Time and Mind: The Journal of Archaeology, Consciousness and Culture

Volume 3Issue 1 March 2010 pp. 6384

DOI
10.2752/175169710X12549020810498

Reprints available directly from the publishers Photocopying permitted by licence only Berg 2010

The Prophet as Intellectual and Vice Versa: A Psychoanalytical Interpretation of the Phenomenon of Prophecy
Moritz E.M. Bilagher
Moritz Bilagher currently works as a Statistical Advisor with an international organization in Kenya. He is a graduate in Science and Technology Studies from the University of Amsterdam, a member of Kellogg College, University of Oxford, and is interested in philosophy of religion, which he studied at Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam. m.bilagher@kellogg.oxon.org

Abstract This article aims to give the phenomenon of prophecy a rational-conceptual foundation which can help further its understanding in historic, present, and future societies. This will be achieved, mainly, by reinterpreting it via some concepts of psychoanalysis as developed by Freud and Jung. It is argued that prophecy equates to the ability of persons to connect with the unconscious layers of their psyche, at the bottom of which is Absolute Mind or God. This realm, similar to the philosophers realm of abstraction, is characterized by timelessness, or eternity, and is contrasted with the time-bound nature of consciousness. Prophecy itself is dened as the application of principles from timeless reality in the immanent world, rather than as the ability of divination. Thus, the role of the historical prophet is similar to that of the modern public intellectual. To illustrate this, a multidisciplinary approach will be applied, applying perspectives from philosophy, theology, and, to a smaller extent, cultural anthropology.
Time and Mind Volume 3Issue 1March 2010, pp. 6384

64 The Prophet as Intellectual and Vice Versa

Moritz E.M. Bilagher

Keywords: prophecy; psychoanalysis; philosophy of religion; public intellectual

Part One: Sneak Previews of a Divine Plot

Preliminary remarks on the phenomenon of prophecy and structure of this article* Sometimes, the notes of an editor of a text are almost as interesting as the work itself. On page 88 of an 1862 edition of Spinozas Tractatus theologico-politicus, in a footnote the editor Robert Willis counts Spinoza among the prophets. The reason for this is that in Williss view Spinoza, in 1670, the year in which the Tractatus was published, foresaw an event that would take place in 1861. The essential characteristic of prophecy, as indicated here, thus seems to relate to the ability of foreseeing the future, or divination. By the same token we would, unfortunately, have to say that Willis himself was not a prophet. In another footnote (1862: 87), he makes two predictions that in less than 100 years after this edition proved dramatically untrue: that the Jews would soon be integrated in European societies without a trace; and that there would never again exist a sovereign Jewish state. The Shoa or holocaust and the foundation of the State of Israel or Nakba (catastrophe) in 19381945 and 1948 respectively make both predictions untrue. These notes are from a chapter dealing with the election of the Jewish people. The subject of this article is the phenomenon of prophecy. Its objective is to give prophecy a rational foundation which can help further the understanding of its nature in historical, present, and future societies. It is my intention to do this by

explaining the essence of prophecy, via some concepts from the theoretical framework of psychoanalysis as developed by Freud and Jung, primarily, while also applying perspectives from philosophy, theology, and cultural anthropology. In essence, I will argue that prophecy relies on the ability of persons to venture into the unconscious layers of their psyche, at the bottom of which we nd Absolute Mind or God. This realm shows remarkable likeness with the philosophers realm of abstraction, as reected in the works of Plato and Kant for example, in respect of its quality of timelessness. This is contrasted with the time-bound nature of consciousness. I will then explain that the art of prophecy consists of the application of principles from this timeless reality in the immanent world, rather than in the ability to predict the future.1 In this respect, the role of the historical prophet is similar to that of the modern public intellectual, who can thus be seen as a contemporary prophet. From this I will infer that prophecy is a phenomenon that is not the exclusive prerogative of any culture.

Understanding an uncertain future Although the ability to foresee future events, or divination, is not necessarily considered to be the only characteristic of prophecy, it seems to be a widely accepted one. Instances of this type of prophecy in Christianity occur, for example, when John the Baptist predicts the coming of Jesus (Matthew 3:1112, Mark 1:78); when Jesus foresees the destruction of Jerusalem (Matthew 24:12); and when the end of times is predicted in the Book of Revelation (21). For Christians, Jesus arrival itself is the realization of older prophecies from the Old Testament predicting the

Time and Mind Volume 3Issue 1March 2010, pp. 6384

Moritz E.M. Bilagher

The Prophet as Intellectual and Vice Versa 65

coming of a Messiah. This can be seen when comparing John 7:42 with Micah 5:1 or John 12:14 with Zechariah 9:9. John the Baptist is once asked whether he is Elijah or the prophet,i.e., a prophet predicted by Moses in Deuteronomy 18:15. John then says that this is Jesus. However, the prevailing view in Christianity is that Jesus was more than a prophet; that, in fact, he was the Son of God, His incarnation. This view was not only not accepted by a majority of Jews, but also criticized in the Islamic holy book the Quran, where Jesus is explicitly said to be a prophet (9:3031), as are the prophets of the Old Testament, and Abraham (3:85), who is incorporated into Islam as a Muslim (3:68; see also 3:53). By contrast, in early renaissance Europe, Dante believed the patriarchs to dwell in hell because, being born before Christ, they could not have been Christians (Alighieri 1972 [1321]: 27). Attempts at owning the future, through prophecy, have not been the exclusive domain of what we refer to as religion. Drawing on the work of Paul Radin, Bauman identies in primitive societies two fundamental types of temperament: that of the priest-thinker and that of the layman (1987: 9). Radin (1938: 23, in Bauman 1987: 10) emphasizes that [p]rimitive man is afraid of one thing, of the uncertainties of the struggle of life. It is this sense of insecurity on which the priest-thinker capitalizes, in the postulation of a special vantage point, accessible only to special people and on special condition, from which a logic could be discerned beneath supercial randomness, so that the random could be made predictable. The control over fate proposed by the religious formulators, Bauman concludes (ibid.), was thus mediated by knowledge

from the start. The fact that Radins priestthinker is not only a priest but also a thinker elicits part of the agenda of scientic exploration. Increasing control over nature, and thus over fate through an increasing understanding of nature, has always been one of its objectives.

The laws of nature Scientic experimentation has enabled scientists to understand natural processes, which has in turn made it possible for them to become, to an extent, predictable. Such knowledge and the consequent ability to predict the future have helped scientists make the world a place where there is an intelligible relation between action and outcome. The reality underpinning this expectation is grounded in the realization that nature is not fundamentally chaotic, but acts according to regularities. These regularities are referred to as laws of nature. According to Kwa (1991: 101, 108), this notion can be traced back to the Old Testament,2 where nature has to obey divine laws just like human beings. Only in the seventeenth century, during what is referred to as the scientic revolution, Kwa observes, do moral and natural law part ways (1991: 109). Spinoza, who compared our Creator to nature,3 even saw no difference between natural laws and divine decrees (1981 [1677]: 31; 1862: 73). Nonetheless, as the example of the weather forecast illustrates, the instruments that our knowledge of nature have afforded to predict the future of natural events is still relatively limited.4 The birth of the human sciences in the nineteenth century as described by Foucault (2005: 3757) has led to the idea that the human world, society, is also subject to a

Time and Mind Volume 3Issue 1March 2010, pp. 6384

66 The Prophet as Intellectual and Vice Versa

Moritz E.M. Bilagher

set of laws. These have been formulated in disciplines such as sociology, cultural anthropology, and psychology. However, these are often regarded as even less successful than the exact or natural sciences in making sense of the realities they attempt to describe. This self-realization may have been the main reason that in the sciences, by way of postmodernism the fundamental unintelligibility of the world was declared. Bauman denes the postmodern view as that of an [in principle] unlimited number of models of order, each one generated by a relatively autonomous set of practices, which are thus not retractable to one overarching model. To be fair, this notion arose against the background of a failure of ideologies to make sense of the world. But still, these ideologies themselves originated from economic and sociological theories (capitalism from the work of Smith and Mill; socialism from that of Marx and Engels; and liberalism from Voltaire and Rousseau).

Ends of history There is, however, a narrow line dividing normative views of the future and descriptive ones, and it is on this line of tension that the futuristic aspect of prophecy operates. That is, there are views of a future that according to a presumed natural lawfulness or regularity will at one point come into existence, and they are normally part of the theory postulating that regularity itself; and there are views that describe a desirable, but not necessarily inevitable future. These are utopias. The sociological theories mentioned above try to make sense of the world and what happens in it, but also identify an inherent and intrinsically desirable order in the nature of things, which can explain

current events. That is, sociological theories often identify mechanisms at work in society that point to an end of history that is inherent in the nature of the laws governing the societies at hand. These ends of history are at the same time desirable and inevitable. By declaring the denitive unintelligibility of human society, postmodernism thus also seems to declare the futility of social interventions, as interventions cannot have an effect in an inherently chaotic system. The classical example of a normative view of the future is the utopia. Utopias are visions of an ideal future, normally expressed as an ideal society. The utopia was also a signicant literary genre, as Manuel and Manuel indicated (1982: 4), which has, however, notoriously equally invoked its opposite, the dystopia. Examples of this are Orwells 1984 and Huxleys Brave New World. These works invoke the notion that a utopia or dystopia, in general, says more about the time in which it is conceived than about any future it tries to describe, predict, or bring about.5 In this respect, Mumfords distinction between utopias of escape and utopias of reconstruction (1923: 15) is important. The difference between these is that the realization of a utopia of escape is entirely dependent upon divine intervention, while a utopia of reconstruction is an ideal society that can be brought about by human intervention alone. An example of the former is New Jerusalem, as predicted in the Book of Revelation. This utopia describes an ideal situation that will occur at the end of time, and is desirable. It therefore combines a normative with a descriptive view of the future. This is not the case with some of the secular utopias, or utopias of reconstruction.

Time and Mind Volume 3Issue 1March 2010, pp. 6384

Moritz E.M. Bilagher

The Prophet as Intellectual and Vice Versa 67

The advent of the future Most, but not all of the secular utopias (Platos Republic, Mores Utopia, Kants world republic, Wyndham Lewiss United States) are utopias of reconstruction. They are visions of what should be, but not necessarily of what will be. For example, Platos Republic is a description of an ideal state, but also of one that does not yet exist; Mores Utopia is usually perceived as a social critique, but whether the utopia itself will ever be realized depends on whether all men are good, which the storys narrator Raphael Hythlodaeus does not expect to see for quite a few years yet (2001 [1516]: 44); Kants world republic (1903 [1795]: 136), which sees sovereignty as an obstacle to his practical ethic, can to an extent be regarded as having been realized with the establishment of the United Nations Organization. However, this recipe was purely prescriptive and entirely unprophetical in that it proposed a course of action but did not declare its inevitability. Utopia seems to take on a prophetic form again with Marxs utopia: socialist society. This differentiates itself from the other utopias of reconstruction in that it presents itself not only as normative but also as descriptive. Marx, borrowing from Hegels theory of historicism6 which perceives of world history as a denite course with a predetermined end point that can be identied by human reason (Fukuyama 1992: 64), proclaimed socialism as the inevitable outcome of history. This view was severely criticized, notably by Popper, who concluded that Marxs ingenious attempt to draw prophetic conclusions from observations of contemporary economic tendencies has failed (2003: 10). The occurrence of the

word prophetic here is not casual, as Popper had also observed that one of the earliest forms of historicism is found in the notion that the Jewish people7 are the chosen people in a story that is written by Yahweh, of which prophets assert they can unravel the plot (2007: 455). Popper however argues that it is human actions rather than a course of history as an independent force that decide what the future will bring (1994: 8). Although we cannot yet be so presumptuous as to pretend the end of history has already been revealed to us, and although the theory of socialism has, indeed, fundamentally changed the political order of the world, for now it seems that it has not proved to be the ultimate outcome of world history. Challenging Marx posthumously, Fukuyama asserted that by contrast it was the historical opponent of socialism, liberal democracy, that is proving to be the ultimate idea that marks the end of history (Fukuyama 1992: 45). These words seemed appropriately prophetic as, a few months after publication of the essay on which the later book was based, in 1989, the Berlin Wall fell. But we are now moving too quickly.

Part Two: Intermediaries

Attempt at a denition of the concept of prophecy If we say that the ability to foresee future events is an aspect of prophecy, then this may or may not be true, but it is not the only one. The German rabbi Samuel Hirsch, in fact, criticized those that elevated the importance of this aspect of prophecy to the extent that it would denote its whole essence (1842: 605). According to Hirsch, there are two fundamental characteristics of a prophet:

Time and Mind Volume 3Issue 1March 2010, pp. 6384

68 The Prophet as Intellectual and Vice Versa

Moritz E.M. Bilagher

the recognition that what is said are not the words of the prophet her- or himself and, indeed, the ability to see into the future (ibid.: 590). Hirsch, however, emphasizes that this does not concern the simple divination or the prescience of events, as if to satisfy any curiosity. In fact, he argues that to know anything in advance seems highly indifferent to the religious life (ibid.: 605). The future the prophets could see, Hirsch says, was the ideal future of humankind (ibid.: 604). They are thus utopians in the classical sense, and the function of their vision of an ideal future would be to educate the people of the present so as to bring about this ideal (ibid.). This activist function of the prophets in Hirschs view is amplied by the specic role he saw for them: that of the guardians of the virtue of the people (ibid.: 596), which prompted them to intervene in actual states of affairs in any possible way (ibid.: 601). Hirschs denition of prophecy accords well with other authoritative interpretations of this phenomenon. Spinoza (1862: 58), for example, argues that some prophetic accounts, such as the representations of Zechariah were so obscure that without an explanation they could not be understood by himself. Similarly, the prophecies of the prophet Daniel were so dark that even when explained they were still unintelligible, not to others only, but also to the prophet himself. These are good examples of Hirschs criterion that the words of the prophets are recognized as not their own but that it is, in fact, God speaking through them. To an extent this reects the original meaning of the Greek word prophet () or Hebrew nabi or navi ( :)interpreter. Summarily, for

Spinoza a prophet is one who interprets things revealed by God to those who of themselves cannot have certain knowledge of them (ibid.: 31). The prophet is thus an intermediary between God or a divine realm and the people. For Maimonides, the prophet is someone who proclaims a law of which he or she himself is, however, not the source (1963 [c.1190]: 384). The prophet is one whom God talks to, if necessary through the agency of an angel (ibid.: 3856). In fact, this characteristic of prophecy may be prevalent in many cultures. Anthropologist J. Leavitt (1997: 31), for instance, says that mantic (i.e., prophetic) speech is usually understood to emanate from a source different from the subject who usually speaks out of the body in question.

Guardians of virtue But only having access to divine knowledge is not enough to be a prophet. As Hirsch said, prophets also have to act as guardians of the virtue of society and, to that end, intervene in current affairs. Spinoza, similarly, says that the business of the prophet was not so much to teach the laws of his nation as the rules of a virtuous life (ibid.: 79). The prophets thus do not only gather knowledge for the sake of it, but also engage with societies to ensure their adherence to ethical values. It is the combination of these characteristics that denes the prophet, as Goldberg and Rayner indicate. The new prophets Amos, Hosea, and their successors, for example, on the one hand were spokesmen of Yahweh, champions of the Covenant, preachers of righteousness, but on the other denounced social injustice (Goldberg and Rayner 1989: 39). This understanding is even clearer with the group whom Goldberg and Rayner call

Time and Mind Volume 3Issue 1March 2010, pp. 6384

Moritz E.M. Bilagher

The Prophet as Intellectual and Vice Versa 69

the Latter Prophets (ibid.: 199): [t]hey are all interpreters of currents events in the light of general religious and moral principles. They are all, in varying degrees, critics of contemporary society, fearless in delivering their message, however unpopular it may be. Again, we nd this idea reected in anthropological experience more generally, where the mantic performer (i.e., the prophet) is a natural destabilizer and critic of society at the same time that he or she can represent a conrming voice from beyond (Leavitt 1997: 301). It is interesting to note that prophecy as a theological theme has attracted varying degrees of attention in the monotheistic world religions. In Judaic theology, for example, it is central, with contributions from almost all important Judaic thinkers. In Islam by contrast, it is almost absent. This could be explained from the point of view that the Quran is thought to be the undiluted word of God, mediated through the agency of the angel Gabriel or Jibril ( ,)and Mohammad is seen as the seal of the prophets. In Christianity, it is not a main theme among important theologians such as Barth, Bultmann, and Tillich. This may have to do with the fact that the main gure in Christianity, Jesus, is seen as the Son of God. As a consequence, in Christianity prophecy is not the direct mediation between a community and a transcendent God but between it and Jesus. Prophecy is then almost a type of hermeneutics, or proclamation of the good news, kerugma (). In the words of Barth (1963: 12, in Peters 2006: 373), [w]hen the Gospel is preached, God speaks. A more recent voice, following this line of reasoning, attributes a prophetic role to priests (Peters 2006: 374)

in as far as they deconstruct the current world view: [t]o proclaim the gospel as Gods Word, the preacher needs to challenge our this-worldly assumptions and loyalties so that we can open ourselves to a message that comes from beyond.

Intermediaries between worlds In what are usually referred to as the three monotheistic traditions, therefore, the phenomenon of prophecy seems to be characterized by a combination of traits: rst, the prophet stands in a special relation with God and has therefore privileged access to divine knowledge. This knowledge means that the prophet understands general or abstract, eternal principles and as a derivative of this, the prophet is a person with vision, who can imagine an ideal future or utopia but not predict the future as with divination. And, secondly, the prophet engages with contemporary society, specically protecting its ethical values (as a guardian of virtue), thus translating general principles to laws and decrees for the here and now, as was the case with Moses (Ten Commandments), Jesus, and Mohammad. The performing of miracles, incidentally, does not seem to emerge as an inherent part of prophecy either. Spinoza explicitly argues that the nature of the prophets is not in conict with human nature (1862: 47) and Dostoyevsky argued that, contrary to common perception, the miracle was not a central tenet to Jesus teaching. When Satan tempted him to perform one, Dostoyevsky believed, Jesus refused because he wanted people to believe for their own sake, not because of a miracle (1992: 317).

Time and Mind Volume 3Issue 1March 2010, pp. 6384

70 The Prophet as Intellectual and Vice Versa

Moritz E.M. Bilagher

Privileged access Our denition of prophecy is, however, not an explanation of it. In fact, it raises one more, very specic question: what does it mean to be in a special relation with God? This can be rephrased as: what does it mean to have access to a realm of divine knowledge, and therefore: what does this realm of divine knowledge stand for? I will argue that it is plausible that there is no essential difference between the divine reality that we understand as an intrinsic part of the prophetic equation, and the metaphysical or abstractreality of the philosophers.8 This is contrasted with empirical reality as abstract reality; with physical reality as the metaphysical one; with concrete reality as conceptual; and so on. That both exist in one way or another can hardly be denied, but what has always been subject to heated debate in the history of philosophy is (a) how these realities relate to each other and (b), more specically, whether one precedes the other. In relation to the rst of these questions, according to Rorty, without it, we would not have had the 2,500 years of philosophy that we have had in the Western world (1980: 149). The second of these questions refers to whether mind preceded and thus produced matter, which is what the idealists think, or whether matter preceded and thus produced mind, which is the position of the materialists or realists. It seems safe to say, with C.S. Lewis (1961: 912), that in contemporary society the view that physical reality is somehow more real than the metaphysical one has gained the upper hand. Tangible reality seems to more rmly correspond with common sense, and the facts are, therefore, what one can see, hear, and feel, while obviously, metaphysical

reality is withdrawn from sense experience by denition. This state of affairs may reect the authority of a scientic worldview in contemporary society because in religion, by contrast, the situation is almost perfectly inverted: religions almost universally hold in greater esteem the mental, spiritual, and immaterial than the physical, tangible, and material. In Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, the body is lower than the spirit, which is conversely higher and thus associated with the skies (note that lower signies inferior to higher). What is material is subject to rot, as Le Goff (1988: 83) described for Christianity in the Middle Ages: Gods incarnation was also his humiliation. The body was an ergastulum, a slaves prison for the soul. Spinoza (1862: 44) emphasized that all sins were believed to proceed from the esh the spirit, mind, or understanding prompted only to good. Nietzsche, in the religious rejection of material reality suspected, incidentally, a conscious plot, where a class of weaklings, the priestsi.e., Jewshave convinced the world that they are the real children of God, while those that are strong and rich are damned (1968 [1887]: 281).

Platos world of unity While it certainly seems true that the materialist position, for whatever reason, is stronger in the public discourse nowadays than idealism, and while it also seems true that in the West what is holy has been replaced with what is rational (Ramdas 1993: 7), it would be obviously wrong to think that the postulate of a metaphysical reality is irrational. Scientic enquiry, for example, does not rely only on its subject of study alone, but also on a conceptual toolbox in which we nd instruments such

Time and Mind Volume 3Issue 1March 2010, pp. 6384

Moritz E.M. Bilagher

The Prophet as Intellectual and Vice Versa 71

as hypotheses, taxonomies, and theories. Such concepts cannot be found in empirical reality itself (Rosenthal-Schneider 1980: 88). For example, a theory can describe an event (or predict it), but it is not the event. While no materialist account describes where these concepts come from, idealism posits that they are derived from a mental or ideal reality. The tenets of this position are explained comprehensively by Plato in the Republic. In this work, he distinguishes two worlds, which in essence underpin the ensuing philosophical confusion at the fault-line of the physical and metaphysical. One is what Plato would call the world of deception, which corresponds with sensory perception and the manifoldness (of impressions) that is its consequence. The other world, which for Plato is the real world, is the world of ideas and unity. To do justice to Platos theory, we have to realize that his real world is not actually a world. Its essence lies in his distinction between essence and manifestation. To illustrate this, he gives the example of the distinction between things that are beautiful, and beauty itself. Those who can not see the difference and are thus incapable of abstraction are unable to see the unchangeable essence of things; they only see its manifold manifestations (1995 [c.360 BC]: 144). The difference between both classes of things is that the rst can only be seen, the other ones only thought (ibid.: 166). This distinction runs parallel to our present understanding of the difference between concepts and objects. While an object is an entity in concrete reality, such as a chair,9 a concept is one in abstract reality. But where do these concepts come from? As Plato emphasizes that a concept can only be

thought, the answer has to be: from the mind. There is, however, one more important inference to be drawn from this theory: as, without concepts, one could not perceive objects that populate the material world, the conceptual world as it were creates the empirical one. God, Plato states (ibid.: 247), created only one chair the abstract type, that which makes a chair a chair. In other words, only in conjunction with the mind, and its ability of abstraction, can sense experiences actually have any meaning.

Kants metaphysical space According to Jaffe (1970: 40), Jung saw in Kants theory of categories a renascence of the Platonic spirit. It is true that there are similarities between Platos theory and that of Kant who,10 according to Rorty, reinterpreted the great philosophical questions of the European tradition as inquiries into the rules the human mind had set up for itself (1980: 1601). In essence, Kant believed that there exists a metaphysical realm, prior to time and space, that all rational beings can have access to by means of their faculty of reason or Vernunft. Kants argument begins with the notion that there are two types of human knowledge: one relating to content or sensory impressions, and one that is given a priori to this content, such as time. We have no empirical knowledge of time, Kant says, but all empirical knowledge begins with it (1990 [1781]: 1). From this, he infers that time is nothing in itself but a condition of subjective consciousness (ibid.: 312). Specically all phenomena (objects in sensory perception) are in time but not objects as things themselves, in which we recognize concepts (ibid.: 31). Kants realization that time does not objectively exist, combined

Time and Mind Volume 3Issue 1March 2010, pp. 6384

72 The Prophet as Intellectual and Vice Versa

Moritz E.M. Bilagher

with the notion that there exists a pure reason that is not dependent upon sensory perception (ibid.: 192) leads to the notion of human perception as a framework within which the contents of a timeless reality unfold themselves. In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant develops this idea for human ethics. While pure reason refers to what is true, practical reason refers to truth as it can be realized by the human subject (1996 [1788]: 242). It thus refers to an ethical law that Kant believes to be inherent in all human beings through their faculty of reason (ibid.: 210). This ethical law, which is objective, is the realization of good and evil that gives the human being the option to do either. Interestingly, for Kant the condition for freedom is given with choice i.e., knowing that there is a right and a wrong choicebut its realization only with making the right choice (ibid.: 140). By submitting to the ethical law, human subjects, paradoxically, realize their freedom because its source is not something external to them, but something they are in direct contact with via the virtue of reason (ibid.: 261), which is itself the basis of their humanity and why they are holy and an end in themselves (ibid.: 210). This freedom is what distinguishes the human subject from nature, which, according to Kant, is all that operates under laws (ibid.: 156). With Kant, therefore, the objective coincides with the metaphysical, while what is physical is by denition subjective (ibid.: 133).

Part Three: The Other World

The resurrection of idealism and the understanding of the mind While the theories of Plato and Kant have their own specic emphases, they have at

least one very important aspect in common: they both identify a metaphysical realm that is at the heart of meaning in the material world. This transcendental realm can be recognized as the realm of abstraction, of which Bouman related the birth to the emergence of monotheism in the desert of Palestine (1998: 16). We may as well locate the birth of abstraction in Greek thought, with Plato, or even earlier, with Heraclites when he noted that we both step and do not step in the same rivers (2006 [c.500 BC]: 58, Fragment 93). Another defence of idealism comes from Jung. According to Jung, we may as well say that the mind is the source of all reality since sensory perception is always transferred through it. In his own words (1982: 16): [i]t is a ridiculous prejudice that existence could only be physical. We could just as well posit the opposite, [viz.] that physical existence is our own conclusion because we only know anything about matter in as far as we have access to mental images, which are transferred to us by our senses. The appearance of one of the main gures of psychoanalysis at this point is not coincidental. There exists a reection of the metaphysical realms of Plato and Kant in another concept in the history of ideas that seems particularly useful for our mission: the unconscious. For Foucault, the unconscious was the counterfactual of human subjectivity that was so aptly formulated in Descartes cogito (2005: 3524), rst visible in the work of Hegel, Schopenhauer, Marx, and Husserl (ibid.: 356) and conceptualized by Freud. Nonetheless, Freud describes how this notion at rst encountered resistance not only with medical practitioners of his time, but also with the philosophers. While

Time and Mind Volume 3Issue 1March 2010, pp. 6384

Moritz E.M. Bilagher

The Prophet as Intellectual and Vice Versa 73

he could understand the resistance from medical practitioners, because they were used to dealing with processes in the physical body while the unconscious is immaterial, he had expected the philosophers to be more receptive to his ideas. However, in their case, he discovered another obstacle: for the philosophers, the mental has always coincided with the direct content of consciousness (1991: 97). The psychological thus coincided with perception. Freud however hypothesized that the basic idea of psychoanalysis is that the mind is essentially unconscious and that consciousness is, as it were, an almost accidental property of it. Freuds model of the mind can, chiey, be represented as a diagram (Figure 1) that has at the top the super ego, in the middle the ego and at the bottom the id. The super ego, in the words of Freud (1985: 364) is the successor and representative of the individuals parents (and educators) it carries on their functions almost unchanged. It thus represents the ideals and expectations

Superego Ego Id

dened by culture and society, as passed on by the parents. The id stands for the human or animal instinct which is related to the unconscious. These two elements (id and super ego) can conict with each other. While ones instinctive drive can be, for example, to boundlessly eat in a restaurant, without respect for conventions, the expectations of the public may prevent one from doing so. The ego mediates the relation between super ego and id. If it does not manage to do so, this can result in a neurosis. Although Jungs theories are certainly the continuation of the work of Freud, Jung has been able to create such a version of psychoanalytical theory that makes it possible to link this with the metaphysical realm that we identied with Plato and Kant. Jungs model of the psyche is similar to Freuds, but there are important differences (Figure 2, by Jacobi 1949: 34). In Jungs model the individual, which is similar to Freuds ego, is at the top. But this is founded not only on a personal unconscious, as with Freud, but also on a collective unconscious. This is a part of the mind that collects, as it were, memories of the species and is thus supraindividual. It would be wrong not to mention that the conditions for developing this idea were given by Freud, who asserted that, in its development, the individual traverses the whole evolutionary history of the species she or he belongs to (1991: 143). However, the collective unconscious as a concept does not appear in the work of Freud.

Fig 1 Freuds architecture of the mind (authors interpretation)

Deep time What is of particular importance in Jungs model, and what links this most strongly with Kants theory, is that the lower one descends in it, the more relative a role time

Time and Mind Volume 3Issue 1March 2010, pp. 6384

74 The Prophet as Intellectual and Vice Versa

Moritz E.M. Bilagher

Fig 2 Jungs architecture of the mind, according to Jacobi

plays. For the individual, who represents or is constituted by consciousness, time is crucial. This is equal to Kants view, which almost equated consciousness with time (1990: 32), and also seems to refer to Freuds accusation that for the philosophers, psyche and perception are one. That is, any conscious perception without time is unimaginable. That may be a psychological truth, it is also a philosophical one or, alternatively stated, it is one with philosophical implications. Time, for consciousness, is that of the here and now, the seconds in which one reads this sentence or the minutes in which I write this page. Time scales for the human mind are built on hours, days, weeks, or even months. This is different for the personal unconscious, which is, as it were, the repository of ones personal memories. These are collected

over years and decades; they color ones perception and shape ones identity. This scale of time is again different from that of the development of the species, to which the collective unconscious is linked. For this part of the mind, not even centuries are meaningful measures of time, as the species developed over thousands of years, life itself over millions of years. The collective unconscious is related to a concept that geologists refer to as deep time, which counts time in millions or even billions of years (cf. Kroonenberg 2007: 512). To understand what it means to have access to divine knowledge, what is important in Jungs model is that under this layer of the mind, the collective unconsciousness, Jung identied another layer. This is Absolute Mind or God (layer H or the

Time and Mind Volume 3Issue 1March 2010, pp. 6384

Moritz E.M. Bilagher

The Prophet as Intellectual and Vice Versa 75

central force in Figure 2). With this notion, Jung links individual conscious experience (Platos world of sensory perception; Kants consciousness) to a mind, or part of the mind that is supra-individual and present in all other minds. The common elements seem too striking not to associate these with Kants metaphysical realm that can be accessed via reason, or Platos world of unity that one participates in, the more one is wise. And, by analogy with the regularity we identied that time becomes more relative the deeper one descends into the mind, at its bottom, we nd what we could call eternitywhich, as Wittgenstein said, is not innite time but timelessness (1969: 81, axiom 6:4311). This coincides with Kants realm, which stands out of time, and also holds for Platos world of ideas. Time seems to be the pivotal notion by means of which one can gain a deep understanding of the essential difference between consciousness and the realm beyond, as time and consciousness seem interdependent entities (Kant 1990: 30). Conversely, the bottom of the mind, the Absolute Mind must by necessity seem paradoxical to consciousness because its laws are precisely the inversion of those of consciousness itself: where consciousness exists by the grace of a priori knowledge such as time and space, Absolute Mind is timeless (understood by consciousness as eternity) and nonlocal (omnipresent). Thus, paradoxically, because it is nowhere, it is everywhere. We can then easily recognize in this state of affairs the existence of two times (the eternity of Absolute Mind and the here and now of consciousness), the inherently paradoxical nature of the human subject itself: its living in two

worlds (Mumford 1923: 13); its identity as Mittelwesen (Heinisch 1960: 235) with ambiguous loyalties; and the origin of the tension between universals and particulars itself.11 Moreover, as the activity concerned with this paradox, we can perceive religion as the institutional attempt at a resolution of this tension. This must then necessarily express itself paradoxically because, as Jung (1970: 67) formulates: only the paradox is capable of encapsulating by approximation the fullness of life; the unambiguous and uncontradictory by contrast are onesided and therefore unt to express the incomprehensible.

Part Four:The Intellectual as Prophet

Convergence of understandings One of the central theses of this article is that this reality described by the philosophers as a metaphysical realm and by Jung as Absolute Mind12 or central force is the same realm of divine knowledge that prophets have access to. Access to this realm is what it means to stand in a special relation with God. This means that in this realm the central concepts of a number of realities or disciplines converge: that of psychoanalysis, or more in general psychology; of metaphysics, or more in general philosophy; and of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam or more generally religion.13 It is a realm where the multiplicity of sensory perceptions coincides into the oneness or unity that a monotheistic religion envisions to characterize the root of reality.14 This was already predicted by Cusanus, who said that in the innite opposites coincide (1993 [1453]: 678). He added,

Time and Mind Volume 3Issue 1March 2010, pp. 6384

76 The Prophet as Intellectual and Vice Versa

Moritz E.M. Bilagher

however, that rational understanding i.e., the understanding based on the laws of consciousnesscould not reach that conclusion because in that other realm its laws do not hold; there, later and earlier and nal goal and beginning coincide (ibid.: 73). This realm is also a realm where we nd not only truth, but also an ethical law, as Kant predicted. Platos imperative to look for unity in diversity has its own ethical implications. We can now also understand how we can refer to Absolute Mind as our Creator: as we can only recognize objects with concepts, our knowledge of concepts creates our perception of things as objects at all and thus empirical reality as a whole. The reader of this article may now object to my argumentation that if we take all of what has been said to be true, it is not only prophets who have access to this realm of divine knowledge, but all human beings. This is true. However, the fact that this land is there to be explored by anyone in principle does not mean that it actually is explored by anyone. One reason for this is that the paradoxical, and the domain where we encounter it, the unconscious, can be a dangerous place. As Leavitt says, the difference between prophet and lunatic is one of degree (1997: 130). It is not a coincidence that the psychoanalytical model of the mind is developed not for the sake of some philosophical exploration per se, but with the explicit aim to heal persons affected by psychosomatic afictions. This was always emphasized by Freud (1991: 412). As Peters mentioned, this divine realm is other-worldly, and after the priest has engaged in his prophetic task of proclaiming the other reality, she or he also has to engage in the pastoral task

of guiding the community through this newly discovered world (Peters 2006: 375). Relevant to this, for Radin those that were not priest-thinkers belonged to a group for which monotony holds no terror (Radin 1938, in Bauman 1987: 15), but the paradoxical, unknown land of the unconscious probably does. Therefore, while anyone in principle can have access to this realm, the degree to which this ability is exerted, it seems, differs substantially.

Faculties of prophecy What it is that makes certain people have greater access to the realm of divine knowledge has historically been a subject of debate. For Christian theologians, the innite distance between God and man (Tillich 1959: 68, in Peters 2006: 374) plays a main role, and therefore whether one has access to this realm becomes a question of divine grace. This, however, only transfers our problem, because it raises the question of what divine grace should be understood to be. The routine answer is that this is unknowable. For Maimonides, prophecy was an overow from the active intellect into the imagination. He emphasizes that one is especially susceptible to this when sensory stimulation is reduced (1963: 370). The role of the active intellect seems reminiscent of Kants reason or Platos intelligence. For Spinoza, access to divine knowledge is a question of imagination. Spinoza vividly illustrates that some men of great learning were not considered prophets while some persons that were regarded as prophets did not have an intellectual background. This was also the position of the Su Muslim scholar Ibn Arab (Diyab 1999: 70), to whom revelation is truths transmitted from Divinity

Time and Mind Volume 3Issue 1March 2010, pp. 6384

Moritz E.M. Bilagher

The Prophet as Intellectual and Vice Versa 77

to a certain prophet, which therefore must have passed through the concretizing process of the prophetic imagination. Whatever the faculty via which prophets were in contact with the realm we have identied, it is interesting to note that the prophetic vocabulary is similar to that of the psychoanalysts. On the basis of Numbers 12:6, Maimonides (1963: 370) says that in vision and dream, all the degrees of prophecy are included. The dream as a vehicle of prophecy is also mentioned by Spinoza (1862: 35) and Ibn Arab has referred to a Hadith reporting that Mohammad received his rst revelation through a veridical dream (Diyab 1999: 70), warning, however, that the interpretation of dreams is not immune to error (ibid.: 69). The signicance of the role of the dream in prophecy is only matched by its capacity to express the contents of the unconscious (cf. Freud 1985: 176). In this respect Maimonides (1963: 370) seems strangely visionary when he observed that a matter that occupies a man greatly while he is awake is the one with regard to which the imaginative faculty acts while he is asleep. Numbers 12:6 also mentions visions. According to Hirsch, Hebrew prophets were originally called seers or roeh ( ,)and Spinoza says that divine revelations are normally received by the aid or medium of imagination, viz. by means of words, signs, or visions (1862: 39). These can be thought of as glimpses of the world beyond the immanent one, which indicate how we should understand the sacred texts of religion: as messages from an other side, from a world that is unchangeable, undivided, and unitary.

The present and the eternal It would be wrong to think of prophets as people who only received visions. We have before identied the prophets as individuals with privileged access to a realm of transcendental knowledge and who actively engaged with the social issues of their times. If the rst condition were met, but not the second one, they would merely be mystics (cf. Scholem 1974: 47). What the prophets thus did was to formulate rules and regulations based on universal principles as a response to the particular needs and circumstances of their times and places. St. Augustine already recognized that, although the truth itself is eternal, it gives to every time its own regulations (1985 [398]: 72) and the Quran also contains a number of verses to this effect (cf. 13:39; 22:35; 22:68). Thus, while the principles from which rules are derived may be timeless and independent of culture, this does not mean that the rules themselves are timeless. Salim gives an interesting example of where a religious regulation does not anymore match the principle behind it. The Quran indicates that the testimony of two women is worth that of one man. This, according to Salim, can be explained from the historical context in which the Quran was conceived, where women often did not have the same chances of social development as men. However, she argues (2003: 95), now that women practice professions in many Islamic countries the rule should adapt to reect changed circumstances in order to continue to reect timeless principles such as justice. This reects the basic principle of monotheism: that the source, not the manifestation, is what matters.

Time and Mind Volume 3Issue 1March 2010, pp. 6384

78 The Prophet as Intellectual and Vice Versa

Moritz E.M. Bilagher

Contemporary prophets Hirsch vigorously resisted any comparison between the role of the prophets of the past and any roles of the present. Consequently, he stated that at present there are no prophets (1842: 590; see also Spinoza 1862: 33) rejecting the equation of prophets with philosophers or poets (Hirsch 1842: 603). There is, however, one role of the present that seems very similar to that of the historical prophet: the intellectual (see also Hoffer 1964: 44). Like the prophet, the essence of the intellectual seems dened by a double role: access to a realm of privileged knowledge on the one hand, and engagement with the social issues of the day on the other. Both conditions must be met for someone to be called an intellectual. Furedi (2004: 31), for example, acknowledges that intellectuals are usually understood to be persons that do intellectual work, but adds to this that for being an intellectual this is not enough. Intellectuals are dened according to the manner in which they act, the way they see themselves, and the values that they uphold (ibid.: 31). Their sense of identity as an intellectual derives, in part, from participating in a project that transcends any particular occupation or interest; their authority has rested on the claim to be acting and speaking on behalf of society as a whole; and, thus, being an intellectual implies social engagement (ibid.: 35). This idea also appears in Bauman: [t]he intentional meaning of being an intellectual is to rise above the partial preoccupation of ones own profession and engage with the global issues of truth, judgement and taste of the time (1987: 2). In essence, the roles of intellectual and prophet coincide in the practice of

exploring and identifying universal, timeless principles and applying these to actual situations with a view of solving these. This idea is encapsulated in Marxs thesis that philosophers should not only interpret the world, but also change it (CohnSherbok 2007: 147).15 The importance of the comparison between these groups is twofold: rst, it indicates that the time of prophetic work is not over. It would be wrong to think that the present world needs this less than the world of around 3,000 to 1,500 years ago. In fact, the contrary seems more plausible, as the challenges that the world is faced with nowadays seem to require leadership of certainly prophetic dimensions. It is only logical to think that intellectuals should provide this. Secondly, it can help us not to make an idol of the Biblical past and, instead, to realize that we can also learn from persons of a more recent age. We can reread and reinterpret more key texts than only the Bible, as did Toulmin, who showed that Descartes attempt to arrive at a truth that is equally valid for all of mankind, the fundamental truth of cogito ergo sum, was in fact a reaction to the horrors of the Thirty Years War (1992: 62)a war between Protestants and Catholics in the heart of Europe that left entire areas depopulated.

Todays intellectuals These considerations raise the question of who todays intellectuals are. A 2005-ranking, based on a poll by Foreign Policy and Prospect Magazine identied as the worlds top intellectuals Noam Chomsky, Umberto Eco, and Richard Dawkins. In an analysis, Herman (2005) defends the validity of the choices of the participants in the poll with a reference

Time and Mind Volume 3Issue 1March 2010, pp. 6384

Moritz E.M. Bilagher

The Prophet as Intellectual and Vice Versa 79

to the intellectual range of the winners: Havel [who ended in fourth place] was a playwright and statesman; Eco a literary critic and bestselling author; [Jared] Diamond was a professor of physiology and now has a chair in geography at UCLA, and writes on huge issues ranging over a great time span. In all these cases, the intellectuals are understood to be intellectuals because they engage in intellectual work but also in work of some social signicance. Herman endorses Chomskys victory in particular by noting that he belongs to a tradition which goes back to Zola, Russell and Sartre: a major thinker or writer who speaks out on the great public issues of his time, opposing his government on questions of conscience rather than the ne print of policy. The same characteristics used to describe the intellectuals of the twenty-rst century apply to those of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: for example, Popper was a philosopher of science but also engaged with the idea of an open society; Foucault a historian but he also became (albeit largely unwittingly) a leader of the 1968 Paris student revolt; Marcuse was a sociologist but also criticized the logic of oppression of the elites; Sad was a literary critic but also criticized the neo-colonial view of eastern cultures. For the nineteenth century, we could mention Mach, the psychologist among physicists and famously anti-racist; Cuvier, the natural historian and historian of culture; Nietzsche, whose character of Zarathustra resembles the archetypal prophet; and many others. These individuals have socially fullled the same function as the prophet in the past: they acted as the conscience of society (Furedi 2004: 35), developing visions of ideal futures, as did

Martin Luther King, and new rules based on timeless principles for a present that is intrinsically changing. Currently, many of these changes seem to be conditioned by technological developments, mainly in biotechnology and information technology. In these cases it is again the intellectuals, such as Jonas, Sloterdijk, and Ellul who develop new laws from eternal principles, such as respect for life.

Chosen to what? If we relate a phenomenon that claims roots in the supernatural to a scientic theory, then what are the implications of this? Are we then denying the Holy Book its uniqueness and stature? In this regard, it is interesting to note that the two chapters preceding the one on the election of the Jewish people in Spinozas Tractatus (the text with which we opened this article), deal with prophecy and prophets respectively. This is for a reason. The question Spinoza poses is of the extent to which prophecy is an intrinsically Jewish phenomenon. If we persist in our idea that the prophets of ancient times were similar to our contemporary intellectuals, we are, clearly, saying it is not. Therefore, by placing prophecy on a rational foundation we are not only breaking the spell of prophecy as we know it from the Bible but, also, breaking some of the spell associated with the Jewish people, who, according to many Jewish thinkers (Geiger, Rosenzweig, Heschel), have played the role of unique deliverers of divine messages. This cannot please everyone as, according to Hirsch, religion is all the Jewish people have. It is, he said, their contribution to world history, comparable to the contributions of other peoples, such as the art of the Greeks, Roman law (1842:

Time and Mind Volume 3Issue 1March 2010, pp. 6384

80 The Prophet as Intellectual and Vice Versa

Moritz E.M. Bilagher

616), and German speculative depth of knowledge (ibid.: 602). However, magic spells are rarely uniformly positive, and the perception of the uniqueness of a specic people has, in the expression of Jung, had strikingly enantiodromic properties (1946: 5412): that is, the perception of the people as superior (Freud 1985: 3512; Spinoza 1862: 48) seems to evoke its potential opposite. This mechanism nds an interesting explanation in the work of Freud (1985: 351, note 1), who explains how the perception of Jews as lepers in antiquity may have been a case of projection, as an Egyptian high priest wrote: they [the Jews] keep as much apart from us as though we were lepers. A universal law may reveal itself here. However that may be, the mere maintenance of spells is not our aim, and the assertion that Biblical revelation is denitive is not founded on assumptions in line with our observations. This idea may require a shift in thinking about revelation in general. What the Bible testies of may be one expression of an eternal and all-pervasive idea that we nd in a very special form in this Holy Book, but by no means only there. It may also be present in w the Hindu concept of atma n among others. This does not mean that we dethrone any people of a special status, but it does mean that knowledge of a divine reality is not the prerogative of any specic group. To assert otherwise would not be a manifestation of faith, but of superstition.

of verses (ayat) can differ slightly from the numbering of verses in other translations, because this version counts the opening formula of every sura as a separate verse. Some non-English language works (mainly in German and Dutch) were consulted for this article. When quoted from, the translations of the original text to English are mine. 1 The book When Prophecy Fails, by Festinger et al., is a good example of how this particular aspect of prophecy has often been considered its central element (see e.g. 1956: 5). 2 In this context, Kwa refers to Zilsel (1942), who explicitly mentions Job 38:10, Psalms 104:9, Proverbs 8:29, and Jeremiah 5:22. However, Job 38:10 should be read in conjunction with 38:11, and Job 38:12 may also be mentioned. 3 Spinoza was not the rst. The Italian monk Tommaso Campanella, one of the classical utopians, is said to have said the same, in front of terror-struck witnesses (Manuel and Manuel 1982: 266). The original proceedings in Latin can be found in Amabile (1882: 195). 4 However, Kroonenberg points out that the unpredictability of the weather is, to an extent, a question of scale. He argues that, although we may not know whether the climate will change this century, we know that in a few centuries we will have another ice age. This is because we are aware of greater regularities, such as Milankovic cyclicity (2007: 15). 5 For example, Labrie (1989: 211) argues that in the twentieth century there is a stronger trend toward dystopias than toward utopias. 6 Marx, incidentally, borrows from many others: the ideals formulated in the Communist Manifesto bear striking resemblance to Platos Republic and Mores Utopia, for example, in respect of the abolition of the family and of private property. 7 As a side note, Cohn-Sherbok (2007: 148) indicates that, although Jewish, Marxs relations with Judaism have always been fraught. 8 In this regard, Scholem mentions a sphere, a whole realm of divinity, which underlies the world

Notes
* The Quran used for this article is the translation from Arabic to Dutch of the Ahmadiyya movement (1994, Rabwah: The Oriental & Religious Publishing Corporation). The numbering

Time and Mind Volume 3Issue 1March 2010, pp. 6384

Moritz E.M. Bilagher

The Prophet as Intellectual and Vice Versa 81

of our sense-data and which is present and active in all that exists (1974: 11). 9 Russells classical example of the concept of a cat (2007: 123) seems to miss the mark to an extent, as he explains his point with a reference to a substance of cattiness. However, the main characteristic of Platos metaphysical world is explicitly that it is immaterial, and that there are no substances in it. 10 Kant discussed Platos theory of ideas in the Critique of Pure Reason (1990: 197201). 11 This idea seems implicit in Rortys classication of the physical [as] spatio-temporal; the psychological [as] non-spatial but temporal; [and] the meta-physical [as] neither spatial nor temporal (1980: 20). 12 This expression itself is derived from Von Baader (1851: 194), in Jung (1950: 615). 13 After having written a rst draft of this article I came across Benny Shanons speculation about a connection between use of certain mind-altering plants in the ancient Middle East and the rise of Israelitic religion (2008: 51). It is well known that certain hallucinogenic substances can afford access to deeper layers of the mind. 14 Scholem, for example, speaks about the encounter with the absolute Being in the depths of ones soul (1974: 15). 15 Interestingly, in 1842 Hirsch wrote: With Schelling and Hegel, philosophy has come to realize that its business has never been, nor will it ever be, to create a new world, but only to understand the actual world (603).

Baader, F. von, 1851. Fermenta cognitionis. Leipzig: Publisher unknown. Barth, K., 1963. The Preaching of the Gospel. Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press. Bauman, Z., 1987. Legislators and Interpreters. Cambridge: Polity. Bouman, S., 1998. Isral contra Zion. Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Jan Mets. Cohn-Sherbok, D., 2007. Fifty Key Jewish Thinkers. London: Routledge. Cusa, N. van, 1993 [1453]. Het zien van God. Kapellen: Pelckmans.
Diya b, A.N., 1999. Intellect and Imagination in Ibn Arabs Anthropological Epistemology. Al-Shajarah. Journal of the International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization 4(1): 5374.

Dostoyevsky, F., 1992. De gebroeders Karamazow. Amsterdam: G.A. van Oorschot. Festinger, L., Riecken, H.W. and Schachter, S., 1956. When Prophecy Fails. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Foucault, M., 2005. The Order of Things. London: Routledge. Freud, S., 1985. The Origins of Religion. London: Penguin. Freud, S., 1991. Zelfportret. De weerstanden tegen de psychoanalyse. Het vraagstuk van de lekenanalyse. Meppel/Amsterdam: Boom. Fukuyama, F., 1992. The End of History and the Last Man. London: Penguin. Furedi, F., 2004. Where Have all the Intellectuals Gone? London: Continuum. Goldberg, D. and Rayner, J., 1989. The Jewish People: Their History and their Religion. London: Penguin. Heinisch, K.J., 1960. Der Utopische Staat. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt. Heraclites (c.500 BC), 2006. Aldus sprak Heraclitus. Groningen: Historische uitgeverij.

References
Alighieri, D., 1972. The Divine Comedy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Amabile, L., 1882. Fra Tommaso Campanella: La sua congiura, i suoi processi e la sua pazzia. Naples: Cav. Antonio Morano. Augustinus, A., 1985. Belijdenissen. Amsterdam: Athenaeum/Polak & Van Gennep.

Time and Mind Volume 3Issue 1March 2010, pp. 6384

82 The Prophet as Intellectual and Vice Versa

Moritz E.M. Bilagher

Herman, D., 2005. Global Public Intellectuals Poll. Prospect Magazine. Retrieved 24 March 2008 from http://www.prospect-magazine.co.uk/article_details. php?id=7078. Hirsch, S., 1842. Die Religionsphilosophie der Juden. Leipzig: Verlag Heinrich Hunger. Hoffer, E., 1964. The Ordeal of Change. London: Sidgwick & Jackson. Jacobi, J., 1949. The Psychology of Jung. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Jaffe, A., 1970. The Myth of Meaning in the Work of C.G. Jung. London: Hodder & Stoughton. Jung, C.G., 1946. Psychological Types. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner. Jung, C.G., 1950. Gestaltungen des Unbewuten. Zrich: Rascher. Jung, C.G., 1970. Bewutes und Unbewutes. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Bcherei. Jung, C.G., 1982. Psychologie en religie. Rotterdam: Lemniscaat. Kant, I., 1903. Perpetual Peace: A philosophical Essay. London: George Allen & Unwin. Kant, I., 1990. Critique of Pure Reason. Amherst, NY: Prometheus. Kant, I., 1996. Kritik der praktischen Vernunft: Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Kroonenberg, S., 2007. De menselijke maat. Amsterdam/Antwerpen: Uitgeverij Atlas. Kwa, C., 1991. Wetten en verhalen. Kennis en methode 1: 10520. Labrie, A., 1989. De reis naar Utopia. Skript historisch tijdschrift 11(4): 196212. Le Goff, J., 1988. The Medieval Imagination. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Leavitt, J., 1997. Poetry and Prophecy: The Anthropology of Inspiration. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Lewis, C.S., 1961. Dienstanweisung fr einen Unterteufel. Freiburg: Herder Bcherei.

Maimonides, M., 1963. The Guide of the Perplexed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Manuel, F.E. and Manuel, F.P., 1982. Utopian Thought in the Western World. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. More, T., 2001. Utopia. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Mumford, L., 1923. The Story of Utopias. London: George Harrap & Co. Nietzsche, F., 1968. Jenseits von Gut und Bse: Zur Genealogie der Moral. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. Peters, T., 2006. Contributions from Practical Theology and Ethics. in P. Clayton and Z. Simpson (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 37287. Plato (c.360 BC), 1995. Constitutie. Amsterdam: Athenaeum/Polak & Van Gennep. Popper, K., 1994. La lezione di questo secolo. Venice: Marsilio. Popper, K., 2003. The Open Society and its Enemies. Vol. 2, Hegel and Marx. London: Routledge. Popper, K., 2007. Conjectures and Refutations. London: Routledge. Radin, P., 1938. Primitive Religion, its Nature and Origin. London: Hamilton. Ramdas, A., 1993. In het huis van mijn vader. Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Jan Mets. Rorty, R., 1980. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Rosenthal-Schneider, I., 1980. Reality and Scientic Truth. Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press. Russell, B., 2007. The History of Western Philosophy. London: Routledge. Salim, N., 2003. De vrouwen van de profeet. Amsterdam: Van Gennep. Scholem, G.G., 1974. Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism. New York: Schocken. Shanon, B., 2008. Biblical Entheogens: a Speculative Hypothesis. Time & Mind 1(1): 5174.

Time and Mind Volume 3Issue 1March 2010, pp. 6384

Moritz E.M. Bilagher

The Prophet as Intellectual and Vice Versa 83

Spinoza, B., 1862. Tractatus theologico-politicus. London: Trbner & Co. Spinoza, B. de, 1981. Ethics. Salzburg: University of Salzburg, Institut fr Anglistik & Amerikanistik. Tillich, P., 1959. Theology of Culture. London and New York: Oxford University Press.

Toulmin, S., 1992. Cosmopolis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Wittgenstein, L., 1969. Tractatus logicophilosophicus. in Schriften 1. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Zilsel, E., 1942. The Genesis of the Concept of Physical Law. Philosophical Review 51: 24579.

Time and Mind Volume 3Issue 1March 2010, pp. 6384