Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution UNCOVERING THE MECHANISMS

Macartan Humphreys

Mohsin Ayub 10566

Background
The author links the peace/conflicts of a region with

the availability of natural resource

The relation among the civil war, resource conflicts

and resource dependence is proven through rebel greed hypothesis

Rebel Greed Hypothesis is dependent upon any one

or combination of plausible mechanisms

Initiation
The conflict onset is more impact of past natural

resource production than potential for future production

Natural Resource conflicts and weak state Agricultural dependence

Natural resource wars

Chad and the Oil Reserves

Tombalbaye in April 1975 was killed from successful

coup detat. Reasons lay with the oil in the Doba fields in the South For almost 30 years after Chad had allowed U.S. corporations to prospect for oil in the ex-colony

Relations with France have weakened People are against the government Control of oil revenues has been central to Chadian politics Up to 2003, not a single drop had been pumped

Natural Resources And Civil Wars

Countries whose wealth is largely dependent on the

exportation of primary commodities are highly prone to civil violence

Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler at the World Bank

Conflicts may occur due to Greed Grievances Marginalization

The Six Rival Families Of Mechanisms

The Greedy Rebels Mechanism The Greedy Outsiders Mechanism The Feasibility Mechanism

The Grievance Mechanism The Sparse Networks Mechanism

The Weak States Mechanism

The greedy rebels mechanism

Domestic groups may engage in quasi-criminal

activity Natural resources increase the prize value of capturing the state Natural resources are concentrated groups may become dissatisfied
Example: Sierra Leone, where control of the

diamond areas sufficiently weakened the state as to make state capture appear easy

The greedy outsiders mechanism

The existence of natural resources may be an

incentive for third parties

States Corporation

Example: the escalation of the civil war in Congo has

resulted in part from the involvement of neighboring states seeking raw materials

The grievance mechanism

Countries with middling levels of dependence on

natural resources may be experiencing transitory inequality as part of the development process Economies that are dependent on natural resources may be more vulnerable to terms of trade shocks The process of extraction may produce grievances Natural resource wealth may be seen as more unjustly distributed than other wealth Example: In Sierra Leone and Nigeria

The feasibility mechanism

The conflicts due to natural resources are permissive

cause and not root cause

because motivations for conflict are found

everywhere
And these motivation are contingent

The weak states mechanism

Citizens are untaxed by governments, they have less

power over them

Governments that rely on natural resources rather

than taxation have weakened incentives to create strong bureaucratic institutions

The sparse networks mechanism

The importance of natural resources may lie in their

impacts on the daily economic activities of the citizens of an economy

The weakness of the manufacturing sector and the

fragmentation of an economy into independent enclaves of production may raise conflict risks

Good cross-national measures of the density of

internal trade or the sparseness of internal networks do not exist

NATURAL RESOURCES AND DURATION

The feasibility mechanism The domestic conflict premium mechanism The sparse networks mechanism

The international conflict premium mechanism

The military balances mechanism

The possibility of pork mechanism

The fragmented organizational

The feasibility mechanism

Natural resource financing creates longer wars by

enabling rebel groups to keep fighting

Angola conflict is good example for this as both

sides had access to natural resource financing to support their combatants

Similarly in case of Niger and Mali, the countries

were not wealthy enough to support a protracted struggle as the regions were occupied by insurgents

The military balances mechanism

The natural resources financing helps in keeping the

combatants alive and fighting, thus leads to ultimate victory in war

Wars with financial asymmetries are likely to last

less long, balance makes for longer wars

Researchers however suggest that balance in natural

resources facilitates negotiated settlement

The fragmented organizational structures mechanism

Organizational effects may matter for war duration. Researchers have suggested, for example, that we

should expect a positive relationship between the cohesiveness of a rebel organization or its degree of hierarchy and the duration of a conflict.

The possibility of pork mechanism

If resource exploitation depends on peace, then the

presence of natural resource endowments should make negotiation more likely to succeed
But third party involvement is necessary Both parties should be willing

The domestic conflict premium mechanism

Groups that benefit during conflict may prefer to

fight than to win and therefore act as spoilers to peace processes

The fighters in these conflicts may not have an

interest in the success of negotiations

The link between the benefits of war and a conflicts

duration can be clear from the fact that individuals benefit in Wartime more than they would in times of peace

The international conflict premium mechanism

Insofar as third parties can bring pressure to bear on

the resolution of conflicts, their incentives can help determine the duration of conflicts
Neighbouring states can provide sanctuary for rebel

bases within their borders, and they can provide logistical support to one side or another

The sparse networks mechanism

Sparse network explains the duration of war more

clearly
The dense linkages within economies may prevent a

conflict from breaking out, so may they help resolve them.

MECHANISMS AND ESTIMATION

Two different waysreferred to as systems with Type B systems with Type A mechanisms by Elster

(1998)in which rival mechanisms may relate to each other.

SYSTEMS WITH TYPE B MECHANISMS

System with Type B mechanisms is one in which

multiple mechanisms may work simultaneously, possibly with opposite effects. Type B mechanisms use more fine-grained data. Two approaches stand out. Disaggregating the Explanatory Variable Disaggregating the Dependent Variable

SYSTEMS WITH TYPE A MECHANISMS

Type A mechanism problem as one where the

indeterminacy concerns which (if any) of several causal chains will be triggered.We can consider two cases.

Type A Mechanisms Where the Sorting Procedure Is Known Type A Mechanisms Where the Sorting Procedure Is Not Known

RESULTS: MECHANISM IDENTIFICATION

The most common measure that has been used is the

value of primary commodity exports as a share of GDP or of total exports Singapore appears as one of the most naturalresource-dependent economies Sudan and Burma feature as countries with among the lowest levels of dependence on natural resources.

Conclusion
Countries dependent on agricultural commodities

are at risk Weak state structures and grievance hypotheses Natural resource conflicts are more likely to end quickly and are more likely to end with military victory There are interventions of third parties among 85% of the conflicts that arise over natural resources

Thank You

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