ENTRIES IN OFFICIAL RECORDS

HERCE, JR v. MUN. OF CABUYAO FACTS: Both Pet & Resp claim to be the owners of a parcel of land TC granted resps motion to re-open the decree of registration Pets MFR having been denied, he filed for certiorari w the CA CA denied his petition, saying the reqs for reopening of the decree of registration were met & that: The basis of the issuance of the Decree in favor of Pet is the May 30, 1980 decision of the CFI in 2 Cadastral cases instituted by the Rep of the Phils denying its petition for registration wc is based on the opposition filed by Pet alleging hes the rightful owner of the prop, having acquired it from Jose Carpena But in the May 30 decision, the existence of Decree No4244 was never mentioned neither was it mentioned in Pets motion to modify the decision

2099, pertaining to the same parcel of land covered by Decree No. 4244, has no legal basis and should be nullified Pet files this MFR Pet claims:

the entries in the Ordinary Decree Book of the LRA ddnt categorically state that the prop covered by his decree & OCT was included in Decree No4244 Thus, the title issued in his favor cldnt be declare void since it wasnt shown that the lot covered thereby was included in Decree No.4244 Resps opposition/comment: the prop subject of litigation was included in Decree No 4244 issued in the name of Municipality of Cabuyao shown by the ff evidence:

The LRA, in its comment didnt oppose any objection to Pets motion to modify, but said provided it wont adversely affect the govt & 3rd parties If the LRA exercised prudence in checking its records, it wldve found Decree No4244 The motion to modify was granted despite the fact the fact that the 1957 decision of the TC directing the issuance of the decrees over the 44 parcels of land applied for by the grp of Juanita Carpena had alrdy attained finality, that decrees over the 42 of these parcels have alrdy been issued & the prop subj of the present case wsnt issued a decree in view precisely of the existence of Decree No 4244 Clearly, the decree was issued upon the Pets manifestation before the TC that it was the rightful owner of the prop subj of the controversy & that as transferee & successor-in-interest of the orig applicant Juanita Carpena, he was entitled to the issuance of a decree of registration as decreed in the 1957 Decision of the CFI of Laguna

Survey Plan of the Bureau of Lands w notation at the bottom portion indicating that Decree No. 4244 was issued in favor of the Municipality on March 3, 1911 over the Lot 1, Plan II-2719-A; Certification issued by Mr. Teodoro Bonifacio, then Administrator of the Land Registration Authority, stating that Plan SWO-25706 (II-2719-A) was presented as evidence in the "Carpena case;" Entries in the Ordinary Decree Book of the LRA; LRA Report of Dec 2, 1980 narrating the history of the subject property; Survey Plan over Lot 3484.

Pet to the SC wc upheld the validity of Decree No 4244 issued in favor of resp Municipality & declared null & void Decree No N-216115 & OCT No 0-2099 issued in the name of Pet

I: WON the property subj of the litigation is included in Decree No4244. Case remanded to the trial Ct In the TC order, it was stated that the case shld be set for presentation of evidence for Herce/Pet It is clear that Pet must still present evidence to prove his claim of the prop When resp filed a petition/motion to re-open/review decree it alleged: As early as March 3, 1911 it had been issued Decree No4244 In 1975 Pet entered his opposition to the case claiming to be possessor of the land Ct ruled in favor of Pet & ordered a decree of registration in his favor, but it was later discovered that the decree cldnt be ordered since in the Ordinary Decree Book of the LRC Record 6763, a previous decree (Decree No4244) was alrdy issued in favor of resp wc covered the same parcel of land sought to be registered by resp

SCs decision/reasons: (this is the decision being Decree No4244 issued in favor of resp in 1911 has become indefeasible, so Pet is barred from claiming the subj land Tho the resps claim of ownership is based on the entry in the Ordinary Decree Book, showing Decree No4244 was issued on March 3,1911 & that Lot I Plan II-2719 was 1 of the 6 parcels of land previously applied for registration by the municipality, being a public document, the Ordinary Decree book is prima facie proof of the entries appearing therein In absence of evidence to the contrary, the Ordinary Decree Book, is presumed to have been regularly issued by the accountable public officers who enjoy the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of their functions o Thus, proceedings wc led to the issuance of Decree No4244 cant be overturned wo any countervailing proof to the contrary decree of registration issued by the LRA on Jan 28, 1997 in favor of Pet & the issuance of OCT No. O-

assailed in this resolution)

the ground relied upon by resp in seeking the reopening of the decree of registration is the Report dated Dec 2, 1980 of the LRA in Cadastral Case No. N-B1, LRC Cadastral No. N-651 that after plotting the technical descriptions of Lot 3484, in the Municipal Index Map, it was found that said lot is more or less identical to the parcel of land described in Plan II-2719-A for which no final decree of registration has as yet been issued.

To hold otherwise would result in a situation wherein the LRA would be compelled to issue a decree of registration over a piece of land wc has already been decreed and titled in the name of another, if it were found out that indeed, the property has already been earlier titled in the name of the municipality. Since there are 2 conflicting titles, the Ct properly granted reopening of the decree of title to settle the issue of ownership The decision of the CA dsnt expressly state that the prop covered by the OCT & Decree issued to Pet is included & w/in the scope of Decree No4244 As we have ruled in the assailed Decision, there is no doubt that Decree No. 4244 issued in favor of the municipality has become indefeasible.

 However, based on the record, theres insufficient information to conclude that Decree No. 4244 includes the property covered by the OCT & decree of Pet thus, the case shld be remanded for further proceedings a Ct must render judgment confirming the title of the applicant only if it finds that the latter has sufficient title proper for registration. An application for land registration may include 2 or more parcels of land, but the Ct may at any time order an application to be amended by striking out 1 or more of the parcels or order a severance of the application FERNANDEZ, ET AL. v. CA FACTS:

Petitioners filed a civil case for support against Carlito in QC RTC, dismissed on Dec. 9, 1986 because the judge found that there is nothing in the material allegations in the complaint that seeks to compel Carlito to recognize or acknowledge petitioners as his illegitimate children, and that there was no sufficient and competent evidence to prove the petitioners' filiation. The judge held that: Petitioners certificates of birth imputing filiation to defendant as the putative father are incompetent evidence. The baptismal certificates, upon the other hand, is not an indubitable writing that is impressed with authority to establish filiation with those alleged as the parents of the child baptized. The oral testimony of Violeta Esguerra, uncorroborated as it were, cannot sustain a conclusion that defendant indeed is the father of plaintiffs." On Feb. 19, 1987, they filed the case at bench, another action for recognition and support against the Carlito in another branch of the QC RTC. Violeta P. Esguerra, single, is the mother and guardian ad litem of the two petitioners, CLARO ANTONIO FERNANDEZ and JOHN PAUL FERNANDEZ. Violeta and the Carlito, CARLITO S. FERNANDEZ, met sometime in 1983, at the Meralco Compound tennis courts. A Meralco employee and a tennis enthusiast, Carlito used to spend his weekends regularly at said courts, where Violeta's father served as tennis instructor. Violeta pointed to Carlito as the father of her two sons. She claimed that they started their illicit sexual relationship six (6) months after their first meeting. The tryst resulted in the birth of petitioner Claro Antonio on Mar. 1, 1984, and of petitioner John Paul on Feb. 11, 1985. Violeta further claimed that she did not know that Carlito was married until the birth of her two children. She averred they were married in civil rites in Oct. 1983. In Mar. 1985, however, she discovered that the marriage license that they used was spurious. Pets. presented the following documentary evidence: their certificates of live birth, identifying Carlito as their father; the baptismal certificate of petitioner Claro which also states that his father is Carlito; photographs of Carlito taken during the baptism of petitioner Clara; and pictures of respondent Carlito and Claro taken at the home of Violeta Esguerra. Pets. Also presented many witnesses, among them a neighbor, the doctor who delivered the babies, Violetas brothers mother-in-law, and Fr. Liberato Fernandez, who held the baptism of Claro. The first three witnesses told the trial court that Violeta Esguerra had, at different times introduced Carlito to them as her "husband". Fr. Fernandez, on the other hand, testified that Carlito was the one who presented himself as the father of Claro during the latter's baptism. Carlito denied Violeta's allegations that he sired the two petitioners. He averred he only served as one of the sponsors in the baptism of Claro.

This claim was corroborated by the testimony of Rodante Pagtakhan, an officemate of Carlito who also stood as a sponsor of Claro during his baptism. Carlito also presented as witness, Fidel Arcagua, a waiter of the Lighthouse Restaurant. He disputed Violeta's allegation that she and Carlito frequented the said restaurant during their affair. Arcagua stated he never saw Violeta and Carlito together at the said restaurant. Carlito also declared he only learned he was named in the birth certificates of both petitioners as their father after he was sued for support in the first civil case. TC ruled in favor of petitioners, ordering Carlito to recognize the kids as his, and that he give support every month. Carlito appealed. The decision was set aside, CA dismissed the complaint. In its decision dated Oct. 20, 1992, it found that the proof relied upon by the TC is inadequate to prove Carlitos paternity and filiation of the petitioners. It further held that the doctrine of res judicata applied because of the dismissal of the petitioners' complaint in the first civil case. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied on Dec. 22,1992. ISSUES: 1. Are the pieces of documentary evidence offered by pets. insufficient to prove their filiation? YES. 2. Are the testimonies enough to prove filiation? NO. RATIO: As to Issue 1: Pets. cannot rely on the photographs showing the presence of Carlito in the baptism of Claro. These photos are far from proofs that Carlito is the father. As Carlito explained, he was in the baptism as one of the sponsors of petitioner Claro. His testimony was corroborated by Rodante Pagtakhan. The pics taken in Violetas house, showing Carlito showering affection to Claro does not prove paternity either. The baptismal certificate of Claro naming Carlito as his father has scant evidentiary value. There is no showing that Carlito participated in its preparation. Berciles vs. Systems: "As to the baptismal certificate, the rule is that although the baptismal record of a natural child describes her as a child of the decedent, yet, if in the preparation of the record the decedent had no intervention, the baptismal record cannot be held to be a voluntary recognition of parentage. The reason for this rule that canonical records do not constitute the authentic document prescribed by Arts. 115 and 117 to prove the legitimate filiation of a child is that such canonical record is simply proof of the only act to which the priest may certify by reason of his personal knowledge, an act done by himself or in his presence, like the administration of the sacrament upon a day stated; it is no proof of the declarations in the record with respect to the parentage of the child baptized, or of prior and distinct facts which require separate and concrete evidence." Macandang vs. Court of Appeals: while baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the child's paternity.

The certificates of live birth of the petitioners identifying Carlito as their father are not also competent evidence on the issue of their paternity. Again, the records do not show that Carlito had a hand in the preparation of said certificates.

Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar: Sec. 5 of Act No. 3793 & Art. 280 of the CC explicitly prohibited, not only the naming of the father of the child born outside wedlock, when the birth certificate, or the recognition, is not filed or made by him, but also, the statement of any information or circumstances by which he could be identified. Accordingly, the Local Civil registrar had no authority to make or record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information f a third person and the certificate of birth of an illegitimate child, when signed only by the mother of the latter, is incompetent evidence of fathership of said child." SC reiterated this rule in Berciles, op. cit., when we held that "a birth certificate not signed by the alleged father therein indicated is not competent evidence of paternity." As to Issue 2: Father Liberato Fernandez who solemnized the baptismal ceremony Claro, was questioned as to how he was able to identify Carlito. He was not proven to be a close friend of Violeta and Carlito, which should render unquestionable his identification of Carlito during the baptism. However, on cross examination, Father Fernandez admitted that he has to be shown a picture of the Carlito, and that Violeta showed him a picture of Carlito, saying he is the father. SC cannot concede that Father Fernandez who officiates numerous baptismal ceremonies day in and day out can remember the parents of the children he has baptized. Violetas testimony is highly suspect, as it is self-serving and by itself, is insufficient to prove the paternity of the petitioners. The Court did not pass upon the correctness of the ruling of the CA applying the doctrine of res judicata as additional reason in dismissing petitioners' action for recognition and support. It is unnecessary considering our findings that petitioners' evidence failed to substantiate their cause of action. DISPOSITIVE PORTION: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED and the Decision of the respondent court CA-G.R. CV No. 29182 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. MANALO v. ROBLES FACTS: Robles Transportation Co., Inc. operates taxicabs. An accident occurred between one of Robles taxicabs and a passenger truck. In the course of the accident, the Manalos son, Armando was ran over by the taxicab and died. The driver, Edgardo Hernandez was eventually found guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. He served out his sentence but failed to pay the indemnity. Two writs of execution were issued against him to satisfy the amount of the indemnity. However, both writs were returned unsatisfied by the sheriff who certified that no property, real or personal, in Hernandez's name could be found. Hence, the spouses Manalo sued Robles to enforce its subsidiary liability under A102-103, RPC. Pieces of Evidence Presented by Spouses Manalo: 1. copy of the decision in the criminal case 2. the writs of execution 3. the returns of the sheriff It must be noted that Robles objected to the admissibility of these pieces of evidence, to no avail. CFI: The Manalo spouses are entitled to recover damages. SC: affirmed the CFI Decision

ISSUES:

1.

Are these admissibile?

a. b. 2. 3.

judgment of conviction? YES. ENTRIES IN OFFICIAL RECORDS: sheriffs return? YES.

Were A102-103, RPC repealed by A2177, CC? NO. Has the action prescribed? NO.

RATIO:

First Issue Evidence: Judgment of Conviction The judgment of conviction, in the absence of any collusion between the defendant and offended party, is binding upon the party subsidiarily liable. Evidence: Writ of Execution and Sheriffs Return Robles Argument: In admitting these pieces of evidence to prove Hernandezs insolvency, without requiring the sheriff's appearance in court, it was deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine. SC: Relying on Rule 130.44, the sheriff making the return need not testify in court as to the facts stated in his entry. If this exception is not in place, hosts of officials would be found devoting the greater part of their time to attending as witnesses in court or delivering their depositions before an officer. Further, the law reposes a particular confidence in public officers that it presumes they will discharge their several trusts with accuracy and fidelity. Thus, whatever acts they do in discharge of their public duty may be given in evidence and shall be taken to be true under such a degree of caution as the nature and circumstances of each case may appear to require. ENTRIES IN THE COURSE OF BUSINESS: With reference to the method of proving private documents, an exception is made with reference to the method of proving public documents executed before and certified to, under the hand and seal of certain public officials. (this case is also cited for Entries in the Course of Business, this is the lone statement that I could attribute to that topic) Second Issue A2177, CC expressly recognizes civil liabilities arising from negligence under the RPC, only that it provides that plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act of omission of the defendant. Third Issue Robles Argument: This is an action either upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff or upon a quasi-delict. A1146, CC provides that such an action must be instituted within four years. The accident occurred on Aug. 9, 1947 and the present action was brought on February 17, 1953. Hence, more than four years have elapsed. Thus, the present action has prescribed. SC: The present action is based upon a judgment in a criminal case. Thus, it may be instituted within ten years (A1144, CC). SOLINAP v. LOCSIN FACTS: TC appointed Juan E. Locsin, Jr., respondent, as the sole administrator of the Intestate Estate of the late Juan "Jhonny" Locsin, Sr.

11 months after "Jhonny" Locsin, Sr. died intestate on December 11, 1990, respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. filed with the RTC a "Petition for Letters of Administration" praying that he be appointed Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the deceased. He alleged: a. that he is an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin; b. that during his lifetime, the deceased owned personal properties which include undetermined savings, current and time deposits with various banks, and 1/6 portion of the undivided mass of real properties owned by him and his siblings, namely: Jose Locsin, Jr., Manuel Locsin, Maria Locsin Yulo, Lourdes Locsin and Ester Locsin; and c. that he is the only surviving legal heir of the decedent. TC issued an order setting the petition for hearing on January 13, 1992, which order was duly published, thereby giving notice to all persons who may have opposition to the said petition. Opposition to respondents petition filed by: 1. Heirs of Jose Locsin, Jr., the heirs of Maria Locsin, Manuel Locsin and Ester Jarantilla, claiming to be the lawful heirs of the deceased Averred that respondent is not a child or an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin, who during his lifetime, never affixed "Sr." in his name 2. Lucy Solinap (sole heir of the late Maria Locsin Vda. De Araneta, sister of the deceased), Manuel Locsin and the successors of the late Lourdes C. Locsin Alleging that respondent's claim as a natural child is barred by prescription or the statute of limitations 3. Intestate Estate of the late Jose Locsin, Jr. (brother of the deceased) 4. Ester Locsin Jarantilla (another sister of Juan C. Locsin) Stating that there is no filial relationship between respondent and the deceased Evidence to support respondents claim that he is an acknowledged natural child of the deceased and entitled to be appointed administrator of the intestate estate: 1. Exhibit D Machine copy of his Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 found in the bound volume of birth records in the Office of the Local Clerk Registrar of Iloilo City Contains the information that respondent's father is Juan C. Locsin, Sr. and that he was the informant of the facts stated therein, as evidenced by his signatures 2. Presented Rosita J. Vencer, the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City To prove the existence and authenticity of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 from which Exhibit "D" was machine copied She produced and identified in court the bound volume of 1957 records of birth where the alleged original of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 is included. 3. Exhibit C Photograph showing him and his mother, Amparo Escamilla, in front of a coffin bearing Juan C. Locsin's dead body Respondent claims that photo shows that he and his mother have been recognized as family members of the deceased. Oppositors argument: Exhibit D is spurious. Evidence presented: 1. Exhibit 8 Certified true copy of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 found in the Civil Registrar General, Metro Manila

Indicating that the birth of respondent was reported by his mother, Amparo Escamilla, and that the same does not contain the signature of the late Juan C. Locsin.

Observed as anomalous the fact that while respondent was born on October 22, 1956 and his birth was recorded on January 30, 1957, however, Exhibit D was recorded on a December 1, 1958 revised form. Exhibit "8" appears on a July, 1956 form, already used before respondent's birth. This scenario clearly suggests that Exhibit "D" was falsified. 2. Presented Col. Pedro L. Elvas, a handwriting expert Testified that the signatures of Juan C. Locsin and Emilio G. Tomesa (then Civil Registrar of Iloilo City) appearing in Exhibit D are forgeries. Concluded that the said Certificate is a spurious document surreptitiously inserted into the bound volume of birth records of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. TC: found that Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") and the photograph (Exhibit "C") are sufficient proofs of respondent's illegitimate filiation with the deceased appointed him administrator CA: affirmed TC Findings of TC affirmed by CA Re: genuineness and probative value of Exhibit "D" (SC doesnt agree): 1. It was duly established in Court that the Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 in the name of Juan E. Locsin, Jr., the original having been testified to by Rosita Vencer, exists in the files of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo. 2. Petitioner since birth enjoyed the open and continuous status of an acknowledged natural child of Juan C. Locsin, Sr., he together with his mother was summoned to attend to the burial as evidenced by a picture of relatives facing the coffin of the deceased with petitioner and his mother in the picture. 3. It was duly proven at the trial that the standard signatures presented by oppositors were not in public document and may also be called questioned document whereas in the certificate of live birth No. 477, the signature of Juan C. Locsin, Sr. was the original or primary evidence. 4. The anomalous and suspicious characteristic of the bound volume where the certificate of live birth as alleged by oppositors was found was testified to and explained by Rosita Vencer of the office of the Local Civil Registrar that they run out of forms in 1957 and requisitioned forms. 5. However, the forms sent to them was the 1958 revised form and that she said their office usually paste the pages of the bound volume if destroyed. 6. All the doubts regarding the authenticity and genuineness of the signatures of Juan C. Locsin, Sr. and Emilio Tomesa, and the suspicious circumstances of the bound volume were erased due to the explanation of Rosita Vencer."

ISSUE:

Which of the 2 documents Exhibit "D" and Exhibit "8" is genuine? Exhibit 8

RATIO: Section 6, Rule 78 ROC lays down the persons preferred who are entitled to the issuance of letters of administration: o "Section 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. - If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are

incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted: (e) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve; x x x Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person: o "Sec. 2 Contents of petition for letters of administration. - A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (e) The jurisdictional facts; x x x" An "interested party", in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. o In estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the decedent is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees. o Gabriel v. Court of Appeals: in the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed administrator. Here, undisputed is the fact that the deceased, Juan C. Locsin, was not survived by a spouse. o In his petition for issuance of letters of administration, respondent alleged that he is an acknowledged natural son of the deceased, implying that he is an interested person in the estate and is considered as next of kin. But has respondent established that he is an acknowledged natural son of the deceased? No o The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. o In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the ROC and special laws. o The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required. o In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. o Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the child's acknowledgment. Pursuant to Section 12 of Act 3753, the records of births from all cities and municipalities in the Philippines are officially and regularly forwarded to the Civil Registrar General in Metro Manila by the Local Civil Registrars. o Since the records of births cover several decades and come from all parts of the country, to merely access

them in the Civil Registry General requires expertise. To locate one single birth record from the mass, a regular employee, if not more, has to be engaged. It is highly unlikely that any of these employees in Metro Manila would have reason to falsify a particular 1957 birth record originating from the Local Civil Registry of Iloilo City. With respect to Local Civil Registries, access thereto by interested parties is obviously easier. Thus, in proving the authenticity of Exhibit "D," more convincing evidence than those considered by the TC should have been presented by respondent.

TC: doubts respecting the genuine nature of Exhibit "D" are dispelled by the testimony of Rosita Vencer, Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City SC: NO! o The event about which she testified on March 7, 1994 was the record of respondent's birth which took place on October 22, 1956, on 37 or 38 years ago. The Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City at that time was Emilio G. Tomesa. Necessarily, Vencer's knowledge of respondent's birth record allegedly made and entered in the Local Civil Registry in January, 1957 was based merely on her general impressions of the existing records in that Office. o When entries in the Certificate of Live Birth recorded in the Local Civil Registry vary from those appearing in the copy transmitted to the Civil Registry General, pursuant to the Civil Registry Law, the variance has to be clarified in more persuasive and rational manner. We find Vencer's explanation not convincing. Indications of irregularity of Exhibit "D": 1. Exhibit D was recorded in a December 1, 1958 revised form. Asked how a 1958 form could be used in 1957 when respondent's birth was recorded, Vencer answered that "during that time, maybe the forms in 1956 were already exhausted so the former Civil Registrar had requested for a new form and they sent us the 1958 Revised Form."

The answer is a "maybe", a mere supposition of an event. It does not satisfactorily explain how a Revised Form dated December 1, 1958 could have been used on January 30, 1957 or almost 2 years earlier.

Exhibit "8" of the petitioners found in the Civil Registrar General in Metro Manila is on Municipal Form No 102, revised in July, 1956. We find no irregularity here.

Indeed, it is logical to assume that the 1956 forms would continue to be used several years thereafter. But for a 1958 form to be used in 1957 is unlikely. 2. The back cover of the 1957 bound volume in the Local Civil Registry of Iloilo is torn. Exhibit "D" is merely pasted with the bound volume, not sewn like the other entries. COURT: I will butt in. Are these instances where your employees would only paste a document like this Certificate of Live Birth? WITNESS: Yes, Your Honor, we are pasting some of the leaves just to replace the record. Sometimes we just have it pasted in the record when the leaves were taken. ATTY. TIROL: You mean to say you allow the leaves of the bound volume to be taken out? A: No sir. It is because sometimes the leaves are detached so we have to paste them."

There is no explanation why out of so many certificates, this vital document, Exhibit "D", was merely pasted with the volume. 3. The documents bound into one volume are original copies. Exhibit "D" is a carbon copy of the alleged original and sticks out like a sore thumb because the entries therein are typewritten, while the records of all other certificates are handwritten. 4. Unlike the contents of those other certificates, Exhibit "D" does not indicate important particulars, such as the alleged father's religion, race, occupation, address and business. The space which calls for an entry of the legitimacy of the child is blank. On the back page there is a purported signature of the alleged father, but the blanks calling for the date and other details of his Residence Certificate were not filled up. 5. When asked to explain the torn back cover of the bound volume, she had no answer except to state, "I am not aware of this because I am not a bookbinder." Vencer's testimony suffers from infirmities. Far from explaining the anomalous circumstances surrounding Exhibit "D", she actually highlighted the suspicious circumstances surrounding its existence. o The records adequately support a finding that Exhibit "8" for the petitioners, not respondent's Exhibit "D", should have been given more faith and credence. The Civil Registry Law requires the Local Civil Registrar to send copies of registrable certificates and documents presented to them for entry to the Civil Registrar General, thus: o "Duties of Local Civil Registrar. Local civil registrars shall (e) send to the Civil Registrar-General, during the first ten days of each month, a copy of the entries made during the preceding month, for filing; o Hence, a copy of the document sent by the Local Civil Registrar to the Civil Registrar General should be identical in form and in substance with the copy being kept by the latter. In the instant case, Exhibit "8", as transmitted to the Civil Registrar General is not identical with Exhibit "D" as appearing in the records of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. Such circumstance should have aroused the suspicion of both the TC and CA and should have impelled them to declare Exhibit "D" a spurious document. o A Certificate of Live Birth duly recorded in the Local Civil Registry, a copy of which is transmitted to the Civil Registry General pursuant to the Civil Registry Law, is prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. However, if there are material discrepancies between them, the one entered in the Civil Registry General prevails. Exhibit "8" o Shows that respondent's record of birth was made by his mother o The signature and name of Juan C. Locsin listed as respondent's father and the entry that he and Amparo Escamilla were married in Oton, Iloilo on November 28, 1954 do not appear. o Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar "Section 5 of Act No. 3753 and Article 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines . . . explicitly prohibit, not only the naming of the father of the child born out of wedlock, when the birth certificate, or the recognition, is not filed or made by him, but also, the statement of any

information or circumstances by which he could be identified.

Accordingly, the Local Civil Registrar had no authority to make or record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of a third person and the certificate of birth of an illegitimate child, when signed only by the mother of the latter, is incompetent evidence of fathership of said child." Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals "a birth certificate not signed by the alleged father (who had no hand in its preparation) is not competent evidence of paternity."

A birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence prescribed by both the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code for purposes of recognition and filiation. However, birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence. Its evidentiary worth cannot be sustained where there exists strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity. o In this case, respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 entered in the records of the Local Civil Registry (from which Exhibit "D" was machine copied) has all the badges of nullity. Without doubt, the authentic copy on file in that office was removed and substituted with a falsified Certificate of Live Birth. Section 23, Rule 132 ROC: "(d)ocuments consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated." o In this case, the glaring discrepancies between the two Certificates of Live Birth (Exhibits "D" and "8") have overturned the genuineness of Exhibit "D" entered in the Local Civil Registry. What is authentic is Exhibit "8" recorded in the Civil Registry General. Photograph with his mother near the coffin of the late Juan C. Locsin cannot and will not constitute proof of filiation o Anybody can have a picture taken while standing before a coffin with others and thereafter utilize it in claiming the estate of the deceased. Respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. failed to prove his filiation with the late Juan C. Locsin, Sr.. His Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") is spurious. o Respondent is not an interested person within the meaning of Section 2, Rule 79 ROC entitled to the issuance of letters of administration.

HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 57708 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent's petition for issuance of letters of administration is ORDERED DISMISSED. AFRICA v. CALTEX ** evidence in question: the reports on the fire made by Manila Police and Fire Departments and by a certain Captain Tinio of the Armed Forces of the Philippines FACTS: 1. A fire broke out at the Caltex service station at the corner of Antipolo Street and Rizal Avenue Manila 2. It started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was inserted. 3. The fire spread to and burned several neighboring houses, including the personal properties and effects inside them

4.

Owners, including petitioners herein, sued Caltex and Mateo Boquiren, the first alleged owner of the station and the second as its agent in charge of operation. Negligence on the part of both of them was attributed as the cause of the fire. (action for damages) 5. EVIDENCE PRESENTED: certain reports on the fire prepared by the Manila Police and Fire Departments and by a certain Captain Tinio of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. 6. Police Department report: Investigation disclosed that at about 4:00 P.M. March 18, 1948, while Leandro Flores was transferring gasoline from a tank truck, plate No. T5292 into the underground tank of the Caltex Gasoline Station located at the corner of Rizal Avenue and Antipolo Street, this City, an unknown Filipino lighted a cigarette and threw the burning match stick near the main valve of the said underground tank. Due to the gasoline fumes, fire suddenly blazed. Quick action of Leandro Flores in pulling off the gasoline hose connecting the truck with the underground tank prevented a terrific explosion. However, the flames scattered due to the hose from which the gasoline was spouting. It burned the truck and the following accessories and residences. 7. The Fire Department report: In connection with their allegation that the premises was (sic) subleased for the installation of a coca-cola and cigarette stand, the complainants furnished this Office a copy of a photograph taken during the fire and which is submitted herewith. it appears in this picture that there are in the premises a coca-cola cooler and a rack which according to information gathered in the neighborhood contained cigarettes and matches, installed between the gasoline pumps and the underground tanks 8. Report of Captain Tinio: reproduced information given by a certain Benito Morales regarding the history of the gasoline station and what the chief of the fire department had told him on the same subject 9. TC and CA in favor of Caltex. Petitioners failed to prove negligence and that respondents had exercised due care in the premises and with respect to the supervision of their employees. 10. CA The foregoing reports were ruled out as "double hearsay" by the Court of Appeals and hence inadmissible. 11. Petitioners contentions: a. said reports were admitted by the trial court without objection on the part of respondents

2.

3.

Three requisites for admissibility of the rule: (Source: Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1957] p. 398) a. that the entry was made by a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so; b. that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and c. that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official information AS APPLIED IN THE CASE AT BAR Of the three requisites just stated, only the last need be considered here. ** Were the material facts recited within the personal knowledge of the officers who conducted the investigation? Answer: OBVIOUSLY NOT!

** Was knowledge of such facts, however, acquired by them through official information? Answer: NO! Why? Coz As to some facts the sources thereof are not even identified. Others are attributed to Leopoldo Medina, referred to as an employee at the gas station were the fire occurred; to Leandro Flores, driver of the tank truck from which gasoline was being transferred at the time to the underground tank of the station; and to respondent Mateo Boquiren, who could not, according to Exhibit V-Africa, give any reason as to the origin of the fire. To qualify their statements as "official information" acquired by the officers who prepared the reports, the persons who made the statements not only must have personal knowledge of the facts stated but must have the duty to give such statements for record The reports in question do not constitute an exception to the hearsay rule; the facts stated therein were not acquired by the reporting officers through official information, not having been given by the informants pursuant to any duty to do so. EXTRA: Courts disposition as to the petitioners first two contention:

b.

that with respect to the police report (Exhibit VAfrica) which appears signed by a Detective Zapanta allegedly "for Salvador Capacillo," the latter was presented as witness but respondents waived their right to cross-examine him although they had the opportunity to do so. THE CONTENTION RELEVANT TO THE TOPIC: that in any event the said reports are admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule under section 35 of Rule 123, now Rule 130.

c.

ISSUE: WON the reports here given are admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule under Rule 130, Sec. 35. (entries in official records as prima facie evidence of facts) NO. RATIO: 1. RULE: Section 35, Rule 123: entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

The first contention: is not borne out by the record. The transcript of the hearing of September 17, 1953 (pp. 167-170) shows that the reports in question, when offered as evidence, were objected to by counsel for each of respondents on the ground that they were hearsay and that they were "irrelevant, immaterial and impertinent." Indeed, in the court's resolution only Exhibits J, K, K-5 and X-6 were admitted without objection; the admission of the others, including the disputed ones, carried no such explanation. On the second point: although Detective Capacillo did take the witness stand, he was not examined and he did not testify as to the facts mentioned in his alleged report (signed by Detective Zapanta). All he said was that he was one of those who investigated "the location of the fire and, if possible, gather witnesses as to the occurrence, and that he brought the report with him. There was nothing, therefore, on which he need be crossexamined; and the contents of the report, as to which he did not testify, did not thereby become competent evidence. And even if he had testified, his testimony

would still have been objectionable as far as information gathered by him from third persons was concerned. (digesters note: the rest of the case delved on the issue of res ipsa loquitur which I didnt include na. it will only lengthen the digest.) SALMON, DEXTER & CO. v. WIJANGCO FACTS: On the 8th day of October, 1920, a contract was entered into between the parties to this action for the purchase and sale of a tractor and threshing machine upon the conditions specified in said contract. Plaintiff files this action for collection of sum of money for defendants failure to pay. The defendant, as defense argued, that the tractor and threshing machine did not meet the conditions specified and guaranteed in the aforesaid contract of sale, to wit, (a) the good operation of the Machineries; (b) the new quality of the materials employed in the construction thereof; and (c) the capacity to thresh 300 cavans of palay per day, and by virtue of which, the defendant prays that the contract in question be declared rescinded. The lower court rendered judgment sentencing the defendant to pay the plaintiff. The trial court held that the preponderance of the evidence shows that if the defendant could not thresh a larger quantity of palay in the period aforementioned (1920 to 1921 agricultural year), it was due not to the bad quality of the machineries in question, but to the poor quality of the palay harvested and threshed in Magalang and Concepcion in said period. The appellant presented testimonies of his six witnesses in support of the proposition that the palay threshed by the machineries in question is ordinary palay, and that notwithstanding this fact the threshing machine could not give out 300 cavans of palay per day. However, the trial court found them to be inconsistent. The appellant also questioned the admission by the lower court of Exhibit L of the plaintiff, which is a certificate of the Director of the Bureau of Agriculture as to the average crop of palay produced in the municipality of Magalang in the 19201921 agricultural year, and is as follows: "I, Adriano Hernandez, Director of the Bureau of Agriculture, hereby certify that the records of the said Bureau of Agriculture show that for the crop seasons 1920-1921 there was planted to palay in the municipality of Magalang Province of Pampanga, 5,050 hectares and that the average yield per hectare for such crop seasons was 22 cavanes. (Sgd.) ADN. HERNANDEZ, Director." ISSUE: Whether the certificate issued by the Director is admissible in evidence? YES. RATIO: The statistics prepared by the Bureau of Agriculture is chiefly based on the quarterly reports of the municipal presidents made pursuant to section 2202 of the Administrative Code, which provides: "The president of each municipality shall, upon forms to be supplied by the Director of Agriculture, and in such detail as shall be required by him, make quarterly reports of the condition of agriculture and live stock in his municipality, and of such other matters as related to the development of those interests.

"The reports so made shall be submitted to the municipal council, and, if approved, a copy thereof shall be forwarded to the office of the provincial governor, a second copy to the representative from the district, a third copy to the Director of Agriculture, and a fourth copy shall be filed in the office of the municipal secretary." Under such circumstances, we hold that the certificate issued by the Director of Agriculture is admissible in evidence as an official document issued by a public officer authorized by law. Wigmore, in his treatise on evidence, vol. 3, section 1636, speaking of exceptions to the rule as to the inadmissibility of hearsay evidence, among other things, says: "6. Certificates. - Every officer has an implied duty or authority to prepare and deliver out to an applicant a certificate stating anything which has been done or observed by him or exists in his office by virtue of some authority or duty, and the certificate is admissible." DBP POOL OF ACCREDITED INSURANCE COMPANIES v. RADIO MINDANAO NETWORK, INC. FACTS: RMNIs properties were covered by fire insurance policies. On July 27, 1988, its radio station, located in SSS Bldg., Bacolod City, was razed by fire. RMNI sought to collect the insurance proceeds from DBP. DBP denied liability on the ground that the cause of the loss was an excepted risk excluded under the insurance policy. The exclusion is brought by DBPs allegation that the fire was caused by members of the CPP-NPA. Hence, RMNI filed a complaint to claim the insurance proceeds due it. TC & CA: The insurance companies are liable for the loss. The evidence failed to support DBPs allegation that the loss was caused by an excepted risk, i.e. members of the CPP-NPA caused the fire. SC: Affirmed the TC and CA. The insurance company is liable for the loss. RATIO: Ill discuss the different topics for this case based on each piece of evidence presented by DBP. - rom On admissions and confessions: Evidence: a letter of one Celso Magilang who claims to be a member of the NPA and to be responsible for the fire This is an admission of a person who is not a party to the present action. It is inadmissible under Rule 130.26. WHY? An admission is competent only when the declarant or someone identified in legal interest with him is a party to the action. On Burden of Proof v. Burden of Evidence: Burden of Proof: the duty of ANY party to present evidence to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law the party who asserts the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof to obtain a favorable judgment e.g. when the defendant asserts an affirmative defense, as in this case, avoidance of the claim Evidence: Stipulation in the insurance policy, to wit: In any action, suit or other preceding where the Companies allege that by reason of the provisions condition any loss or

damage is not covered by this insurance, the burden of proving that such loss or damage is covered shall be upon the Insured. The burden of proof contemplated by this provision actually refers to the burden of evidence (burden of going forward). It refers to the insureds duty to show that the loss or damage is covered by the policy. Still, the burden of proof rests on DBP to prove that the damage or loss was caused by an excepted risk in order to escape liability. On Res Gestae as Exception to the Hearsay Rule: Hearsay Rule: based upon serious concerns about the trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence 1. such evidence are not given under oath or solemn affirmation 2. such evidence have not been subjected to crossexamination by opposing counsel to test the perception, memory, veracity and articulateness of the out-of-court declarant or actor upon whose reliability on which the worth of the out-of-court statement depends Res Gestae: those exclamations or statements made by either the participants, victims or spectators to a crime immediately before, during or after the commission of the crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement applies only when the declarant himself did not testify and the testimony of the witness who heard the declarant complies with these requirements: 1. that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence 2. the statements were made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood 3. the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending circumstances Evidence: Testimony of the police (Lt. Col. Torres, SFO II Rochar) that the bystanders they interviewed claimed that the perpetrators were members of the CPP-NPA. These declarations are not part of res gestae. WHY? It cannot be said that these utterances were made spontaneously by the bystanders and before they had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood. These statements were taken by the police while they were making investigations during and after the fire. It is reasonable to assume that when these statements were noted, the bystanders already had enough time and opportunity to mill around, talk to one another and exchange information, not to mention theories and speculations. Thus, it cannot be ascertained whether these utterances were the products of truth. That they were mere idle talk is not remote. On Admissibility of Evidence v. Weight and Sufficiency: Admissibility: depends on its relevance and competence Weight: pertains to evidence already admitted and the tendency to convince and persuade Evidence: declaration of bystanders Assuming this is admissible (it is inadmissible), these declarations should be calibrated vis--vis the other evidence on record. Res Gestae and Entries in Official Records: Evidence: police blotter, certifications from the Bacolod Police Station, Fire Investigation Report These may be considered exceptions to the hearsay rule, being entries in official records.

BUT: None of these documents categorically stated that the perpetrators were members of the CPP-NPA. It only stated in these documents that it was believed or suspected that members of the CPP-NPA were the perpetrators. Suspicion alone is not sufficient, preponderance of evidence being the quantum of proof.