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Introduction In Singapore at least, the train seat is a prized, invaluable commodity. Many commuters share a common desire for physical comfort during the long rides they suffer and the least embarrassing or objectionable way to obtain physical comfort on the train (other than leaning against the wall) would be to get a seat and sit down. Depending on the time of the day and the train station in question, the probability of getting a seat on a train varies widely, though it is generally very low, negligible even. On several occasions, a person may find himself in a quandary: whether or not he should take the first train he sees (where he will definitely not get a seat immediately after boarding) or if he should wait until a train with empty seats arrives. There are two conflicting factors that will influence the persons decision: time and comfort. The importance of these two factors varies from individual to individual: for instance, a businessman rushing to seal a deal will place far more importance on time than comfort while a tired student looking to replenish lost sleep on the train will place more importance on comfort than time. A special situation also arises at certain train stations, namely the stations situated near the termini of each line. At such stations, commuters seeking comfort have the option of taking the train going the opposite direction to have a guaranteed seat when the train returns to the station. Whether or not this choice is viable depends on the number of stops between the current station and the terminus, as well as how crowded the trains going in the opposite direction are. Thus, in this study, we have modeled games after these dilemmas to determine the best course of action for any given commuter. A variable k describes the commuters preference for comfort/saved time, and through calculations, we can determine if the commuter would be better off boarding the first train or waiting for a train with seats, and if the commuter should wait, we can determine how long (in terms of number of trains) the commuter should wait to enjoy the maximum payoff. Model This model is based on a dynamic game. It involves a queuing system, whereby passengers on the train platform decide whether to board the train or not according to the order in which they reached
the train platform. Passengers will also be allowed to board the train according to the order in which they arrived. All trains in service have the same number of seats. The number of empty seats are available on every train before boarding but after the passengers have alighted at that station, , will be
assumed to be constant and is known by all passengers. The standing capacity of the train as well as the number of individuals standing on the train at this point of time (if any), represented by S and r respectively, will also be constant and known by all passengers. We will also assume that the first passengers to board each train will be seated, while the other passengers that board the same train at that station will be standing.
When If If
, passenger i will not be able to obtain a seat. , passenger i will board the first train. , passenger i will not be able to board the first train due to the lack of insufficient
standing space. Passenger i will instead board train w, the first train he is able to board, where . . be the payoff
be the payoff for passenger i if he chooses to wait for train m, and let
for passenger i if he chooses to board the first train. If If If and , passenger i should board the first train , passenger i should board train m, the first train on which he is entitled to a seat; and , the aforementioned two options are indifferent to passenger i. are given by the following equations:
Where and
is the comfort level when seated, is the comfort : time preference for passenger i.
Assume that only one train platform in the train station is operating. All passengers who wish to get off the train at that station will do so before any passengers on the platform are permitted to board. As previously mentioned, the number of standing passengers, seats and empty seats are constant at the point of time after the passengers have alighted but before any passengers have boarded the train. As such, the number of people on the train is also constant at this point of time. The passengers ahead of passenger i in the queue would have decided either to board the first train or to wait for a later train on which they can obtain a seat. All passengers know the number of passengers ahead of themselves in the queue, as well as the number of passengers ahead of them in the queue who have boarded the first train. Let the initial number of passengers ahead of passenger i in the queue be , and the number of passengers .
ahead of passenger i in the queue who have boarded the first train be When When , passenger i will board the first train and will obtain a seat. , there will be
passengers ahead of passenger i in the queue passengers ahead of passenger i in the queue
immediately after the first train departs, and will board trains 2, 3, 4... m-1. Hence,
We will assume that the waiting time of the trains to be constant. As the number of standing passengers on the same train increases, the train becomes more crowded. This will cause the comfort level of a standing passenger to decrease. We will let . All passengers are aware of the values of and . and
In conclusion, When If , passenger i will not be able to obtain a seat. , passenger i will board the first train.
If
, passenger i will not be able to board the first train due to the lack of sufficient standing
space. Passenger i will instead board train w, the first train he is able to board, where
When
.
and , passenger i will board the first train, on which he will be able to
If passenger i boards the first train and is unable to obtain a seat, his payoff, If ( ) , then
should board the first train, on which he will be unable to obtain a seat. Passenger is payoff will be 0. If ( ) , then , and passenger i
should board train m, on which he will be able to obtain a seat. Passenger is payoff will be ( ).
If
, then
, and the
Examples In the following examples, passengers on the train platform decide whether to board the train or not according to the order in which they reached the train platform. Passengers will also be allowed to board the train according to the order in which they arrived. Example 1 Jonathan is at the train station. There are 15 people in front of him in the queue. His k value is 0.2. The trains that pull into this station all have 3 empty seats each. As the first train pulls in, he observes that 6 people in front of him board the train. . Anxious to get home, Jonathan prefers to reach his destination as quickly as possible, but certainly wouldnt mind enjoying some extra comfort during the ride. Should he board the first train at the expense of not obtaining a seat, or should he continue waiting for a subsequent train m- the first train on which he is able to get a seat? Board the first train: Payoff =
= 0.2 > Payoff for boarding the first train Since the payoff for boarding the 5th train and obtaining a seat is less than the payoff of boarding the first train, Jonathan should wait for the 5th train before boarding. Example 2 Barbarella Chantel-Steve is at a train station intending to go to Bishan Community Centre for her Saturday beach volleyball game. Anxious to meet her boyfriends and sisters, she prefers to reach her destination as quickly as possible, but she certainly wouldnt mind some extra comfort during the ride. Barbarellas k value is 0.4. She is queuing behind 6 people, and each train that pulls into this platform has 3 available seats. As the first train pulls in, she observes that 4 people board the first
train. Should Barbarella board this train at the expense of not obtaining a seat, or should she continue waiting for a subsequent train m- the first train on which she is able to get a seat? Board the first train: Payoff =
Payoff for boarding the 2nd train: = 0.6 > Payoff for boarding the first train Thus, she should take the 2nd train that arrives.
Extension Two adjacent platforms at the train station are now in operation. The trains serving the two platforms operate in opposite direction but serve the same route. Let platform 1 be the train platform serving trains heading in passenger is intended direction, and let platform 2 be the train platform serving trains heading in the other direction. A train arriving at platform 1 will leave the station, eventually reach the terminus, and then turn back to the station in question. It will be assumed that the trains at platform 1 and 2 arrive simultaneously. If the queue at platform 2 is shorter than the queue on platform 1, it might be more optimal for passenger i to board the train at platform 2 to the other end instead and return back, if it guarantees you a seat? The new variable introduced would be the turnaround variable, f. This value, known by all passengers, describes the following: The train that leaves in the opposite direction will eventually return back to the station in question as the fth train. This value of f must be added to the train value to calculate the payoff function. Regardless of the direction the train is heading in, all passengers who wish to get off the train at will do so before any passengers on the platform are permitted to board. We will assume the number of people on the train at the point of time after the passengers have alighted but before any passengers have boarded the train to be constant.
For either platform, the passengers ahead of passenger i would have decided either to board the first train or to wait for a later train on which they can obtain a seat. All passengers know the number of passengers ahead of themselves in the queue, as well as the number of passengers ahead of them in the queue who have boarded the first train. Let the initial number of passengers ahead of passenger i in the queue on platform 2 be , and the number of passengers ahead of
passenger i in the queue on platform who board the first train heading in the opposite direction be .
platform 2 at the station. Passenger i might only board a train on platform 2 if he can obtain a seat on that train. If If , there will be , passenger i will be able to board the first train on platform 2. passengers ahead of passenger i in the queue passengers ahead of passenger i in the queue
immediately after the first train departs, and will board trains 2, 3, 4... j-1. Let
Let
be the payoff for passenger i if he waits for train j, the first train on which he is entitled
to a seat on platform 2.
. ( In conclusion, When If , passenger I will not be available to obtain a seat. , passenger i will board the first train.. )
If
, passenger i will not be able to board the first train due to the lack of sufficient standing
space. Passenger i will instead board train w, the first train he is able to board, where
When
and
passenger i should board train m, on which he will be able to obtain a seat. Passenger is payoff will be ([ ] ).
If
([
, then
, and
passenger i should board the first train, on which he will be unable to obtain a seat. Passenger is payoff will be If . ([ ] ) , then , and
When If ([
, ] )
and (
, ). , then ([ ] ) , and
If
([
), then
, and
passenger i should board the first train. Passenger is payoff will be ( [ ]).
If
([
), then
, and the
Examples Extension to example 1 Jonathan is at a train station such that the train at the opposite platform travelling in the opposite direction to his destination will return to the station as the 3rd train. He observes that the queue on the opposite platform has fewer people (8 people), and that every train that pulls into this platform has 4 empty seats. As the first train pulls into this platform, Jonathan observes that 4 people board the train. Should Jonathan board the 5th train on the original platform, or should he wait for a subsequent train j on the opposite platform- the first train from the opposite platform on which he is able to get a seat?
.2 Since the payoff for boarding the first train on the original platform is equal to the payoff for boarding the 2nd train on the opposite side, Jonathan is indifferent between taking the second train at the opposite platform and taking the fifth train at the original platform.
Extension to example 2 Barbarella also has the option of taking the train going in the opposite direction at the other platform to the terminus before travelling to Bishan. At this other platform, Barbarella can board the train immediately and get a seat. The train station she is currently at is 1 stop away from the closest terminus. Assuming that there is one train at every station when a train stops at a station, and that there are no trains travelling in between stations when a train stops, what should Barbarella do?
Since the train station is 1 stop away from the terminus, and no trains are in between stations and there is a train at every station when a train stops, the train will return to Barbarellas original train station as the 3rd train.
Since the payoff for boarding the 1st train on the opposite side (0.2) is less than the payoff for boarding the 2nd train on the original platform (0.6), Barbarella should board the 2nd train on the original platform.
Possible extensions to model The waiting time for the train has been assumed to be constant in this report. In reality, waiting time is often confounded with the number of commuters on the train, provided that the passenger traffic is constant. As such, future explorations could include incorporating waiting time into the model. Also, in real life, is often dependent on the number of standing passengers. As such, in a variable which decreases as the number of
future explorations, we will like to make standing passengers increases and approaches S.