upholding the petitioner herein, we are not giving him a carte blanche to order recesses in the future in violation of the Rules, or otherwise to prevent the lawful meetings thereof. Neither are we, by this disposition, discouraging the Sanggunian from reorganizing itself pursuant to its lawful prerogatives. Certainly, it can do so at the proper time. In the event that be petitioner should initiate obstructive moves, the Court is certain that it is armed with enough coercive remedies to thwart them. 39 In view hereof, we find no need in dwelling on the issue of quorum. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Sangguniang Pampook, Region XII, is ENJOINED to (1) REINSTATE the petitioner as Member, Sangguniang Pampook, Region XII; and (2) REINSTATE him as Speaker thereof. No costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 92299 April 19, 1991 REYNALDO R. SAN JUAN, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CECILIA ALMAJOSE, respondents. Legal Services Division for petitioner. Sumulong, Sumulong, Paras & Abano Law Offices for private respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p In this petition for certiorari pursuant to Section 7, Article IX (A) of the present Constitution, the petitioner Governor of the Province of Rizal, prays for the nullification of Resolution No. 89-868 of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) dated November 21, 1989 and its Resolution No. 90-150 dated February 9, 1990. The dispositive portion of the questioned Resolution reads: WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission resolved to dismiss, as it hereby dismisses the appeal of Governor Reynaldo San Juan of Rizal. Accordingly, the approved appointment of Ms. Cecilia Almajose as Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal, is upheld. (Rollo, p. 32) The subsequent Resolution No. 90-150 reiterates CSC's position upholding the private respondent's appointment by denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. The antecedent facts of the case are as follows: On March 22, 1988, the position of Provincial Budget Officer (PBO) for the province of Rizal was left vacant by its former holder, a certain Henedima del Rosario. In a letter dated April 18, 1988, the petitioner informed Director Reynaldo Abella of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Region IV that Ms. Dalisay Santos assumed office as Acting PBO since March 22, 1988 pursuant to a Memorandum issued by the petitioner who further requested Director Abella to endorse the appointment of the said Ms. Dalisay Santos to the contested position of PBO of Rizal. Ms. Dalisay Santos was then Municipal Budget Officer of Taytay, Rizal before she discharged the functions of acting PBO. In a Memorandum dated July 26, 1988 addressed to the DBM Secretary, then Director Abella of Region IV recommended the appointment of the private respondent as PBO of Rizal on the basis of a comparative study of all Municipal Budget Officers of the said province which included three nominees of the petitioner. According to Abella, the private respondent was the most qualified since she was the only Certified Public Accountant among the contenders. On August 1, 1988, DBM Undersecretary Nazario S. Cabuquit, Jr. signed the appointment papers of the private respondent as PBO of Rizal upon the aforestated recommendation of Abella. In a letter dated August 3, 1988 addressed to Secretary Carague, the petitioner reiterated his request for the appointment of Dalisay Santos to the contested position unaware of the earlier appointment made by Undersecretary Cabuquit. On August 31, 1988, DBM Regional Director Agripino G. Galvez wrote the petitioner that Dalisay Santos and his other recommendees did not meet the minimum requirements under Local Budget Circular No. 31 for the position of a local budget officer. Director Galvez whether or not through oversight further required the petitioner to submit at least three other qualified nominees who are qualified for the position of PBO of Rizal for evaluation and processing. On November 2, 1988, the petitioner after having been informed of the private respondent's appointment wrote Secretary Carague protesting against the said appointment on the grounds that Cabuquit as DBM Undersecretary is not legally authorized to appoint the PBO; that the private respondent lacks the required three years work experience as provided in Local Budget Circular No. 31; and that under Executive Order No. 112, it is the Provincial Governor, not the Regional Director or a Congressman, who has the power to recommend nominees for the position of PBO. On January 9, 1989 respondent DBM, through its Director of the Bureau of Legal & Legislative Affairs (BLLA) Virgilio A. Afurung, issued a Memorandum ruling that the petitioner's letter-protest is not meritorious considering that public

respondent DBM validly exercised its prerogative in filling-up the contested position since none of the petitioner's nominees met the prescribed requirements. On January 27, 1989, the petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the BLLA ruling. On February 28, 1989, the DBM Secretary denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration. On March 27, 1989, the petitioner wrote public respondent CSC protesting against the appointment of the private respondent and reiterating his position regarding the matter. Subsequently, public respondent CSC issued the questioned resolutions which prompted the petitioner to submit before us the following assignment of errors: A. THE CSC ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE APPOINTMENT BY DBM ASSISTANT SECRETARY CABUQUIT OF CECILIA ALMAJOSE AS PBO OF RIZAL. B. THE CSC ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CECILIA ALMA JOSE POSSESSES ALL THE REQUIRED QUALIFICATIONS. C. THE CSC ERRED IN DECLARING THAT PETITIONER'S NOMINEES ARE NOT QUALIFIED TO THE SUBJECT POSITION. D. THE CSC AND THE DBM GRAVELY ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION IN NOT ALLOWING PETITIONER TO SUBMIT NEW NOMINEES WHO COULD MEET THE REQUIRED QUALIFICATION (Petition, pp. 7-8, Rollo, pp. 15-16) All the assigned errors relate to the issue of whether or not the private respondent is lawfully entitled to discharge the functions of PBO of Rizal pursuant to the appointment made by public respondent DBM's Undersecretary upon the recommendation of then Director Abella of DBM Region IV. The petitioner's arguments rest on his contention that he has the sole right and privilege to recommend the nominees to the position of PBO and that the appointee should come only from his nominees. In support thereof, he invokes Section 1 of Executive Order No. 112 which provides that: Sec. 1. All budget officers of provinces, cities and municipalities shall be appointed henceforth by the Minister of Budget and Management upon recommendation of the local chief executive concerned, subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, and they shall be placed under the administrative control and technical supervision of the Ministry of Budget and Management. The petitioner maintains that the appointment of the private respondent to the contested position was made in derogation of the provision so that both the public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding Almajose's appointment. There is no question that under Section 1 of Executive Order No. 112 the petitioner's power to recommend is subject to the qualifications prescribed by existing laws for the position of PBO. Consequently, in the event that the recommendations made by the petitioner fall short of the required standards, the appointing authority, the Minister (now Secretary) of public respondent DBM is expected to reject the same. In the event that the Governor recommends an unqualified person, is the Department Head free to appoint anyone he fancies ? This is the issue before us. Before the promulgation of Executive Order No. 112 on December 24, 1986, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code vested upon the Governor, subject to civil service rules and regulations, the power to appoint the PBO (Sec. 216, subparagraph (1), BP 337). The Code further enumerated the qualifications for the position of PBO. Thus, Section 216, subparagraph (2) of the same code states that: (2) No person shall be appointed provincial budget officer unless he is a citizen of the Philippines, of good moral character, a holder of a degree preferably in law, commerce, public administration or any related course from a recognized college or university, a first grade civil service eligibility or its equivalent, and has acquired at least five years experience in budgeting or in any related field. The petitioner contends that since the appointing authority with respect to the Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal was vested in him before, then, the real intent behind Executive Order No. 112 in empowering him to recommend nominees to the position of Provincial Budget Officer is to make his recommendation part and parcel of the appointment process. He states that the phrase "upon recommendation of the local chief executive concerned" must be given mandatory application in consonance with the state policy of local autonomy as guaranteed by the 1987

Constitution under Art. II, Sec. 25 and Art. X, Sec. 2 thereof. He further argues that his power to recommend cannot validly be defeated by a mere administrative issuance of public respondent DBM reserving to itself the right to fill-up any existing vacancy in case the petitioner's nominees do not meet the qualification requirements as embodied in public respondent DBM's Local Budget Circular No. 31 dated February 9, 1988. The questioned ruling is justified by the public respondent CSC as follows: As required by said E.O. No. 112, the DBM Secretary may choose from among the recommendees of the Provincial Governor who are thus qualified and eligible for appointment to the position of the PBO of Rizal. Notwithstanding, the recommendation of the local chief executive is merely directory and not a condition sine qua non to the exercise by the Secretary of DBM of his appointing prerogative. To rule otherwise would in effect give the law or E.O. No. 112 a different interpretation or construction not intended therein, taking into consideration that said officer has been nationalized and is directly under the control and supervision of the DBM Secretary or through his duly authorized representative. It cannot be gainsaid that said national officer has a similar role in the local government unit, only on another area or concern, to that of a Commission on Audit resident auditor. Hence, to preserve and maintain the independence of said officer from the local government unit, he must be primarily the choice of the national appointing official, and the exercise thereof must not be unduly hampered or interfered with, provided the appointee finally selected meets the requirements for the position in accordance with prescribed Civil Service Law, Rules and Regulations. In other words, the appointing official is not restricted or circumscribed to the list submitted or recommended by the local chief executive in the final selection of an appointee for the position. He may consider other nominees for the position vis a vis the nominees of the local chief executive. (CSC Resolution No. 89-868, p. 2; Rollo, p. 31) The issue before the Court is not limited to the validity of the appointment of one Provincial Budget Officer. The tug of war between the Secretary of Budget and Management and the Governor of the premier province of Rizal over a seemingly innocuous position involves the application of a most important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy. Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacaang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy. The exercise by local governments of meaningful power has been a national goal since the turn of the century. And yet, inspite of constitutional provisions and, as in this case, legislation mandating greater autonomy for local officials, national officers cannot seem to let go of centralized powers. They deny or water down what little grants of autonomy have so far been given to municipal corporations. President McKinley's Instructions dated April 7, 1900 to the Second Philippine Commission ordered the new Government "to devote their attention in the first instance to the establishment of municipal governments in which natives of the Islands, both in the cities and rural communities, shall be afforded the opportunity to manage their own local officers to the fullest extent of which they are capable and subject to the least degree of supervision and control which a careful study of their capacities and observation of the workings of native control show to be consistent with the maintenance of law, order and loyalty. In this initial organic act for the Philippines, the Commission which combined both executive and legislative powers was directed to give top priority to making local autonomy effective. The 1935 Constitution had no specific article on local autonomy. However, in distinguishing between presidential control and supervision as follows: The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. (Sec. 11, Article VII, 1935 Constitution) the Constitution clearly limited the executive power over local governments to "general supervision . . . as may be provided by law." The President controls the executive departments. He has no such power over local governments. He has only supervision and that supervision is both general and circumscribed by statute. In Tecson v. Salas, 34 SCRA 275, 282 (1970), this Court stated: . . . Hebron v. Reyes, (104 Phil. 175 [1958]) with the then Justice, now Chief Justice, Concepcion as the ponente, clarified matters. As was pointed out, the presidential competence is not even supervision in general, but general supervision as may be provided by law. He could not thus go beyond the applicable statutory provisions, which bind and fetter his discretion on the matter. Moreover, as had been earlier ruled in an opinion penned by Justice Padilla in Mondano V. Silvosa, (97 Phil. 143 [1955]) referred to by the present Chief Justice in his opinion in the Hebron case, supervision goes no further than "overseeing

or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties." (Ibid, pp. 147-148) Control, on the other hand, "means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate had done in the performance of their duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter." It would follow then, according to the present Chief Justice, to go back to the Hebron opinion, that the President had to abide by the then provisions of the Revised Administrative Code on suspension and removal of municipal officials, there being no power of control that he could rightfully exercise, the law clearly specifying the procedure by which such disciplinary action would be taken. Pursuant to this principle under the 1935 Constitution, legislation implementing local autonomy was enacted. In 1959, Republic Act No. 2264, "An Act Amending the Law Governing Local Governments by Increasing Their Autonomy and Reorganizing Local Governments" was passed. It was followed in 1967 when Republic Act No. 5185, the Decentralization Law was enacted, giving "further autonomous powers to local governments governments." The provisions of the 1973 Constitution moved the country further, at least insofar as legal provisions are concerned, towards greater autonomy. It provided under Article II as a basic principle of government: Sec. 10. The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units, especially the barangay to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities. An entire article on Local Government was incorporated into the Constitution. It called for a local government code defining more responsive and accountable local government structures. Any creation, merger, abolition, or substantial boundary alteration cannot be done except in accordance with the local government code and upon approval by a plebiscite. The power to create sources of revenue and to levy taxes was specifically settled upon local governments. The exercise of greater local autonomy is even more marked in the present Constitution. Article II, Section 25 on State Policies provides: Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments The 14 sections in Article X on Local Government not only reiterate earlier doctrines but give in greater detail the provisions making local autonomy more meaningful. Thus, Sections 2 and 3 of Article X provide: Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy. Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units. When the Civil Service Commission interpreted the recommending power of the Provincial Governor as purely directory, it went against the letter and spirit of the constitutional provisions on local autonomy. If the DBM Secretary jealously hoards the entirety of budgetary powers and ignores the right of local governments to develop self-reliance and resoluteness in the handling of their own funds, the goal of meaningful local autonomy is frustrated and set back. The right given by Local Budget Circular No. 31 which states: Sec. 6.0 The DBM reserves the right to fill up any existing vacancy where none of the nominees of the local chief executive meet the prescribed requirements. is ultra vires and is, accordingly, set aside. The DBM may appoint only from the list of qualified recommendees nominated by the Governor. If none is qualified, he must return the list of nominees to the Governor explaining why no one meets the legal requirements and ask for new recommendees who have the necessary eligibilities and qualifications. The PBO is expected to synchronize his work with DBM. More important, however, is the proper administration of fiscal affairs at the local level. Provincial and municipal budgets are prepared at the local level and after completion are forwarded to the national officials for review. They are prepared by the local officials who must work within the constraints of those budgets. They are not formulated in the inner sanctums of an all-knowing DBM and unilaterally imposed on local governments whether or not they are relevant to local needs and resources. It is for this reason that there should be a genuine interplay, a balancing of viewpoints, and a harmonization of proposals from both the

local and national officials. It is for this reason that the nomination and appointment process involves a sharing of power between the two levels of government. It may not be amiss to give by way of analogy the procedure followed in the appointments of Justices and Judges. Under Article VIII of the Constitution, nominations for judicial positions are made by the Judicial and Bar Council. The President makes the appointments from the list of nominees submitted to her by the Council. She cannot apply the DBM procedure, reject all the Council nominees, and appoint another person whom she feels is better qualified. There can be no reservation of the right to fill up a position with a person of the appointing power's personal choice. The public respondent's grave abuse of discretion is aggravated by the fact that Director Galvez required the Provincial Governor to submit at least three other names of nominees better qualified than his earlier recommendation. It was a meaningless exercise. The appointment of the private respondent was formalized before the Governor was extended the courtesy of being informed that his nominee had been rejected. The complete disregard of the local government's prerogative and the smug belief that the DBM has absolute wisdom, authority, and discretion are manifest. In his classic work "Philippine Political Law" Dean Vicente G. Sinco stated that the value of local governments as institutions of democracy is measured by the degree of autonomy that they enjoy. Citing Tocqueville, he stated that "local assemblies of citizens constitute the strength of free nations. . . . A people may establish a system of free government but without the spirit of municipal institutions, it cannot have the spirit of liberty." (Sinco, Philippine Political Law, Eleventh Edition, pp. 705-706). Our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions on local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit of liberty upon which these provisions are based. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned resolutions of the Civil Service Commission are SET ASIDE. The appointment of respondent Cecilia Almajose is nullified. The Department of Budget and Management is ordered to appoint the Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal from among qualified nominees submitted by the Provincial Governor. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 93252 August 5, 1991 RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS T. SANTOS, respondents. G.R. No. 93746 August 5,1991 MARY ANN RIVERA ARTIEDA, petitioner, vs. HON. LUIS SANTOS, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Local Government, NICANOR M. PATRICIO, in his capacity as Chief, Legal Service of the Department of Local Government and SALVADOR CABALUNA JR., respondents. G.R. No. 95245 August 5,1991 RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS T. SANTOS, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Local Government, respondents. Nicolas P. Sonalan for petitioner in 93252. Romeo A. Gerochi for petitioner in 93746. Eugenio Original for petitioner in 95245.

SARMIENTO, J.:p The petitioners take common issue on the power of the President (acting through the Secretary of Local Government), to suspend and/or remove local officials. The petitioners are the Mayor of Iloilo City (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) and a member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod thereof (G.R. No. 93746), respectively.

The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of administrative complaints, ten in number, filed against him by various city officials sometime in 1988, on various charges, among them, abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution, and arbitrary detention. 1 The personalities involved are Joceleehn Cabaluna, a clerk at the city health office; Salvador Cabaluna, her husband; Dr. Felicidad Ortigoza, Assistant City Health Officer; Mansueto Malabor, Vice-Mayor; Rolando Dabao, Dan Dalido, German Gonzales, Larry Ong, and Eduardo Pefia Redondo members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod; and Pancho Erbite, a barangay tanod. The complaints against the Mayor are set forth in the opinion of the respondent Court of Appeals. 2 We quote: xxx xxx xxx In her verified complaint (Annex A), Mrs. Cabaluna, a clerk assigned to the City Health, Office of Iloilo City charged that due to political reasons, having supported the rival candidate, Mrs. Rosa 0. Caram, the petitioner City Mayor, using as an excuse the exigency of the service and the interest of the public, pulled her out from rightful office where her qualifications are best suited and assigned her to a work that should be the function of a non-career service employee. To make matters worse, a utility worker in the office of the Public Services, whose duties are alien to the complainant's duties and functions, has been detailed to take her place. The petitioner's act are pure harassments aimed at luring her away from her permanent position or force her to resign. In the case of Dra. Felicidad Ortigoza, she claims that the petitioner handpicked her to perform task not befitting her position as Assistant City Health Officer of Iloilo City; that her office was padlocked without any explanation or justification; that her salary was withheld without cause since April 1, 1988; that when she filed her vacation leave, she was given the run-around treatment in the approval of her leave in connivance with Dr. Rodolfo Villegas and that she was the object of a well-engineered trumped-up charge in an administrative complaint filed by Dr. Rodolfo Villegas (Annex B). On the other hand, Mansuelo Malabor is the duly elected Vice-Mayor of Iloilo City and complainants Rolando Dabao, Dan Dalido, German Gonzales, Larry Ong and Eduardo Pefia Pedondo are members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of the City of Iloilo. Their complaint arose out from the case where Councilor Larry Ong, whose key to his office was unceremoniously and without previous notice, taken by petitioner. Without an office, Councilor Ong had to hold office at Plaza Libertad, The Vice-Mayor and the other complainants sympathized with him and decided to do the same. However, the petitioner, together with its fully-armed security men, forcefully drove them away from Plaza Libertad. Councilor Ong denounced the petitioner's actuations the following day in the radio station and decided to hold office at the Freedom Grandstand at Iloilo City and there were so many people who gathered to witness the incident. However, before the group could reach the area, the petitioner, together with his security men, led the firemen using a firetruck in dozing water to the people and the bystanders. Another administrative case was filed by Pancho Erbite, a barangay tanod, appointed by former mayor Rosa O. Caram. On March 13, 1988, without the benefit of charges filed against him and no warrant of arrest was issued, Erbite was arrested and detained at the City Jail of Iloilo City upon orders of petitioner. In jail, he was allegedly mauled by other detainees thereby causing injuries He was released only the following day. 3 The Mayor thereafter answered 4 and the cases were shortly set for hearing. The opinion of the Court of Appeals also set forth the succeeding events: xxx xxx xxx The initial hearing in the Cabaluna and Ortigoza cases were set for hearing on June 20-21, 1988 at the Regional Office of the Department of Local Government in Iloilo City. Notices, through telegrams, were sent to the parties (Annex L) and the parties received them, including the petitioner. The petitioner asked for a postponement before the scheduled date of hearing and was represented by counsel, Atty. Samuel Castro. The hearing officers, Atty. Salvador Quebral and Atty. Marino Bermudez had to come all the way from Manila for the two-day hearings but was actually held only on June 20,1988 in view of the inability and unpreparedness of petitioner's counsel. The next hearings were re-set to July 25, 26, 27,1988 in the same venue-Iloilo City. Again, the petitioner attempted to delay the proceedings and moved for a postponement under the excuse that he had just hired his counsel. Nonetheless, the hearing officers denied the motion to postpone, in view of the fact that the parties were notified by telegrams of the scheduled hearings (Annex M).

In the said hearings, petitioner's counsel cross-examined the complainants and their witnesses. Finding probable grounds and reasons, the respondent issued a preventive suspension order on August 11, 1988 to last until October 11,1988 for a period of sixty (60) days. Then the next investigation was set on September 21, 1988 and the petitioner again asked for a postponement to September 26,1988. On September 26, 1988, the complainants and petitioner were present, together with their respective counsel. The petitioner sought for a postponement which was denied. In these hearings which were held in Mala the petitioner testified in Adm. Case No. C-10298 and 10299. The investigation was continued regarding the Malabor case and the complainants testified including their witnesses. On October 10, 1988, petitioner's counsel, Atty. Original moved for a postponement of the October 24, 1988 hearing to November 7 to 11, 1988 which was granted. However, the motion for change of venue as denied due to lack of funds. At the hearing on November 7, 1988, the parties and counsel were present. Petitioner reiterated his motion to change venue and moved for postponement anew. The counsel discussed a proposal to take the deposition of witnesses in Iloilo City so the hearing was indefinitely postponed. However, the parties failed to come to terms and after the parties were notified of the hearing, the investigation was set to December 13 to 15, 1988. The petitioner sought for another postponement on the ground that his witnesses were sick or cannot attend the investigation due to lack of transportation. The motion was denied and the petitioner was given up to December 14, 1988 to present his evidence. On December 14,1988, petitioner's counsel insisted on his motion for postponement and the hearing officers gave petitioner up to December 15, 1988 to present his evidence. On December 15, 1988, the petitioner failed to present evidence and the cases were considered submitted for resolution. In the meantime, a prima facie evidence was found to exist in the arbitrary detention case filed by Pancho Erbite so the respondent ordered the petitioner's second preventive suspension dated October 11, 1988 for another sixty (60) days. The petitioner was able to obtain a restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Iloilo City. The second preventive suspension was not enforced. 5 Amidst the two successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzon instituted an action for prohibition against the respondent Secretary of Local Government (now, Interior) in the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City, where he succeeded in obtaining a writ of preliminary injunction. Presently, he instituted CA-G.R. SP No. 16417, an action for prohibition, in the respondent Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, on May 3, 1990, the respondent Secretary issued another order, preventively suspending Mayor Ganzon for another sixty days, the third time in twenty months, and designating meantime Vice-Mayor Mansueto Malabor as acting mayor. Undaunted, Mayor Ganzon commenced CA-G.R. SP No. 20736 of the Court of Appeals, a petition for prohibition, 6 (Malabor it is to be noted, is one of the complainants, and hence, he is interested in seeing Mayor Ganzon ousted.) On September 7, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment, dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 16417. On July 5, 1990, it likewise promulgated a decision, dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 20736. In a Resolution dated January 24, 1990, it issued a Resolution certifying the petition of Mary Ann Artieda, who had been similary charged by the respondent Secretary, to this Court. On June 26,1990, we issued a Temporary Restraining Order, barring the respondent Secretary from implementing the suspension orders, and restraining the enforcement of the Court of Appeals' two decisions. In our Resolution of November 29, 1990, we consolidated all three cases. In our Resolutions of January 15, 1991, we gave due course thereto. Mayor Ganzon claims as a preliminary (GR No. 93252), that the Department of Local Government in hearing the ten cases against him, had denied him due process of law and that the respondent Secretary had been "biased, prejudicial and hostile" towards him 7 arising from his (Mayor Ganzon's) alleged refusal to join the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino party 8 and the running political rivalry they maintained in the last congressional and local elections; 9 and his alleged refusal to operate a lottery in Iloilo City. 10 He also alleges that he requested the Secretary to lift his suspension since it had come ninety days prior to an election (the barangay elections of November 14, 1988), 11 notwithstanding which, the latter proceeded with the hearing and meted out two more suspension orders of the aforementioned cases. 12 He likewise contends that he sought to bring the cases to Iloilo

City (they were held in Manila) in order to reduce the costs of proceeding, but the Secretary rejected his request. 13 He states that he asked for postponement on "valid and justifiable" 14 grounds, among them, that he was suffering from a heart ailment which required confinement; that his "vital" 15 witness was also hospitalized 16 but that the latter unduly denied his request. 17 Mayor Ganzon's primary argument (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) is that the Secretary of Local Government is devoid, in any event, of any authority to suspend and remove local officials, an argument reiterated by the petitioner Mary Ann Rivera Artieda (G.R. No. 93746). As to Mayor Ganzon's charges of denial of due process, the records do not show very clearly in what manner the Mayor might have been deprived of his rights by the respondent Secretary. His claims that he and Secretary LuisSantos were (are) political rivals and that his "persecution" was politically motivated are pure speculation and although the latter does not appear to have denied these contentions (as he, Mayor Ganzon, claims), we can not take his word for it the way we would have under less political circumstances, considering furthermore that "political feud" has often been a good excuse in contesting complaints. The Mayor has failed furthermore to substantiate his say-so's that Secretary Santos had attempted to seduce him to join the administration party and to operate a lottery in Iloilo City. Again, although the Secretary failed to rebut his allegations, we can not accept them, at face value, much more, as judicial admissions as he would have us accept them 18 for the same reasons above-stated and furthermore, because his say so's were never corroborated by independent testimonies. As a responsible public official, Secretary Santos, in pursuing an official function, is presumed to be performing his duties regularly and in the absence of contrary evidence, no ill motive can be ascribed to him. As to Mayor Ganzon's contention that he had requested the respondent Secretary to defer the hearing on account of the ninety-day ban prescribed by Section 62 of Batas Blg. 337, the Court finds the question to be moot and academic since we have in fact restrained the Secretary from further hearing the complaints against the petitioners.
19

As to his request, finally, for postponements, the Court is afraid that he has not given any compelling reason why we should overturn the Court of Appeals, which found no convincing reason to overrule Secretary Santos in denying his requests. Besides, postponements are a matter of discretion on the part of the hearing officer, and based on Mayor Ganzon's above story, we are not convinced that the Secretary has been guilty of a grave abuse of discretion. The Court can not say, under these circumstances, that Secretary Santos' actuations deprived Mayor Ganzon of due process of law. We come to the core question: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the President's alter ego, can suspend and/or remove local officials. It is the petitioners' argument that the 1987 Constitution 20 no longer allows the President, as the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions did, to exercise the power of suspension and/or removal over local officials. According to both petitioners, the Constitution is meant, first, to strengthen self-rule by local government units and second, by deleting the phrase 21 as may be provided by law to strip the President of the power of control over local governments. It is a view, so they contend, that finds support in the debates of the Constitutional Commission. The provision in question reads as follows: Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions. 22 It modifies a counterpart provision appearing in the 1935 Constitution, which we quote: Sec. 10. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all Local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. 23 The petitioners submit that the deletion (of "as may be provided by law") is significant, as their argument goes, since: (1) the power of the President is "provided by law" and (2) hence, no law may provide for it any longer. It is to be noted that in meting out the suspensions under question, the Secretary of Local Government acted in consonance with the specific legal provisions of Batas Blg. 337, the Local Government Code, we quote: Sec. 62. Notice of Hearing. Within seven days after the complaint is filed, the Minister of local Government, or the sanggunian concerned, as the case may be, shall require the respondent to submit his verified answer within seven days from receipt of said complaint, and commence the hearing and investigation of the case within ten days after receipt of such answer of the respondent. No investigation shall be held within ninety days immediately prior

to an election, and no preventive suspension shall be imposed with the said period. If preventive suspension has been imposed prior to the aforesaid period, the preventive suspension shall be lifted. 24 Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension. (1) Preventive suspension may be imposed by the Minister of Local Government if the respondent is a provincial or city official, by the provincial governor if the respondent is an elective municipal official, or by the city or municipal mayor if the respondent is an elective barangay official. (2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, when the evidence of culpability is strong, when the gravity of the offense so warrants, or when the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. In all cases, preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension. (3) At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended official shall be deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings against him until its termination. However ' if the delay in the proceedings of the case is due to his fault, neglect or request, the time of the delay shall not be counted in computing the time of suspension. 25 The issue, as the Court understands it, consists of three questions: (1) Did the 1987 Constitution, in deleting the phrase "as may be provided by law" intend to divest the President of the power to investigate, suspend, discipline, and/or remove local officials? (2) Has the Constitution repealed Sections 62 and 63 of the Local Government Code? (3) What is the significance of the change in the constitutional language? It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitutional language, the charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right or the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local officials. It is our opinion that the omission (of "as may be provided by law") signifies nothing more than to underscore local governments' autonomy from congress and to break Congress' "control" over local government affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in particular, concerning discipline. Autonomy does not, after all, contemplate making mini-states out of local government units, as in the federal governments of the United States of America (or Brazil or Germany), although Jefferson is said to have compared municipal corporations euphemistically to "small republics." 26 Autonomy, in the constitutional sense, is subject to the guiding star, though not control, of the legislature, albeit the legislative responsibility under the Constitution and as the "supervision clause" itself suggest-is to wean local government units from over-dependence on the central government. It is noteworthy that under the Charter, "local autonomy" is not instantly self-executing, but subject to, among other things, the passage of a local government code, 27 a local tax law, 28 income distribution legislation, 29 and a national representation law, 30 and measures 31 designed to realize autonomy at the local level. It is also noteworthy that in spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local government under the general supervision of the Executive. It is noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congress to include in the local government code provisions for removal of local officials, which suggest that Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the existing Local Government Code has done, delegate its exercise to the President. Thus: Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units. 32 As hereinabove indicated, the deletion of "as may be provided by law" was meant to stress, sub silencio, the objective of the framers to strengthen local autonomy by severing congressional control of its affairs, as observed by the Court of Appeals, like the power of local legislation. 33 The Constitution did nothing more, however, and insofar as existing legislation authorizes the President (through the Secretary of Local Government) to proceed against local officials administratively, the Constitution contains no prohibition. The petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally, "supervision" is not incompatible with disciplinary authority as this Court has held, 34 thus: xxx xxx xxx

It is true that in the case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, 51 Off. Gaz., No. 6 p. 2884, this Court had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by the President over local government officials in contrast to the power of control given to him over executive officials of our government wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in meaning and extent. Thus in that case the Court has made the following digression: "In administration law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter." But from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President over local government officials does not include the power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires, as postulated in Section 64(c) of the Revised Administrative Code. ... 35 xxx xxx xxx "Control" has been defined as "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for test of the latter." 36 "Supervision" on the other hand means "overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. 37 As we held, 38 however, "investigating" is not inconsistent with "overseeing", although it is a lesser power than "altering". The impression is apparently exacerbated by the Court's pronouncements in at least three cases, Lacson v. Roque, 39 Hebron v. Reyes, 40 and Mondano v. Silvosa, 41 and possibly, a fourth one, Pelaez v. Auditor General. 42 In Lacson, this Court said that the President enjoyed no control powers but only supervision "as may be provided by law," 43 a rule we reiterated in Hebron, and Mondano. In Pelaez, we stated that the President "may not . . . suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding provincial board." 44 However, neither Lacson nor Hebron nor Mondano categorically banned the Chief Executive from exercising acts of disciplinary authority because she did not exercise control powers, but because no law allowed her to exercise disciplinary authority. Thus, according to Lacson: The contention that the President has inherent power to remove or suspend municipal officers is without doubt not well taken. Removal and suspension of public officers are always controlled by the particular law applicable and its proper construction subject to constitutional limitations. 45 In Hebron we stated: Accordingly, when the procedure for the suspension of an officer is specified by law, the same must be deemed mandatory and adhered to strictly, in the absence of express or clear provision to the contrary-which does not et with respect to municipal officers ... 46 In Mondano, the Court held: ... The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over municipal officials in the provincial governor who is authorized to "receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude." And if the charges are serious, "he shall submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge by one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question." Section 86 of the Revised Administration Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be exercised by the Department Head over the administration of ... municipalities ... . If it be construed that it does and such additional power is the same authority as that vested in the Department Head by section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, then such additional power must be deemed to have been abrogated by Section 110(l), Article VII of the Constitution. 47 xxx xxx xxx In Pelaez, we stated that the President can not impose disciplinary measures on local officials except on appeal from the provincial board pursuant to the Administrative Code. 48 Thus, in those case that this Court denied the President the power (to suspend/remove) it was not because we did not think that the President can not exercise it on account of his limited power, but because the law lodged the power elsewhere. But in those cases ii which the law gave him the power, the Court, as in Ganzon v. Kayanan, found little difficulty in sustaining him. 49

The Court does not believe that the petitioners can rightfully point to the debates of the Constitutional Commission to defeat the President's powers. The Court believes that the deliberations are by themselves inconclusive, because although Commissioner Jose Nolledo would exclude the power of removal from the President, 50 Commissioner Blas Ople would not. 51 The Court is consequently reluctant to say that the new Constitution has repealed the Local Government Code, Batas Blg. 37. As we said, "supervision" and "removal" are not incompatible terms and one may stand with the other notwithstanding the stronger expression of local autonomy under the new Charter. We have indeed held that in spite of the approval of the Charter, Batas Blg. 337 is still in force and effect. 52 As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means "a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization." 53 The Constitution as we observed, does nothing more than to break up the monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local governments and as put by political adherents, to "liberate the local governments from the imperialism of Manila." Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the relation of partnership and inter-dependence between the central administration and local government units, or otherwise, to user in a regime of federalism. The Charter has not taken such a radical step. Local governments, under the Constitution, are subject to regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose than precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance self- government. As we observed in one case, 54 decentralization means devolution of national administration but not power to the local levels. Thus: Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable," and "ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress." At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous, In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency. 55 The successive sixty-day suspensions imposed on Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon is albeit another matter. What bothers the Court, and what indeed looms very large, is the fact that since the Mayor is facing ten administrative charges, the Mayor is in fact facing the possibility of 600 days of suspension, in the event that all ten cases yield prima facie findings. The Court is not of course tolerating misfeasance in public office (assuming that Mayor Ganzon is guilty of misfeasance) but it is certainly another question to make him serve 600 days of suspension, which is effectively, to suspend him out of office. As we held: 56 2. Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. His term of office does not expire until 1986. Were it not for this information and the suspension decreed by the Sandiganbayan according to the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, he would have been all this while in the full discharge of his functions as such municipal mayor. He was elected precisely to do so. As of October 26, 1983, he has been unable to. it is a basic assumption of the electoral process implicit in the right of suffrage that the people are entitled to the services of elective officials of their choice. For misfeasance or malfeasance, any of them could, of course, be proceeded against administratively or, as in this instance, criminally. In either case, Ms culpability must be established. Moreover, if there be a criminal action, he is entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence. A preventive suspension may be justified. Its continuance, however, for an unreasonable length of time raises a due process question. For even if thereafter he were acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold office had been nullified. Clearly, there would be in such a case an injustice suffered by him. Nor is he the only victim. There is injustice inflicted likewise on the people of Lianga They were deprived of the services of the man they had elected to serve as mayor. In that sense, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted continuance of this preventive suspension had outrun the bounds of reason and resulted in sheer oppression. A denial of due process is thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such an unconstitutional application that the order of suspension should be lifted. 57 The plain truth is that this Court has been ill at ease with suspensions, for the above reasons, 58 and so also, because it is out of the ordinary to have a vacancy in local government. The sole objective of a suspension, as we

have held, 59 is simply "to prevent the accused from hampering the normal cause of the investigation with his influence and authority over possible witnesses" 60 or to keep him off "the records and other evidence. 61 It is a means, and no more, to assist prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against an erring local official. Under the Local Government Code, it can not exceed sixty days, 62 which is to say that it need not be exactly sixty days long if a shorter period is otherwise sufficient, and which is also to say that it ought to be lifted if prosecutors have achieved their purpose in a shorter span. Suspension is not a penalty and is not unlike preventive imprisonment in which the accused is held to insure his presence at the trial. In both cases, the accused (the respondent) enjoys a presumption of innocence unless and until found guilty. Suspension finally is temporary and as the Local Government Code provides, it may be imposed for no more than sixty days. As we held, 63 a longer suspension is unjust and unreasonable, and we might add, nothing less than tyranny. As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a remote possibility Mayor Ganzon is to all intents and purposes, to make him spend the rest of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and purposes, his suspension permanent. It is also, in fact, to mete out punishment in spite of the fact that the Mayor's guilt has not been proven. Worse, any absolution will be for naught because needless to say, the length of his suspension would have, by the time he is reinstated, wiped out his tenure considerably. The Court is not to be mistaken for obstructing the efforts of the respondent Secretary to see that justice is done in Iloilo City, yet it is hardly any argument to inflict on Mayor Ganzon successive suspensions when apparently, the respondent Secretary has had sufficient time to gather the necessary evidence to build a case against the Mayor without suspending him a day longer. What is intriguing is that the respondent Secretary has been cracking down, so to speak, on the Mayor piecemeal apparently, to pin him down ten times the pain, when he, the respondent Secretary, could have pursued a consolidated effort. We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of Interior from exercising a legal power, yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary of Interior is exercising that power oppressively, and needless to say, with a grave abuse of discretion. The Court is aware that only the third suspension is under questions, and that any talk of future suspensions is in fact premature. The fact remains, however, that Mayor Ganzon has been made to serve a total of 120 days of suspension and the possibility of sixty days more is arguably around the corner (which amounts to a violation of the Local Government Code which brings to light a pattern of suspensions intended to suspend the Mayor the rest of his natural tenure. The Court is simply foreclosing what appears to us as a concerted effort of the State to perpetuate an arbitrary act. As we said, we can not tolerate such a state of affairs. We are therefore allowing Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon to suffer the duration of his third suspension and lifting, for the purpose, the Temporary Restraining Order earlier issued. Insofar as the seven remaining charges are concerned, we are urging the Department of Local Government, upon the finality of this Decision, to undertake steps to expedite the same, subject to Mayor Ganzon's usual remedies of appeal, judicial or administrative, or certiorari, if warranted, and meanwhile, we are precluding the Secretary from meting out further suspensions based on those remaining complaints, notwithstanding findings of prima facie evidence. In resume the Court is laying down the following rules: 1. Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere decentralization of administration, not of power, in which local officials remain accountable to the central government in the manner the law may provide; 2. The new Constitution does not prescribe federalism; 3. The change in constitutional language (with respect to the supervision clause) was meant but to deny legislative control over local governments; it did not exempt the latter from legislative regulations provided regulation is consistent with the fundamental premise of autonomy; 4. Since local governments remain accountable to the national authority, the latter may, by law, and in the manner set forth therein, impose disciplinary action against local officials; 5. "Supervision" and "investigation" are not inconsistent terms; "investigation" does not signify "control" (which the President does not have);

6. The petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon. may serve the suspension so far ordered, but may no longer be suspended for the offenses he was charged originally; provided: a) that delays in the investigation of those charges "due to his fault, neglect or request, (the time of the delay) shall not be counted in computing the time of suspension. [Supra, sec. 63(3)] b) that if during, or after the expiration of, his preventive suspension, the petitioner commits another or other crimes and abuses for which proper charges are filed against him by the aggrieved party or parties, his previous suspension shall not be a bar to his being preventively suspended again, if warranted under subpar. (2), Section 63 of the Local Government Code. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued is LIFTED. The suspensions of the petitioners are AFFIRMED, provided that the petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may not be made to serve future suspensions on account of any of the remaining administrative charges pending against him for acts committed prior to August 11, 1988. The Secretary of Interior is ORDERED to consolidate all such administrative cases pending against Mayor Ganzon. The sixty-day suspension against the petitioner, Mary Ann Rivera Artieda, is AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 79956 January 29, 1990 CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent. G.R. No. 82217 January 29, 1990 LILIA YARANON and BONA BAUTISTA, assisted by their spouses, BRAULIO D. YARANON and DEMETRIO D. BAUTISTA, JR., respectively; JAMES BRETT and SINAI C. HAMADA, petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, Executive Secretary, HON. VICENTE JAYME, Secretary of Finance, HON. GUILLERMO N. CARAGUE, Secretary of Budget and Management, and HON. ROSALINA S. CAJUCOM, OIC National Treasurer, respondents.

CORTES, J.: In these consolidated petitions, the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 220, dated July 15, 1987, which created the (Cordillera Administrative Region, is assailed on the primary ground that it pre-empts the enactment of an organic act by the Congress and the creation of' the autonomous region in the Cordilleras conditional on the approval of the act through a plebiscite. Relative to the creation of autonomous regions, the constitution, in Article X, provides: AUTONOMOUS REGIONS Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. SEC. 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure that laws are faithfully executed. Sec. 17. All powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted Constitution or by law to the autonomous regions shall be vested in the National Government. Sec. 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the regional consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multi-sectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure of government for the region

consisting of the executive department and legislative assembly, both of which shall be elective and representative of the constituent political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this Constitution and national laws. The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region. Sec. 19. The first Congress elected under this Constitution shall, within eighteen months from the time of organization of both Houses, pass the organic acts for the autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras. Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over: (1) Administrative organization; (2) Creation of sources of revenues; (3) Ancestral domain and natural resources; (4) Personal, family and property relations; (5) Regional urban and rural planning development; (6) Economic, social and tourism development ; (7) Educational policies; (8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and (9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region. Sec. 21. The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be the responsibility of the local police agencies which shall be organized, maintained, supervised, and utilized in accordance with applicable laws. The defense and security of the regions shall be the responsibility of the National Government. A study of E.O. No. 220 would be incomplete Without reference to its historical background. In April 1986, just after the EDSA Revolution, Fr. Conrado M. Balweg, S.V.D., broke off on ideological grounds from the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its military arm the New People's Army. (NPA). After President Aquino was installed into office by People Power, she advocated a policy of national reconciliation. She called on all revolutionary forces to a peace dialogue. The CPLA heeded this call of the President. After the preliminary negotiations, President Aquino and some members of her Cabinet flew to Mt. Data in the Mountain Province on September 13, 1986 and signed with Fr. Conrado M. Balweg (As Commander of the CPLA and Ama Mario Yag-ao (as President of Cordillera Bodong Administration, the civil government of the CPLA a ceasefire agreement that signified the cessation of hostilities (WHEREAS No. 7, E.O. 220). The parties arrived at an agreement in principle: the Cordillera people shall not undertake their demands through armed and violent struggle but by peaceful means, such as political negotiations. The negotiations shall be a continuing process until the demands of the Cordillera people shall have been substantially granted. On March 27, 1987, Ambassador Pelaez [Acting as Chief Negotiator of the government], in pursuance of the September 13, 1986 agreement, flew to the Mansion House, Baguio City, and signed with Fr. Balweg (as Chairman of the Cordillera panel) a joint agreement, paragraphs 2 and 3 of which state:

Par. 2- Work together in drafting an Executive Order to create a preparatory body that could perform policy-making and administrative functions and undertake consultations and studies leading to a draft organic act for the Cordilleras. Par. 3- Have representatives from the Cordillera panel join the study group of the R.P. Panel in drafting the Executive Order. Pursuant to the above joint agreement, E.O. 220 was drafted by a panel of the Philippine government and of the representatives of the Cordillera people. On July 15, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino signed the joint draft into law, known now as E.O. 220. [Rejoinder G.R. No. 82217, pp. 2-3]. Executive Order No. 220, issued by the President in the exercise of her legislative powers under Art. XVIII, sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution, created the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) , which covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province and the City of Baguio [secs. 1 and 2]. It was created to accelerate economic and social growth in the region and to prepare for the establishment of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras [sec. 3]. Its main function is to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and services in the region, particularly, to coordinate with the local government units as well as with the executive departments of the National Government in the supervision of field offices and in identifying, planning, monitoring, and accepting projects and activities in the region [sec. 5]. It shall also monitor the implementation of all ongoing national and local government projects in the region [sec. 20]. The CAR shall have a Cordillera Regional Assembly as a policy-formulating body and a Cordillera Executive Board as an implementing arm [secs. 7, 8 and 10]. The CAR and the Assembly and Executive Board shall exist until such time as the autonomous regional government is established and organized [sec. 17]. Explaining the rationale for the issuance of E.O. No. 220, its last "Whereas" clause provides: WHEREAS, pending the convening of the first Congress and the enactment of the organic act for a Cordillera autonomous region, there is an urgent need, in the interest of national security and public order, for the President to reorganize immediately the existing administrative structure in the Cordilleras to suit it to the existing political realities therein and the Government's legitimate concerns in the areas, without attempting to pre-empt the constitutional duty of the first Congress to undertake the creation of an autonomous region on a permanent basis. During the pendency of this case, Republic Act No. 6766 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region," was enacted and signed into law. The Act recognizes the CAR and the offices and agencies created under E.O. No. 220 and its transitory nature is reinforced in Art. XXI of R.A. No. 6766, to wit: SEC. 3. The Cordillera Executive Board, the Cordillera Region Assembly as well as all offices and agencies created under Execute Order No. 220 shall cease to exist immediately upon the ratification of this Organic Act. All funds, properties and assets of the Cordillera Executive Board and the Cordillera Regional Assembly shall automatically be transferred to the Cordillera Autonomous Government. I It is well-settled in our jurisprudence that respect for the inherent and stated powers and prerogatives of the law-making body, as well as faithful adherence to the principle of separation of powers, require that its enactment be accorded the presumption of constitutionality. Thus, in any challenge to the constitutionality of a statute, the burden of clearly and unequivocally proving its unconstitutionality always rests upon the challenger. Conversely, failure to so prove will necessarily defeat the challenge. We shall be guided by these principles in considering these consolidated petitions. In these cases, petitioners principally argue that by issuing E.O. No. 220 the President, in the exercise of her legislative powers prior to the convening of the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution, has virtually pre-empted Congress from its mandated task of enacting an organic act and created an autonomous region in the Cordilleras. We have carefully studied the Constitution and E.O. No. 220 and we have come to the conclusion that petitioners' assertions are unfounded. Events subsequent to the issuance of E.O. No. 220 also bear out this conclusion. 1. A reading of E.O. No. 220 will easily reveal that what it actually envisions is the consolidation and coordination of the delivery of services of line departments and agencies of the National Government in the

areas covered by the administrative region as a step preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the Cordilleras. It does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the creation of an autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground for autonomy. This does not necessarily conflict with the provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions, as we shall show later. The Constitution outlines a complex procedure for the creation of an autonomous region in the Cordilleras. A regional consultative commission shall first be created. The President shall then appoint the members of a regional consultative commission from a list of nominees from multi-sectoral bodies. The commission shall assist the Congress in preparing the organic act for the autonomous region. The organic act shall be passed by the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution within eighteen months from the time of its organization and enacted into law. Thereafter there shall be held a plebiscite for the approval of the organic act [Art. X, sec. 18]. Only then, after its approval in the plebiscite, shall the autonomous region be created. Undoubtedly, all of these will take time. The President, in 1987 still exercising legislative powers, as the first Congress had not yet convened, saw it fit to provide for some measures to address the urgent needs of the Cordilleras in the meantime that the organic act had not yet been passed and the autonomous region created. These measures we find in E.O. No. 220. The steps taken by the President are obviously perceived by petitioners, particularly petitioner Yaranon who views E.O. No. 220 as capitulation to the Cordillera People's Liberation Army (CPLA) of Balweg, as unsound, but the Court cannot inquire into the wisdom of the measures taken by the President, We can only inquire into whether or not the measures violate the Constitution. But as we have seen earlier, they do not. 2. Moreover, the transitory nature of the CAR does not necessarily mean that it is, as petitioner Cordillera Broad Coalition asserts, "the interim autonomous region in the Cordilleras" [Petition, G.R. No. 79956, p. 25]. The Constitution provides for a basic structure of government in the autonomous region composed of an elective executive and legislature and special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction [Art. X, sec. 18]. Using this as a guide, we find that E.O. No. 220 did not establish an autonomous regional government. It created a region, covering a specified area, for administrative purposes with the main objective of coordinating the planning and implementation of programs and services [secs. 2 and 5]. To determine policy, it created a representative assembly, to convene yearly only for a five-day regular session, tasked with, among others, identifying priority projects and development programs [sec. 9]. To serve as an implementing body, it created the Cordillera Executive Board composed of the Mayor of Baguio City, provincial governors and representatives of the Cordillera Bodong Administration, ethno-linguistic groups and non-governmental organizations as regular members and all regional directors of the line departments of the National Government as ex-officio members and headed by an Executive Director [secs. 10 and 11]. The bodies created by E.O. No. 220 do not supplant the existing local governmental structure, nor are they autonomous government agencies. They merely constitute the mechanism for an "umbrella" that brings together the existing local governments, the agencies of the National Government, the ethnolinguistic groups or tribes, and non-governmental organizations in a concerted effort to spur development in the Cordilleras. The creation of the CAR for purposes of administrative coordination is underscored by the mandate of E.O. No. 220 for the President and appropriate national departments and agencies to make available sources of funds for priority development programs and projects recommended by the CAR [sec. 21] and the power given to the President to call upon the appropriate executive departments and agencies of the National Government to assist the CAR [sec. 24]. 3. Subsequent to the issuance of E.O. No. 220, the Congress, after it was convened, enacted Republic Act No. 6658 which created the Cordillera Regional Consultative Commission. The President then appointed its members. The commission prepared a draft organic act which became the basis for the deliberations of the Senate and the House of Representatives. The result was Republic Act No. 6766, the organic act for the Cordillera autonomous region, which was signed into law on October 23, 1989. A plebiscite for the approval of the organic act, to be conducted shortly, shall complete the process outlined in the Constitution. In the meantime, E.O. No. 220 had been in force and effect for more than two years and we find that, despite E.O. No. 220, the autonomous region in the Cordilleras is still to be created, showing the lack of basis of petitioners' assertion. Events have shown that petitioners' fear that E.O. No. 220 was a "shortcut" for the creation of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras was totally unfounded. Clearly, petitioners' principal challenge has failed. II A collateral issue raised by petitioners is the nature of the CAR: whether or not it is a territorial and political subdivision. The Constitution provides in Article X:

Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. xxx xxx xxx Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. We have seen earlier that the CAR is not the autonomous region in the Cordilleras contemplated by the Constitution, Thus, we now address petitioners' assertion that E. 0. No. 220 contravenes the Constitution by creating a new territorial and political subdivision. After carefully considering the provisions of E.O. No. 220, we find that it did not create a new territorial and political subdivision or merge existing ones into a larger subdivision. 1. Firstly, the CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It does not have a separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities. Neither is it vested with the powers that are normally granted to public corporations, e.g. the power to sue and be sued, the power to own and dispose of property, the power to create its own sources of revenue, etc. As stated earlier, the CAR was created primarily to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and services in the covered areas. The creation of administrative regions for the purpose of expediting the delivery of services is nothing new. The Integrated Reorganization Plan of 1972, which was made as part of the law of the land by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1, established eleven (11) regions, later increased to twelve (12), with definite regional centers and required departments and agencies of the Executive Branch of the National Government to set up field offices therein. The functions of the regional offices to be established pursuant to the Reorganization Plan are: (1) to implement laws, policies, plans, programs, rules and regulations of the department or agency in the regional areas; (2) to provide economical, efficient and effective service to the people in the area; (3) to coordinate with regional offices of other departments, bureaus and agencies in the area; (4) to coordinate with local government units in the area; and (5) to perform such other functions as may be provided by law. [See Part II, chap. III, art. 1, of the Reorganization Plan]. We can readily see that the CAR is in the same genre as the administrative regions created under the Reorganization Plan, albeit under E.O. No. 220 the operation of the CAR requires the participation not only of the line departments and agencies of the National Government but also the local governments, ethnolinguistic groups and non-governmental organizations in bringing about the desired objectives and the appropriation of funds solely for that purpose. 2. Then, considering the control and supervision exercised by the President over the CAR and the offices created under E.O. No. 220, and considering further the indispensable participation of the line departments of the National Government, the CAR may be considered more than anything else as a regional coordinating agency of the National Government, similar to the regional development councils which the President may create under the Constitution [Art. X, sec. 14]. These councils are "composed of local government officials, regional heads of departments and other government offices, and representatives from non-governmental organizations within the region for purposes of administrative decentralization to strengthen the autonomy of the units therein and to accelerate the economic and social growth and development of the units in the region." [Ibid.] In this wise, the CAR may be considered as a more sophisticated version of the regional development council. III Finally, petitioners incidentally argue that the creation of the CAR contravened the constitutional guarantee of the local autonomy for the provinces (Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province) and city (Baguio City) which compose the CAR. We find first a need to clear up petitioners' apparent misconception of the concept of local autonomy. It must be clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution [Art. X, sec. 2] refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast in more technical language, the decentralization of government authority [Villegas v. Subido, G.R. No. L-31004, January 8, 1971, 37 SCRA 1]. Local autonomy is not unique to the 1987 Constitution, it being guaranteed also under the 1973 Constitution [Art. II, sec. 10]. And while there was no express guarantee under the 1935 Constitution, the Congress enacted the Local Autonomy Act (R.A. No. 2264) and the Decentralization Act (R.A. No. 5185), which ushered the irreversible march towards further enlargement of local autonomy in the country [Villegas v. Subido, supra.]

On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy these regions. Thus, the provision in the Constitution for an autonomous regional government with a basic structure consisting of an executive department and a legislative assembly and special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction in each of the autonomous regions [Art. X, sec. 18]. As we have said earlier, the CAR is a mere transitory coordinating agency that would prepare the stage for political autonomy for the Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap in the process of transforming a group of adjacent territorial and political subdivisions already enjoying local or administrative autonomy into an autonomous region vested with political autonomy. Anent petitioners' objection, we note the obvious failure to show how the creation of the CAR has actually diminished the local autonomy of the covered provinces and city. It cannot be over-emphasized that pure speculation and a resort to probabilities are insufficient to cause the invalidation of E.O. No. 220. WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994 MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners, vs. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION, respondents. Aquilino G. Pimentel, Jr. and Associates for petitioners. R.R. Torralba & Associates for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.: There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the project. The religious elements echoed the objection and so did the women's groups and the youth. Demonstrations were led by the mayor and the city legislators. The media trumpeted the protest, describing the casino as an affront to the welfare of the city. The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its tremendous success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, it leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., one of the herein private respondents, renovated and equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas season. The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353 reading as follows: ORDINANCE NO. 3353 AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ISSUANCE OF BUSINESS PERMIT AND CANCELLING EXISTING BUSINESS PERMIT TO ANY ESTABLISHMENT FOR THE USING AND ALLOWING TO BE USED ITS PREMISES OR PORTION THEREOF FOR THE OPERATION OF CASINO. BE IT ORDAINED by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cagayan de Oro, in session assembled that: Sec. 1. That pursuant to the policy of the city banning the operation of casino within its territorial jurisdiction, no business permit shall be issued to any person, partnership or corporation for the operation of casino within the city limits. Sec. 2. That it shall be a violation of existing business permit by any persons, partnership or corporation to use its business establishment or portion thereof, or allow the use thereof by others for casino operation and other gambling activities.

Sec. 3. PENALTIES. Any violation of such existing business permit as defined in the preceding section shall suffer the following penalties, to wit: a) Suspension of the business permit for sixty (60) days for the first offense and a fine of P1,000.00/day b) Suspension of the business permit for Six (6) months for the second offense, and a fine of P3,000.00/day c) Permanent revocation of the business permit and imprisonment of One (1) year, for the third and subsequent offenses. Sec. 4. This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days from publication thereof. Nor was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93 reading as follows: ORDINANCE NO. 3375-93 AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE OPERATION OF CASINO AND PROVIDING PENALTY FOR VIOLATION THEREFOR. WHEREAS, the City Council established a policy as early as 1990 against CASINO under its Resolution No. 2295; WHEREAS, on October 14, 1992, the City Council passed another Resolution No. 2673, reiterating its policy against the establishment of CASINO; WHEREAS, subsequently, thereafter, it likewise passed Ordinance No. 3353, prohibiting the issuance of Business Permit and to cancel existing Business Permit to any establishment for the using and allowing to be used its premises or portion thereof for the operation of CASINO; WHEREAS, under Art. 3, section 458, No. (4), sub paragraph VI of the Local Government Code of 1991 (Rep. Act 7160) and under Art. 99, No. (4), Paragraph VI of the implementing rules of the Local Government Code, the City Council as the Legislative Body shall enact measure to suppress any activity inimical to public morals and general welfare of the people and/or regulate or prohibit such activity pertaining to amusement or entertainment in order to protect social and moral welfare of the community; NOW THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED by the City Council in session duly assembled that: Sec. 1. The operation of gambling CASINO in the City of Cagayan de Oro is hereby prohibited. Sec. 2. Any violation of this Ordinance shall be subject to the following penalties: a) Administrative fine of P5,000.00 shall be imposed against the proprietor, partnership or corporation undertaking the operation, conduct, maintenance of gambling CASINO in the City and closure thereof; b) Imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more than one (1) year or a fine in the amount of P5,000.00 or both at the discretion of the court against the manager, supervisor, and/or any person responsible in the establishment, conduct and maintenance of gambling CASINO. Sec. 3. This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days after its publication in a local newspaper of general circulation. Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement. 1 Reconsideration of this decision was denied on July 13, 1993. 2 Cagayan de Oro City and its mayor are now before us in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 3 They aver that the respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that:

1. Under existing laws, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cagayan de Oro does not have the power and authority to prohibit the establishment and operation of a PAGCOR gambling casino within the City's territorial limits. 2. The phrase "gambling and other prohibited games of chance" found in Sec. 458, par. (a), sub-par. (1) (v) of R.A. 7160 could only mean "illegal gambling." 3. The questioned Ordinances in effect annul P.D. 1869 and are therefore invalid on that point. 4. The questioned Ordinances are discriminatory to casino and partial to cockfighting and are therefore invalid on that point. 5. The questioned Ordinances are not reasonable, not consonant with the general powers and purposes of the instrumentality concerned and inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State. 6. It had no option but to follow the ruling in the case of Basco, et al. v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991, 197 SCRA 53 in disposing of the issues presented in this present case. PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. In Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation, 4 this Court sustained the constitutionality of the decree and even cited the benefits of the entity to the national economy as the third highest revenue-earner in the government, next only to the BIR and the Bureau of Customs. Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly vested with the police power under what is known as the General Welfare Clause now embodied in Section 16 as follows: Sec. 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. In addition, Section 458 of the said Code specifically declares that: Sec. 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The Sangguniang Panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall: (1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and effective city government, and in this connection, shall: xxx xxx xxx (v) Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress and impose appropriate penalties for habitual drunkenness in public places, vagrancy, mendicancy, prostitution, establishment and maintenance of houses of ill repute, gambling and other prohibited games of chance, fraudulent devices and ways to obtain money or property, drug addiction, maintenance of drug dens, drug pushing, juvenile delinquency, the printing, distribution or exhibition of obscene or pornographic materials or publications, and such other activities inimical to the welfare and morals of the inhabitants of the city; This section also authorizes the local government units to regulate properties and businesses within their territorial limits in the interest of the general welfare. 5

The petitioners argue that by virtue of these provisions, the Sangguniang Panlungsod may prohibit the operation of casinos because they involve games of chance, which are detrimental to the people. Gambling is not allowed by general law and even by the Constitution itself. The legislative power conferred upon local government units may be exercised over all kinds of gambling and not only over "illegal gambling" as the respondents erroneously argue. Even if the operation of casinos may have been permitted under P.D. 1869, the government of Cagayan de Oro City has the authority to prohibit them within its territory pursuant to the authority entrusted to it by the Local Government Code. It is submitted that this interpretation is consonant with the policy of local autonomy as mandated in Article II, Section 25, and Article X of the Constitution, as well as various other provisions therein seeking to strengthen the character of the nation. In giving the local government units the power to prevent or suppress gambling and other social problems, the Local Government Code has recognized the competence of such communities to determine and adopt the measures best expected to promote the general welfare of their inhabitants in line with the policies of the State. The petitioners also stress that when the Code expressly authorized the local government units to prevent and suppress gambling and other prohibited games of chance, like craps, baccarat, blackjack and roulette, it meant all forms of gambling without distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemos. 6 Otherwise, it would have expressly excluded from the scope of their power casinos and other forms of gambling authorized by special law, as it could have easily done. The fact that it did not do so simply means that the local government units are permitted to prohibit all kinds of gambling within their territories, including the operation of casinos. The adoption of the Local Government Code, it is pointed out, had the effect of modifying the charter of the PAGCOR. The Code is not only a later enactment than P.D. 1869 and so is deemed to prevail in case of inconsistencies between them. More than this, the powers of the PAGCOR under the decree are expressly discontinued by the Code insofar as they do not conform to its philosophy and provisions, pursuant to Par. (f) of its repealing clause reading as follows: (f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. It is also maintained that assuming there is doubt regarding the effect of the Local Government Code on P.D. 1869, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the petitioners, in accordance with the direction in the Code calling for its liberal interpretation in favor of the local government units. Section 5 of the Code specifically provides: Sec. 5. Rules of Interpretation. In the interpretation of the provisions of this Code, the following rules shall apply: (a) Any provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower local government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local government unit concerned; xxx xxx xxx (c) The general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to local government units in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the people in the community; . . . (Emphasis supplied.) Finally, the petitioners also attack gambling as intrinsically harmful and cite various provisions of the Constitution and several decisions of this Court expressive of the general and official disapprobation of the vice. They invoke the State policies on the family and the proper upbringing of the youth and, as might be expected, call attention to the old case of U.S. v. Salaveria, 7 which sustained a municipal ordinance prohibiting the playing of panguingue. The petitioners decry the immorality of gambling. They also impugn the wisdom of P.D. 1869 (which they describe as "a martial law instrument") in creating PAGCOR and authorizing it to operate casinos "on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines." This is the opportune time to stress an important point. The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it been said that courts do not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories. 8 That is the prerogative of the political departments. It is settled that questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicibility of statutes are not addressed

to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the legislative and executive departments, to which the function belongs in our scheme of government. That function is exclusive. Whichever way these branches decide, they are answerable only to their own conscience and the constituents who will ultimately judge their acts, and not to the courts of justice. The only question we can and shall resolve in this petition is the validity of Ordinance No. 3355 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 as enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City. And we shall do so only by the criteria laid down by law and not by our own convictions on the propriety of gambling. The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions 9 has held that to be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements: 1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute. 2) It must not be unfair or oppressive. 3) It must not be partial or discriminatory. 4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade. 5) It must be general and consistent with public policy. 6) It must not be unreasonable. We begin by observing that under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law. The petitioners are less than accurate in claiming that the Code could have excluded such games of chance but did not. In fact it does. The language of the section is clear and unmistakable. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, a word or phrase should be interpreted in relation to, or given the same meaning of, words with which it is associated. Accordingly, we conclude that since the word "gambling" is associated with "and other prohibited games of chance," the word should be read as referring to only illegal gambling which, like the other prohibited games of chance, must be prevented or suppressed. We could stop here as this interpretation should settle the problem quite conclusively. But we will not. The vigorous efforts of the petitioners on behalf of the inhabitants of Cagayan de Oro City, and the earnestness of their advocacy, deserve more than short shrift from this Court. The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that they contravene P.D. 1869 and the public policy embodied therein insofar as they prevent PAGCOR from exercising the power conferred on it to operate a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. The petitioners have an ingenious answer to this misgiving. They deny that it is the ordinances that have changed P.D. 1869 for an ordinance admittedly cannot prevail against a statute. Their theory is that the change has been made by the Local Government Code itself, which was also enacted by the national lawmaking authority. In their view, the decree has been, not really repealed by the Code, but merely "modified pro tanto" in the sense that PAGCOR cannot now operate a casino over the objection of the local government unit concerned. This modification of P.D. 1869 by the Local Government Code is permissible because one law can change or repeal another law. It seems to us that the petitioners are playing with words. While insisting that the decree has only been "modified pro tanto," they are actually arguing that it is already dead, repealed and useless for all intents and purposes because the Code has shorn PAGCOR of all power to centralize and regulate casinos. Strictly speaking, its operations may now be not only prohibited by the local government unit; in fact, the prohibition is not only discretionary but mandated by Section 458 of the Code if the word "shall" as used therein is to be given its accepted meaning. Local government units have now no choice but to prevent and suppress gambling, which in the petitioners' view includes both legal and illegal gambling. Under this construction, PAGCOR will have no more games of chance to regulate or centralize as they must all be prohibited by the local government units pursuant to the mandatory duty imposed upon them by the Code. In this situation, PAGCOR cannot continue to exist except only as a toothless tiger or a white elephant and will no longer be able to exercise its powers as a prime source of government revenue through the operation of casinos. It is noteworthy that the petitioners have cited only Par. (f) of the repealing clause, conveniently discarding the rest of the provision which painstakingly mentions the specific laws or the parts thereof which are repealed (or modified) by the Code. Significantly, P.D. 1869 is not one of them. A reading of the entire repealing clause, which is reproduced below, will disclose the omission: Sec. 534. Repealing Clause. (a) Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the "Local Government Code," Executive Order No. 112 (1987), and Executive Order No. 319 (1988) are hereby repealed.

(b) Presidential Decree Nos. 684, 1191, 1508 and such other decrees, orders, instructions, memoranda and issuances related to or concerning the barangay are hereby repealed. (c) The provisions of Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Republic Act No. 1939 regarding hospital fund; Section 3, a (3) and b (2) of Republic Act. No. 5447 regarding the Special Education Fund; Presidential Decree No. 144 as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 559 and 1741; Presidential Decree No. 231 as amended; Presidential Decree No. 436 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 558; and Presidential Decree Nos. 381, 436, 464, 477, 526, 632, 752, and 1136 are hereby repealed and rendered of no force and effect. (d) Presidential Decree No. 1594 is hereby repealed insofar as it governs locally-funded projects. (e) The following provisions are hereby repealed or amended insofar as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Code: Sections 2, 16, and 29 of Presidential Decree No. 704; Sections 12 of Presidential Decree No. 87, as amended; Sections 52, 53, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, and 74 of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended; and Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 972, as amended, and (f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. Furthermore, it is a familiar rule that implied repeals are not lightly presumed in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing of such intention. In Lichauco & Co. v. Apostol, 10 this Court explained: The cases relating to the subject of repeal by implication all proceed on the assumption that if the act of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the lawmaking power to abrogate the prior law, this intention must be given effect; but there must always be a sufficient revelation of this intention, and it has become an unbending rule of statutory construction that the intention to repeal a former law will not be imputed to the Legislature when it appears that the two statutes, or provisions, with reference to which the question arises bear to each other the relation of general to special. There is no sufficient indication of an implied repeal of P.D. 1869. On the contrary, as the private respondent points out, PAGCOR is mentioned as the source of funding in two later enactments of Congress, to wit, R.A. 7309, creating a Board of Claims under the Department of Justice for the benefit of victims of unjust punishment or detention or of violent crimes, and R.A. 7648, providing for measures for the solution of the power crisis. PAGCOR revenues are tapped by these two statutes. This would show that the PAGCOR charter has not been repealed by the Local Government Code but has in fact been improved as it were to make the entity more responsive to the fiscal problems of the government. It is a canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting one statute against another in an inevitably destructive confrontation, courts must exert every effort to reconcile them, remembering that both laws deserve a becoming respect as the handiwork of a coordinate branch of the government. On the assumption of a conflict between P.D. 1869 and the Code, the proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other but to give effect to both by harmonizing them if possible. This is possible in the case before us. The proper resolution of the problem at hand is to hold that under the Local Government Code, local government units may (and indeed must) prevent and suppress all kinds of gambling within their territories except only those allowed by statutes like P.D. 1869. The exception reserved in such laws must be read into the Code, to make both the Code and such laws equally effective and mutually complementary. This approach would also affirm that there are indeed two kinds of gambling, to wit, the illegal and those authorized by law. Legalized gambling is not a modern concept; it is probably as old as illegal gambling, if not indeed more so. The petitioners' suggestion that the Code authorizes them to prohibit all kinds of gambling would erase the distinction between these two forms of gambling without a clear indication that this is the will of the legislature. Plausibly, following this theory, the City of Manila could, by mere ordinance, prohibit the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office from conducting a lottery as authorized by R.A. 1169 and B.P. 42 or stop the races at the San Lazaro Hippodrome as authorized by R.A. 309 and R.A. 983. In light of all the above considerations, we see no way of arriving at the conclusion urged on us by the petitioners that the ordinances in question are valid. On the contrary, we find that the ordinances violate P.D. 1869, which has the character and force of a statute, as well as the public policy expressed in the decree allowing the playing of certain games of chance despite the prohibition of gambling in general. The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo

the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute. Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations in the State, and the corporation could not prevent it. We know of no limitation on the right so far as to the corporation themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature. 11 This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control of the local government units although in significantly reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local government units of the power to tax, 12 which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it. The Court understands and admires the concern of the petitioners for the welfare of their constituents and their apprehensions that the welfare of Cagayan de Oro City will be endangered by the opening of the casino. We share the view that "the hope of large or easy gain, obtained without special effort, turns the head of the workman" 13 and that "habitual gambling is a cause of laziness and ruin." 14 In People v. Gorostiza, 15 we declared: "The social scourge of gambling must be stamped out. The laws against gambling must be enforced to the limit." George Washington called gambling "the child of avarice, the brother of iniquity and the father of mischief." Nevertheless, we must recognize the power of the legislature to decide, in its own wisdom, to legalize certain forms of gambling, as was done in P.D. 1869 and impliedly affirmed in the Local Government Code. That decision can be revoked by this Court only if it contravenes the Constitution as the touchstone of all official acts. We do not find such contravention here. We hold that the power of PAGCOR to centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, remains unimpaired. P.D. 1869 has not been modified by the Local Government Code, which empowers the local government units to prevent or suppress only those forms of gambling prohibited by law. Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered. Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concurring: I concur with the majority holding that the city ordinances in question cannot modify much less repeal PAGCOR's general authority to establish and maintain gambling casinos anywhere in the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 1869. In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), 197 SCRA 52, I stated in a separate opinion that:

. . . I agree with the decision insofar as it holds that the prohibition, control, and regulation of the entire activity known as gambling properly pertain to "state policy". It is, therefore, the political departments of government, namely, the legislative and the executive that should decide on what government should do in the entire area of gambling, and assume full responsibility to the people for such policy." (Emphasis supplied) However, despite the legality of the opening and operation of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City by respondent PAGCOR, I wish to reiterate my view that gambling in any form runs counter to the government's own efforts to reestablish and resurrect the Filipino moral character which is generally perceived to be in a state of continuing erosion. It is in the light of this alarming perspective that I call upon government to carefully weigh the advantages and disadvantages of setting up more gambling facilities in the country. That the PAGCOR contributes greatly to the coffers of the government is not enough reason for setting up more gambling casinos because, undoubtedly, this will not help improve, but will cause a further deterioration in the Filipino moral character. It is worth remembering in this regard that, 1) what is legal is not always moral and 2) the ends do not always justify the means. As in Basco, I can easily visualize prostitution at par with gambling. And yet, legalization of the former will not render it any less reprehensible even if substantial revenue for the government can be realized from it. The same is true of gambling. In the present case, it is my considered view that the national government (through PAGCOR) should re-examine and re-evaluate its decision of imposing the gambling casino on the residents of Cagayan de Oro City; for it is abundantly clear that public opinion in the city is very much against it, and again the question must be seriously deliberated: will the prospects of revenue to be realized from the casino outweigh the further destruction of the Filipino sense of values?

DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring: While I concur in part with the majority, I wish, however, to express my views on certain aspects of this case. I. It must at once be noted that private respondent Pryce Properties Corporation (PRYCE) directly filed with the Court of Appeals its so-called petition for prohibition, thereby invoking the said court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of prohibition under Section 9(1) of B.P. Blg. 129. As I see it, however, the principal cause of action therein is one for declaratory relief: to declare null and unconstitutional for, inter alia, having been enacted without or in excess of jurisdiction, for impairing the obligation of contracts, and for being inconsistent with public policy the challenged ordinances enacted by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of the City of Cagayan de Oro. The intervention therein of public respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) further underscores the "declaratory relief" nature of the action. PAGCOR assails the ordinances for being contrary to the non-impairment and equal protection clauses of the Constitution, violative of the Local Government Code, and against the State's national policy declared in P.D. No. 1869. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction over the nature of the action. Even assuming arguendo that the case is one for prohibition, then, under this Court's established policy relative to the hierarchy of courts, the petition should have been filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. I find no special or compelling reason why it was not filed with the said court. I do not wish to entertain the thought that PRYCE doubted a favorable verdict therefrom, in which case the filing of the petition with the Court of Appeals may have been impelled by tactical considerations. A dismissal of the petition by the Court of Appeals would have been in order pursuant to our decisions in People vs. Cuaresma (172 SCRA 415, [1989]) and DefensorSantiago vs. Vasquez (217 SCRA 633 [1993]). In Cuaresma, this Court stated: A last word. This court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance), which may issue the writ, enforceable in any part of their respective regions. It is also shared by this court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals (formerly, Intermediate Appellate Court), although prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the latter's competence to issue the extraordinary writs was restricted by those "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction." This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the revenue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A

becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket. Indeed, the removal of the restriction of the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in this regard, supra resulting from the deletion of the qualifying phrase, "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction" was evidently intended precisely to relieve this Court pro tanto of the burden of dealing with applications for extraordinary writs which, but for the expansion of the Appellate Court's corresponding jurisdiction, would have had to be filed with it. (citations omitted) And in Vasquez, this Court said: One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses before us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court despite the fact that the same is available in the lower courts in the exercise of their original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be sought therein. This practice must be stopped, not only because of the imposition upon the previous time of this Court but also because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction. II. The challenged ordinances are (a) Ordinance No. 3353 entitled, "An Ordinance Prohibiting the Issuance of Business Permit and Canceling Existing Business Permit To Any Establishment for the Using and Allowing to be Used Its Premises or Portion Thereof for the Operation of Casino," and (b) Ordinance No. 3375-93 entitled, "An Ordinance Prohibiting the Operation of Casino and Providing Penalty for Violation Therefor." They were enacted to implement Resolution No. 2295 entitled, "Resolution Declaring As a Matter of Policy to Prohibit and/or Not to Allow the Establishment of the Gambling Casino in the City of Cagayan de Oro," which was promulgated on 19 November 1990 nearly two years before PRYCE and PAGCOR entered into a contract of lease under which the latter leased a portion of the former's Pryce Plaza Hotel for the operation of a gambling casino which resolution was vigorously reiterated in Resolution No. 2673 of 19 October 1992. The challenged ordinances were enacted pursuant to the Sangguniang Panglungsod's express powers conferred by Section 458, paragraph (a), subparagraphs (1)-(v), (3)-(ii), and (4)-(i), (iv), and (vii), Local Government Code, and pursuant to its implied power under Section 16 thereof (the general welfare clause) which reads: Sec. 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. The issue that necessarily arises is whether in granting local governments (such as the City of Cagayan de Oro) the above powers and functions, the Local Government Code has, pro tanto, repealed P.D. No. 1869 insofar as PAGCOR's general authority to establish and maintain gambling casinos anywhere in the Philippines is concerned. I join the majority in holding that the ordinances cannot repeal P.D. No. 1869. III. The nullification by the Court of Appeals of the challenged ordinances as unconstitutional primarily because it is in contravention to P.D. No. 1869 is unwarranted. A contravention of a law is not necessarily a contravention of the constitution. In any case, the ordinances can still stand even if they be conceded as offending P.D. No. 1869. They

can be reconciled, which is not impossible to do. So reconciled, the ordinances should be construed as not applying to PAGCOR. IV. From the pleadings, it is obvious that the government and the people of Cagayan de Oro City are, for obvious reasons, strongly against the opening of the gambling casino in their city. Gambling, even if legalized, would be inimical to the general welfare of the inhabitants of the City, or of any place for that matter. The PAGCOR, as a government-owned corporation, must consider the valid concerns of the people of the City of Cagayan de Oro and should not impose its will upon them in an arbitrary, if not despotic, manner.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concurring: I concur with the majority holding that the city ordinances in question cannot modify much less repeal PAGCOR's general authority to establish and maintain gambling casinos anywhere in the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 1869. In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), 197 SCRA 52, I stated in a separate opinion that: . . . I agree with the decision insofar as it holds that the prohibition, control, and regulation of the entire activity known as gambling properly pertain to "state policy". It is, therefore, the political departments of government, namely, the legislative and the executive that should decide on what government should do in the entire area of gambling, and assume full responsibility to the people for such policy. (emphasis supplied) However, despite the legality of the opening and operation of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City by respondent PAGCOR, I wish to reiterate my view that gambling in any form runs counter to the government's own efforts to reestablish and resurrect the Filipino moral character which is generally perceived to be in a state of continuing erosion. It is in the light of this alarming perspective that I call upon government to carefully weigh the advantages and disadvantages of setting up more gambling facilities in the country. That the PAGCOR contributes greatly to the coffers of the government is not enough reason for setting up more gambling casinos because, undoubtedly, this will not help improve, but will cause a further deterioration in the Filipino moral character. It is worth remembering in this regard that, 1) what is legal is not always moral and 2) the ends do not always justify the means. As in Basco, I can easily visualize prostitution at par with gambling. And yet, legalization of the former will not render it any less reprehensible even if substantial revenue for the government can be realized from it. The same is true of gambling. In the present case, it is my considered view that the national government (through PAGCOR) should re-examine and re-evaluate its decision of imposing the gambling casino on the residents of Cagayan de Oro City; for it is abundantly clear that public opinion in the city is very much against it, and again the question must be seriously deliberated: will the prospects of revenue to be realized from the casino outweigh the further destruction of the Filipino sense of values? DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring: While I concur in part with the majority, I wish, however, to express my views on certain aspects of this case. I. It must at once be noted that private respondent Pryce Properties Corporation (PRYCE) directly filed with the Court of Appeals its so-called petition for prohibition, thereby invoking the said court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of prohibition under Section 9(1) of B.P. Blg. 129. As I see it, however, the principal cause of action therein is one for declaratory relief: to declare null and unconstitutional for, inter alia, having been enacted without or in excess of jurisdiction, for impairing the obligation of contracts, and for being inconsistent with public policy the challenged

ordinances enacted by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of the City of Cagayan de Oro. The intervention therein of public respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) further underscores the "declaratory relief" nature of the action. PAGCOR assails the ordinances for being contrary to the non-impairment and equal protection clauses of the Constitution, violative of the Local Government Code, and against the State's national policy declared in P.D. No. 1869. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction over the nature of the action. Even assuming arguendo that the case is one for prohibition, then, under this Court's established policy relative to the hierarchy of courts, the petition should have been filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. I find no special or compelling reason why it was not filed with the said court. I do not wish to entertain the thought that PRYCE doubted a favorable verdict therefrom, in which case the filing of the petition with the Court of Appeals may have been impelled by tactical considerations. A dismissal of the petition by the Court of Appeals would have been in order pursuant to our decisions in People vs. Cuaresma (172 SCRA 415, [1989]) and DefensorSantiago vs. Vasquez (217 SCRA 633 [1993]). In Cuaresma, this Court stated: A last word. This court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance), which may issue the writ, enforceable in any part of their respective regions. It is also shared by this court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals (formerly, Intermediate Appellate Court), although prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the latter's competence to issue the extraordinary writs was restricted by those "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction." This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the revenue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket. Indeed, the removal of the restriction of the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in this regard, supra resulting from the deletion of the qualifying phrase, "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction" was evidently intended precisely to relieve this Court pro tanto of the burden of dealing with applications for extraordinary writs which, but for the expansion of the Appellate Court's corresponding jurisdiction, would have had to be filed with it. (citations omitted) And in Vasquez, this Court said: One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses before us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court despite the fact that the same is available in the lower courts in the exercise of their original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be sought therein. This practice must be stopped, not only because of the imposition upon the previous time of this Court but also because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction. II. The challenged ordinances are (a) Ordinance No. 3353 entitled, "An Ordinance Prohibiting the Issuance of Business Permit and Canceling Existing Business Permit To Any Establishment for the Using and Allowing to be Used Its Premises or Portion Thereof for the Operation of Casino," and (b) Ordinance No. 3375-93 entitled, "An Ordinance Prohibiting the Operation of Casino and Providing Penalty for Violation Therefor." They were enacted to implement Resolution No. 2295 entitled, "Resolution Declaring As a Matter of Policy to Prohibit and/or Not to Allow the Establishment of the Gambling Casino in the City of Cagayan de Oro," which was promulgated on 19 November 1990 nearly two years before PRYCE and PAGCOR entered into a contract of lease under which the latter leased a portion of the former's Pryce Plaza Hotel for the operation of a gambling casino which resolution was vigorously reiterated in Resolution No. 2673 of 19 October 1992.

The challenged ordinances were enacted pursuant to the Sangguniang Panglungsod's express powers conferred by Section 458, paragraph (a), subparagraphs (1)-(v), (3)-(ii), and (4)-(i), (iv), and (vii), Local Government Code, and pursuant to its implied power under Section 16 thereof (the general welfare clause) which reads: Sec. 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. The issue that necessarily arises is whether in granting local governments (such as the City of Cagayan de Oro) the above powers and functions, the Local Government Code has, pro tanto, repealed P.D. No. 1869 insofar as PAGCOR's general authority to establish and maintain gambling casinos anywhere in the Philippines is concerned. I join the majority in holding that the ordinances cannot repeal P.D. No. 1869. III. The nullification by the Court of Appeals of the challenged ordinances as unconstitutional primarily because it is in contravention to P.D. No. 1869 is unwarranted. A contravention of a law is not necessarily a contravention of the constitution. In any case, the ordinances can still stand even if they be conceded as offending P.D. No. 1869. They can be reconciled, which is not impossible to do. So reconciled, the ordinances should be construed as not applying to PAGCOR. IV. From the pleadings, it is obvious that the government and the people of Cagayan de Oro City are, for obvious reasons, strongly against the opening of the gambling casino in their city. Gambling, even if legalized, would be inimical to the general welfare of the inhabitants of the City, or of any place for that matter. The PAGCOR, as a government-owned corporation, must consider the valid concerns of the people of the City of Cagayan de Oro and should not impose its will upon them in an arbitrary, if not despotic, manner.

G.R. No. 90336 August 12, 1991 RUPERTO TAULE, petitioner, vs. SECRETARY LUIS T. SANTOS and GOVERNOR LEANDRO VERCELES, respondents. Balgos & Perez and Bugaring, Tugonon & Associates Law Offices for petitioner. Juan G. Atencia for private respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.:p The extent of authority of the Secretary of Local Government over the katipunan ng mga barangay or the barangay councils is brought to the fore in this case. On June 18,1989, the Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of Catanduanes, composed of eleven (11) members, in their capacities as Presidents of the Association of Barangay Councils in their respective municipalities, convened in Virac, Catanduanes with six members in attendance for the purpose of holding the election of its officers. Present were petitioner Ruperto Taule of San Miguel, Allan Aquino of Viga, Vicente Avila of Virac, Fidel Jacob of Panganiban, Leo Sales of Caramoran and Manuel Torres of Baras. The Board of Election Supervisors/Consultants was composed of Provincial Government Operation Officer (PGOO) Alberto P. Molina, Jr. as Chairman with Provincial Treasurer Luis A. Manlapaz, Jr. and Provincial Election Supervisor Arnold Soquerata as members.

When the group decided to hold the election despite the absence of five (5) of its members, the Provincial Treasurer and the Provincial Election Supervisor walked out. The election nevertheless proceeded with PGOO Alberto P. Molina, Jr. as presiding officer. Chosen as members of the Board of Directors were Taule, Aquino, Avila, Jacob and Sales. Thereafter, the following were elected officers of the FABC: President Ruperto Taule Vice-President Allan Aquino Secretary Vicente Avila Treasurer Fidel Jacob Auditor Leo Sales 1 On June 19, 1989, respondent Leandro I. Verceles, Governor of Catanduanes, sent a letter to respondent Luis T. Santos, the Secretary of Local Government,* protesting the election of the officers of the FABC and seeking its nullification in view of several flagrant irregularities in the manner it was conducted. 2 In compliance with the order of respondent Secretary, petitioner Ruperto Taule as President of the FABC, filed his comment on the letter-protest of respondent Governor denying the alleged irregularities and denouncing said respondent Governor for meddling or intervening in the election of FABC officers which is a purely non-partisan affair and at the same time requesting for his appointment as a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the province being the duly elected President of the FABC in Catanduanes. 3 On August 4, 1989, respondent Secretary issued a resolution nullifying the election of the officers of the FABC in Catanduanes held on June 18, 1989 and ordering a new one to be conducted as early as possible to be presided by the Regional Director of Region V of the Department of Local Government. 4 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of August 4, 1989 but it was denied by respondent Secretary in his resolution of September 5, 1989. 5 In the petition for certiorari before Us, petitioner seeks the reversal of the resolutions of respondent Secretary dated August 4, 1989 and September 5, 1989 for being null and void. Petitioner raises the following issues: 1) Whether or not the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction to entertain an election protest involving the election of the officers of the Federation of Association of Barangay Councils; 2) Whether or not the respondent Governor has the legal personality to file an election protest; 3) Assuming that the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction over the election protest, whether or not he committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in nullifying the election; The Katipunan ng mga Barangay is the organization of all sangguniang barangays in the following levels: in municipalities to be known as katipunang bayan; in cities, katipunang panlungsod; in provinces, katipunang panlalawigan; in regions, katipunang pampook; and on the national level, katipunan ng mga barangay. 6 The Local Government Code provides for the manner in which the katipunan ng mga barangay at all levels shall be organized: Sec. 110. Organization. (1) The katipunan at all levels shall be organized in the following manner: (a) The katipunan in each level shall elect a board of directors and a set of officers. The president of each level shall represent the katipunan concerned in the next higher level of organization. (b) The katipunan ng mga barangay shall be composed of the katipunang pampook, which shall in turn be composed of the presidents of the katipunang panlalawigan and the katipunang panlungsod. The presidents of the katipunang bayan in each province shall

constitute the katipunang panlalawigan. The katipunang panlungsod and the katipunang bayan shall be composed of the punong barangays of cities and municipalities, respectively. xxx xxx xxx The respondent Secretary, acting in accordance with the provision of the Local Government Code empowering him to "promulgate in detail the implementing circulars and the rules and regulations to carry out the various administrative actions required for the initial implementation of this Code in such a manner as will ensure the least disruption of on-going programs and projects 7 issued Department of Local Government Circular No. 89-09 on April 7, 1989, 8 to provide the guidelines for the conduct of the elections of officers of the Katipunan ng mga Barangay at the municipal, city, provincial, regional and national levels. It is now the contention of petitioner that neither the constitution nor the law grants jurisdiction upon the respondent Secretary over election contests involving the election of officers of the FABC, the katipunan ng mga barangay at the provincial level. It is petitioner's theory that under Article IX, C, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, it is the Commission on Elections which has jurisdiction over all contests involving elective barangay officials. On the other hand, it is the opinion of the respondent Secretary that any violation of the guidelines as set forth in said circular would be a ground for filing a protest and would vest upon the Department jurisdiction to resolve any protest that may be filed in relation thereto. Under Article IX, C, Section 2(2) of the 1987 Constitution, the Commission on Elections shall exercise "exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction." The 1987 Constitution expanded the jurisdiction of the COMELEC by granting it appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction or elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. 9 The jurisdiction of the COMELEC over contests involving elective barangay officials is limited to appellate jurisdiction from decisions of the trial courts. Under the law, 10 the sworn petition contesting the election of a barangay officer shall be filed with the proper Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Court by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office within 10 days after the proclamation of the results. A voter may also contest the election of any barangay officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines by filing a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court within 10 days after the proclamation of the results of the election. 11 Only appeals from decisions of inferior courts on election matters as aforestated may be decided by the COMELEC. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC is over popular elections, the elected officials of which are determined through the will of the electorate. An election is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the people. 12 It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote. 13 Specifically, the term "election," in the context of the Constitution, may refer to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes 14 which do not characterize the election of officers in the Katipunan ng mga barangay. "Election contests" would refer to adversary proceedings by which matters involving the title or claim of title to an elective office, made before or after proclamation of the winner, is settled whether or not the contestant is claiming the office in dispute 15 and in the case of elections of barangay officials, it is restricted to proceedings after the proclamation of the winners as no pre-proclamation controversies are allowed. 16 The jurisdiction of the COMELEC does not cover protests over the organizational set-up of the katipunan ng mga barangay composed of popularly elected punong barangays as prescribed by law whose officers are voted upon by their respective members. The COMELEC exercises only appellate jurisdiction over election contests involving elective barangay officials decided by the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts which likewise have limited jurisdiction. The authority of the COMELEC over the katipunan ng mga barangay is limited by law to supervision of the election of the representative of the katipunan concerned to the sanggunian in a particular level conducted by their own respective organization. 17 However, the Secretary of Local Government is not vested with jurisdiction to entertain any protest involving the election of officers of the FABC. There is no question that he is vested with the power to promulgate rules and regulations as set forth in Section 222 of the Local Government Code. Likewise, under Book IV, Title XII, Chapter 1, See. 3(2) of the Administrative Code of 1987, ** the respondent Secretary has the power to "establish and prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances and implementing laws on the general supervision of local government units and on the promotion of local autonomy and monitor compliance thereof by said units."

Also, the respondent Secretary's rule making power is provided in See. 7, Chapter II, Book IV of the Administrative Code, to wit: (3) Promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out department objectives, policies, functions, plans, programs and projects; Thus, DLG Circular No. 89-09 was issued by respondent Secretary in pursuance of his rule-making power conferred by law and which now has the force and effect of law. 18 Now the question that arises is whether or not a violation of said circular vests jurisdiction upon the respondent Secretary, as claimed by him, to hear a protest filed in relation thereto and consequently declare an election null and void. It is a well-settled principle of administrative law that unless expressly empowered, administrative agencies are bereft of quasi- judicial powers. 19 The jurisdiction of administrative authorities is dependent entirely upon the provisions of the statutes reposing power in them; they cannot confer it upon themselves. 20 Such jurisdiction is essential to give validity to their determinations. 21 There is neither a statutory nor constitutional provision expressly or even by necessary implication conferring upon the Secretary of Local Government the power to assume jurisdiction over an election protect involving officers of the katipunan ng mga barangay. An understanding of the extent of authority of the Secretary over local governments is therefore necessary if We are to resolve the issue at hand. Presidential power over local governments is limited by the Constitution to the exercise of general supervision 22 "to ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." 23 The general supervision is exercised by the President through the Secretary of Local Government. 24 In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that the subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fails or neglects to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. The fundamental law permits the Chief Executive to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local government or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local governments so long as the same or its officers act within the scope of their authority. 25 Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body. 26 Construing the constitutional limitation on the power of general supervision of the President over local governments, We hold that respondent Secretary has no authority to pass upon the validity or regularity of the election of the officers of the katipunan. To allow respondent Secretary to do so will give him more power than the law or the Constitution grants. It will in effect give him control over local government officials for it will permit him to interfere in a purely democratic and non-partisan activity aimed at strengthening the barangay as the basic component of local governments so that the ultimate goal of fullest autonomy may be achieved. In fact, his order that the new elections to be conducted be presided by the Regional Director is a clear and direct interference by the Department with the political affairs of the barangays which is not permitted by the limitation of presidential power to general supervision over local governments. 27 Indeed, it is the policy of the state to ensure the autonomy of local governments. 28 This state policy is echoed in the Local Government Code wherein it is declared that "the State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress." 29 To deny the Secretary of Local Government the power to review the regularity of the elections of officers of the katipunan would be to enhance the avowed state policy of promoting the autonomy of local governments. Moreover, although the Department is given the power to prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances, the Administrative Code limits its authority to merely "monitoring compliance" by local government units of such issuances. 30 To monitor means "to watch, observe or check. 31 This is compatible with the power of supervision of the Secretary over local governments which as earlier discussed is limited to checking whether the local government unit concerned or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Even the Local Government Code which grants the Secretary power to issue implementing circulars, rules and regulations is silent as to how these issuances should be enforced. Since the respondent Secretary exercises only supervision and not control over local governments, it is truly doubtful if he could enforce compliance with the DLG Circular. 32 Any doubt therefore as to the power of the Secretary to interfere with local affairs should be resolved in favor of the greater autonomy of the local government. Thus, the Court holds that in assuming jurisdiction over the election protest filed by respondent Governor and declaring the election of the officers of the FABC on June 18, 1989 as null and void, the respondent Secretary acted in excess of his jurisdiction. The respondent Secretary not having the jurisdiction to hear an election protest

involving officers of the FABC, the recourse of the parties is to the ordinary courts. The Regional Trial Courts have the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear the protest. 33 The provision in DLG Circular No. 89-15 amending DLG Circular No. 89-09 which states that "whenever the guidelines are not substantially complied with, the election shall be declared null and void by the Department of Local Government and an election shall conduct and being invoked by the Solicitor General cannot be applied. DLG Circular No. 89-15 was issued on July 3, 1989 after the June 18, 1989 elections of the FABC officers and it is the rule in statutory construction that laws, including circulars and regulations 34 cannot be applied retrospectively. 35 Moreover, such provision is null and void for having been issued in excess of the respondent Secretary's jurisdiction, inasmuch as an administrative authority cannot confer jurisdiction upon itself. As regards the second issue raised by petitioner, the Court finds that respondent Governor has the personality to file the protest. Under Section 205 of the Local Government Code, the membership of the sangguniang panlalawigan consists of the governor, the vice-governor, elective members of the said sanggunian and the presidents of the katipunang panlalawigan and the kabataang barangay provincial federation. The governor acts as the presiding officer of the sangguniang panlalawigan. 36 As presiding officer of the sagguniang panlalawigan, the respondent governor has an interest in the election of the officers of the FABC since its elected president becomes a member of the assembly. If the president of the FABC assumes his presidency under questionable circumstances and is allowed to sit in the sangguniang panlalawigan the official actions of the sanggunian may be vulnerable to attacks as to their validity or legality. Hence, respondent governor is a proper party to question the regularity of the elections of the officers of the FABC. As to the third issue raised by petitioner, the Court has already ruled that the respondent Secretary has no jurisdiction to hear the protest and nullify the elections. Nevertheless, the Court holds that the issue of the validity of the elections should now be resolved in order to prevent any unnecessary delay that may result from the commencement of an appropriate action by the parties. The elections were declared null and void primarily for failure to comply with Section 2.4 of DLG Circular No. 89-09 which provides that "the incumbent FABC President or the Vice-President shall preside over the reorganizational meeting, there being a quorum." The rule specifically provides that it is the incumbent FABC President or VicePresident who shall preside over the meeting. The word "shall" should be taken in its ordinary signification, i.e., it must be imperative or mandatory and not merely permissive, 37 as the rule is explicit and requires no other interpretation. If it had been intended that any other official should preside, the rules would have provided so, as it did in the elections at the town and city levels 38 as well as the regional level.. 39 It is admitted that neither the incumbent FABC President nor the Vice-President presided over the meeting and elections but Alberto P. Molina, Jr., the Chairman of the Board of Election Supervisors/Consultants. Thus, there was a clear violation of the aforesaid mandatory provision. On this ground, the elections should be nullified. Under Sec. 2.3.2.7 of the same circular it is provided that a Board of Election Supervisors/Consultants shall be constituted to oversee and/or witness the canvassing of votes and proclamation of winners. The rules confine the role of the Board of Election Supervisors/Consultants to merely overseeing and witnessing the conduct of elections. This is consistent with the provision in the Local Government Code limiting the authority of the COMELEC to the supervision of the election. 40 In case at bar, PGOO Molina, the Chairman of the Board, presided over the elections. There was direct participation by the Chairman of the Board in the elections contrary to what is dictated by the rules. Worse, there was no Board of Election Supervisors to oversee the elections in view of the walk out staged by its two other members, the Provincial COMELEC Supervisor and the Provincial Treasurer. The objective of keeping the election free and honest was therefore compromised. The Court therefore finds that the election of officers of the FABC held on June 18, 1989 is null and void for failure to comply with the provisions of DLG Circular No. 89-09. Meanwhile, pending resolution of this petition, petitioner filed a supplemental petition alleging that public respondent Local Government Secretary, in his memorandum dated June 7, 1990, designated Augusto Antonio as temporary representative of the Federation to the sangguniang panlalawigan of Catanduanes. 41 By virtue of this memorandum, respondent governor swore into said office Augusto Antonio on June 14, 1990. 42 The Solicitor General filed his comment on the supplemental petition 43 as required by the resolution of the Court dated September 13,1990. In his comment, the Solicitor General dismissed the supervening event alleged by petitioner as something immaterial to the petition. He argues that Antonio's appointment was merely temporary "until such time that the provincial FABC president in that province has been elected, appointed and qualified." 44 He stresses that Antonio's

appointment was only a remedial measure designed to cope with the problems brought about by the absence of a representative of the FABC to the "sanggunian ang panlalawigan." Sec. 205 (2) of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) provides(2) The sangguniang panlalawigan shall be composed of the governor, the vice-governor, elective members of the said sanggunian and the presidents of the katipunang panlalawigan and the kabataang barangay provincial federation who shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied.) Batas Pambansa Blg. 51, under Sec. 2 likewise states: xxx xxx xxx The sangguniang panlalawigan of each province shall be composed of the governor as chairman and presiding officer, the vice-governor as presiding officer pro tempore, the elective sangguniang panlalawigan members, and the appointive members consisting of the president of the provincial association of barangay councils, and the president of the provincial federation of the kabataang barangay. (Emphasis supplied.) In Ignacio vs. Banate Jr. 45 the Court, interpreting similarly worded provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 51 on the composition of the sangguniang panlungsod, 46 declared as null and void the appointment of private respondent Leoncio Banate Jr. as member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Roxas representing the katipunang panlungsod ng mga barangay for he lacked the elegibility and qualification required by law, not being a barangay captain and for not having been elected president of the association of barangay councils. The Court held that an unqualified person cannot be appointed a member of the sanggunian, even in an acting capacity. In Reyes vs. Ferrer, 47 the appointment of Nemesio L. Rasgo Jr. as representative of the youth sector to the sangguniang panlungsod of Davao City was declared invalid since he was never the president of the kabataang barangay city federation as required by Sec. 173, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337. In the present controversy involving the sangguniang panlalawigan, the law is likewise explicit. To be appointed by the President of the Philippines to sit in the sangguniang panlalawigan is the president of the katipunang panlalawigan. The appointee must meet the qualifications set by law. 48 The appointing power is bound by law to comply with the requirements as to the basic qualifications of the appointee to the sangguniang panlalawigan. The President of the Philippines or his alter ego, the Secretary of Local Government, has no authority to appoint anyone who does not meet the minimum qualification to be the president of the federation of barangay councils. Augusto Antonio is not the president of the federation. He is a member of the federation but he was not even present during the elections despite notice. The argument that Antonio was appointed as a remedial measure in the exigency of the service cannot be sustained. Since Antonio does not meet the basic qualification of being president of the federation, his appointment to the sangguniang panlalawigan is not justified notwithstanding that such appointment is merely in a temporary capacity. If the intention of the respondent Secretary was to protect the interest of the federation in the sanggunian, he should have appointed the incumbent FABC President in a hold-over capacity. For even under the guidelines, the term of office of officers of the katipunan at all levels shall be from the date of their election until their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified, without prejudice to the terms of their appointments as members of the sanggunian to which they may be correspondingly appointed. 49 Since the election is still under protest such that no successor of the incumbent has as yet qualified, the respondent Secretary has no choice but to have the incumbent FABC President sit as member of the sanggunian. He could even have appointed petitioner since he was elected the president of the federation but not Antonio. The appointment of Antonio, allegedly the protege of respondent Governor, gives credence to petitioner's charge of political interference by respondent Governor in the organization. This should not be allowed. The barangays should be insulated from any partisan activity or political intervention if only to give true meaning to local autonomy. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED in that the resolution of respondent Secretary dated August 4, 1989 is hereby SET ASIDE for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction. The election of the officials of the ABC Federation held on June 18, 1989 is hereby annulled. A new election of officers of the federation is hereby ordered to be conducted immediately in accordance with the governing rules and regulations. The Supplemental petition is hereby GRANTED. The appointment of Augusto Antonio as representative to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in a temporary capacity is declared null and void. No costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-34915 June 24, 1983 CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY, petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII; HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC., respondents. City Fiscal for petitioners. Manuel Villaruel, Jr. and Feliciano Tumale for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: This is a petition for review which seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII declaring Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, of the Quezon City Council null and void. Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF" provides: Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. The area so designated shall immediately be developed and should be open for operation not later than six months from the date of approval of the application. For several years, the aforequoted section of the Ordinance was not enforced by city authorities but seven years after the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed the following resolution: RESOLVED by the council of Quezon assembled, to request, as it does hereby request the City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers burial. Pursuant to this petition, the Quezon City Engineer notified respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 would be enforced Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing with the Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch XVIII at Quezon City, a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction (Sp. Proc. No. Q-16002) seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question The respondent alleged that the same is contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code. There being no issue of fact and the questions raised being purely legal both petitioners and respondent agreed to the rendition of a judgment on the pleadings. The respondent court, therefore, rendered the decision declaring Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 null and void. A motion for reconsideration having been denied, the City Government and City Council filed the instant petition. Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. They further argue that the Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in the exercise of local police power, " to make such further ordinances and resolutions not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein." On the other hand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contends that the taking or confiscation of property is obvious because the questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property. The respondent also stresses that the general welfare clause is not available as a source of power for the taking of the property in this case because it refers to "the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property." The respondent points out that if an owner is deprived of his property outright under the State's police power, the property is generally not taken for public use but is urgently and summarily destroyed

in order to promote the general welfare. The respondent cites the case of a nuisance per se or the destruction of a house to prevent the spread of a conflagration. We find the stand of the private respondent as well as the decision of the respondent Judge to be well-founded. We quote with approval the lower court's ruling which declared null and void Section 9 of the questioned city ordinance: The issue is: Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power? An examination of the Charter of Quezon City (Rep. Act No. 537), does not reveal any provision that would justify the ordinance in question except the provision granting police power to the City. Section 9 cannot be justified under the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee, and regulate such other business, trades, and occupation as may be established or practised in the City.' (Subsections 'C', Sec. 12, R.A. 537). The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit (People vs. Esguerra, 81 PhiL 33, Vega vs. Municipal Board of Iloilo, L-6765, May 12, 1954; 39 N.J. Law, 70, Mich. 396). A fortiori, the power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate. The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery, because under Section 13 of said ordinance, 'Violation of the provision thereof is punishable with a fine and/or imprisonment and that upon conviction thereof the permit to operate and maintain a private cemetery shall be revoked or cancelled.' The confiscatory clause and the penal provision in effect deter one from operating a memorial park cemetery. Neither can the ordinance in question be justified under sub- section "t", Section 12 of Republic Act 537 which authorizes the City Council to'prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and provide for their burial in such proper place and in such manner as the council may determine, subject to the provisions of the general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries and governing funerals and disposal of the dead.' (Sub-sec. (t), Sec. 12, Rep. Act No. 537). There is nothing in the above provision which authorizes confiscation or as euphemistically termed by the respondents, 'donation' We now come to the question whether or not Section 9 of the ordinance in question is a valid exercise of police power. The police power of Quezon City is defined in sub-section 00, Sec. 12, Rep. Act 537 which reads as follows: (00) To make such further ordinance and regulations not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote, the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein; and enforce obedience thereto with such lawful fines or penalties as the City Council may prescribe under the provisions of subsection (jj) of this section. We start the discussion with a restatement of certain basic principles. Occupying the forefront in the bill of rights is the provision which states that 'no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law' (Art. Ill, Section 1 subparagraph 1, Constitution). On the other hand, there are three inherent powers of government by which the state interferes with the property rights, namely-. (1) police power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation. These are said to exist independently of the Constitution as necessary attributes of sovereignty. Police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property' (Quoted in Political Law by Tanada and Carreon, V-11, p. 50). It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare. In police power, the owner does not recover from the government for injury sustained in consequence thereof (12 C.J. 623). It has been said that police power is the most essential of government powers, at times the most insistent, and always one of the least limitable of the powers of government (Ruby vs. Provincial Board, 39 PhiL 660; Ichong vs. Hernandez, 1,7995, May 31, 1957). This power embraces the whole system of public regulation (U.S. vs. Linsuya Fan, 10 PhiL 104). The Supreme Court has said that police power is so far-reaching in scope that it has almost become impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of

the state itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope. Being coextensive with self-preservation and survival itself, it is the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most essential insistent and illimitable Especially it is so under the modern democratic framework where the demands of society and nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions. The field and scope of police power have become almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have become almost all embracing and have transcended human foresight. Since the Courts cannot foresee the needs and demands of public interest and welfare, they cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of the police power by which and through which the state seeks to attain or achieve public interest and welfare. (Ichong vs. Hernandez, L-7995, May 31, 1957). The police power being the most active power of the government and the due process clause being the broadest station on governmental power, the conflict between this power of government and the due process clause of the Constitution is oftentimes inevitable. It will be seen from the foregoing authorities that police power is usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the general welfare. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general welfare as for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms. It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property without due process of law, nay, even without compensation. In sustaining the decision of the respondent court, we are not unmindful of the heavy burden shouldered by whoever challenges the validity of duly enacted legislation whether national or local As early as 1913, this Court ruled in Case v. Board of Health (24 PhiL 250) that the courts resolve every presumption in favor of validity and, more so, where the ma corporation asserts that the ordinance was enacted to promote the common good and general welfare. In the leading case of Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila (20 SCRA 849) the Court speaking through the then Associate Justice and now Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando stated Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the a of any evidence to offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a statute or ordinance. As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm 'The presumption is all in favor of validity. ... The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular ... municipality and with all the facts and lances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well-being of the people. ... The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation. (U.S. v. Salaveria (1918], 39 Phil. 102, at p. 111. There was an affirmation of the presumption of validity of municipal ordinance as announced in the leading Salaveria decision in Ebona v. Daet, [1950]85 Phil. 369.) We have likewise considered the principles earlier stated in Case v. Board of Health supra : ... Under the provisions of municipal charters which are known as the general welfare clauses, a city, by virtue of its police power, may adopt ordinances to the peace, safety, health, morals and the best and highest interests of the municipality. It is a well-settled principle, growing out of the nature of well-ordered and society, that every holder of property, however absolute and may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community. An property in the state is held subject to its general regulations, which are necessary to the common good and general welfare. Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable restraints and regulations, established by law, as the legislature, under the governing and controlling power vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient. The state, under the police power, is possessed with plenary power to deal with all matters relating to the general health, morals, and safety of the people, so long as it does not contravene any positive inhibition of the organic law and providing that such power is not exercised in such a manner as to justify the interference of the courts to prevent positive wrong and oppression. but find them not applicable to the facts of this case.

There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries. The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and practise in the past. It continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the development of communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to home-owners. As a matter of fact, the petitioners rely solely on the general welfare clause or on implied powers of the municipal corporation, not on any express provision of law as statutory basis of their exercise of power. The clause has always received broad and liberal interpretation but we cannot stretch it to cover this particular taking. Moreover, the questioned ordinance was passed after Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. had incorporated. received necessary licenses and permits and commenced operating. The sequestration of six percent of the cemetery cannot even be considered as having been impliedly acknowledged by the private respondent when it accepted the permits to commence operations. WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the respondent court is affirmed. SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. L-45338-39 July 31, 1991 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellee, vs. POLICARPIO GONZALES and AUGUSTO JOSUE, respondents-appellants. Jose Z. Galsim for respondent-appellant P. Gonzales. Jaime G. Manzano for appellant A. Josue.

FELICIANO, J.:p The Republic of the Philippines is the owner of two (2) parcels of land situated in Taong Malabon, Metro Manila and designated as Lots 1 and 2 of Plan MR-1018-D. Lot I which adjoins F. Sevilla Boulevard has an area of 605 square meters; Lot 2, an interior lot abutting F. Sevilla Boulevard only on its northern portion, is 664 square meters in area. This piece of property was formerly a deep swamp until the occupants thereof, among them appellants Policarpio Gonzales and Augusta Josue, started filling it. Each of appellants who are brothers-in-law, constructed a mixed residential and commercial building on the interior part of Lot 2. On 14 April 1955, then President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 144, entitled "Reserving for Street Widening and Parking Space Purposes Certain Parcels of the Public Domain Situated in the Municipality of Malabon, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon." 1 Lots 1 and 2 were specifically withdrawn from sale or settlement and reserved for the purposes mentioned in the Proclamation. The Municipal Council of Malabon then passed Resolutions 2 authorizing the filing of ejectment cases against appellants so that Proclamation No, 144 could be implemented. On 23 June 1955, the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Pasig, Rizal filed separate complaints against appellants for the recovery of the portions of Lot 2 they were occupying. Appellants disputed the light of the Government to recover the land occupied by them. In his answer, Policarpio Gonzales claimed (1) that Lot 2 was covered by a lease application, and later a miscellaneous sales application, filed before the Bureau of Lands; (2) that he had a municipal permit to construct a building as well as a business

license duly issued by the Office of the Mayor of Malabon; and (3) that the lot occupied by him was not needed by the Municipality of Malabon in the widening of F. Sevilla Boulevard. The defenses interposed by Augusto Josue were substantially similar to those raised by Policarpio Gonzales. Upon agreement of the parties, the separate cases were tried jointly. On 28 January 1967, the trial court, presided over by then Judge Cecilia Muoz-Palma, rendered a decision with the following dispositive portion: WHEREFORE, finding the complaints to be justified and meritorious, this Court orders defendants Policarpio Gonzales and Augusto Josue and/or their agents, representatives, successors-in-interest to vacate Lots 1 and 2 of Plan MR1018-D as described in the complaint, and to remove at their expense their respective buildings and/or improvements erected and existing on said lots, and restore the possession thereof to the Republic of the Philippines, and to pay the corresponding costs in the respective cases. SO ORDERED. 3 Appellants appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a Resolution dated 1 December 1976, the Court of Appeals, speaking through Mr. Justice Luis B. Reyes, certified the consolidated cases to this Court since the appeals raised only a question of law, that is, whether Presidential Proclamation No. 144 was valid or not. 4 Although appellants filed separate briefs before the Court of Appeals, their common defense was presented and discussed in very similar language: Stripped of surplusage, it is respectfully submitted that Proclamation No. 144 dated April 14, 1955 of the President of the Philippines, more particularly that portion which withdrew from sale and settlement the land in question and reserving [the] same for parking space purposes, is not in accordance with Section 83 of the Public Land Law, Commonwealth Act No. 141, and therefore, invalid. Under said law "parking space" is not one of those reservations for public benefit which the President of the Philippines may designate by proclamation from any tracts of land of the public domain. The reservation for "parking lots" under the presidential proclamation in question is not required by public interest, nor it is for the benefit of the public, because only those who have cars can use the parking lot. Public use or public benefit must be for the general public and not a use by or for particular persons. The essential feature of public use is that it should not be confined to privileged individuals, but open to the general public. This is not so of the parking space as contemplated by the presidential proclamation in question. (Citations omitted.) Section 83 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, known as the Public Land Law provides: Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce [now Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources], the President may designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the public domain as reservation for the use of the Commonwealth of the Philippines [now Republic of the Philippines] or of any of its branches, or of the inhabitants thereof, in accordance with regulations prescribed for this purpose, or for quasipublic uses or purposes when the public interest requires it, including reservations for highways, rights of way for railroads, hydraulic power sites, irrigation systems, communal pastures or leguas comunales, public parks, public quarries, public fishponds, workingmen's village and other improvements for the public benefit. (Emphasis supplied) Appellants urge this Court to declare Proclamation No. 144 invalid. They contend that the setting aside of the lots occupied by them for parking space purposes does not redound to the public benefit as required under Section 83 of the Public Land Act. They claim that only certain privileged individuals, i.e., those who have cars, can avail of the parking facility without any advantage accruing to the general public. As observed by the trial court, Proclamation No. 144 was issued by then President Ramon Magsaysay in response to several resolutions passed by the Municipal Council of Malabon, Rizal, which had become particularly aware of the increasing vehicular traffic and congestion along F. Sevilla Boulevard. 5 The Municipal Council had proposed to widen F. Sevilla Boulevard and at the same time, to reserve an area for parking space to ease up traffic problems, in anticipation of the completion of the then proposed market and slaughterhouse located to the west of F. Sevilla Boulevard. In this day and age, it is hardly open to debate that the public has much to gain from the proposed widening of F. Sevilla Boulevard and from establishment of a municipal parking area. Indiscriminate parking along F. Sevilla Boulevard and other main thoroughfares was prevalent; this, of course, caused the build up of traffic in the surrounding area to the great discomfort and inconvenience of the public who use the streets. Traffic congestion constitutes a threat to the health, welfare, safety and convenience of the people and it can only be substantially relieved by widening streets and providing adequate parking areas. Under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, parking in designated areas along public streets or highways is allowed 6 which clearly indicates that provision for parking spaces serves a useful purpose. In other jurisdictions where traffic is at least as voluminous as here, the provision by municipal governments of parking space is not

limited to parking along public streets or highways. There has been a marked trend to build off-street parking facilities with the view to removing parked cars from the streets. While the provision of off-street parking facilities or carparks has been commonly undertaken by private enterprise, municipal governments have been constrained to put up carparks in response to public necessity where private enterprise had failed to keep up with the growing public demand. American courts have upheld the right of municipal governments to construct off-street parking facilities as clearly redounding to the public benefit. 7 Appellants, however, allege that the benefits, if any, that may be derived from the proposed street-widening and parking space will be confined to people who have cars, hence there would be lacking the essential feature of property reserved for public use or benefit. Appellants would restrict property reserved for public use or benefit to include only property susceptible of being utilized by a generally unlimited number of people. The conception urged by appellants is both flawed and obsolete since the number of users is not the yardstick in determining whether property is properly reserved for public use or public benefit. In the first place, Section 83 above speaks not only of use by a local government but also of "quasi-public uses or purposes." To constitute public use, the public in general should have equal or common rights to use the land or facility involved on the same terms, however limited in number the people who can actually avail themselves of it at a given time. 8 There is nothing in Proclamation No. 144 which excludes non-car-owners from using a widened street or a parking area should they in fact happen to be driving cars; the opportunity to avail of the use thereof remains open for the public in general. Besides, the benefits directly obtained by car-owners do not determine either the validity or invalidity of Proclamation No. 144. What is important are the long-term benefits which the proposed street widening and parking areas make available to the public in the form of enhanced, safe and orderly transportation on land. This is the kind of public benefit envisioned by the Municipal Council of Malabon, Rizal and which was sought to be promoted by the President in issuing Proclamation No. 144. We believe and so hold that Proclamation No. 144 was lawful and valid. Proclamation No. 144 specifically provided that the withdrawal of Lots No. 1 and 2 shall be subject to existing private rights, if any there be. Prior to the issuance of Proclamation No. 144, appellants had applied for miscellaneous sales applications over the lots respectively occupied by them. Insofar as appellant Policarpio Gonzales is concerned, it is not disputed that he had acknowledged the ownership of the National Government of the land applied for by him. 9 Although not expressly stated, Augusto Josue must be deemed to have similarly admitted that ownership by the National Government since he filed a miscellaneous sales application with the Bureau of Lands, an agency of the Government, an application which can only be filed in respect of tracts of public land, not private land. The miscellaneous sales application, however, of appellant Policarpio Gonzales had not been approved by the Bureau of Lands at the time Proclamation No. 144 was issued; the land therefore retained its character as land of the public domain. Upon the other hand, the miscellaneous sales application of appellant Augusto Josue had already been rejected in an Order of the Director of Lands dated 8 January 1954. 10 Accordingly, no private rights had accrued and become vested in appellants. In both cases, the lots remained public lands and were in fact subject to the free disposition and control of the Government. Appellants allege having built mixed residential and commercial buildings on Lot 2. The evidence of record discloses that appellants had secured the appropriate municipal permits or licenses therefor, that is, for the construction of said buildings as well as the carrying on of business therein. However, since the lease, sale or any other form of concession or disposition and management of lands of the public domain was directly under the executive control of the Director of Lands, 11 and not of local government officials, the Malabon Municipal Mayor must be held to have exceeded his authority in allowing the use of lands of the public domain to appellants by constructing thereon commercial and residential use buildings, or any other kind of building for that matter. Sometime after Proclamation No. 144 was issued by the President, appellants brought their predicament to the attention of the President. The then Presidential Complaints and Action Committee ("PCAC") conducted an investigation on the basis of which it eventually recommended the exclusion from the reservation of the lots affected, in line with the "Land for the Landless" policy of President Magsaysay's administration. 12 The then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources similarly recommended the exclusion of the portion of Lot 2 occupied by appellants and forwarded to the Office of the President a draft of a proposed amendment of Proclamation No. 144 specifically excluding Lot 2 from the scope of application thereof .The amendment, however, remained merely a proposal for failure on the part of the President of the Philippines to act favorably thereon. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated 28 January 1967 of then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 1 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against appellants. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 104786 January 27, 1994 ALFREDO PATALINGHUG, petitioner, vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RICARDO CRIBILLO, MARTIN ARAPOL, CORAZON ALCASID, PRIMITIVA SEDO, respondents. Gonzales, Batiller, Bilog & Associates for petitioner. Garcilaso F. Vega for private respondents.

ROMERO, J.: In the case before us, we are called upon to decide whether or not petitioner's operation of a funeral home constitutes permissible use within a particular district or zone in Davao City. On November 17, 1982, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 363, series of 1982 otherwise known as the "Expanded Zoning Ordinance of Davao City," Section 8 of which states: Sec. 8. USE REGULATIONS IN C-2 DISTRICTS (Shaded light red in the Expanded Zoning Map) AC-2 District shall be dominantly for commercial and compatible industrial uses as provided hereunder: xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 3.1 Funeral Parlors/Memorial Homes with adequate off street parking space (see parking standards of P.D. 1096) and provided that they shall be established not less than 50 meters from any residential structures, churches and other institutional buildings. (Emphasis provided) Upon prior approval and certification of zoning compliance by Zoning Administrator issued on February 10, 1987 Building Permit No. 870254 in favor of petitioner for the construction of a funeral parlor in the name and style of Metropolitan Funeral Parlor at Cabaguio Avenue, Agdao, Davao City. Thereafter, petitioner commenced the construction of his funeral parlor. Acting on the complaint of several residents of Barangay Agdao, Davao City that the construction of petitioner's funeral parlor violated Ordinance No. 363, since it was allegedly situated within a 50-meter radius from the Iglesia ni Kristo Chapel and several residential structures, the Sangguniang Panlungsod conducted an investigation and found that "the nearest residential structure, owned by Wilfred G. Tepoot is only 8 inches to the south. . . . ." 1 Notwithstanding the findings of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, petitioner continued to construct his funeral parlor which was finished on November 3, 1987. Consequently, private respondents filed on September 6, 1988 a case for the declaration of nullity of a building permit with preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction and/or restraining order with the trial court. 2 After conducting its own ocular inspection on March 30, 1989, the lower court, in its order dated July 6, 1989, dismissed the complaint based on the following findings: 3 1. that the residential building owned by Cribillo and Iglesia ni Kristo chapel are 63.25 meters and 55.95 meters away, respectively from the funeral parlor. 2. Although the residential building owned by certain Mr. Tepoot is adjacent to the funeral parlor, and is only separated therefrom by a concrete fence, said residential building is being rented by a certain Mr. Asiaten who actually devotes it to his laundry business with machinery thereon. 3. Private respondent's suit is premature as they failed to exhaust the administrative remedies provided by Ordinance No. 363. Hence, private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. (CA G.R. No. 23243). In its decision dated November 29, 1991, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court by annulling building permit No. 870254 issued in favor of petitioner. 4 It ruled that although the buildings owned by Cribillo and Iglesia ni Kristo were beyond the 50-meter residential radius prohibited by Ordinance 363, the construction of the funeral parlor was within the 50-meter radius measured from the Tepoot's building. The Appellate Court disagreed with the lower

court's determination that Tepoot's building was commercial and ruled that although it was used by Mr. Tepoot's lessee for laundry business, it was a residential lot as reflected in the tax declaration, thus paving the way for the application of Ordinance No. 363. Hence, this appeal based on the following grounds: The Respondent Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the Tepoot building adjacent to petitioner's funeral parlor is residential simply because it was allegedly declared as such for taxation purposes, in complete disregard of Ordinance No. 363 (The Expanded Zoning Ordinance of Davao City) declaring the subject area as dominantly for commercial and compatible industrial uses. We reverse the Appellate Court and reinstate the ruling of the lower court that petitioner did not violate Section 8 of Davao City Ordinance No. 363. It must be emphasized that the question of whether Mr. Tepoot's building is residential or not is a factual determination which we should not disturb. As we have repeatedly enunciated, the resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts where findings on these matters are received with respect and are in fact binding on this court, except only where the case is shown as coming under the accepted exceptions. 5 Although the general rule is that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on us, 6 this admits of exceptions as when the findings or conclusions of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contrary to each other. 7 While the trial court ruled that Tepoot's building was commercial, the Appellate Court ruled otherwise. Thus we see the necessity of reading and examining the pleadings and transcripts submitted before the trial court. In the case at bar, the testimony of City Councilor Vergara shows that Mr. Tepoot's building was used for a dual purpose both as a dwelling and as a place where a laundry business was conducted. 8 But while its commercial aspect has been established by the presence of machineries and laundry paraphernalia, its use as a residence, other than being declared for taxation purposes as such, was not fully substantiated. The reversal by the Court of Appeals of the trial court's decision was based on Tepoot's building being declared for taxation purposes as residential. It is our considered view, however, that a tax declaration is not conclusive of the nature of the property for zoning purposes. A property may have been declared by its owner as residential for real estate taxation purposes but it may well be within a commercial zone. A discrepancy may thus exist in the determination of the nature of property for real estate taxation purposes vis-a-vis the determination of a property for zoning purposes. Needless to say, even if we are to examine the evidentiary value of a tax declaration under the Real Property Tax Code, a tax declaration only enables the assessor to identify the same for assessment levels. In fact, a tax declaration does not bind a provincial/city assessor, for under Sec. 22 of the Real Estate Tax Code, 9 appraisal and assessment are based on the actual use irrespective of "any previous assessment or taxpayer's valuation thereon," which is based on a taxpayer's declaration. In fact, a piece of land declared by a taxpayer as residential may be assessed by the provincial or city assessor as commercial because its actual use is commercial. The trial court's determination that Mr. Tepoot's building is commercial and, therefore, Sec. 8 is inapplicable, is strengthened by the fact that the Sangguniang Panlungsod has declared the questioned area as commercial or C-2. Consequently, even if Tepoot's building was declared for taxation purposes as residential, once a local government has reclassified an area as commercial, that determination for zoning purposes must prevail. While the commercial character of the questioned vicinity has been declared thru the ordinance, private respondents have failed to present convincing arguments to substantiate their claim that Cabaguio Avenue, where the funeral parlor was constructed, was still a residential zone. Unquestionably, the operation of a funeral parlor constitutes a "commercial purpose," as gleaned from Ordinance No. 363. The declaration of the said area as a commercial zone thru a municipal ordinance is an exercise of police power to promote the good order and general welfare of the people in the locality. Corollary thereto, the state, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. 10 Thus, persons may be subjected to certain kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general welfare of the state and to this fundamental aim of government, the rights of the individual may be subordinated. The ordinance which regulates the location of funeral homes has been adopted as part of comprehensive zoning plans for the orderly development of the area covered thereunder. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1991 is hereby REVERSED and the order dated July 6, 1989 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.