INTERVENTION METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, petitioner, vs.

THE PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Manila Branch 39, RAYCOR AIRCONTROL SYSTEM, INC. and COURT OF APPEALS * , respondent.1990 September 212nd DivisionG.R. No. 89909D E C I S I ON REGALADO, J.: Before the Court for review on certiorari is the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 17341, dated July 19, 1989, 1 dismissing petitioner's original action for certiorari and mandamus which seeks to set aside the order of the trial court dated June 2, 1988, allowing the intervention suit thereinto proceed, and its order of January 11, 1989, admitting the amended complaint in intervention. The proceedings in the court below from which this appeal arose, as found by respondent Court of Appeals, are as follows: "Petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. (Metropolitan) in whose favor a deed of chattel mortgage was executed by Good Earth Emporium, Inc. (GEE) over certain air conditioning units installed in the GEE building, filed a complaint for replevin against Uniwide Sales, Inc. (Uniwide, for brevity) and the BPI Investment Corporation and several other banks collectively called BPI-Consortium, for the recovery of the possession of the air-conditioning units or in the event they may not be recovered, for the defendants which acquired the GEE building in an auction sale, (to) be required, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiff the unpaid obligations on the units. "Per paragraph 3.11.3 of its complaint, plaintiff Metrobank alleged that the air-conditioning units were installed on a loan of P4,900,000.00 it extended to Good Earth Emporium & Supermarket, Inc. in its building located at Rizal Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila, after the land and building had been foreclosed and purchased on June 3, 1983 at public auction by the defendants, except Uniwide, and in order to secure repayment of the loan, a deed of chattel mortgage was constituted over the personal properties listed in the deed which included the airconditioning units. "It also alleged in par. 3.11.2 of the complaint, that '(T)he loan proceeds were used by GEE to finance the acquisition of airconditioning equipment from Reycor (sic) Air Control System, Inc. (amounting to P4,250,000.00 and installation costs of P650,000.00) under an Agreement of Sale dated 29 June 1984' (Annex A, Petition, id., pp. 23-24). "The defendants filed their Answer, Uniwide on July 25, 1986 (Annex B, Petition, id., pp. 32-48) and the defendants (presumably the rest of the defendants), on July 14, 1986 (Annex C, Petition, id., pp. 39-49). "On July 17, 1986, Raycor Air Control Systems, Inc. filed a motion for leave to intervene alleging 'it has a direct and immediate interest on the subject matter of the litigation such that it will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment' and attached the 'Intervention Complaint' (Annex D, Petition, id., pp. 49-52). There was no opposition to the motion and the intervention complaint was admitted by the lower court per its order dated August 8, 1986. Metrobank on November 19, 1986, filed its Answer To The Intervention Complaint (Annex E, Petition, id., pp. 53-59). "On August 3, 1987, the lower court set the case for trial on the merits on September 15, 1987 but before the date of the trial, on September 7, 1987, plaintiff Metrobank and the defendants Uniwide and BPI Consortium, filed a motion for postponement of the scheduled hearing on September 15, 1987 and asked for thirty (30) days from September 15 within which to submit a compromise agreement. On March 15, 1988, plaintiff Metrobank and defendants BPI Consortium filed a joint motion to dismiss the complaint and on March 18, 1988, the lower court issued the order dismissing the complaint with prejudice (Annex D to Comment of Raycor Air Control System, Inc., Rollo, p. 108). "On April 19, 1988, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing the complaint with prejudice, claiming it was not furnished with copy of the joint motion for dismissal and that it received the order of dismissal only on April 14, 1988. On June 2, 1988, the respondent court issued the order granting the motion for reconsideration filed by the intervenor (Annex I, Petition, id., p. 67) which order is now subject of present petition for certiorari. "On August 2, 1988, private respondent filed a motion to admit amended complaint (Annex F, Intervenor's Comment, id., p. 110) and attached the Amended Intervention Complaint (Annex J, Petition, id., pp. 68-73) to the motion. To this motion, plaintiff Metrobank filed an opposition (Annex K, Petition, id., pp. 71-76) and after the intervenor had filed their Reply (Annex L, Petition, id., pp. 77-81) and the plaintiff a Rejoinder (Annex M, Petition, id., pp. 82-87), on January 11, 1989, the respondent court issued the order admitting the amended complaint in intervention (Annex N, Petition, id., p. 88). This is the other order which is subject of the petition for certiorari. "On February 9, 1989, plaintiff Metrobank filed a motion for extension for 15 days or until February 24, 1988 within which to file its answer to the amended complaint in intervention and the intervenor on February 17, 1989 filed an opposition to Metrobank's motion and at the same time moved that Metrobank be declared in default on the amended complaint in intervention. The respondent court granted Metrobank's motion and on February 18, 1989, Metrobank filed its Answer to the Amended Complaint in Intervention with Counterclaim." 2 On April 14, 1989, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with respondent Court of Appeals contending that the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in allowing, per its order of June 2, 1988, the intervention suit to survive despite the dismissal of the main action and also in admitting, per its order of January 11, 1989, the amended complaint in intervention. 3 As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals found no merit in the petition and dismissed the same on July 19, 1989. Petitioner is now before us raising the same issues and arguments. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the lower court was innocent of any grave abuse of discretion in issuing the orders complained of.

The contention of petitioner that the order of the lower court, dated June 2, 1988, has the effect of allowing the intervention suit to prosper despite the dismissal of the main action obviously cannot be upheld. There is here no final dismissal of the main case. The aforementioned order of the lower court has the effect not only of allowing the intervention suit to proceed but also of vacating its previous order of dismissal. The reinstatement of the case in order to try and determine the claims and rights of the intervenor is proper. The joint motion of therein plaintiff and the original defendants to dismiss the case, without notice to and consent of the intervenor, has the effect of putting to rest only the respective claims of the said original parties inter se, but the same cannot in any way affect the claim of private respondent which was allowed by the court to intervene without opposition from the original parties. A resum of pertinent rulings on the matter would be in order. Intervention is defined as "a proceeding in a suit or action by which a third person is permitted by the court to make himself a party, either joining plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaint, or uniting with defendant in resisting the claims of plaintiff, or demanding something adversely to both of them; the act or proceeding by which a third person becomes a party in a suit pending between others; the admission, by leave of court, of a person not an original party to pending legal proceedings, by which such person becomes a party thereto for the protection of some right of interest alleged by him to be affected by such proceedings." 4 Any person who has or claims an interest in the matter in litigation, in the success of either of the parties to an action, or against both, may intervene in such action, and when he has become a party thereto it is error for the court to dismiss the action, including the intervention suit on the basis of an agreement between the original parties to the action. Any settlement made by the plaintiff and the defendant is necessarily ineffective unless the intervenor is a party to it. 5 By the very definition of "intervention," the intervenor is a party to the action as the original parties and to make his right effectual he must necessarily have the same power as the original parties, subject to the authority of the court reasonably to control the proceedings in the case. 6 Having been permitted to become a party in order to better protect his interests, an intervenor is entitled to have the issues raised between him and the original parties tried and determined. 7 He had submitted himself and his cause of action to the jurisdiction of the court and was entitled to relief as though he were himself a party in the action. 8 After the intervenor has appeared in the action, the plaintiff has no absolute right to put the intervenor out of court by the dismissal of the action. The parties to the original suit have no power to waive or otherwise annul the substantial rights of the intervenor. When an intervening petition has been filed, a plaintiff may not dismiss the action in any respect to the prejudice of the intervenor. 9 It has even been held that the simple fact that the trial court properly dismissed plaintiffs action does not require dismissal of the action of the intervenor. 10 An intervenor has the right to claim the benefit of the original suit and to prosecute it to judgment. The right cannot be defeated by dismissal of the suit by the plaintiff after the filing of the petition and notice thereof to the other parties. A person who has an interest in the subject matter of the action has the right, on his own motion, to intervene and become a party to the suit, and even after the complaint has been dismissed, may proceed to have any actual controversy established by the pleadings determined in such action. The trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's action does not require dismissal of the action of the intervenor. 11 The intervenor in a pending case is entitled to be heard like any other party. 12 A claim in intervention that seeks affirmative relief prevents a plaintiff from taking a voluntary dismissal of the main action. 13 Where a complaint in intervention was filed before plaintiff's action had been expressly dismissed, the intervenor's complaint was not subject to dismissal on the ground that no action was pending, since dismissal of plaintiff's action did not affect the rights of the intervenor or affect the dismissal of intervenor's complaint. 14 An intervenor's petition showing it to be entitled to affirmative relief will be preserved and heard regardless of the disposition of the principal action. 15 As we ruled in Camacho vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., 16 the rationale whereof is clearly applicable to the present controversy "There is no question that intervention is only collateral or ancillary to the main action. Hence, it was previously ruled that the final dismissal of the principal action results in the dismissal of said ancillary action. The main action having ceased to exist, there is no pending proceeding whereon the intervention may be based. In the case at bar, however, there was no such final or complete dismissal but rather an approval of a compromise agreement which was embodied in what was specifically designated as a 'Partial Decision' affecting only the interests of herein petitioner and the defendant in said case but not those of her co-plaintiff municipality and the intervenor. The clear intent of the court below in making the partial decision is to make a reservation to determine the rights of the intervenor and, presumably, the plaintiff municipality. There may be nothing much left to be done with respect to the main case but as far as the proceedings in the trial court are concerned, the controversy therein has not been fully settled and the disposition of the case is definitely incomplete." Moreover, to require private respondent to refile another case for the settlement of its claim will result in unnecessary delay and expenses and will entail multiplicity of suits and, therefore, defeat the very purpose of intervention which is to hear and determine at the same time all conflicting claims which may be made on the subject matter in litigation, and to expedite litigation and settle in one action and by a single judgment the whole controversy among the persons involved. 17 On the propriety of the order dated January 11, 1988, admitting private respondent's amended complaint in intervention, we sustain respondent Court of Appeals in upholding the same. Incidentally, it will be recalled that petitioner was granted the opportunity to file, as it did file, its answer to the amended complaint in intervention and it even interposed a counterclaim in the process. Now, the granting of leave to file an amended pleading is a matter particularly addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and that discretion is broad, subject only to the limitations that the amendments should not substantially change the cause of action or alter the theory of the case or that it was made to delay the action. 18 Once exercised, that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal, except in case of abuse thereof. 19 In the case at bar, a reading of the amended complaint in intervention shows that it merely supplements an incomplete allegation of the cause of action stated in the original complaint so as to submit the real matter in dispute.

Contrary to petitioner's contention, it does not substantially change intervenor's cause of action or alter the theory of the case, hence its allowance is in order. As aptly stated by the Court of Appeals: "In both the Intervention Complaint and the Amended Complaint in Intervention, the private respondent seeks the payment to it of the amount of P150,000.00 which should have been paid to it from out of the P650,000.00 which the petitioner as plaintiff in CC 863618 had referred to in pars. 3.11.2 and 3.11.3 of its complaint as cost of installation of the airconditioning units under the agreement of sale (between plaintiff Metrobank and GEE Inc). dated June 29, 1984 and so basically, the Amended Complaint In Intervention did not really detract or depart from that basic claim." 20 In determining whether a different cause of action is introduced by amendments to the complaint, what is to be ascertained is whether the defendant shall be required to answer for a liability or legal obligation wholly different from that which was stated in the original complaint. An amendment will not be considered as stating a new cause of action if the facts alleged in the amended complaint show substantially the same wrong with respect to the same transaction, or if what are alleged refer to the same matter but are more fully and differently stated, or where averments which were implied are made in expressed terms, and the subject of the controversy or the liability sought to be enforced remains the same. 21 The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid multiplicity of suits and in order that the real controversies between the parties are presented, their rights determined and the case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay. 22 This liberality is greatest in the early stages of a lawsuit, 23 especially in this case where the amendment to the complaint in intervention was made before trial of the case thereby giving petitioner all the time allowed by law to answer and to prepare for trial. On the issue regarding the propriety of the intervention, suffice it to state that petitioner's failure to interpose a timely objection when the motion for leave to intervene was filed by private respondent bars the former from belatedly questioning the validity of the same on appeal. In any event, the trial court duly considered the circumstances and granted the motion, which order was not seasonably questioned by petitioner thus evincing its approval of the court's action. WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error, the petition is DENIED and the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Melencio-Herrera (Chairman) and Sarmiento, JJ., concur. Paras, J., is on leave. Padilla, J., took no part. Footnotes * The Court of Appeals was impleaded as a party respondent pursuant to the resolution of the Court dated October 2, 1989.

1. Penned by Justice Cezar D. Francisco, with the concurrence of Justices Reynato A. Puno and Jorge S. Imperial. 2. Rollo, 51-53. 3. Ibid., 31-49. 4. 33 C.J. 477, cited in Garcia, etc., et al. vs. David, et al., 67 Phil. 279 (1939); Government Service Insurance System vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 169 SCRA 244 (1989). 5. Progressive Design, Inc. vs. Olson Bros. Mfg. Co., 206 N.W. 2d 832. 6. 59 Am. Jur. 2d 615. 7. Poehlmann vs. Kennedy, 48 Cal. 201. 8. Schoniger, et al. vs. Logan, et al., 166 N.W. 266. 9. Patterson vs. Pollock, et al., 84 N.E. 2d 606; Elliot vs. Luers, 6 Nev. 287. 10. Gage vs. Cameron, 212 Ill. 146; 72 N.E. 204. 11. Seil and Seil vs. Board of Supervisors of Will County, 234 N.E. 2d 826. 12. 67A C.J.S. 852. 13. Steffens vs. Rowley, 10 Cal. App. 2d 628; 52 P2d 493. 14. Muirhead vs. Johnson, 232 Minn. 408, 46 N.W. 2d; In Scott vs. Van Sant, 193 Minn. 465, 258 N.W. 817. 15. Progressive Design, Inc. vs. Olson Bros. Mfg. Co., ante. 16. G.R. No. 79564, November 24, 1989. 17. 67A C.J.S. 794. 18. Uy vs. Uy, 2 SCRA 675 (1961). 19. Torres Vda. de Nery vs. Tomacruz, 49 Phil. 913 (1927). 20. Rollo, 53. 21. Shaffer vs. Palma, et al., 22 SCRA 934 (1968). 22. Shaffer vs. Palma, et al., supra; Demaronsing vs. Tandayag, etc, et al., 58 SCRA 484 (1974). 23. Torres Vda. de Nery vs. Tomacruz, ante. ~*~ /---!e-library! 6.0 Philippines Copyright 2000 by Sony Valdez---\ [1993V42E] HON. ISIDRO CARIO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. BERNARDO REYES, Regional Director, DECS, Region III, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE CARLOS OFILADA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 15, Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, PRISCILLA RAMOS, WILFREDO ESPIRITU, CARMELITA SARCENO, ELVIRA PENGSON, AMELITA RESTURA, REMEDIOS RIVERA, TRINIDAD ANGELES, NIDA ANGELES, JOSE SANTOS, CIRILA PABLO, WILMA LAGUNA, CORNELIA ANTONIO, REMEDIOS BALMES, REGINO DE LEON, ELEONOR VELAGO, ROSARIO MAGTALAS, PILAR CALIWAG, PANCRACIO SANTOS, ANANIAS DICDICAN, AURELIO PACIULIGAN, REYNALDO ANTONIO, POTENCIANO DELA CRUZ, LORENA SOTTO, CORAZON AJERO, JULIO MENDOZA, BENJAMIN STA. CRUZ, RITA STA. CRUZ, ROMANA MANABAT, LODIVINA SIDAYON, ROMEO VILLANUEVA, ELMER

JULIANO, SIMPLICIO JIMENES, GERARDO CORONEL, LUZ CORONEL, HERMINIA PASCUAL, HELEN MASAMBAL, ANGELINA ORTEGA, NESTOR LAZARO, and MILAGROS PERES, respondents.1993 Jan 18En BancG.R. No. 102836D E C I S I O N DAVIDE, JR., J p: This is a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to set aside, for having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, the 29 October 1991 Order of respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 210-M-91 entitled "Priscilla Ramos, et al. 1 vs. Hon. Isidro Cario, et al.," which allowed the Petition in Intervention of Ananias Dicdican, et al. 2 and granted the application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for the reinstatement of the intervenors and the payment of their back salaries. In the Resolution of 13 December 1991, 3 We required the respondents to comment on the petition and issued a temporary restraining order directing the respondent Judge to cease and desist from enforcing the challenged order. Respondents Priscilla Ramos, et al. (hereinafter referred to as the Private Respondents) filed their Comment on 20 January 1992. 4 Respondents Ananias Dicdican and the others (hereinafter referred to as Private Respondents-Intervenors) filed their Comment on 16 January 1992. 5 In Our Resolution of 13 February 1992, 6 We considered the Comments as the Answers, gave due course to the petition arid required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda. Private Respondents filed their Memorandum only on 6 October 1992. The facts which gave rise to this petition are not disputed. Private Respondents are among those who allegedly staged, on 21 September 1990, a "mass action" in Bulacan to demonstrate their solidarity with the public school teachers who were then engaged in a strike in the National Capital Region. For their failure to comply with the 24 September 1990 and 1 October 1990 return-to-work orders, petitioner Bernardo Reyes, DECS Regional Director for Region III, filed administrative complaints against them and created an investigation committee. On 6 February 1991, petitioner Reyes rendered separate decisions in two (2) administrative cases, to wit: a) Case No. DECSRO-III-91-001 wherein he imposed the penalty of immediate dismissal from the service on respondents Priscilla Ramos and twenty-seven (27) others; 7 and b) Case No. DECSRO-III-91-002 wherein he imposed the penalty of suspension from the service for a period of one (1) year, effective upon receipt of the decision, on respondents Benilda Sarmiento and eleven (11) others. 8 Both decisions were "confirmed" by petitioner Cario. Private Respondents-Intervenors Ananias Dicdican, Reynaldo Antonio, Potenciano dela Cruz, Lorena Sotto, Corazon Ajero and Julio Mendoza are among the twenty-eight (28) respondents in Case No. DECSRO-III-91-001. The rest of the Private RespondentsIntervenors, with the exception of Aurelio Pacuiligan, Angelina Ortega, Nestor Lazaro and Milagros Peres, are the respondents in Case No. DECSRO-III-91-002. While the names of these last four (4) parties are included in the Petition in Intervention, 9 they do not appear in either of the two (2) decisions. On 4 March 1991, Private Respondents filed with petitioner Reyes a motion or petition to recall or reconsider the decision in Case No. DECSRO-91-001. Thereafter, on 9 April 1991, they filed with the court a quo a petition for mandamus wherein they alleged that the said decision was rendered without any hearing and was not supported by evidence; it was further averred that the petitioners failed to act on the motion for reconsideration within the period prescribed by P.D. No. 807, as amended. They prayed therein that the petitioners be required to recall or reconsider the decision. The petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 210-M-91. On 7 June 1991, respondent Judge issued an order directing herein petitioners to reinstate the Private Respondents. Petitioners challenged the said order in a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus filed with this Court and docketed as G.R. No. 100206. On 22 August 1991, We promulgated the following resolution in the said case: "The Court considers that since no administrative hearings were actually held, private respondent teachers should have the fullest opportunity to present the facts in their individual cases before the respondent Regional Trial Court, and the Regional Trial Court given a chance to grant such corrective relief as it may regard warranted (sic). The Court is aware that DECS Regional Director Reyes has declined to show any 'magnanimity' and held private respondents summarily guilty in the administrative proceedings then on going before him, and that private respondents went directly to the Regional Trial Court. There is, of course, nothing to prevent DECS Regional Director Reyes from re-examining and withdrawing his 6 February 1991 decision, if he is minded to do so, so that the facts in the individual cases of private respondents might be brought out in the administrative proceedings, rather than ventilating them immediately before the Regional Trial Court; in such case, private respondents, if still adjudged guilty, could appeal to the Civil Service Commission. In the meantime, the Court believes that private respondents should be reinstated pending determination by the Regional Trial Court of the issues presented to it. ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus and to REMAND this case to respondent Regional Trial Judge for further proceedings consistent with this Resolution." In view thereof, petitioner Reyes issued on 6 September 1991 an order, in Case No. DECSRO-III-91-001, setting aside and recalling the decision therein dated 6 February 1991, and directing that a formal investigation be conducted. 10 Private Respondents were thus reinstated and a general payroll for their backwages was prepared. 11 Petitioners then filed a motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 210-M-91 which the Private Respondents opposed.

In the meantime, Private Respondents-Intervenors filed in Civil Case No. 210-M-91 a motion for leave to intervene, attaching thereto their Petition in Intervention 12 dated 6 September 1991. They prayed that: "WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that the order of February 6, 1991 of the Regional Director Region III (DECS) as confirmed by Hon. Isidro Cario be declared null and void, that the petitioners/intervenors be exonerated and allowed them (sic) to return to their respective assignment (sic) of duties in order to perform and discharge their function as secondary public school teachers of Bulacan; the decision dated October 18, 1990 shall stand; Petitioners/intervenors further prays (sic) for such other reliefs to (sic) which they are entitled in law and in equity." 13 In the said petition, Private Respondents-Intervenors made a general reference to a 6 February 1991 decision by petitioner Reyes without specifying if they had been dismissed (Case No. DECSRO-III-91-001) or merely suspended from the service for one (1) year (Case No. DECSRO-91-002). They claimed that they had received a copy of the decision on 19 February 1991. During the hearing on 15 October 1991, the respondent Judge declared that he was holding "in abeyance the ruling on the Motion to Dismiss pending compliance with the resolution of the Supreme Court," 14 which he elaborated to mean reinstatement and the payment of backwages. When categorically asked if he would dismiss the case upon payment by the petitioners of the said backwages, respondent Judge declared: "COURT: Yes, if they will pay and the teachers . . . are reinstated, I will proceed to dismiss the case but they are also under the ruling, allowed to investigate the individual teacher (sic)." 15 On the same occasion, petitioners herein, through Solicitor Hernandez, orally moved that they be granted a period of ten (10) days within which to file an opposition to the Petition in Intervention. 16 The trial court granted the motion. As shown in the general payroll, 17 the Private Respondents had already received their backwages. On 29 October 1991, the respondent Judge issued an order 18 resolving (a) the Petition for Intervention and (b) the Application for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. Thus: "Under the premises and applying the equal protection clause of the Constitution: 1. the aforementioned Petition in Intervention is allowed; 2. with the petitioners' posting of a bond in the amount of P20,000.00 each, a preliminary mandatory injunction is issued against the Secretary of Education, Hon. Isidro Cario and Dr. Bernardo Reyes, Regional Director, Region III, ordering them: a. to reinstate the 22 teachers, intervenors; b. pay them back salaries from February 1991; and c. to recall them from inactive duties considering the newspaper report (Headline-Manila Bulletin, May 26, 1991 issue) that the Nation needs 27,000 teachers; as there are so many teachers needed to fill the vacant slots." 19 By way of a note to this order, two (2) teachers, namely Isabelita S. Paguiligan and Aurelio Mariano, were included as intervenors. The first could very well be Isabelita Paguiligan, one of the respondents in Case No. DECSRO-III-91-001. The second is also a respondent therein. On 30 October 1991, the Respondent Judge issued the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. 20 In view of all these, the instant petition was filed. As grounds therefor, petitioners allege that: "I RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ALLOWING THE PETITION FOR INTERVENTION. II RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT DISMISSING THE CASE AFTER THE REINSTATEMENT AND PAYMENT OF BACKWAGES OF THE ORIGINAL EIGHTEEN RESPONDENT TEACHERS." 21 The petition is impressed with merit. With respect to Civil Case No. 210-M-91, the respondent Court had nothing left to do except to dismiss it. For that and for the further reason that intervention was not proper in the premises, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the motion to intervene, admitting the petition in intervention and issuing a preliminary mandatory injunction for the reinstatement of and the payment of back salaries to the intervenors - herein Private Respondents-Intervenors. As thus formulated, the justification for the above conclusion logically requires a discussion of the second ground relied upon by the petitioners in their petition. 1. The parties do not dispute the fact that petitioner Reyes, taking into account the Resolution of this Court of 22 August 1991 in G.R. No. 100206, set aside, on 6 September 1991, his 6 February 1991 decision in Case No. DECSRO-III-91-001. By virtue thereof, the herein Private Respondents, who were among the respondents in the said case, were reinstated. The pertinent portion of the said Resolution upon which the recall order is based reads as follows:

". . . There is, of course, nothing to prevent DECS Regional Director Reyes from re-examining and withdrawing his 6 February 1991 decision, if he is minded to do so, so that the facts in the individual cases of private respondents might be brought out in the administrative proceedings, rather than ventilating them immediately before the Regional Trial Court; in such case, private respondents, if still adjudged guilty, could appeal to the Civil Service Commission. In the meantime, the Court believes that private respondents should be reinstated pending determination by the Regional Trial Court of the issues presented to it." The petitioners even went a step further than reinstatement - they paid the Private Respondents back salaries. The petition for mandamus in Civil Case No. 210-M-91 sought for the recall or reconsideration of the 6 February 1991 decision on the ground that the said decision was rendered without any hearing and the petitioners were not able to act on the Private Respondents' motion for reconsideration within the period prescribed by P.D. No. 807. With the 6 September 1991 Order recalling the said decision, the dismissal of Civil Case No. 210-M-91 should have followed as a matter of course "so that," as We stated in the 22 August 1991 Resolution, "the facts in the individual cases of private respondents might be brought out in the administrative proceedings, rather than ventilating them immediately before the Regional Trial Court." The trial court was fully aware of the legal significance and consequence of the recall order, reinstatement and payment of back salaries, for which reason it committed itself during the hearing on 15 October 1991 to dismiss the case upon payment of the back salaries of the Private Respondents. Thus, in sitting on a case which had lost its reason to exist, the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion. 2. Intervention may be allowed only in the instances provided for by law. Furthermore, the discretion of the court to allow the same is subject to certain limitations. The basic law on intervention is Section 2, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court which provides: "SEC. 2. Intervention. - A person may, before or during a trial, be permitted by the court, in its discretion, to intervene in an action, if he has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof." This provision has its roots in Section 121 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is a verbatim copy of Section 387 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the State of California: 22 "Intervention is a proceeding in a suit or action by which a third person is permitted by the court to make himself a party, either joining plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaint, or uniting with defendant in resisting the claims of plaintiff, or demanding something adversely to both of them; the act or proceeding by which a third person becomes a party in a suit pending between others; the admission, by leave of court, of a person not an original party pending legal proceedings, by which such person becomes a party thereto for the protection of some right or interest alleged by him to be affected by such proceedings. (33 C.J., 477). Fundamentally, therefore, intervention is never an independent action, but is ancillary and supplemental to the existing litigation. Its purpose is not to obstruct nor (sic) unnecessarily delay the placid operation of the machinery of trial, but merely to afford one not an original party, yet having a certain right or interest in the pending case, the opportunity to appear and be joined so he could assert or protect such right or interest." 23 Otherwise stated, the right of an intervenor should only be in aid of the right of the original party. Where the right of the latter has ceased to exist, there is nothing to aid or fight for; hence, the right of intervention ceases. 24 The interest contemplated by law must be actual and material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent or expectant; it must be in the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment. 25 The words "an interest in the subject" mean a direct interest in the cause of action as pleaded, and which would put the intervenor in the legal position to litigate a fact averred in the complaint, without the establishment of which plaintiff could not recover. 26 Accordingly, intervention is improper and should be disallowed if the claim of the intervenor could be decided or fully protected in a separate proceeding. 27 Finally, intervention may be allowed only before or during the trial. The term trial is used in its restricted sense, i.e., the period for the introduction of evidence by both parties. This period of trial terminates when the judgment begins. 28 Applying the foregoing principles to this case, it is not at all difficult to rule against the intervention by the Private RespondentsIntervenors because they do not possess actual and material, direct and immediate legal interest in the matter in litigation or in the success of either of the parties. Their interest is exclusively personal to them and would not be affected by the proceedings. In fact, such interest could be completely decided and fully protected in a separate suit. As earlier observed, Private Respondents-Intervenors Ananias Dicdican, Reynaldo Antonio, Potenciano de la Cruz, Lorena Sotto, Corazon Ajero and Julio Mendoza, as well as one Aurelio Mariano and Isabelita Paguiligan who are probably the parties referred to under the name Aurelio Pacuiligan in the Petition in Intervention, are among the respondents in Case No. DECSRO-91-001 who did not join the Private Respondents in the original petition for mandamus in Civil Case No. 210-M-91. The decision therein having been recalled on 6 September 1991, their cause of action as intervenors therein was extinguished as of the said date. As to the rest of the Private Respondents-Intervenors, with the exception of Angelina Ortega, Nestor Lazaro and Milagros Peres, their cause of action is based on the 6 February 1991 decision of petitioner Reyes in Case No. DECSRO-III-91-002 which ordered their suspension for one (1) year from the service. They likewise opted not to join the Private Respondents in the original petition in Civil Case No. 210-M-91. As to why they initially distanced themselves from the Private Respondents has not been explained. But gauged from their conduct, the possibility is not remote that they entertained doubts as to the ripeness of the said judicial action in view of the pendency of their motion to reconsider the DECS decision; in effect, they consider the Private Respondents' move as a test case which they could take advantage of if the outcome of the same would be favorable. In short, they were ready to share in the harvest but not in the task of sowing or planting.

Howsoever viewed, Private Respondents-Intervenors' principal cause of action is entirely distinct and separate from, and not ancillary or supplemental to, that involved in the petition of the Private Respondents. Considering that as earlier noted, the latter's cause of action was rendered moot and academic by the recall of the 6 February 1991 decision in Case No. DECSRO-III-91-001 and that there remained nothing more to be done in Civil Case No. 210-M-91 except to dismiss it, neither the Rules of Court nor an appeal to reason could prop up the intervention. The life from which it intended to derive sustenance having been extinguished, it cannot be made to stand on its own in said Civil Case No. 210-M-91. The trial court then acted with grave abuse of discretion in allowing the intervention; it further compounded such indiscretion by arbitrarily issuing a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction without the notice and hearing required in Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, as amended by B.P. Blg. 224. Since the trial court granted, during the hearing on 15 October 1991, a period of ten (10) days within which the petitioners could file an opposition to the motion to intervene, the subsequent application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction cannot be properly granted ex-parte and simultaneously with the ruling on the motion. The foregoing notwithstanding, since Director Reyes had in fact set aside and recalled the decision in Case No. DECSRO-III-91-001, and the one (1) year suspension from the service imposed in Case No. DECSRO-III-91-002 had already lapsed, Private RespondentsIntervenors are likewise entitled to reinstatement. It should be stressed here that although the suspension period had already expired, petitioner Reyes may also recall his decision in Case No. DECSRO-III-91-002, if he is so minded, bearing in mind Our Resolution of 22 August 1991 in G.R. No. 100206. Such revocation, however, should be without prejudice to the formal investigation of the administrative charges, unless a new policy which renders moot and academic the pursuit of such charges has, in the meantime, been adopted by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged order of respondent Judge of 29 October 1991 in Civil Case No. 210-M-91 is hereby SET ASIDE and respondent Judge is hereby directed to DISMISS said case. However, petitioners should reinstate Private Respondents-Intervenors who are the respondents either in Case No. DECSRO-III-91-001 or Case No. DECSRO-III-91-002, taking into account the above observations. No pronouncements as to costs. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur. Footnotes 1. And Wilfredo Espiritu, Carmelita Sarceno, Elvira, Pengson, Amelita Restura, Remedios Rivera, Trinidad Angeles, Nida Angeles, Jose Santos, Cirila Pablo, Wilma Laguna, Cornelia Antonio, Remedios Balmes, Regino de Leon, Eleonor Velago, Rosario Magtalas, Pilar Caliwag and Pancracio Santos. 2. The rest of the private respondents herein. 3. Rollo, 61. 4. Id., 78-94. 5. Id., 102-118. 6. Id., 197-198. 7. The first Annex "7" to Comments of Private Respondents-Intervenors; Rollo, 130-133. 8. The second Annex "7" of the Comment of Private Respondents-Intervenors; Id., 134-137. 9. Annex "C" of Petition; Rollo, 30-37. In Case No. DECSRO-III-91-001, two (2) of the respondents are Aurelio Mariano and Isabelita Paguiligan. There must have been some confusion somewhere. The name Aurelio Pacuiligan in the Petition in Intervention could refer to Aurelio Mariano and Isabelita Paguiligan. 10. Annex "D" of Petition; Rollo, 38. 11. Annexes "E" and "E-1", Id.; Id., 39-40. 12. Annex "C", Id.; Id., 30-37. 13. Id., 36. 14. TSN, 15 October 1991, (Annex "F" of Petition), 11; Rollo, 51. 15. Id.; Id., 52-53. 16. Id., 56. 17. Annexes "E" and "E-1" of Petition; Id.; 39-40. 18. Annex "A", Id.; Id., 24-27. 19. Rollo, 27.

20. Annex "B" of Petition; Id., 28-29. 21. Rollo, 11. 22. Garcia vs. David, 67 Phil. 279, 283 [1939]. 23. At page 282. 24. Clareza vs. Rosales, 2 SCRA 455 [1961]. 25. Garcia vs. David, supra., at page 284 citing several pertinent American cases. 26. Magsaysay-Labrador vs. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 266 [1989], citing authorities. 27. Batama Farmers Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. vs. Rosal; 42 SCRA 408 [1971]; Pfleider vs. De Britanizo, 12 SCRA 222 [1964]. 28. FRANCISCO, V. J., The Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines, Vol. 1, 1973 ed., citing Bool vs. Mendoza, 92 Phil. 892 [1953]; Felismino vs. Gloria, 47 Phil. 967 [1924].