Jun e 2008

I go r M un t ean u
Ser gi u B ucan ean u, A sso ci at i o n f o r Par t i ci p ato r y D em o cr acy
A D E PT
I n tegr ati o n Per sp ecti ves an d Syn er gi c E f f ects of E ur op ean
T r an sf o r m at i o n i n t h e Co un t r i es T ar get ed by EU
E n l ar gem en t an d N ei gh bo ur h o o d Po l i ci es
The Political Transformation Process in Moldova
Study prepared by
Igor MUNTEANU
Paper prepared in the framework of the project:
Integration Perspectives and Synergic Effects of European Transformation in
the Countries Targeted by EU Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policies
Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION
Chapter 1 - The Political Transformation Process
1.1. Soviet Dissolution and Independence
1.2. Efforts to Set Up a Functional Rule of Law State in Moldova
1.3. Local and Regional / Sub-National Institutions Functioning in Moldova
1.4. Political and Historical Circumstances of the Territorial Conflict in Moldova
Chapter 2 - Institutional Patterns and Political Traditions Assisting State-Building
2.1 Emergence of Pluralist Institutions in Post-Soviet Republic of Moldova
2.2 Democratisation of the Moldovan Society, its Implications for Political Actors Since 1990
2.3 Democratic Traditions as an Essential Background for a Competitive Political Environment
2.4 Legitimisation Mechanisms for the Main Political and Administrative Structures in Moldova
Chapter 3 - Transparency, Decision-Making Process, the Role of the Society Actors, Minority Rights, the
Rights of the Political Opposition
3.1 Political Institutions and Transparency
3.2 Civil Society Emergence in Moldova and its Impact on the Transformation Paradigm
3.3 Public Trust and the Functioning of the Political System in Moldova: the Origins of State Capture
3.4 Building up an Independent Judiciary in Moldova
3.5 The Autonomy of Local Governments in Moldova
3.6 Other Social Actors Influencing the Policy-Making Process in Moldova: Trade Unions, Churches
3.7 Ensuring the Freedom of the Mass Media in Moldova
3.8 The Ethnic Composition of the Moldovan State: Incentives or Disincentives for Welfare
Chapter 4 - Opposition Parties, Political Institutions and the Functioning of the Parliamentary Control
4.1 The Role of the Opposition and its Contribution to Democratisation
4.2 Parliamentary Oversight
4.3 Relations Between the Governing and Opposition Parties
4.4 Moldovas Foreign Policy Dimension: the CIS, Relations with Russia, Relations with Ukraine, Relations with
Romania, EU RM Relations, Relations with the NATO
4.5 State-Building and Political Construction as a Pattern of Postponed Modernisation
4.6 Changes in Political Party-Preferences, the Struggle for Power, Political Populism
Bibliography
Introduction
Moldova is the only country in the European part of the former Soviet Union that experienced a large-scale armed
conflict on its territory, in 1992, ended with more than a thousand of deaths. Apart from other conflicts with which
it is usually compared, it has not been ethnicity that made conflicts and violence break out in Transnistria, but a
combination of economic fears, radical insurgency heavily backed by the Russian military and deep-seeded Soviet
mentalities, induced by a regime, which is too much alive to be forgotten. The oblivious nature of the post-cold
order, opened the way towards independence of Moldova from the USSR, with no guarantees that it may survive,
nor with strong state-building actors, enabled to fight for it.
Often described as a case of politicised regionalism, the separatist regime soon gained the reputation of a black
hole, where secret services gathered to do business, not forgetting to placate the Moldova authorities towards a
CIS statute. Together with other pieces of the separatist mosaics (Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Crimea, or Karabakh),
the separatist regime played perhaps the most decisive role in keeping Moldova out of the major integration
streams with Europe, while depriving the society from critical resources (industry, infrastructure, energy), which
thus made Moldova alter its statute to a miserable one, competing with Albania for the poorest country of
Europe. After more than ten years of totally futile mediation, in which Russia practically excluded the West from
any tangible role in the process of conflict regulation, the separatist regime is still alive, and very keen to infuse
with its endemic influences other regions.
While Moldova is a formal democracy, with elections held regularly and power changing hands, the TMR had
organised only mock popular consultations, so, the same leaders dominated the past decade. Regular Moldovan
elections are not held in the separatist region, and those attempting to vote in other sections were arrested or
kidnapped. Admittedly, there is little chance for having renewed combat hostilities now, but these unresolved
fragments of the Soviet Empire, as they were called in a GMF study, serve today as shipping points for weapons,
drugs, and human trafficking, and as breeding grounds for transnational organised crime, and last but not least, for
terrorism. As a new state, the Republic of Moldova started to make new links with other international actors and
build a new type of society, by creating democratic institutions, (i.e. founding of a legal state which follows
democratic principles) starting from national level to local ones.
Since the existing framework for negotiations is apparently incapable of ensuring any favourable outcome in the
negotiations, even despite the current rapprochement between Moldova and Russia and the strategic partnership
between Russia and the West, then it is clearly time for a new approach, one in which the EU plays a more central
role. But with the double enlargement of NATO and the EU, and the gradual emergence of a European Security
and Defense Policy, the idea is becoming more and more relevant. Europe, however, still lacks a vision in the role
it might play in the reintegration of Moldova. Given this evidence of Russian intransigence, and against the
background of NATO's and the EU's looming enlargement, the West's indifference to the Transnistria conflict is
difficult to explain. So, the reintegration topic prevailed clearly in Moldova politics for more than 15 years from
the end of the military confrontation, and post-conflict settlement negotiations. Nevertheless, people ranked it quite
low, be it because most of the people never thought it could be resolved, or because their social pressures voiced
louder than any other political argument.
On top of that, people simply feel discouraged to learn that despite the obvious lack of reasons to fight in between
the banks of Dniester, clans succeeded to defend their forces and strength, while control over local industries
seemed to be the most assertive note in dialogue initiated by Moscow with Chisinau, in the legalisation of the
privatisation acts, and economic power. For obvious reasons, the last 16 years of full isolation of the breakaway
region from the rest of Moldova left its signs. Nevertheless, under no international scrutiny, has it been preserved
as a harsh, militarised society, with few functioning institutions, but with an overwhelming density of security
services, military units, and economies open to crime. The full-fledged partition of a recognised UN and OSCE
state-member remained a matter of real life realities, while Moscow used to pressure Chisinau to recognise the
facts on the ground, and even build up future talks with Tiraspol, on the basis of the earlier made agreements.
Russia succeeds to grant important concessions from Moldova to the separatist enclave. Nevertheless, Chisinau
remained unconvinced of the benefits of a confederated statute, while proponents for a unitary state as enshrined
in the present Constitution of the Republic of Moldova (adopted in 1994) inferred, however, a possible special
statute to some territories, such as the Gagauz Territorial Autonomy or the eastern rayons of the country.
But, political arrangements, encroached by the Moldova Constitution, find no reasonable response in Tiraspol,
which wants to successfully win by default a veto royalty or even a super-representative participation within the
law-making and political foundation of the Moldova state, leaving an open gateway, however, to a possible
secession, in case any of the institutional arrangements currently considered are unworkable. Although the
European Union sent his representative to Moldova to oversee and contribute to the settlement process, it could not
instill much hope that a solution will become possible in the nearest future.
Russian policy implications are more than obvious, while the right time for the right solutions is difficult to
predict. That is why, Moldova is more than interested to involve international players: the EU, the US, the OSCE,
in its effort to reintegrate the country. While EU security interests in Moldova are legitimate, it is hard to see how
the Transnistrian conflict poses any direct security challenges to Russia, which is 350 miles distant. Russia's
presence in Moldova is a matter of geopolitical ambition, not a vital necessity.
Insecurity is deeply resented by ordinary citizens, and this has an impact on the functioning of public authorities in
Moldova, as well as abroad. Given that, it is not surprising that in 2007 Moldova was the most unstable European
state, according to the The failed states index 2007, elaborated by the US Foreign Policy.
Out of the 60 most vulnerable states in the world, Moldova ranked 48, scored with 85.7. Only 4 of the 60 were
states located in Europe: Moldova, Belarus (51), Bosnia and Herzegovina (54) and Georgia (58). Even in 2008,
Moldova is still quoted as one of the countries with increased political risks
1
. Economic risks and reimbursement
of debts to the international creditors, as well as poor judiciary, intervention of the politics in economy rank
Moldova, in the same group with Belarus, Georgia and Armenia.
Moldova is steadily working to convince the EU that it needs more than a neighbouring status, and that it is
effectively capable to succeed with the Action Plan underway. This implies, however, a real revolution within the
institutional format of traditional politics, economy, education, and other related fields.
Therefore, the expected benefits are clearly downgraded by practical results in place, which mobilise the
opposition parties to campaign for a radical change in government, while placing the Euro-integration at the
highest possible place of objectives to be desired by the population. Thus, the Europeanisation of Moldova is seen
as a much more ambitious task, which overpasses the instrumental goal of recuperating Transnistria, as a
legitimated part of the country.
The ENP is surely a framework where the EU may gain leverage, but only if it definitely decides to play its natural
role as a civilisation cement, as a political transformer and a liberator, thus, resolving the critical vulnerabilities
and weaknesses of the states that are still outside of the enlargement waves, whose economies, societies and
political elites are still under siege from the old-regime mentalities and soldiers.
1 Scores calculated by US AON and UK Oxford Analytica, Deca press agency, 27 February 2008
CHAPTER 1 - THE POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION PROCESS
1.1. Soviet Dissolution and Moldova`s Path Towards Full-Fledged Independence
The Republic of Moldova emerged in 1991 as a result of the USSRs dissolution. It was the second-smallest
republic in the USSR, after Armenia, being mostly known by its Russian transcribed name, Moldavia, different
from the other historical Moldova, now an integral part of the Romanian state. On June 23, 1990, Moldova stated
its conditional sovereignty within the USSR, which meant that no laws or decisions of the Soviet centre could
have primacy over other laws or decisions adopted by the republics authorities.
Once Russia decided to distance itself from the Soviet Centre and proclaim its national sovereignty, the same
was followed by other republics. The Baltic States, Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova openly challenged the Soviet
Centre. In September 1990; the first President of the RSSM was elected
2
with the aim to increase political defiance
and a limited degree of autonomy from the rapidly imploding Soviet centre.
Similar steps were made practically in all national republics, which sought to acquire a kind of internal
sovereignty on their own territories, more or less ethnically bound. Nationalistic rhetoric grew on with alternative
waves in support of perestroika objectives.
But, military and Soviet hardliners still hoped to save the Soviet Union from collapse and freeze the course to full-
fledged separation of its republics. On August 19, 1991, a group of generals, KGM and party officials of the USSR
declared a state of emergency all over the republics of the Union. Then, in a desperate attempt to reverse the logic
of perestroika (political reforms launched by the acting President Mikhail Gorbaciov), decided to arrest him
while the later rested in Sochi. Instead of raising peoples support, these steps were seen as a farce and
tragicomedy.
Informal movements in the national republics backed reformist leaders in Moscow, who got the support of the
intelligentsia and mass media. Shortly, the leaders of the coup dtat found themselves in full isolation from the
rest of society and, in this rather delicate situation, they were unable to challenge the radical opposition of the
national elites and population to stop the pace of reforms.
Moreover, with almost no public support even in Russia, where the incumbent President Eltsyin lined against the
Soviet centre, they ended themselves in arrest for state betrayal in less than 10 days. This episode served,
nevertheless, as a catalyst towards full-fledged independence of the national republics from USSR, and even the
most hesitating elites decided to establish an independent state, the Republic of Moldova, within the borders of the
former Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova (SSRM).
On August 27, 1991, Moldova decided to separate itself from the Soviet Union, following similar decisions that
took place in Ukraine, Baltic States and Caucasus. It adopted a Declaration of Independence widely supported by
the population, and then decided to ban and dismantle the Communist Party, which acted that time as a
territorially-located clone of the USSR Communist Party, in the shadow of the administrative and military
structures of the Soviet Centre.
This proclamation was anticipated and then followed by some basic political and legislative reforms being the
foundations of an independent state. Among them, there are the laws on language (31 August 1989), property (22
January 1991), citizenship (5 June 1991) and privatisation (4 July 1991). Moldova signed the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS), on 21 December 1991. However, it declined to participate in the Treaty on Collective
Security.
In August 1991, a large meeting of supporters of independence of the Republic of Moldova (called Marea
Adunare Nationala) took place in Chisinau, hailing the act adopted by the Parliament, and calling the political
leadership to forge a real independent state. Once full separation from the USSR became the agenda for each of the
former republics, this was practically the only solution available to the Moldovan leaders, including those who
earlier served the Communist Party of Moldova. The other option was to join Romania, following the 1918
historical precedent, when a Regional Assembly of Bessarabia (Sfatul Tarii) favoured unification with Romania.
The latter option found fewer supporters in Moldova, and even Bucharest was too much involved with its own
disruptions following the 1989 power-shift in Romania. With the exception of the Popular Front, other political
forces were quite apathetical towards the project of reuniting with Romania. Despite the amazing similarities
2
Act from September 3 1990, nr.250-XII regarding of the creation of the President of Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova
between these historical episodes, it seems that both Chisinau and Bucharest were unable to join forces. Bucharest
lived through the consequences of the post-revolution transition, full of public unrest, domestic instability fueled
by former dictators supporters, as well as a painful accommodation of Romania with the post-cold war scene in
Europe.
Shortly, the Parliament in Chisinau adopted the first laws that established a separate National Bank, created a
department on military affairs, summoned force-ministries to accept the primacy of Moldovan laws and decisions
over those sent by Moscow, and took over protecting the political rights and liberties on its national territory. The
country adopted its anthem; flag, other state and national symbols that further emphasised the course towards full
independent statehood. Its legislative body (Sovietul Suprem) became the Parliament of Moldova (Sfatul Tarii),
but only after the Communist Party was banned
3
.
The state building process started almost from the scratch. With no relevant experience in independent statehood,
Moldova moved soon to establish its own cabinet of ministers, a foreign policy department, courts of justice, and
the internal public order bodies, based on democratic values and norms. All these steps found support of the
people, building on the trust that independence will bring democratic standards, welfare, and liberty from Soviet
oppression.
In a very short period of time, the first ruling elites of the new country succeeded to adopt a number of crucial
laws, such as: a new legislation on citizenship, national anthems and flag, property and political rights of its
citizens.
At the core of the statehood, Moldovan elites placed a civic nation concept, making a great difference from the
other patterns of ethnic-states, more or less restored in the Baltic states, or in some of the ex-Yugoslav entities.
As the key-central authority, the government was in charge of the organisation and cooperation of the whole
societys activity from the executive branch. It was established as a result of peaceful negotiations through
constitutional standards
4
.
Despite formidable obstacles after the USSR`s break-up, formal institutions of democracy were established in
Moldova quite rapidly and have been often referred to as being amongst the best models if compared with other
CIS states.
Moldova was certainly one of the fast-learning newly independent states (NIS), being praised on the way of
implementing its first generation of structural reforms by mid the 1990s, which allowed it to achieve admirable
macro-economic indicators, to step on an ambitious set of land and the privatisation reform of state properties.
With one of the first constitutions adopted in the ex-Soviet space, and with one of the most pluralist and dynamic
political landscapes, Moldova received a good bunch of positive appreciation and encouragements from its main
supporters (the World Bank, the IMF, and the EBRD). Although, Agrarians succeeded to keep their political
weight in the 1994 February elections, Moldova remained quite dedicated to its structural reforms, and challenging
task to reintegrate the breakaway region of Transnistria through negotiations, and internationalisation of the
conflict settlement. Moreover, with the adoption of the first constitution (July 1994), the Moldovan Parliament
found a good ground to resolve by legal and political means the conflict with the Gagauz ethnic minority, located
in the south of the country.
Devolution and political accommodation of the local demands of a rather limited ethnic community of Gagauz
speakers was the best recipe to finally make an end to the conflict
5
. In 1994 the territorial conflict was resolved
when a special statute of the regional autonomy was adopted. It appears that the ideas of federalisation nourished
new political expectations in the UTAG, whose leaders announced their eagerness to mitigate the state of the
future federalised state.
3
The Communist Party was banned in Russia for anti-constitutional activities, for supporting the coup detat, and that was followed by the rest of the ex-Soviet republics.
4
Law regarding the creation of the government (May 1990, nr.64-XII)
5
For more information about the conflict in the Gagauz area of settlements see the following resources: Jeff Chinn / Steve Ropers, Territorial Autonomy in
Gagauzia, in: Nationalities Papers, 26 (1998), 1, pp. 87-10; Charles King, Gagauz-Yeri and the Dilemmas of Self-Determination, in: Transitions 1 (1995),
19, pp. 21-25; Rudolf Mark, Das Gesetz uber die besondere Rechtsstellung von Gagausien (Gagauz-Yeri), in: WGO-Monatshefte fur Osteuropaisches
Recht, 37 (1995), 5, pp. 291-297. Randolf Oberschmidt, Neue Satzung fur Gagausien (Gagauz-Yeri) in der Republik Moldau, in: WGO-Monatshefte fur
Osteuropaisches Recht 41 (1999), 1, pp. 13-21; Vladimir Socor, Gagauz Autonomy in Moldova: A Precedent for Eastern Europe?, in: RFE/RL Research
Report 3 (1994), 33, pp. 20-28; Vladimir Socor, Gagauz in Moldavia Demand Seperate Republic, in: Report on the USSR 2 (1990), 36, pp. 8-13; Paula
Thompson, The Gagauz in Moldova and Their Road to Autonomy, in: Magda Opalski [ed.], Managing Diversity in Plural Societies - Minorities, Migration
and Nation-Building in Post-Communist Europe, Ontario 1998, pp. 128-147.
Since many see it as a tool to re-integrate the entire country, such a scenario is really an interesting risk for the
Gagauzian leaders as well
6
. A new constitution was concocted by expert groups in November 2002, though there
are still obvious disagreements as to the matter of a future conscionable agreement. The CPM leader sees it as an
asymmetric arrangement between the federal center and an unclear number of subjects, which would imply the
annihilation of the Transnistrian vertical of power while preserving his own.
The main priority at this moment for the Republic of Moldova remains economic and social development, as well
as integration in the European Union. The political parties` political platforms, even if they had different
principals, do not differ considerably. The parties, on the whole, have the same goals, at least on paper. Conflicts
or confrontations are not solutions, a thing that political leaders understand.
Despite the painful separation of its most industrialised region, the Republic of Moldova succeeded to build up a
legal and institutional framework that radically departed the country from its previous colonial statute within the
USSR.
Nevertheless, one of its most-praised programmes on mass privatisation showed less positive impact than
expected, while the weak judiciary deterred strategic links with strategic investments. Economic decline has
further aggravated the well-being of the country. Moldova has a multi-party political system, with a unicameral
Parliament elected by universal, direct suffrage, based on a proportional system. Although a parliamentary regime,
it has a strong president, indirectly elected by the legislative. But, the degree of polarisation is high on both axles
of strategic orientation - economic reform and nation/state building.
Political dynamics of the last decade have been featured by volatile coalition majorities and short-lived
governments. Political instability exerted a massive political influence on the administrative and civil service in
Moldova. It dealt with a chaotic circulation of civil servants across the state/public bodies, weak judiciary and the
almost inexistence of autonomous local governments. The lack of transparent, reliable and modern procedures of
civil service recruitment and promotion, political neutrality and public scrutiny over the business of the state
administration, made the state apparatus simply a hostage to politicians.
The unicameral Moldovan parliament (Parlament) has 101 seats, and its members are elected by popular vote
every four years. The Parliament then elects a president, who functions as the head of state. The president appoints
a prime minister as head of government who in turn assembles a cabinet, both subject to parliamentary approval.
Although the president is elected by the legislature, it still holds most of the competencies that belonged to the
former semi-presidential political system. In August 2000, the Moldovan Parliament challenged the president of
the state, Petru Lucinschi, who requested additional executive powers through constitutional amendments.
This was treated as an attempt to grab the power under the control of an oligarchic structure, and respectively, the
majority of the MPs decided to cooperate in order to change the constitution, but in a different sense. The
Parliament amended the constitution in 2000 by changing the political regime: from a semi-presidential to a
parliamentary republic, with a president of the country to be elected with the qualified majority of the MPs.
Changing the constitution was not an easy task even for the ADR, whose main components split over and
provoked thus a deep political crisis. Political turmoil between the president and Parliament only accelerated the
Cabinet of Ministers` failure and, after several weeks of unstable cohabitation between the parts, the Cabinet
presented its resignation
7
.
Thus, the largest political force of the Moldovan Parliament, the Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADR) came to an
open confrontation with the incumbent President Luchinski, who decided to counter-attack, and very soon, after
two unsuccessful attempts to confirm the new prime minister of the government of Moldova, called for early
elections (in December 2001). In 2001, only 2 parties of the former Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADR) retained
their legislative seats: the Communist Party (CPM) 50.2% votes and the Christian Democrat Popular Party
(CDPP) 8.18%.
The third parliamentary fraction of the Parliament was Braghis Alliance with 13.45%, headed by the former
prime minister, Dumitru Braghis, ranked as Lucinschis political successor. On February 27, 2001, general
elections were won by the Communist Party, which garnered 50% of the ballots cast in the elections, which
allowed them to take over 71 out of 101 seats. The victory of the Communists came as a big surprise to everyone,
6
Claus Neukirch Moldovan Headaches The Republic of Moldova 120 days after the 2001 Parliamentary Elections Working Paper, http://www.core-
hamburg.de/documents/15_Wp3.pdf
7
For 3 years after 1998, the Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADR) held a relative majority of seats in Parliament (60 against 40 held by the CPM, with a deputy, Ilie Ilashcu,
imprisoned by the separatist regime of Transndniestria).
including the party itself. Many have considered such an exotic result almost absurd that a Communist party,
which has never dissociated itself entirely from the Soviet past, could regain its power via open and democratic
elections.
Even the leaders of this party appeared to be astonished by the overwhelming success. By April 2001, the
Communist Party announced that they would support a technocratic Cabinet of Ministers, lead by Vasile Tarlev,
a former manager of the Bucuria factory, and the acting Chairman of the National Producers` Business
Association.
Although the governing programme have copy-pasted the main election slogans of the Communist Party, the
Cabinet soon realised that it is worth to continue the mainstream of the economic and social reforms under way in
Moldova. Moldova joined the Stability Pact in May 2001, which made it the only ex-Soviet entity with a visible
south-east identity. It joined other regional initiatives and cooperative frameworks, such as the SECI, but without
renouncing entirely to the obsolete ambition of its Communist leaders to preserve its membership in the CIS, as
well as discussing about joining the Russia-Belarus Union.
Here is to be mentioned that when the Communists ascended to power, most of the unpopular, painful economic
and social reforms had already been carried out (such as, land privatisation, privatisation of the enterprises and
state properties for bonds, macroeconomic stabilisation, cadaster and other related key-policies), which displayed
undeniable signs that Moldova began to relieve from the effects of the 1997 financial crisis. Thanks to that, the
ruling Communist Party (MCP) felt at ease to guarantee social protection to citizens and maintain the economic
reform momentum.
Nevertheless, the ruling party has provoked considerable unrest and peoples discontent, particularly because of
some of its most questionable decisions to revise the results of the privatisation, to re-create collective farms in the
countryside. Most of these aims ended in futile rhetoric, which, nevertheless, fueled major unease and massive
protests of the opposition.
By the spring of 2002, opposition parties rallied against the Communists policy to censor the history textbooks in
schools (History of Romanians), while in the summer of 2004, journalists working for the State Broadcasting
Company were beaten in front of their offices by security guards and police officers.
Nevertheless, the Communist Party became the strongest and the most organised political force in the country,
with MCP structures available in all populated areas to the last village. As the Communist rule was associated by
many citizens with a good promise to stability and economic growth, they easily reported an impressive election
success, gaining a constitutional majority (71 out of 101) of the Parliament, which allowed them to appoint a
Cabinet of Ministers of their own. Evidently, the PCM was elected in 2001 on a ticket of status quo and non-
reform.
The MCP campaigned on the basis of a classic socialist programme and an ostensible pro-Russian shift in foreign
policy. Conflicting messages concerning an orientation towards Moscow and the CIS, on the one hand, and the
European Union and IFIs, on the other hand, indicated the lack of policy prioritisation.
The government embraced on a strident rhetoric of returning to traditional socialist institutions, and even
resurrected to some of the policies that had simply frozen the structural reforms in the country. In fact, the
Communist leaders sold a kind of transition pattern without social costs. In real practice, all social indicators
continued to decline, and people continued to leave the country in search for better employment opportunities
8
.
The need to cooperate with the IFI has produced some reforms and prevented strategic backtracking, but no
consistent and coherent policy is presented and implemented. Some achievements in economic reform, e.g. in
privatisation, are reversed and a gradual loss of human capital is accepted for the sake of avoiding unpopular
measures.
The low rate of FDI and international assistance, the size of the black economy (including transfers from
Moldovans working abroad) as well as the massive outflow of labor indicate that trust in government policies is
low and the credibility of the emerging centrist opposition is yet unproven. The absence of massive violence and
catastrophes seems assured, but consistent macro-economic policies (e.g. no re-nationalisation) are not, and neither
are safeguards against poverty with 82% of the population living below the poverty line (i.e. 4 USD a day).
8
Life expectancy at birth decreased from 69.0 years in 1989 to 65.9 in 1995, and 64.0 in 2002 (average in CIS, but lower with 11,4 than in Central and Eastern Europe.
Quickly after the elections in 2001, the MCP leadership strove to consolidate the partys monopoly on the whole
state by installing the so-called vertical of power and by re-creating the party-state system after 2001.
Aiming to achieve thus a stronger control over the economy and society, the Communist leaders often called
openly for repressions against the countervailing political opposition, which responded on its turn by mass scaled
protests. For instance, in the spring of 2002, opposition launched mass-scale protest actions in downtown of
Chisinau, and for more than 4 months it assembled hundreds of tents for protesters in front of the Parliament and
Presidency.
Other protest actions followed in October November 2003, when a Russian concocted plan of settlement for
Transnistria was openly disputed and contested by the opposition, which made the Communist leaders step back
and reject the plan. Overall, the ruling party opposition relations became more strenuous and conflict-prone than
even in the time of the Soviet rupture (1991). This in turn, prompted European organisations to intervene, and
mediation efforts were needed to calm down the sides, which were ready for the worst.
Over 50% of respondents say they would oppose to the dissolution of the Parliament, governing by decrees,
establishing a censorship in the mass media, banning public protests or demonstrations, other meetings or limiting
the right of circulation for Moldova citizens.
Alarmed by this negative trend, PACE has tried since April 2002 to meddle into the political crisis of 2002, and
after 2 consecutive resolutions, it has initiated a monitoring mission, with a special representative of the Chairman
of the Council of Europe in Moldova. At the recommendation of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe, a round table as a platform of dialogue and permanent consultations between the government and
opposition was established in 2002.
Nevertheless, the political and civil rights failed to be protected satisfactory through the domestic legal remedies.
Freedom of the press was in serious decline, while the attempts to install a strong vertical of power were at odds
with the principles of local autonomy enshrined by the constitution and European conventions.
The negative trend was confirmed by various international monitoring reports, including the Freedom House
indices
9
: all four (elections, civil society, free media, and governance) have declined from bad to worse since 2001.
National surveys showed that over 55% of the population believed the country goes into a wrong direction,
though the highest rates of popular support belonged still to the CPM
10
.
Both in February 2001 and in May 2003 the electoral result of the Communist party doubled, but stagnated in
March 2005, when it had to conciliate with the opposition. The inertia made the CPM win the local and regional
elections in 2003, but they were critically assessed by almost all national and foreign observers as the the worst
since 1991 according to compliance to the European standards.
A Joint Statement of the ODIHR/OSCE/ Council of Europe on June 2003 qualified local elections in Moldova as
partially free, while reports about police raids and law suits against opposition parties and media outlets
increased. Media failed to provide neutral information on the electoral process, often serving merely as the voice
of state authorities and the ruling party; it also provided scant access to opposition representatives.
Nevertheless, independent surveys were confirming a high rate of popularity of the president and the ruling party.
A certain degree of unfair competition for media coverage and the abuse of official positions and resources for
disguised election campaigns, however, had been a common trait, which became even more visible after 2001.
Electoral rules (a 6% hurdle for party and 9% or 12% for bi- and multi-party alliances) combined with the low
participation in elections have artificially reduced the number of political parties able to effectively compete in
elections. In 2001, the Communist party gained about 1/3 of the total number of votes. The low level of
participation of Moldovan citizens in the elections made 1/3 turn into . When smaller parties did not pass the
electoral threshold, 1/2 votes turned into 2/3 of all mandates.
In March 2003, a law on local self-governance was adopted against the fierce opposition of the opposition and
local governments associations. Rapporteurs of the Council of Europe failed to determine Moldova authorities to
reconsider their plan of re-designing the system of public administration. This policy has reversed the pace of
territorial arrangements laid down in 1999 by previous governments, receiving praise from the international
community.
9
Nations in transit: Freedom House 2003, 2004, Rowman&Littlefield Publishers, Inc. New York
10
Public Barometer, IPP, December 12, 2003
Under these reforms, the ten (10) constituent regions (judets) of Moldova were replaced by (32) thirty two districts
(raions). The return to a system based on tighter control of the central authorities over local and regional affairs
fomented criticism of various civil society groups and mayors in Moldova, as well as of the Council of Europes
CLRAE, but also of the IMF and WB, which cautioned that the costs of so-called territorial reforms may
certainly raise unexpected damages for the poor state budget and shaky public institutions.
It was therefore legitimate to look forward to the general elections in March 2005 as a test to democratic stability
and pro-European aspirations of Moldova. The fears of CPRM about lower election results (46.1% in 2005 vs.
50.1% in 2001) and revolutionary trends in Ukraine and Georgia forced the ruling party to look for a change.
In March 2005, the Communist party gained of the total number of votes, which became 2/5 because of the low
participation and seats because of the proportional distribution of mandates. But, receiving 56 of votes, the
Communists needed political support from the opposition in order to re-install their party leader as the head of
state
11
.
At first sight, Moldova followed a different paradigm from Ukraine and Georgia in 2005, retaining in power of
those who seemed unable to break their links with the former regime. Instead of an orange revolution, things
went towards a conditioned cooperation and evolution between former rival-actors: the Communists and the
Non-Communists.
This cooperation was hard to imagine several months prior the elections. The foundation of common language on
the countrys priorities where the ruling party and opposition can cooperate ended with a conditioned
agreement consisting of 10 distinct points. This cooperation was hard to imagine several months prior the
elections, and raised various speculations.
The political consensus announced on April 4, 2005 echoed very well inside and outside of Moldova, but remained
to be quite fragile due to its apparent paradoxical nature. Confirmed with only 56 of votes of the CPRM fraction in
Parliament, the old-new Prime-Minister, Vasile Tarlev, had to put in practice the best of achievements of the post-
election agreement between the ruling party and the constructive opposition. The president and government
revealed inclination to reform the country and determination to intensify cooperation with European countries and
institutions, identifying the integration with the EU as the countrys foreign policy priority. Moldovas political
conundrum - which limits effective transformation of the country, - remains yet to be solved.
However, positive developments are apparent. Externally, the European Union has increasingly revealed its
readiness to launch a more pro-active policy in an attempt to achieve a settlement in Moldova. This pinpoints to an
increasing awareness and interest of the leaders of the EU to make a contribution to the resolution of this political
predicament near its prospective borders.
Alarmed by revolutionary waves in Ukraine, the CPM was quick to request a cease-fire from their earlier rival
parties, while the price of peace was to strengthen the national-wide consensus on a set of objectives: pro-EU
membership, as well as a new approach on how to resolve the conflict in Transnistria. As a result, the opposition
obtained much more seats in the Parliament in 2005 than it held in 2001, and this happened despite the internal
problems inside the parties and the limited resources for mass-media.
But, selecting the pro-EU target as the main objective for post-electoral trajectory of governance, the new cabinet
has to resolve a far more difficult agenda than it is prepared for. The Parliament confirmed the executives top-
priorities, which include
12
: modernisation of the economy, reconsolidation of the countrys territories, a better
quality of life, consolidation of society, EU integration. The prime minister Tarlev was thus expected only to
reiterate the objective earlier announced by the president: EGPRSP implementation (19941996, Law nr.398 of
2.dec.2004), EU-RM Action Plan (1995-1997), signed in February in Brussels, expanding the mid-term plan for
budget spending, EGPRSP implementation and reformation of the most sensitive parts of government (judiciary,
prosecution, special services, state press, etc.)
The re-elected Communist government was eager to stress its commitment to the task of Moldovas European
integration, which marks a clear ideological shift from the initial pro-Russian orientation of the Communists
foreign policy. In the wave of turning West, the Communists had assimilated most of the political objectives of the
opposition, while promising them to stick to the main Action Plan EU / RM provisions. Improving the
sustainability of economic growth, neutralising risks (energy dependence, narrow export base, reintegrate divided
11
President of Moldova i s elected by Parliament with 2/3 of votes as a result of the 2000 constitutional change of the political system.
12
Infotag News Agency, Chi;inau, April 19, 2005
territory, reduce poverty and new social inequality), increasing the competitiveness of the national economy are
the key tasks of the Action Plan.
The first political declaration adopted by the legislative body even during the first session (March 24, 2005)
13
grounds the priorities of the domestic and foreign policy of the country. It states that further development of the
Republic of Moldova cannot be ensured only through the consistent and irreversible promotion of the strategic
course towards the EU integration, peaceful and democratic resolution of the Transnistrian problem, effective
functioning of democratic institutions and ensuring of national minorities rights.
The risk of a reversal of institutional democratisation seems remote in Moldova, but the encroaching of dominant
political players and their undermining of democratic institutions may hinder the implementation of goals Moldova
has committed to. Further, in order to preserve its electorate, the CPRM will have to adapt its rhetoric, its decision-
making process and the internal procedures to the European standards.
Although, the judiciary is separated and de jure independent, its functioning is, in fact, hampered by political
interference and bias, as well as by widespread corruption. The rare cases of court rulings against the government
point out clearly the existence of unwritten rules that dominate the inner function of the judiciary today. Public
surveys show that a large part of the population does not trust the justice system.
Looking backward, one can easily remark the sinuous evolutions that it suffered in the last decade, and the many
obstacles that it is still confronted with. Three key-constraints that challenged Moldova with the Soviet dissolution:
(a) loss of the eastern markets for its traditional exports (food, wines, textile) and difficulties in reorienting itself to
other markets; (b) territorial secession of one of its most industrialised regions, Transnistria, and military conflict
that converted a centre-region dispute into a largely inflated inter-state conflict, involving several state players,
i.e. Russia using the region as a springboard for its special policy towards the near abroad; and (c) the split inside
of the titular nation, originating from the previous cultural policies of the USSR (Moldavian versus Romanian
identity).
Each of these perennial issues absorbs enormous political energy, undermines the legitimacy and strength of the
state authorities and can easily be used as an excuse not to tackle key reform issues. Overall, the issue of state- and
nationhood absorbed all political energies until early 1994 and resulted in the postponement of economic reforms
in particular.
The delay and partial derailing of the transformation process was seriously aggravated by the reactive nationalism
of Russian-language groups in Moldova. Thus, Moldovan society was challenged by a difficult transition involving
a plethora of interrelated processes: state-building, national building, and transformation of the former centralist-
planning economy into a free market-oriented one. The predominance of issues of nation and state building in the
crucial first phase of post-communist transition resulted at the very least in much valuable time loss and a delay in
democratic and economic transformation.
1.2. Hurdles of the State- and Nation-Building in Moldova
At the outset, Moldova had shown very good signs of progress towards market economy and rule of law state. In
fact, it was the first ex-Soviet republic to adopt a new constitution. It succeeded to resolve one of its territorial
conflicts by endorsing a special territorial-autonomous statute to the Gagauz national minority, putting an end to
the escalating ethno-linguistic unease with this ethnic group in the south of Moldova, and has been repeatedly
praised for its remarkable achievements in transforming its economy and state bodies into a market-oriented and
pluralist state and society.
Once a suppressed minority in the USSR, the rise of the national sentiment amongst Moldovan-speakers on the
territories that were annexed by Soviets after the WW2 alarmed the former dominant group, Russian-speakers,
who feared they would become second-class citizens, losing their deserved prestige and class privileges. For
the former, independence was an opportunity; for the latter, a threat, which was perceived to threat the internalised
norms, and the group dominance of the big brother that originated in the USSRs mythology.
Economic and social disruption of traditional ties that followed soon after 1991 further exacerbated the existing
fears. And this in sum made up a classic set of ingredients for domestic trouble-making and unease in Moldova, on
behalf of those who regarded independent option and national revival as key challenges to the former
13
Declaration of the Parliament of Moldova on the political partnership in order to attain the objectives of economic integration , April 2005
internationalistic legacy of the USSR
14
. Nevertheless, the achievements of the first decade remained fragile, and
the viability of the state has been constantly tested by its tremendous political, economic and geopolitical factors.
In the early phase of mobilisation and transformation, the future of a Moldovan state and/or the existence of an
ethnic or civic Moldovan nation was hotly disputed, and to a certain extent mis-interpreted. Initially, the emerging
political elites favoured a course towards re-unification with neighbouring Romania and questioned the raison
detat for the existence of a separate Moldovan state and nation.
Therefore, as soon as the newly established Republic of Moldova became a recognised member of the United
Nations (UN), in March 1991, the conflict broke out with Transnistrian para-military guards taking gradually full
control of public institutions, such as municipal and local administrative buildings, police stations, schools,
newspapers and radio stations in towns and villages of the left bank.
In March 1992, an armed conflict escalated in the hands of separatist rebels from the self-proclaimed Dniester
Moldovan Republic. The violence continued throughout the summer and as a result, the 14th Russian Army
entered the city of Tighina situated on the right bank of the Dniester and extended its influence into the region that
Russia called a peacekeeping gesture. The true objectives of this foreign army presence in Moldova were and
continue to be questioned by the Moldovan government and international organisations; the conditions of its
withdrawal are currently being pursued in multilateral meetings.
The break-away secessionist enclave emerged as a response strategy to confront a possible reunification with
Romania, first, and later on, it became a heavy leverage to downplay the democratic developments in Moldova, as
soon as it started to depart with the CIS structures and allies. Since a bout of violence in 1991-1992, the territory
on the left bank of the Dniester River became a springboard of political and economic pressures on Moldova,
remaining beyond the sovereign authority of the Moldovan government in Chisinau. It controls now almost 410
km of the Moldovan border with Ukraine, and has received heavy supplies and support from the Russian
Federation to thrive on its own, thus becoming an excellent leverage in the hands of Kremlin to amend the
Moldovan course of domestic and foreign policy.
Despite a decade of on-off negotiations, the territorial secession still remains of the most visible birth-signs of the
Moldovan statehood and independence, posing threats to the stability of the entire region, and the population of
Moldova. Lack of all-national consensus sapped in the last decade in Moldova most of the political energy and
mobilisation. The break-up of its most industrialised region, made Moldova rely mostly on its old-fashioned food
processing industry and agriculture, with almost no sources of domestic-generating energy resources, and a loose
space for the authorities to control the national border with Ukraine.
Gradually the DMR established separate executive, legislative, administrative and judicial bodies and created its
economic, customs, monetary, tax as well as educational and other systems. Not recognised by any other state, the
DMR has border guards who under their own flag and with a Coat of Arms illegally demand passports at
borders.
15
Many Soviet-era laws, some amended and supplemented, remained in force.
16
Most importantly the DMR created separate law-enforcement bodies including an agile KGB-style secret police
and a formidable army that according to military specialists is superior to the Moldovan one.
17
From their
perspective, a political and economic transformation process beyond the dismemberment of ex-Soviet bodies
would be counterproductive, and unjustified. Other contenders came from the Transnistrian region, located on the
eastern bank of the Dniester at the border with Ukraine.
There, a heavily industrialised elite, with considerable political and military support from the Soviet centre,
decided to challenge the very idea of a separate Moldovan state, on the ground that it will lose its strategic assets
and values, once they receive orders from the new capital of a national state, instead of having direct subordination
to Moscow.
Together with another region, Gagauzia, the elites of Transnistria voted on September 2, 1991, to join the USSR,
after heavily supporting earlier the coup dtat in Moscow. Disputes on the legislation of language, ethnicity and
course towards independence soon had degenerated into a traumatic confrontation between the pro-western and
14
Pal Kolsto, The Dniestr Conflict: Between Irredentism and Separtism, in: Europe-Asia-Studies 45 (1993), 6, pp. 973-1000;
15
See JCC Work Continues to Be Tremendously Difficult and Almost Fruitless, http://www.azi.md/ news?ID=1140, 1 February 2001.
16
E.g. the 1961 Penal Procedural Code of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic, the 1964 Civil Code or the 1964 Civil Procedural Code.
17
See Waters Trevor, Instabilities in Post-Communist Europe. Moldova, Conflict Studies Research Centre. RMA Sandhurst. January 1995, Interfax news agency, 7 August
2001, Mihai Gribincea, The Russian Policy on Military Bases: Georgia and Moldova, 2001, pp. 217-235.
legitimate Chisinau government, and the pro-Moscow, and illegitimate Tiraspol government, which paved the way
for military hostilities.
The population of the DMR is disenfranchised and cannot participate in national elections and when allowed to
elect their own Parliament and President, international electoral standards are flouted. Thus, differentiated
institutions in the full range of policy fields exist on two banks of the Dniester River, which conserves the division
of the country along the demarcation lines remaining from the 1992 combat operations.
The unsettled territorial conflict, mostly known as Transdniestrian separatism, has clearly eroded the quality of
democratic process in Moldova, leading the country to deep institutional crisis, poor institutional and economic
performances, and extreme poverty reaching almost 70% of the population. When allowed to elect their own
Parliament and President, the international electoral standards are flouted.
18
Benefits span beyond the stated
political aim of statehood, as the profits from untaxed trade and production of cigarettes, trafficking, alcohol,
petrol, drugs and weapons channeled through these black-hole republics are significant.
19
Yet another reason is the obvious failure of the international community (e.g. the United Nations, OSCE, EU or
NATO) to resolve frozen conflicts. A draft memorandum on settling the conflict through the creation of a
federalised state was submitted in mid-November 2003, embarking Moldovan and Transnistrian sides to scrutiny
it and quickly showing their own attitudes. The Russian plan was met with considerable resistance and mistrust by
citizens, and in particular by the opposition.
The public prevalent opinion was that the plan intended to undermine the internationally recognised state of the
Republic of Moldova, without providing consistent benefits to incorporate the separatist regime of Transnistria
into the constitutional regime of the unitary state. Independent analysts and opposition parties have sharply
criticised the conceptual drawbacks that make it specifically weak and unfeasible as regards the need to re-
integrate the country.
In spite of that, President Vladimir Voronin voiced hope that the Moscow-offered plan would be signed in the
nearest time, and that the Constitution might be ready by April 2004, after which its text needs to be agreed
between the sides of this conflict and then put up for a referendum. Since then, unproductive negotiations on the
future status of this so-called Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic (PMR) within a Moldovan (con)federation has
induced successive Moldovan governments to bend backwards to accommodate Moscow as the key backer of the
PMR-regime in Tiraspol, thus adding to Moldovas political and economic dependency, while putting constraints
on any pro-European reform endeavours.
The on-going debate on the reorganisation of the state structure to accommodate the PMR are by now a far more
serious threat to the very stateness of Moldova than any debates concerning the Romanian-ness of the Moldovan
nation and the idea of state re-unification. Already in 2005, the Parliament of Moldova adopted its official
approach towards the conflict settlement within the framework of its sovereign constitution, and internationally
protected borders; followed in 2006 by considerable laws and actions protecting the social and economic interests
of the regions inhabitants, i.e. the business community. Many authors say that as long as the Transnistrian conflict
remains unsolved, the Republic of Moldova will continue to be an unfulfilled state existing on the same level as a
declaration of an unfulfilled intention
20
.
Aiming to avoid violence and escalation, and perhaps fearing that the untrained and ill-equipped Moldovan forces
will be unable to match Russian regular troops that served as a stronghold of the Transnistrian military and
paramilitary guards, Chisinau tried initially to conciliate divergences.
Nevertheless, on December 13, 1991, in Dubasari, and later on, on March 28, 1992, new clashes took a violent
character, that forced Chisinau to declare a state of emergency, while fighting between Moldovan and
Transnistrian forces intensified, and grew into a large-scale military conflict. The decisive battle took place along
the left-bank settlements of Cocieri, Corjova, Malovata, Dorotchaia, Pirita, compactly populated by Moldovan
ethnics, and in Tighina (Bender), which has an important mixed population of Russians, Ukrainians and
Moldovans, during June 19-21 battles on the streets of Tighina (Bender) and its neighbouring Varnitsa.
18
The Transdniestrian authorities have consistently prevented the population from participating in national elections (1994, 1998 and 2001) by prohibiting the creation of
polling stations in the region. When Presidential and Parliamentary elections in Moldova were held, a state of emergency was declared (e.g. a state of emergency from 12
January 1996 until 1 July 1997 was declared by DMR Presidential decree No. 6). See U.S. Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998,
http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_ rights.
19
Charles King, The Benefits of Ethnic War. Understanding Eurasia's Unrecognized States, World Politics 53.4 (2001), 524-552; Michael Wines, Trans-Dniester 'Nation'
Resents Shady Reputation, The New York Times, 5 March 2002.
20
The issue of the conflict in the eastern zone of the Republic of Moldova after Maastricht, Oazu nantoi, IPP, www.ipp.md
The rebels, aided by considerable contingents of Russian Cossacks, Ukrainian paramilitary UNA/UNSO, and the
mighty Russian 14th Army, armed with tanks, reactive rockets, and modern assault armoury, succeeded to
maintain their strategic control over Bender on the right bank, but were categorically removed from the Moldovan
settlements which stayed loyal to Chisinau in Transnistria.
The 14
th
Russian Army played a decisive role in arming the paramilitary troops of Transnistria, militsia and
Cossacks, and even encouraged the transfer of entire battalions full-armed to the Transnistrian authorities, trained
the Republican Guard, and warned Chisinau authorities to surrender
21
.
As a result of this civil war, hundreds of people were killed, and thousands were forced to leave the region as
refugees. The Moldovan government made several requests to the UN, and the OSCE, to provide a peacekeeping
mechanism for its conflict, but after many attempts to gain this vital international support, on 21 July 1992,
Moldovan authorities agreed finally to end up hostilities by signing up of a Cease-Fire Agreement, endorsed by
Presidents Snegur M. and Eltsyn.
The agreement provided for an immediate cease-fire and the creation of a demilitarised zone extending 10 km
from the river Nistru (Dniester) on each side of the river, including the strategically important city of Tighina
(Bender) on the right bank. A set of principles for the peaceful settlement of the dispute between the parts was then
announced, i.e. by respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Moldova, the need to establish a special
statute for Transnistria and the right of the inhabitants to determine their future in case Moldova were to join
Romania.
In technical terms, the agreement established a Joint-Control Commission (JCC) to monitor and implement the
provisions of it, while a peacekeeping force was established, consisting mainly of the Russian military,
complemented with Moldovan and Transnistrian peacekeepers
22
. As Ukraine showed no sign of acknowledging
the Moldovan insecurity complex, this helped the separatist enclave take full benefits of its off-shore zone, in
smuggling from Ukraine to Moldova, to produce and sell arms, and in avoiding by all the means to pay any kind of
taxes for the use of the strategic resources it could use for free: gas and electricity, crossing the region to Balkans.
A demarcation of the border with Ukraine was signed only in March 2001 (entering into force on November 18,
2001), but remained unconcluded with Romania. The total length of the Moldovan state border is 1,906 km, of
which 955 km is land border and 951 km is water border. The length of the state border between the Republic of
Moldova and Romania is 684 km. The length of the state border between the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine is
1,222 km, out of which 421 km are within the Transnistrian sector and are not under Moldovan state control.
23
The interpretation of the post-conflict situation only added new concerns. A bilateral agreement on the withdrawal
of Russian troops was reached only in October 1994, stipulating that departure of the military will be completed
within the forthcoming 3 years, but the process will be synchronised with the granting of a special autonomous
status for Transnistria.
In May 1993, Moldovan authorities made several concessions to the opposing side, and even ratified the
membership in CIS (Commonwealth of the Independent States), showing clearly a turn towards Russia, while
trying to accommodate the separatist leaders towards Moldova. In response, Russia began its withdrawal, and even
replaced the 14
th
Army General Lebed from his command, while renaming it as Operational Group of Russian
Forces (OGRF). The same concerns the storage of more than 40,000 of tonnes of equipment and ammunition
stockpiled in Transnistria.
While both the Russian and Moldovan authorities consent that these should either be destroyed or removed, the
Tiraspol leaders insist that they should be turned over to the Transnistrian people, who deserved it, and that the
destruction of the military stockpiles was not addressed in the 1992, or in the 1994 agreement on withdrawal
24
.
However, the Russian State Duma stalled the withdrawal, and the changing status of the Russian forces remained
in air, thus creating uncertainties about Russias own responsibilities as a mediator in the conflict, supplier of the
Peacekeeping forces, and part of the conflict, as the opposition in Chisinau, had always stated. In the meantime,
the initial demands of the Transnistrian leaders have rapidly increased.
21
Trevor Waters, Security Concerns in Post Soviet Moldova, Conflict Studies Research Centre, April, 2001, pp.5-8
22
Ion Constantin, Peace Consolidation Mission Moldova: Parties and Interests, www.azi.md/news, August 15, 2003, p.2
23
New Borders in South Eastern Europe, The Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, Romania, IPP, 2002, p. 103
24
Tony Vaux with Jan Barett, Conflicting Interests Moldova and the Impact of Transndniestria, London Humanitarian Initiatives (DFID), January 2003, p.13
Starting with more or less autonomy and neutrality demands, they soon claimed independence status, and
succeeded to report massive backup from the political, economic and military Russian establishment. Senior
officials of the Russian Parliament voiced out their unconditional support, paying all the bills of the emerging
separatist enclave. Massive arms and equipment stocks remained located in Transnistria, while the separatist
regime has received huge economic, political and military support from Russia.
After 1993, they have been keen to suspend any negotiations that will not lead to unilateral recognition of the
regions independence. Still not satisfied despite their considerable gains against the Chisinau government, and
under the shadow of Soviet heavy artillery, the Transnistrian leadership even demanded that the Moldovan
Parliament rescind parts of its 1991 declaration of independence and return the Republic of Moldova to a
subordinate role as a part of Russia.
To further accelerate the withdrawal of the foreign military from its territory, in July 1994, Moldova adopted a new
constitution, in which it declared itself a neutral state, which prohibits the presence of any military troops on its
soil
25
. But, this argument was unable to ease up the tensions with Transnistrian leaders, who followed direct
instructions from Moscow, needless to say that all financial, economic, political and military support, was
provided by the Russian Federation to father accelerate separation of the breakaway region from Moldova, rather
than helping to fix up the initial disagreements.
This status quo seriously affects the process of strengthening a civic Moldovan nation and deprives the Republic of
Moldova of the main juridical foundation of its existence a community of citizens for whom the state would be a
coveted asset. At the same time, the existence of this frozen conflict is a real threat to regional security and
becomes a serious problem for the EU and NATO, which are in the process of enlargement.
Thus, for more than a decade, the problems associated with the breakaway region of Transnistria have become the
pinnacle and symbol of Moldovas domestic turmoil and a major obstacle to stability and economic development.
Smuggling and illegal earnings penetrated easily through the separated region, while obscure interests and
corruption among the key-actors in Moldova, Ukraine and Russia had significantly deterred the state to obstruct
the illegal trade, and control the borders of the sovereign state. International criticism and OSCE requirements
notwithstanding, the Russian Federation has not completed its troop and military equipment withdrawal.
All mediation efforts to reach a permanent solution to the conflict so far have been ineffective. For more than 15
years, Russian Federation patronages Tiraspol, being at the same time the only peace-keeping supplier to the
conflict in Moldova, and a mediator in the negotiations. But, this situation raised serious concerns in the
international community; therefore, Russia had to come to terms with the inclusion of Ukraine after 1998 in the
mediation efforts, and since 2004, with the inclusion of the OSCE, European Union and the USA.
The new 5 + 2 format has been established, but it failed to achieve any substantial breakthrough. The main
reason behind the stalemate is mainly attributed to the reluctance of the separatist regime to convey to the rules
established for negotiations by its multiple players/mediators. Nevertheless, one may not overlook the overt
reaction of the Russian authorities to see their role balanced or even changed by the European Union and the
USA, now members of the extended format.
The Moldovan state can be described in terms of procedural democracy. Although it made an incredible effort to
align itself to the most important human rights, civil and political freedoms conventions, their implementation is
still impeded by dysfunctional bodies, dependent judiciary and political instability. According to the article 1,al. 3
of the Constitution , the Republic of Moldova is a democratic state, governed by the rule of law, in which the
dignity of people, their rights and freedoms, the open development of human personality, justice and political
pluralism represent supreme values that shall be guaranteed.
Largely, as a legacy from the Soviet regime, a full set of administrative institutions exists. The problem is that
these institutions operate in a rather unreformed environment, largely patronaged by the ruling party leaders, too
far from public scrutiny and accountability. At the national level, the Parliament is the supreme representative
body of the people and the sole legislative authority of the State in the Republic of Moldova.
The structure, organisation and functioning of the Parliament is established by internal regulations. The Parliament
approves the national budget and, with it, its own financial resources. The president of the Republic of Moldova
represents the state and is the guarantor of national sovereignty, independence, of the unity and territorial integrity
of the nation.
25
Constitution of the RM, art.11 permanent neutrality of Moldova
One of the main roles of the government is to carry out the domestic and foreign policy of the state and to apply
general control over the work of public administration. Public administration as manifested in the
administrative/territorial units is based on the principles of local autonomy, of decentralisation of public services,
of the eligibility of local public administration authorities and of consulting the citizenry on local problems of
special interest.
At village and town level, the public administration authorities through which local autonomy is executed are
represented by the elected local councils and mayors. Justice shall be administered in the name of the law by courts
of law only. Justice shall be administered by the Supreme Court of Justice, the Court of Appeal, by tribunals and
the courts of law, in creating an eligible type of democracy. (Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, Chapter
IV, article 60,64,Chapter V,article78,Chapter VI, article 96,Chapter VIII, article 107,112,Chapter IX, article 114).
In 1999, Moldova showed the worst performance among 20 transition countries when compared on a governance
index by the EBRD. Moldova also rated the lowest among 7 transition countries with respect to perceptions of
quality and efficiency of central government services in the World Bank/EBRD Businesses Environment and
Enterprise Performance Survey.
A study carried out by the WB and Stanford University confirms the existence of a systematic deficit of skillful
governance in Moldova
26
. The ownership reform, which was socially, not economically oriented at its initial stage
in the mid-90s, failed to combust sound institutional transformation, due to its incomplete shape and numerous
conceptual dysfunctions. Modest achievements in macro-economic stability could not lead to desirable and needed
social benefits to an impoverished population.
For instance, the law on the government of Moldova was amended at least 25 times during 19922000.
Amendments usually focused on merging and splitting ministries, setting or closing of some units subordinated to
them (independent regulatory agencies, departments, decentralised services) and other structures, but not
strategies.
The Ministry of Economy was reformed at least 5 times between 1991-2004, the Ministry of Industry 6 times,
the Ministry of Culture 7 times; the number of departments subordinated to the government were reduced from 4
in 1999, to 12 in 2002, while in 2005 they were abolished at once.
From a comparative perspective, the young Republic of Moldova was frequently quoted as one of the least stable
political systems
27
, close to Italy, Japan and Thailand, with 8 cabinets changing hands in the last 12 years of
transition. But one should observe that, in addition to the frequent changes of the governments, Moldova has a top
position in the early end-up of the executives mandates
28
.
Without a clear-cut analogy of statehood with the Baltic states, some of the democratic institutions received
considerable recognition in the Republic of Moldova. Electoral democracy is clearly on the top of achievements.
First, elections have generally been bitterly fought within a pluralist and competitive political environment.
Despite coming to power in uncontested election in 1991, President Mircea Snegur lost the presidency to the head
of the legislature, Petru Lucinschi, in 1996. Moreover, legislative elections in 1990, 1994, 1998, and 2001 all
caused serious changes in the party and ideological composition of the legislature. This caused some of the
international scholars to call Moldova a pluralist country by default (Lucan Way), implying at least a recognition
of the pluralistic institutions forged along the transition.
Second, the media in post-Soviet Moldova have carried a diverse range of views, even if many media outlets
remain state-run or party-owned.
Third, political developments in Moldova benefited from a considerable stability of the constitution with the
Constitutional Court playing a key role between 1994 and 2000 in mediating conflicts between the different
branches of government. Finally, the legislature has consistently constrained presidential authority to a degree not
seen in Moldovas post-Soviet neighbours.
26
Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay and P. Zoido-Lobaton, 2002. Governance Matters II: Updated Indicators for 2001. The World Bank and Stanford University,
www.worldbank.org/research/growth. The authors of the Study use 6 integrated indicators; political stability, accountability and transparency, effective poli cy, quality of
regulatory framework, rule of law and control over corruption. The variation of indicators is reflected between -2,5 and 2.5, where 1 is the standard deviation from 0, upper
valuers illustrate higher quality.
27
Lucan Way, Pluralism by Default. Journal of Democracy 13, October 2002
28
The average duration of governments was 17.5 months in Moldova after 1991,
In 1994, the legislature virtually excluded President Mircea Snegur from designing the countrys constitution.
President Lucinschi faced to some extent a similar challenge. When he threatened to force early legislative
elections if his reform measures were not passed in 1997, the legislature responded by deposing the presidents
strongest supporter from the legislative leadership.
In 2000, the legislature countered efforts by Lucinschi to create a stronger presidency by voting to eliminate the
post of popularly elected president altogether. In February 2001, the CPMR (Communist Party of Moldova) came
to power by winning 71 of 101 seats in the unicameral parliamentthe first-ever comeback of a hard-line
Communist Party in the post-Soviet world.
Currently, Moldova has one of the few parliamentary regimes in the former Soviet Union. Nevertheless, in
contrast to what many have assumed the perils of presidentialism,
29
the establishment of a parliamentary system
has not promoted democratic development in Moldova, while some authors even say that the opposite has been
right
30
. Whereas the military is not a factor of any political weight in Moldova, the business community and the
nomenclature constitute veto powers to some extent. Moldovas political system can be described as an unstable
system of governance with certain levels of political pluralism, but with a strong and centralised government.
After ten years of volatile coalition majorities and short-sighted politics, the last 2 elections (general - in February
2001, and local - in May 2003) were marked by wide dissatisfaction of the ordinary people, whose pessimist views
and attitudes towards their own social issues over the last decade appeared to be stronger than their hatred against
the ancient regime.
Some 800,000 Moldovan inhabitants left the country in the former decade, and over 9 cabinets replaced each other
leaving little time for consistent policies and economic growth. The May 2004 public opinion survey indicates
about the same level of distrust - 25.2%
31
, which stems from the perception that the judiciary is corrupt, inefficient
and ineffective in enforcing its rulings
32
. The cost of litigation also discourages people from filing lawsuits.
Underutilisation of the courts is also due to relatively low levels of legal awareness and high levels of poverty.
While analysing the TI-Moldova reports, one can notice that if, in 2000, causes of corruption were dealt with
complicated and contradictory legislation at a larger scale, in 2004, opinions dwelled especially with the
tradition and ubiquity of bribery, the fact that confirms in a way the acceptance and assimilation of corruption
with local habits
33
.
With a decade lost in the management of transition, for the current government the structural constraints on
governance are massive. Moldovas top and mid-level governmental management faces considerable constraints
with origins that reach far beyond the responsibility of the current ruling government.
Moldovas financial fragility and energetic dependence, hidden economy nourished through various channels by
the unsettled territorial conflicts, together with a plethora of populist leaders made it strongly dependent on
consumption-oriented politics, at the neglect of reforms
34
. It has experienced however a real transformation
deficit
35
, both in terms of resources and policy process.
Large parts of state policy have been fragmented into fiefdoms. Government policy, driven by a status-quo
objective of staying in power, tends to prioritise basic subsistence for the populace unless forced by international
pressure to reconsider.
1.3. The Need for Reforms and Ambiguous State Traditions
Driving on its path of transition, Moldova has built up a certain model of how really not to carry out reforms.
Although praised for more than a half of decade, many of its long-cherished attempts to convert the former state
properties into private stocks, and the former collective farms into privately-owned enterprises failed, so it
acquired a dubious fame of a laggard of reforms.
29
Juan J. Linz, The Perils of Presidentialism, Journal of Democracy 1 (Winter 1990): 5170.
30
Pluralism by Default in Moldova, Lucan A. Way, Journal of Democracy October 2002.
31
IPP, Insti tutul pentru Politici Publice, www.ipp.md.
32
According to a 2002 Transparency International survey, Corruption and Quality of Governance: The Case of Moldova, the public identified corruption as the second most
significant problem facing Moldova, preceded only by poverty. In 2000, the primary motivation for corruption was poverty. In 2002, the public identified the motivation behind
corruption as pressure exerted by superiors and tradition, which suggests corruption as an entrenched problem.
33
Corruption Justice TI, 2002
34
Kaufmann, D.,A.Kraay and P.Zoido-Lobaton, 2002, Governance Matters II. The WB and Stanford University, www.worldbank.org/research/growth
35
Early Warning Report on Moldova, December 2002, SAR/IDIS
Truly speaking, not because such reforms as the adoption of new laws, and assuming new commitments never
ended up in the Parliament of Moldova, but because of the quality of legislation and the poor-governance
standards. The IMF and the WB disagreed with the aforementioned reforms, as there were few chances to foresee
how the central authorities plan to implement them, and what were the benefits of reform for the social and
economic growth of the country.
From 1991 till 2001, the Republic of Moldova had a presidential form of government, since 2001 when the Party
of Communists won; some changes were made in the organisation of the state system, and it became a
Parliamentary one. The latest polls predict 62% for the PCM, 12% for the PPCD and 15% for the Our-Moldova
Alliance (successor to the Braghis Alliance) remarkable stability compared to the 2001 results of 50%, 8% and
13%, respectively. Similarly, trust in Vorinin has doubled over the past three years to 32% against 6% for the
opposition leader Serafim Urechean. In fact, the victory of the CPM in 2001 reduced the relevance of
parliamentarism - with a president having in reality a super-dominant role in almost all aspects of the political
process.
The president appoints the acting prime minister, who forms the Cabinet, decides on all other issues pertaining to
domestic and foreign policy and, despite the legal provisions making the prime minister and the Cabinet subject to
approval of the Parliament, there is little evidence that this may counter-balance the acting presidents political
grandeur and influence.
Of course, the Parliament can insist on adopting laws which are vetoed by the president, but it is unlikely to
happen with a Communist majority (71 out of 101-seats between 2001 2005, and 56 out of 101-seats between
2005 till now) that receive most of the drafts of laws and decisions from the presidency and the government.
In fact, decisive decisions are clearly made outside the legislative chamber, within CPM Political Buro, whose
senior official is the incumbent President Vladimir Voronin. As such, CPM leaders have substantially increased
their control over mass media, administration and judiciary, combusting fears that it is installing its uni-personal
hard-rule.
Known for their sympathies for Lukashenko, CPMs leaders tried hardly to combine the Belarus approach towards
the role of the state, bound on socialist clich-ideas with a euphoric orientation towards the EU. What may be seen
as an antithetic relation (EU Lukashenko) from outsiders is, in Moldova, a strange but an effective instrument to
control the nostalgic voters on the basis of the same capitalist-driven policies that were earlier almost a shame on
previous ruling-parties. Embarking itself on the EUs boat, the CPM attempts to reduce the criticism of the
opposition parties that did not cease their criticism on Moldovas membership in the CIS, and on other satellite-
driven policies around Russia.
This is clearly that ousters the opposition from the ruling partys approach: the latter is willing to be integrated in
the EU without leaving the CIS, while the former would favour a comprehensive and steady inclusion into the
EUs economic and political institutions. In fact, they aim a strategy that seems to be a combination of two red-
lines: strengthening a vertical of power that resembles Lukashenkos hard rule, based on sultanistic control over
society, and insist on EUs integration, which is desired more in terms of geography and less in commitment to EU
values.
Addressing an impoverished electorate, this appealing and enciphered slogan of EU orientation is often
accompanied by blunter ones, i.e. international donors should take responsibility for the general failures of
reforms implemented so far.
Thus, Moldovan state has been often described as torn between its past allegiance to Russia and its future
prosperity, which only the EU can guarantee. But the EU cannot be forthcoming enough, partly because of
Moldova's low level of political and economic development, and partly because of its unclear commitment to the
EUs rule of the game. The current regime has used its constitutional majority in parliament to amend the electoral
law, increasing the hurdles for the opposition parties, e.g. by increasing the 6%-hurdle to 9% for two-party
alliances and 12% for multiparty alliances. During the latest elections in 2003 as well as 2007, international
observers reports showed evidence of multiple police raids and law suits against opposition parties and media
outlets that increased.
Nevertheless, independent surveys tend to confirm that so far the popularity of the president and the ruling party
are more or less in line with the outcome of the elections. Similarly, the CPM rejected at the end of 2002 two
referendums initiated by the main opposition parties, and both of them were downplayed by the CEC on various
formal reasons, simply because the CPM was unwilling to accept the oppositions gaining leverage in public eyes.
By mid-2002, the BA fraction had collected over 200,000 of signatures to initiate a referendum on changing the
election system: from proportional party-lists vote to a majoritarian election system combined with one-past the
post, though the CEC, after repeated checking of the lists with signatures, suddenly decided to curb the initiative.
The same happened in December 2002 January 2003 with the initiative of CDPP aiming to hold a national
referendum on joining the EU and NATO.
The current Communist administration relies on (or has been captured by) the conservative interests of the rural
nomenclature as well as on an implicit consent not to interfere extensively with the massive trafficking and other
illegal economic activities and organised crime. Moldovas TI rank for 2004 is 112 out of 146 (score 2.3), making
Moldova the most corrupted country in Europe by TI standards. The most recent GRECO report was equally
devastating in its conclusions.
The lack of effective policy transformations are finally met by ordinary people, and by society at large, resulting in
the creation of serious social and cultural gaps between the powerful political and economic elites, and
powerless categories of disadvantaged people, united by a sharp division of incomes, almost widespread
poverty, and a dramatic drop in employment, low wages, fewer employees rights, and lack of trust in the benefits
of political process.
Source: CBS Axa Survey, March 2008, ordered by IDSI Viitorul
The relatively promising start of economic transformation in Moldova in the early 1990s was due to certain
available economic and trade potentials rather than to governmental reform policies per se. The controversies over
state- and nationhood soon put actual reforms on the backburner.
By the time the electorate made economic considerations a top priority (in the 1998 parliamentary elections), the
window of opportunity had closed. Moldovas total dependency on Russian markets and energy resources as well
as the absence of natural resources or competitive agricultural and industrial products for western markets resulted
in a structural socio-economic crisis. The absence of a potent pro-reform elite, the socio-economic malaise (even
without the hardships of actual reform) and the erosion of public trust in economic reforms resulted in a
conservative backlash.
Over the past few years, hundreds of thousands of Moldovan workers have left the country as legal or illegal
migrants or victims of human trafficking demonstrating the annihilation of reform perspectives. Thus, as many as
600,000 persons (37%) of the total number of active population emigrated to find a job by 1997-1998
36
.
According to the World Development Report (2003), 38.4% of people in Moldova live on less than $2 a day,
which is the lowest indicator among other European countries. The lack of sustainable economic growth is being
correlated both with low scores achieved by the instability of governments, populist decisions, contradictory and
poor legislation and by the lack of policy implementation capacity. In spite of the obvious difficulty in resolving
its territorial splits, the most intractable problems remained, however, in the sphere of quality governance in
Moldova.
36
Data provided by the Migration Department of the Republic of Moldova, 2003
Corruption is still ranked among the first sensitive issues for citizens. Public opinion polls show that the majority
of population is unsatisfied by the governance quality and does not trust the state bodies. Instability of legislative
process leads to instability of institutions
37
.
Social safety has been one of the main victims of Moldovas flawed transition process, with over 80% of the
population living below the poverty line and in total dependency on migrant remittances for subsistence.
Expenditures on health and education account for 8-9% of GDP, but real GDP has not yet reached half the level of
1991.
The existing system of social safety has been declined. So far, the 2004 Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction
Strategy exists primarily on paper, as the continuous outflow of population (including illegal migration and
trafficking) indicates. Remittances are clearly the main source of budget generation (estimated at USD1.3 bln
annually), which make the state to be significantly dependent on imports and consumption.
Over 70% of the budget is collected at the border, in result of the taxes and accesses. Independent forecasts
anticipate that in 2008, the domestic deficit balance could reach USD3 bln, which almost equals to the annual
budget. Exports have grown as well, registering in 2007 almost USD1.3 bln (128% growth if compared with
2006)
38
.
In 2007, imports increased by 137% if compared with 2006, thus registering a record amount of USD3.69 bln
(mostly received from Ukraine, Russia, Romania and Germany).
Share of exports and imports of Moldova (20052007)
Moldova is characterised by a combination of state interventionism and wild capitalism typical for a weak post-
communist state in transition. The percentage of state-defined prices is still relatively high, but so is the share of
the grey economy (estimated at 30-70% of GDP) and the volume of untaxed migrant remittances. Thus, the state
functions of economic regulation and redistribution are strictly limited to some strategic sectors and some basic
subsistence guarantees for the populace. Most families rely on remittances from migrants to avert poverty, whereas
the states power in directing economic processes is seriously handicapped by illegal flows of labour and capital as
well as by state capture.
The economy is increasingly reduced to derelict state-owned industrial enterprises, organised crime and
subsistence farming. Well-designed trade-offs between conflicting policy objectives are obstructed by the
personalistic style of leadership centred almost entirely on the Presidential Office, which replicate a kind of
presidentialismo of Latin-American influence, but with certain pro-Soviet traces and standards. The separation
of powers is certainly a part of the Moldovan Constitution (1994) and the corresponding differentiated institutional
and procedural setup exists, but the implementation of this principle is not at all a strong part of achievements.
The lack of consistent and sustainable growth is being attributed, as a rule, to the failures in the internal policy and
incomplete transformations. A study carried out by the WB and Stanford University confirms the existence of a
deficit of governance in Moldova
39
. The ownership reform, which was socially, not economically oriented at its
38
Source: Economic Statewatch, March 2008, edited by IDIS Viitorul (www.viitorul.org)
39
Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay and P. Zoido-Lobaton, 2002. Governance Matters II: Updated Indicators for 2001. The World Bank and Stanford University,
www.worldbank.org/research/growth. The authors of the study use 6 integrated indicators; political stability, accountability and transparency, effective policy, quality of
initial stage in the mid 1990s, failed to provide for the financial coverage to the transformation, which was carried
at the expense of the population. As many as 600,000 persons (37%) of the total number of active population
emigrated to find a job
40
.
Lack of consistent and sustainable growth was generally attributed to the failures in the internal policy and
incomplete transformations, due to lack of stability and domination of election politics instead of effective politics.
It is worth to note here that since Russia and Ukraine suffered a negative decline in such areas as the freedom of
expression, pluralism and political stability as well, the decline in Moldova was extensively due to the lack of
effective governance, low-quality laws and practices, incoherent management of public affairs, poor regulatory
framework and anti-corruption measures, all in all, the symptoms of a weak state.
It is therefore not surprising that many authors referred to Moldova as facing the most profound decline in the
governance quality at the regional level
41
, thus, losing its earlier standing of a South-East European state and
being re-associated with the average level registered in CIS. Nevertheless, not only the fact that since the 2001
elections the Communist Party has had a constitutional majority in Parliament, but also substantial inclinations
within the ruling party to subordinate the separation of powers to vested interests and party politics have severely
undermined this democratic principle in practice.
Objections to government policies by the judiciary and constitutional court in particular are rather an exception.
The fact that they do occur, however, indicates that the separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary
have not been abandoned completely. The Communist regime in power since 2001 has fundamentally obstructed
the activity of the established civil-society and party organisations.
Complaints about interference and repression have been quite frequent. As both, civil society and party activities in
Moldova are to a large extent top-down and funded or initiated by international counterparts, the scarcity of such
organised activities per se is not a measure of political repression.
Some government-critical think tanks and NGO advocacy are allowed to function and use the rights guaranteed by
the constitution. Especially the more radical pro-Romanian groupings and parties are subject to various forms of
harassment and obstruction, as demonstrated by their recurring protests to organisations such as the Council of
Europe. The overall lack of state resources for the implementation of substantial policies and the opportunistic
concept of politics had derailed some important reforms to take place, with the civil service and judiciary reforms
on the top of the agenda of priorities.
The formal and informal monopoly position of the Communist executive has encroached upon the prerogatives of
the parliament. The dominant Communist faction (71 out of 101 seats) and a partly obstructionist (nationalist)
opposition have effectively eliminated the democratic function of parliament and the checks and balances are in
practice, if at all, provided by international pressure and conditionality rather than by domestic powers.
The installation of an internationally instigated round table for dialogue between the government and the
opposition in 2003 acknowledges the undermining of actual democracy. The judiciary is institutionally
differentiated and de jure independent. In practice, its functioning is on all levels severely hampered by political
interference and bias as well as by corruption.
The rare cases of court rulings against the Communist authorities point to some residues (or germs) of professional
ethics or to intra-party controversies. Legally, penalties for elected politicians, office-holders, and (octopus) public
servants do exist. The immunity granted to a wide range of elected office-holders and other government officials,
however, severely inhibits even the formal options to bring cases of corruption to court.
Conflicts of interest are primarily used as political instruments, most prominently against opposition leader Iurie
Rosca, but also against Serafim Urechean, the leader of the Moldovan Noastra Alliance, and other victims of the
dependent judiciary, who later defended their rights in the ECHR (European Court for Human Rights).
As Moldovas TI ranking indicates, administrative practice and political reality are quite different. Thus, corrupt
office-holders are not prosecuted systematically and adequately, but incidentally either on the basis of intra-party
and personal loyalties or in reaction to adverse publicity. Some court cases strongly indicate that corruption
charges are initiated by the government in order to discredit opponents and to oust disloyal functionaries.
regulatory framework, rule of law and control over corruption. The variation of indicators is reflected between -2,5 and 2.5, where 1 is the standard deviation from 0, upper
valuers ilustrate higher quality.
40
Data provided by the Migration Department of the Republic of Moldova, 2003.
41
Moldova Country Financial Accountability Assessment, Report No.27425, World Bank, September 2003
As previous conclusions concerning the political control of the judiciary and widespread corruption indicate, the
rule of law legal guarantees and juridical redress for violations of civil liberties are not assured. Actual political
repression and civil-rights
violations are, according to the most relevant reports, quite limited (of course, with the notable exception of the
Dniester Republic).
Redress for known violations of civil and human rights, however, is virtually non-existent. The performance of the
democratic and administrative institutions of Moldova is barred not so much by instability, but rather by a lack of
resources, state capture by vested interests and (consequently) the lack of political will to tackle the key problems
of the populace at large.
Additionally, there is a tendency to restructure administrative institutions for ad-hoc political reasons. Cynically
and arguably, friction between democratic institutions is reduced by the dominance of the Communist party over
the executive, the legislative and the judiciary. The key problem of acceptance of institutions in Moldova is one of
state capture and monopoly rather than veto players. Wiretapping political opponents is reportedly a widespread
practice.
The risk of a reversal of institutional democratisation seems remote in Moldova, but the encroaching of dominant
political players and their undermining of the actual functioning of democratic institutions is political reality.
The symbiosis of the state and vested economic interests seriously reduces the capabilities and political will to
counter monopolies and oligopolies. Only the absence of valuable natural resources and the size of the country
have prevented the emergence of major oligarchs. Large portions of the state are controlled by private groupings
and corruption is pervasive and omnipresent.
Significant parts of policy making and resource distribution are based on particularistic and bureaucratic-hierarchic
considerations. Most policy decisions of importance converge on the president. Due to varying pressures, the
resultant policies are often erratic and non-transparent. As part of the above-mentioned chain-reaction, many of its
highly qualified new generation left the country in numbers unknown in any of the other post-Communist states,
thus depriving the state of crucial human capital for governance and reform.
Different legacies of statehood and political legitimacy competed in Moldova after 1991. The first political elites
that succeeded to unlock Moldova from the USSR found their inspiration in the pre-war models of national ideals.
But, they were easily replaced by more experienced apparatchiks, who returned to power after November 2003,
on the waves, made by the post-conflict syndrome in Moldova.
In 1994, elections were favourable to the Agrarians (DAPM), who were unable to resolve the territorial conflict
but accepted important concessions paid to Russia, and Transnistria, in order to overcome the consequences of the
lost war. Nevertheless, Moldova made considerable effort in conducting democratic and economic reforms, by
adopting a constitution in 1994, and by setting up the core institutions of the new statehood.
Needless, to say that the Agrarian centrists were keen to pursue a number of structural economic reforms, to
launch privatisation that was expected to lead the country towards the social prosperity of its citizens.
While this transformation continued on the same track, and the country was praised for its commitment to far-
reaching objectives (privatisation, civil service, SMEs and international trade), the lack of public consensus on the
countrys key-issues, and many hardships on the Moldovan people led to popular dissatisfaction and a victory of
the CPM, in 2001.
Although the installation of a stable constitutional majority contributed to more cohesion of the state bodies, and
better chances to vote for legislation that earlier were postponed because of lack of votes, the ruling Communist
party appeared to be more dedicated to its vendetta actions than to move towards effective policy reforms,
willing to pay back the opposition for years of passive watching under the previous centrist-alliances (1994), or
volatile centrist-right ruling coalitions (1997-1999), aspiring to restore the relicts of the former single-party system.
The unexpected chance to run the machinery of state propelled a strong confidence in the CPM that they may pay
no more attention to the constitution (having no difficulty to amend it anytime) or to political pluralism and
separation of powers, as most of them are perceived as a kind of election trophy.
With more stability of the parliamentary disciplined majority of the CPM, there is no such stability of the Cabinet
of Ministers, with 8 ministers and more than 20 vice ministers being replaced (2001-2003) by decrees of the
president, Vladimir Voronin, which leads through a traumatic exposure to unlimited power bordering on tyranny.
In fact, decisive decisions are clearly made outside of the Parliament, within the triumvirate of the CPMs Central
Committee, which is led by the same President Voronin, and this was the reason for the profound political crisis in
2002 lasting until the end of 2003. In obvious disrespect with constitutional checks and balances principles, the
CPM leaders have initiated staff-cleansing policies in almost all state branches that never occurred as such after
1991, by trying to substantially increase their control over the most important public institutions: mass media and
judiciary, business and church, trade and security.
In particular, it shall be referred to the situation of the Mayor of Chisinau Municipality who was discharged from
the status of a Cabinet member for the reason of incompatibility of the elected and executive character of this
status
42
, though it goes without saying that the same provision was applicable to the Governor of Gagauz
Autonomy, who, however, retained his position. A public policy process is clearly missing in Moldova, which
make the rulers attempt to privatize their public positions and capture state institutions.
Civil society involvement is still limited and weak, although some of the challenges of the state, i.e. the EU
expansion, sensitive issues related to identity markers, or regulation of the existing territorial and political
conflicts, are highly sensitive for the civil society, which has demonstrated its strength and maturity.
Although the events of 2002 were gone, their effects are still alive. Starting in January 2002, with some street
rallies of the CDPP, which aimed to protest against the decision of the Ministry of Education to change the
curricula of history in schools, and then to lift the immunity of some of the CDPPs deputies, the protesters
installed their tents in front of the Parliament, and resisted for almost 4 months, under permanent attacks of
security forces and police, violence and exhaustive strike.
The political deadlock came to an end only by the end of April 2002, as a result of the PACEs intervention to
secure a peaceful resolution of the internal conflict in Moldova. The PACE adopted on April 27, 2002 a Resolution
on the functioning of democratic institutions in Moldova, bringing both the ruling party and protesters to a
round-table where they were coached to settle their mutual antagonism.
The Resolution called upon the central authorities to revise the parliaments rules of procedure in order to
effectively use the oppositions right to participate in the political process, to stop criminal proceedings initiated
against the CDPP leaders, and refrain from further lifting the immunity of other oppositionist leaders.
The CDPP had thus to suspend its street actions, while the ruling party committed itself to fulfill a number of
recommendations defined by the PACE Rapporteurs. Contrary to the obligation to identify the offenders who, in
2002, kidnapped one of the CDPP MPs, Cubreacov, who was released after 2 months of illegal detention, central
authorities appeared to be unable to proceed further with this case and, as a result, President Voronin dismissed the
prosecutor in charge with this case, although further advancement could not be achieved.
It is particularly interesting that the government declined any support from outside, even tough some western
European states showed their readiness to assist it in this sensitive case. Criminal proceedings against CDPP MPs
were not closed down, but only suspended, while non-MP members of the CDPP were still attempted to be
prosecuted up to the end of 2002, and later on, on the accusation of participating in illegal street actions of the
opposition.
At the same time, no consistent dialogue with the civil society or with the opposition occurred in 2003, and the
legislative activities went with even more difficulty than earlier, with the opposition boycotting the sessions, and
the majoritarian fraction, doing the same when opposition leaders were asked to take the floor in the Parliament.
At the beginning of 2003, the opposition parties claimed that it was virtually precluded to participate in the work of
the Parliament, and this was due to the CPM Speaker, Eugenia Ostapciuc, who refused to allow the opposition
MPs to speak in the Parliament. After repeated attempts to redress this situation, two opposition groups decided in
March 2003 to boycott the plenary sittings of the Parliament, calling for a new PACE monitoring mission.
42
The same provision is applicable to the Governor of Gagauz Yeri, but whose presence is actually accepted further by the prime minister.
In particular, they drew the PACE`s attention to the fact that the Resolutions on Moldova were not fulfilled by the
authorities and, there is a strong need to reform the political parties round table, which turned in the last months
into an inefficient structure, simulating a sort of dialogue which does not exist.
Politicians saw the main reason for this situation in the fact that opposition parties in Moldova have almost no
mechanisms of making the ruling CPM act in a constitutional way, in strict conformity with democratic principles
and standards, and this is why it has ignored all earlier agreements with CoE
43
.
Moreover, the CPM initiated debates of a draft law on prosecuting extremist organisations in January 2003, with
the aim to prevent opposition and other civil society groups to protest publicly against abuses, at arm distance from
its earlier agreement to guarantee the expression of the rights to assembly and political pluralism.
Public opinion polls show that the majority of the population is unsatisfied by the governance quality and does not
trust the state bodies
44
. Citizens consider that the public authorities have no capacity to solve strategic issues
45
and
seek to avoid them by adopting sceptical attitudes towards the state power tools, i.e. the law and public authorities.
The decision-making process is inefficient, underdeveloped (pre-modern) and too expensive. On the other hand,
public institutions are over-personalised, bureaucratic, non-transparent, and isolated from public scrutiny. Citizens
cannot influence decisions made by the state and often feel frustrated when larger economic pressure groups take
advantage of the system.
Nevertheless, ratings continued to remain favourable for CPM leaders, and the inertia of the voters confidence
was reconfirmed in November 2003, with the CPM being the most favoured with 32.2% the Social-Liberal
Alliance Our Moldova with 4.4%, the CDPP 3.7%. The CPM is making the utmost to preserve their link with
the nostalgic segment of voters while trying to convince the West that they are going to continue with the reforms
and privatisation of plants, that previously were blamed to be a robbery, while previous governments were
harshly criticised because of their reforms.
This is perhaps the reason for the considerable chaos of the ordinary voters, and several doctrinal confusions with
the acting ruling party, which is largely confirmed by a large number of no-response 29.5%, and no trust in
parties at all with 22.10%
46
.
Among the political-administrative institutions, the local government and the president enjoy the largest share of
trust (47% each). The respondents have the least trust in political parties, the police and trade unions. Of political
personalities, Vladimir Voronin enjoys the greatest trust (47%), the trust in the president remains prevalent. The
level of trust in Vasile Tarlev has increased (42% compared to 35% in November 2006). Marian Lupu is the
following in the rating of trust - 31%, which is the lowest percentage since December 2005, but he is, at the same
time, the least rejected person. Serafim Urecheanu is trusted by 25% of the respondents, Dumitru Braghis, Dorin
Chirtoac, and Iurie Rosca - by 17%, the trust in these three personalities has slightly changed since November
2006. Looking at the chart showing the dynamics of public trust, one can see that the stakeholders register all
together a common growing trend, but also a certain path dependency could be observed. Not only each
stakeholder stays in its own path, ranging between a margin of 10% and 20%, but also there are hardly any
points of intersection between their traces. It illustrates in fact the lack of public participation and inter-level
communication in Moldova. In general, it is well known that in Moldova the TV has the largest audience and
enjoys the biggest trust among population, while the consumption of written media is much lower.
But besides the differences in the level of media consumption there is a lack of the same intersection points
between the discourses in the newspapers and the discourses on the TV, which shows the existence of the
mentioned path dependency at the level of separate actors of the civil society. Most interesting, it seems that the
population, or the ordinary citizen, do also have a path of its own. There are no intersection points between the
general public and various institutions, including the civil society actors. There is no dialogue between them - one
can easily observe that the average citizen acts like a spectator, not like an actor.
A poll conducted in 2003 by the IDIS shows that the second most important way to get informed about the
political life for the ordinary people is to talk with other people about politics, the first most important way is
watching the TV news. The balance between the choice of watching the TV and the choice of talking with others is
close to fifty-fifty, which means that people are reactive, not proactive.
43
Declaration of the Committee of Defending the Independence and Constitution of Moldova, December 6, 2003
44
See for instance, Barometer of Public Opinion, October November, 2004, made by the IPP, www.ipp.md.
45
Only 9% do trust the government, 8% - do trust the Parliament, 5.4% - do trust justice, 2.5% - do trust political parties and 3.8% - do trust the police (as compared with
43.9% - do trust church). The IPP Barometer of Public Opinion, Februariy 2005
46
Public Barometer Opinion Poll, IPP, November 2003
Considering the obvious hardships in providing free access to information, while keeping the National TV under
strict control of the ruling party, one may easily understand that the society feels largely disoriented. People feel
the state is too big, while politicians are too many. In 2002, respondents claimed that there are too many political
parties in Moldova, and one party would suffice.
There are a lot of newspapers, TV channels, and radio stations in Moldova, the NGOs are flourishing, the
opposition is sitting in the parliament, and people are not sent to jail for criticising authorities. All the massive
street protest actions that have taken place in Moldova since 1988 were of a political nature claims to raise the
social status of the Moldovan/Romanian language marked the rise of the national movements in 1989; they
provoked considerable political reshuffles in 1995; and proved to be a strident political slogan also in 2002, when
anti-Communist strikes were held on the streets of the capital.
1.4. The Political Dynamics of the First Decade
Since declaring independence in 1991, Moldova has been one of the most pluralistic post-Soviet states, even if at
times it has oscillated between non consolidated democracy and non consolidated authoritarianism. Some authors
in the West even concocted the term pluralism by default system of governance, suggesting that the lack of a
unified pillar (ethnic, religious, civic) brings systematic instability to the political regime and is conducive to
continuous unrest in Moldova.
The trend toward democracy has been traditionally stronger, especially throughout the 1990s but was significantly
hampered by economic problems, the lack of consistent reforms, and a secessionist conflict in Transnistria. The
latter has diverted Moldovas extremely limited political and economic resources from promoting reforms into
efforts to reunite the country.
Until 1990, the Communist Party of Moldavia (CPM) was the dominant political force in the republic. It had
controlled the administrative, economic, and cultural affairs of the Moldavian SSR from its establishment until
1990. During that period, CPM officials monopolised virtually all politically significant government positions.
However, once democratic elections were decided upon, the party's power disintegrated swiftly. The CPM was
formally banned in August 1991, following the abortive August coup d'tat against the Soviet president
Gorbachev, but former Communists continued to participate actively in politics through their membership in a
variety of successor organisations.
In the wake of the 1990 elections, the Moldovan Popular Front, founded in 1989 and consisting of an association
of independent cultural and political groups, moved into a commanding position in the country's political life. It
emerged as an advocate of increased autonomy from the Soviet Union and of the rights of the Moldavian SSR's
ethnic Romanian population. Popular Front delegates were able to dominate proceedings in the Supreme Soviet
and to select a government made up of individuals who supported its agenda.
The Popular Front was well organised nationally, with its strongest support in the capital and in areas of the
country most heavily populated by ethnic Romanians. Once the organisation was in power, however, internal
disputes led to a sharp fall in popular support, and it fragmented into several competing factions by early 1993. In
February 1993, the Popular Front was reformed as the Christian Democratic Popular Front (CDPF).
Several other parties, primarily composed of ethnic Romanians, were organised after 1990. The largest and most
influential of these ethnically-based parties is the Democratic Agrarian Party of Moldova, which is a coalition of
former Communists and moderate status-quo supporters of the Moldovan statehood and closer economic ties with
Russia. The party's support comes mainly from the rural populace, economic conservatives, and ethnic minorities
opposed to reunification with Romania. The Democratic Agrarian Party of Moldova won a majority of the votes in
the 1994 parliamentary election. A much smaller but still influential political group is the Social Democratic Party
of Moldova.
Most of the Social Democrats' leaders originally participated in the Popular Front but later formed their own
organisation in response to what they perceived as the increasingly nationalistic position of that party. The Social
Democrats are multiethnic, and their constituency consists mainly of educated professional and managerial groups.
Their support is the strongest in the republic's capital.
A new political party, "Fair Pridnestrovie", has been registered in Pridnestrovie and will compete in the next
elections. Three sitting members of the parliament joined the party during its founding congress. With the new
party, the total number of political parties in Pridnestrovie now reaches ten. At the moment, a total of ten registered
political parties exist in Pridnestrovie.
Apart from "Fair Pridnestrovie", the latest, the nine others are: The Republican Party ("Respublika"), Renewal,
Breakthrough ("Proriv"), the Pridnestrovie Communist Party (PKP), the Communist Party of Pridnestrovie (KPP-
CPSU), the Patriotic Party of Pridnestrovie (PPP), the Liberal Democratic Party of Pridnestrovie (LDPR), the
People's Will, and the Social Democratic Party.
The Law on Political Parties and Socio-Political Organisations passed by the parliament in September, 1991
provided that 300 citizens of the Republic of Moldova could come together and organise a political party.
The easy legal requirements for the registration of a political party and the proportional representation system
contributed to a greater extent to the development of a highly fragmented party system in Moldova. Between 1991
and 1998, in Moldova, 58 political parties were established and registered by the Ministry of Justice. Between
1998 and 2002, parties with parliamentary representation tried to address the problem of party system
fragmentation by increasing the number of party members necessary for the registration of a political party.
So, in 1998 the number of party members was raised from 300 to 5,000. In 1998, of 58 political parties only 25
parties managed to re-register according to the new provisions, but the number of political parties increased in
2001 to 31. In 2002, the Christian Democratic Peoples Party, the only party having representation in all four
parliaments, requested an increase in the number of party members from 5,000 to 15,000, in a draft law that was
rejected.
Thus, parties in the parliament were more preoccupied with securing their own position and limiting the access of
new political parties.
Table 1 The Main Political Parties and Electoral Blocs during parliamentary elections in Moldova 19942008
Name of the Party or Bloc Election Results Party Chairman Roots
Party of Communists 1994: - banned
1998: 30.01% - 40 mandates
2001: 50.07% - 71 mandates
2005: 45.8% - 56 mandates
Vladimir Voronin Communist Party of
the Soviet Union
Agrarian Democratic
Party of Moldova
1994: 43.18%
1998: 3.63%
2001: 1.16%
2005: not participated
Anatol Popusoi Communist Party of
the Soviet Union
Viata satului
Party of Rebirth and
Conciliation
1994: - not registered
1998: 19.42%, participated in a bloc with CDPP
2001: 5.79%
2005: not participated
Mircea Snegur PCM / PDAM
Democratic Party 1994: -
1998: 18.16%23
2001: 5.02%
2005: component of the Our Moldova Alliance
Dumitru Diakov PCM / PDAM /
Our Moldova Alliance 2001: not registered
2005: 28.5% - 34 mandates
Serafim Urechean Alliance of
Independents
Alliance for Braghis 1994: -
1998: -24
2001: 13.36%
2005: component of the Our Moldova Alliance
Dumitru Braghis PCM / PDAM /
Democratic and
Prosperous
Moldova
Unity (Edinstvo) 1994: 22.00% 25
1998: 1.83%26
2001: 0.46%
2005:
Valentin Krilov
Veronica
Abranciuc
Edinstvo
Movement /
Socialist Unity
Christian Democratic
Popular Party
1994: 7.53%27
1998:28
2001: 8.24%
2005: 9.07%, 11 mandates
Iurie Rosca Popular Front
Party of Democratic
Forces
1994: 9.21 29
1998: 8.84%
2001: 1.22%
2005: dissolved
Valeriu Matei Popular Front
Bloc of Peasants
and
Intellectuals
National Liberal Party 1994: 30
1998: 2.24%31
Mircea Rusu Popular Front /
Bloc of Peasants
2001: 2.81%
2005: component of the Our Moldova Alliance
and
Intellectuals
Social Liberal Party 2001:
2005: component of the Our Moldova Alliance
2007: merged with the Democratic Party
Oleg Serebrian Party of Democratic
Forces
In February 1994, Moldova held its very first post-independence, free parliamentary elections
47
. The Collectivist-
led Agrarian Democratic Party won the largest number of seats of the parliament, and a first pro-Moscow, old-
minded leftist bloc (ADPM and Socialist Party/Edinstvo) created a ruling coalition.
By stepping into power, the new pro-CIS block decided to ratify Moldova's political adherence to the CIS, and
claimed to restore historical ties that must bring back the prosperity that our citizens lost as a result of the Soviet
dissolution. In order to block any attempt of the opposition to claim a rapprochement between Moldova and
Romania, President Snegur, under the pressure of the Agrarian-Socialist block, organised a hurried national
referendum (March 1994) with a single question, whether "the people wish to build an independent Moldova,
entirely separate from Romania?.
Such a measure, taken immediately after the elections (which otherwise reinforced the influence of the old
nomenclature when the electorate continued to be in a deep depression provoked by the bloody and lost war in
Transnistria, and by the unprecedented post-independence inflation), brought the expected results to the pro-
Moscow faction. Around 90% of those who participated in the pool supported a Republic of Moldova within its
1990 borders, entirely independent of Romania but including the Transnistrian region.
Soon after, the Moldovan Parliament revoked the law which made the Moldovan national anthem identical to the
Romanian one, and then in April 1994 suspended the provision of the 1989 law that required the Romanian
language to be learnt in ten years by all public servants. Moreover, in July 1994, the Agrarian-Socialist coalition
agreed to adopt a constitution, which provided that the name of the official language of Moldova is not Romanian
but Moldovan (Art.13), and declared Moldova's permanent neutrality (versus NATO's rapprochements of the
neighbouring countries).
The Agrarian-Socialist block governance (1994-1998) had a strong impact on Moldova's self-perception, as a
newly emerging independent country, and on its image abroad.
Although Moldova was the first CIS country to join the Council of Europe in 1995, and to implement the
economic reform with the support of international and regional organisations, the "outcomes" of these reforms
made the country one of the poorest regions in Europe.
This was due to the fact that, enjoying the support of the IMF, World Bank, and donors who during these years
generously offered Moldova huge loans and grants totaling more than USD1.3 billion, the Agrarian-Socialist
government did not reform the agriculture and opposed massive privatisation. Instead, the former Communist
leadership redirected budget sources and different state-guaranteed loans, and grants to the non-reformed sectors of
economy, or used these financial sources totally improperly, thus actually contributing to their embezzlement or
stealing.
Thus, the Agrarian-Socialist government aggravated Moldova's poorest preparedness for a smooth transition to
market economy and democracy. Amid slow gains and painful setbacks to that transition, without clear political
views for the country's future, Moldova did not aspire, as did other countries from the region, to NATO or
European Union membership. As a member of the Partnership for Peace Programme, its cooperation with the
NATO did not exceed the level of cooperation attained by other aspirant countries.
Moreover, during the years of 1994-1998, Moldova did not take measures to be seriously and firmly supported by
the US, the European Union and other countries for pursuing the Russian Federation to withdraw its troop and
armaments from the Transnistrian region where Russian army troops prop up the breakaway authorities.
Already in the 1998 parliamentary elections, the Party of Communists became the strongest force in the Moldovan
Parliament holding 30 percent of the popular vote and 40 out of the 101 seats.
47
Earlier, elections were held in 1990 in correspondence with the laws and institutions existing in the USSR, while later on, due to the mounting military conflict in Transnistria,
political developments were cooled down.
However, the Communists were sidelined by the non-Communist factions, which formed a broad coalition called
the Alliance for Democracy and Reforms (ADR).So, when in 1998 the Alliance for Democracy and Reforms
(ADR) held office(with 61 out of 101 seats in the parliament), it was not capable of rapidly solving many of the
existing painful political, economic and social problems: the Transnistrian conflict, inherited foreign debts, and
arrears to pensions and salaries.
This coalition united the Democratic Convention (led by ex-president Mircea Snegur - the Party of Rebirth and
Conciliation PRCM, the Christian Democratic Popular Front - led by Iurie Rosca, a Bloc for a Democratic
and Prosperous Moldova led by Dumitru Diakov, then a close ally of President Petru Lucinschi and the Party
of Democratic Forces (PFD)11 led by Valeriu Matei (8.84 percent 11 seats). The Communist Party remained in
full isolation, though it received 40 mandates then. The Democratic Convention components divided the main
posts in the parliament and in the Ciubuc-II-government among them according to a 2-2-1 scheme, called the
algorithm.
Already in late 1998 the first signs of division became apparent within the Alliance for Democracy and Reforms,
and following that Prime Minister Ion Ciubuc resigned in February 1999, it took the ADR several months to
appoint Ion Sturza as the new prime minister. At that time, the Christian Democratic Popular Front which had
been renamed the Christian Democratic Popular Party (PPCD)in 1999 left the Democratic Convention and the
ADR, leaving this coalition with the narrowest possible majority of 52 votes . Shortly thereafter, President
Lucinschi announced a plan to transform the mixed Moldovan parliamentary-presidential system into a
presidential one.
This idea was strongly opposed by most members of the parliament and the Parliament`s Speaker Diacov, whose
party had strongly benefited from Lucinschis support in the 1998 elections, distanced himself from the president.
As a result, some parliamentarians still close to the president defected from the so-called Diacov-bloc, leaving the
Sturza-government without a parliamentary majority. In late 1999, Sturza had to resign and a new government
under Dumitru Braghis was formed with the support of the Communists, the Popular Front and the pro-Lucinschi
independents.
Although the new pro-European government clearly reoriented its foreign policy toward the West, and succeeded
in including the Transistrian issue on the agenda of the OSCE and to strengthen cooperation with the European
Union, Moldova did not achieve the expected results. The duplicity in its dialogue with Moscow did not allow it to
fully benefit from the December 1999 OSCE summit decision regarding the withdrawal of the Russian troops from
Transnistria by the end of 2002.
Corruption of the public administration and mistrust in independent judiciary, a huge and criminalised
underground economy that is connected with the uncontrolled Transnistrian regime, a divided and differently
oriented political elite, all blocked the ADR to convince the European Union to grant Moldova an associated
status. Moreover, before the December 1999 Helsinki EU Summit, the plan incited and supported by President
Lucinschi (elected in 1996) to dismiss the reformist ADR government and to split the ADR's parliamentary
majority was achieved.
These long political disputes and debates among parliamentary factions, and between the president and the
parliament, culminated with the modification of the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova on June 5, 2000,
when the Moldovan Parliament, with a large majority, transformed Moldova into a parliamentary republic.
According to the amended Constitution, the president of the Republic of Moldova shall be elected by Parliament,
not by popular vote, and the government was invested with broader, extra powers. The elections of the new
president of Moldova by the Parliament proved to be a difficult task for the Parliament, which split into different
antagonising groups.
Although the Communist Party leader Vladimir Voronin fell just two votes short of becoming Moldova's third
president in the first round of elections, on December 21 the right-centrists factions (Democratic Convention of
Moldova, Democratic Party, Party of Democratic Forces, and Christian Democratic Popular Party), candidate,
Pavel Barbalat, received only 35 votes, and boycotted the second round of a repeated presidential election.
Accordingly, after the Constitutional Court concluded that all the conditions there allowed the president to dissolve
the Parliament, it was dissolved by President Lucinschi on December 30, 2000. But the new preliminary elections
of February 25, 2001 happened to be a dramatic event for the Republic of Moldova. Refusing to form an electoral
bloc, almost all reformists, pro-European political parties, and of course the incumbent President, Petru Lucinschi,
contributed to transform Moldova into the first post-Soviet country in which the Communist Party legally came
back to power.
Only two other political forces -- an ad-hoc pro-presidential political alliance led by the incumbent prime minister
Dumitru Braghis, and the Christian Democrat Popular Party, supported indirectly by President Lucinschi, -- passed
the required 6% threshold, getting together 30 out of 101 seats in Parliament.
As expected, on April 2, 2001, the Communist controlled Parliament elected the Communist Party leader Vladimir
Voronin as Moldova's third president. With its own president and 71 seats in the legislature, the Party of
Communists achieved almost an uncontested majority of seats in the Parliament that allowed them even to change
the main law, the Constitution.
The 2001 elections, actually marked a new record in lost votes due to the new 6 percent-threshold for parties and
electoral blocs
48
. Altogether 28.33 percent of the voters opted for electoral contestants who failed to achieve the
threshold set for them. Only three formations managed to enter the parliament:
the Party of Communists earned 71 mandates with 50.07% of the vote;
the Braghis Alliance led by the then prime minister formed by several centre-left parties gained 13.36% and 19
mandates;
the Christian-Democratic Popular Party of Iurie Rosca obtained 8.24% and 11 mandates.
With a large majority of mandates in the parliament and a president of the state, identical with their party leader,
the Communists soon found , however, that their party human resources were less than necessary, and that in order
to supply with the right people the state machinery they had just received through democratic and free
elections, they needed to search for allies.
Without altering their monopoly on power by making post-election coalitions, the CPRM launched a campaign
to recruit new members of the party, as well as technocrats willing to work in the interest of the party. So, when
the Prime Minister, Tarlev was designated for the position of prime minister and established the Cabinet of
Ministers, the government of Moldova seemed quite neutral in political terms, with almost no members of the
party as ministers.
The situation started to change in one year, when the leaders of the CPRM discovered that they could lose control
over the Cabinet, once it operates without the label of party-associated people.
In tactical terms, the Communist leaders have assimilated without any shame all the achievements and results of
the reforms made by their precursors, whom they blamed, however, for having ruined the country. They found,
however, that they could lose cooperation with the IMF, the World Bank, and other important western Partners if
they blindly pursue their election objectives, therefore, taking the risk of being criticised by the most radical wings
of the party, the CPRM admitted they shall refrain from some of the most vocal election promises, such as joining
the Russia Belarus Union, or revising the privatisation results.
Generally, the rhetoric and programmes that were first favoured by the CPRM leaders were visibly captured by
populist aims, and could be read only through the lenses of the electoralist interests. But, this was nothing new for
the political elites of the post-Communist states. Populist parties and populist leaders are well-known in
transitional societies.
Trying to invent the countrys democratic traditions almost from scratch, the new leaders of an independent
Moldova need disparately to entice their political objectives into a nicely phrased and well-done public discourse
that gets public approval, and where populism gets its full acceptance.
So, if one analysed the succession of governments in Chisinau that may easily be equated with the succession of
populist groups that have only changed decorations but never their inner content to remain in power: nationalists
Agrarians Socialists Communists, all of them had a difficult time to accommodate themselves to the political
scene but never changed the main approach to the political power, as an instrument of wealth creation, and
reinterpretation of the past.
So, if balancing between East and West was a major tactics for President Luchinschi, then, the Communist
government in 2001 came with a rather generous plethora of promises to restore the former collective farms, and
wealth that existed in the USSR, to join the Russia Belarus Union, or to raise salaries till 2008 to almost 300
usd/mo. Conflict settlement of Transnistria is counted among the most ubiquitous sources of populism in Moldova,
48
In 1994 and 1998, a 4%-threshold applied for all electoral contestants. Since April 2008, a 6%-threshold has been adopted.
as it has always played a role in keeping politicians dependent on external agendas, without having their own
resources to reach the aim of reintegration.
Not to be outdone, in September 1997 Lucinschi's supporters formed the Bloc for a Democratic and Prosperous
Moldova, taking membership from the pro-Lucinschi Movement for a Democratic and Prosperous Moldova that
had been set up in December 1996 under the leadership of the Deputy Speaker of Parliament Dumitru Diacov.
Like the Democratic Convention, the Bloc included a number of smaller parties. As in the presidential elections of
1996, the Lucinschi forces hoped to capture as much of the political center as possible. Somewhat of a surprise
was the return of a strong unreformed Communist Party.
Although outlawed from 1991 to 1994, the Communist Party of Moldova still maintained by far the best
countrywide political organisation, and it was the only political party with longevity and tradition. The party hoped
to capitalise on Moldovans' suffering from the country's severe economic plight and to dominate the left, including
Russian-language speakers and other minorities, by combining protest with nostalgia. The Communists sharply
attacked western-style market reforms as the root of the problem while preaching a return to a more command
economy and the renationalisation of privatised enterprises; they also opposed the privatisation plans of the
government, full integration into the CIS, and the expansion of NATO.
Increasingly succumbing to populism, the left-dominated parliament passed a law that "ostensibly guaranteed all
Moldavians a subsistence-level income," even though the cost to the state would be twice the annual budget. In an
effort to benefit the Bloc, Diacov proposed that the parliament should dissolve itself and schedule early elections.
But the gambit backfired when the left and right joined forces to remove him as deputy speaker. Several other
highly placed Lucinschi supporters were dismissed from their positions as well. Even though Lucinschi had
previously criticised Snegur for not being able to work within the constitutional structure, which gives roughly
equal power to the prime minister and the president, he now began calling for changes that would strengthen the
power of the president.
Moldova's bitterly fought political campaigns, marked by numerous personal attacks, have prompted some to
question the idea of having elections for the presidency and parliament only two years apart, instead of holding
them together.
As one analyst stated, "Society ... is tired of incessant elections, and each time a new polarisation of opinions has a
painful impact on the development of [the] democratic process." In a television address after the March elections,
Ciubuc said that the five months preceding the elections had damaged the country's economy beyond "the darkest
expectations."
The executive branch of the government had "worked just formally" and "ties with the IMF [International
Monetary Fund] and the World Bank were practically disrupted, while foreign investments ceased." The
government unjustifiably forgave "huge debts" of many state enterprises and made "populist reductions of tariffs
for energy consumption." Therefore, political parties strategies are emphasised just during the elections, when the
members try to influence people both by their charisma and by their political programmes, which give priorities
and advantages to people and for people.
Based on a vociferous populist ideology, the Communist party in power blamed the previous governments for the
accumulation of social problems, promised to halt privatisation, increase salaries and pensions, and renationalise
the industry. Its government followed a dirijistic approach, which led to significant barriers to business, and new
rent-seeking opportunities for corrupt behavior. The system of civil service has been entirely subordinated to the
partys views and interests, while symbolic policies have prevailed over other substantial reforms.
Whereas the military is not a factor of any political weight in Moldova, the business community and nomenclature
do enjoy real veto powers in various fields. After the Party of Moldovan Communists (PCM) won power in 2001,
Moldovas scores on democracy, electoral practices, civil society, independence of the media, and independence of
the judiciary worsened. In 20042005, the downward spiral stopped, and there are chances that the negative trend
will be reversed in 2006.
Nevertheless, the most pressing questions for Moldova and its international partners are, however, less connected
to the countrys record in human rights and democracy which, judged by the standards within the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), is quite positive but directed more towards economic problems.
After the elections, the principle of respect for private property was reiterated numerous times. On the other hand,
the PCRM, inter alia, emphasised the significance of the state property in economic branches of strategic
importance and called for the protection of local producers as well as price controls on several products, including
energy, and the wine-making industry.
The Communists have opposed the privatisation process in the agricultural sector in the past years and continued
their criticism after the elections. Vladimir Voronin had qualified the Pamant (Land) privatisation programme
implemented
with the support of the US government as destructive , stating that the Party will revise the agrarian reform
course and to introduce some corrections at the reform's post-privatisation stage
49
. By appointing a declared
opponent of Pamant Dumitru Todorolgo, as Minister of Agriculture, the above-mentioned question mark has
become even more significant.
The PCM remained in office (March 6), though with a significantly smaller majority. The low rate of FDI and
international assistance, the size of the black economy (including transfers from Moldovans abroad) as well as the
massive outflow of labour indicate that trust in government policies is low and the credibility of the emerging
centrist opposition is yet unproven. This has opened the way for a more balanced political system in which the
opposition and civil society have a greater role to play.
The population is still rather discontent with the government policy in several major fields, with a prevalent share
of discontentment with the actions undertaken in all the fields included in opinion polls.
The respondents constantly express the highest degree of discontentment with the government policy in the fields
of salaries (83.7% of respondents are discontent), employment (81.4%), living standards (76.4%), which are the
major fields, as well as in the fields of fighting against corruption (75.3%), settlement of the Transnistrian conflict
(73.9%). Rise in salaries and pensions (28%), paying salaries, pensions and stipends in duly terms (17%),
economic and infrastructure development (13% and, respectively, 9%) are the most frequently mentioned
achievements of the present government, i.e. of the ruling Communist Party. The most frequently mentioned
failures of the present government are raising prices (12%), propagation of corruption and criminality or no fight
against them (10%), failures of foreign policy (8%) and unsettled Transnistrian conflict (6%).
1.5 Party Rule and the Status of the Political Opposition in Moldova
The Republic of Moldova has changed its government many times since 1990. The opposition has always been
weak and unstable. In Moldova, democracy encounters serious practical problems because the ruling elite equates
it with majority rule without due respect for minority views and constitutionally guaranteed rights.
The rule of the Communist Party since 2001, the weak opposition parties and a political culture that has not fully
absorbed democratic values have led to a situation where the democratic framework and its institutions are
constitutionally enshrined, but are under serious strain in practice.
Parliament is not really receptive to alternative opinions and policy recommendations. Political parties, in
government or opposition, do not engage in regular dialogue with civic groups to develop inclusive,
comprehensive public policies and governance programmers.
A viable democracy entails extensive cooperation between the government and opposition parties. For countries
like Moldova, struggling to build democratic institutions and processes, the development of good working
relationships between parties is of key importance and will have a significant influence on the future of democracy.
With Agrarians as the ruling party (19941998), the poles remained in the opposition (Socialist Party Edinstvo and
a bunch of right-wing pro-EU parties: the Popular Front, the Party of Democratic Forces, the Party for Rebirth and
Conciliation, etc). For a very brief period after the 1998 Russian crisis, a weak coalition of pro-reform parties
succeeded to implement a number of reforms. This allowed Moldova to apply and receive a WTO membership, to
rationalise and encourage investments in the energy distribution sector, design a pension reform, and proceed on
land privatisation.
After gaining elections in 1998, a new democratic coalition, called the Alliance of Democratic forces, promised to
continue and advance the reforms, but it was too weak and fragile. Even the laws adopted so far went slowly and
with various degrees of resistance from the state bureaucracy on their implementation. Political fight among
coalition main partners (the Popular Christian Democratic Party, the Party of Democratic Forces and the
49
Infotag 02.04.2001, Communists Intend to Revise Some Essential Laws..
Democratic Party) caused increased discontent, stimulated also by falling living standards, and the slow and
unsatisfactory outcomes of the reforms, combined with the growing and pervasive level of poverty.
In the 1994 and 1998 parliamentary elections, the electoral threshold was 4% for political parties and 3% for the
independent candidates. The parliament passed several amendments to the Electoral Code in 2000 by increasing
the threshold to 6% for political parties and in 2002 by introducing the 9% and 12% thresholds for the electoral
blocs of two political parties and of three and more parties respectively.
These changes in the electoral legislation were passed in order to clean up the political scene of the Republic of
Moldova. The electoral threshold for parliamentary elections proved to be a major barrier for Moldova`s weakly
institutionalised political parties for getting representation in the parliament and playing an active role in public
policy and the development process of the country.
Thus, political parties of different size, ideological and programmatic stances were forced to come together and
form electoral blocs, which fell apart after being elected and having got representation in the parliament and
disappeared before the next parliamentary elections.
As for the Republic of Moldova, its first electoral law provided for a 4% threshold. Under that law, the 1998
parliamentary elections took place. Because of the threshold, 23.57% of the votes were ignored. The ratio of
distortion, i.e. the percentage of seats gained compared to the percentage of votes cast, was equal to 1.32 (in other
words, each party who managed to overcome the threshold received 1.32% of offices for each 1% of votes cast).
However, a later amendment to electoral law raised the threshold to 6%. Under the later version of the Electoral
Code, the 2001 early parliamentary elections took place. Due to the 6% threshold, 28.33% of the votes were left
out. The ratio of distortion was equal to 1.4. (If the 2001 parliamentary elections took place under 4% threshold,
only 17.52% of votes would be left out, with the distortion ratio being equal to 1.21.)
By the end of 2007, the Communist-majority parliament, in cooperation with the Christian Democratic Popular
Party, had adopted another amendment to the Electoral Code, which prohibited the formation of the election blocs,
as well as changing the threshold for electoral blocs of two parties to 6%, as reported to the previous threshold of 7
to single parties, as well as to three and more parties to 12%.
The electoral threshold provided for the parliamentary elections was used as a tool to stabilise the party system and
to contribute towards the development of stronger and more viable political parties. The majority of political
parties established in Moldova since 1991 represented weak organisations active only before and during election
campaigns, fully dependent on their leaders, who usually provided and secured the financial resources necessary
for the parties survival and disconnected from the voters needs, incapable of articulating their priorities and
expectations into feasible programmes and governing alternatives.
It is our position that any electoral threshold, which seriously undermines the whole idea of proportional electoral
system, and ultimately the legitimacy of the representative body (Parliament, local council), is not democratic.
Contemporary democracy is based on personal representation. That means that these are the individual citizens in
their own capacity, who are to be represented, not social classes or groups. Consequently, the system of
representation has to reflect as accurately as possible the interests of all and each particular individual. It, therefore,
has to correspond to the existing preferences in society.
That is why any electoral mechanism, which, though called proportional or representative, is neither
representative, nor proportional, may not be considered democratic. It is our contention that the existing Moldovan
electoral system of 6%-9%-12% threshold distorts the actual electoral preferences to a very high degree.
It inflates the interests of a group who voted for several major parties, but absolutely neglects the preferences of
supporters of medium-size and small parties. It multiplies the value of a citizen who voted for a major party by 1.4,
while reducing the value of a citizen who voted for other parties to 0. This case is in sharp contradiction with the
principle of equal vote. The electoral code was reformed but not sufficiently to prepare the ground for the elections
from 2009. The score of electoral process remains unchanged at 3.75.
As a result of the election campaign, the peoples intention to take part in voting has increased, which happens
before all elections. 77% of respondents stated they would go to vote. If parliamentary elections were held in the
Republic of Moldova next Sunday, approximately 28.7% of the respondents who expressed the intention to go to
vote stated that they would vote for the Communist Party, which is a drastic decrease compared to November 2006
when such an option was expressed by 50% of respondents. 6.8% of respondents would vote for Our Moldova
Alliance Party, 5.9% - for the Peoples Christian-Democratic Party, 3.7% - for the Social Liberal Party, 3.3% -
for the Democratic Party, the other parties accumulated under 3%.
At the same time, 41% of respondents who have the intention to vote have not decided yet what party or political
structure to vote for if parliamentary elections were held next Sunday. 81% of respondents expressed the intention
to take part in the forthcoming local elections (will certainly or probably go to vote), but the share of irresolute
people is higher if compared to the intention to take part in parliamentary elections (53%). In the total share of
people who have the intention to go to vote, 23% would vote for the Communist Party in the local/municipal
council and 24% would opt for the Communist Party in the district council. 4.8% and respectively 5.0% would
vote for Our Moldova Alliance Party, Peoples Christian-Democratic Party would accumulate 4.8% and,
respectively, 5.8%, the other parties would accumulate under 3%.
This was largely the reason for the huge political crisis by mid 2000, resulting in new anticipated elections in
February 2001, in which the Communist Party won a landslide victory and a constitutional majority in the
Parliament of Moldova. The population fell into poverty basically because the old system stopped functioning and
the new mechanisms were not in place yet. The feeling of frustration, deception, and confusion related to the social
costs (in financial terms) of the reforms is of course, one of the most frequently used explanations of the
phenomenon of communism popularity in Moldova.
The return to power of an unreformed Communist Party had a notably negative effect on the quality of democracy
in Moldova, and most of the economic reforms were suspended or even reverted. In the March 2005 elections, the
Communists received 46.1% of votes, and 56 seats in the parliament, more than enough to form a government, but
short of the 61 votes necessary to elect a president.
The biggest faction in the legislature remains the Party of the Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM),
with 56 seats in the 101-seats Parliament. This majority gives the Communists a majority of seats and so the
possibility to form a government on their own. However, they will not be able to elect the president. The Head of
State must be elected by at least 61 MPs. In the previous period, the Communists had 71 MPs. The oppositional
Bloc Moldova Democratic (BMD), as well as the Christian Democratic Peoples Party (PPDC) managed to enter
the parliament, with 34 and 11 seats.
The centralising tendencies of President Vladimir Voronin, are exacerbated by a weak and often co-opted
opposition, specifically for the Democratic Party and for the Christian Democratic Peoples Party, which have
been acting as de facto allies of the PCM on the most important political issues. Moldovas greatest political
problem is that there are few effective checks and balances on the power of the governing party.
After being in power for six years, the governing party has penetrated and politicised most public institutions,
including judiciary, law enforcement agencies, legislature and local authorities. To a large extent, the PCM has
become omnipresent in all public institutions, which makes it difficult to speak about effective checks and
balances on the power ruling party. Therefore, instead of a large united bloc in the parliament, the opposition
consists today of small groups of independent deputies and opposition fractions that are more often in conflict with
one another than opposing the government.
The Communist Party formed its own government and elected the president of the country. The Communist Party
faces now the challenge of internal party modernisation and reformation. The process is supported by President
Voronin but is carried out very slowly because of the fear to lose the traditional party votes and aversion of
orthodox party members to change.
Whether the Communist Party will manage to modernise or not will have a direct impact on the democratisation
process of Moldova but also on the party system development. In September 2005, a new party the European
Party conducted its first congress and is following the legal procedure for party registration. Currently, in Moldova
there are 25 political parties, registered by the Ministry of Justice. Neither the high number of members, obligatory
for party registration, nor the high electoral threshold for parliamentary elections impedes new contenders to
establish new political parties.
As a result of this political imbroglio, the Christian Democratic Popular Party, and some other parties provided a
conditional support to elect the president, who promised to deliver on needed reforms and ensure the euro-
atlantic integration of the country. The re-elected Communist government was eager to stress its commitment to
the task of Moldovas European integration, which marks a clear ideological shift from the initial pro-Russian
orientation of the Communists foreign policy.
Although analysts continue to dispute how genuine and credible this move is, putting emphasis on the task of
European integration, as well as taking some concrete steps to reform government institutions and to democratise
political life (both were initiated under very considerable pressure from the opposition), further strengthened the
reputation and legitimacy of the Communist government in the eyes of most of the key international actors in the
region.
Nevertheless, independent surveys tend to confirm that so far the popularity of the president and the ruling party
are more or less in line with the outcome of the elections. Local elections in may 2003 raised concerns, however,
in particular about the secrecy of vote, reported intimidation of opposition candidates, mass media censorship and
the incomplete separation of party and government, misuse of public resources, and biased state mass media.
Therefore, general elections in 2005 caused a high rate of public interest, and massive international involvement.
Although the legislative dominance of the CPM was reduced after the 2005 elections, Moldovan voters preserved
the communist majority in the parliament.
Factions in parliamentary opposition, partly due to the strength of the Communists popular mandate and partly
due to the Communists skillful use of such selective incentives as offers of high positions in the executive and
legislative branches of government, chose to break ranks and support re-election of the CPM leader as the
countrys president.
Still, the reformation of the judiciary remains a priority in Moldova, i.e. by strengthening judicial power,
independence of judges and prosecutors, enforcement of court decisions, quality of personnel and ensuring access
to justice. Reports state that judges remain vulnerable to external pressure and corruption
50
.
Although the situation has improved since 2005, old habits of subordinate practices imposed by the executive to
judiciary, and local autonomy, still persist. Democratisation and transition to a market economy has largely
increased demand for court services in Moldova alike in other transitional states.
According to the Freedom Houses 2005 Nations in Transition Report, Moldovas rating for national democratic
governance is a poor 5.75, reflecting the absence of effective checks and balances. It is not the quantity but the
quality of political parties that has had most impact on the development of democracy in Moldova. Currently, there
are 22 registered political parties, but only five are represented in parliament.
Moldovan parties are lacking in internal democracy, strong and sustainable organisations, accountability and
responsiveness, policy expertise in areas of interest to voters, and the ability to lobby on behalf of their
constituents. A winner-takes-all approach is still very evident in the mindset and behaviour of the ruling elite.
Formally, opposition parties can participate in the government. In reality, however, they have great difficulty in
getting their message across and their policy recommendations included in legislation. Similar to Ukraine, in
Moldova, one can broadly distinguish between those who promote a European choice and supporters of a
Slavic choice.
Trying to define these categories, one would certainly see that those who make a Slavic choice and want their
country to work towards some sort of restoration of the Soviet Union or, at the very least, a confederation with
other Slavic states.
They are opposed to membership of the European Union and to cooperation with NATO. Second are proponents of
a European choice who believe that close relations or even membership of Euro-Atlantic institutions will enhance
their countrys independence from Russia.
50
Legal and judiciary sector assessment, The World Bank, August October 2004
Source: CBS Axa, national representative survey, August 2007
Disillusioned centrists are a subset of these, referring to the growing number of lite members in Moldova, who
feel profoundly betrayed by what they perceive as inadequate western assistance and who fear that as a result their
country might slip back into Russias sphere of influence.
This significantly limits their ability to develop and sustain democracy. It also highlights a more general problem
common to countries of the third wave: the practice of democracy depends very much on the willingness of key
actors political parties, civil organisations, business, to play according to democratic rules. This is because the
ruling Communist Party still plays the democratic game according to Soviet rules, excluding opposition parties and
civic groups from a more active role in decision-making.
At the same time, the performance of opposition political parties shows that they still lack the capacity to fulfill
their roles as outlined in the constitution and national legislation. They have a poor understanding of how the
ruling party governs the country, and do not know how to promote alternative policies, programmers and draft
laws.
In order to function effectively as opposition parties, they need to develop strong and democratic party
organisations, greater expertise, and accountable and responsible leaders able to reach out to citizens. Democracy
in Moldova will depend to a great extent on viable political parties equipped to perform their primary functions in
a democratic system. In this, they have much to learn from their British counterparts.
Electoral rules (a 6% hurdle for party and 9% or 12% for bi- and multi-party alliances) has artificially reduced
the effective number of parties. Nevertheless, voter volatility used to be high, but indications show that the
Communist Party, winning a landslide victory in the 2001 elections, will still muster a solid, albeit reduced
majority in the next elections on March 6, 2005, in which they received only 55 mandates (after 71 in 2001).
The most prominent defeat of the Communist Party came only in the 2007 June local elections, which helped the
opposition parties to win elections in 21 rayons out of the existing 32. As can be seen from the attached Map of
Moldova, the Communist Party retained its control only in the northern part of the country, some isolated rayons
(Dubasari, Leova, Basarabeasca), but losing completely its traditional fiefs in Gagauzia, center and south of the
country, as well as in the Municipality of Chisinau, where a liberal mayor succeeded
51
.
Political composition of the sub-national governments after the June 2007 Local Elections in Moldova
51
Source: Policy Brief Profile of the local elections in Moldova, September 2007, IDIS Viitorul
The political structure of the cities and villages is less contrasting, due to the fact that the Communist Party has
retained its influential leverages to support its loyal structures in the ground. In particular, those who decided to
join or remain affiliated with the party in power succeeded to get the largest part of the subsidies and capital
investments from the central government, as shown in the report prepared by IDIS.
Thus, Communist mayors received in 2007 by 2.2 times more capital investments as calculated per capita,
compared with non-Communist mayors. The study shows that the government has extensively used the leverage of
discretionary transfers to influence the independent candidates to join the ruling party as members in elections and,
when this did not help, it decided to revoke the investments planned in the central budget, as a retaliation
towards the later
52
.
Source: Policy Brief, March 2008, IDIS Viitorul / www.viitorul.org
The degree of polarisation is high (on both axles of strategic orientation - economic reform and nation/state
building). Most parties tend to be shallowly rooted in society and rather represent the political ambitions and
controversies of individual politicians or groups. In many respects, political parties or alliances were created, fused
and split up to comply with the ambitions and agendas of individual politicians.
With such a polarisation on both axles of the political landscape, pragmatic cooperation and consensus building
have proven extremely difficult. The creation of a civil-society round table, moreover, indicates that normal
democratic mechanisms of mediation between society and the state have proven ineffective.
Nevertheless, the party landscape in Moldova has a considerable degree of effective detachment from the socio-
economic interests of the populace at large and rather represents the vested interests of privileged groups.
One of the reasons behind this situation is that party-lists have considerably detached the ordinary voters to vote
for people they trust, and accordingly, the party-system has practically monopolised the political selection
mechanism, in a political system which only formally resound generic values of a pluralist environment.
52
Source: Policy Brief Analysing Capital Investments Landscape in Moldova and its political determinants, IDIS, 2008
PCRM
33%
A "MN"
47%
PDM
7%
PPCD
3%
UCM
7%
PDSM
3%
Thus, no independent candidates have been elected in the last 4 parliaments of Moldova, irrespective of their
merits, due to a kind of informal pact among parties to keep the election threshold high and leave no space for
contenders that were not partyaffiliated.
The fragmentation of the party system in combination with the high threshold has resulted in a limited number of
three parties in the current parliament and 1.79 on the Laakso/Taagepera index. Another reason for limited changes
in the structure of the parliament is certainly due to the existence of one electoral district in the country, with a
limited number of precincts, where again party lists prevail by their magnitude and political influence over
independent candidates
53
.
People seem politically active and participative, but the truth is that they are not, and that is exactly why there were
no massive social actions of protests in Moldova. Even in the late 1980s, when the regular sessions of the newly
elected democratic parliament have become for the general public one of the most interesting shows to be watched
on TV, and not knowing the contents of yesterday editorial in the main newspaper, supporting the popular front
was considered nearly an obscenity, even in those times when the national movements were politically inspired. In
fact, this is a simulation of a democratic participatory process. The state rather tends to penetrate and aim at
controlling civil society and NGOs.
As a recent survey (IPP, Nov. 2008) indicates, the Communist party still ranks the first in polls with 46% - trust,
after being rated in November 2007 with 45%, with 48% in May 2007, and with 50% in November 2006
54
. The
polls show a slowdown of the opposition while keeping the ruling party still high, apparently because it succeeded
to instill new hopes with the changes of the government in March 2008.
Nevertheless, the rating in the leader of the CPRM dropped significantly: to 39.5% in April 2008 after being rated
at 41.7% in November 2007, and 44% in may 2007. The trends suggest that the drop of popularity for the leader of
the Communist party may reach a 33% in the fall of 2008, some 5 months before the upcoming general elections,
which may affect the ruling party stance, as it is increasingly built around the paternalistic rule of Vladimir
Voronin, as a donor of public confidence.
The government uses a political rhetoric of transition reforms without social costs. In political practice, some
achievements in economic reform, e.g. in privatisation, are reversed and a gradual loss of human capital is
accepted for the sake of avoiding unpopular measures. Evidently, the PCM was elected in 2001 on a ticket of
status quo and non-reform.
The need to cooperate with the IFI has produced some reforms and prevented strategic backtracking, but no
consistent and coherent policy is implemented. Moldova ranks high in assessments of state capture.
The effects were quickly seen through an almost unchallenged political hegemony of the ruling party, reigning
over a fragmented and weakened opposition
55
. The reform-oriented opposition was too divided and weak to be in a
position to exclude or co-opt anti-democratic veto actors. One of the visible hampering factors to the on-going
modernisation of the country was clearly the political elites.
Nevertheless, protests typically do not question the democratic institutions as such. Judging the rule of law, the
civic peace, democracy, human dignity, the rights and freedoms of man, the free development of human
personality, justice and political pluralism to be supreme political values, being aware of the responsibility and
duties towards the past, present and future generations, reasserting the devotion to overall human values, and the
wish to live in peace and harmony with all the peoples of this world, in accordance with the unanimously
acknowledged principles and norms of international law, the constitution is considered the supreme law of the
society.
Each type of democratic institutions tried to respect and apply in practice international and national rules, laws,
and conventions. According to the regular representative surveys, the level of trust in institutions of all kind
registered a growing trend over the years of 2001-2005
56
.
53
The obvious reason to keep the proportional representative election system within one district was that Moldovan authorities aimed to include all citizens of the country in
elections, despite of the obvious fact of being unable to hold free and democratic elections on the left bank of Dniester, where separatists impede elections to be held there.
54
Public Barometer, April 2008, IPP
55
New Freedom House Study Reveals Growing Democracy Gap in Europe Russia Displays Further Setbacks. NEW YORK, May 24, 2004; Report of the Bureau of
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights OSCE/BIDDO on local elections of 2003, http://www.osce.org/odihr
56
Barometer of public opinion, IPP, 2003, 2004, 2005, Chisinau
At the same time, the level of participation in the elections has seen a decrease over the last decade. The last year
local elections in Chisinau, the capital of Moldova, failed four times because of the low turnout below the
mandatory level of minimum one third of the number of electors.
As a rule, the turnout of electors in Chisinau is by about 1015 percent lower than on the country. The traditional
absenteeism of Chisinau residents may also seem hard to explain - as most civil society actors, are concentrated in
the capital city.
79.3
69.1
67.5
65
60
58
59
27
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
%
Dynamics of participation in local and national elections in Moldova
Over 70% of the respondents say it is very important to live in a state which is democratically governed. Variations
are essentially influenced by the incomes, and age. Cross-tabulating the results of a survey implemented in 2007,
one can see that men are more prone to appreciate the influence of democracy to their lives than women (overall
score is 6.99), and the second factor is related to ethnicity.
Romanian ethnics appreciate more the importance of democracy in Moldova than other nationalities, being
followed by Bulgarians and Moldovans, with the lowest scores provided by Ukrainians and Russians. Here is to be
mentioned that differences between Romanians Moldovans are purely ascribed to the individual sense of
belonging, and not to the official version of the titular nation identity. It seems that the scores can be mainly
attributed to the degree of political socialisation of the groups.
Another factor towards effective socialisation of the groups seem to be related to the relative size of it. Thus, one
could observe a higher mobilisation in politics for minority groups which are not very numerous. Insofar as the
national group is smaller, individual interest in getting into politics is higher (15.9% for Ukrainians, 10.3% for
Gagauz, 13.6% Romanians, 5.9% Moldovans). Another variation can be correlated with the incomes. Low-income
persons and with primary education only stem far away from politics, political debates, or active forms of
mobilisation.
How important is for you to live in a state democratically governed?
In addition to measure the importance of the democratic rule for individuals, it seems to be of particular
importance to define exactly what democracy means for citizens. Democracy is defined as important influencing
the life of more than 88.6% of the adult respondents in Moldova, with only 11.4% saying that they cannot define
what is democracy.
Considering that Moldova is a young state, the score is quite high and impressive
57
. Politics attracts ordinary
people very little. Respondents claim they participate rarely or do not participate in political gatherings (75.2%), as
compared with only 2% who say they participate regularly in the public rallies.
Almost 53.8% of the respondents say they see no reason to enroll themselves as member of a political party, or to
convince anyone to vote in a certain way (53.7%). It shall be noted that the number of persons that share
membership with a political party or NGO does not exceed 2%.
Defining democracy by the respondents of a national representative survey in Moldova
57
Family in transition Study, accomplished by the IDSI Viitorul, ordered by UNICEF Moldova, Survey implemented in 2007.
Not at all important Very important
6.0% 2.9% 4.4% 5.0% 15.5% 6.0% 7.8% 11.5% 15.5% 25.4%
Frequently, people discuss politics with their close friends (15%), watch various TV or Radio programmes on
political issues (16.6%), or read political newsletters (11.5%). Nevertheless, acknowledging that democracy
influences their life does not mean that people are very satisfied with the level of democracy in the country.
How satisfied are you with the level of democracy in Moldova?
Synthetical indicator VOP 2006
Male -49.0
Female -54.1
Primary education / no-education -36.4
Grammar school and professional-tehnical education -48.9
High-level university education -60.3
18-29 years -50.4
30-44 years -51.5
45-59 years -58.6
60+ years -47.7
Rural -49.0
Small cities -53.5
Large cities -60.8
Opposition -51.7
Communist party -35.6
Will not vote -63.7
Dont know -60.7
Full-time employment -58.3
Part-time employment -60.4
Not employed -50.1
Moldovan/Romanian -50.6
Russian -68.6
Ucrainian -57.6
Gagauz (national minority speaking a dialect of Turkish
language, being of Christian Orthodox faith) -80.7
Up to 400 lei -52.9
401 - 700 lei -44.2
701 - 1000 lei -44.3
1001 - 2000 lei -54.9
Over 2000 lei -66.2
Sure, I will vote (national minority speaking a dialect of
Turkish language, being of Christian Orthodox faith) -46.0
Perhaps I will vote -51.0
Probably I will not vote -63.8
Sure, I will not vote -78.3
Dont know (nu citii) -54.6
Do not want to respond (nu citii) -69.2
Politicians -37.6
Dont trust anyone -67.4
No response -45.7
No response -57.5
In a parliamentary republic as the Republic of Moldova is, only 18% of the population consider that the country is
really led by the parliament, over half of respondents have stated that in fact the president rules the country, while
a tenth of respondents think that the country is ruled by some circles of interests from inside the country.
According to the respondents, the president of the parliament, Marian Lupu, has the greatest chances to become the
president of the Republic of Moldova after the 2009 parliamentary elections (11,9%), followed by the prime
minister, Vasile Tarlev (6.4%) and by the vice-president of the parliament, Iurie Rosca (3%).
Nearly 70% of respondents did not respond to such a question, while 2.8% of the participants in the poll think that
the president in office will be re-elected after the 2009 elections.
1.6. Corruption and Anti-Corruption Policy in Moldova
Moldovas Transparency International rank for 2007 is 113th of 146 with a score of 2.3, labeling this country as
one of the most corrupted countries in Europe. During year 2006, the country received a score of 3.2 on
(Transparency International) TI's 10 point composite index of the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist
among a country's politicians and public officials. The score marked an improvement on the 2005 score of 2.9 out
of 10, where 10 indicates the lowest level of corruption.
The law provides for free public access to official information; however, the government generally denied access
to public information and ignored requests from the independent media. For example, the investigative weekly
newspaper Ziarul de Garda did not receive a detailed response to its June 2005 request for a copy of a contract the
president's office signed with a private company.
In 2004, the newspaper Timpul filed a complaint against the parliament for refusing to provide transcripts of its
sessions; the Supreme Court dismissed the suit. Parliament subsequently changed its regulations and now provides
transcripts of debates on the parliament's Web site and also allows transcripts of sessions to be published.
58
The existing political elite are the descendants either of the Soviet nomenclature or the nationalist-oriented
movements which appeared in opposition to the former Soviet regime.
The entire political spectrum of Moldova is still quite limited in variations: redundant former nomenclature and the
emotive newly-created opposition, having all the preconditions to become on their turn corruption producers,
through their penchant for using the unofficial connections that existed in the USSR era and which lasted until the
current phase of transition.
No measures have really been undertaken to de-motivate either the political class or the lower rank public servants,
business community who take advantage of their position for personal benefit.
It is publicly expressed that creation of a large network of specialised bodies on curbing corruption has even
increased corruption, making it more sophisticated, with several steps remaining totally descriptive, declarative
and formal on behalf of the government of Moldova. The anti-corruption programmes have flourished in the last 2
years, partly because of the increased attention from the public authorities, partly because of the Millennium
Threshold`s particular focus on curbing corruption in Moldova.
Nevertheless, the anticorruption measures are still quite reactive, compensating the lack of real cases of corrupt
behaviour with political statements and party-based accusations, which show how anti-corruption is becoming
an effective tool to the ruling party against its economic and political rivals. The political elites are missing an
opportunity to prevent rather than cure by implementing a change in the environment favoring corruption.
Public institutions are run by people who are commonly loyal to the ruling party, instead of proving their
professional standards and knowledge, while being accountable to the general public, as customers of the services
provided by the state.
The evaluation report for Moldova adopted by the Stability Pact Anti-Corruption Initiative (SPAI) in April 2002,
contains a series of recommendations for legislative and institutional reforms, these recommendations should now
be implemented, notably within the framework of the PACO programme. Moldova shall ratify the Convention on
Money Laundering, the Search For, and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime (STE 141).
58
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2006 Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour March 6, 2007
The report by PC-R-EV adopted in December 2001 contains a series of recommendations to reinforce the fight
against money laundering, including the process of criminalising money laundering. The deadline for submitting
declarations of income by civil servants has been continuously extended, in May 2002 to July 2003 and in August
2003 by two more months, being finally abandoned, despite the fact that Moldova applied for a Millennium
Challenge Account, supported by the US government
59
.
It is to mention here that the assets owned by the Communist candidate to the Chisinau Municipality run-off have
been subjected to several investigations by independent mass media, although no reactions were found from the
National Council on Anti-Corruption, led by the prime minister, and other acting ministers.
This is why, the CPM has launched since 2001 a vociferous campaign in favour of strengthening the vertical of
power, which also concerns the subordination over the judiciary. When the political discourse is becoming
confused, while the ideology is fuzzy, the authoritarian practices remain the last doorpost for the preservation of
power in state.
The Global Report on Corruption for 2002 launched in January 2003, in London, by the Transparency
International, states even clearer that Although, Voronin, wants to be treated as a fighter against corruption, his
own efforts seems to pursue more votes than the practical identification of solutions on this issue
60
.
The report is emphasising also the fact that there are very few cases in which the countrys authorities succeed in
finding out how to convert pure rhetoric on anti-corruption into consistent and effective programmes of curbing it.
In a different report, dated of April 2003, the Transparency International placed Moldova on the first rank of the
most corrupted states in Europe. Moldova has signed both the Criminal and Civil Conventions against corruption
(ETS 173 and 174), but has yet to ratify them.
By mid-2002, Moldova will be evaluated within the framework of GRECO; it seems likely that recommendations
for reform will emanate from this evaluation.
The activities of the public institutions are not understood as services provided to its customers - representatives of
civil society, and the public employees do not picture themselves as servants of the same civil society.
There is no mandatory system of professional promotion on the basis of performance; amoral nepotism is largely
practiced instead. To come to this conclusion, one should look at the very few, if any, public announcements for
vacancies in the governmental bodies, but also in some other state-owned institutions, including state enterprises,
schools and hospitals.
Along the same lines, the disclosure of the salaries and other benefits paid out of the taxpayers contributions to
the representatives of the political elites would seem unacceptable for the latest. All governmental institutions have
their internet sites. Here the citizens have the opportunity to get contact information about the representatives of
the institutions, strategies, signed treaties, reports, projects etc. Even this way the transparency is still ignored,
especially when it comes to corruption.
They are rarely disposed to assume the risks of personal confrontations, especially when they are brought into the
realities of healthcare or education systems. Here petty corruption is benefiting from even a higher level of
tolerance. Almost 90 percent of the population believes that the healthcare sector is corrupted, and, at the same
time, over 60 per cent of the population believes that offering a gift to a doctor to take better care of a patient is not
a corrupted act.
The overall picture in the education system is not much different. Almost 80% of the population shares the opinion
that the sector is corrupted, but 70 per cent of the respondents are afraid that the refusal to make additional
payment will have a negative influence on the academic results of their children
61
.
The low wages of the doctors and the teachers, combined with the impunity of witnessed corruption leads to its
perception by the civil society as normal behaviour. Besides, in a society with a traditionally limited competition in
the predominantly public health and education systems, there are little opportunities to choose the school or the
hospital, the teacher or the doctor.
59 Chisinau, August 26 ( INFOTAG ).
60 BASA-press, Chi;inau, 28 ianuarie 2003.
61
ibid.
The traditional practice of providing healthcare and education services on a sector affiliation basis implies a large
understanding that a favour should be gratified. On their turn, businesses people, similar to the large share of the
population, have a limited number of choices, if they are not in the corruption circle, they are somewhere in the
category of overburdened taxpayers.
Many of them perceive their tolerance towards corruption as part of their survival strategy - according to some
evidence, businessmen are visited by various inspections more then 30 times per year.
62
Local elections in 2003
showed an incredible number of scandals on financial abuses, although the battle-field against corruption was
ignored by the authorities. State mass media have openly accused the acting mayor of Chisinau of being corrupt.
On their side, the mass media subordinated to the municipality of Chisinau accused the CPM candidate of having
several assets and houses not-reported in the declaration of income. All cases in which some of the officials were
accused of mis-management of corruption were lately found inconsistent and proved no relevance to the judiciary
or prosecution.
There is corruption without corrupt people! It is therefore amazing how the ruling party leaders found the most
corrupt among the opposition opponents, in spite of the cases frequently quoted by the Accounting Court where the
Communist leaders are directly referred. In the regional election for the head of the Executive Power (Governor) of
Gagauzia, the ruling party had an active and rather hasty involvement that led to the dismissal of the former
governor, being accused of corruption, although later appointed as Moldovas Ambassador to the WTO Office in
Bern (Switzerland).
The same should be mentioned about the transparency of the budgets of the public sector it was never questioned
by the Moldovan political elites, and at the same time, the private sector has the tendency to keep a double
accounting.
The tendency to hide the earnings in the private sector, and on the other hand, to hide the expenditures in the
public sector should be noticed. This is the essence of the vicious circle favouring the shadow economy, which,
despite the stereotypical fat cat, has more than just one participant. In this particular situation, the whole
economically active population is double-thieved through private illegal earnings, but also through public
unjustified expenditures and public illegal transactions.
An example of public unjustified expenditure would be the amount spent by the state on pensions for the members
of the parliament, which are not only higher than the ones of ordinary pensioners, but also not linked to the
contributions paid by the latest to the pensions fund.
According to some calculations, about 70 such privileged pensioners spend the amounts, which would be enough
for over 800 ordinary pensions. An example of illegal transaction would be the contract, the Social Fund signed
not long ago, to import some sugar at a price above the market price. The presumable private profit out of this
contract was sufficient to pay monthly pensions to some 12 thousand people.
Usually, it is the internal fight between various interest groups in the parliament that reveals the eventual
unjustified expenditures. For instance, a rather violent conflict broke up recently when the opposition commenced
to raise the issue of breaking up the contract signed between the government of Moldova and the German
Publishing House that printed passports for Moldovan citizens; thus, the parliament adopted a resolution
compelling the government to initiate the contract annulment.
Opposition parties have repeatedly challenged the government officials for suspicion on corruption cases. Their
demands have never been seriously considered, and the public got the impression that corrupt people are only
those who do not belong to the ruling CPRM. For instance, the Christian democrats proposed to fire some of the
ministers suspected of corruption (Molojen), but the CPRM voted the motion down.
The CDPP faction maintained "the contract fleeces the country" because the department must pay to Seabeco 40
percent of the price the client pays for each document. This burden makes it impossible to reduce the document
prices, and the only person who benefits from the contract is the Canadian tycoon Boris Birstein, the Seabeco
owner.
62
Corruption and Quality of Governance, produced by Centre for Strategic Researches and NGO Transparency International Moldova, with the help of the World Bank,
UN/UNDP Moldova with the financial support of the US Embassy in Chisinau
At the same time, the Communist majority did not support another CDPP's initiative on breaking up the leasing
contract signed between Moldova and Seabeco International on supplying the Department of Information
Technologies with electronic equipment used for issuing passports, identity cards, and driving licenses.
In September and October, 2003, a human-rights NGO, Adjuta-Cives, accused a number of top-ranked officials of
various cases of corruption, protectionism and nepotism
63
. In particular, the accusation targeted the secretary of the
presidential Supreme Security Council Valeriu Gurbulea, who was blamed to implant his devoted people to the
interior and prosecutor organs in order to use them in his own, selfish interests.
These collateral changes are exactly the ones to cause opposition from some public officials who must have
normally been the main beneficiaries of the particular programmes. It happens because any type of a change,
leading to a better transparency of the services provided by the institution is a means to reduce the powers of the
civil servants and their control over service providing, or in other words, to unbalance the corrupted circle.
That is why not just high rank officials, but also public servants of a lower level are extremely suspicious towards
the know-how from abroad some routes between the levels of an institution are often being changed or even
liquidated.
In fact, this internal dispute has become for a pretty long time a rather attractive business for various mafia-related
groups and even security services, with substantial backing from Russia and Ukraine. Statistics show that the
volume of the imports largely exceeds the regions needs (petrol, alcohol, tobacco, sugar, cosmetics, and
pharmaceutics), therefore, this is therefore then re-exported into the Republic of Moldova, which is receiving,
according to the official data, not less than 25% of all Transnistrian exports, while imports of the region make up
only 7-8%. It is telling that the volume of imports in Transnistria exceeded in 2002 the exports with over
USD206.2 mln, or with 82.4% of the regional PIB, while the same indicator is only 24.2%.
1.7 Power Opposition Relationship as a Litmus Test for the Europeanisation
From January to April 2002, large demonstrations took place in opposition to several controversial government
proposals, including the expanded use of the Russian language in schools and its designation as an official
language. While the demonstrations were sometimes tense, the government did not use force and ultimately agreed
to the Council of Europe`s mediation.
In March 2005 parliamentary elections, the Communist Party received 46.1% of the vote, or 56 seats in the 101-
member Parliament -- more than enough for the 51-vote minimum required to form a government, but short of the
61 votes necessary to elect a president.
Due to the political predominance of the Communist party, the necessity to manage political cleavages and prevent
them from escalating is limited. In order to placate the international community, the rulers have accepted some
forms of dialogue and mediation with the reform-oriented and the pro-Romanian opposition blocks.
This applied specifically to Moldovas policy vis--vis the European Union and the European Neighbourhood
Policy. Cooperation with the neighbouring countries is a politically explosive issue, whether it concerns Romania,
Russia, or the Ukraine. The inability (or impossibility) to choose between its western and eastern dependencies
makes it impossible for Moldova to reap the fruits of cooperation.
The main cost of cooperation with IFIs and transition-relevant organisations would be to accelerate the reform
process without avoiding social costs. So far the PCM regime has limited this engagement for the sake of power
consolidation, while trying to uphold its CIS integration. In sum, Moldova is a passive and reluctant partner in
most regional and international transition-related forms of cooperation.
Policies of cooperation are eclectic and lacking in substance, e.g. in response to Romanias offer for cooperation in
the energy field and the options for cooperation provided by the Stability Pact or the apparent need to cooperate
with the Ukraine in the management of the Eastern border. Domestically, the reform process has profited from the
weakening of the ruling Communist Partys political dominance after the March 6, 2005, parliamentary elections.
63 Chisinau, 9 september ( INFOTAG ).
At least in some policy fields, reform legislation and its implementation have improved due to higher political
commitment and coherence. The rationale behind the regimes improved track record of reforms, however, is not
political pressure by the weak and discordant opposition, but rather the regimes quest for acceptance by and
partnership with the international community, the USA and the EU specifically.
The Communist Party has learned that a foreign-policy agenda of Euro-Atlantic integration guarantees domestic
popularity and makes it hard for the political opposition to define an alternative stance. The genuine drive and
conviction behind the domestic reform agenda, however, are still rather limited.
The rapid economic slide of the 1990s has produced dire social consequences that no 6% growth rate can reverse:
glaring social disparities between a small criminalised economic elite with strong, but non-transparent connections
to and overlaps with a corrupted political nomenclature, on the one hand, and an impoverished majority of the
population, on the other hand. Substantial remittances from hundreds of thousands of Moldovan (il)legal migrants
actually keep Moldovas economy afloat.
In April 4, 2005, guided by a surviving instinct, the Communist Party decided to create a provisional alliance
with some of its former rivals, and on the basis of their conditions, put forward, a Declaration on the strategic
objective of the Republic of Moldova to join the EU, which was endorsed by all the political parties of the newly
elected parliament. Winning only 55 seats, instead of the minimum requested mandates to confirm the president of
the country; the Communists were ready to accept however conditions, formulated by the opposition, only to have
their formal leader re-installed in its top-state position.
For most of the 2005, this volatile coalition between the Communist Party and its allies played an important role,
which had resulted in the adoption of important laws, such as: the Law on the Special Status of the eastern rayons
(Transnistria), as well as the law on the basic principles for the conflict settlement (July 26, 2005). Political forces
combined their forces in 2006 as well, by voting consensual reforms and laws, although the first signs of tidiness
were seen and acknowledged. Since end 2006, the cooperation of the Communist Party with the opposition parties
returned to its pre-election rim.
However, President Voronin was re-elected with support from the Christian Democratic People's Party and from
the Democratic and Social Liberal party factions, after Voronin promised to deliver on needed reforms and Euro-
Atlantic integration for the country. These defections broke apart the opposition unity of the pre-election
Moldovan Democratic Bloc, led by Our Moldova Alliance (AMN) faction leader and former Chisinau Mayor
Serafim Urechean. Nationwide local elections in June 2007 showed improvement over nationwide parliamentary
elections in 2005, with better access to the media for opposition candidates, and greater evidence of impartiality by
the Central Election Commission.
While the voting itself generally met international standards, the government's behaviour in the campaign period --
including bias in state media and misuse of administrative resources -- remained a concern. The Communist Party
suffered a significant setback, losing the high-profile Chisinau mayoral election and control of numerous local
councils to opposition party coalitions.
Elections in the semi-autonomous region of Gagauzia were held in December 2006; Mikhail Formuzal, a longtime
opponent of President Voronin, was elected "Bashkan" (Governor). Nowadays, even in the Republic of Moldova
there are a lot of political parties (25) we can not say that they have a real future and do not possess the treatment
for ordinary people in realising their plans and making a prosperous future, spending just public money and
worsening the outcome of the elections.
Parliamentary elections are scheduled for 2009 and the new parliament will elect the next president of Moldova.
In 2006, an estimated 30% of the working-age population worked abroad and their cash remittances of USD1
billion amounted to 30% of Moldovas GDP. Especially in the villages, the social fabric has been severely
damaged and out of economic despair, countless Moldovans, especially women have fallen victim to human
trafficking and ended up in prostitution and other forms of quasi-slave labour.
In 2002, the leaders of the PPCD, one of the opposition parties, organised a political protest against political
power. The event was important, as it has marked the beginning of important stages in the political process having
a major impact on the Republic of Moldova. The protest rallies staged by the Christian-Democrats at the
beginning of the year 2002 ended with the adoption of PACE Resolution and close monitoring of political
developments in the Republic of Moldova by the Council of Europe. The fact that the Republic of Moldova is due
to take over the presidency of the Council of Europe Ministerial Council at the time when the Communists are in
power, seems an advantage.
For one thing, this may serve, as a guarantee that there would be no "anti-democratic slide" within the country at
least for the time period that the Republic of Moldova holds the presidency. This was a political protest with no
huge violent struggle. There were some violent actions made by the police forces against journalists, citizens, who
later sued the Moldovan government and won the case at the CEDO.
CHAPTER 2 - THE TRANSNISTRIAN CONUNDRUM
2.1 Life in the Newly Acquired Communities
The breakup of the USSR generated completely antagonistic images in the industrial urbanities of the left bank of
the Dniester river and in Bender, as compared with the left-bank, with the capital in Chisinau.
A part of the problem was clearly related to the history of the region, located on the left-bank of the Nistru, as well
as in the demographic structure of the population
64
. It is to be recalled that state legacy has two completely
different meanings in Chisinau and Tiraspol. Emerging from the same USSR, the two displayed antagonistic
memories albeit not ethnically bound.
Thus, if a considerable part of the present-day Transnistria, belonged before World War II to the USSR, and even
to an artificial Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR) existing between 1924 and 1940,
while the right-bank region of Moldova was part of the Romanian Kingdom (19181940). Tiraspol, the seat of the
current secessionist government, was the capital of the MASSR from 1929 until its abolition in 1940.
Thus, it preserved some of its independence during the Soviet rule (1944-1989), mainly because of the centralist-
planning legacy, huge investments were made by the USSR in the industrialisation of the region, which finally had
an effect that the MASSR gradually developed as two republics in one: a Bessarabian area (between the Prut and
the Dniester) more Europeanised, but mostly rural, agriculture-intensive and populated by Moldovan ethnics
speaking a non-Slavic language, whereas the East of the Dniester region experienced a period of intensive
industrialisation, growth of heavy industries, and military bases, completed generally with pre-war and post-war
Soviet-loyal population, for whom Russian was the dominant language, irrespective of the ethnic background of
cultural traces.
It was from this region that that in the 1920s and 30s, Soviet authorities exerted huge political and diplomatic
pressures on Romania to accept its withdrawal form Bessarabia. In fact, the Soviets occupied Bessarabia in June
1940, as a result of a Molotov Ultimatum presented to the Romanian King, Mihai with the commandment to leave
the province in 24 hours.
Later on, Soviet historiography described the episode as being fully embraced by the population, which was by
that time largely populated by Ukrainians. It was nothing more than empty words and ideology, as neither the
demographic structure of the population, nor the mindset of the population was supportive to the new regime.
The brutal force of the Soviets had no mercy to the intellectuals and rich people, who were mostly eradicated from
the newly acquired province, liberated now from the bourgeois Romanian rule
65
. To a large extent however,
the Sovietisation of the right-bank Bessarabia took place mainly through the infusion of party and administrative
staff brought over from Russia, as well as from the Soviet Transnistria
66
.
Russian language became soon the lingua franca in all areas of political, scientific and public life, with the titular
language of the statistic majority being almost totally squeezed out of official and public use, and even changed in
script: from Latin to Cyrillic.
Some of the authors used this assumption to conclude that Moldova is a democracy divided by default on ethnic
lines. It was far from the real issues of confrontation over the region. In fact, most of the populace living in the
area was unprepared for the disintegration of the Soviet Union, whose final act in Bielovejska Puschia was seen as
a kind of personal trauma. Many of them wished for the infinite continuation of the USSR at any cost and were
easily captured by a massive media campaign against the national state established in Chisinau, thanks to a deep-
seeded Romano phobic background and a heavy military component of the region.
This state of mind was manipulated in order to focus the peoples hopes on the separatist and anti-state concept
regarding the Republic of Moldova. There are dozens of studies on Transnistrian separatism, often depicted as a
case of politicised regionalism, or a handbook practice for a military plot, or just a black hole where secret
64
In August 1940, a small strip of land, in the east of the Nistru river (Dniester) that had no name, nor separate existence was incorporated in the new Moldavian SSR, now re-
occupied by the USSR, following the infamous Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. This area, which had never been part of Romania, has become one of Stalins last big successes
almost half a century after his death. Its current size is just over 4,100 square kilometres (12% of the MSSR), with a population estimated between 540,000 and 700,000.
65
Needless to say that Ukrainians were only a slight national minority of the province before the World War II, and they do represent 8.2% today, if compared with Russian
ethnics 4.4%, Gagauzians 4.5%, Bulgarians 2.3%, and Moldovans/Romanians 74.5%. Source: Results of the National Census of 2004.
66
Igor Munteanu, Social Multipolarity and Political Violence, in National Integration and Violent Conflict in Post-Soviet Societies, The cases of Estonia and Moldova, Edited by
Pal Kolsto, Rowman and Littlefield, 2002, p.202
services, formally belonging to the great northern neighbour do a great business, but there is one basic element
that relates the separatist Transnistria with other statelets, such as Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
At the heart of it, a clan had prevailed and usurped the political, military and economic power by dint of Russian
arms, in a local war, while 16 years of full isolation under no scrutiny, no public rights and freedoms led to the
installation of a economic-military conclave, run by despotic leaders, with almost no counterbalancing
mechanisms. This sort of statelets used huge amounts of resources to create their so-called state identities,
while their rich sponsor, the Russian Federation, which tried to build there a kind of a regime with the human
face and even gave birth to some institutions that usually were associated with formal procedural democratic
institutions.
Since the early 1990s, the break-away region has become a power-instrument in the hands of the Russian state to
pressure Moldovan authorities. Whereas, Moldova as a whole had 14% of Ukrainians and 13.4% of Russians, the
Transnistrian population was more russified, while its relatively equal ethnic communities (36%-Moldovans, 30%
Ukrainians, 4%-Bulgarians, 30% - Russians), were clearly dominated by the Russian ethnics, populating the
largest cities (Tiraspol and Rabnita).
All these elements could play no role whatsoever in the course of the modern, post-USSR development if the
military factor were not involved in local politics. By 1991, there were almost 7,600 of military in the
Transnistrian part of Moldova, as a core-group of the 14
th
Soviet Army, stationed in the region, having at their
disposal large amounts of combat equipment, guns and hardware, tanks and even reactive aviation.
Thus, the civil war that erupted in 1992 left a separatist enclave under the shelter of Russian peacekeepers (the
same which supported military hostilities to erupt earlier of 1991), upon which Moldovan law is not applied, and
international control on various obscure arms trade, smuggling, and violations of the human rights cannot be
extended.
The secession appeared and was perceived in Moldova mainly as a kind of punishment of the Soviet centre
against Moldovan elites searching for independence, in 1991. Fully armoured with ammunition and arms received
from the stores of the former 14
th
Russian Army, the separatist guards have easily dismantled the constitutional
authorities of Moldova on most of the settlements of the left-bank part, receiving substantive support of the regular
military Russian troops.
This helped Transnistrian guards not only succeed to strike back the police forces of Moldova but also win one of
the key-military battles in Bender that followed after the military hostilities, which started to escalate in March
1992.
Moldova requested UN intervention against the aggression of the Russian Federation, but weak international
support, and almost no armed forces and resources, led Moldovas first President, Mircea Snegur, to accept direct
talks with Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, who promised to make peace over the region.
In July 21, 1992, a Russian-Moldovan cease-fire agreement put an end to the military hostilities, and with the
installation of the Russian peacekeepers, Transnistria freed its hands to create parallel state structures, effectively
separated from the constitutional bodies of Moldova. It has to be mentioned that the leaders of the most
industrialised part of the RSSM sought some kind of guarantees that they will preserve their independence to trade
and export.
Therefore, the fears that the right-bank Moldova could move towards reunification with Romania was more a
stylish political discourse than a real concern. When, in 1989, the elites in Chisinau decided to switch from Cyrillic
to Latin alphabet for their language, in addition to the adoption of the same official flag colours as Romanias,
some of the economic and party leaders in Tiraspol found a great excuse to negotiate their separate status in
Moscow and excellently used the whim of the dying Soviet centre to trump under foot those republics that
challenged the Soviet policies, and alike Baltic states, Ukraine and Caucasian republics, aspired for independence.
Although dominated by Russian-speakers, around 40% of the population in Transnistria speaks Moldovan - which
is virtually identical to Romanian - as a first language. Anything Romanian is viewed with suspicion in
Transnistria.
Anything coming from Chisinau was regarded with a great dose of suspicion, frustration and mistrust, bitterly
critical on the West-orientation of the political leaders in Chisinau, while remaining loyal to the Russia-orientation
in Transnistria, the later being rewarded consistently by Moscow, when it granted substantial privileges to the
business of the region, allowing infinite concessions for energy and gas consumption, while practically substituting
local elites with direct management of the Russian intelligence forces.
Although on the right bank of the Dniester, the language disputes have ended, with the majority of the population
having had accepted the idea that there are no two distinct languages Romanian and Moldovan and that the Latin
script is the norm for the Romanian language, in Transnistria this is not the case. Its local authorities insist that
public education for ethnic Moldovans in their mother tongue is done using the artificially created, Soviet-
originated orthography.
The schools that performed their instruction in the Romanian language using the Latin script were forcibly closed
by the Tiraspol authorities. In response, the EU banned the circulation of the separatist leaders in Europe, for their
obstructive position in the settlement process.
Although, the school issue has achieved notoriety in the international press, the secessionist leaders claim they
have reacted in accordance with the laws they have adopted, and that no other bodies will block the state
ideology that is required by the people of Transnistria. The words Romania and West are continuously
demonised by the Transnistrian leaders, who constantly linked them to the memories of the fascist Romanian
occupation, as well as that of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, now alive only in the memories of a few
nostalgic supporters.
Transdniester touts its own brand of nationalism while billing itself as the last bastion of Moldovanism (an exotic
ideological artifax promoted by Stalin), which it pits righteously against a Romanianised right-bank Moldova.
Nevertheless, the ideologues in Tiraspol cannot explain simply why the largest part of Transnistria is still inhabited
by Moldovans, living for long centuries in villages along the left- and right-bank of the Dniester, who remained
loyal to the Moldovan statehood and embraced without hesitations the Latin script and their language-identity with
other Romanian-speakers, and they form almost 40% of the whole population of Transnistria (550,000 inhabitants
in total).
The Russian army was still stationed in the Moldovan territory in breach of earlier commitments. In addition to the
geopolitical role attributed to Transnistria (alike Kaliningrad in the Baltic region), Russia is heavily supporting
the regime there, in finance and in kind, mentoring arms-production facilities and factories
67
, subsidising the so-
called local army which involves almost 18,000 gunmen and provides political backup to the Tiraspol
administration.
The military units of the Russian Federation located in the eastern part of the Republic of Moldova include military
units and subdivisions of the former 14-th Army, which since 1997 has been called the Russian Operative Group
Troops (ROGT). These transformations are explained by the Russian Federation because of significant reduction
of its military presence in the region and new "peacekeeping" missions, which are carried out by its troops.
Later, the use of the name "14th Army" became too inconvenient for Moscow on the motive that it was directly
connected to Russian involvement in the military conflict on the separatist side. The name change allowed to
distract attention from the unwillingness of Russia to go on further according to the provisions of the 1992
Agreement "On principles of conflict settlement in the Transdniestrian region of the Republic of Moldova".
According to it, the military units of the region could not be used in a peacekeeping operation.
In 1997, a 3-year term, which was established to complete Russian troops` withdrawal from the territory of the
Republic of Moldova, stipulated in a widely known agreement in 1994, expired. The Russian Federation was
forced to make the impression that even in spite of agreement implementation postponement due to its "blocking
by the Russian Duma", Russia was acting according to its "real possibilities in the spirit of the agreement. In
reality, neither any new missions for Russian troops appeared nor did a significant reduction of military
presence take place.
By the end of 1997, 377 railway cars with military equipment were removed to Russian Federation among almost
10,000 evaluated before signing the 1994 Agreement. During these three years, machinery, communications,
radio-electronic warfare, and logistic equipment was withdrawn from the territory of the Republic of Moldova but
no major battle tank, armoured combat vehicle, cannon, antitank, air defense system, nor wagon with
ammunitions, etc.
67
The ICC reports that Transdniestria has five or six arms factories making small arms, mortars and missile-launchers, for sale to the world's trouble-spots, while the GMF of
the US say the region serves as shipping points for weapons, narcotics, and victims of human trafficking, as breeding grounds for transnational organised crime, and last but
not least, for terrorism.
This tendency did not change in the next years. In 1998, no car with military equipment that belonged to the
GORT was withdrawn from the territory of Moldova, in 1999 122 wagons with automobiles, engineering and
repair equipment, in 2000 again only 40 cars with automobiles and logistic equipment were withdrawn. (Thus, till
now the military equipment that was withdrawn from the territory of Moldova has not exceeded 5 % of the volume
declared for evacuation).
From a military point of view, the cancellation of the name 14th Army seems to be logic due to the fact that the
biggest part of military units, which entered in its structure till 1992, were quartered on the territory of Ukraine and
were taken under Ukraine jurisdiction. At the same time, two military units (from Parcani and Dubasari) went
under Tiraspol s jurisdiction, and the military units quartered in Tiraspol were actually no more than infantry
divisions with several strengthening military units.
At present, the structure of the operative group is almost similar to structure of 59-th Infantry Motorised Division.
It includes an infantry brigade (created on the basis of 3 infantry regiments from 59th Division), tank regiment,
artillery regiment, air defense missile regiment, antitank artillery battalion, reconnaissance battalion,
communication battalion, maintenance units, warehouses, etc.
The provision of the Russians troops during the last 6 years has undergone no significant changes: 115 main battle
tanks T-64 in 2000 versus 120 in 1994, 130 armored combat vehicles in 2000 vs. 160 in 1994,128 cannons in 2000
vs. 128 in 1994 and 180 in 1992. (Bear in mind that the difference between the quantity of the Russian military
equipment and armaments in 1992,1994 and 2000 is simply explained by the fact of its transfers to the armed
forces of TRM)
68
.
On May 8, 1997, the Memorandum On the basis for the Normalisation of Relations between the Republic of
Moldova and Transnistria (PMR) was signed in Moscow. The concept of a common state was then introduced
for the first time by the Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov
69
.
Because of a rather dubious meaning of this very term, further negotiations were blocked by the attempts of
interpreting and defining the legal sense of it, and therefore, they have never reached even a point of discussing a
division of competences between Moldova and the TMR. Because of the continuous obstruction by separatist
authorities, Chisinau withdrew from the negotiations between September 2001 and May 2002.
In June 2002, a new approach to conflict settlement was articulated in the so-called Kiev Document, and under
the pressure from the three mediators, Moldova rejoined the negotiations. This document proposed a federal
structure to be the main basis for Chisinau Tiraspol relations; it outlined divided and shared competences, new
federal institutions, and a system of international guarantees. However, incompatible positions of the two parties
made impossible any serious progress (over six months, only four of forty-two articles were discussed).
Since 2000, some attempts of the OSCE have reverberated a chance to start a new round of negotiations, although
the weaknesses of the central power in Chisinau, as well as the inconsistency of the mediating parties (Russia) led
this to limited results
70
.
The stormy events of late 2004 the beginning of 2005, related mainly to presidential and parliamentary elections
in Ukraine, Romania and Moldova, have changed the regional context of the Transnistrian conflict and created a
new window of opportunities for its eventual resolution. Ukrainian proposals, first presented schematically at the
GUAM Summit in Chisinau on 22 April, and then developed into the so-called Yushchenko Plan of May 2006,
although criticised for its obvious flaws and dubious points, has been accepted as a framework for developing a
new approach to conflict settlement based on the idea of democratisation of the Transnistrian region as a
cornerstone of its further reintegration into the Republic of Moldova.
68
The technical aspect of the Russian Federation ammunitions and troops withdrawal from the Republic of Moldova territory. Pantea, IPP, 2000
69
The plan Primakov was an attempt to legalise the existing situation. That plan did not provide any dramatic measures for conflict resolution and by manipulation with slogan
of "the common state", invented by the Moscow, promoted ideas for the creation of all necessary conditions of a so-called TRM state recognition. As a result, this plan does
not contain measures for integration / dismounting of the separatist regimes military potential and provides for the keeping of the existing military units of so-called TRM and
Russian military units, as the base force for peacekeeping operation.
70
T h e p r o j e c t o f O S C E M i s s i o n ( 1 9 9 6 /2 0 0 0 ) (20) aimed to restart negotiations between the parts in conflict by means of modification of principles and mechanisms that have
applied till now. With this purpose, the project provides for signing the agreement on the final settlement of the conflict, the agreement which will allow performance on the
following basic ideas: (1) Amplification and activation of participation of the OSCE and the international community in negotiation and resolution of the conflict by transforming
the status of the Mission of OSCE from "observer" to" security guarantor" and main intermediary. (2). Preservation of the existing procedure of the security zone and the
achievement of a strict performance of principles of the Agreement from 1992 and the new Agreement and decisions of the Unified Control Commission by all parties. (3).
Development and implementation of some measures to consolidate security and credibility by ensuring complete transparency of the armed forces and military-industrial
complex.
For more than 16 years of separate existence, the Transnistrian statelet incorporated a number of distinctive
features form its protgs state, in particular, the overwhelming control of special services, organised crime,
corruption, and authoritarian leadership. Territorial secession contributed to the declining legitimacy of the
Moldovan state.
The region has become a black hole of Moldovan economy, a hotspot of organised crime, trafficking and
bootlegging. Over the years, the Dniester Republic has become a black hole of the global economy, a hotspot of
organised crime, trafficking and bootlegging. The ethnic dimension of the original conflict has long been
substituted by Soviet nostalgia, anti-reformism and economic interests (both in the Dniester Republic and in all
neighbouring countries).
The overall background of the country has been seriously damaged by the territorial split-over. Nearly 12 years of
separate existence of the Transnistrian region (with less than 11% of the population, and over 40% of the whole
economy of the country) that succeeded to thrive on its own thanks to the huge support received after 1991 from
the Russian Federation, have created a rather dynamic enclave on the left-bank of the Dniester river, known also as
a self-proclaimed Transnistrian republic, which is likely to play the role of a Kaliningrads enclave to the
future borders with the NATO and the EU.
At the summit of the Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE) in Istanbul in 1999, Russia
promised to withdraw its arms caches and troops from the region. But there has been little progress so far. When
the deadline for the withdrawal expired on December 31, 2002, the OSCE agreed to extend it for another 6 months.
Moscow argues that its military presence guarantees peace and stability in the region. But what it also guarantees
is the stability of the separatist regime of the breakaway region, and Russia's indirect influence all over Moldova.
Russia itself is claiming that it was unable to withdraw its troops before the OSCE-agreed deadline because of
opposition from the separatist regime in Transnistria. Moscow has also tried to make any future withdrawal of its
troops conditional on the absence of "technical obstacles."
With its declared capital of Tiraspol,
71
Transnistria became a Soviet air-museum, where all Soviet-era
monuments and names were carefully preserved - the Moldovan SSR flag and the coat of arms with the hammer
and sickle emblem, and the old-style communist rhetoric became the business card of Transnistria.
This eastern part of Moldova is reminiscent of a Soviet empire in miniature with the same names of the streets
and boulevards, the same feasts and traditions and conserved memories from the Soviet time. Its citizens
documents have not been recognised by a single state in the world, so they are used only inside the region.
Fortunately for the population of Transnistria, it permits dual citizenship, so besides the self-style Transnistrian
passport; practically every adult person living in the breakaway region has also a Moldovan, Russian or Ukrainian
passport. According to the Ministry of Reintegration, the number of Transnistrian residents bearing Moldovan
documents - foreign-travel passports and domestic identification cards - reached 400 thousand by 2007.
The deterioration of relations between Russia, which is the main economic and political backer of the Transnistrian
regime, and both Moldova and Ukraine further underscored the fragility of Transnistrias international status.
Formal opposition to any withdrawal of Russian troops by the pro-Russian separatists in Moldova, it should be
noted, could be interpreted by Russia as one of these "technical obstacles." That opens the way to a prolonged
Russian military presence in Moldova and, consequentially, abolishes any chance for European integration and
internal stability of the country.
While, Tiraspol is continuously pedaling on its pro-Russian attitudes, Voronin has tried to signal to the EU some
possibilities on internationalising the conflict. In September 2003, President Vladimir Voronin invited the EU to
take part in the permanent negotiation process for the Transnistrian problem settlement
72
. Vladimir Voronin named
the frozen conflicts in Europe and the lack of universal mechanisms for their settlement "a challenge to the
European community's abilities to find optimum solutions to such explosive cases". With regards to this, the civil
society is clearly behind him.
There is a huge public support of bringing European organisations more actively involved in conflict resolution.
For instance, by September 2003, over 80,000 of signatures were collected by the SLP in favour of the OSCE`s
initiative to bring EU peacekeepers into Transnistria. The opposition has repeatedly called for the EU and the
71
The city which was the capital of the Moldavian ASSR, an autonomous republic within Ukrainian SSR, which existed from 1924 to 1940, prior to the unification of the territory
with Moldova.
72 Chisinau,
S
eptember 11 ( INFOTAG ).
OSCE to assist the evacuation of Russian troops from the region and replace them with EU or OSCE
peacekeepers.
In July 2003, the OSCE first offered the EU member states a chance to consider such a possibility of sending EU
peacekeepers to maintain peace in Moldova after the Transnistrian problem is solved politically. This was done in
response to Moscow's proposal to conduct a "militarily guaranteed operation under the Russia's aegis", and the
response caused Kremlin's discontent. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Russia,
and Ukraine have attempted to mediate a final settlement between Moldova and the DMR.
They also participate in the Joint Control Commission that monitors compliance with the 1992 ceasefire. In
September 2005, the United States and the European Union (EU) were invited to join the negotiations as
observers. Moldova will be an immediate neighbour of the EU in 2007 and is an aspiring candidate itself.
As long as Transnistria remains outside the control of Moldovas authorities which allow for several illegalities
and abuses to thrive in the territories controlled by the illegal authorities of the region, it will be heavily affecting
the countrys abilities to manage consistent reforms and democratisation. The economic relevance of
Transdniestria is enormous for a largely agricultural-oriented country.
The only big power plant of Moldova and the only modern and competitive steel-mill are both located in the
breakaway region; gas pipelines which supply Moldova cross it as well, and finally, the state is unable to control
its borders and flows of goods and capital in its eastern markets.
Without effective custom control on the goods crossing the region, smuggling became one of the most flourishing
businesses of the separatist region, with serious effects on the revenues and business relations of the rest of the
country. On the other hand, the separatist leadership lacks even the appearances of democratic legitimacy, with the
support of the Russian forces having undisputed political and economic control in the region.
Therefore, some business circles may earn important profits from legal/illegal businesses in the region. At the
same time, Russian support to Transdniestria is perceived to be part of a wider strategy of the Russian opposition
to western expansion, especially to NATO. Latest developments seem to indicate that Russia is unwilling to
comply to the earlier signed OSCE Agreements (1999 and 2000) on the evacuation of its troops and military
armoury from Moldova and that, it seems to be very much interested in preserving a strong military and political
control in the region.
Tiraspol wants an equal division of rights and responsibilities with the rest of Moldova, while Chisinau insists on
an asymmetrical division with certain rights exclusively held by the federal centre (i.e. defense, border controls,
customs, and currency). These views were reflected the November 17`s Russian Draft Plan of settling the conflict,
handled in Chisinau to the Moldovan officials by Russian Presidential Councilor, Kozak.
Voices of criticism and appeals towards the international community have been expressed abroad, reflecting public
concerns that federalisation will further aggravate the domestic difficulties of the country. The new political plan
(Memorandum) aims at setting up a full command of the entire state by the substantial devolution of its
competences and territories
73
, which led the opposition to initiate a huge campaign against the adoption of such a
Memorandum, saying that the plan is in fact a plastic formula of destroying the country, and not reuniting it
clearly providing for the liquidation of the Moldova as a state
74
.
This was in fact the main idea of the Kozaks Plan of Regulation, which was finally suspended, however, it
provoked a huge internal mobilisation of the opposition, as well as intense diplomatic efforts from outside.
The only existing preconditions for that scenario are that Russian troops shall be evacuated and stifling censorship
of the State TV will be eliminated. Another concern of the opposition is that the region continued to be over-ruled
by the war-elite whose political attitude towards democratic standards and the rule of law principles is almost
non-existent, and because of that, every plan of peaceful regulation is a utopia unless a significant change in the
political configuration of the region occurs.
Human rights NGOs claim that the separatist government of Transnistria is authoritarian and has a poor human
rights record, and is accused of arbitrary arrest and torture. In 2004, the ECHR held unanimously that Moldova and
73
Altogether, Transnistria and Gagauzia make up less than 20% of the total number of inhabitants in this country.
74
Draft Memorandum, TIMPUL, November 17, 2003, art.3.8.
Russia had to take all the necessary measures to put an end to the arbitrary detention of Ilie Ilascu Group members,
Andrei Ivantoc and Tudor Petrov-Popa, who were detained for 11 and 12 years in a Transnistrian prison
75
.
The regime has largely restricted political rights, the freedom of religion and other civil liberties of the regions
inhabitants, i.e. the freedom of association and assembly. Relevant sources have witnessed cases of local NGOs
being prohibited for their links of cooperation with their counterparts from right-bank Moldova. In 2003, the
Helsinki Committee Moldova presented evidence of terror against the Chitcani village population
76
, and other
facts that testify the violence of the regime against local leaders. It was said that, in less than half of 2003, over 20
murders, rapes and tortures were registered in this small village controlled by the para-military and security forces
of the separatist regime, but in spite of the evidence gathered by human rights organisations neither Transnistrian
nor Moldovan law-enforcement organs reacted so far, and even the OSCE Mission decided not to intervene to stop
the violence.
In the summer of 2004, local administration forcibly closed six schools that taught the language using the Latin
script. A number of 3,400 enrolled children were affected by this measure while several teachers and parents who
opposed the closures were arrested.
The closed schools were reopened but they still have the status of NGOs, remaining vulnerable to the aggressive
attacks of local administration. In the meanwhile, Ukrainian and Moldovan presidents jointly applied to the EU to
join a new negotiation format and send a border-monitoring mission to operate on the Ukrainian side of the border.
During the crisis, the Moldovan government decided to respond to this linguistic cleansing policy by initiating a
blockade that would isolate the leadership of the self-styled regime. Isolating the regime could not but fail to
achieve any substantive results because of a lack of cooperation from Ukraine's government.
2.2 Characteristics of the Regional Economy
Most of the Soviet Moldova industrial infrastructure was dislocated on the eastern bank of Dniester, which is now
controlled by the Transnistrian regime. One of the last bastions of Soviet-style rhetoric, the territory has
nonetheless privatised some of its industrial enterprises. Not surprisingly, the dispute between Tiraspol and
Chisinau also cover the issue of control of the economic assets of Transnistria. Moldova has passed a law stating
that any privatisation in the territory of Moldova (including Transnistria) must be approved by the Moldovan
parliament, nevertheless, the Transnistrian leadership began privatisation with a human face
77
of the Moldovan
state property in the region. However, the authors of a report produced by
the Bar Association of the city of New York
78
on Transnistria are questioning, among other aspects of the conflict,
the right of the Transnistrian regime to privatise the property in its area of effective control, and the possible
consequences of such a privatisation decision in the event of the possible future reintegration of the two parts of
Moldova.
The authors of the report mention that since 2002 the Transnistrian authorities have sold 37 major assets for
USD51.5 million, and many of the deals were sweetheart deals for those close to president Igor Smirnov and his
entourage. The report also inferred that under Russia's ongoing military assistance, economic support, and its effectively
bargaining on behalf of the TMR using energy prices and other levers of power against Moldova leads to credible claims of state
responsibility on the part of Russia for the continuing separatist crisis and its proximate results
79
.
The privatisation process started as early as 2000, when Transnistrian authorities started to prepare the enterprises
of the region for privatisation, and of course, the main cash-beneficiaries of that could not be other than Russian
oligarchs.
Despite official warnings that Moldovan authorities would not officially recognise any sort of privatisation deals in
Transnistria outside of the legal/constitutional space of Chisinau, gas debts started to be accumulated, while
Russian giants used the debts to take over important industries in Transnistria. In 2003, Tiraspol administration
received loans, amounting to USD150 million, in exchange for some major defence industrial units.
75
Ilie Ila;cu was arrested and tortured, together with four other persons, in their homes in Tiraspol in the early days of June 1992, with the charge of fighting against the break-
away unrecognised republic of Transnistria. They were subsequently charged with the murder of two "civil servants" and terrorist crimes against the MRT. It has been alleged
that the real reason for their imprisonment was their political association or their lack of support for Transnistria.
76
Chitcani Village, like Bender Municipality and other 5 neigbouring villages lie on the right bank of the Dniester river, but it is still militarily controlled by the Dniester guards
who remained there after the 1992 civil war
77
the country decided to make human values the main priority of the privatisation process. The privatisation programme for 2006 included approximately 130 state-
owned companies. http://pridnestrovie.net/privatization.html
78
Thawing a Frozen Conflict: Legal Aspects of the Separatist Crisis in Moldova: A Report from the Association of the Bar of the City of New York
79
Idem, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=920151
Most of these enterprises were suspected by the Moldovan authorities to produce and sell arms. In fact, the Pribor
plant located in Bender produces reactive-guns BM-21 Grad and rocket-launchers, while Electromash and
Metallorukav produces pistols PM, TT, PSM, automatic guns AK, AKM, special guns Policman, grenade-
launchers SPG9, Pcela, Gnom, as well as mine-launchers Katran, Vasiliok, PZRK and Duga. Earlier, the Military-
Industrial Currier posted a list of the Transnistrian defence industries put for sale and of their main production
items, their location, and structure of ownership.
In June 2005 the Ministry of Economy of Transnistria released data stating that in the year to date 10 major
assets for a price of USD4.8 million were privatised. This included the Tiraspol bread-making bakery (USD1.49
million), the Tiraspol bread-product integrated works (USD1.29 million), and the Odema textile factory (USD1.29
million).
The bread-making assets were purchased by Sheriff Corporation.
80
. Although official communiqus claims that the
region showed marked improvement in main macroeconomic indicators from 2000 to 2005, when the GDP
increased by 209.6%, and the per capita GDP experienced an increase of 223.0%
81
, and even some foreign
researches admit that Transnistria achieved a relatively high degree of self-sufficiency during its nearly 18 years
of self proclaimed independence
82
, the economical viability of the Transnistrian regime remains a chimera for
several reasons.
First, it is too largely dependent on the unofficial shadow economy. The annual turnover of the Sheriff
Company, controlled by the president of the self-proclaimed republic, is around USD2 billion, which is 5 times
bigger than the budget of Moldova and 25 times bigger than that of the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic.
Second, the sources of such wealth include money laundering, smuggling and trafficking. Contraband and
smuggling of weapons, alcohol, oil, drugs, pharmaceuticals, tobacco and other goods on Tiraspol-Odessa line
generate USD2 billion a year to the Smirnovs regime, whose budget has amounted to a total of USD85 million.
83
Third, the official economy, on the other hand, has avoided collapse also because of massive external subsidies.
Russia has made the Transnistrian economy viable by providing energy at much lower rates compared to what is
provided to Moldova.
The Russian Gazprom is charging Transnistria USD60 for thousand cubic meters, (three time less than the price
Moldovan customers are charged) while the Transnistrian unpaid debt for Russian gas is USD1.3 billion, twice as
much as Moldovas debt
84
. It ensures Transnistrian manufacturers an artificially created competitiveness on the
market, as they can produce and sell cheaper goods. For instance, Rabnitsa steel factory has received gas for only
USD30 per 1000 cubic meters of gas, and this made it quite a profitable factory for the last decade, being also the
main contributor to the budget of the region (60% of its incomes). The same is true for the cement industry, and
other industrial plants located in Tiraspol, but also for the population of the urban settlements in the breakaway
region, which simply has not paid its utilities for more than a decade since the Soviet dissolution.
Neither the Russian Gazprom has sought the gas debt of more than one billion dollars, nor the Transnistrian
leaders show obligations towards paying the above-mentioned debt. As Igor Smirnov commented recently,
Transnistria has no legal [gas] debt, because there is no contract signed with Gazprom. According to Smirnov,
the contract was signed between Gazprom and JSC Moldova-gaz, in which Transnistria had a share of 14.7%,
but later it withdraw these shares in Moldova-Gaz JSC
85
.
The Transnistrian regime states that Pridnestrovie has a stronger, more open and prosperous free market economy
than Moldova
86
, but, looking at the facts, one can realise that no credit could be taken from the regions
authorities for its economic growth.
At the end of 2007, Gazprom announced that the debts accumulated by Transnistria solely reached the amount of
USD1.8 billion
87
, and that the debts fall under the responsibility of Moldova to be paid back, and that penalties are
already imposed on Moldova. Apart from that, since 1994, Moldova was one of the high-tax payers for gas
delivered by Russia, if compared with other CIS and Baltic states.
80
Thawing a Frozen Conflict: Legal Aspects of the Separatist Crisis in Moldova: A Report from the Association of the Bar of the City of New York
81
Pridenstrovie.net
82 Transnistria - The Unrecognised Country in Moldova, ICEG European Centre News of the Month, December 2007
83 Ceslav Ciobanu, Frozen and Forgotten Conflicts in the Post-Soviet States: Genesis, Political Economy and Prospects for Solution, United States Institute of Peace, Virgini a
State University, Richmond, 2008
84
Infotag, 26 March 2007; Nezavisimaya Moldova, 30 January, 2007
85
lasrpon repeqan puquectposee Anuaepy /cnauosy. pesuqeut Cnupuos otrasMsaetc rnatute uosony rpequtopy, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 23 March 2007
86
Pridnestrovie.net
87
Infotag, March 16, 2008
So, if by 1999, Moldova paid USD120 (compared with USD30 in Belarus, 50 in Ukraine and 60 in Georgia), by
2000 Moldova already paid USD150-160 along with Ukraine, compared to USD120-125 per 1000 cubic meters of
gas for the Baltic countries, and USD110 for Georgia and Armenia.
88
Since 2007, Moldova pays 190, and since
January 2008, - already USD210, outscoring Ukraine which remained at 190 USD, and even some of the Baltic
States.
Moldova is also subject to various restrictive trade policies of its traditional major trading partner Russia. In
2005, Russia banned several times the importation of goods from Moldova. In April a ban on meat import was
imposed, the official reason being that the meat was in fact, re-exported, and not domestically produced, in May, it
banned the importation of Moldovan fruits and vegetables, stating that Moldovan fruits and vegetables did not
meet Russian standards, and in September, Russia's Federal Customs Service stopped releasing documentary
excise stamps to producers of Moldovan spirits and wines.
The economic impact of these bans are hard to underestimate - only for the wines industry, according to Moldova-
Vin export agency estimates, the loss in sales was at over USD180 million between March 2006 and January 2007.
The indirect effects on the economy have been even larger, since a number of other industries depend on the wine
industry.
Moldova's National Statistics Bureau estimates that industrial production dropped by 6.9 percent in 2006 compared
to 2005. This was the first time in six years that Moldova has posted such a loss.
89
With the growing confrontations
with Ukraine on gas transit, and the strategic aim to impact on the gas distribution policies of Europe, Gazprom
suddenly changed its policy towards Transnistria.
Since 2006, Tiraspol has been warned twice officially by Gazprom that it will be cut off from the gas supply if the
debts are not settled. In February 2008, Tiraspol officially demanded Gazprom to suspend raising prices, for the
reason that Transnistria is still a zone of very special interests for Russia
90
. Igor Smirnov stated that the regions
industries cannot survive if they are forced to pay USD190 per 1000 cubic metres, and if this is unacceptable to
Gazprom, the whole region will be lost.
Officials of Transnistria claim they will be able to pay 100% for the gas exported by Gazprom only in 2012
91
. On
the basis of that, Chisinau tried hard to negotiate with Moscow a differentiation of the gas payment, receiving
instead only vague assurances that the deadlock will be avoided.
The solutions are not simple even for Gazprom, foremost, due to the fact that almost 12% of the gas exported by
Russia crosses Moldova, while the other burden is clearly related to the political lobby in Moscow on behalf of
Transnistrian separatists. Cheap gas and political support is still behind the survival of the Transnistria regime.
Another factor that maintained alive some of the industrial complex of Transnistria was the offshore status that
helped local oligarchs export almost without restrictions their goods to the neighbouring Ukraine and Moldova,
without noticing even the borders that were trespassed.
Many pointed to the large business operated by some of the President Kuchma relatives in the region, and
therefore, only with the orange power-shift in Kiev, new opportunities emerged. Transnistria retaliated by a
series of actions meant to destabilise the economic situation in Moldova, in particular, by cutting the power supply
from the power plants that were built predominantly in Transnistria in Soviet times. As a result, this crisis
generated power outages in parts of Moldova.
2.3 The Limits of Outside-Led Intervention in Moldova
At the summit of the Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE) in Istanbul in 1999, Russia
committed itself to withdraw its arms caches and troops from Moldova in one year after the signature of the
Declaration. But there has been little progress so far. A pull-out of the Russian troops began in 2001 but was halted
when Transnistria blocked the dispatch of weapons. Subsequent agreements to resume failed to reach fruition.
Long-running talks supervised by the OSCE, Russia and Ukraine have yet to yield a political solution. Attempts by
Moldova to exert economic pressure on the Dniester authorities have failed to produce the desired result. When the
88
Reporter.md, 1 December 2005
89
Moldova: Counting Losses As Russian Wine Ban Lingers, By Ryan Kennedy, April 4, 2007, Radio Free Europe
90
AP FLUX Chi;inau, February 6, 2008
91
Infotag, December 24, 2007
deadline for the withdrawal expired on December 31, 2002, the OSCE meekly agreed to extend it for another six
months, and after one year, this was extended for another year.
Initially, Russian diplomats stated they could not get permission from the local separatists to withdraw ammunition
from the region, and then Moscow started to argue that its military presence guarantees peace and stability in the
region.
In 2003, a new Russian-brokered plan, which would have made the presence of Russian troops permanent for at
least the coming 40 years, sparked mass protests in Moldova and the plan was shelved, causing huge discontent in
Kremlin. Ukraine has since come up with settlement proposals in 2005, which was presented as the Yustchenko
plan, but these too have stalled.
Although, Russia accepted to expand the negotiations format after 2003, understanding that the Kozak failure
was due to the emerging new realities on the ground, with a more assertive West interested in bringing peace and
stability into its peripheries, it did not hesitate to ensure that the new format would stagnate to the end.
In the meantime, Russian diplomacy attempted to play tough on the Kosovo issue, saying it will multiply it, as
soon as the West infringes upon the existing international law system, anywhere in the former Soviet space, in
which unrecognised states wait for unilateral recognition
92
. If Kosovo declares its independence and gets
international recognition, Russia will respond by recognising de facto existing states, such as Transnistria, South
Ossetia, and Abhazia.
And although officially Russia does not recognise the Tiraspol regime, it has started invoking the Kosovo
precedent, accusing the West of double standards, for advocating independence of the nominally Serbian province,
but opposing the same treatment for Transnistria. In fact, Russia remains the paramount player in the region.
It still maintains troops and military equipment in Transnistria, and recently President Putin suspended Russia's
participation in the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), on November 30, 2007
93
. Moscow
considers the original CFE treaty, signed in December 1990 by 16 NATO countries and six Warsaw Pact
members, to be discriminatory and outdated since it does not reflect the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the
breakup of the Soviet Union, or the recent NATO expansion.
In a parallel move, Russia imposed crippling restrictions on the OSCEs Office of Democratic Institutions and
Human Rights (ODIHR, the election-monitoring agency) to monitor Russias December 2 parliamentary elections,
thus forcing ODIHR to desist.
In the run-up to the year-end meeting, an emergent bloc of seven post-Soviet states under Russian leadership
submitted further proposals that would disable the OSCEs democracy-promoting role. Russia is angry over the
non-ratification of the treaty by NATO countries and the western insistence on Russian troops` withdrawing from
Moldova and Georgia and claim that Transnistria deserves to keep its independence.
2.4. Breakthrough or a Vicious Circle in Dealing with the Separatist Conclave in Transnistria?
Moldova is a sovereign state, even if it does not control all its territory. Its sovereignty was recognised
internationally and proves to be a sound basis for the consolidation of a civic nation, which aspires to integrate
within the expanded European Union. Multiple versus single citizenship plays an essential role in the self-
identification of Moldovans.
Due to kinship, political legacy and emerging opportunities, Moldovans inhabitants often had to make important
decisions about their belonging and national affiliation. Since 2003, Moldova has experienced a single citizenship
law, which could not deter Moldovan citizens to apply for a different citizenship, although this was not a massive
phenomenon, and usually, it remained a kind of hidden secret of the respective individuals. Romania, Bulgaria,
Ukraine and Russia were perhaps the most important countries of citizenship applications
94
.
Since 1992, Transnistria has remained the main headache for the Moldovan state, which made extensive
concessions to bring the breakaway region back into its control, but with no practical results. As an unresolved
fragment of the Soviet Empire, Transnistria served for more than a decade as a shipping point for weapons, drugs,
and smuggling of drugs, taking the leadership in the club of unrecognised secessions, and even supplying the
92
Deca press, 5 February 2008
93
OSCEs Democracy Agenda Set Back at Year-End Meeting. Eurasia Daily Monitor. 04.12.2007.
94
This excludes the US, Germany, France, as countries of permanent emigration flows.
other zones of warfare with arms and military that fell under the label of transnational organised crime and
terrorism, many years before the war against terrorism was launched.
Thus, after failing to conclude any reasonable compromise with the new Communist leaders in Chisinau, since
2002, Moscow has staggered intensive efforts to consolidate the union of the unrecognised entities
95
. This aimed
on the one hand to provide leverages to counterbalance the emerging GUUAM, while on the other hand, only by
providing a sort of quazi-recongition status, strengthened the separatists opposition to the governments in Tbilisi,
in Chisinau, and possibly in Kiev. It has to be mentioned that the United States has maintained a visa blacklist for
separatist leaders, which the European Union joined in 2003.
A plan of conflict regulation was also proposed by President Iuschenco earlier in April, 2005, tough updated later
by the Head of the Council for National Security and Defense, Petro Poroshenko, according to which the
separation of Transnistria and Moldova would be settled through a negotiated settlement and free elections.
In July 2005, Ukraine opened five new customs posts on the Moldova-Ukraine border close to the area controlled
by Tiraspol. The posts, staffed by both Moldovan and Ukrainian officials, are intended to reduce the hitherto high
incidence of smuggling between the breakaway statelets and its neighbours. The Moldovan Parliament responded
to the Ukrainian plan with two laws, which aimed to improve and focus some of the conceptual basis of the
conflict settlement (July 22, 2005 - Law on the special status of the eastern rayons of Moldova).
All three steps aimed to provide a democratic framework for settlement in line with European standards and the 3-
D strategy (democratisation, demilitarisation, and de-criminalisation) elaborated by the Moldovan civil society in
2004. These steps depart from the old approach of power-sharing between Chisinau and the anti-constitutional
entity. The separatist regime, on the other hand, found itself in a weaker international position at the end of the
2004-05 electoral cycles.
The fresh democratic legitimacy of the Moldovan government was in stark contrast to the reputation problems of
the Transnistrian elite, which is widely perceived as presiding over a highly authoritarian and illiberal political
regime. The Orange Revolution in Ukraine did not only highlight the issue of democratic legitimacy but also
created a painful vulnerability for the separatist authorities: openness of the Ukrainian border, the only external
border that these authorities used, could no longer be taken as granted.
Although more than a decade has passed since the battles that ended in 1992, the Tiraspol regime still regularly
erects memorial complexes, symbolising the war against Moldovan aggressors, as in 2008
96
Transnistrias
relations with Moldova deteriorated again in 2006, as customs regulations imposed by Ukraine limited the
separatist enclaves ability to trade independently of Moldova. Referendum voters in September overwhelmingly
supported independence and eventual unification with Russia.
In December 2005, the opposition group Obnovlenye made surprising gains in the parliamentary elections, but
incumbent President Igor Smirnov was reelected in December 2006. Despite the fact that the fear of unification
with Romania is continuously being used as the main argument for Transnistrian secessionism, the creation and
maintenance of a Transnistrian separate identity was mainly due to the persistence of the communist ideology and
the so called red directors, who opposed any democratic change and reform in Moldova.
For most of the population of Transnistria, the end of the Soviet Union was not emancipation (since there is no
single dominant nationality) but deprivation, and humiliation. In the face of strong Moldovan nationalism next
door, and a rising nationalist Ukraine on the other side, the small but multinational strip of land in the middle saw
that its internationalist ideals were about to be trampled and forgotten, states the newspaper Tiraspol time in its
article The legacy of Lenin.
97
Recently, president Voronin launched several initiatives for building trust between Chisinau and Tiraspol which
have to improve the communication between the two banks of the Nistru and give a boost to the negotiation talks
over the resolution of the frozen conflict.
While these initiatives received approval from European counterparts, Tiraspol expressed distrust and considers
these moves to be a new populist approach of Voronins team in sight of the 2009 parliamentary elections in
Moldova and as a tool to regain the popularity of the electorate shaken after the June 2007 local elections.
95
http://www.strana.ru
96
A new Memorial Complex will be erected in Tiraspol in the memory of those who died in the war against aggressors from Chisinau, in 1992 ( O l i v i a p r e s s , F e b 1 9 , 2 0 0 8 )
97
Tiraspol Times, The legacy of Leni n, 16 July 2006
These measures provide for mutually beneficial plans for developing the infrastructure and especially a European
corridor that will link Chisinau with Dubasari, access to the GSP Plus facilities for Transnistrian economic agents
who register with official Chisinau, common use and benefit from the railway which will be owned by the
authorities in Chisinau lifting the travel ban for Transnistrian officials.
It is obvious that the Communist party is looking for solutions that would bring Tiraspol back to the negotiation
table. The package that has been offered does not seem very attractive for the Transnistrian leadership, though. The
Transnistrian segment of the railway is significant for the passenger and cargo traffic from Moldova to CIS
countries. Now these routes have been diverted which results in increased resources and time to reach the
destination.
That is why, it is so important for Chisinau to regain control over this segment and, on the other hand, this is why
it is so important for Tiraspol to own it. However, a European corridor to Ukraine and Russia through Transnistria
could bring palpable benefits to both banks if they were to agree on the terms how to build and own it. If such
initiatives were put into practice, a small and gradual Europeanisation of Transnistria could take place, as
opposed to plans launched by ex-presidential councilor Sergiu Mocanu to leave aside the right bank and to pursue
European integration and thereafter to try to get Transnistria back.
The weak point of these initiatives is that they avoided the Kremlin. Obviously, Moldova is a sovereign state and
Transnistria is part of it, although still uncontrolled by central authorities. However, everything Transnistria does,
it does with the consent from Moscow. Voronin can promise golden mountains to Tiraspol, if such proposals do
not receive approval from Russia, they are doomed to failure.
Despite a rapprochement between Moscow and Chisinau during 2006-2008, it is hardly possible to get Tiraspol on
the track proposed by Voronin (reintegration without federalisation), and Russia continues to insist on the equal
status of the parties in conflict, having apparently more leverages to press Chisinau, than accept its legitimate
claims.
The desire of the Communist government to achieve some progress in the resolution of the conflict is
understandable, as it is their major electoral promise. Otherwise they cannot hope to stay in power after 2009.
However, it is predictable that no major breakthrough will occur in the 5+2 format of negotiations unless a big
deal for Russia is struck at the level of its major global counterparts, the US and the EU.
The dispute for this buffer zone has bigger risks for Russia than for the EU, which is why, Russia plays harder on
this issue and will continue to fiercely oppose any rapprochement between Moldova and the EU. On the other
hand, the EU is not happy with the Transnistrian conflict still unsolved at its front door, so fears and the security
challenge posed by Transnistria cannot be neglected in Brussels.
However, the EU seems to be overtaken by Russia when it comes to economic ties. Russia uses its energy supplies
card to economically blackmail the EU, and thus the EU stays out of its way concerning its "near abroad".
CHAPTER 3 - DESIGNING A EUROPEAN LEGACY FOR THE MOLDOVAN STATEHOOD
3.1 Moldovas Foreign Policy Dimension
European integration remains one of the high priorities of Moldovan foreign policy. At least, this is what the
presidency, government, and the parliament have been saying already for several years. However, this is a process
which requires a lot of efforts from the applicant country and a long process of reformation and adjusting to the EU
norms and regulations.
Given the Soviet past of Moldova and the long transition to democracy and market economy, which in fact is not
over yet, the country is on the outskirts of the European project of democracy and welfare. Just to recapitulate,
Moldova established its relations with the EU in 1994 when the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement was
signed and later on, in 1998 entered into force for a period of 10 years.
The PCA provided for not more than cooperation in different fields and technical assistance within the TACIS
project. The EU became more popular with Moldova or at least attractive when countries from Central and Eastern
Europe got closer than ever to "Europe's nucleus".
Initially, Moldovas hoped to approach the EU through the countrys participation in the Stability Pact for South-
Eastern Europe, and this was stated in the related concept
98
. But the European Commission has made another
decision: in the framework of the Wider Europe New Neighbourhood Initiative
99
, approved by the Council of
the EU in December 2003, it proposed to Moldova to show its readiness in the participation of European
integration through the self-realization of the Action Plan EU-Moldova, covering areas of co-operation such as
political dialogue, bringing this state into area of EU legislation, participation in some EU programmes
(institutional, economic, and social), the wider opening of the market for trade pursuant to WTO principles, co-
operation within internal affairs (border management, human traffic, organised crime, money laundering, etc.). The
major obstacle to the EU-Moldova Action Plan is the economic one.
Importantly, the term of its implementation coincides with the medium-term Economic Growth and Poverty
Reduction Strategy (EG PRSP) that Moldovas government agreed with the IMF, the World Bank, and donor
organisations. This increases even more the responsibility of the government, which has outlined the following
progress steps for itself:
100
To implement the EU-Moldova Action Plan from 2005 to2007 and to create conditions for the Association
Agreement between the EU and the Republic of Moldova. To implement the first Copenhagen criterion
(democratic state system) by the end of 2009, and to implement the second criterion (competitive market
economy) by the end of 2012. To complete negotiations of the Republic of Moldova`s adherence to the EU by
2015.
The so-called "breakthrough" came unexpectedly and odd enough with the Communist Party being in power and
after high allegiances for Russia and the Russia-Belarus Union. There was hope, a naive one, that the Communist
Party can bring Moldova closer to the EU.
These hopes gained some ground with the signing of the Action Plan, the instrument used by the EU for promoting
its European Neighbourhood Policy, a humble attempt to temper the European "boom" in the former Soviet
republics of Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and the Mediterranean countries, which all started to claim clear European
perspectives for their countries. Now, with the Action Plan coming to its end and with the PCA expiring in 2008
Moldova is looking for a new legal agreement that would meet its interests and set a solid base for further
cooperation with the EU which is not more and not less than being a quality of member of the EU.
To put it bluntly, the EU is not ready nor does it want to grant such a status to its new neighbour, and there are a lot
of factors determining such a decision. First of all, there is the enlargement fatigue felt by the old EU members
about the last wave of enlargement which included 12 new members from the Central and Eastern Europe.
This means that the old members have to "support" financially the continuous modernisation of CEE economies
and supply the money for the structural funds used by the new members. Then, it is about the failure of the EU
98
The Concept of Integration of the Republic of Moldova in the European Union. National Commission for the European Integration. Chisinau, August 2003
99
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. Wider Europe Neighbourhood. A new Framework for Relations with our Eastern and
Southern Neighbors, COM (2003), Brussels, March 11, 2003
100
Millennium Development Goals of the Republic of Moldova. (draft), Government of the Republic of Moldova, Chisinau, September, 2004
Constitutional Treaty and the crisis it generated within EU. Only now with the new proposals and a reformed EU
Treaty the constitutional crisis within the EU seems to be brought to an end. Third, there are other "contenders"
queuing up to join the Union with a clear perspective for that. This comes as the result of the disintegration of
Yugoslavia and the Kosovo war, which put in danger the whole Europe. The best way for the EU to avoid a new
escalation in the Balkans is to integrate these countries into its structures. No doubt, the tools for doing it remain
unchanged or at least they keep their consistency: the policy of conditionality and socialisation of using sticks and
carrots. Consequently, the EU has a very busy agenda and without minimising its interest in Moldova, it is
unrealistic to believe that Moldova can be included in the EU's enlargement structures soon enough.
Advantages of Moldovas rapprochement with EU lie in the political, economic and social areas. Politically, it
means democracy, stability, state improvement and the citizens security. Economically, it means the elimination
of periphery economy syndrome, increased competitiveness of the country, expanding access to the development
funds, investments and new technologies.
The social aspect means harmonisation with European standards in education, healthcare and environment,
information and the protection of human rights. And finally, the constructive settlement of the Transnistria
problem, the only frozen conflict at the eastern land border of the wider Europe, is of primary importance both for
Moldova (in terms of security, economy and human rights) and EU (in terms of security).
On the other side of the table, there is Moldova, a small country which claims to be in South-Eastern Europe, the
poorest country in Europe stuck in an endless process of transition, with one third of its population being abroad
and ruled in the 21
st
century by a Communist Party. All this makes Moldova a highly undesirable candidate for
EU integration, not to speak about unfulfilled commitments and obligations.
The goals of the PCA together with those for the Action Plan continue to be only theoretical. It is enough to
mention independent justice, human rights protection, the separation of powers, the freedom of speech, and the
independent media, all which is non-existent in Moldova and constitute the core values of the EU.
Moldovan aspirations for EU integration have to be viewed also in the context of the external environment and the
particularities of the region as such. For a long period considered a grey geostrategic zone, now Moldova is more a
buffer zone between the EU and Russia, even though there is no common border with the big brother.
Nevertheless, with the Transnistrian region being overwhelmingly controlled by Russia and Russian troops
deployed there, Russian presence is permanently felt. The dispute about this buffer zone has bigger risks for Russia
than for the EU, which is why, Russia plays harder on this issue and will continue to fiercely oppose any
rapprochement between Moldova and the EU.
On the other hand, the EU is not happy with the Transnistrian conflict still unresolved at its front door. Thus, fears
and the security challenge posed by Transnistria cannot be neglected in Brussels. However, the EU seems to be
overtaken by Russia when it comes to economic ties. Russia uses its energy supplies card to economically
blackmail the EU, and thus the EU stays out of its way concerning its "near abroad".
The Ukraine is facing a constant political crisis after the orange revolution, and the battle for a European Ukraine
or a Russian one is not over yet. Yushchenko`s presidency came up with the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict
but got stuck when he lost domestic support. Romania is already in the EU and cannot play on its own when it
comes to Moldova's European integration. Moreover, with the recent visa scandal and continued attacks from the
Communist government, exacerbated by some EU declarations regarding the Romanian law about regaining
Romanian citizenship by Moldovan nationals, put a lot of pressure on the Moldovan-Romanian relations.
Nonetheless, the Communist government is hoping that the year 2008 can be a promising one given the fact that
Moldova will hold the presidency in the South-eastern European Cooperation Process (SEECP), a organisation
which along with other regional initiatives as the Central European Initiative (CEI), the Stability Pact for South-
eastern Europe (SPSEE), the Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA) and the South-eastern European
Cooperative Initiative(SECI) have as final goal a European perspective for the member states and are meant to
bolster the cooperation, trade, and transfer of competencies required for a successful transition
and further adherence to the EU.
However, for example, Moldovan membership in the SPSEE was conditioned upon not asking for EU involvement
in the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict and not asking to be included in the Stabilisation and Association
process with further EU membership. Anyway, the EU got involved, at least in the capacity of observer in the
settlement of this conflict, but it is not likely to grant Moldova any European future so far.
The explanation is that Moldova was included in all these initiatives with the hard lobbying of some EU members
or the neighbouring Romania, since Moldova is not on the list for European enlargement. As stated above, all these
bodies have the finality of EU accession and are meant to prepare the candidate country to fulfill the Copenhagen
criteria for accession as well as to meet the absorption capacity of the EU.
Given that Moldova is a small state, it should not create troubles for the EU`s capacity to absorb such a country,
but when it comes to the political and economic criteria for accession, Moldova is far away from their
achievement. These and other reasons, the major of them being the Transnistrian conflict will be invoked by the
EU to further deny Moldova an association agreement, without a clear EU membership. Therefore, Moldova
should start doing its job in the domestic arena and begin to implement real reforms and develop a functional
market economy.
On the external stage, Moldova has to make better use of such opportunities as the chairmanship in the SEECP and
gain the trust of regional partners as well as of EU member states.
The EU-Moldova relations can hardly be called successful and mutually beneficial. Since the implementation of
the PCA and Action Plan started, Moldova has made little progress, in some areas even regressed in internalising
core European norms and values: the rule of law, market economy, and the protection of human rights. In almost
10 years of contractual relations with the EU, Moldova benefited from technical assistance without giving anything
back.
The situation continues to be the same, moreover, it becomes worse. The Communist government decided that EU
has to upgrade its relations with Moldova just because Moldova is sidelined and trapped in misery, poverty, torn
by the unsolved Transnistrian conflict, etc. It does not work that way, is the other way round and high officials
from the Moldovan government should be aware of that.
Currently, the Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration (MFAEI) began an offensive in
Brussels targeting the Autonomous Free Trade Agreement (available only for western Balkans with a clear
European perspective) and the liberalisation of the visa regime. Furthermore, on the eve of the AP and PCA
expiry, Moldovan officials speak about setting up new mechanisms that would open the access to the four
freedoms of the EU: the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital. This is too daring since from these
freedoms, only the EU member states benefit, and the candidates for membership and Moldova do not. It should
be expected that the EU will politely refuse the four freedoms to the extent Moldova wants to benefit from and the
liberalisation of the visa regime given the huge number of Moldovan illegal migrants in the EU countries. Due to
Moldovan membership in the CEFTA, an Autonomous Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) is more likely to be signed,
but under special provisions to ensure the quality of products coming from Moldova.
Furthermore, it is difficult to predict the content of the future renewed agreement with the EU. Obviously, the
Moldovan government expects an Association agreement, however, the EU cannot grant it. It is more likely that
the EU will follow the strategy of small steps in order to ensure at least minimal progress in Moldova towards
democratisation and modernisation. The stakes are already raised with a possible signing of AFTA in 2008 and
visa facilitation agreement.
Therefore, the EU will continue this policy of giving small bits and asking for further reforms. The new contractual
treaty will not be an Association one. It does not matter how it will be called, the most important thing will be its
content and what Moldova should gain instead of compliance with EU requirements. It can be predicted that as an
exception, Moldova can benefit from some EU pre-adherence funds as PHARE, SAPARD and ISPA without being
a candidate for membership but to a lesser extent than other candidate countries. Anyway, everything depends on
the willingness of the EU to cope with Moldova and to sponsor further reforms in this country. However,
compliance with EU norms and values should be imperative for Moldova and conditionality and socialisation
policy the tools to ensure it.
Moreover, in its aspiration to eat the cake (of international financing) and have it (support of the large Communist
electorate) it has embraced almost all the ideas that were resounded in the Moldovan society after 1991. For
instance, it has placed itself as the most important promoter of the country towards EU, blaming its previous
governments for being unable to carry out serious steps towards EU in the last decade.
In the fall of 2003, Communist leaders claimed that they were the most proponent supporters of the EU integration
for Moldova, and they were expecting in vain to be accepted by the EU in 2007, at least, until the visit of Gunter
Verheugen, EU Commissioner for integration to Moldova, when he stated that Moldova is not on the agenda of
expansion, although the EU will propose an individual Plan of actions that will help the country to overcome
structural deadlocks it is facing today.
Public pressure is certainly a strong incentive to draw the current leadership closer to the EU agenda. Increasing
exports with the EU, a large number of Moldovan expatriates working in many EU countries, and the emerging
benefits out of the neighbouring status in the ENP (European neighbourhood policy) play a considerable factor
in changing the public mindset, and attitudes. At the same time, some of the Communist leaders still insist on the
need to join the Russia Belarus Union, thus, giving several reasons to the opposition parties to believe that the
ruling party has a shaky and immature position towards EUs enlargement.
Ambiguous as it is, the European membership is quite appealing to the ordinary people. More that 76% of the
respondents claim they want Moldova to be part of the EU.
Source: CBS Axa Survey, March 2008, made by IDSI Viitorul
Nevertheless, the political consequences of the membership do not mean too much to the ordinary citizens, who
are still divided around cultural and economic lines. Almost 45% of respondents believe that Moldova can be
simultaneously present in two areas the CIS and the EU, and this ambiguous statement is often echoed before
elections and after their termination by top-officials of the country.
Although officials of Moldova overemphasise the countrys categorical opposition to NATO membership, on the
premises that the 1994 Constitution stipulates the countrys neutrality, most of the opposition politicians and civil
society have repeatedly declared their support towards the full integration of Moldova in Europe, i.e. in the Euro-
Atlantic dimension. Public support to NATO membership is on the rise in Moldova, and the creation of several
information and documentation centers, libraries, clubs, contribute steadily to the process of public awareness, and
the involvement of the Moldovan society in fierce debates.
Source: CBS Axa Survey, March 2008, ordered by IDIS Viitorul
Beyond the unceasing political/cultural dilemmas, Moldova has officially accepted a new generation of political
commitments. So, Moldova signed an Action Plan with the EU (February 23, 2005) that ended in March 2008, and
with the North Atlantic Alliance, Moldova signed an Individual Action Plan (IPAP). Chisinau is urging to realise
the Plan of individual measures for Moldova's integration into the European Union.
Such perspective would be much more useful for Moldova in its striving for European integration, and would be a
serious incentive for reforms. Earlier, President Voronin stated that European integration of Moldova in 2007 is
the most important goal for the Republic of Moldova to develop
101
. Earlier, the Parliament of Moldova signed a
political declaration that stated Moldovas will to become a part of the enlarged EU (April 2005).
Nevertheless, the EU means different things to the different social groups of the population. For most of it, the EU
is a magic world of prosperity and peace, bringing only benefits saying little about the core institutions that need
to be adopted and abided; for many others, EU means an ultimate resort against Russians attempts to regain full
101 Chisinau, Infotag News Agency, August 28, 2003
control of Moldova. Located on the border of the EU/NATO, Moldova citizens seems to be quite well informed,
but still the quality of information is critical.
Source: CBS Axa Survey, March 2008, ordered by IDIS Viitorul
Due to the fact that Moldova is a typical product of the electoral democracy, politicians tend to run their business
by pedaling on more or less unrealistic objectives. After signing the Action Plan in 2005, Chisinau presented it as
almost a cheque for the forthcoming invitation to join the EU, as other Stability Pact Members were through the
so-called Stabilisation and Association Agreements (Macedonia, Croatia, Albania).
This caused uneasy reactions among EU officials, who hurried up to refute the allegation saying that there are
phases in the process of integration that cannot be omitted by any of the candidate-countries, and that the
Neighbourhood policy of the EU (addressing the countries that will remain at the border with the EU after the
2004-2007 waves of integration) is today what can be ultimately proposed to Moldova.
In the meanwhile, an EUs Wider Europe document
102
has set out several incentives which are provided to those
countries that cannot be integrated today, in return for concrete signs of political, economic and institutional
reforms. Among these incentives, the EU is proposing a greater European political involvement in conflict
prevention and crisis management. Transnistria is specifically mentioned as a region where the EU should take a
more active role.
The Commission also suggests intensified co-operation to combat common security threats such as trafficking in
drugs and trafficking of human beings, money laundering, and corruption.
Since the mid-1990s, lites and mass publics in these outsider countries are faced with increasing disparities
between the development of their own countries and those located immediately next to the West. In spite of a wide
range of softening instruments developed by the EU and NATO (from Partnership for Peace, Partnership and
Co-operation Agreements, common strategies to modest programme of cross-border cooperation), Moscow, Kiev,
Minsk and Chisinau Europe seem to be moving away instead of closer.
Feelings of exclusion are strengthened by the fact that the new NATO members and EU-candidates in central
Europe are seen to be making progress, whereas the own societies continue to be plagued by economic malaise
and, with the possible exception of Putins Russia, political disorientation.
Comparative analysis of the confidence scores in political institutions (Euro barometer)
102
Wider Europe: proposed new framework for relations with the EUs Eastern and Southern Neighbours, March 2003.
OSCE observer missions have generally evaluated the post-Communist (parliamentary, presidential and local)
elections in Moldova as free and fair. Irregularities were seen, attested, confirmed but qualified as being minor.
The usual trouble with the elections in Moldova is related to the biased state mass media, administrative resources,
as well as poor administration of the voters lists. A certain degree of unfair competition for media coverage and
the abuse of the incumbent positions/resources for the ruling party has been a common trait of most elections after
1994.
This tendency has become stronger since the Communist Party returned to power, in 2001. President Voronin won
his mandate in April 2001 in parliament after the PCM had garnered 50% of the vote (and thus 71 out of the 101
seats) in February 2001.
This young democracy is still struggling for stability, reforms and territorial unity. Nevertheless, with the adoption
of the ENP by the EU in relationship with its neighbours, Moldova faced literally a new isolation wall with
neighbouring Romania. Once Romania joined, on January 1, 2007 the EU, it had to revise its previous entry
regime for Moldovan citizens and introduced a visa regime. Despite the privileged relations with Moldova,
Bucharest had to follow the general rules on consular affairs terminating the practice of entering Romania on the
basis of a simple passport
103
.
Although some officials of Romania suggested that they would convince the EU to accept issuing the visa at the
border, the introduction of visa went painfully, and with important tensions in the relationship between Chisinau
and Bucharest. Only in the fall of 2007, Bucharest succeeded to open up a modern Consular Office, thus creating
civilised conditions to apply for visa, or even multiple entries visa for Moldovan citizens.
Moreover, a large number of questions relating to the documents and procedures stipulated for citizens who cross
the border frequently for business purposes and family matters, and for high school pupils and students are also
being addressed, as it is a known fact that a large number of young Moldovans study in Romania.
103
Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, www.mae.ro, 22
nd
of October 2004.
The lack of available statistics concerning the real number of the double citizens in Moldova was enough to keep
the issue under the carpet, thus, it could not influence essentially the public mood. Nevertheless, the changing
geography of eastern Europe, once invited to join the EU, started to attract more candidates to apply for
citizenship.
Since 2001, the acquisition of Romanian citizenship has become even more desirable, as it allows the visa-free
travel to the European Union. It is worth to mention that more than 140,000 Moldovan citizens have received
Russian citizenship, 60,000 have Israeli citizenship and several tens of thousands have Ukrainian citizenship.
104
There are also almost 180,000 citizens of the Republic of Moldova of Bulgarian origin. The majority of them hold
the Bulgarian citizenship too.
105
Since Romania is a full-fledged EU member, it insists on Moldovas European perspective. This makes the
neighbouring country a natural ally of Moldova in receiving more attention from Brussels, exploring the utmost
benefits which are related to the size, manageability and possible attraction of Moldova as a south-eastern country,
willing to abide the law, i.e. through the plethora of regional initiatives and programmes.
Nevertheless, the EU`s policy orientation in Moldova seems to be discarded by the unresolved conflict and by, to a
large extent, Russians unwillingness to be substituted by the EU in influencing the domestic and foreign
destination of Moldovan politics.
As even respondents note, more success in the EU integration is perceived as a zero-sum game in relationship with
Russias near abroad foreign policy, and intervention in the ground.
Source: CBS Axa Survey, March 2008, by IDSI Viitorul
Under the new law on citizenship (amended in 2003), Moldovans who have the citizenship of other countries are
not obliged to give up the Moldovan citizenship. The law also allows persons who had lost Moldovan citizenship
in the past to gain it back, without renouncing the present citizenship.
Unfortunately, the law doesnt define clearly the legal status of persons with double citizenship. Moldovan citizens
have the opportunity to acquire Romanian citizenship if they can prove that one of their parents has lived on
Romanian soil. The situation of Moldovans who hold the double nationality (Romanian and Moldovan) represents
a delicate issue for the Romanian authorities because they must determine the conditions under which these people
will pass the border towards Romania.
Whereas Moldovan citizens holding double nationality enjoy the same rights and obligations as ordinary
Romanian citizens, with regards to their movement within the Schengen space, it is necessary to clarify the
Romanian policy in this respect. Now, the status of such citizens is special, as they can go back and forth across
the Romanian border by virtue of their Romanian passport.
The persons who desire to regain the Romanian citizenship need to compile a dossier with all the documents
proving their Romanian roots - the origins of their parents and/or grandparents. No interview is necessary. The
commission in charge with the granting of Romanian nationality will admit or will refuse the request on the basis
of the documents presented by the applicant in his/her dossier
106
.
From 2002, in order to prevent a massive migration of Moldovan citizen, the Romanian government has revised its
policy regarding the granting of Romanian citizenship by tightening considerably the eligibility criteria. Therefore,
104
Report for the third meeting of the WG on Moldova of the Budapest Secretariat, ICMPD, 2004, p. 23
105
Bulgarians want autonomy for a minority from the Republic of Moldova, Mihai Isac, Realitatea Romaneasca, 21.05.2004.
106
The Romanian Ministry of Justice is the authority in charge to deal with the citizenship issues.
the Romanian government adopted in June 2002 an Emergency Ordinance (no 68/ 2002) concerning a series of
facilitations for the citizens coming from the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, who desire to regain the
Romanian citizenship.
This move raised serious concerns in the EU, as well as in the Communist government in Moldova, who feel that
this could essentially change its political plans to win the power, once more Moldovans become Romanian
citizens. In late 2007, the Parliament of Moldova decided to prohibit a very wide number of officials to hold
double citizenship.
This fomented serious political crisis, making the opposition claim that the law deprives Romanian ethnics of the
chance to serve the Republic of Moldova, thus creating discrimination.
3.2 The Civil Society as a Part of the Grand Design in Democratic Accountability
Democracy building started already with the first groups advocating for the immediate separation from the USSR.
They emerged as dissidents to the Soviet regime, while later, they steadily gained the peoples confidence and
became the most influential forces that shaped up the Moldovan statehood.
This was the case with the Popular Front, which emerged from the Movement for Democracy and Reforms,
pedaling initially on measures and support to Gorbaciovs policies, but when the Soviet leader became the hostage
of his own limitations, the crystallised groups of the political opposition in Moldova directly contested the
legitimacy and power of the Soviet structures and administration, as well as of the Communist Party`s leading role.
Dissidence proved to be justified considering that the Soviet state was much weaker than many could believe.
Nevertheless, it appeared to be more difficult to build on the independence than contest the ancient regime.
Only after the Declaration of Independence (26 August, 1991), democratic traditions regained their force and
shape
107
. Moldova has ratified the core UN human rights conventions, as well as all ILO fundamental conventions
(forced labour, freedom of associations, collective bargaining, child labour and discrimination in employment).
In 1997, Moldova abolished the death penalty, but has still to face a tremendous task of improving the detention
conditions, of excluding the ill-treatment of prisoners during interrogations and torture. The changes to which the
country was promoted are the establishment of a multiparty system, free elections, the appearance of the market
economy, and many others.
The changes in the political, economic, and social life prompted significant changes in peoples mentality and
brought about new forms of social relations, which influenced the overall process of transition in the country. An
unsettling fact is the decreasing ranking of the Human Development Index (HDI) for the Republic of Moldova
since 1992 from 81, to 110 among the 185 countries monitored by the UN.
Domestic legislation provides a fairly liberal environment for the development of the civil society. The number of
NGOs reached over 3,500 at the beginning of 2005. New laws on political parties (financing and organisation) are
expected to be adopted till the end of this year.
The traditions of the civil society are still weak in Moldova; expectations from the state and the government are
high but in decrease, however, the viability of the civil sector is largely undermined by low self-sustainability. The
number of effective NGOs is insignificant and most of them are fully dependent on international support and
funding. Trust in political institutions is low.
The combination of general Soviet and specific Moldovan traditions with an NGO-unfriendly government resulted
in a particular weak civil society. Since independence, a substantial portion of civil mobilisation has been directed
towards exclusivist ethnic issues hardly appropriate to increase trust in institutions or generate a moderating
influence on society. Overall, the grass-root quality of NGOs is doubtful: the international community serves more
as both a sponsor and main client or an addressee of the NGOs.
Typically, most of the current politically relevant NGOs are highly dependent on international funding. Not only
juridical and bureaucratic obstruction of NGO activities, but also their substitution and undermining by pro-
107
Starting from the age-old aspirations of our people to live in a sovereign country, and fulfilling those aspirations in proclaiming the independence of the Republic of
Moldova, considering that while growing into a nation the Moldovan people has given strong evidence of historical and ethnic continuity in its statehood (taken from the
Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, July 29,1994 ).
government, established or guided NGOs are quite frequent in an attempt to counterweigh NGOs that are critical
of the current leadership.
In 2003, for example, Moldovas independent trade unions accused state officials of interfering in their activities,
alleging that the state was using threats, fiscal controls, and other methods to sabotage their work, while in 2004,
the government tried to blackmail the 2005 Coalition for free and democratic elections.
The freedom of speech and the considerable proliferation of the mass media have characterised generally the end
of the USSR which supported the creation of an active and vigorous mass media. After 2001, censorship in the
state mass media, as well as open conflicts between the journalists and political authorities broke out as a matter of
high sensitivity
108
.
Moldovas new criminal code, which came into effect in 2003, provides up to five years in prison for persons
convicted of defamation despite strong opposition from domestic and international groups. The independent mass
media also faced economic pressures such as high tax burdens and limited editorial independence owing to links
with specific political parties or businesses.
In March 2004, the OSCE and the Council of Europe jointly issued a recommendation on how the public
broadcaster should be structured. The ruling party tried to expel disloyal journalists from the State TV in 2004,
which resulted in unprecedented large-scale protest actions
109
.
In 2003, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe stated that recent trends [in Moldova] clearly
indicate that the ruling party insists on keeping the mass media under strict control. Likewise, many domestic
NGOs have argued that the ruling party is increasingly using state-owned media as a tool against the opposition
and putting pressure on independent media through financial and legal means. Although in 2003, the Parliament
adopted the long-awaited legislation transforming Teleradio-Moldova (TVM1), the state television broadcaster,
into a public service company, it still remained subject to significant government influence and party control.
In November 2006, a new Broadcasting Code was adopted by the Parliament of Moldova, which set up the
framework for transforming the ex-state company Teleradio-Moldova into an effectively responsible public TV
company.
The political regime during the Soviet era had nothing to do with democratic traditions, although it followed a
number of legal instruments and norms of conduct. The Soviet Constitution and its claims for promoting the
human rights of the Soviet people were systematically infringed by party hegemony and double-standards.
Therefore, the only democratic pattern that could be recalled as reference for Moldova is a limited historic period
of the existence of a Democratic Popular Republic. In 1918, Romania's political unity, based on the principles of
peoples' right to self-determination, was completed. After 1918, Romania made important steps toward
strengthening the national state life by enacting major reforms: the universal ballot (1918), the land reform (1921),
and the Constitution of 1923.
Benefiting from large natural resources and boasting a constitutional regime based on a democratic system, the
country recorded a strong upsurge of development. In 1938, King Carol II abolished the constitution and
proclaimed a royal government.
After declaring independence from Russia on 24 January 1918, the Romanian dominated Sfatul Trii voted for
union with Romania on April 9, 1918. Of the 148 deputies, 86 voted for the union, 3 against, 36 abstained (the
deputies representing the minorities, 50% at the time)and 13 were not present.
The organs of state power in the regions, counties, districts, and communes were designated "people's councils."
Formally established by law in 1949, these bodies were organised into a centralised system in which the lower-
level councils were fully subordinated to the next higher council, and all functioned under the direct control of the
central government.
It was the citizens' duty to observe the constitution and the laws of the republic, to preserve and develop socialist
property, to practice work discipline, and to strengthen the "regime of people's democracy." Military service and
108
In April and September 2002, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) adopted, the 1280 and 1303 Resolutions regarding the activity of the
democratic institutions in the Republic of Moldova, by which PACE, in fact, requested the Republic of Moldova to amend the law on audiovisual and to adopt a law, by which
the status of the State Company Teleradio Moldova.
109
Resolution for the protection of human and professional dignity, Chisinau, August 8, 2004.
the defense of the nation were described as duties of honour for all citizens. In the 1970s and 1980s, Moldavian
SSR received substantial investment from the budget of the USSR to develop industrial and scientific facilities, as
well as housing.
In 1971, the Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted a resolution about the measures for further development of
Kishinev city that secured more than one billion rubles of investment from the USSR budget. Subsequent decisions
were also directed at substantial funding and brought highly qualified specialists from all over the USSR to
develop Moldova's industry.
These investments came to a halt in 1991 with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, when Moldova became
independent. Along with the other peripheral Soviet republics, Moldova started to move towards independence
from 1988 onwards; in August 1989, a language law was passed, adopting the Latin alphabet for Moldovan and
declaring it the state language of the MSSR. The first free elections for the local parliament were held in February
and March 1990.
The concept of the civil society is a relatively new but emerging in Moldova. More than 7,000 of NGOs were
registered in Moldova by the end of 2007, and their numbers grow year after year, as well as their influence on the
decision-making process.
Although the legislation is somehow adjusted to allow the existence of public organisations, it is sometimes
considered to be restrictive and prohibitive. There are laws regulating the existence of not-profit organisations as
associations made up by individuals, and foundations, which are more complex entities.
There was established a relation of the state institutions with the civil society. The representatives of the civil
society may participate in law projects, initiate discussions on different subjects, attend meetings with the
representatives of the ministries etc.
The NGOs or other kinds of organisations are more likely to get involved in the political decision-making process
than the citizens, who confront the basic problem the lack of information. The civil society actors may get
involved in the decision-making process at national, and also at a local level.
Coalition efforts have been registered in various sectors, and of different strength. Coalition networking is still a
weak point of the civil society in Moldova, although considerable efforts had been made in the last years,
particularly between 2002 2005, when the civil society challenged the legacy of several political decisions, first,
the ruling elites will to sign a political document with Russia, and second, in 2005, monitoring the free election
process in Moldova, through a nation-wide initiative, called Coalitia 2006.
Many other public initiatives, coalition-building efforts, advocacy groups have rapidly increased their voice at the
national and regional level in the last 5 years. Regular forums have been held in Moldova since 2000, as platforms
for assembling the synergies of various sectors and groups of NGOs.
The civil society has a tradition of self-organising initiatives. NGO forums were the most important public events
that occurred in 1997, 1999, 2001, allowing the third sector to consider the existing constraints and quality of
developments, institutional milestones and state policies in the field of the associative rights.
Social, non-political self-organisation and self-help are mainly concentrated on communal and family structures of
economic subsistence. A small elite, almost exclusively in the capital of Chisinau, has produced social capital by
teaming up with relevant international organisations.
Typically of a USSR successor state, attitudes and concepts concerning social organisation are focused on the
state, irrespective of the ability and willingness of the state to live up to these expectations. The issue here is not a
low level of trust among the population, but rather a fragmentation of society and a dominance of the state.
More far-reaching forms of social organisation are limited to a rudimentary elite and mobilise the populace rather
on an ad-hoc basis. Several thousand NGOs are registered, but recent changes in legislation and registration
procedures are generally perceived as restrictive.
The emerging civil society of Moldova has clearly become a visible component of the public life, with valuable
human, financial and institutional resources. Over 3,000 NGOs were registered in Moldova until the mid of 2003.
The fields in which Moldovas NGOs mostly prevail are: ecology, youth, mass media, gender studies, local public
administration, human rights, economic and social development. 65% of the NGOs see themselves as national,
while 35% as local. The majority of NGOs are concentrated in the capital city: mainly because of infrastructure,
access to funds, competitiveness. Organisations, de jure national, are active within the municipality area.
The NGO Sustainability Index shows that the main financing source for NGOs in late 2002 were the foreign
grants, as over 60% of all NGOs benefited from donors` support.
110
Considering the geographical location of
NGOs, one could observe a fast growth of NGOs operating locally, as international donors have redirected their
grants to the regions (Table 2.1).
Table 2.1 NGO geography %
1997 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
National 94.5 60.5 - - - -
Local 6.4 34 - - - -
100.9 94.5 - - - -
There is an obvious deficit of financing in the emerging civil sector, as its funding is still questionable under
current legislation. The law on sponsorship allows donations from legal entities to public benefit organisations,
thus giving them the right to tax reduction for any donation made for charity purposes, provided that the donation
does not exceed 7% of the income amount for the current year.
However, economic agents tend to report small incomes under high taxation conditions, while state fiscal bodies
do not make any difference between for profit and not for profit, charitable activities performed by the legal
entities of Moldova.
The entire legal framework for NGOs has several drawbacks and needs improvement, while the culture of money-
giving among business is still embryonic. The economic activity of NGOs is not stimulated well enough and
regulated by the existent legal framework; consequently, the number of financing sources for the sector is
significantly decreasing.
Among the organisations providing services, 69% do not render paid services, and other 12% collect 10% out of
their provided services costs. Some analysts, however, would notice that the civic society is present in Moldova
only virtually. It is an absent presence.
111
It represents a big number of dispersed actors, who know each other,
recognise each other, support and envy each other. The Ministry of Justice reports that in 2004, 3156 national and
international NGOs were registered in Moldova, 35% of which worked at the local level
Half of all the NGOs registered by the Moldovan Ministry of Justice consider themselves active, the majority of
which are located in Chisinau, Balti, and other large cities where they have access to information, training,
consulting, and donor resources. But nobody knows about them outside the club.
The number of Moldovans who do not trust NGOs is still twice as large as the number of those who do trust them.
Even if one can place doubt on the level of knowledge that the population has with regard to NGOs people
usually have only vague ideas of the third sectors role and activities, if they have any idea at all this is still a
valid indicator of the fact that the largest part of the players in civil society remains rather anonymous.
110
NGO Sustainability index, Contact: November 2002
111
Dan Dungaciu, What happens there? Moldova azi, November 2005
NGOs and their activity are not very well known by the public, and this has already been perceived as a serious
problem and is going to pose a priority activity direction in the near future. The November 2003 Barometer of
public opinion
112
reveals interesting tendencies with regards to the perception the public has of the civil sector and
the state authorities. It is interesting to follow up the dynamics of public trust in the civil sector`s main players,
compared to that in the authorities representatives (figure 2.1).
One could easily notice that the number of people trusting the main civil sector actors has increased in 2003
compared to 2002, while the number of people trusting the authorities has decreased. And, at the same time,
distrust of the authorities has increased, while the distrust for the civil sector players has decreased.
The increased trust the people have in the civil sector players, and their decreased trust in public authorities,
combined with peoples disbelief in the efficiency of the participatory process (figure 2.3) is a clear indicator of a
slow, but certain deterioration of the state structures authority.
Since 1995, the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova has adopted a series of 5 laws regulating the NGOs
activity
113
. Both the law on public associations and the law on foundations set precise norms on the procedure for
the establishment and registration of associations and foundations, while in January 2003 a new Civil Code
incorporated specific provisions on non-commercial organisations, and other general regulations, applicable to the
functioning of all legal entities.
Both the law on public associations and the law on foundations set precise norms on the procedure for the
establishment of associations and foundations. All foundations, regardless of the area of their activity, are
registered by the Ministry of Justice, while local NGOs are registered by local governments.
The procedure for the establishment and registration of NGOs is the same as for national and local organisations.
The lack of cases of NGOs liquidation by the state for political or random reasons shows that the effective
legislation protects the NGOs activity. NGOs are free to decide on their structure and management; the legal acts
stipulations on the structure and competence of organisations are minimal, and they can carry out those activities
that are not forbidden by legislation. The liquidation procedure is possible only upon the decision of the court.
However, since the CPM`s victory in the February 2001 elections, there have been essential changes in the attitude
of the state towards the third sector as such. In spite of the generous legal framework, the rules of fiscal reporting
for NGOs are rather unfriendly; being equalised with those of the existing commercial entities, and this has a
largely negative impact mainly due to the need to carry out a rather sophisticated accountability and other fiscal
duties.
This is why, the government initiated in the spring of 2003 an initiative which aimed to control the foreign
resources granted to the Moldovan NGOs. For instance, the draft law stipulated that all grants, technical
assistance and other financial assistance are provided on the basis of earlier concluded agreements with the
Government (art.6-1), while in art.7 a, b.c, e, it states that the Ministry of Economy will elaborate a unified
procedure for setting up the priorities on concluding contracts (for NGOs), will determine the efficiency of the
grant utilisation, will make proposals for the nomination by competition of the managers of the grant project,
Ministry of Finance will decide upon the scheme of salaries for the project experts.
A number of NGOs sharply criticised the governmental draft law on foreign grants stating that, if applied, it
would affect dramatically the independence and sustainability of the NGOs, pointing out that this law may infringe
on the right to associate and the freedom of expression, contractual freedom, the inviolability of ownership, private
business
114
. Interventions of the state in the third sector activities increased in 2003 not to strengthen the
legislative basis but to split and divide the existing organisations
115
.
Thus, the ruling party tried hard to seek support after 2001 from the healthy civil society to its policies, while
blaming the rest of the NGOs for damaging the credibility and foundations of the Moldova statehood. This was
the reason why in March 2002, President Voronin launched the initiative of a social pact with the third sector
scheduling several meetings with NGOs from various sectors and of various profile.
112
The Public Barometer Opinion Poll, November 2003, IPP
113
Law on Public Associations (1996), Law on Foundations (1999), Law on Sponsorship and Philanthropy (1995), Tax Code.
114
Declaration of the NGO National Board on the risks of the Draft law on foreign grants, October 2003
115
N.Negru, NGOuri guvernamentale, Moldova Azi, November 17, 2003
The consultations with the president ceased to be interesting for the CPM leaders when very few NGOs happened
to express their support to the policies of 2002, including the street clashes with the opposition.
Thus, the ruling party changed the track by deciding to infuse the civil society with their own loyal NGOs, the so
called GonNGOs, assembled to counter if not to split those associations that were known previously for being
critical towards the official policies of CPM. Following a divide et impera principle, the ruling party highly
encouraged the creation, on March 12, 2002 of an alternative organisation to the acting Union of Moldovas
Journalists (UMJ), under the name of the League of Professional Journalists (LPJ), whose membership was
requited strictly from the state-owned press.
The LPJ has been instrumental to downplay the critics on the limitations of the freedom of press, accusing their
colleagues of making politics not work, or of having an anti-state orientation.
The same policy proceeded in 2003 even further when President Vladimir Voronin blessed the creation of the
alternative Union of writers by promising large subsidies from the state, strong links with the Minister of Culture,
in spite of the fact that the newly set NGO accounted for less than 5% of the old unions membership. State
officials were also quoted for blaming the old union for nationalism and destructive actions, for working
against the future of the statehood and the people
116
.
Similar trends were experienced in 2003 by the trade unions, whose leaders openly accused state officials of
interfering into the activities of the unions. It was mentioned that by threats and planned actions of sabotaging the
functioning of the unions, the government intends to split the unions movement, and this is done by fiscal controls
and even security services
117
. Soon after the local elections, a draft law on the associations of local governments
was compiled by the government aiming to create a single association of local authorities, while erasing the rest of
the existing associations from the Public Registrar held by the Minister of Justice.
In response, local government associations required the CoE to intervene in the emerging dispute saying that the
governments involvement in the creation of a new association of local authorities does not serve the long-term
strategic objectives of the local governments in Moldova, running counter to the norms set up by the European
Charter on Local Self-Government, and that the real objective pursued is to maintain an artificial separation of
local public authorities in small organisations, easily manipulated and rather ineffective
118
.
By administrative pressures, through blackmail or manipulation, the CPM is trying to get rid of the critical views
expressed by the most dynamic part of the civil society, and in this regard, it attempts to re-create a Soviet-like
framework where public organisations may only have the freedom to agree with the leadership.
This trend had been debated during the work of the NGO National Forum which warned that the general situation
in the country and the conditions of the civil sector had worsened greatly in 2003, as result of frequent violations
of human rights and freedoms, political pressures and intimidation of the state structures
119
.
In spite of the vociferous appeals to increase the quality of consultation of the government with the civil sector,
they did not avail to convince it of the benefits of such a cooperation, as in the case of the PRSP Strategy
(Poverty Reduction & Economic Growth), which was not approved by the set date by the IMF and the WB and,
and, as a result, only in 2003 Moldova lost a loan of USD124 million, originally provided for the implementation
of this strategy.
The weakness of the civil sector allows the current leadership of the country to attempt to take control over the
political process, to change the rules of the game and even gain additional battle-fields for future elections.
Therefore, such a dialogue is not only important, but almost critical to the democratic development of the
Moldovan state and society, simply because it still remains strongly polarised on various ethnic, political, cultural,
and economic criteria. The decrease of the rating shows that there is a slight albeit important step towards civil
society development, while there are still important battles to be won by the civil society groups and parties.
Actual political repression and civil-rights violations are, according to most relevant reports, quite limited (of
course, with the notable exception of Transnistria. Redress for known violations of civil and human rights,
however, is virtually non-existent. It goes without saying, however, that the soft violations of the human rights
116
Mold-Press News Agency, September 10, 2003
117
November 5, 2003, BASA-press/www.azi.md
118
August 11, 2003, Joint Appeal to the CoE of the NLAM, FLRA and AGM
119
November 20, 2003, Infotag News Agency
are widely spread. A number of laws adopted over the last 4 years also have serious deficiencies in terms of human
rights.
A severe political crisis in 2002 was resolved only with the intervention of the APCE and the adoption of two
subsequent resolutions on the situation of democratic institutions in Moldova
120
. Despite these positive moves, the
opposition has been sidelined from the decision-making process, further reducing the credibility of the legislative
process
121
.
The deterioration of the political situation affected the conduct of free and fair elections in May 2003
122
. As
Freedom House Reports indicated during 2002-2003-2004 (Nations in Transit), Moldova registered a bad record
and continued to deteriorate. This trend has been encompassing most of the indicators: the judiciary, the freedom
of expression, elections, and the governance. The public perception of the courts is preponderantly negative
123
.
As a part of the civil society, trade unions do not present an important force for their members in defending the
basic rights of employees
124
. An eloquent example is the protests of teachers and health personnel for salary
increases. The Trade Union Confederation (TUC), which is the largest in Moldova, was reluctant to support its
members when they went on strike picketing the government and the parliament and demanding an increase in
salary and the payment of wage arrears.
While the average salary in the country is 500 lei (USD37), a high school teacher gets 330 lei (USD24.5) a month,
and a kindergarten instructor merely 140 lei (USD10.4) a month. Ignoring the doctors and teachers demand of a
100 percent pay increase, the TUC rushed to sign with the government a 40 percent increase in order to prevent a
general strike. TUC, as well as Solidaritate, the second largest trade union in Moldova, have a long way to go to
become a western-type organisation that would represent its members in negotiations with employers.
Neither the Penal Code nor the Code of Administrative Offences stipulates any specific sanctions for violating
trade union rights. As a result, prosecutors may reject appeals by trade unions against any anti-union behaviour by
employers and governments; violations of the Trade Union Act remain unpunished. The law provides workers the
right to establish or join unions; however, there were reports that the government continued to pressure individual
unions to join a confederation that supported government policies. Over 50 percent of the workforce belonged to a
union.
The law also provides for the right to strike, except for workers in essential services, and workers exercised this
right by conducting legal strikes. There were two unions, the Trade Union Confederation of Moldova (TUCM) and
the Confederation of Free Trade Unions Solidaritate (Solidarity). The latter advocated government positions and
was widely believed to enjoy government support.
During the year, the government continued to pressure local unions to quit the TUCM and join Solidarity. On June
30, a representative of the state wine agency interfered in a meeting of the trade union of the National Institute of
Wine and Viticulture to prevent the transfer of the trade union to Solidarity.
125
The Republic of Moldova Law 393-XIV of 13.05.99 "Regarding the Chamber of Commerce and Industry"
confirms the status of the Chamber and defines it as "a non-governmental, autonomous, and independent
organisation, which represents common concerns of the Republic of Moldova`s entrepreneurs. The Chamber is a
legal person under public law and as such is supported by the state". The major objective of the CCI RM is to
create a business community and environment in the society as well as to represent the concerns of its members in
the system of external economic relations of the Republic of Moldova and in relations of the members with
governmental authorities and foreign business circles. The Chamber mentioned above collaborates with the
Ministry of Economy and represents a link between the ministry and economic groups.
Civil-society traditions have no deep roots in the Moldovan society, which does not fit completely into the rational
framework that describes the role of and need for civil society actors. Participation of the civil society actors is
organised on an ad-hoc basis and has not yet been institutionalised through an effective public policy process.
Moldova is certainly not an exception in this regard. Because of the Moldova-Romania nexus and the
120
27 April 2002 Resolution of APCE regarding functioning of democratic institutions in Moldova
121
Assessment Report on Parliament, 2004, Geoff Dubrow. Director, Eastern Europe, Parliamentary Centre
Submitted December 24, 2004, to UNDP Moldova
122
Report on local election observation, 25 May, 8 June 2003, prepared by CLRA of the Council of Europe, July 4, 2003
123
A 2001 public opinion survey identified that 26% of the population does not trust the justice system. The May 2004 public opinion survey indicates about the same level of
distrust - 25.2%. IPP, www.ipp.md.
124
Trade unions are to be established in Moldova in accordance with the law on public organisations, making no difference from any other professional or NGO
125
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2006 Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour March 6, 2007,
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2007/mar/81422.htm
corresponding concern of the Soviet authorities in Moscow, the repression of non-state organisations and the
reduction of the scope for civil activities were particularly prominent after World War II.
Instead of genuine forms of civil participation and private charity organisations, the Soviet regime concocted the
organisation of komsomol and pioneers organisations that were subservient to the regimes ideological beliefs
and social order. On the eve of the USSR dissolution, democratisation claims brought into life several dozens of
more or less organised informal networks, which had a major role in challenging the decaying regime and its
leading hegemonic party, thus paving the way towards an almost revamping of the former Soviet gerontocracy
and monopoly on public associations.
Although, a substantial portion of civil mobilisation was directed towards national and ethnic issues, immediately
after and before independence, hardly appropriate to increase trust in institutions or generate influence in society,
civic organisations became more organised, and less chaotic
126
.
Half of all the NGOs registered by the Moldovan Ministry of Justice consider themselves active, the majority of
which are located in the capital and the main cities of the country (Chisinau, Balti, Orhei, Cahul) and in other large
cities where they have access to information, training, consulting, and donor resources.
But nobody knows about them outside the club. The number of Moldovans who do not trust NGOs is still twice
as large as the number of those who do trust them. Even if one can place doubt on the level of knowledge that the
population has with regard to NGOs people usually have only vague ideas of the third sectors role and activities,
if they have any idea at all this is still an actual indicator of the fact that the largest part of the players in civil
society remains rather anonymous.
Most employment and education opportunities are also located in Chisinau. Clearly, there is no clear dependency
between the size of the sector, its access to information, training, consulting, and resources and the social capital
produced by the civil society.
The explanation seems to be that civil society actors have become very much part of the political landscape in
Moldova. NGOs claim to have very little access to the information held by state institutions (especially central
bodies) and are not accepted, in most cases, as participants in the process of discussion of policies, strategies,
with their abilities of implementing diverse programmes and providing services unrecognised. NGOs align
themselves to the functions of the state structures and as a result, get associated with the state structures and even
perceived, along with other civil sector actors, as its branch organisations.
Even the various opinion researches would put them in the same line with the state administration structures, and
what is more significant, approximately in the same order the government, the parliament, and the president
would go first, then the media, and NGOs and the trade unions would come second.
Looking at the chart showing the dynamics of public trust, one can see that the stakeholders register all together a
common growing trend, but also a certain path dependency could be observed. Not only each stakeholder stays
in its own path, ranging between a margin of 10% and 20%, but also there are hardly any points of intersection
between their traces. It illustrates, in fact, the lack of public participation and inter-level communication.
Dynamics of public trust
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
Nov-01 Mar-02 Nov-02 Apr-03 Nov-03 May-04 Nov-04 Feb-05
Government Parliament Media NGOs Trade unions
126
Angela Munteanu, Democratic learning: why not?, SEER, No.2, 2006
In Moldova, we may witness a paradox here: citizens do not trust public institutions, having considerable doubts
over their capacities and motivation of their leaders, but, at the same time, they expect to receive a very wide range
of public services from the state, too many perhaps, expecting that the state will take care of most of the public life
aspects.
The international community serves more both as a sponsor and a main client and as an addressee of the NGOs.
Typically, most of the current politically relevant NGOs are highly dependent on international funding, most
prominently by the Soros Foundation.
Not only juridical and bureaucratic obstruction of NGO activities, but also their substitution and undermining by
GONGOs (government-organised NGOs) are recent phenomena. The combination of general Soviet and specific
Moldovan tradition with an NGO-unfriendly government has resulted in a particular weak civil society in terms of
NGO activity. The minute size of the societal and political elite exacerbates the problems of developing a civil-
society separate from party-politics.
On December 29, 2005, the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova adopted a Resolution concerning the approval
of the Concept of Cooperation between Parliament and the Civil Society, but its implementation had not achieved
much of what it promised. Formalistic approaches, rigidity of the bureaucracy, and narrow party interests prevailed
insofar.
According to this, the representatives of the civil society can initiate and participate in law projects and collaborate
with the representatives of the parliament on law drafts. Besides, they can attend different meetings on different
topics, organised by the ministries, political institutions etc. Nevertheless, the traditions of the civil society are
weak; expectations from the state and the government are high, but volatile. The number of effective NGOs is
insignificant and most of them are fully dependent on international support and funding.
Most interestingly, it seems that the population, or the ordinary citizen, does also have a path of its own. There
are no intersection points between the general public and various institutions, including the civil society actors.
There is no dialogue between them - one can easily observe that the average citizen acts like a spectator, not like
an actor.
A poll conducted in 2003 by the IDIS shows that the second most important way to get informed about political
life for the ordinary people is to talk with other people about politics, the first most important way is by watching
the TV news. The balance between the choice of watching the TV and the choice of talking with others is close to
fifty-fifty, which means that people are more reactive than proactive.
Considering the obvious hardships of providing free access to information, while keeping the National TV under
strict control of the ruling party, one may easily understand that the society feels largely disoriented. People feel
that the state is too big, while politicians are too many. In 2002, respondents claimed that there are too many
political parties in Moldova, and one party would suffice. A pluralistic by default (Lucan Way) society of
Moldova was apparently fed up by politicians? The right answer would be that the population was fed up by
ineffective politics.
People seem politically active and participative, but the truth is that they are not, and that is exactly why, there
were no massive social actions of protests in Moldova. Even in the late 1980s, when the regular sessions of the
newly elected democratic parliament became for the general public one of the most interesting shows to be
watched on TV, not knowing the contents of yesterday editorial in the main newspaper, supporting the popular
front was considered nearly an obscenity, and even in those times, the national movements were politically
inspired.
In fact, this is a simulation of a democratic participatory process. There are a lot of newspapers, TV channels and
radio stations in Moldova, NGOs are flourishing, the opposition is sitting in the parliament, and people are not sent
to jail for criticising authorities.
All the massive street protest actions that have taken place in Moldova since 1988 were genuinely of a political
nature claims to raise the social status of the Moldovan/Romanian language marked the rise of the national
movements in 1989; claims to block the federalisation of the country in 2003, or massive protests of the patenta-
holders in 2007, as a result of the laws abolishing some of the rights of the small entrepreneurs.
These kinds of politically-bound protests provoked considerable reshuffles in 1995, as well as in 1999; fewer
changes between 20012007 once the Communist Party gained its exclusive right to hold power. But, again, as
another paradox in the 1990s, people were losing massively their savings, their jobs and their economic security,
and still, in contrast to political issues, there were no massive protest actions.
It seems that the civil society of the Republic of Moldova only becomes visible when it has a political background.
It means, in fact, that insufficient social capital and insufficient public services are produced. It means that
regardless the quantitatively impressive size of the associative sector, the vertical nature of the public dialogue has
not changed.
Translating it into lifestyles, people still write letters to the president of the country to ask for social assistance,
even if there are thousands of NGOs in Moldova, a lot of them rendering services in areas like healthcare,
education, psychological assistance, family planning, assistance to domestic violence victims as well as other
social assistance services.
3.3 Church and Faith
The church has a very special place in the legal and social landscape of Moldova thanks especially to high trust in
church. The largest part of the population is of Christian Orthodox faith (92%), with less than 5% of Protestant
religion, and other confessions accordingly (3%).
Confidence in church ranks the highest in polls in Moldova, irrespective of the political or social developments,
showing thus a persistent stability and faith that it creates across the nation. Nevertheless, religious dogmas play no
role whatsoever in the functioning and legitimacy of the state. The state order is secular, albeit no longer atheistic.
The constitution provides for the freedom of religion, and the government generally respects this right in practice;
however, the law includes restrictions that at times inhibit the activities of some religious groups. In particular,
unregistered religious groups are not permitted to buy land or obtain construction permits for churches or
seminaries; therefore, members of this kind of religious groups hold services in homes, NGOs, and other locations,
while in other cases, they try to get property and permits on behalf of their individual members.
The generally amicable relationship among religions in the society contributed to religious freedom; however,
disputes among various branches of the Christian Orthodox faith continued. A number of minority religious groups
in the separatist region of Transnistria that is not controlled by the government continued to be denied registration
and are subjected to official harassment.
As an IPP survey of November 2004 revealed, trust in political institutions continues to be low: 25% for political
parties, 31% for the judiciary, 42% for the parliament, 47% for the government and 56% for the president,
compared with 79% for the church.
The church in the Republic of Moldova plays a very important role for its citizens. 93.3 % of the population,
according to the assessment from 2004, is Orthodox. Trust in church and mass media (78% and 66%) reaches the
highest scores of the poll, being followed by the local authorities and the president of country (each with 47%).
The rest of political institutions seem to be quite low in scores, with political parties and police at the bottom of the
peoples trust. At the same time, ratings for the economic and social policy of the government are devastating and
most respondents assume that corruption has become more widespread since 2001.
Thats why the political power has never confronted the principles of the church or disapproved it, in order to have
the people`s support.
Source: CBS Axa Survey, August 2007, ordered by UNICEF-Moldova and IDIS Viitorul
The actual government looked for a stable relationship with the church and even to be sustained by it in some
matters of political connotation.
Conversely, in some domestic issues state authorities are inclined to discriminate against pro-Romanian groups
(e.g. the Bessarabian Orthodox Church or teaching the History of the Romanians), while favouring pro-Moldovan
or pro-Russian positions (e.g. the teaching of a History of Moldova or the introduction of Russian as a compulsory
subject in elementary school and a language of inter-ethnic communication). Religious tensions are marginal in a
laicised state with a 98% Orthodox majority in which the Russian Orthodox Church receives some preferential
treatment, whereas minor churches and sects are obstructed by government bureaucracy.
The Orthodox Church is divided in Moldova into two competing Mitropolies (one is a tributary of the
Moscow/Russian Orthodox Patriarchate Mitropoly of Moldova, the largest one, and another is the Bessarabian
Mitropoly, which claims that it restores a canonical legacy with the pre-war situation. Their canonical disputes
are a matter of political imprint and cultural splits of the country, although the role of the clergy in the rural in
particular is steadily growing.
Re-established in 1992, the BMC received almost an immediate support from the Romanian Patriarchy, which
recognised it as a canonical successor of the Bessarabian Mitropoly that existed before 1940. It is to be
mentioned that as an ecclesiastic institution, the BMC ceased to exist in 1944, when the territories between the Prut
and Dniester rivers (the central part of the historic province of Bessarabia) were annexed to the USSR.
Quickly after the installation of the Soviet administrative and party structures on the newly captured territories, the
Russian Patriarchy assembled its own subsidiary territorial units in the MSSR127 as a Moldovan Metropolitan
Church. After 1945 however, the MM has had little if any separate autonomy within the Russian Patriarchy, and
most of the priests were educated in Russia for which they became rather anti-national and philo-Russian.
The action against the Moldovan government lasted almost 2 years and culminated in October, 2001 with a
decision of the European Court to consider the governments decision illegal, recommending that the BCM shall
be registered immediately, while the Moldovan government must pay the penalties for the sue (about EUR21,000).
The EHCR decided that in this particular case, the government violated Art.9 (the freedom of confession) and
Art.13 (the right to be applied for judicial remedies) of the European Convention of the Human Rights.
After 2002, the government registered the BCM, but resisted so far to the restitution of property claims filed by the
believers. Moreover, even after the official legalisation of the BCM, political authorities continued to provide
unilateral shelter and benefits to one Orthodox Mitropoly, at the expense of the others
128
.
The constitution provides for the freedom of religion, and the government generally respected this right in practice;
however, the law includes restrictions that at times inhibited the activities of some religious groups. On May 11,
2007, Parliament passed a new law on religion that dealt with many of these problems; however, the president
returned the law to Parliament for reconsideration on June 18, 2007. No further action was taken by the end of the
reporting period.
There was no overall change in the status of respect for religious freedom by the government during the period
covered by this report. The government continued to uphold its earlier decisions to deny some groups registration,
although the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons) was registered in December 2006. In the
separatist region of Transnistria, which is not controlled by the government, authorities continued to deny
registration to a number of minority religious groups and harass their members.
129
The Moldovan society is
conservative regarding its traditions and religion.
From 1990 till present, the majority of Orthodox people hardly accept other religious groups. The religious groups
and representatives of The Spiritual Organisation of Muslims, Jehovah's Witnesses, Evangelists, were harassed by
local religious groups, priests, policemen, etc. The groups that suffer the most are from Transnistria territory,
which usually are interrupted during their sessions.
3.4 The Status of Ethnic and Language Minorities in Moldova
127
MSSR Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic, a union republic of the USSR, which lasted between 1945 until 1991 when, as a result of the Soviet collapse, a Declaration of
Independence created the premises for an independent statehood for the population and territories of the former MSSR.
128
President Voronin warned in December 2007 that due to the fact that the EHRC oblidged Moldova to legalise the BCR, Moldova may repeat Cosovo, and in this case, the
country may leave out EHRC.
129
International Religious Freedom Report 2007, Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour. US Department - http://www.state.gov/g/drl/irf/
Since the Soviet breakup, Moldova was the state that adopted one of the most liberal and inclusive citizenship laws
towards aliens, as well as towards the non-titular.
Although it adopted a law on the official language already in 1989, like in almost all national republics of the
USSR, it had almost no practical effect on professional recruitment while the main parts of its implementation
were softened later on, once a moderate government succeeded to take the power from the first inception
Cabinet of Ministers, after 1993.
Ethnic unrest, or open hostilities between the titular and non-titular were visible mainly by the time of the
informal movement, and later, with the abolition of the Communist Party (19911995), the main organiser of the
anti-national strikes and protests, simply disappeared for more than a decade in Moldova, with perhaps the
exception of Transnistria, where control over the collective groups of workers (OSTK) continued to remain an
important leverage of power.
According to the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, Article 16, (2) all citizens of the Republic of Moldova
are equal before the law and the public authorities, without any discrimination as to race, nationality, ethnic origin,
language, religion, sex, political choice, personal property or social origin. Ukrainians and Russians are the two
largest minorities.
A Christian Turkic minority, the Gagauz, makes up a small percentage of the population living primarily in the
Gagauz Autonomous Region in the south of the country. Society has a substantial share (over 30%) of ethnic
minorities. Ethnic cleavages are only one (and not the main) dimension of the Dniester conflict. In a way, one
might also refer to a Romanian-Moldovan ethnic split in the society of Moldova.
The spirit of toleration is quite a present phenomenon in Moldova, and this is perhaps a result of a large Christian
Orthodox community (with a small Protestant church), but also because, ethnic diversity was always a continuous
element of the population of the region of Bessarabia. So, no clear-cut delimitation or splits on ethnic basis
characterise todays Moldova, and social discrepancies have really installed more oppressing walls than the
language spoken by the population.
Source: CBS Axa National Survey, August 2007, ordered by IDIS Viitorul
Typically, however, in the villages the issue is contained by old structures of segregation and in the cities there is
little ethnic tension in daily life. Unlike in the Baltic States, ethnic conflict is a political meta-issue of nation and
state building rather than a source of everyday tension and discrimination.
The ethnic cleavages are largely unrelated to socio-economic disparities. Nevertheless, the impoverishment of the
population that has thus far not translated into violent mobilisation and the legacy of the violent potential of the
once-ethnic Dniester conflict put serious constraints on the governments strategic options. According to the
assessment in 2004, there are 75, 8 % Moldavians, 8.4 % Ukrainians, 5.9 % Russians, 4.4 % Gagauzies, 2.2 %
Romanians, 1.5 % Bulgarians etc.
Despite the difficult times since 1990, the ethnic minorities were not persecuted, and their rights in the limit of the
possibility had been respected. The ethnic groups, the Russians, Ukrainians, Bulgarians, and Turkish, etc. have the
possibility to retain their culture, as they have access to education in their native language, have the right to form
groups of interest, have the same rights as all citizens of the Republic of Moldova.
Domestic violence against women remained a widespread problem, and the law does not specifically address
domestic assault. In the first eight months of the year 2006, the Ministry of Internal Affairs reported that it
received 212 domestic violence complaints. Of that number, eight resulted in serious bodily injury and seven in
death. In 2005, the MIA said it received more than 3,000 domestic violence complaints.
Women's groups, however, continued to assert credibly that incidents of spousal abuse and rapes were
underreported.
130
In the period under review, the ruling party twice attempted to redefine the policy on nation and
state building by making Russian-language instruction mandatory in schools and by replacing the history curricula.
Ethnic conflicts are potential and instrumental rather than real. The social differences define the main cleavages in
society. Nevertheless, an eruption and escalation of violent conflict would undoubtedly result in ethnic
mobilisation and confrontation endangering the cohesion of the state.
Currently, the level of violence is not exceptionally high, as the well-entrenched Communist Party dominates
politics with a large constituency. No mobilised group or protest movement has a major impact on politics at the
moment. Society is not considerably polarised along socio-economic lines. The regime is thus far successful in
integrating various ethnic groups and social classes. The seriousness of the conflict is potential, but not high.
At the end of 2004, about 500 laws over 15,000 draft regulations awaited legal expertise not available within the
parliament. Numerous government decrees and policies have been approved without any feasibility assessments or
analysis of costs
131
.
But, frequent legislative changes are on their turn a factor undermining the stability of the political and economic
system, and provide the civil service, judiciary and police with too much room for manipulation. Wiretapping
political opponents is a reportedly widespread practice.
Democratisation and transition to a market economy should have been correlated with a higher demand for court
services. The demand for services in the Moldova courts increased with only 5% since the reform of the judiciary
in 1994.
132
The publics distrust stems from its perception that the judiciary is corrupt, inefficient and ineffective in enforcing
its rulings.
133
The cost of litigation also discourages people from filing lawsuits. Underutilisation of the courts is
also due to relatively low levels of legal awareness and high levels of poverty.
As result of state interference, most newspapers in Moldova have either become dependent on state subsidies or
have turned into tabloids with irregular circulation. Serious critical reporting is largely limited to a handful of
major newspapers. Overall, serious cases of massive and direct political interference and violations of the freedom
of expression and freedom of the media are rare.
Women have significant access to higher education, public office, etc. They make up 44% of all employed public
servants. However, the number of 1
st
grade public servant women is 9 out of 69.
Only 15% of the elected mayors were women in 2003. As for 2005 general elections, 21 women entered the
parliament in 2005, out of 101 members of the parliament. Increasingly, social status and economic resources have
become a factor in access to education and jobs. For lack of financial resources, the role of the state in providing
equal access to public services is declining.
The dynamics of women representation in the parliament is shown in the table below:
1998 2001 2005
9 (8.7%) 16 (15.8) 21 (20.7%)
The number of mayor-women has increased in 2007 only with 1%, as a result of the latest elections in June.
Nevertheless, statistics show that in 2007 there were almost 20% more candidates on the party lists in elections,
which implies that participation of women in campaigns cannot be seen as a sign of fashion, but a demand of the
130
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2006. Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour March 6, 2007 -
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78828.htm
131
An auditing of the Moldovan Parliament showed, in 2004, that only on the basis of 23 laws adopted between 20012003, there were 322 of amendments adopted later on to
them. Over 80-90% of laws have been drafted and submitted to the legislative by the government. Among the most frequently changed laws were; the Law on annual budget
changed 68 times in the last 3 years, Criminal Code 32 times, Administrative Code 55 times, Civil code 13 times, Penal Procedures Code 27 times.
132
Annual Conference of Judges, a speech by the Chief Justice on the judiciarys activity in 2003, Bulletin of the Supreme Court, No. 2/2004. By comparison, East German
courts faced a 50 percent increase in the demand for court services after the fall of the Berlin Wall.
133
According to a 2002 Transparency International survey, Corruption and Quality of Governance: The Case of Moldova, the public identified corruption as the second most
significant problem facing Moldova, preceded only by poverty. In 2000, the primary motivation for corruption was poverty. In 2002, the public identified the motivation behind
corruption as pressure exerted by superiors and tradition, which suggests corruption as an entrenched problem.
real political interests of the respective political parties and the voters
134
. There is no, however, non-discriminatory
legislation in Moldova, forbidding any specific discrimination cases in the field of labour, social security,
education, housing, care, in the sphere of private and public contracts etc. This lacuna is a serious obstacle to an
effective system of gender legislation
135
.
Poverty is largely affecting women who represent the largest share of labour migrants from Moldova
136
.
Independent reports show that women are usually placed in inferior positions than men for social and family
considerations.
Women involved in professional activities continue to carry double loads, having the obligation to financially
support their families to do housework, and to take care and educate their children. Thus, the distribution of the
employed population by social-economic activities brings up significant gender disparities.
3.5 Democratisation as a Desirable Option or a Must?
The political consensus on democracy and market-economy is fragile yet emerging. Although formal
democratisation and economic liberalisation have been achieved, the consensus remains conditional and in need of
external support/pressure.
Whereas the ruling party is time and time again tempted to sacrifice the principles and procedures of democratic
pluralism to party interests, conservative factions within the party regularly question market economy as a prime
objective. Since the proclamation of the independent statehood (August 27, 1991), the Parliament of the Republic
of Moldova has been at the core of the process of building up a new political system, advocating for the key-
reforms in economy and social affairs.
Moldova is a newly established state that elects directly the legislature, the parliament and indirectly the head of
state, the president. As an effect of the 2000 constitutional amendments, the political regime is clearly impeded by
the lack of effective separation of powers, with the president of the country serving simultaneously as the leader of
the ruling majoritarian party in the parliament and dominating the whole executive structures by appointing judges
and equally distributing resources along the system of the public administration in Moldova.
With all its powers and attributions still conserved from the time of the semi-presidential republic, the president of
state can easily escape any kind of subordination to the parliament, as long as it retains under its control the ruling
party as a unified and obedient mammoth.
By March 15, 2008, the party has reconfirmed the authority of the incumbent president as its unchanged leader,
simply avoiding changing anything in its ideological programme and legacy. This would promise no sign of
parliamentary oversight in any foreseeable future.
The parliament (Parlamentul) has 101 members, elected for a four-year term by proportional representation. To
enter the parliament, the independent candidates must obtain 3% of the total number of the votes, the parties 6%,
the electoral blocs (consisting of two parties) at least 9%, and the electoral blocs consisting of more than two
parties 12%.
According to the electoral law, the lost votes of the parties that did not pass the threshold are distributed
proportionally among those who did. The most important committees in the Republic of Moldova linked with the
Parliaments activity are as follows: the Legal Committee on Appointments and Immunities; the Committee on
Economy, Industry, Budget and Finance; the Committee on National Security; the Foreign Affairs Committee; the
Committee on Human Rights and National Minorities; the Public Administration Committee; the Committee on
Culture, Science, Education, Youth and Mass Media; the Committee on Agriculture and Processing Industry; the
Committee on Social Protection, Health and Family; the Committee on Environment and Territorial Development.
The parliament was therefore one of the essential bodies of post-Soviet transformation. It underwent important
institutional changes by assimilating the emerging political pluralism of the informal groups and, by
empowering its MPs with effective tools of control over executive bodies and, to even a greater extent, by
adjusting its institutional format to the standards and models of modern parliaments.
134
Policy Brief, September 2007, Local Elections Profile 2007, Natalia Rotaru, IDIS Viitorul
135
Gender Equality in the Republic of Moldova Sociological research, UNDP - http://www.unece.org/gender/pubreps.htm
136
Pressbox, 09-03-2004.
The first Parliament of the Republic of Moldova (19891994) literally revamped the role of politicians in the
society, paving the way towards a radical transformation of the former Soviet-made republic into an independent
and viable state entity. Four major functions were recognised as being its core business: representative,
legislative, supervising and administrative.
According to Article 73 of the Constitution the right to legislative initiative belongs to the acting members of the
parliament, government, President of Moldova and the Popular Assembly of the Autonomous Territorial Unit
Gagauzia. The acting Parliament of the Republic of Moldova is a unicameral legislative and representative body.
The election, institutional structure, organisation of sessions and general functioning of the parliament are set out
by such legislative acts as: the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, in part III, Public Authorities; the Law
on Parliament Internal Regulations;
137
the Law on the Status of the Member of Parliament;
138
the Electoral Code,
in Title III Parliamentary Elections; the Law on Legislative Acts
139
. All law-drafts and legislative proposals
submitted for examination to the parliament are registered by the Permanent Bureau and distributed immediately to
all delegates but can be added to the agenda only in 15 working days.
The chairman of the parliament or a vice-chairman submits the law-drafts to be debated and possibly endorsed by
relevant permanent committees. Any permanent committee has the right to give its notification on law-drafts,
submitted by the leadership of the parliament. Curiously enough, however, the latter legal prescription contradicts
the right of the Permanent Bureau to reject any committees request to give its notification.
But this decision can be overcome by the parliament with a simple majority of votes. As in other legislative
practices, the Moldovan parliament can adopt 3 types of laws: constitutional, organic and ordinary, as well as
decisions
140
. Ordinary laws and parliaments decisions are adopted by the vote of the majority of MPs having
attended the session. Organic laws and other constitutional laws are adopted by the vote of the majority of elected
MPs or by other qualified majorities. The MPs vote personally by open or secret vote.
Transparency is of course a fundamental criterion to judge upon the commitment of the legislature to work
according to the values proclaimed in the fundamental acts of the state. But, transparency is largely linked also to
accountability, tolerance, genuine popular representation and effectiveness of the law-making, ensuring a fertile
ground for political debates, in which civil society, mass media, unions and NGOs should play a considerable role.
Therefore, while assessing the performance of the legislative chamber, one must include not only the
numerical/statistic indicators, but also the qualitative assessment of the parliament`s functioning. And even
statistics, however, shall be analysed with a great deal of attention because it provides us with a very interesting
picture in this respect
141
:
Political legislative cycles Indicators of performance
First legislature (XII of
1990 October 1993
years)
Adopted a total of 1,683 acts, out of which 802 were Decisions of the Presidium of
the Parliament, 682 decisions of the Parliament and 199 laws. One may want to
know that during 19901994, the most considerable part of the Presidiums
decisions had a normative and general-compulsory legal character. In the above-
mentioned period of time, the President had the right to issue decrees-laws through
which most of the fields of activity were regulated. Here is to be mentioned that out
of 199 laws adopted 105 were totally new laws (52.7%), and 94 (47.3%) were
proposals to amend the existing legislation.
Second legislature (XIII of
1994 1998 years)
adopted 1,108 decisions and 517 laws, out of which 197 (38.1%) were new basic
laws, while 320 (61.9%) were proposals to amend the existing legislation.
Third legislature (XIV of
1998 2001 years)
adopted 1,440 acts, out of which 973 were decisions and 467 laws. Almost 147 (or
31.5%) were new laws, while 320 (or 68.5%) were proposals to amend the existing
legislation.
Fourth Legislature (XV of
20 March 2001 26
December 2003)
adopted 2,181 of new legislative acts, out of which 1,284 were decisions and 897
laws. It is to be mentioned, however, that 156 (or 7.1%) were new laws, while 741 or
92.9% proposals to adopt or complete the existing legislation.
137
Law of Republic of Moldova on the Parliament Internal Regulations, Nr.797-XIII of 02 Apr 96, Monitorul Oficial, nr.81-82 of 19 Dec 1996;
138
Law of Republic of Moldova on the Status of the Member of Parliament, nr.39-XIII, , 07 Apr 94, modified, Monitorul Oficial, nr.57-58, 18 May 2000;
139
Law of Republic of Moldova on Legislative Acts, Nr. 780-XV, 27.12.2001, Monitorul Oficial, nr.36-38, 14 March 2002;
140
Law of the Republic of Moldova on Legislative Acts, nr.780-XV 27.12.2001, Monitorul Oficial, nr.36-38, 14 March 2002, art.3;
141
Report: Parlamentul ;i societatea, Mihai Petrache, Member of the Parliament, presented in the Workshop of 24 May 2004, organised by IDIS
Fifth legislature (XVI of 4
Apr 2005 till now)
displays a rather productive agenda, with more than 1.400 of new legislative acts and
decisions, but with a relatively poor capacity to monitor the implementation of these
laws.
What kind of conclusions can be drawn from the above-mentioned statistics? First of all, one may observe that the
first three parliaments adopted more or less an equal number of decisions/laws: 1,683 between 19901993, 1,625
between 19941990 and 1,440 between 19982000.
Apparently, the last parliament registered the largest quantitative indicator of newly adopted decisions and laws at
sight. But, if one looked into the qualitative analysis of the adopted laws, then, it would be obvious that an
alarming trend is clearly taking place with the acting legislature.
First of all, there is a gradual and substantive reduction of new laws adopted (from 52.7% in 19901994, to 38.1%
in 19941998, and 31.5% in 19982001 to only 7.1% in 20012003
142
.
Of course, the functioning of the first parliament was largely unique first and foremost because of the basic
decisions and laws laid down in the years originating from the Declaration of Independence of the country (August
27, 1991), abolishment of the Soviet-based mock legislation and the creation of a set of basic legal prerequisites
for the democratic regime.
For the sake of the analysis, we have selected a sample of laws adopted in 2001 and have calculated that all
together, 23 laws passed in the last 3 years suffered 322 amendments. Needless to say, all these amendments have
seriously affected the state of affairs of economic and social actors, suggesting the lack of a consistent and serious
governing programme.
Members of the parliament confessed that sometimes, the same law is amended 3-4 times in the same day.
Considering the low level of intellectual potential of its stubborn supporters, the ruling Communists initiated a
policy that aims at changing everything but reforming nothing, thus, increasing the legislative instability and
promoting poor draft laws onto the legislative agenda. Only the budgetary law has been amended 68 times in the
last 3 years, the Penal Code 32 times, the Administrative Code 55 amendments, the Civil Code 13
amendments, the Procedural Penal Code 27 amendments, the State Tax Law 16, the Law on entrepreneurship
and enterprises joint stocks and telecommunications by 6 amendments respectively.
This assessment should carefully consider the almost absolute lack of legislative expertise among the MPs of the
first Moldovan Parliament, which proclaimed state sovereignty and independent statehood through a painful
process of confrontation with the political and military leadership of the USSR.
Needless to say that the first parliament was the most active supporter of Moldovan statehood, independence, and
basic freedoms and liberties by the time when the Russian Federation had violently intervened on behalf of the
separatist regime in Transnistria, which literally split up the country. In spite of the difficult role it had to play in a
violent environment, the foundational parliament was one of the most effective in law-making.
Following its example, the second legislature of the Republic of Moldova (1994-1998) continued the path of
reforms and showed its willingness to follow the implementation of structural reforms within a totally new
legislative framework: the privatisation of the former state assets, land-reform, which were indispensable elements
for the strengthening of the statehood, consolidation of the new political, economic, legal and social-cultural
relations in the society.
In July 1994, it adopted a new constitution and over 200 new laws were enshrined during its mandate. At the same
time, it revised the older Soviet-era legislation, while the share of the new laws represented almost 38.1%. In the
same tradition, the legislature of 1998-2000 continued the rejuvenation of the legislation, further reforms and the
share of new laws was at the level of 31.5%.
Public participation in the committees open deliberations is not very encouraged, while Art.23 says that the
minutes made on the debates can be made public only with overt consent of the committees chairman. The same
is true concerning the hand writing of the debates in committees, which is specifically decided only by the
chairman of the committee.
142
Democratic auditing in transition states: the case of Moldova, Sofia, 2005
In spite of the provision that committees sessions are usually public, most of the decisions to allow people,
other than deputies, to attend these sessions are made on an ad-hoc basis, on a sole discretionary power of the
deputies in charge with such powers, leaving no space to dispute any possibility of limiting people to access
information or report on the hearings made by the committees on certain issues of public interest. Only the press
service of the Parliament may be commanded to prepare press communiqus about the work done by the
committee in this regard.
Although, the Regulation stipulates a mechanism of balancing the political diversity of the chamber (Art.15, p.5
if parliamentary fractions do not reach an agreement over the list of members for a committee, the Permanent
Office will propose, and in the plenary session deputies will decide with the simple majority of votes the
committee membership, considering the proportional representation and personal option of the deputies.
Hence, deputies cannot be members of more than one committee, while the Speaker of the House and its two Vice
Speakers are not allowed to be members of the committees, which thus, creates a kind of logical framework for not
allowing top-level legislative officials to influence the debates on the bills debated by committees.
Usually, the Permanent Committees of Parliaments in Moldova have competencies in such areas like agriculture
and rural social development, crime prevention, culture and religion, ecology, the economy and the budget, foreign
affairs, health and social assistance, human rights and relations among nationalities, law, local administration and
the local economy, public relations and the mass media, science and education, state security and military affairs,
women and family issues.
The last parliamentary elections were held on 6 March 2005. These were the fourth elections since independence
of the Soviet Union in 1991. The turnout rate was 63.7%. The elections on March 6, 2005, created the basis for
strengthening Moldovan democracy while maintaining governmental stability and economic growth.
Despite the victory of the PCM, a new political consensus between the government and the opposition has
emerged. The Communist faction in the legislature had enough votes to elect the government and the Speaker, the
liberal-minded former minister of economy Marian Lupu. To ensure the reelection of President Voronin, the PCM
made an alliance with the three opposition partiesthe Christian Democratic Peoples Party (CDPP), the Social-
Liberal Party (SLP), and the Democratic Party (DP).
As part of an agreement with the opposition, Voronin agreed to a set of 10 measures to ensure independence of the
media, independence of the judiciary, decentralisation of local government, greater parliamentary oversight of law
enforcement agencies, reform of the electoral authorities, reform of the Communist Party, and his resignation as
Communist Party chairman. Some of the measures have been partly implemented.
For example, legislative sessions are now broadcast live, and deliberations are posted verbatim on the Parliaments
Web site. The government has renounced ownership of its two official newspapers (Moldova Suverana in
Romanian and Nezavisimaia Moldova in Russian), even if their editorial policies remain strongly pro-
governmental.
The electoral process for the Superior Council of Magistrates (SCM) has been amended to make it more
independent. Likewise, the Central Election Commission (CEC) has changed its appointment process so that five
members are chosen by the opposition and only four by the governing party. The chairman of the CEC comes from
the DP and a deputy chairman from the CDPP.
3.5 Changing the Political Regime in Moldova: its Effects and Consequences
The transition from a semi-presidential to a parliamentary republic after 2000 was one of the most significant and
contradictory political developments of the post-1991 Moldova. Already in the spring of 1999, President Petru
Lucinschi set up a National Committee for the revision of the constitution by decree. Although, the decree did not
mention the task to change the political regime, it envisioned the need to elaborate a concept for the political
regime, considering the tremendous relevance for the establishment of a presidential rule for the country and for
the future of the society
143
.
In 2000, Parliament passed a decree making Moldova a parliamentary republic, with the president elected by
Parliament instead of by popular vote. Widespread popular dissatisfaction with previous governments and
economic hardship led to a surprise at the polls in February 2001.
143
Decretul Pre;edintelui Republicii Moldova privind constituirea Comisiei na[ionale pentru elaborarea proiectului Legii pentru modificarea Constitu[iei Republicii
Moldova,nr.1070 II din 1 iulie 1999.
In the elections certified by international observers as free and fair, slightly over half of Moldova's voters cast their
ballots for the Communist Party. Under the rules of Moldova's proportional representation system, the Communist
faction, which in the previous Parliament consisted of 40 of Parliament's 101 seats, jumped to 71 -- a clear
majority.
The Parliament then elected the leader of the Communist faction, Vladimir Voronin, to be president. President
Voronin's first term was marked by up and down relations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
World Bank. Politically, the government was committed to the reduction of poverty by allocating more resources
to social safety net items such as health, education, and increasing pensions and salaries.
Voronin proceeded with former President Lucinschi's plans to privatise several important state-owned industries
and even on occasion broke with his own party over important issues. The presidential initiative could not find an
enthusiastic support among parliamentarians who feared that strengthening the competencies of the president were
inspired by the anti-democratic changes in most of the ex-Soviet republics, thus, they could not but fight back the
attempts of the incumbent president.
So, as soon as the president set up his commission and announced that he would favour this initiative to be voted
in a national referendum, almost all parties and fractions strongly disputed his argument and instead, they connoted
a counter-proposal aiming to transform the semi-presidential type of political regime into a parliamentarian one.
Passions prevailed in public debates and many considered the political response as an attempt to punish any other
presidentialist trends guised under populist slogans.
Firstly, the initiative of the constitutional amendment came from the president but his intention was to modify the
legislation in a way that would give him more power and would change the political system from a semi-
presidential to a presidential one. In May 1999 already, during general local elections, the president initiated a
consultative referendum regarding the political system in the Republic of Moldova.
Respondents were asked to express their preferences either for a parliamentary system or for a presidential.
According to the computations of the central electoral commission, 64% of voters claimed to support the idea of
giving the president supplementary powers. Inspired by optimistic results of the first round, the president
intended to organise a second referendum that would engender legal consequences resulting in the amendment of
the constitution.
His central argument was that a parliamentary system would produce nothing more than an increase of political
and social instability in Moldova because of the lack of consensus among the factions sitting in the previous
parliament. His constitutional revision came after a long range of acute political conflicts between President Petru
Lucinschi complaining of having few and shallow competences and the Parliament chaired by Dumitru Diacov
trying to impede the excessive concentration of power in the presidency.
The constitution could have remained unchanged, had the president given up his initiative. Ironically, that was not
the first attempt to transform the political regime in Moldova. Mircea Snegur was the first Moldovan President,
elected initially by the parliament, then, through the general vote. During his mandate, the first president also
asked for supplementary powers to be granted to the president
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.
But the parliament whose chairman at that time was, surprisingly, Petru Lucinschi ignored his appeals. Now, as
soon as the acting Chairman of the Parliament went into disgrace of President Lucinschi, the situation sharply
changed. In 2000, Mircea Snegur, seating by then in Parliament, stated that for Moldova the parliamentary system
is more adequate than the presidential one.
He argued that at the beginning of the 1990s his request for supplementary constitutional powers was determined
by the necessity to solve operatively many problems that the new state was passing through. In his opinion, in
2000, Moldova had already developed a legislative base and it would have been irrational to give special powers to
the president. New presidential elections were scheduled to be held by the parliament in December 2000 since the
legal mandate of Mr. Lucinschi was due to expire in January 2001.
But, the Moldovan case proves that even in a democratic parliamentary regime, a single party can easily gain a
hegemonic dominance and employ its relative size to undermine political pluralism. Majority versus minority
relations in the parliament constantly decreased the space for political maneuvering and compromise, mainly
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because decisions were clearly taken outside of the legislative house. As analysts commented, the opposition felt
itself annihilated, paralysed, while the civil society was unable to countervail the antidemocratic impulses of the
super-majoritarian party
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.
The newly established parliament turned soon into a paradoxical situation. Contrary to the constitutional realities
that provided almost an undisputed role to the parliament, the CPM faction promoted its leader in the position of
the president of the state and not as of the Speaker of the Parliament, for which, the CPM lobbied someone that
had a totally irrelevant position in the party until 2001. Political analysts described this choice as an attempt of the
president, Vladimir Voronin, to annihilate any possibility of power-contest from the position of the Speaker, that
earlier had made the former President Lucinschi to lose control over its pro-presidential party, (the Movement for a
Democratic and Prosperous Moldova, led by the Speaker of the Parliament, Dumitru Diacov).
The president was apparently not satisfied with this situation and soon started to grow up his staff and policies,
showing to everyone that the real and the most effective power-keeper is the president, who installed a rigid and
omnipresent subordination of the majority faction to the presidential indications (party-based), which, of course,
ran against the constitutional provisions (Art.68) stating that during their mandate, deputies act on behalf and to
the benefit of the people, and not of the party or its leader. In addition to its representative role, parliaments have
to fulfil two other roles, i.e. lawmaking and monitoring of executives.
Apart from these changes affecting the judicial system as a whole, the CPM initiated steps to change the
Constitution of Moldova in 2003. On July 25, several provisions concerning the special statute of the UTAG
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were amended, providing to the Gagauzian Peoples Assembly a right for legislative initiative that distinguished it
from the rest of other sub-national governments. Observers noted that this was aimed to fulfill some of the CPMs
election promises to territorial autonomy that backed them in February 2001, and secure some incentives to the
forthcoming regional elections of UTAG in November. It was also notorious that Moldovan authorities aspired to
employ these changes as a tool in their negotiations with Transnistrian regime, mediated by the OSCE and other
state-guarantees, a conflict which is by large the most serious threat to the political and economic stability of
country.
The parliaments Internal Regulation as well as the law on legislative acts set up the basic regulations for the
legislative process by formulating the main rules, terms and procedures that are required in order to discuss, vote
and enforce new laws. The Internal Regulation stipulates a roadmap for the drafts of the laws that are to be
considered initially in the standing committee, special committees and at the plenary sessions of the parliament.
The law-drafts rejected by the parliament cannot be discussed any longer during the same session. A law comes
into force on the day of publication or on the date noted in its text. According to the law on legislative acts if a law
is not published, it actually means that it does not exist. The legislative procedure in the Moldovan Parliament
includes several stages: drafting legislative initiative by law-initiators; examination and endorsement of law-drafts
by permanent committees; inclusion of the law-drafts in plenary session agenda; law-drafts debate; adoption (in
one, two or three lectures); signing of the law by the Chairman of the Parliament; promulgation by the President of
Moldova and publishing the law.
The stages of the legislative procedure are determined by the constitution, the parliament`s regulation, the law on
legislative acts and, in some cases, by common rules that result from parliamentary practice and traditions. It
should be mentioned that in spite of the exceptionally important role that this regulation plays in the organisation
of the law-making process, the document has been ever published in the Monitorul Oficial. But this is not an
exception.
Neither the budget of the parliament nor the respective distribution of expenditures can be found, nor are the
records of the plenary or special sessions available to the public. In spite of the repeated appeals to make them
accessible to the press, parliamentary staff claimed that this would be in contradiction with the provisions set up by
the Internal Regulation of the parliament, which thus conflicts with the law on access to information and the
constitution.
It is to be emphasised that the drafts of the constitutional drafts of the law on budgetary issues, finances, economy,
which may need considerable financial expenditures, as well as international treaties, by a special decision of the
parliament, can be debated in the third reading as well.
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Timpul, Un grav accident istoric, Constantin Tanase, April 23 2004, no.16
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The Territorial Administrative Autonomy of Gagauzia (UTAG) is a thin territory of the south of the Republic of Moldova, mostly populated by Gagauz ethnics, a small
community of Christian Orthodox faith, largely based in the rural area, speaking a dialect of Turkish language.
The reform-oriented opposition is too divided and too weak up to now to be in a position to exclude or co-opt anti-
democratic veto actors. Within the ruling party, the moderate reformist wing around president Voronin has
managed to control the conservative wing around the speaker of the parliament Marian Lupu. At the same time, the
real veto powers, the business community has captured the state rather than being captured or co-opted by the
state.
Correspondingly, the political leaderships suspicion and aversion against uncontrolled civil-society involvement
in policy development is quite pronounced. In exceptional cases e.g. the process of EU integration selected
NGOs are accepted as interlocutors because of the apparent lack of competence in this field within the Communist
administration. NGOs as civil society representatives are tolerated rather than involved in the policy process.
The transition period involved not only economic or social problems, but also a political instability. The political
power has always been criticised and judged by the civil society, opposition, domestic or foreign media. The
opposition, however, was also limited by the political power. Since 2001, after the Communists gaining power,
certain conflicts appeared between the political power and opposition. The pre-transition period, was practically
monopolised by the political power.
There were no oppositions, or even representatives of the civil society to confront. The transition period brings
about new events and introduces new political actors on the stage. Even if at the beginning, when a political
democratic system was established, the opposition was weak and mostly unimportant and the civil society did not
play a key role in the political life, today public opinion, the opposition has a much more important role.
The impact of the opposition`s attitude or the civil society`s on political power, made it review its principles and
start to develop a democratic country. The first step toward this was the start to implement the RM-EU Action
Plan, which has a democratic connotation and requires from the Moldovan government to reach some democratic
standards.
Nevertheless, the population lost its faith in the government. The changes after 1990, made them untruthful
toward government. The transition period became for them as a hard period to face to, full of changes and
disappointments. When there is a chance, the civil society, criticises the political power. The next parliamentary
elections are scheduled for 2009.
3.6 The Freedom of Expression in Moldova
Free and independent mass media have certainly reached a level of maturity in Moldova, although it is still
vulnerable in financial and political terms. As the Freedom House ratings indicate Moldova has a bad record in
protecting effectively the freedom of press in a pluralistic and democratically-bound environment.
According to the Freedom House Organisation study, in 2007, the press from the Republic of Moldova was
declared as being not free or censored. It was placed on the 144 place among 195 states. In 2006, the results of the
Barometer of Public Opinion pointed out that among institutions, the church (70%) and the media (58%) still
enjoyed an important trust.
The respondents have very much trust or some trust in the president (44%) and local government (50%). The
respondents trust the least the political parties (21%) and trade unions (31%) (IPP2006).
Typically, as reported for instance by the Centre for Independent Journalism, most newspapers have either become
dependent on state subsidies or have turned into tabloids. Serious critical reporting is largely limited to a handful
of major newspapers. State TV and radio still predominate and have been highly controversial recently due to
politicisation and journalists protests.
Teleradio Moldova remains the main source of information for most of the populace and the only outlet with
nation-wide coverage. Overall, serious cases of massive and direct political interference and violations of the
freedom of expression and freedom of the media are rare.
The mass protests against the pro-Russian legislation in 2002 and 2004, for instance, were all but banned from the
official media. Nevertheless, in an isolated country with a populace socialised by decades of political propaganda,
a substantial distortion of realities and a manipulative censoring of domestic and international realities occur.
After June 1990, with the first Moldovan-language Glasul Natiunii set up as an independent publication, hundreds
of magazines and dailies flourished on the first wave of democratisation, but with very few of them still on the
market.
The main obstacle faced by the independent press is bound to resources, and this is why the largest market share
belongs to a number of publications that mainly reprint their Russian versions (Ekonomicheskoie obozrenie,
Argumenti I fakti, Komsomolskaya Pravda), but also some local commercials, which collect altogether over 70%
of the advertising money, with the rest diverted via state or state-affiliated publications (Moldova Suverana,
Nezavisimaia Gazeta).
The same division is replicated by electronic mass media, where Russian TV Channels clearly dominate the
information landscape of the country (ORT 32.6%, RTR&NTV 15%, M111.2%, and Pro TV5.40%). In
December 2003, Moldova had 161 of TV stations, including 45 TV broadcasting and 35 Radio broadcasting
companies, 81 cable-TVs
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.
However, 100 out of 161 are foreign stations broadcasting in Moldova, and not genuine local TV and Radio
stations. Only the state TV Station M1 covers the whole territory of the country, while the most popular Radio
Stations say they cover 70%. The law ensures the freedom of speech and of the press; however, the government
sometimes restricted these rights and on occasion intimidated journalists into practicing self-censorship.
Public criticism of the government is generally allowed; however, members of the media and NGOs believe that
authorities try to impede criticism when it is made by influential persons. The print media expressed a wide variety
of political views and commentary.
The government owned a news agency; local and city governments subsidised approximately 25 newspapers.
Political parties and professional organisations also published newspapers, most of which had a circulation of less
than 15,000.
The government did not restrict foreign publications, but most were not widely circulated because of high costs.
Russian newspapers were available; some of them published special weekly supplements for the country.
The Audiovisual Council is inclined to explain the situation in financial terms, although there are several reasons
to doubt on that. Nevertheless, the whole market sharing between the largest TV and Radio stations is strongly
dependent on the ruling party and its loyal people favouring those channels that fit to the criteria of the CPM, at the
expense of others that are less loyal. This is why, from August 2002 till March 2003, the authorities of Moldova
suspended broadcasting of the TVR1, a Romanian National Channel that was the most popular in the Moldova
rayons bordering Romania, while some of the regional TV stations (Nisporeni) were banned to broadcast under the
accusation that it campaigned for the opposition meeting in November 30.
Mass media is subject to burdensome taxes, having to ensure considerable funds for the fines imposed by the
authorities as a result of various judicial decisions taken on the basis of a restrictive legislation. Often, independent
mass media have no other choice than to affiliate with some of the opposition groups or become controlled by the
ruling party as a result of various trades-offs to get access to survive.
Most trustful TV Stations (-Averages based on a scale 1 to 5 where 5 is very much- ):
All, 15 +
1 Russian Channel (Former ORT) transnational, based in Russia 3.30
NTV transnational, based in Russia 2.70
RTR transnational, based in Russia 2.30
Pro TV transnational, based in Romania 1.50
PMR regional, subordinated to the breakaway separatist regime in Tiraspol 1.40
TVC 21 cable TV, based in Chisinau 1.00
Euro TV Municipal TV, based in Chisinau 0.90
M1 Moldova State TV Channel national, covering the whole territory of Moldova 0.80
NIT regional, based in Chisinau 0.70
Acasa national, based in Romania 0.50
In January 2003, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted a resolution on the freedom of
expression in Europe with a chapter on Moldova. The document is quoting discrepancies between the CoE
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Moldova Suverana, 16 January 2004, p.3
recommendations and the existing legislation. It states that the recent trends clearly indicate that the ruling party
insists on keeping the mass media under strict control.
The Resolution implies that these laws are still inadequate and do not exclude the immixture of the state in the
business of the free mass media, while the issue of making National TV and Radio into a public company is still
inconsistent. The control over state TV, Radio and press was coterminous with placing loyal (to the CPM) people
on the top leadership of this company, and the exclusion of the opposition leaders from the aired radio and TV
National channels.
It shall be noted that already in 2002, the PACE Recommendation 1554 (point 5 i), advised Moldovas authorities
to follow the provisions of the Article 10 of the ECHR as concerns the reformation of the State TV and transform
it into an independent public station.
The parliament was encouraged to review (in FebruaryMarch 2003) the draft law on public TV, earlier
elaborated by the one of the opposition fractions, but later called back, due to the fact that the Parliamentary
Committee for Mass Media and Human Rights decided to substantially re-write the proposed text, according to
the CPMs views and specific appraisal. In particular, the CPM wanted to keep its political control on the
coordination body of the emerging public company at any cost, and to continue to keep at arms distance the
opposition leaders from any possibility of speaking on the National TV.
It became obvious, however, that further disregard of these critics will cost Moldova the chairmanship of the
Committee of Ministers of the CoE. The inevitability of sanctions from the CoE made the ruling party re-consider
its position in March 2003 and accept to transform the State TV into a Public Company as demanded by CoE, and
even stated a term of 15 days for its implementation.
They have argued that the state press has become an instrument of the ruling party against opposition, and that
pressures on independent mass media are still widely used by the top-leadership via financial and legal means.
Willing to show their dissatisfaction with the CPMs policies, professional organisations protested in March
against the censorship at the State TV and issued protest statements.
They also staggered public presentations of those programmes that were censored by the TV Administration in
March and April, by showing the Programme News Messenger, screened on a wall in the down street as an
alternative version of the programme broadcasted one night before. In March 2003, many thousands of citizens
demonstrated in the streets against the new policy and in favour of the freedom of speech in the press. But, the
state-owned TeleRadio Moldova censored reports of the protests and its journalists launched a strike calling for
democracy at the station.
On 19 May 2003, the Union of Moldovas Journalists issued a statement in which it blamed the ruling party for
intimidating the independent press when it ordered the Prosecution organs to monitor and question the journalists
of the Flux Daily, to question the audience of the Hyde Park aired radio programme, and of the Radio Antena C, of
the Moldavkyie vedmosty Editor, and for deliberate pressures on the investigative journalists of the Association of
the Independent Press (AIP). The specific case of the interactive Hyde Park Radio Programme deserves special
attention.
Although of limited reach, the programme was broadcasted by the Antena C Radio Station, belonging to the
municipality of Chisinau, and wired by night an interactive discussion on various hot-subjects of the politics. At
the end of 2002, the Security Services announced that they found the programme guilty of questioning the
fundaments of the statehood, harassed the journalists, Oleg Brega, interrogated him several times, and started to
collect evidence about the callers of the mid-night audio show. In spite of the protests, and of the support of
professional associations, municipal authorities decided to give up on the eve of local elections, in March 2003,
and suspended the Programme.
Soon after the elections, it was announced publicly, however, that the manager of the State Company of TV and
Radio, Ion Gonta, was suddenly sacked and later sent for a diplomatic mission in France and, that the Council of
Audiovisual would appoint a new manager of the company.
Many hoped that the decision to appoint a young business-oriented manager would help the company to gain
institutional independence and professionalism. It caused serious concerns, though, when the manager announced
that for the further transformation of the State TV, it needs to be dissolved, and this demand received green-light
from the presidency, the government and the parliament, in October 2003. In spite of the obvious conflict with
earlier made commitments, the new manager proceeded to this step without prior consultation with the journalists
of the TV Company, and even lacking the necessary expertise of the Council of Europe.
As a result, several mass media organisations contested the unilateral decision of the new leadership, calling it
out of the range of the mission that was entitled to the newly companys management, and considering the
companys liquidation as unlawful. On October 16, the Communists declined a motion of the centrist opposition
fraction to establish 2 new ad hoc commissions to study the situations in the Teleradio-Moldova company
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fearing that it may lose control over the process of managing the company and, although they admitted that the law
on public TV had drawbacks, they stated that it is pointless to amend it as it is already implemented.
On October 24, the Association of Electronic Press (APEL) accused the CPM of neglecting recommendations of
the Council of Europe on transformation of the national company Teleradio-Moldova into a public broadcaster,
saying that this "an obvious attempt to bring back the main mass media institutions in the country under the control
of certain political and economic groups hidden behind the current governance
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.
Internal discontent was also a sign that the process was going in an opposite direction from the previous
commitment to transform it into a public company. On October 23, trade unions and the Union of TV Workers
(FORT) went on strike in front of the companys administration, urging negotiations on the issue of the
company`s close-up saying that the company administration is attempting to boycott the implementation of the law
on public TV as well as labour legislation.
As a result, about 500 people may have lost their jobs, feared Trade Unions of the State TV
150
. The participants
voiced concern over the amendments to the above-mentioned law approved by the parliament, mainly because the
decision to dissolve the company instead of reforming it had obvious benefits to the ruling party: first of all, it
could create the image of following the CoE`s advice of transforming the state TV irrespective of the final end
product, and secondly, it may prevent several scandals on corruption that concerned two of its former managers
(both of them, appointed by the CPM), very well known for their blind loyalty to the top-leadership.
It has been already announced that several misdeals were related to loans negotiated earlier by the former
managers, and later on, these loans were entirely covered by the state budget
151
. Several critics that were incited by
the decision to privatise the company implied that it aims for some business-interests. Liquidation of a company
and foundation of a new one enables staff reduction without problems, whereas in case of reorganisation, this is
much more difficult.
During the summer, a new law to transform the state TV and a public company was adopted, as required by the
Council of Europe, but in fact, the law simply re-confirmed the Communist domination of the institution. The key-
element of the transformation was the creation of an independent Council of Observers, whose competence
precipitated a number of political disputes.
As the newly created body is entitled to select and appoint the general manager of the company, to confirm the
nominal list of the administration council, approve the staff of the company, oversee the various statutory and
legislative provisions of the company, as well as other internal regulations, which regulate, inter alia, the
management procedures of the company, it also has competencies of notifying verbally the general director of the
company on every kind of breaches of the legislation, asking him to stop violations and take measures to exclude
them in the future.
The freedom of the press in Moldova has been largely limited in the last years by an active censorship of the state
authorities of the main Radio and TV channels, Teleradio Moldova. Even though the adoption of a new Code of
the Audiovisual in Moldova was saluted by the OSCE and the Council of Europe in 2006, generating a wave of
moderate optimism within the whole civil society, then the transformation of the Teleradio-Moldova State
Company into a Public Company, truly amenable to the public interest, is still facing tremendous obstacles.
Independent observers of the company say publicly that the reform stagnates, and the reasons for this are purely
political
152
.
148 October 16 ( INFOTAG ).
149 Chisinau, 24 october, Basa Press
150
Declaration of the Association of Electronic Mass Media on the situation of the National TV Council, 14.10.03
151 In 2002, the Companys debts to the State Company RadioCommunications were estimated at around 17 mln lei, which later were canceled, In 2003, the annual budget of the Company was increased from 33 to 47 mlnlei, 6 of which were extrabudgetary funds, in spite of the
earlier statements that the financing of the TV Company from the state budget will be reduced in order to avoid political pressures on the Companys programmes.
152
Teleradio-Absurdistan, or the failed reform of the public TV in Moldova, Policy Brief, November.
The way of managing the TV Company, as well as the censorship guarded by the party hardliners proved to reflect
a certain maneuver of routine of the ruling party, which avoids losing its adorable leverage of influence over the
public in Moldova.
Rude censorship is replaced with the a bit of soft censorship of the content editors of programmes. Independent
experts are blamed for siding with the opposition, and thus, they are erased from the broadcasted news and
analytical programmes. Public debates are further replaced by grey-aggressive propaganda shows, such as
Rezonans, while analytical programmes in the official language of the state are prohibited.
Respectively, the necessity to approve an autonomous budget approved by the government, by tradition, is
transformed into a long political collusion for converting state financing into political influence and electoral
resource. Financing the company by the state is easily converted into an instrument of influence. Thus, the rate of
budgetary allocations for the Public Company TRM, in the total volume of expenditures and revenues of the state
budget, decreased constantly since 2002 till 2008.
Estimates show that the ratio allocated by the parliament to finance the public TV Company dropped 2.3 times
(from 0.93% to 0.4% of the public budget). Maintenance in 2008 of the level achieved in 2002 would represent
allotment from the state budget of over 110 mln lei in comparison with 51.5 stipulated in the draft law on state
budget for 2008.
Table 1. Evolution of budgetary allocations for TRM in the total of budgetary expenditures
Table 2. Volume of budgetary allocations for TRM
The analysis of the budgetary situation of the Teleradio Company shows that the government influences the
editorial policy of the company through financial instrument means.
Since 2001, budgetary allocations for the state company TELERADIO-Moldova have been strictly determined by
the political schedule and electoral evolutions, with the government being interested in keeping the most important
TV channel and radio station at the lowest level of subsistence possible, thus encouraging the administration of the
company to test its political loyalty especially before elections.
In 2001, the budget of the company constituted 27.5 mln lei, followed by a sudden increase in 2003, with the
budget achieving 41 mln. In 2004, we can notice a decrease in absolute terms of the budget, and in 2005, the
budget of the company again increased to 44.5 mln lei.
In 2006, a new drop in finances from the public budget intervenes, so in 2007 an increase up to 51,5 mln lei can
be detected. According to the reactions of the authorities, we can presume that in 2008, finances will suffer a new
stagnation, which will be followed by an exponential increase in 2009.
Another factor affecting the freedom of the press was generally associated by the professional media organisations
with a deep sense of self-censorship of the journalists working for the public stations, who still belong to the most
vulnerable social categories.
Another issue of concern appeared with the actions of the Audiovisual Coordination Council (ACC), which had
repeatedly rejected to bid for new frequencies that TV owners libeled to belong to the opposition. Although, the
Audiovisual Coordination Council (ACC) is by its statutory charter an autonomous regulatory body which is
entitled to ensure free competition on the mass media market and to provide positive incentives to the domestic
broadcasters, it has been the creator in the last 2 years of a policy that, in fact, limited the interests of the domestic
broadcasters, at the expense of Moscow-wired Radio and TV Stations
153
. Yet, some of the orders of the ACC
raised bewilderment among mass media owners.
In September 2003, it adopted a decision compelling private cable television networks to transmit in a compulsory
way the No.1 TV Moldova channel
154
. The decision was explained by the ACC by the fact that several remote
settlements in Moldova do not receive state TV programmes, although the opposition interpreted it as an attempt to
transfer party censorship into the private network of regional TV stations.
The biggest number of cable channels is concentrated in the largest cities and municipalities: Chisinau, Balti,
Orhei, Edinet, Cahul, but lately this service is becoming increasingly popular in small villages, too. Censorship of
the state TV and Radio, the use of governmental resources were the most frequent kinds of abuses, aiming to
minimise the oppositions impact on the electorate.
This statement raised serious concerns among mass media professionals, who questioned the argument of the state
authorities and cast doubts on the sincerity of the Communist rulers that they are going to fulfill their
commitments
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. The Criminal Code enforced on January 1, 2003, provided for up to 5 years of imprisonment for
defamation, to the dismay of the Council of Europes experts, who recommended Moldova to amend legislation to
de-criminalise the offence before May 2003, when the Chairmanship of the Council of Europes Committee of
Ministers was passed to Moldovas authorities.
They have also recommend to improve the legislation on public TV and Radio, by adjusting it to the European
standards and norms, including the creation of prerequisites for political pluralism and freedom of expression in
the functioning of its components as a public body, released from party or state-bodies control and tutelage.
Controlling the Council of Observers means in fact to control the whole company and, implicitly, to control the
most powerful mass media covering the whole territory of the state. The International Article 19 has reported the
lack of access of information, and low degree of transparency in Moldova, emphasising the political pressures put
on the independent mass media.
As ODIHR and CoE election observers noted, the state TV and press failed to provide neutral information, often
serving merely as the voice of state authorities and the ruling party; it also provided scant access to opposition
representatives. The monitoring time showed that, M1 dedicated 45% of its political news coverage to the
president and further 43% to the government.
The coverage was overwhelmingly positive on the ruling party, while the sole M1's analytical programme
Rezonans (of Russian language) was specifically used for negative campaigning against Mr. Urechean, who was
not allowed even for rebuttal.
On the same note, Euro TV, controlled by the Chisinau City, dedicated 73% of its political news coverage to Mr.
Urechean, presenting him in an overwhelmingly positive light, while the other candidates received less than 2%.
Private broadcasters Channel 1 in Moldova and NIT dedicated the largest part of their news programme to the
president and the government, portraying them exclusively in positive or at least neutral light. At large, state TV
and press abounded during the entire campaign in defamatory statements, blackmailing rival CPM candidates,
which made it to be quoted by professional unions of journalists as the worst campaign since 1991
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.
The director of the News Department of the state MOLDPRES News Agency was removed from her position after
publicly accusing the Presidential Press Office of putting undue pressure on the agency to publish information
affecting the campaign, forcing the agency to disseminate unverified, unsourced information
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.
According to the government's Audiovisual Coordinating Council in 2006, there were 44 radio stations and 194
television stations and cable operators broadcasting in the country. Most of them rebroadcast programmes from
Romania, Russia, and Ukraine, offering only a limited amount of locally produced programming. The government
controlled a national radio and television station, Teleradio Moldova (TRM), which covered most of the country.
153
Statement issued by the Vocea Basarabiei. Chi;inau, 11 februarie 2003
154 Chisinau, September 10 ( INFOTAG ).
155
Declaration of APEL, AFP, Acces-Info, ICJ, Anticensorship Committee, January 15 2003
156
Monitoring report of the election campaign: April May 2003, CIJ, CIVIS
157 This was reported by BASA Press in many of its releases.
Some local governments, including in Chisinau and in the autonomous territorial unit of Gagauzia, operated
television and radio stations and newspapers. A number of cable television operators provided a variety of foreign
television programmes, including international news programmes, to an estimated 202,300 subscribers.
In 2006, on July 27, the parliament adopted the Audiovisual Code that combined and revised several media laws
according to OSCE and Council of Europe recommendations.
The new code regulates the activity of private television and radio stations, the government-controlled public
broadcaster Teleradio Moldova (TRM), and the CCA. However, critics and local media NGOs expressed concern
that the law, which placed all public television and radio stations under TRM, would hurt media independence and
stifle independent and dissenting media. In Transnistria, authorities limited the freedom of speech and of the press.
Alternative viewpoints were stifled by widespread censorship, and residents were wary of voicing alternative
opinions and engaging in meaningful debate over key issues affecting the region. It was difficult to register,
maintain, and financially sustain an independent newspaper, radio, or television station in the separatist region.
3.7. Moldova: a Case of Procedural Democracy
Moldova is an example of procedural democracy: formal institutes have been established, and most of the first-
generation laws for the emerging democracies have been adopted encountering resistance and poor
implementation. Moldovas legal framework provides a sound basis for democratic elections, which explains why
the OSCE/ODIHR, the Council of Europe, and other international organisations had generally assessed elections in
Moldova as generally free and fair, including the 2001 elections which were won by the CPM.
The CPM has used its majority rule in parliament to amend the electoral code increasing the hurdles for opposition
parties, e.g. by increasing the 6%-hurdle to 9% for two-party alliances and 12% for multiparty alliances. Reports
about police raids and law suits against opposition leaders and media outlets increased, and a certain degree of
unfair competition for media coverage; the use of official positions and resources for electoral campaigning was
almost a common trait of most elections.
This tendency has become markedly stronger since the Communist Party came to power in 2001, widely reported
by human rights analysts.
A major source of tensions was served by the attempt of the ruling party after 2001 to implement a state-ideology
in Moldova, aiming to reduce the overspread courses of the Romanian History Textbooks in schools, to further
exclude references that Moldovan and Romanian are practically identical, and to re-emphasise a number of Soviet
dogmas that earlier made the USSR delineate the occupied part of Bessarabia from the state to which it belonged
before World War II.
In Moldova, the discussions about the integrated history started with 2001. When the authorities tried to implement
integrated history, in 2002, a group of teachers, schoolboys, and parents from Prometeu lyceum started to
protest, these protests were in short time taken under the trusteeship of Christian Democratic Peoples Party. The
first signs that the government wanted to change Romanian history with Moldovan History was in 1995 while the
Agrarian Party was governing.
Then, following protests (1995) this theme was somehow removed from the governmental agenda.
158
A second
attempt to introduce the new textbooks of history in the primary and lyceum schools of Moldova, thus using the
integrated history subject as an ideological leverage, followed then by the second objective of making Russian
language the second state language coincided with the second half of 2001 and the beginning of 2002, when the
Ministry of Education announced its will to implement these two changes.
The reaction of the opposition was prompt, the opposition organised protests for a period of 4 months, and
following that the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted a resolution that obliged the
Moldovan government to introduce a moratorium concerning the linguistic policies and those ones which refer to
history.
159
The Resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe was adopted on April 24, 2002. Also in this
year on September 26, the CoE adopted one more resolution concerning the democratic institutions in Republic of
158
Zoia Jalba, independent MP, Plenary parliamentary session, 05/10/2006
159
Igor Botan, ADEPT, http://www.e-democracy.md/comments/political/20030903/ ,
Moldova, where it is clearly stipulated that the moratorium on changing history represents one of the proof of
political stability in Republic of Moldova.
160
According to the parliamentary group of the Christian Democratic Peoples Party, through this attempt to
implement integrated history and Russian language as a state language, the government violates the concept of
developing education in the Republic of Moldova (1995), the national programme of education development in the
Republic of Moldova (1995), also foresight nr. 15 (2001) concerning the teaching of history in Europe in the 21
st
century, adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe.
161
Those protests were sustained by a few parties, the Christian Democratic Peoples Party (the main party involved
in this protests), the Social Liberal Party, the Reform Party (now Liberal Party), Braghis Alliance, etc.
International experts from Germany, Romania, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States met at the
George Eckert International Institute for the Analysis of History Books, based in Braunschweig, Germany, on June
25 to 29, and examined the history curricula and books in Moldova.
The Moldovan Association of Historians said in a communiqu that most participants in the seminar described the
plans of Moldova's communist authorities to do away with "The History of Romanians" as an attempt to revive
Stalinist concepts about the Moldovans as a distinct people with a language and culture from Romanian, which
contravenes the recommendation of the CoE's Committee of Ministers on history teaching in Europe in the 21
st
century.
They criticised the intention of the Moldovan government to introduce an "integrated history course" but spoke in
favour of teaching Romanian history and universal history.
162
In the middle of August 2003, a lot of teachers
expressed their disagreement with the newly introduced course. The displeasure with this course mainly came from
the representatives of Chisinau teachers,
163
but after a few days there were also reactions from the regions.
164
The main role in combating integrated history is taken by the Historian Association (HA), which has been
opposing for many years against integrated history. HA said that these textbooks are introduced illegally in
schools, because there was no official tender on creating these books. Also HA emphasised that a lot of teachers
from the regions are against this history, and they receive clear signals that the government will punish the teachers
who do not want to teach this history.
165
On the last meeting of the Historian Association, on September 30, 2006, they decided to start the protests against
the Integrated History. First, they decided to protest after the meeting, but for the reason that the City Hall did not
give them the authorisation for the protest they postponed protests for October 11.
166
One very important thing is that all the time the government and the Communist Party have been telling the people
that the Integrated History is recommended by the Council of Europe, which is admittedly true, and also they tell
that the CoE recommended and appreciated the content of the textbooks, but against their declarations. However,
the Special Representative of the General Secretary of the Council of Europe Vladimir Fillipov said that the
Council of Europe had not made expert conclusions on the Integrated History, but only on the method of
introducing it instead of the History of Romanians in schools. Fact, that revealed the intentions of the
Communists.
167
The party landscape has a high degree of detachment from the socio-economic interests of the populace at large
and rather represents the vested interests of privileged groups. The state tends to penetrate and aim at controlling
civil society and NGOs. Fragmentation is also a common feature of the party landscape, which is seen as
pluralism by default.
As Lucan Way stated, Moldova should be seen less as a struggling democracy, where leaders strive to build more
pluralistic institutions, and much more as a case of failed authoritarianism or what I call pluralism by default, a
form of political competition specific to weak states
168
. Two irresistible poles shaped up the political spectrum
160
Ion Varta, MP, Christian Democratic Party parliamentary group, plenary parliamentary session, 05/10/2006
161
Ecaterin Deleu, Flux http://www.flux.md/news/modb2cal.php?action=show&idu=15202&cat=Cotidian%20National&rub=Eveniment
162
Moldova Azi, 3/07/2003, http://www.azi.md/news?ID=24750
163 Flux, Moldova Azi, 19/08/2003, http://www.azi.md/news?ID=25407
164 Basa Press, Moldova Azi, 28/08/2003, http://www.azi.md/news?ID=25525
165
Timpul, 26/09/2006, page 3
166
Democratia, 03/10/2006, page 4
167
Infotag, Moldova Azi, 02/10/2006, http://www.azi.md/news?ID=41236
168
Lucan Way, Pluralism by default, Journal of democracy, October 2002
since the collapse of the USSR: a Popular Front, perceived as a vanguard of the national liberation movement,
and Interfront a pro-Soviet movement, which was actively inspired by the KGB and the CPSS.
Independence also generated internal political conflicts in Transnistria, in which Russian troops and special
services (KGB) rebelled against the constitutional authorities of Moldova. After the 1993 political crisis, the poles
have split again into dozens of smaller parties and party groupings along a traditional line of left-right division: the
right votes for reforms and Europe, the left votes for conserving some parts of the former economic-administrative
regime and Russia. Nevertheless, the Agrarian Party, a centrist-based party, representing generally the interests of
the former landlords (heads of the collective farms) approved a new constitution, in 1994, and, a number of
decisive laws, including mass-scale privatisation, and ratification of the most important EU and International
Conventions on Human Rights.
The judiciary was clearly headed in the first years of independence by the General Prosecution Office, as a pure
remnant of the Soviet heritage. Although the principle of separation of powers was proclaimed by Moldovan
authorities along with the Soviet dissolution, only with the adoption of the first constitution, in 1994, new
mechanisms were created to secure its applicability. A concept of the judiciarys reform was elaborated in 1993
with the aim to trace a number of steps for a genuinely democratic and independent judiciary. According to
Art.115 of the constitution, justice is rendered by the Supreme Court of Justice, assisted by the Court of Appeal
and district courts.
From the very inception of judicial reform, it has received fewer allocations as compared with other public
authorities, as it shows it as a kind of index of attitudes from the state bodies
169
. Many of the current state top-rank
officials think that once they have got the power, their interests shall be served by the rest of the state institutions,
irrespective of the existing laws or regulations.
Although there is no subordinate relation with the other branches of powers, the judiciary is highly dependent on
executives financing. In addition to the regular financing of the courts proceedings, there is no any financial
scheme that would allow the judiciary to avoid the situation of receiving funds or even some benefits from bodies
of the executive.
The High Council of Magistrates (HCM) is the body in charge to notify the government on the required expenses.
It seems, however, that only the Ministry of Justice is responsible for drafting the budgetary expenses for the
judiciary without any budget planning procedure or transparent consultation with the HCM, or other professional
bodies of judiciary
170
.
For instance, the law on the statute of judges stipulates that the state shall secure judges with residence (house),
which is a competence strictly linked to the Ministry of Finance. The courts have a constant deficit of resources to
hire qualified personnel: court clerks, chancellery employees, secretaries, not including judges. It is stated that due
to the low wages, people are hired for a very short period of time, and this has a direct impact on the quality of
justice.
Year Budget for courts (mln lei) Budget for national intelligence (mln lei)
1997 11.3 (2.4) 46.9 (10.0)
1998 8.15 (1.74) 36.0 (7.7)
1999 9.96 (1.1) 29.0 (2.4)
2000 18.7 (1.56) 50.3 (4.21)
2001 21.2 (1.7) 63.19 (5.1)
2002 21.79 (1.6) 83.08 (6.4)
2003 61.3 (4.2) 95.9 (6.6)
2004
2005
2006
2007
67.18 (5.16)
-
-
-
103.243 (7.94)
-
-
-
The constitutional, legislative and judicial framework suffered profound and controversial changes in 2003. At the
beginning of the year, the parliament adopted a new Civil Code enforced in June 2003,
171
and a law defining the
status of the prosecution being incorporated into the judiciary system
172
.
169
Comparative overview of the budgetary expences. Source: Annual State Budget Law 1997 - 2004
170
Monitoring Judicial Independence, COLPI & Freedom House Moldova, January 2003
171 Chisinau, march 14 ( INFOTAG ).
172 Chisinau, march 14 ( INFOTAG ).
Apart from this step in finalising the reformation of the judiciary, several steps were noted as diverging from this
reform, which aimed to subvert the progress registered so far, by installing loyal (to the CPM) in the key-positions
of judiciary, while excluding those that were unwilling to accept party patronage.
The Prosecution Office has been for a long time the main reason for several debates and political hurdles in
Moldova. Obviously, some officials were interested to maintain it as an integral part of the executive power (a
subdivision of the Ministry of Justice) as it was during the USSR, while others claimed that it should be an
independent body within the judicial system as Moldova committed itself when joining the CoE.
The parliament has given preference to the second viewpoint as the most efficient one for the Office's activity. In
accordance with the new law, the Office is entitled to carry out criminal prosecution duties; to put forward charges
in court instances; it participates in the examination of civil suits, administrative offenses and economic disputes;
examines and meets citizens' applications and complaints.
The prosecutor system includes: the General Prosecutor's Office, the Prosecutor Office of the Court of Appeal, the
Prosecutor Office of Gagauzia, district, municipal and sector offices, specialised prosecutor offices - military,
transport, and other. The deputies did not change the technique of appointing the General Prosecutor by parliament
for a 5-year term of office. One and the same person may not hold the position for more than two terms in a row.
The new law stipulates some social guarantees for the Prosecutor Office employees, primarily the ones pertaining
to pension insurance. Heretofore, only prosecutor organs were eligible to make such investigations, but now, these
functions have been entrusted to special subdivisions at the Ministry of the Interior, the Information and Security
Service, the Customs Department, and the Centre for Struggle against Economic Crimes and Corruption.
As soon as the CPM had gained political legitimacy, they announced a series of steps to change the constitutional
and judicial order established so far. The judiciary reform was carried out in a very inconclusive way, with more
statements than real debates, non-transparent and politicised, which failed to show up a consistent understanding of
the real difficulties and challenges of judiciary.
In early September, President Voronin called upon the parliament to optimise the national judicial system and raise
its efficiency
173
. But even the scope of the reform of the judiciary cannot be reduced simply to shorten the terms
for judiciary procedures and not, change the institutional format.
The demand for speeding up the procedural side of the judiciary runs counter, however, to the widespread practice
of the neighbouring states (Romania and Ukraine) where the acting terms of considering cases are even longer than
in Moldova. This plan is even stranger when one will consider that the Council of Europes legal experts, who
have monitored the functioning of the judiciary, did not find that the terms for considering judicial decisions were
too long.
Moreover, they have concluded that as a rule, in Moldova, cases are substantially faster considered than in France
or Italy, or in Romania. To start with the fact that the ruling CPM has publicly accused incessantly the whole bulk
of judiciary of being corrupt, or of being too slow with decisions, although it failed to provide the system with
a conceptual change of the existing legal system, and this is why, they were oscillating between the return to the
older system based on 2 levels of justice (specific to the USSR legal system) and the 3 levels of courts
(incorporating the election of the judges as a remedy to improve the system). In fact, PCM leaders have initiated a
large campaign aimed to clean up the judiciary, although, it appeared that they aimed more to install their loyal
people than really set up the mechanisms for an independent judiciary.
Several measures and steps were undertaken to limit the independence of the judiciary, i.e. the cleaning of the
judiciary, non-confirmation of judges that led to the dismissal from their positions.
Only in 2002, more than 200 judges were replaced; another step aimed to re-organise the appeal courts, which was
initiated, it is believed, to neutralise the existing opposition entities to the ruling party judges
174
, changing the
amendments operated in Law no.544/XIII regarding the status of the judge and Law no.947 regarding the Superior
Council of Magistrates (SCM).
173 Chisinau, october 16 ( INFOTAG).
174 http://e-democracy.md/comments/legislative/20030512/, Legea privind reorganizarea sistemului instan[elor judecatore;ti, mai 2003.
Due to the fact that most of the current politicians originate from the USSRs time and logic, when justice was but
one of the leverages of the regime, they do not value nor believe it is appropriate to have too autonomous judiciary.
Observers say that the need for the reform bears a rather ideological and not a legal backup to the CPM, and that
by initiating a policy to reform it, one has pursued a formal pretext for massive personal changes in the system of
the judiciary.
The most vicious practice of the current governance is the almost total obedience of the judiciary to the orders of
the ruling party, which imprescriptibly allows their leaders to influence the application of justice and employ
several tools to control the judiciary
175
. For the first time ever, Moldova is going to have a new post-court
investigator, called to direct the process of preliminary confinement and to be in charge of the security of material
evidence used during court examinations.
The Code reads that preliminary confinement may not last longer than 30 days. In case of need, it may be
extended, gradually, till 4 months for juveniles and till 12 months for adults. Law enforcement is the logical and
necessary consequence of legislative approximation. It implies a well functioning judiciary, efficient enforcement
of courts' decisions, as well as well-functioning administrative bodies responsible for the law application (e.g.
prosecutor's offices, police, customs, tax administration, and other authorities responsible for the legal
enforcement, environment and statistics offices).
The violations covered a large area from the restrictions on free movement to the limitations of information to the
independent journalists, from telephone surveyance to arrests of journalists. Many judges contested publicly the
competence of the president to reject repeatedly candidates proposed by the Council of Magistrates in the position
of judges, which thus dramatically affects the credibility and role of the SCM, as an autonomous body of the
judiciary.
They have also refuted accusations brought by the top-ranked officials saying that the real aim of these changes is
simply to re-filter judiciary personnel, with several judges becoming dependent on politicians confirming their
mandates. Typically, the changes of the judiciary system are justified by measures to curb corruption. It is obvious
that in fact, the re-centralisation of the state structures is a component to subordinate justice to the legislative and
executive branches.
The president welcomed and was behind a series of judge dismissals during 20012004, and this served the
Communist Party`s interests in replacing judges that were unwilling to admit the interference in their business.
More than 55 judges were dismissed by 2003, according to the information provided by the Association of Judges
of Moldova, which proved to be detrimental to the credibility of the judiciary system.
Not surprising that by 2007, Moldova appeared to be the country with the largest number of cases lost in the
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg (calculated per the number of citizens of the country), while since
2007, Moldova has lost economic cases, with millions of penalties to the business entities that have been affected
by the politicised decisions of the domestic courts. It seems that the autonomy of the judiciary in Moldova is
largely affected by the vision of the politicians of the respect of this autonomy.
Currently, in Moldova there is a singly one draft to amend the judiciary system, which involves the liquidation of
the tribunals and the creation of 5 new appeal courts. The number of courts depends, however, on the number of
territorial-administrative units, therefore, after the 2003 territorial reform of the local administration, their number
was supposed to increase by 2 times, but because of time and shortage of money, the government decided to
preserve the former district-based system of courts. In most of the cases, the newly adopted regulatory acts are
not well understood, nor respected or strictly applied.
A road-map for assisting the reformation of the judiciary in order to guarantee the foundations of the legal
autonomy, competencies and competence of the judiciary bodies is still missing in Moldova.
The same can be applied to the future constitutional format of the country, which is highly dependent on still
unclear negotiations mediated by foreign actors, but with almost no contribution from the civil society which is
thus excluded from the process. It is obvious that without a strong international support, Transnistrian settlement is
almost impossible, and this is linked to the international guarantees which will be installed following settlement.
175
Report of the Freedom House Moldova, Chisinau 2003
These guarantees should apply, however, not only to the military field, but also to social, economic, legal, and
property protection, aiming to restore peace but also democratic institutions in the war-torn zone of the
Transnistrian region. Compared to its direct neighbours, the demand for services in the Moldovan courts barely
increased by 5% (since the reform of the judiciary in 1994)
176
, which is often explained by a low degree of trust in
judiciary.
And not only the peoples blatant ignorance or hesitations to apply to judicial remedy are to be blamed, but the
acute perception that those domestic legal instruments are open only to the rich people, and state oligarchs, at the
expense of the poor, and needy. By the end of 2007, Moldova registered over 100 cases lost in the European
Human Rights Court in Strasbourg.
The publics distrust stems from its perception that the judiciary is corrupt, inefficient and ineffective in enforcing
its rulings.
177
The cost of litigation also discourages people from filing lawsuits. Underutilisation of the courts is
also due to relatively low levels of legal awareness and high levels of poverty.
Other factors are equally true, however,: human management, lack of resources and tradition of briberies. People
believe that the judiciary is not free, and over-dependent on political actors, with financing received from the
Ministry of Justice and insufficiently self-governing. The judiciarys budget in Moldova is at 0.74 percent of total
public sector expenditures.
178
In spite of an increase in public spending for the judiciary during the last two years,
such a budget still does not allow for the implementation of any development project, let alone efficient courts.
With the exception of the Constitutional Court, there should be 446 judges in Moldova but 102 vacancies currently
exist.
179
176
Annual Conference of Judges, a speech by the Chief Justice on the judiciarys activity in 2003, Bulletin of the Supreme Court, No. 2/2004. By comparison, East German
courts faced a 50 percent increase in the demand for court services after the fall of the Berlin Wall.
177
According to a 2002 Transparency International survey, Corruption and Quality of Governance: The Case of Moldova, the public identified corruption as the second most
significant problem facing Moldova, preceded only by poverty. In 2000, the primary motivation for corruption was poverty. In 2002, the public identified the motivation behind
corruption as pressure exerted by superiors and tradition, which suggests corruption as an entrenched problem.
178
By comparison, in 2001, the budget for the judiciary was 23,720,300 lei (US$1,867,739) or 0.65 percent of the total public sector budget; 74.6 percent of the judicial budget
went to personnel expenses. Customarily, however, the allocation for salaries did not last through the fiscal year and a supplemental request was made and subsequently
granted. During the i ntervening period, the judges were not paid. In 2004, the judicial budget increased to 39.620.800 lei (3.047.754 US$), which is currently .74 percent of
total public sector expenditures.
179
SCJ data, March 2004. Judges in Transnistria are not included.
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: Parlamentul si societatea, Mihai Petrache, Member of the Parliament, presented in the Workshop of 24 May 2004, organized by IDIS
Democratic auditing in transition states: the case of Moldova, Sofia, 2005
US Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998, http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_ rights.
Nations in transit: Freedom House 2003, 2004, Rowman&Littlefield Publishers, Inc. New York
Early Warning Report on Moldova, December 2002, SAR/IDIS
NEW YORK, May 24, 2004; Report of the Bureau of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights OSCE/BIDDO on local elections of 2003,
http://www.osce.org/odihr
Legal and judiciary sector assessment, The World Bank, August October 2004
Policy Brief Profile of the local elections in Moldova, September 2007, IDIS Viitorul www.viitorul.org
Policy Brief Analysing Capital Investments Landscape in Moldova and its political determinants, IDIS, 2008 www.viitorul.org
Policy Brief, September 2007, Local Elections Profile 2007, Natalia Rotaru, IDIS Viitorul www.viitorul.org
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2006 Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour March 6, 2007
Corruption and Quality of Governance, produced by Centre for Strategic Researches and NGO Transparency International Moldova, with
the help of the World Bank, UN/UNDP Moldova with the financial support of the US Embassy in Chisinau
Teleradio-Absurdistan, or the failed reform of the public TV in Moldova, Policy Brief, November 2007 www.viitorul.org
Monitoring report of the election campaign: April May 2003, CIJ, CIVIS www.ijc.md
Igor Botan, ADEPT, http://www.e-democracy.md/comments/political/20030903/ ,
Ecaterin Deleu, Flux http://www.flux.md/news/modb2cal.php?action=show&idu=15202&cat=Cotidian%20National&rub=Eveniment
Comparative overview of the budgetary expenses. Source: Annual State Budget Law 1997 2004
Monitoring Judicial Independence, COLPI & Freedom House Moldova, January 2003
Report of the Freedom House Moldova, Chisinau 2003
Transnistria - The Unrecognised Country in Moldova, ICEG European Center News of the Month, December 2007
Laws, Surveys, Declarations
Resolution of APCE regarding functioning of democratic institutions in Moldova - Resolution 1280 (2002),
Submitted December 24, 2004, to UNDP Moldova
Bulletin of the Supreme Court, No. 2/2004.
Law of Republic of Moldova on the Parliament Internal Regulations, Nr.797-XIII of 02.04.96, Monitorul Oficial, nr.81-82 of 19.12.1996;
Law of Republic of Moldova on the Statute of the Member of Parliament, nr.39-XIII, 07.04.94, modified, Monitorul Oficial, nr.57-58,
05.18.2000;
Law of Republic of Moldova on Legislative Acts, Nr. 780-XV, 27.12.2001, Monitorul Oficial, nr.36-38, 14.03.2002;
Law of the Republic of Moldova on Legislative Acts, nr.780-XV 27.12.2001, Monitorul Oficial, nr.36-38, 14.03.2002, art.3;
Social Opinion Barometer: April 202, Imas Inc., conducted by IPP
Report for the third meeting of the WG on Moldova of the Budapest Secretariat, ICMPD, 2004, p. 23
Bulgarians want autonomy for a minority from the Republic of Moldova, Mihai Isac, Realitatea Romaneasca, 21.05.2004.
Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, www.mae.ro, 22
nd
of October 2004.
Corruption Justice TI, 2002
Public Barometer, IPP, December 12, 2003
Declaration of the Parliament of Moldovan on political partnership to join the EU www.parlament.md
Public Barometer Opinion Poll, IPP, November 2003
Barometer of public opinion, IPP, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, Chisinau www.ipp.md
Family in transition Study, accomplished by the IDSI Viitorul, ordered by UNICEF Moldova, Survey implemented in 2007
www.viitorul.org
Declaration of the Association of Electronic Mass Media on the situation of the National TV Council, 14.10.03
Declaration of APEL, AFP, Access-Info, ICJ, Anticensorship Committee, January 15 2003
CBS Axa Survey, March 2008, ordered by IDSI Viitorul
Data provided by the Migration Department of the Republic of Moldova, 2003
Declaration of the NGO National Board on the risks of the draft law on foreign grants, October 2003
Mass media and news
Mold-Press News Agency, September 10, 2003
News Agency BASA-press/www.azi.md, November 5, 2003,
August 11, 2003, Joint Appeal to the CoE of the NLAM, FLRA and AGM
News Agency Infotag, November 20, 2003
Timpul, Un grav accident istoric, Constantin Tanase, April 23 2004, no.16
Infotag News Agency, Chisinu, April 19, 2005
Interfax news agency, 7 August 2001,
BASA-press, Chisinu, 28 ianuarie 2003.
Moldova Suverana, 16 January 2004, p.3
Infotag
, O
ctober 16, 2006
Statement issued by the Vocea Basarabiei. Chisinu, 11 februarie 2003
News Portal Moldova Azi, 3/07/2003, http://www.azi.md/news?ID=24750
Newsletter Flux, Moldova Azi, 19/08/2003, http://www.azi.md/news?ID=25407
News Agency Basa Press, Moldova Azi, 28/08/2003, http://www.azi.md/news?ID=25525
Daily Newsletter Timpul, 26/09/2006, page 3
Weekly Newsletter Democratia, 03/10/2006, page 4
News Portal Moldova Azi, 02/10/2006, http://www.azi.md/news?ID=41236
Draft Memorandum, TIMPUL, November 17, 2003, art.3.8.
Infotag, 26 March 2007; Nezavisimaya Moldova, 30 January, 2007
Iasnpom nepean Hpnnecrponte Annmepy Vcmanony. Hpesnenr Cmnpnon orxastnaercx nnarnrt nonomy xpenropy , Nezavisimaya
gazeta, 23 March 2007
Infotag, March 16, 2008
Reporter.md, 1 December 2005
AP FLUX Chisinu, February 6, 2008
Infotag, December 24, 2007
Deca press, 5 February 2008
OSCEs Democracy Agenda Set Back at Year-End Meeting. Eurasia Daily Monitor. 04.12.2007.
News Agency Olivia press, 19.02.2008)
Tiraspol Times, The legacy of Lenin, 16 July 2006
Chisinau, Infotag News Agency, August 28, 2003
Infotag 02.04.2001, Communists Intend to Revise Some Essential Laws..
The Relations of Moldova with the EU
Achieved Progress, Encountered Problems and Future Prospects
Study prepared by
Sergiu BUSCANEANU
Association for Participatory Democracy ADEPT
and
Humboldt Universitt, Berlin
Paper prepared in the framework of the project:
Integration Perspectives and Synergic Effects of European Transformation in
the Countries Targeted by EU Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policies
April, 2008
Table of Contents
List of Diagrams and Tables
Chapter 1 National Institutions Managing Moldova-EU Relations
1.1 Executive Structures
1.2 Legislative Power
1.3 Conclusions: National Institutional Setting between Paradox and Imitation
Chapter 2 Moldova-EU Political Relations
2.1 Positions on Relations with the EU
2.1.1 Governmental Activity Programs and Other Relevant Documents
2.1.2 Parliament Positions
2.2 Major Events Marking the EU-Moldova Relations
2.2.1 High Level Political Contacts with the EU
2.2.2 Diplomatic Relations with the EU
2.2.3 Parliamentary and NGOs Contacts
2.3 EU-Moldova Agreements and Future Prospects
2.3.1 Documents Regulating EU-Moldova Relations
2.3.1.1 EU-Moldova PCA
2.3.1.2 EU-Moldova Action Plan
2.3.1.3 Other EU-Moldova Agreements
2.3.2 Prospects of Future Contractual Relations
2.4 EU Positions on Moldova
2.5 Conclusions: EU Soft Power and Attractiveness at Work?
Chapter 3 Evolution of the European Option in Moldova (2000-2007)
3.1 Dynamics of Public Opinion in Moldova on European Integration
3.2 Conclusions: Need for a Well-Defined Targeted Communication
Chapter 4 Moldova-EU Economic Relations
4.1 EU-Moldova Trade
4.1.1 Bilateral Trade Regimes
4.1.1.1 EU-Moldova PCA
4.1.1.2 ENP & EUMAP
4.1.2 Bilateral Trade Relations
4.1.2.1 Development of Trade, Volume and Balance
4.1.2.2 Product Pattern, Main Imported and Exported Items
4.2 FDI from the EU
4.3 EU Assistance to Moldova
4.3.1 Volume and Forms since 1991
4.3.2 Main Fields of EU Contribution
4.3.3 Impact of EU Assistance
4.4 Conclusions: Progressive Expansion of the EU-Moldova Economic Relations
Chapter 5 Legal Adaptation
5.1 Legal Adaptation Brief Overview
5.2 Official Positions on Legal Adaptation
5.2.1 Framework Set by the EU-Moldova Agreements for Legal Approximation
5.2.2 Domestic Legal and Institutional Basis
5.3 Conclusions: Legal Adaptation Quite Well on Paper, Bad in Practice
Chapter 6 Effects of EU Conditionality and Prospects of EU Membership
6.1 EU Conditionality
6.2 Prospects of EU Membership for Moldova
6.3 Conclusions: Need for More Explicit Positive Conditionality and Perceptible Rewards
Appendices
Bibliography
List of Diagrams and Tables
Diagram 3.1 What do you think is the path our country should follow?
Diagram 3.2 Should there be a referendum next Sunday on Moldovas accession to the EU,
how would you vote?
Diagram 4.1 The structure of Moldovan exports in 2007 (%)
Diagram 4.2 The structure of Moldovan imports in 2007 (%)
Diagram 4.3 FDI attracted by Moldova in 1998-2007 (MioUSD)
Diagram 4.4 The geographic structure of FDI attracted by Moldova in 2006 (%)
Table 3.1 What do you think is the path our country should follow?
Table 4.1 The evolution of Moldovas trade balance with the EU
Table 4.2 Moldovas trade balance with its main partners (2006)
Table 4.3 The EU`s trade with its main partners (2006)
Table 4.4 EU exports to Moldova, by Product Grouping (Mio EUR)
Table 4.5 EU Imports from Moldova, by Product Grouping (Mio EUR)
Table 4.6 EC assistance to Moldova, 1991-2006 (Mio EUR)
CHAPTER1 NATIONAL INSTITUTIONSMANAGING MOLDOVA-EURELATIONS
Along with the overall evolution of the Moldova-European Union (EU) relations, the former
has gradually developed its institutions aimed at building up an adequate framework for an
efficient multi-dimensional dialogue with the EU. The institutions have been developed
within both the executive and legislative powers.
1.1 Executive Structures
Given the role that the president plays traditionally within the political system of the Republic
of Moldova, he had a great influence over developments occurring under the label of
European integration. Usually, Moldovan presidents were at the origins of one of the most
important initiatives that brought new momentum into the processes aimed at the European
integration of Moldova. At the same time, the weight of presidents role explains in some
cases the setbacks of these processes.
Although one could expect a more limited influence of the president over foreign
policy after July 2000, when Moldova became de jure a parliamentarian republic, this did not
happened. While being elected by the parliament, the president retained most of the
competences he had before July 2000. Apart from this, the first elected president by the
parliament in 2001, Vladimir Voronin, did not renounce his chairmanship of the Party of
Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM), a political force which became clearly the
dominant party in the parliament in two successive legislatures: 2001-2005 and 2005-2009.
Having important competences provided by the constitution and the control over the most
influential party in the parliament, President Voronin has concentrated unprecedented levers
of influence, including in the foreign policy sector.
All Moldovan presidents have been generally assisted by councillors on foreign policy
matters. They usually were not responsible, as other councillors, for a distinctive division
within the structure of the presidency apparatus. In early 2004, within the structure of the
presidency apparatus an inedited function of councillors was set up with special missions.
Although the Presidential Decree setting up this function did not specify exactly what those
special missions were, the councillor made it public that among his duties he had to deal
with the neighbourhood policy of the EU as well. After the resignation of the councillor with
special missions in June 2007, this portfolio was not reactivated.
Later, in February 2008, the President of the Republic of Moldova issued two decrees
which renamed the office of the president councillor on foreign policy matters into that of the
president councillor on foreign policy and European integration matters, and nominated a
person for this official function. Although too early to judge the role of the councillor on
foreign policy and European integration matters, many agree that another president
councillor, on political matters, is to remain the most influential figure in the president`s
decisions, in the foreign policy sector too.
Important executive structures managing EU-Moldova relations lie with the
government. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration (until April 2005
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)) has as one of its main duties the co-ordination of the
European integration process of Moldova
1
. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European
Integration`s (MFAEI) competences in the process of European integration have been
acquired gradually, along with the overall development of the EU-Moldova relations, which
brought changes into the ministrys internal structure.
Only in November 1997, within the MFA structure, a particular body in charge of
EU-Moldova relations the General Division European Integration
2
was set up for the first
time. Until that time the competences in dealing with the EU and its member states, were
shared by at least two MFA divisions
3
. Equally, a number of competences in the European
integration area remained shared with other governmental institutions, especially with the
Ministry of Economy (ME). As concerns the ME, until 2001, it had no specialized division
dealing exclusively with the issues on the EU-Moldova co-operation agenda. However,
though in July 200,1 within the internal structure of the ME, the Principal Division Economic
Adjustments in the Process of European Integration
4
was set up, competences for relations
with the EU and its member states were still shared by several ME divisions.
Following Moldovas adherence to the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe
(SPSEE) in June 2001, the government established in May 2002, a new division within the
1
Government Decision # 1156 of Nov 4, 2005 on approving the Regulation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and European Integration, Official monitor, # 151-153/1233 of Nov 11, 2005.
2
Government Decision # 1075 of Nov 20, 1997 on the structure and staff limit of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Official monitor, # 86-87/869 of Dec 12,1997.
3
Government Decision # 25 of Jan 28, 93 on the Central Apparatus Structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
Government Decision # 355 of May 27, 94 on the Central Apparatus structure and staff limit of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Moldova, Official monitor, # 5/185 of May 30, 1994.
4
Government Decision # 571 of July 05, 2001 on approving the structure and staff-limit of the Ministry of
Economy Central Apparatus, the list of organizations, institutions and enterprises under its authority, Official
monitor, # 75-77/604 of July 06, 2001.
MFA the National Bureau for the SPSEE
5
. The Bureau had a statute equal to that of a
general division and co-ordinated its activities, especially, with the MFA General Division
European Integration.
The most significant institutional changes were triggered by the Presidential Decree
of November 13, 2002, which set up the National Commission for European Integration
(NCEI). According to the Decree, the NCEI had to work out and submit to the parliament for
approval the European Integration Strategy of the Republic of Moldova; and to work out and
approve the action plan for implementing the European Integration Strategy of the Republic
of Moldova as well as to co-ordinate its implementation
6
. The NCEI has a cross-institutional
composition, including members from a wide range of government bodies, MPs, councillors
of the president and representatives of different state bodies. Unfortunately, NCEI had in its
composition only a representative of civil society.
Given the reason for which NCIE was created, one could argue that the Presidential
Decree establishing NCEI was to some extent disregarded. The European Strategy of the
Republic of Moldova, prepared in 2005, is unofficial, for not being approved by the
parliament, as provided in the Presidential Decree.
The next important governmental institutional development was the creation of the
European Integration Department (EID)
7
on August 4, 2003 within the MFA. The creation of
the EID aimed at strengthening the national institutional capacities for the participation of
Moldova in the actions and initiatives concerning its integration into the European structures
as well as at promoting the European Integration Strategy of Moldova.
The EID was established on the basis of the MFA General Division European
Integration and National Bureau for the SPSEE, taking also over the ME`s relevant functions
in the field. However, some competences in the field were left to the ME, especially those
related with economic harmonization
8
. According to the government decision of August 8,
2003, which approved the structure, staff-limit and regulation of the EID, the department
5
Government Decision # 570 of May 07, 2002 on the structure and staff limit of the MFA and National Bureau
for SPSEE Apparatus, Official monitor, # 63-64/657 of May 16, 2002.
6
Decree on establishing the National Commission for European Integration 957-III of Nov 13, 2002, Official
monitor, # 151-153/1196 of Nov 14, 2002.
7
Government Decision # 960 of Aug 04, 2003 on the creation of the European Integration Department, Official
monitor, # 170-172/974 of Aug 08, 2003.
8
Government Decision # 570 of June 10, 2005 on the structure and staff-limit of the Ministry of Economy and
Trade Central Apparatus, Official monitor, # 83-85/620 of June 17, 2005.
includes three main bodies: the General Division Political Relations with the EU; the General
Division Economic Co-operation with the EU; and the National Bureau for the SPSEE
9
.
Among the main EID competences spelled out by its regulation are some to be
mentioned: the EID ensures the co-ordination of the European Integration strategy of the
Republic of Moldova implementation process; submits proposals on the promotion of the
European integration governmental policy; co-ordinates the relationships between
government bodies and EU institutions; oversees fulfilment of the obligations foreseen by the
agreements signed in the co-operation process with the EU institutions; co-ordinates the
participation of Moldova in the regional and sub-regional co-operation mechanisms;
undertakes secretariat work for the NCEI; co-ordinates issues concerning financial assistance
provided by the EU; co-ordinates the organization of the public opinion information
campaigns on Moldovas perspectives of joining the EU
10
.
As a result of launching the negotiations between Moldova and the EU on the EU-
Moldova Action Plan (EUMAP), in the context of the European neighbourhood policy (ENP),
the Moldovan cabinet established in March 2004 four co-ordination commissions of inter-
ministerial activity aiming at working out and implementing the EUMAP: (a) Commission
for law and security issues (Ministry of Justice co-ordinating institution); (b) Commission
for social-economic issues (Ministry of Economy co-ordinating institution); (c) Commission
for infrastructure issues (Ministry of Transport and Communications co-ordinating
institution); and (d) Commission for cultural and humanitarian issues (Ministry of Education
co-ordinating institution)
11
.
Following the 2005 parliamentary elections, the cabinet of ministers was restructured.
In this new governmental institutional setting, approved on April 14, 2005, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs was renamed as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration
12
.
This, along with the nomination of the Minister of Foreign Affairs also as Deputy Prime
9
Government Decision # 981 of Aug 08, 2003 on approving the structure, staff-limit and Regulation of the
European Integration Department, Official monitor, # 177-181/1013 of Aug 15, 2003. This decision was
annulled by the Government Decision # 644 of July 01, 2005 on the structure and staff-limit of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and European Integration Central Apparatus, Official monitor, # 92-94/701 of July 08, 2005. As
the SPSEE ceased to exist in February 2008, its responsibilities and competences being transferred to the
Regional Co-operation Council, the internal structure of EID is to be revised.
10
Government Decision # 981 of Aug 08, 2003 on approving the structure, staff-limit and Regulation of the
European Integration Department, Official monitor, # 177-181/1013 of Aug 15, 2003.
11
Government Decision # 197 of March 02, 2004 on inter-ministerial activity co-ordination for the promotion of
European integration policy of the country, Official monitor, nr.42-44/330 of March 12, 2004.
12
Law # 23-XVI of Apr 14, 2005 for amending the Law # 64-XII of May 31, 1990 on the Government, Official
monitor, # 59-61/203 of Apr 15, 2005.
Minister
13
in December 2004, came to confer a greater importance to the European integration
process of Moldova.
In August 2005, five months after the signing of the EUMAP, the government both
annulled its decision on establishing the above mentioned four co-ordination commissions
and reactivated them but for a bit different purpose: the promotion of European integration
policy and implementation of the EUMAP
14
. The co-ordination commissions re-established
in August 2005 were largely the same as those established in March 2004. The only
differences were related to minor changes within their composition and to their slightly
different aims. While those established in March 2004 had to work mainly on the EUMAP
content, those established in August 2005 had to work particularly on the implementation of
this document.
Although the governmental institutional setting has cast over time a tendency of
convergence of the competences with regard to the management of the EU-Moldova relations
under the auspices of the MFAEI, most of the governmental bodies continue to possess units
in charge of European integration. Among their multiple duties, one relates to the
management of inter-sector relationships with the EU
15
.
1.2 Legislative Power
The Parliament of the Republic of Moldova was, in comparison with the government, more
inert in advancing its institutional structure in line with overall developments of the EU-
Moldova relations. Only in February 2003, as a result of the President Decree establishing the
NCEI, within the parliament structure a special Commission for European Integration
16
was
set up. Until that time, there wasnt a special body explicitly responsible for EU-Moldova
relations. Issues on the EU-Moldova relations were shared by several permanent
parliamentary commissions, and especially dealt with by the Commission for External Policy.
However, the competences of the permanent Commission for External Policy related to the
13
Decree # 2150-III of Dec 21, 2004 on the nomination of Andrei Stratan, minister of Foreign Affairs, as deputy
prime minister, Official monitor, # 237-240/1047 of Dec 24, 2004.
14
Government Decision # 786 of Aug 01, 2005 on inter-ministerial activity co-ordination for the promotion of
European integration policy of the Republic of Moldova, Official monitor, #107-109/869 of Aug 12, 2005.
15
MFAEI and IPP, ed., European Strategy of the Republic of Moldova, 2007 updated version (English),
Institute for Public Policy, http://www.ipp.md/biblioteca1.php?l=ro&id=142.
16
Parliament Decision # 84-XV of Feb 28, 2003 on establishing the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova
Commission for European Integration, Official monitor, # 38-39/169 of March 11, 2003.
EU-Moldova dialogue were not explicitly specified. They could be only assumed as part of a
broader area of the Commission for External Policy focus
17
.
Although the parliament`s decision stated that the Commission for European
Integration should present annually, on July 1 and January 1, its activity report, it is difficult
to know whether this has been done, simply because such reports were not released to the
wide public. Therefore, this makes extremely difficult to assess the efficiency of the above
mentioned commission.
Following the 2005 parliamentary elections, the newly elected parliament established
in March 2005 its permanent commissions, renaming the Commission for External Policy as
the Commission for External Policy and European Integration
18
. In comparison with the
previous formulated competences of this permanent commission, the control over the
implementation process of the EUMAP was explicitly inserted in its renewed list of duties
19
.
The special Commission for European Integration established in 2003 was not reactivated
after the 2005 legislative elections.
On October 29, 2007, under the auspices of the permanent Commission for External
Policy and European Integration, a European Informational Centre was officially inaugurated.
The centre aims at informing the wide public on EU affairs, EU-Moldova relations and on the
parliament`s activity towards the promotion of the European integration of Moldova.
1.3 Conclusions: National Institutional Setting between Paradox and Imitation
The institutional setting managing Moldova-EU relations has changed significantly to date.
The burden of these changes in the structure of both executive and legislative powers has
been, paradoxically, promoted since the late 2002. The paradox is in that they were most
promoted by the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova, a political formation
which was pleading in 2001, when it got the chance to rule in Moldova, for privileged
relationships with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and for assessing the
issue of Moldova`s joining to the Russia-Belarus Union
20
. Thus, being Eurosceptical
before taking over the responsibility to rule in Moldova, the Party of Communists changed its
17
Parliament Decision # 13-XV of March 22, 2001 on establishing the permanent commissions of the
parliament, Official monitor, # 35-38/130 of March 29, 2001.
18
Parliament Decision # 11-XVI of March 31, 2005 on establishing the permanent commissions of the
parliament, Official monitor, # 55-58/192 of Apr 08, 2005. This decision annulled the Parliament Decision # 13-
XV of March 22, 2001.
19
Parliament Decision # 17-XVI of Apr 08, 2005 on the activity scope of the parliament permanent
commissions, Official monitor, # 59-61/212 of Apr 15, 2005.
20
ADEPT, Ghidul tnrului lider politic (Chisinau, 2002), 69.
attitude once it was confronted with the challenges of governing Moldova and managing its
foreign relations. This resembles other Eurosceptical parties from some EU member states
that more or less changed their views after taking over the responsibility to govern their
countries.
In the case of Moldova, this decrease in the Party of Communists` Eurosceptical
attitude could be explained by placing this move into a larger context. At the time of making
the first step in November 2002 towards a more closely cooperation with the EU, Moldova
continued to be dependent on the international community`s financial assistance; the
Moldova-Council of Europe (CoE) relations worsened dramatically due to the 2002 internal
political crisis; there was no progress in the Transnistrian conflict settlement process; and the
ruling Party of Communists began to understand better the role of Russian Federation in this
process. Therefore, the efforts of Moldova towards a better institutionalization of its relations
with the EU were not the corollary of internal changes within the Party of Communists1
ideology, but mainly the result of external factors influence.
Equally, Moldova has borrowed in advancing its institutional setting aimed at
managing Moldova-EU relations elements from the experience of the Central and East
European Countries (CEECs), now members of the EU. Similar institutions to those existing
in Moldova could be found in a number of CEECs accession experience. However,
assimilation of other models was as well as accompanied by the introduction of original, to
some extent, institutional elements, such as NCEI.
CHAPTER2 MOLDOVA-EUPOLITICAL RELATIONS
2.1 Positions on Relations with the EU
2.1.1 Governmental Activity Programs and Other Relevant Documents
The official positions of governments on relations with the EU, since the acquiring of
independence by the Republic of Moldova in 1991, could be assessed via the prism of
governmental activity programs.
For the first time, the EU was mentioned in the Activity Program of the Sangheli II
government (April 1994February 1997)
21
. The program stated in its Foreign Policy
chapter the necessity for Moldova to extend relations with the EU and to sign documents
under the EU aegis with regard to human and minorities rights. These two are the only
references to the EU. At the same time, along with stating the necessity of the extension of
relations with the EU, the program expressed a similar need concerning relations with CIS.
The Activity Program of the next Ciubuc I government (February 1997May 1998)
had no reference to relations with the EU in its Foreign Policy chapter
22
. It stated as important
the more active co-operation with some EU member states, particularly with France,
Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian states. However, in its
External Economic Relations chapter, the program pointed out the necessity of measures
for the integration of Moldovan economic agents into the European Community market;
obtaining European trade-economic arrangements; and the preparation of the negotiation
procedures for a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the EU.
As a result of the 1998 parliamentarian elections, the forces in the parliament called
themselves as democratic formed the Alliance for Democracy and Reforms (ADR) which
appointed a new government, Ciubuc II (May 1988March 1999). Although with the same
Prime Minister, the new Government Activity Program declared the European integration
of Moldova as a foreign policy strategic objective and included in its Foreign Policy and
National Security chapter a distinctive section called the Republic of Moldova and
European Integration
23
. The section set out the following measures to be undertaken: the
working out and the consistent implementation of the national strategy for integration into the
EU; the establishing of an inter-ministerial committee for European integration, and of a
21
Parliament Decision # 153-XIII of June 23, 94 on the Activity Program of the Government for 1994-1997,
Official monitor, # 6/50 of June 30, 1994.
22
Government Decision # 30 of Feb 05, 97 on the Activity Program of the Government of the Republic of
Moldova for the January 1997 March 1998 period, Official monitor, # 13-14/51 of Feb 27, 1997.
23
Government Decision # 523 of June 04, 98 on approving the Activity Program of the Government of the
Republic of Moldova for 1998-2001 years, Official monitor, # 54-55/370 of June 18, 1998.
European integration department aimed at the co-ordination of Moldovas EU integration
process at domestic level , and providing opinions on the compliance of national normative
acts with those of the European Community; strict implementation of the Partnership and Co-
operation Agreement (PCA) provisions; intensifying political and diplomatic bids so that
negotiations on Moldovas association to the EU could start. Apart from these, the program
re-stated in its Foreign Economic Policy chapter the need for Moldova to start negotiations on
a Free Trade Agreement with the EU. The program required in a number of areas (social
security, transport, natural resources and environment) adjustment of domestic policies in line
with the European standards and called for deepening the co-operation of Moldova with some
individual EU member states as well as, within regional and sub-regional organisations
(BSEC, SECI, CEI, etc.) that facilitate the European integration process.
The short-lived Ciubuc II government was replaced by the Sturza government
(MarchDecember 1999). In specialist circles, it is largely believed that the Sturza
government was the first Moldovan government that included in its Activity Program a
special chapter concerning the European integration
24
. As we have seen above, the first
government which did this was the Ciubuc II cabinet. Moreover, the sections on EU-Moldova
relations from the activity programs of both governments are quite similar in content.
However, four differences should be mentioned: Integration of the Republic of Moldova into
the EU section, within the Foreign Policy chapter of the Activity Program of the Sturza
government, stated that the European integration of Moldova is the main strategic objective of
Moldovan foreign policy; expressed the need to conclude a Free Trade Agreement with the
EU; to obtain from the EU a favourable visa regime for Moldovan citizens; to make sure that
for a coherent integration policy into the EU, obligations assumed in foreign policy do not
contravene the EU requirements set for countries aspiring to integration
25
. These four
differences make the Sturza government`s focus on European integration more conspicuous.
Apart from discursive differences, the Sturza government is perceived to be more committed
as well to its pro-EU stance at the practical level.
Due to the internal frictions inside ADR, the Sturza cabinet was dismissed in
December 1999 by PCRM and the Peoples Christian Democratic Party (PCDP)
parliamentary factions. The new appointed Braghis government (December 1999March
24
MFAEI and IPP, ed., European Strategy of the Republic of Moldova, 2007 updated version (English),
Institute for Public Policy, http://www.ipp.md/biblioteca1.php?l=ro&id=142.
25
Government Decision # 270 of Apr 08, 99 on approving the Supremacy of Law, Economic Revitalisation
and European Integration Activity Program of the Government of the Republic of Moldova for 1999-2002
years, Official monitor, # 39-41/279 of Apr 22, 1999.
2001) maintained in the Foreign Policy chapter of its Activity Program a distinct
European integration section
26
. However, the section was less developed and ambitious in
terms of its focus on EU-Moldova relations. It stated that the European integration is a
strategic objective and called for the need to start negotiations on a Free Trade Agreement
with the EU (as Ciubuc II government program). The section also repeated, with some
wording differences, stressed below, the necessity of strict implementation of the PCA
provisions, of intensifying political and diplomatic bids so that negotiations on Moldovas
integration into the EU could start and of the approving of and the consistent implementation
of the national strategy for association to the EU (as both the Ciubuc II and the Sturza
cabinets programs). What was new and strange about the European integration program
section of the Braghis government was that under the same heading it was stated that
considering the economic interests of Moldova, the government will take efforts towards
deepening and diversifying the relations in economic and trade fields within the CIS,
especially on a bilateral basis.
The activity program of the Tarlev I cabinet (April 20012005), reflecting the new
political context after the 2001 parliamentary elections, had only three references to relations
with the EU in its Foreign Policy chapter. It stated out, surprisingly, the necessity of working
out and implementing the national integration strategy of the Republic of Moldova into the
European Community and other international communities; that of extending and
deepening relations with some individual EU member states; of deepening Moldovas
participation in the activity of those regional organizations that contribute to speeding up its
integration into European structures.
The developments of the EU-Moldova relations since 2003 and the ENP brought
significant changes into the content of the Tarlev II cabinet`s Activity Program (April
2005March 2008). It defined European integration as the first main priority and the third
main objective of the government`s activity
27
. In a separate European integration section
within the Government Activity Objectives chapter, the program underlined that the
government will continue to build efficient political, security, economic and cultural relations
with the EU, to enhance cross-border co-operation and to share responsibility for conflict
prevention and resolution. The section also stated out that the EU-Moldova action plan will
serve for the government as a solid basis for economic integration. The Foreign Policy
26
Government Decision # 20 of Jan 11, 2000 on approving the Legality, Consolidation, and Reforms for the
Well-being of Nation Activity Program of the Government of the Republic of Moldova, Official monitor, # 5-
7/100 of Jan 13, 2000.
27
Sergiu Buscaneanu ed., Alegeri 2005 (Chisinau: Gunivas, 2005), 94.
chapter of the program underlined that the foreign policy objectives will reflect the European
aspirations of Moldova and those for European integration, along with territorial reintegration
as the main priority targets of Moldovas foreign policy. The chapter stated out also that the
European integration objective will be promoted by the means of EUMAP implementation
process. In this way, the EUMAP has been declared the cornerstone tool in achieving the
European integration objective. The main task in the EU-Moldova dialogue, set out in the
government`s program, was to get the EU`s agreement on Moldova`s achieving of the
European integration objective in a foreseeable future. Apart from presenting a number of
measures to be undertaken by Moldova under EUMAP, the program also expressed the
necessity to adjust domestic policies to the European standards in a wide range of sectors
(agriculture, fiscal-budgetary policies, financial, public, local self-administration, combating
organized crime and corruption, research and innovation, standardization and metrology,
energy, transport, environment, culture, social protection, education, defense, human rights,
etc.).
Four other official and unofficial documents reflect, to some extent, the Tarlev
cabinet`s approach to the European integration of Moldova. Firstly, for an efficient
implementation of the EUMAP, the government worked out in 2006 a National Program for
the Implementation of the EUMAP, which established necessary measures to be taken,
responsible institutions and terms for their realization.
Secondly, on December 29, 2007 the government approved the Communication
Strategy on the European Integration of the Republic of Moldova (CSEIRM) and the Action
Plan on implementation of this strategy in 2008
28
. The CSEIRM aims to ensure an adequate
and systematic dissemination of information about the EU, the access of the public to more
information sources about the EU, and to provide Moldovan citizens with the opportunity to
participate in the European integration process more actively. The strategy stipulates a series
of actions including surveys (Omnibus, interviews, etc.); consolidation of media services of
central public institutions (government, MFAEI, and others); training seminars for public
functionaries, journalists, teachers; media monitoring and contextual analysis; meetings and
thematic debates; experience exchange visits to the EU; promotional campaigns; radio and
TV programmes, etc. Building an integrated information infrastructure on the EU is an
important aspect of the strategy, and it shall include a website on the EU; European
28
Government Decision # 1524 of Dec 29, 2007 on approving the Communication Strategy on the European
Integration of the Republic of Moldova, Official monitor, # 11-12/66 of Jan 18, 2008.
interactive or information centres; an EU information dissemination system; a free telephone
line; a European newsletter and a database of news and experts on European affairs.
Although the CSEIRM is unquestionably a necessary, ambitious and high-quality
document, it is unlikely that it will be fully implemented, due to three main reasons: it shall be
implemented in a relatively short term by 2010; there are too many tasks to be fulfilled in
this relatively short term; and there is a shortage of financial resources for a plenary
implementation of the CSEIRM
29
.
Thirdly, under the NCEI aegis, the Concept for the Integration of the Republic of
Moldova into the EU was worked out in August 2003. The concept has been never
published. What is known about this document is that it identified the South-East European
path as the most optimal door for Moldova to enter the EU. On September 16, 2003, the
concept was approved by NCEI and on October 10, 2003 it was presented in Brussels to
Javier Solana, HR for CFSP and Secretary General of the EU Council. The only known
official position of the EU on the concept has been expressed briefly in the EUMAP. The
action plan stated out in its introductory part that the EU acknowledges [] Moldovas
concept for the Integration of the Republic of Moldova into the EU.
Fourthly, as requested by the Presidential Decree establishing NCEI, the European
Strategy of the Republic of Moldova was finally prepared in 2005
30
. The strategy, like the
concept, is unofficial. Although the Presidential Decree implied the strategy to be approved
by the parliament, this did not happen. The strategy is a very complex document (2005
Romanian version 661 pages; 2007 updated English version 484 pages
31
), is based on the
concept and designed to prepare Moldova to join the EU in the future. The strategy draws
upon the premise that the integration of Moldova into the EU is the main national interest.
The role of the strategy was conceived similar to that of association strategies used by CEECs
in their accession process to the EU. Therefore, the document considers the experience of
CEECs, draws upon the philosophy of the Copenhagen criteria, while adapting CEECs
experience to the domestic context. The work on the strategy had started before negotiations
on EUMAP were launched. As it was prepared when the EUMAP was already signed, the
strategy structure was changed in order to reflect the EUMAP structure. Equally, the strategy
states that it will be updated periodically to reflect the EUMAP implementation process and
29
Sergiu Buscaneanu, Communication Strategy on the European Integration of the Republic of Moldova,
Policy Brief 1 (2008), ADEPT, http://www.e-democracy.md/en/policy-briefs.
30
MFAEI and IPP, ed., Strategia European a Republicii Moldova, 2005 version (Romanian), Institute for
Public Policy, http://www.ipp.md/biblioteca1.php?l=ro&id=85.
31
MFAEI and IPP, ed., European Strategy of the Republic of Moldova, 2007 updated version (English),
Institute for Public Policy, http://www.ipp.md/biblioteca1.php?l=ro&id=142.
it will serve as a tool for monitoring this process. Also it was believed that, having such a
strategy, Moldova will manage more rapidly to prepare the final monitoring report on the
EUMAP implementation process and to submit it to the European Commission that would,
thus, allow Moldova to outrun other ENP countries and to demand launching negotiations on
a European Agreement of Association. Yet, in August 2003, the First Deputy Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Andrei Stratan, raised expectations that following the negotiation on the
concept and the strategy with the EU, Moldova could file an application to join the EU. In this
context, it was said that Moldova seeks and would have the chance to get by 2007 the status
of an associate member of the EU
32
.
Considering the structure of similar documents used by the CEECs, the European
Strategy of the Republic of Moldova provides for most of the activity fields envisaged: the
legislative and institutional frameworks; current problems and short- and medium-term
priorities. Hence, the strategy specifies the measures to be undertaken for achieving
Moldova`s goal of integration into the EU, expressed by the concept. In the context of this
vision, the EUMAP was seen as the last part of the European strategy priorities. According to
the strategy, Moldovan authorities see the implementation of the EUMAP as a way of
transposing the strategy`s priorities into practice, though there are no official references to this
process. The fact that the European strategy was updated in 2007 might lead to the idea that
authorities sought to synchronize the documents priorities with the state of affairs in
implementing the EUMAP.
The activity program of the Greceani government (March 2008 to date), entitled
Progress and Integration, has no section explicitly dedicated to relations between Moldova
and the EU
33
. The main references to these relations are present in the introductory section of
the program, and in its Ensuring the country`s security and integrity and Increase of
economic competitiveness chapters. The program states in the introduction that Moldova
identifies itself with Europe and [hopes] that [its] role in European structures will be well
outlined and that [this role] will get a clear finality. The Greceani government believes that
ensuring the rule of law, the consolidation of democratic institutions and observance of the
rules of a market economy will place [Moldova] in the space of European values, situation in
which European integration will be naturally acknowledged. In this way, states the program,
32
BASA-press, Guvernul a aprobat structura si atributiile Departamentului de Integrare European, August 6,
2003; Reporter.md News Agency, Conceptia de integrare a RM n Uniunea European este pe ultima sut de
metri, August 22, 2003.
33
Government of the Republic of Moldova, Programul de activitate al Guvernului pentru anii 2008-2009
Progres i Integrare, Government of the Republic of Moldova, http://www.gov.md.
the principles of acquis communautaire will be transposed into practice. The main fields of
the government`s activity are seen as being of equal importance for the progress and
European integration of Moldova.
The Ensuring the country`s security and integrity chapter of the program states,
among other things, that Moldova will seek to explore the potential of socioeconomic
relations with member states of the EU and to intensify co-operation in the framework of the
EU neighbourhood policy (bold-typed S.B.), to enhance interconnectedness with the
European electro-energetic system and to obtain membership in European structures acting in
the energy field. In its Increase of economic competitiveness chapter, the program calls for
concluding new agreements on avoidance of double taxation and investment protection with a
larger number of countries, including EU member states and for the capitalisation of
opportunities provided by the EU system of autonomous trade preferences.
Apart from this, the program refers to European standards as benchmarks in a number
of governmental focus areas (democratisation, civil society; public finance; competition rules;
metrology, standardisation, quality testing and control; railway transport and education).
2.1.2 Parliament Positions
The first substantial document approved by the Moldovan Parliament defining the external
relations of Moldova with the EU was the Foreign Policy Concept of the Republic of
Moldova
34
. As was approved in February 1995, the concept is largely outdated, reflecting
priorities, principles and directions of the Moldovan foreign policy from that time.
The document states out that Moldova will promote an elastic and equilibrated foreign
policy in the following main directions: 1) Development of interstate bilateral relations (a.
Relations with CIS countries, b. Relations with European and North American countries, c.
Relations with Asian, African and Latin American countries); 2) Development of interstate
multilateral relations (a. UN and other international organisations, b. Regional and sub-
regional co-operation); 3) Cultural and scientific international co-operation. The concept
defines briefly the relations with the EU under the sub-heading Regional and sub-regional
co-operation. It states that a major objective conceived in perspective is gradual integration
of the Republic of Moldova into the EU. The first step on this path is signing the Partnership
and Co-operation Agreement. The reference to relations with the EU under the Regional
34
Parliament Decision # 368-XIII of Feb 08, 95 on approving Foreign Policy Concept of the Republic of
Moldova, Official monitor, # 20/187 of Apr 06, 1995.
and sub-regional co-operation sub-heading, low in the concept hierarchy of Moldovas
foreign policy directions, clearly points out a low interest of the parliament, particularly of
the ruling Agrarian Democratic Party of Moldova (ADPM), in a tight relationship with
Brussels.
The parliament`s vision on Moldovas relations with the EU has been changed after a
new composition of the legislative body was elected as a result of 1998 elections. However,
this change in attitude towards the EU has been more noticeable at the level of discourse. The
change did not realise in particular official documents reflecting a more pro-EU stance, except
the Activity Programs of the Ciubuc II and the Sturza cabinets approved by the parliament.
Only on June 19, 2000, 23 political parties agreed to sign a document which declared
adherence of Moldova to the EU as the main strategic priority. The document, entitled The
Republic of Moldovas Strategy of Association to the EU, was signed by the majority of
parliamentarian parties, except for the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova with
40 out of 101 seats in the Parliament. Apart from the PCRM, the Party of Socialists, ADPM,
Furnica Civic Alliance and Socio-Political Movement Ravnopravie, not being
represented in the Parliament, did not sign the strategy, either. Given the high number of
signatory parties, the strategy did not become, however, an official document. The strategy
was submitted on the same date to the President Petru Lucinschi and from that date on, it
became only a reference point in academic and research debates. Nevertheless, having in
mind the institutional developments from 2002 on, promoted by the ruling PCRM, one could
assume that the 2000 strategy served as a source of inspiration for some of them. For
example, setting up the National Commission for European Integration, the parliamentarian
Commission for European Integration, and the European Integration Department was
suggested, with almost the same names, by the 2000 strategy.
In line with the institutional developments promoted in relation with European
integration policy since 2002, all parliamentary factions endorsed on November 15, 2003 a
common declaration which declared the European integration option as a fundamental
strategic objective of the Republic of Moldova. The document expressed the confidence of
signatory parties that the European integration will ease the country`s reunification,
sustainable economic development and its gradual transformation into a modern European
state. The declaration underlined, like the Concept for the Integration of the Republic of
Moldova into the EU, that the South-East European path is the most optimal one for Moldova
to join the EU. Consequently, on the same date, the Moldovan Speaker Eugenia Ostapciuc
sent a letter informing the European Parliament`s (EP) President Pat Cox on the stance of
Moldovan MPs and suggesting the inclusion of Moldova into the Stabilization and
Association Process (SAP)
35
.
As a result of the ENP projection on Moldova, the 2005 parliamentarian elections and
the concluding of the EUMAP, the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova adopted at its
inaugural sitting on March 24, 2005 the Declaration on the political partnership for achieving
the objectives of European integration. This non-binding document was voted unanimously
for the 2005-2009 legislative cycle
36
. Although acknowledging the different visions of
signatory parties on a number of issues related to domestic and foreign policies, they agreed
that the further development of the Republic of Moldova could not be assured without a
consequent and irreversible promotion of the strategic course towards European integration.
The ruling PCRM and opposition parties agreed that in achieving this goal they have to co-
operate in a responsible manner. As main directions of the political partnership the
Declaration identifies: implementation of EUMAP; establishing an independent judiciary
system; bringing national law in compliance with European standards with regard to the free
movements of goods, capital, services and persons; combating corruption; etc.
With the aim of updating the foreign policy concept of the Republic of Moldova and
improving the normative framework on European integration policy, in January 2006, the
National Commission aiming at working out such a concept was established
37
. A Presidential
Decree asked the Commission to work out the above-mentioned concept until March 1, 2006.
After two years since the Presidential Decree was passed, the concept is still missing. This is
the second time when Presidential Decrees establishing special bodies aimed at working out
important documents to set the framework for Moldovan foreign policy, in general, and for
the European integration policy, in particular, are disregarded.
2.2 Major Events Marking the EU-Moldova Relations
2.2.1 High Level Political Contacts with the EU
After the implosion of the USSR in 1991, Moldova found itself in a totally new reality. Along
with the establishment of its state institutions and by undertaking a complex process of
reforms, the Republic of Moldova also had to redefine its relations with the external world.
35
ADEPT, Governance and Democracy in Moldova, # 19, 2003, ADEPT, http://www.e-democracy.md/e-
journal/20031119.
36
Declaration on the political partnership for achieving the objectives of European integration, Moldova
Suveran, # 51 (20688), March 29, 2005.
37
Decree # 414-IV of Jan 16, 2006 on establishing National Commission for elaboration of the Foreign Policy
Concept of the Republic of Moldova, Official monitor, # 9-12/64 of Jan 20, 2006.
On the other hand, the external actors also had to adapt themselves to the new
international architecture, brought by the dissolution of the USSR. The European Community
(EC) was not an exception in this sense. The EC expressed its views on the developments
brought by the dissolution of USSR in two documents: Declaration on Developments in the
Soviet Union, adopted by the Maastricht European Council from December 9-10, 1991;
EPC Declaration on the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and
in the Soviet Union, adopted on December 16, 1991
38
. Following these documents, in 1992,
the European Commission proposed to replace the Agreement between the EC and USSR on
Trade and Commercial and Economic Co-operation, signed in December 1989, with
agreements to be concluded bilaterally with CIS members.
Along with the establishment of the new relations with the former Soviet republics,
the EC committed itself to supporting their political and economic transformation. The EC
TACIS programme became the main instrument which aimed at enhancing the transition
process in all former Soviet republics, except for the Baltic states. When TACIS was initiated
in 1991, the technical assistance through this program was a stand-alone activity. Later it
became part of a more complex policy approach of the EU towards countries in Eastern
Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia, due to a gradual development and formalization of their
bilateral relations through new legal frameworks Partnership and Co-operation Agreements.
In 1993, the EU started negotiations on the PCAs content with Moldova being left
aside. Therefore, in November 1993, and, repeatedly, in January 1994, Mircea Snegur,
President of Moldova, sent letters to the presidents of the EU Council and of the European
Commission expressing the will of Moldova to negotiate a PCA with the EU. Additionally, in
March 1994, President Snegur paid an official visit to Brussels, where he tackled the issue of
the relationship between Moldova and the EU with Sir Leon Brittan, Vice President of the
European Commission, and Hans van den Broek, Commissioner for External Relations and
Enlargement. Shortly, after two rounds of negotiations, the Partnership and Co-operation
Agreement between the EU and Moldova was signed in November 1994.
Pending the completion of the procedures necessary for the entry into force of the
PCA, provisions of certain parts of this agreement, particularly related to trade, were put into
effect by means of an Interim Agreement (IA) between the EC and Moldova. The IA was
signed in October 1995 and entered into force in May 1996.
38
MFAEI and IPP, ed., European Strategy of the Republic of Moldova, 2007 updated version (English),
Institute for Public Policy, http://www.ipp.md/biblioteca1.php?l=ro&id=142.
While the EU-Moldova PCA was passing through a cumbersome ratification
procedure by the EU member states and understanding that the agreement aimed at co-
operation, not at integration into the EU, the second Moldovan President, Petru Lucinschi,
expressed by successive official letters the European aspirations of Moldova. The first two
letters were sent in December 1996 and, respectively, in October 1997 to the President of the
European Commission, Jacques Santer. They expressed for the first time Moldovas will to
become an associate member of the EU by 2000 and to start negotiations on an Association
Agreement (AA). In December 1997, Petru Lucinschi sent letters with a similar content to all
EU heads of states and governments. In addition, in the same month, Prime Minister, Ion
Ciubuc, met in Brussels Jean-Luc Dehaene, Prime Minister of Belgium; Hans van den Broek,
European Commissioner; and Francois Lamoureux, Deputy Director General of the European
Commission DG1A, asking for support so that Moldova would be granted with the statute of
an association member of the EU. All interlocutors welcomed Moldovas political will in this
regard, but underlined that before passing to another stage of relations, Moldova should fulfil
its obligations under PCA.
The EU-Moldova PCA entered finally into force on July 1, 1998, providing a new
contractual relationship between the parties concerned and setting out a co-operation
framework in a broad spectrum of policy areas.
In 1999, despite the reticent attitude of the EU towards the European aspirations of
Moldova, the Sturza government appointed by the ruling parliamentary coalition, the Alliance
for Democracy and Reforms, declared European integration as its main foreign policy
strategic objective. In March 1999, Prime Minister, Ion Sturza, paid an official visit to
Brussels, informing Hans van den Broek and other European officials about the priorities of
his cabinet in domestic and foreign policies and that one of the three pillars of the government
activity program is European integration. However, due to the frictions inside the ADR, the
Sturza government was dismissed, which undermined earlier diplomatic efforts of Moldova
on its way to European integration. According to the authors of the European Strategy of the
Republic of Moldova, the omission of the Republic of Moldova from the conclusions on EU
enlargement to the East, approved by the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, was
the most serious consequence of that fact
39
. Another indirect consequence, due to the fact that
international financial institutions (IFI) suspended their co-operation with Moldova, was the
EU decision to postpone for an indefinite period of time the disbursal of EUR 15 million as
macro-financial assistance aimed at supporting the balance of payments. Moldova was
39
Ibidem: 8.
informed about this decision of the EU at the second meeting of the EU-Moldova Co-
operation Council, held in January 2000, in Brussels, and co-presided by the Prime Minister
Dumitru Braghis.
In July 2000, the visit of President Petru Lucinschi to Brussels followed. Among other
issues related to the political and economic situation in Moldova, such as the settlement of the
Transnistrian conflict and relations between Moldova and the EU, Petru Lucinschi and the
European Commission President, Romano Prodi, discussed the opportunity of opening a
Delegation of the European Commission in Chisinau.
In May 2001, after early parliamentary elections, the newly appointed Prime Minister,
Vasile Tarlev led the Moldovan delegation participating in the third meeting of the EU-
Moldova Co-operation Council held in Brussels. Parties expressed their interest to co-operate
closely in justice, home affairs (JHA) and business matters.
In June 2001, the newly elected President, Vladimir Voronin, participated in Brussels
in the Regional Table of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, where Moldova was
admitted within this regional co-operation project, seen as complementary to the European
integration process. Later, in the same year Moldova was invited (together with Ukraine, and
then Russia) to join the European Conference, set up initially as a forum for political dialogue
between the EU and candidate states.
In April 2002, at the forth meeting of the EU-Moldova Co-operation Council, held in
Luxemburg, Moldovan Prime Minister, Vasile Tarlev, raised the issue of concluding a FTA
with the EU and that of the EU assistance in preparing a JHA action plan.
After a period of a partly incoherent foreign policy, the European dimension of
Moldovas foreign policy started to come back gradually to the top of its external relations
agenda. As a starting point of this at that time surprising return to the pro-EU rhetoric, the
establishment of the National Commission for European Integration by the President Vladimir
Voronin, in November 2002, could be considered, which aimed at the elaboration of the
European Integration strategy of the Republic of Moldova. Later other institutional building
developments such as the establishment of the parliamentary Commission for European
Integration, the EID within the MFA came to add credibility to the re-orientation in the field
of external relations, hardly and hesitantly accepted by the ruling Party of Communists.
On the other hand, the EU, preparing itself for its big-bang enlargement to the East
and South, has been showing an increasing interest in the development of a new policy
approach towards its future neighbours. In December 2003, nine months after launching the
wider Europe communication by the European Commission, Commissioner for
Enlargement and Wider Europe, Gnter Verheugen, paid an official visit to Chisinau
presenting the benefits for Moldovas participation into the new European Neighbourhood
Initiative. Many question marks and a lot of scepticism on part of the Moldovan political elite
towards the EU new initiative were largely the results of Verheugen`s visit to Chisinau.
Shortly after its fifth enlargement wave in May 2004, the EU launched formally the
European neighbourhood policy (ENP), which articulates a revised policy approach towards
sixteen countries in the EU`s neighbourhood. The ENP is a response to the extension of the
EUs borders and to the limits of this extension. As the EU cannot enlarge ad infinitum, while
its enlargement already brought it closer to potentially unstable regions, the ENP attempts to
set up normative terms: to develop a friendly neighbourhood and a zone of prosperity with the
EU neighbours; to avoid drawing new dividing lines in Europe; and to promote stability and
prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the Union
40
. The main vehicle for taking the
ENP forward was the action plans, documents which came to set the framework in short and
medium run for the dialogue between the EU and its neighbours in a variety of fields.
The Republic of Moldova met the EU`s initiative towards its neighbourhood with
mixed feelings. On one hand, Moldova welcomed the EU`s intention to deepen its relations
with neighbouring countries, but on the other hand, it was more or less disappointed as the
new neighbourhood policy of the EU was not considering a clear European perspective for
Moldova. Another important reason for these reticent attitudes was the inclusion of Moldova
in the same box with states without a European vocation. Despite these attitudes, the EUs
initiative towards its neighbourhood brought in Moldova new hopes with regard to its future
European destiny. Although the ENP was not offering a membership perspective, Moldovan
authorities conceived this initiative as an additional way of co-operation with the EU and as
a bridge towards the following stage association and integration into the EU
41
. The head
of the Moldovan diplomacy, Andrei Stratan, expressed the view that once Moldova fulfils
the tasks outlined in the [EU-Moldova Action Plan], it would acquire a more advanced status
in relations with the EU, and Chisinaus aspirations to become an associated member might
become quite realistic
42
. Although, this has been stated later, the negotiation process on the
40
European Commission, Wider Europe Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern
and Southern Neighbours, March 11, 2003, European Commission,
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/world/enp/pdf/com03_ 104_en.pdf.
41
Valeriu Gheorghiu, Moldova on the way to the European Union: Distance covered and next steps to be
done, Institute for Public Policy, http://www.ipp.md/public/biblioteca/83/en/MoldovaWayEU.pdf.
42
ADEPT, Governance and Democracy in Moldova, # 30, 33, 2004, ADEPT, http://www.e-democracy.md/en/e-
journal/2004.shtml.
EU-Moldova Action Plan began with similar hopes. The EU and Moldova negotiated the
Action Plan in four rounds of negotiations held in January, February and June 2004
43
.
On December 9, 2004, the European Commission introduced the EU-Moldova Action
Plan, together with other six similar documents for Israel, Jordan, Morocco, the Palestinian
Authority, Tunisia, and Ukraine. On February 22, 2005, at the seventh meeting of the EU-
Moldova Co-operation Council, held in Brussels, Jean Asselborn, Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Immigration of Luxembourg, on behalf of the Council, and
Vasile Tarlev, Prime Minister of Moldova, signed the EU-Moldova Action Plan
44
.
Although negotiations on the EU-Moldova Action Plan were completed in June 2004,
given the EU`s intention to approve similar documents with a group of states at the same
time, the Action Plan with Moldova was signed nearly a year later than promised. This
contradicts obviously the differentiation principle announced by the EU to be used within the
ENP. Another problem that the negotiation process of the Action Plan has outlined is a
reciprocal lack of knowledge of the EU about the policy developments in Moldova and that of
the latter about the EU policies, programs and standards. During the negotiations, the EU had
to rely much upon the information provided by the Moldovan government, while the latter
had to wait for the EU`s feed-back as regards its standards and requirements. This could be an
additional explanation for the delay in the negotiation process.
Shortly after the signing the EUMAP, the EU started to show that it was serious when
it promised a strong commitment to support the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict. In
March 2005, the Council appointed an EU Special Representative (EUSR) for Moldova,
whose mandate was primarily linked with the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict. In
October 2005, the EU started to participate as an observer in the negotiation process for the
settlement of the Transnistrian conflict in the so-called Five-Plus-Two format. Following
the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on the EU Border Assistance Mission to
Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) in October, the official opening ceremony of the EUBAM
took place on December 1, 2005. The EUBAM works very closely with the EUSR for
Moldova and aims at preventing smuggling, trafficking, and customs fraud, by providing
advice and training to improve the capacity of the Moldovan and Ukrainian border and
43
For details: Sergiu Buscaneanu, How Far is the European Neighbourhood Policy a Substantial Offer for
Moldova, August 2006, ADEPT, http://www.e-democracy.md/files/enp-moldova.pdf.
44
MFAEI, Reuniunea a VII a Consiliului de Cooperare Republica Moldova Uniunea European, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and European Integration, http://www.mfa.md/Ro/Comunicate/2005-02-
24ReuniuneaConsiliuluiCooperareRM_UE.htm.
customs services. The EUBAM was offered a two-year mandate, which was extended in 2007
for another two years.
In April 2006, the eighth meeting of the EU-Moldova Co-operation Council took
place. The Moldovan delegation was headed by the Prime Minister, Vasile Tarlev. This was
the first meeting of the Co-operation Council since the EU and Moldova had signed the
EUMAP in February 2005. Therefore, at the meeting, the implementation of the EUMAP was
assessed. The EU and Moldova also made use of this occasion to sign a horizontal agreement
on air services. One month later, Moldova was accepted as a member of the South East
Europe Co-operation Process (SEECP), seen by Moldovan authorities as an additional way to
get involved within the processes occurring in the region covered by this regional
organisation and as a tool of opening up new perspectives in the relations between Moldova
and the EU.
On 25 April 2007, Franco Frattini, Deputy President of the European Commission and
Commissioner for Justice, Freedom and Security (JFS), participated in the official opening
ceremony of the Common Application Centre (CAC) in Chisinau within the premises of
Hungarian Embassy. The Chisinau-based CAC was the first centre of this kind opened by the
EU in the world, where Moldovan citizens can obtain visas to enter Austria, Latvia, Slovenia
and Hungary. Later, Denmark and Estonia joined the CAC. On the occasion of opening the
CAC, agreements between the EU and Moldova on the facilitation of the issuance of visas
and readmission were initialled.
In June 2007, President Voronin headed the group of Moldovan officials to the ninth
meeting of the EU-Moldova Co-operation Council, held in Luxemburg. The talks between the
sides have generally focussed on two key topics: the implementation of the EUMAP by
Moldova and the Transnistrian settlement process. The EU-Moldova Co-operation Council
did not say many things about the prospects of relations between Chisinau and Brussels.
Simply, Brussels did not know how to formulate them at that time. However, it was hinted
that everything depends on Moldova.
The following important event marking the EU-Moldova political contacts was
President Vladimir Voronin`s official visit to Brussels on December 5-6, 2007. The
Presidents visit to Brussels was aimed to totalize the results of co-operation with the EU in
the past years and to make clear the further co-operation possibilities with the EU. Although
Voronin stressed that he did not visit Brussels to negotiate Moldovas perspective to join the
EU, observers said that the visit of the Moldovan President to EU institutions was aimed to
assure that Moldova continues to be dedicated to its European course and to persuade
European officials to allow Chisinau to succeed to a new qualitative relationship with the EU.
During the meeting with Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Voronin reviewed Moldovas progresses in
implementing the EUMAP, but acknowledged that there is still much work to be done in a
number of areas. He indicated the respect for human rights, the freedom of the media, the
judiciary reform, the anti-corruption fight and the business climate as problematic fields. The
need for reforms in the areas concerned was also reiterated during the meeting with Hans-Gert
Pttering. In turn, the EP President stressed that this is the only way to launch talks on a new
framework of relations between the EU and Moldova.
When President Voronin just arrived in Brussels on December 5, 2007, the European
Commission released a new Communication entitled A Strong European Neighbourhood
Policy
45
. The document, among others, answered the questions regarding the future EU-
Moldova relations, but in the short term. It recommended a roll-over of the EUMAP for one
year along with similar documents for Ukraine and Israel, which were to reach the end of their
term in early 2008.
Shortly, on January 14, 2008, President Vladimir Voronin paid another formal visit to
Brussels. The meeting with the European Commission President, Jos Manuel Barroso, was
the main one on Voronins visit agenda. According to Commissions functionaries, the
meeting between Voronin and Barroso was of a rather protocolary nature. As the European
Commission President could not receive the Moldovan leader during his last visit to Brussels
on December 5-6, 2007, the meeting of the two officials was postponed for January 2008.
Prior to his visit to Brussels, President Voronin told journalists that Moldova will not extend
the implementation deadline of [EUMAP] after February 2008, when the term is over.
However, the conviction that a perspective of advancing to a different type of contractual
relation with the EU will be shaping for Moldova after February 2008, when the three year
period established initially for the implementation of the EUMAP ended, was exaggerated.
Jos Manuel Barroso reconfirmed the December 5, 2007 proposal by the European
Commission launched via the Communication, A Strong European Neighbourhood Policy,
to extend the EUMAP implementation term. In spite of Moldovas accomplishments
regarding the EUMAP implementation stressed by Barroso at a news conference after
meeting Vladimir Voronin, the European official concluded that the EUMAP potential was
not fully exploited and, hence, it must be kept in place as a guiding line tool for the EU-
45
European Commission, Communication from the Commission A Strong European Neighbourhood Policy,
05/12/2007, COM(2007) 774 final, European Commission,
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com07_774_en.pdf.
Moldova` day to day work.
Finally, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European Commissioner for Foreign Relations and
European Neighbourhood Policy, was on a formal visit to Chisinau on February 14-15, 2008.
In her meetings with Moldovan officials, the Commissioner reaffirmed what was said in
December 2007 and January 2008 that the EU will consider the possibility to sign a new
agreement with Moldova only after the complete implementation of the EUMAP. Ferrero-
Waldner praised Moldovan authorities for the success in implementing the EUMAP, but
signalled problematic fields which require more efforts. The problematic areas signalled by
the European Commissioner are those that the EU-Moldova co-operation bodies and the
European Commission have earlier indicated
46
. Also, Ferrero-Waldner reiterated the need of
effectively enforcing the laws adopted during the implementation of the EUMAP. In turn,
President Voronin has assured that Moldova will implement the new regulations and will
organise the 2009 parliamentary elections, which he described as the first and perhaps the
most important test for Moldova, in a democratic, transparent and free way.
2.2.2 Diplomatic Relations with the EU
The diplomatic relations between Moldova and the EU started in early 1990. In January
1994, the first Moldovan Ambassador to Belgium was accredited as the chief of the Republic
of Moldova mission to the EC. For more than ten years, Moldovan ambassadors accredited to
Belgium were also in charge of relations with the EC. Only in October 2004, President
Vladimir Voronin issued a Decree establishing a separate Diplomatic Mission of the Republic
of Moldova to the EC
47
. Nevertheless, many observers point to the fact that the Moldovan
diplomatic mission to the EC has a small number of personnel, being difficult for Moldovan
diplomats to cope with their duties in accordance with the diplomatic missions mandate.
On the other hand, due to a number of official requests, to the increasing EU interest in
its neighbourhood and to the provisions of the EUMAP, the Delegation of the European
Commission to Moldova was inaugurated in October 2005. The Delegation has the status of a
diplomatic mission and officially represents the European Commission in the Republic of
Moldova. The Delegations mandate includes the following: promoting the political and
economic relations between Moldova and the EU; monitoring the implementation of the
EUMAP and EU-Moldova PCA; informing the public about the developments within the EU;
46
See 2.3.1.2 EU-Moldova Action Plan sub-par. below.
47
Decree # 2054-III from 20.10.2004 on establishing the Diplomatic Mission of the Republic of Moldova to the
European Communities, Official monitor, # 189-192/874 of Nov 22, 2004.
participating in the implementation of the EU external assistance programmes, such as
TACIS, Food Security Programme (FSP), European Neighbourhood and Partnership
Instrument (ENPI), etc.
Meanwhile, Moldova expanded its relations on bilateral level with a number of EU
member states. Moldova opened embassies in Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Poland and Romania. More recently, Moldova opened embassies in the
Czech Republic, the UK, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Estonia and Sweden as well. On
the other hand, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, the UK, Hungary, Lithuania,
Poland, Romania and Sweden among the EU member states have diplomatic representations
in Moldova. Italy is the next EU member state to open a diplomatic mission in Chisinau.
2.2.3 Parliamentary and NGOs Contacts
The parliamentary contacts between Moldova and the EU take place, on a regular basis, since
1998 within the institutional framework set up by the EU-Moldova PCA. The Parliamentary
Co-operation Committee (PCC), set up by the PCA (Art. 87-89), is a forum for members of
the Moldovan Parliament and the European Parliament to meet and exchange views on the
implementation of this agreement.
Parliamentary contacts between Moldova and the EU have become more intense over
time. Since late 2002early 2003, the EP has been showing an increased interest in the
developments occurring in the Republic of Moldova. Starting with this period, EP approved a
number of important resolutions concerning Moldova. At the same time, EP delegated its
representatives to monitor elections in Moldova as part of larger election observer groups
such as International Election Observation Mission at the 2005 parliamentary elections.
The most recent meeting of the EU-Moldova PCC (tenth meeting) took place on
October 1-2, 2007, in Chisinau. The EU-Moldova PCC welcomed Moldovas efforts to
implement EUMAP; reiterated the need for Moldovan authorities to redouble their efforts in
order to implement democratic reforms in a series of areas such as respect for human rights,
freedom of media, respect for rule of law; stressed that Moldovas perspectives to join the EU
are open; called for resumption of the Five-Plus-Two Transnistrian settlement negotiations;
rejected any parallels between Transnistria and Kosovo, etc.
In late October 2007, Moldova was visited by the EP Vice-President, Miguel Angel
Martinez Martinez. In Chisinau, he met Moldovan Speaker Marian Lupu. The talks focussed
on many topics, including the move of Moldovan citizens in the EU as well as the
Transnistrian settlement process. The EP Vice-President showed readiness to help extending
the inter-parliamentary dialogue to enhance Moldovas visibility in Europe and to ease the
inclusion of its priorities on the European agenda of talks.
Along with extending the parliamentary contacts, NGO links from Moldova and the
EU became more tight as well. The most successful NGO partnerships have been established
with NGOs from the new member states of the EU, such as Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania. The number of partnerships with NGOs
from the old member states of the EU is considerably lower, with the exception of Germany
and, possibly, Belgium.
The Role of NGOs in the Process of European Integration Working Group of the
last National NGO Forum (forth edition), held in November 2003, approved a thematic
Resolution
48
. NGOs stated that they support unequivocally the idea of the European
integration of the Republic of Moldova, as the only way for the democratisation and progress
in Moldova. The resolution acknowledged a number of governmental actions aimed at the
European integration process of Moldova, but disapproved the totally non-transparent way of
working out the concept for the integration of the Republic of Moldova into the EU.
Therefore, NGOs called upon Moldovan authorities to engage the civil society at all stages in
the European integration process. The document also recommended to authorities to adopt a
communication strategy with civil society in the process of European integration, to work out
in a transparent way all program documents related to the EU-Moldova relations in the future,
and to establish an advisory council from specialized NGOs in European integration matters,
etc.
2.3 EU-Moldova Agreements and Future Prospects
2.3.1 Documents Regulating EU-Moldova Relations
The EU-Moldova relations are regulated by the EU-Moldova PCA, EU-Moldova Action Plan
and other bilateral agreements.
2.3.1.1 EU-Moldova PCA
The PCA was signed by the EU and Moldova on November 28, 1994 and entered into force
on July 1, 1998 for a period of ten years
49
. The EU-Moldova PCA along with other similar
48
Rezolutie, Atelierul: Societatea civil si procesul de integrare european, Forumul ONG din Republica
Moldova, Editia a IV-a, November 2003, ADEPT, http://www.e-
democracy.md/ngo/ngoforum/4rezolutie2.shtml.
49
European Commission, Partnership and Co-operation Agreement, Art. 1, European Commission,
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/ceeca/pca/pca_moldova.pdf.
documents signed with all CIS countries, except for Tajikistan (See Appendix 1), replaced the
agreement between the EEC, EURATOM and the USSR on trade and economic and
commercial co-operation, signed in December 1989. The PCA is the first agreement signed
between the EU and Moldova as an independent state.
Since 1998, the PCA has defined the legal framework of the relations between the EU
and Moldova. The objectives of the document can be read as follows: to provide an
appropriate framework for the political dialogue between the Parties allowing the
development of political relations; to promote trade and investment and harmonious economic
relations between the Parties and so to foster their sustainable economic development; to
provide a basis for legislative, economic, social, financial, and cultural co-operation; to
support efforts of Moldova to consolidate its democracy and to develop its economy and to
complete its transition into a market economy.
The EU-Moldova PCA transcends the strict economic objectives of the agreement
signed with the USSR as it gave a political dimension to the bilateral co-operation by
underlining that the respect for democracy, for the principles of international law, and human
rights underpin the internal and external policies of the Parties and constitute an essential
element of the PCA.
The EU-Moldova PCA has 95 pages and 106 articles. The document refers to a co-
operation process between the Parties concerned in such areas as: political dialogue; trade in
goods; business and investment; payments and capital; competition, intellectual, industrial,
commercial property protection and legislative co-operation; economic co-operation; cultural
co-operation; and financial co-operation (See Appendix 2).
The PCA institutionalized the relations between the EU and Moldova by establishing
three bodies: the Co-operation Council, Co-operation Committee and the Parliamentary Co-
operation Committee. The Co-operation Council supervises the implementation of this
agreement. It meets at ministerial level once a year. It examines any major issues arising
within the framework of the agreement. The Co-operation Council consists of the members of
the Council of the EU and members of the European Commission, on the one hand, and of
members of the government of Moldova, on the other (Art. 82-83).
The Co-operation Committee assists the Co-operation Council in the performance of
its duties and it is composed of representatives of the EU Council and of members of the
European Commission, on the one hand, and of representatives of the government of
Moldova, on the other, normally at senior civil servant level. The duties of the Co-operation
Committee include the preparation of meetings of the Co-operation Council (Art. 84). Several
months after the PCA entered into force, the Co-operation Committee decided to set up 5 sub-
committees: Trade and Investments; Economic and Financial Issues; Customs, cross-border
co-operation, fighting against organized crime; Transport, telecommunications, energy,
environment, education and training, science and technologies, culture; and ECSC Contact
Group.
The Parliamentary Co-operation Committee is a forum for members of the Moldovan
Parliament and the EP to meet and exchange views. The Parliamentary Co-operation
Committee may request relevant information and make recommendations regarding the
implementation of this agreement from/ to the Co-operation Council (Art. 87-89).
Due to the long period of time necessary for the PCA to enter into force, the
provisions of certain parts of this agreement, especially related with trade, had been put into
effect by means of an Interim Agreement between the EU and Moldova, signed in October
1995 and entered into force in May 1996.
In order to help partner countries to implement efficiently the PCAs (See Appendix 1),
the EU provided assistance trough the TACIS financial instrument
50
. As for Moldova, the
TACIS Programme provided assistance for measures focusing on: institutional, legal and
administrative reforms; private sector and economic development; alleviation of the social
consequences of transition; etc.
51
Due to its belated entering into force, in 2002, the co-operation area envisaged by the
PCA was reduced to the co-operation in trade and economic relations, justice and home
affairs, customs and cross-border co-operation, legal harmonisation and conducting a
feasibility study concerning the establishment of the FTA
52
.
In April 2004 and 2007, additional protocols to the PCA were signed between
Moldova and the EU. These protocols extended the provisions of the PCA to the new
members of the EU.
After almost ten years of implementing the PCA, it can be said that this process has
both positive and negative results. Among the positive results, the alignment of the Moldovan
legislation to the EU norms in some policy areas can be noted as well as the facilitation of
50
Launched by the EC in 1991, the TACIS programme provided grant-financed technical assistance to 12
countries of Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan), and aimed mainly at
enhancing the transition process in these countries. Mongolia was also covered by the TACIS programme from
1991, but since 2003 it is covered by the ALA programme.
51
European Commission, The EUs relations with Moldova, European Commission,
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/moldova/intro/index.htm#tech.
52
Valeriu Gheorghiu, European Strategy of Moldova, Institute for Public Policy,
http://www.ipp.md/public/biblioteca/68/ro/ EurStratMold.doc.
Moldovan goods` and services` access to the European market, and the strengthening of
Moldovas judicial system and customs; etc. However, in spite of the above-mentioned
progresses, the EU-Moldova PCA did not provide the expected results. While Moldova had
few incentives to implement the PCA, the EU had no real leverages over its partner, neither
enough interest nor the will for a more active involvement in the implementation process of
the PCA. Moreover, as the PCA did not set any priorities in terms of reforms to be
implemented and benchmarks for the quality of implementation, the latter came down to the
desire and ability of the Parties concerned.
Finally, although the PCA was conceived by policy makers as a first step in a gradual
integration of Moldova into the EU
53
, the agreement does not envisage, even in the distant
future, a membership perspective for Moldova. Therefore, the outcome of the PCA is totally
different from that of the Association Agreements concluded with the CEECs.
2.3.1.2 EU-Moldova Action Plan
Overview on the EUMAP
The EU-Moldova Action Plan was signed in February 2005 and approved by the Tarlev II
cabinet in April 2005. The documents approach is founded on partnership, joint ownership
and differentiation and seeks to contribute to the further development of the EU-Moldova
bilateral relations
54
. The document covers a timeframe of three years and invites Moldova to
enter into intensified political, security, economic and cultural relations with the EU,
enhanced cross-border co-operation and shared responsibility in conflict prevention and
conflict resolution
55
.
The Action Plan acknowledges Moldovas European aspirations
56
, but specifies also
that for the near future the PCA remains a valid basis for the EU-Moldova co-operation.
Hence, the EU-Moldova Action Plan does not substitute, but supplement the existing PCA.
From this stand point, the Action Plan is not a legal document, unlike the PCA, but a political
one.
The Action Plan sets out a comprehensive set of priorities in areas within the scope of
the PCA. Seven priorities out of ten refer to the political dimension of the co-operation
53
Victor Chiril, The relation between the Republic of Moldova and the European Union, Institute for Public
Policy, http://www.ipp.md/files/Publicatii/2001/integrarea_europeana/Chirila-eng.doc.
54
European Commission, EU-Moldova Action Plan, European Commission,
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/world/enp/ pdf/action_plans/moldova_enp_ap_final_en.pdf.
55
Ibidem.
56
The Action Plans with Moldova and Ukraine are the only such documents, concluded so far within the ENP,
which acknowledge the European aspirations of these countries.
process between the EU and Moldova. As foreseen by the Action Plan, the progress in
meeting these priorities was monitored in the bodies established by the PCA and by the
European Commission, requested to issue a mid-term report on progress accomplished. The
EUMAP provided that on the basis of first evaluation, the EU, together with Moldova, will
review the content of the Action Plan and decide on its adaptation and renewal. Though the
Commission issued on December 4, 2006 a mid-term report on the progress accomplished by
Moldova, the EUMAP was not reviewed as foreseen. The second monitoring report by the
Commission was issued after three years of EUMAP implementation, in April 2008.
The EU-Moldova Action Plan contains of 46 pages, formulating 80 objectives and 294
actions/measures to be taken across seven main fields: political dialogue and reform; co-
operation for the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict; economic and social reform and
development; trade-related issues, market and regulatory reform; co-operation in justice and
home affairs; transport, energy, telecommunications, environment, and research, development
and innovation; and people-to-people contacts (See Appendix 2).
Most of these objectives and actions fall only within the Moldovan side`s
responsibility, 14 refer explicitly to the EU and 40 refer to both the EU and Moldova
57
.
Therefore, some observers consider that, despite the rhetoric employed, the EU-Moldova
Action Plan is not a bilateral document, because there are only few obligations taken by the
EU
58
. In this vein, the Plan, as most of the similar documents concluded within the ENP do,
reflects an important dose of EU self-interest and strong centre-periphery characteristics,
being more or less commanding
59
. Smith remarks that the only exception is the Action Plan
concluded with Israel, which is less a list of things for Israel to do, and more a list of things
for the EU and Israel to do together. In her opinion, this inconsistency in the EUs treatment
of its neighbours may reduce the ENPs credibility and legitimacy
60
. Yet, in the case of some
objectives and actions/ measures spelled out by the EU-Moldova Action Plan, it is difficult to
see which part is responsible for their implementation
61
. Sometimes, even when this is clear,
57
Sergiu Buscaneanu, How Far is the European Neighbourhood Policy a Substantial Offer for Moldova,
August 2006, Appendix 5, ADEPT, http://www.e-democracy.md/files/enp-moldova.pdf.
58
Valeriu Gheorghiu, EU-Moldova Action Plan: Negotiations and Implementation, Institute for Public Policy,
http://www.ipp.md/public/biblioteca/92/en/Yerevan272.doc.
59
K. E. Smith, The outsiders: The European neighbourhood policy, International Affairs 81/4 (2005): 757-
773; S. Stetter, Theorising the European Neighbourhood Policy: Debordering and Rebordering in the
Mediterranean, EUI Working Papers RSCAS 34 (2005), European University Institute, Florence,
http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/WP-Texts/05_34.pdf. Smith observes that the Action Plans with Moldova, Morocco,
Tunisia and Ukraine insist that the neighbours must conclude readmission agreements with the EU, which means
that they must agree to readmit not only their own nationals expelled from member states, but the nationals of
other countries who have passed through their territory on the way to the EU.
60
K. E. Smith, op. cit.
61
See, for example, objectives no. 68, 72-73.
due to the lack of precise benchmarks in evaluating the implementation of the document, it is
not always clear how progress was judged, being very difficult to demonstrate that some
actions are implemented or not
62
. Or the quality of implementation led to various
interpretations. Equally, although it was clear that the EU-Moldova Action Plan must be
implemented in a three years` timeframe, there are no exact requirements regarding the time
and quantity in meeting particular objectives and actions/ measures.
All of these lead to the idea that the EU-Moldova Action Plan is far to be a very well
prepared document. One of the reasons in this sense is that the ENP Strategy Paper and
Country Report on Moldova
63
were issued when the Plan for Moldova was in its final stage of
elaboration
64
.
Added Value of the EUMAP
Comparing the provisions of the EU-Moldova PCA and Action Plan, it could be noted that
these documents share a similar rationale and do not differ radically in their concrete
approaches and instruments. Moreover, the finality of both documents is quite similar, in that
it does not lead to the opening of a clear European perspective for Moldova. Therefore, some
could argue that the EU-Moldova Action Plan is a Potemkin village for Moldova.
However, some visible differences should be noted. The ENP and Action Plan brought
about a new dynamics in relations between the EU and Moldova; extended their co-operation
opportunities; specified and detailed the co-operation process between the Parties; updated the
areas of dialogue; contributed to a more operational, visible and participative EUs
engagement in Moldova; added more elements of conditionality with regard to political
dialogue and reform emphasising the necessity of democratic transformations as a
prerequisite for further developments in other co-operation areas; and brought Moldova in a
different spatial perspective based on the European neighbourhood and proximity concepts.
Particularly important for Moldova was the presence of a distinctive section in the
EU-Moldova Action Plan dedicated to the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict and the
EUs commitment to support, through the ENP means, the settlement of this conflict.
62
K. E. Smith, op. cit.; Valeriu Gheorghiu, EU-Moldova Action Plan: Negotiations and Implementation,
Institute for Public Policy, http://www.ipp.md/public/biblioteca/92/en/Yerevan272.doc.
63
European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy Country Report Moldova, European
Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/moldova_enp_country_report_2004_en.pdf.
64
For details see: Valeriu Gheorghiu, EU-Moldova Action Plan: Negotiations and Implementation, Institute
for Public Policy, http://www.ipp.md/public/biblioteca/92/en/Yerevan272.doc; Valeriu Gheorghiu, Stabilizarea
Republicii Moldova vecintate sau asociere la UE, Institute for Public Policy,
http://www.ipp.md/public/biblioteca/94/ro/StabMoldPEV.doc (accessed June 10, 2006).
Moreover, the EU-Moldova Action Plan itself mentions explicitly new partnership
perspectives opened up by the ENP. Of course, a simple listing of the new co-operation
opportunities brought by the Action Plan does not mean that all of them were sufficiently
explored. However, some of the results achieved already in the implementation process of the
Plan seem encouraging. Not less important is that the ENP and EU-Moldova Action Plan
have also determined Moldova to be more receptive, responsive and responsible with regard
to European values and standards in a broad spectrum of areas.
Finally, the subtle message which the ENP and Action Plan brought along for
Moldovan authorities could be read briefly, as follows: only after a rigorous implementation
of the Action Plan, a new contractual relationship could be considered. Therefore, a
responsible implementation of the EU-Moldova Action Plan became crucial for a future
European destiny of Moldova.
Main Findings on Implementation of the EUMAP
EU-Moldova Co-operation Council, April 11, 2006
Assessing implementation of the EUMAP, the EU took the opportunity to stress, at the
eighth meeting of the EU-Moldova Co-operation Council in April 2006, the need for
Moldova to redouble efforts to implement democratic reforms in crucial areas such as media
and rule of law, including independence of the judiciary (bold-typed S.B.)
65
. On the other
hand, the Co-operation Council commended the excellent work of the EUBAM.
ENP Progress Report on Moldova, December 4, 2006
On December 4, 2006, the European Commission released its first ENP Progress
Report on Moldova on implementation of the EUMAP in February 2005November 2006
66
.
The report highlighted the main progresses and problems of this process. It indicated among
important and moderate progresses: the management of the Moldova-Ukraine border; co-
operation with IFI; poverty reduction; reformation of research, development and innovation
sector (appreciated as good progress); gaining the EUs Generalised System of Preferences
Plus (GSP+); achievements against organised crime, trafficking in human beings; Moldovas
adherence to the Bologna Process (appreciated as progress); co-operation with the EU in
65
Council of the EU, 8
th
meeting of the EU-Moldova Co-operation Council, Luxembourg, April 11, 2006, EU
Press communiqu, 8271/06 (Presse 102), Council of the EU,
http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/89220.pdf.
66
European Commission, ENP Progress Report Moldova, COM (2006) 726 final, 4 December 2006, SEC
(2006), 1506/2, European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/sec06_1506-2_en.pdf.
certain problems of foreign policy; better investment climate (appreciated as some
progress), etc.
On the other hand, the main problems included: faulty implementation of reform
strategies; insufficient freedom of mass media; wide spreading of corruption; the
governments interference in business.
Moldovan authorities have received the assessment by the European Commission with
a relative satisfaction. Truly, the Commission has given a positive general mark to Moldova.
However, although the European Commission did not make a comparative assessment of the
progress of the Palestinian Authority, Jordan, Israel, Morocco, Tunisia and Ukraine within the
ENP, such an analysis would place Moldova below performances achieved by Morocco and
Ukraine
67
.
EU-Moldova Co-operation Council, June 19, 2007
The ninth meeting of the EU-Moldova Co-operation Council held on June 19, 2007, in
Luxembourg, provided another occasion to evaluate the implementation of EUMAP. In
connection with this, earlier it was speculated that the EU would criticise much at the
Luxembourg meeting how Moldova honoured its commitments under EUMAP. However, this
hypothesis did not prove true. The tonality of talks on implementation of EUMAP was
generally moderate. The presence of the Moldovan President, Vladimir Voronin, at the
Luxembourg meeting was reportedly a factor that tempered the critical message of European
officials regarding the implementation of EUMAP. In addition, another clear political factor
made the EU officials change the emphases: the secret deal between Moldova and Russia
regarding the Transnistrian conflict was not confirmed before the meeting of the Co-operation
Council and President Voronin persuaded the European side that no agreement can be reached
with Russia outside of the Five-Plus-Two negotiation format to make Moldova go no
another way but towards the EU.
The EU Council official press communiqu released after the June 2007 EU-Moldova
Co-operation Council stated, as follows: The EU took the opportunity to stress the need for
Moldova to redouble efforts to implement democratic reforms in crucial areas such as respect
for human rights, freedom of the media, and respect for the rule of law, including
67
Sergiu Buscaneanu, Moldova within ENP. First assessment report by the European Commission, in
Governance and Democracy in Moldova, # 88, January 1-31, 2007, http://www.e-
democracy.md/en/comments/political/200701311.
independence of the judiciary. The importance of a transparent business environment and
fighting corruption was also underlined (bold-typed S.B.)
68
.
Comparing the communiqu by the EU Council with the ENP Progress Report on
Moldova published on December 4, 2006, it may be said that the EU did not improve much
its perceptions concerning the EUMAP implementation process after half a year.
Civil Society Findings
On side of the civil society, a NGO consortium established by ADEPT and EXPERT-GRUP
has monitored the implementation process of the EUMAP. From February 2005 to February
2008, these NGOs released 10 monitoring reports called Euromonitor, which evaluated the
progress of Moldova in implementing the EUMAP in 10 priority areas
69
.
The first general conclusion of ADEPT and EXPERT-GRUP monitoring is that the
progress in implementing the EUMAP was uneven with Moldova performing better on the
economic dimension of the Plan. The second general finding is that Moldovas progress has
been variable in both the political and economic dimensions of the EUMAP, regarded
separately.
On the political side of the document, an important progress has been observed in such
fields as: co-operation of Moldova with CoE; co-operation of central authorities with civil
society; and border management due to EUBAM to a large extent.
Some progress has been noticed with regard to: promotion of political dialogue
between Moldova and the EU; co-operation on foreign and security matters, Moldova
aligning itself generally to the EU`s declarations in the CFSP field; the JHA field by
facilitating the visa issuance regime and enhancing the systems of monitoring the migratory
flows; combating ill-treatment and torture.
Another important aspect observed is that the progress in implementing the EUMAP
was also uneven on the different sides of the reform process. In all political fields of EUMAP,
an important progress has been noticed in what concerns the adoption of new legislation. Not
the same could be said about transposing these legislative achievements into practice. This
generally explains why in some sensible fields of EUMAP, such as respect for human
68
Council of the EU, EU-Moldova Co-operation Council Ninth meeting, Luxembourg, June 19, 2007, EU Press
Communiqu, 11009/07 (Presse 143), Council of the EU,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/94807.pdf.
69
ADEPT and EXPERT-GRUP, Euromonitor, # 1-10, ADEPT, http://www.e-democracy.md/en/rm-ue or
EXPERT-GRUP, http://www.expert-grup.org/?p=19&lang=en.
rights, freedom of mass media, independence of judiciary and combating of corruption, there
was little progress.
ADEPT and EXPERT-GRUP have also delineated two periods in which political
reforms have been promoted at different speeds. From this point of view, the most important
progress has been made until March 2007. Due to the election campaign for the 2007 general
local elections, in some sectors of the EUMAP, a regression has been noticed.
With regard to the 2007 local elections, compared with the 2005 parliamentary
elections, no progress has been observed. The main concerns and problems valid for the 2005
elections remained valid for the 2007 elections, too. The main difference was that in the case
of the 2005 elections, the violations were quite grave, while at the 2007 elections, there were
less grave violations, though in a larger number.
Having in mind the low speed of political reforms in the period of the 2007 local
election campaign and the upcoming parliamentarian elections in 2009, there are few reasons
for optimism with regard to further progress, especially, in the sensible sectors of EUMAP,
such as the freedom of mass media and independence of the judiciary. With regard to these
fields, it could be foreseen that the tactics that central authorities will employ would be that
of small steps. The latter are likely to be made particularly with regard to new legislation
and formal procedures. Substantial progresses in the above-mentioned sensible sectors are
improbable, because the liberalisation of reforms in these areas has been perceived so far as
threatening the ruling Party of Communists hold on power.
On the economic side of the EUMAP, the most important progress was seen to be the
granting of GSP+ to Moldova as of January 1, 2006, and Autonomous Trade Preferences
(ATPs) as of March 1, 2008. Some progress has been made with regard to the business
climate. However, licensing and the high number of controls are seen to be the remaining
problems in this sector.
In the period foreseen by the EUMAP, the EU has become the most important trading
partner of Moldova. At the same time, the commercial deficit has deepened in favour of the
EU. Unfortunately, while implementing the EUMAP, Moldova did not succeed to redress
poverty. Important problems which still must be addressed lie in the fields of sanitary and
phytosanitary standards, technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures.
ENP Progress Report on Moldova, April 3, 2008
The second Progress Report on Moldova by the Commission was released on April 3, 2008. It
assessed the performance of Moldova in implementing the EUMAP in the November 1,
2006December 31, period. The document concludes that Moldova made good progress in
most areas during this period. It reads that the 2007 local elections were generally well
administered and voters were offered a genuine choice and that Moldova made a substantial
progress in improving the institutional framework and procedures on control and certification
of origin, which made possible for the EU to grant additional Autonomous Trade Preferences
to Moldova. Entering into force agreements on visa facilitation and readmission, and co-
operation of Moldova with the EU Border Assistance Mission have been seen as other major
achievements. The report concludes also that Moldova co-operated closely with the EU on
all questions related to the Transnistria settlement efforts and that economic growth
remained robust despite the negative effects of external shocks.
At the same time, the document underlines that effective implementation of reforms
continues to remain a challenge, especially in such areas as: judicial reform, fight against
corruption, media freedom and business and investment climate
70
.
The document received a warm welcome on the side of Moldovan authorities, at the
same time serving ground for a number of opposition parties, a part of independent mass
media and NGOs for severe criticisms over the problems referred to in the Commission
report. Explaining the positive language used by the Commission in its report, critics pointed
to alleged geo-political and strategic rationales compelling Brussels not to discourage
Moldova so that it should keep focused on the track of European integration. Equally, the
principle of positive conditionality used by Brussels in projecting the ENP and its assessment
of the performance of Moldova in comparison with the developments in a number of more
reluctant ENP members were used by critics as arguments to explain the soft language of the
progress report on Moldova.
2.3.1.3 Other EU-Moldova Agreements
The EU-Moldova relations are governed by several other documents as well. The most
important are: Agreement establishing a double-checking system of the export of certain steel
70
European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the Communication from the
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament Implementation of the European Neighbourhood
Policy in 2007. Progress Report Moldova, SEC(2008) 399, April 3, 2008, European Commission,
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm#3.
products (signed in September 2004)
71
; Agreement on air services (signed in April 2006);
Agreement on the facilitation of the issuance of visas; and Agreement on readmission of
persons (signed on October 10, 2007 and entered into force on January 1, 2008).
The first agreement aims at rigorous monitoring of the export of steel products from
Moldova (read Transnistria) to the EU, while providing for mandatory certificates confirming
the origin of the exported steel to be issued by competent Moldovan authorities. The second
agreement establishes for the first time a bilateral direct air transport relationship between
Moldova and the EU.
The agreement on the facilitation of the issuance of visas maintains the 35-euro price
for a Schengen visa for Moldovan citizens and even excludes the visa costs for certain
categories of applicants, for example, businessmen, students, journalists, etc. Also, the
documents needed to apply for a visa were simplified for certain applicants. Certain
categories of applicants who often travel to the EU are to receive multi-entry visas for a long
term.
The agreement on readmission of persons regulates the management of illegal
migration. It obliges the sides to reciprocally readmit illegal migrants. It demands the EU and
Moldova to readmit also the citizens of a third side who transited the territory of one or
another Party in their way to the EU or Moldova. The last two agreements entered into force
on January 1, 2008 and do not apply to the UK, Ireland and Denmark.
2.3.2 Prospects of Future Contractual Relations
In the near future, Moldova and the EU will need to consider seriously the perspectives of
their contractual relations. First of all, the PCA is obsolete and as of July 1, 2008 the ten year
period initially established for its implementation expires. Secondly, the EUMAP provides
that in light of the fulfilment of the objectives of the Action Plan and of the overall evolution
of the EU-Moldova relations, consideration will be given to the possibility of a new
contractual relationship through a European Neighbourhood Agreement
72
. Having these in
mind and the confidence that Moldova would implement fully the EUMAP within the
provided three-year term, Chisinau hoped that in 2007 it would launch negotiations on a new
71
Council of the EU, Council Decision concerning the conclusion of an Agreement in the form of an Exchange
of Letters between the European Community and the Republic of Moldova establishing a double-checking
system without quantitative limits in respect of the export of certain steel products from the Republic of
Moldova to the European Community, September 7, 2004, 11511/04, Council of the EU,
http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/04/st11/st11511.en04.pdf.
72
European Commission, EU-Moldova Action Plan, European Commission,
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/world/enp/ pdf/action_plans/moldova_enp_ap_final_en.pdf.
contractual relation with the EU. However, the European Commission proposed in its
Communication of December 5, 2007 to roll-over the EUMAP, together with similar
documents for Ukraine and Israel, for one year, with no change in substance
73
. This was seen
as the most pragmatic way of continuing work on the EUMAP, pending the outcome of any
possible future arrangements with Moldova.
The mere fact that the EUMAP was rolled-over for another year points to the idea that
the EU perceives its implementation as insufficient. On the other hand, the Commission`s
proposal to roll-over also the ENP Action Plans for Ukraine and Israel denotes that initial
expectations, when these documents were conceived, proved to be too high. Hence, the
famous capability-expectations gap thesis of C. Hill is becoming increasingly valid for the
ENP, too
74
.
At the same time, the common programme of the German, Portuguese and Slovenian
presidencies until mid-2008 does not say anything about the EU-Moldova relation, while in
the case of Ukraine, it underlines that negotiations should be completed on an enhanced
PCA
75
. It is unlikely that the perspective of the EU-Moldova relations will be an important
subject of concern on the side of France, which will hold the Council Presidency in the July-
December 2008 period. On the other hand, the German Presidency Progress Report on
strengthening the ENP recommends that the Enhanced Agreement started to be negotiated
with Ukraine in March 2007 should be considered as a flagship project for the EU relations
with other ENP states
76
. If this recommendation is taken into consideration, Moldova would
be able to negotiate a similar Enhanced Agreement. In addition, the EP`s Resolution on
strengthening the ENP, passed in October 2007, reiterates the view stated in the EP`s
recommendation of July 12, 2007 that the current negotiations with Ukraine should result in
the conclusion of an association agreement, envisaging among others the possibility of EU
membership
77
. The EP`s Resolution recommended that a corresponding approach should be
taken in relations with Moldova.
73
European Commission, Communication from the Commission A Strong European Neighbourhood Policy,
Brussels, 05/12/2007, COM(2007) 774 final, European Commission,
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com07_774_en.pdf.
74
Christopher Hill, The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europes International Role, Journal
of Common Market Studies 31/3 (1993): 305-28.
75
Council of the EU, 18-months Programme of the German, Portuguese and Slovenian Presidencies,
December 21, 2006, 17079/06, POLGEN 125, Council of the EU,
http://www.eu2007.de/en/The_Council_Presidency/trio/index.html.
76
Council of the EU, Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy Presidency Progress Report, June
15, 2007, 10874/07, Council of the EU, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/enp_progress-report_presidency-
june2007_en.pdf.
77
European Parliament, Report on strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy, (2007/2088(INI)), A6-
0414/2007, November 15, 2007, European Parliament,
Whichever will be the EU`s approach towards its relation with Moldova, surely, in
their relation, changes will appear, having in mind that in July 2008, the initial period of 10
years established for the implementation of EU-Moldova PCA will expire. The first question
that arises here is when these changes in EU-Moldova relations will appear? As the EU-
Moldova PCA has not been denounced by one of the Parties six months before the end of 10
years initial period, the PCA will automatically be renewed for another year, remaining in
force until July 1, 2009. However, it is possible that until that time Moldova and the EU will
start negotiations on a new framework agreement, depending upon the performance of
Moldova, while implementing EUMAP in the period for which it was rolled-over. On the
other side, within the EU institutions, especially in the Council, there are officials that believe
that discussions on a new framework agreement with Moldova should be linked to the
electoral cycles in Moldova. If this idea were considered, the launching of negotiations on a
more advanced type of relations between Moldova and EU will wait at least until the next
parliamentary elections to be held in spring 2009.
By not disregarding the importance of the temporary aspect, the most important
question remains, however, what kind of content the changes within the EU-Moldova
relations will bring? Alike in the case of the first question, the answer is in the hands of
Moldovan authorities. If this answer is an ace, it also depends on them.
2.4 EU Positions on Moldova
The EU`s enlargement to the East made it pay more attention to the developments in
Moldova. This change in attitude towards Moldova has become more visible since 2002.
Of a particular concern for the EU became the Transnistrian frozen conflict in the
Eastern region of Moldova. With regard to this conflict, the EU issued a number of
resolutions and declarations: on December 4, 2002, January 29, February 18 and 27, 2003
78
,
March 16
79
and October 26, 2006
80
, and July 12, 2007
81
. In these documents, the EU
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2007-
0538+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN.
78
MFAEI and IPP, ed., European Strategy of the Republic of Moldova, 2007 updated version (English),
Institute for Public Policy, http://www.ipp.md/biblioteca1.php?l=ro&id=142.
79
European Parliament, MEPs adopt human rights resolutions on Transnistria, Impunity in Africa and the
situation in Kazakhstan, March 16, 2006, European Parliament,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/expert/infopress_page/015-6142-075-03-11-902-20060310IPR06063-16-
03-2006-2006-false/default_en.htm.
80
European Parliament, Resolution on Moldova (Transnistria), October 26, 2006, P6_TA(2006)0455,
European Parliament, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?Type=TA&Reference=P6-TA-2006-
0455&language=EN.
81
European Parliament, Resolution on human rights violations in Transnistria (Republic of Moldova), July 12,
2007, P6_TA-PROV(2007)0358, European Parliament,
condemned the continued repression, harassment and intimidation of representatives of the
independent media, NGOs and civil society by the Transnistrian separatist regime. The EU
also deplored the unwillingness of this regime to engage fully in efforts to reach a peaceful
solution in the Transnistrian conflict. The EU took also the opportunity to stress the need for
Moldova to respect for the rule of law, fundamental freedoms, to promote further the
democratic reforms and to take actions to raise the trust between parties. The need for parties
involved in the conflict to abstain from any actions that could lead to the escalation of the
conflict was also underlined. In addition, the EU reiterated its support for the Moldovas
territorial integrity and its commitment towards an increasing engagement in the process of
solving the conflict. It also called on the Russian Federation to stop its support for the
Transnistrian regime, to withdraw, unconditionally, its troops and munitions from the territory
of Moldova, and to contribute to a peaceful settlement of the conflict.
Proving its commitment to support Moldova in solving the Transnistrian conflict, the
EU has been imposing since February 2003 a travel ban on the Transnistrian leadership to
enter its territory. The EU also initiated, in March 2003, EU-Moldova-Ukraine trilateral
consultations concerning a joint control over the Transnistrian segment of the Moldavian-
Ukrainian border, which led to the establishment of the EUBAM in late 2005.
Apart from expressing its opinion on Transnistria, the EU also took the occasion to
show its attitude towards the developments in Moldova in general. Of a particular interest in
this regard is the EP`s Resolution of December 18, 2003
82
. This is one of the most negative
documents in assessing the situation in Moldova. It pointed out a number of severe problems,
such as: lack of a democratic control over an inefficient administrative capacity; high level of
corruption; an inexistent border control at the Eastern frontier of Moldova; an inefficient
social security system; a high level of criminal activity; a well rooted parallel economy; a low
record in respect for human rights, especially in Transnistria; etc. The Resolution reads that
the Moldovan government did not succeed to stabilize economy and to consolidate
democracy. Hence, the EP recommended to Moldovan authorities to take actions in order to
tackle the above-mentioned shortcomings. With regard to the Transnistrian problem, the EP
underlined that the Kozak Memorandum would not have contributed to the stabilization of
the whole region and invited the Moldovan government to put forward a new settlement plan.
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2007-
0358+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN.
82
ADEPT, Governance and Democracy in Moldova, # 22 (2004), ADEPT, http://www.e-democracy.md/en/e-
journal/20040115.
The EU Council presidencies made use of different occasions as well to express their
attitude towards processes in Moldova. The last such an occasion was the 2007 local elections
in Moldova. The EU German presidency noted in this regard that elections went off smoothly
and that voters had been given a genuine choice between candidates and parties, even if the
elections did not comply on all points with the international obligations assumed by Moldova.
With a view to future elections, the presidency urged Moldova to analyse above all
shortcomings relating to equal access for all candidates to the media, the orderly registration
of all candidates as well as the maintenance of electoral registers and vote counting, and to
rectify them
83
.
2.5 Conclusions: EU Soft Power and Attractiveness at Work?
Moldova was not ready after declaring its independence to govern itself. Without a statehood
memory, the Moldovan elite found itself lost in the burdens of that time. It was neither
prepared to articulate a sound external policy. Improvisations and dilettantism were largely
the characteristics of the Moldovan foreign policy of that time.
Moldovas incoherence in foreign policy has been much complicated by the
secessionist conflict in Transnistria and by assertive Russian influence in the region.
Therefore, certain equilibrium in foreign policy and neutrality as a security policy option were
chosen as safeguards for the fragile Moldovan statehood. Having these in play, Moldova was
reluctant to follow the examples provided by the Baltic states in approaching their relations
with the EU. At the same time, incoherence in the foreign policy of subsequent Moldovan
governments made the EU be reticent towards Moldova, too. EU-Moldova PCA and TACIS
program have been seen in those circumstances as adequate instruments to manage the EU-
Moldova relations. Although there were cases when particular Moldovan governments
attempted to develop a more solid vision on relations with the EU, political crises, followed
by disillusion of Moldovan citizens, brought to an end such attempts. These were additional
arguments for the EU that it did not make a mistake when it offered to Moldova nothing more
than few incentives embedded in a partnership and co-operation appealing formula.
Increasing interest of the EU in its neighbourhood, as a result of its enlargement to the
East and South in 2004, along with other external and domestic factors linked with the
resolution process of the Transnistrian conflict, made both Parties more willing to advance
their bilateral relations. The ENP and EUMAP are the direct results of this will. The new
83
Council Presidency, EU Presidency statement on the local elections in the Republic of Moldova, June 20,
2006, EU Council Presidency, http://www.eu2007.de/en/News/CFSP_Statements/June/0620Moldau.html.
partnership perspectives, the EU incentives in broad policy areas and increased financial
assistance, all as elements of the EU`s soft power and attractiveness, did what hardly could
have beeb predicted in 2001, when the Party of Communists took over power. Having in
mind the experience since EUMAP was put in place, some would be optimistic about the
European perspective of Moldova, while others definitely would not share the same
optimism. Indeed, EUMAP could be viewed, with all problems related to its implementation,
as an effort aimed at modernization and Europeanization. At the same time, it is quite clear
that much more could be done in this regard and that the burden of the Europeanization
process still lies ahead. The recent striking opposition to real reforms in the mass media and
judiciary fields are to make Moldova lose new opportunities, on its way to the EU. Some
important losses are already visible. But more should not be allowed.
CHAPTER3 THE EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEANOPTION INMOLDOVA(2000-
2007)
3.1 Dynamics of Public Opinion in Moldova on European Integration
This chapter reveals the evolution of the European option in Moldova from August 2000 to
November 2007, and establishes the profile of the Europtimistic group of people and the
hierarchy of criteria that divide the public opinion concerning European integration. In this
respect, the approach is based on Barometers of Public Opinion (BPOs)
84
commissioned by
the Institute of Public Policy (IPP). These surveys served as the basis for analysis for at least
three reasons:
BPOs measure the adherence to the European idea in Moldova;
BPOs are conducted systematically, allowing to identify the evolution of public
opinion regarding the European integration;
BPOs are relatively complex, detailed and objective.
Fifteen BPOs had been conducted until 2007. The first BPO was conducted in August
2000, and the last one was launched in November 2007. Two BPOs were conducted every
year between these two dates. Every BPO is conducted on a sample of at least 1,000
respondents; it is representative for the adult population of Moldova, except for Transnistria
and has a maximum error margin of 3 percent.
BPOs contain two basic questions aimed to measure the evolution of the European
option in Moldova in 2000-2007. They are: What do you think is the path our country should
follow? (BPOs conducted from August 2000 to May 2004) and Should there be a
referendum next Sunday on Moldovas accession to EU, how would you vote? (BPOs
conducted from April 2003 to November 2007). Two diagrams have been created on the basis
of answers to these two questions.
84
IPP, Barometer of Public Opinion, Institute for Public Policy, http://www.ipp.md/barometru.php?l=ro.
Diagram 3.1
Diagram 3.1 indicates the distribution of answers for two options from the BPOs conducted
from August 2000, to May 2004: (1) Integration within the EU and (2) Integration/ Stay
within the CIS. If the August 2000 BPO is taken as a reference point, the number of
respondents who opted for Moldovas integration within the EU grew by 8.9 percentage
points from August 2000, to May 2004. At the same time, it is worth to note that the
Integration within the CIS and within the EU was a compromise option in the August 2000
BPO, and 32 percent of respondents chose it. If this option were missing as in the other BPOs
of May 2004, then the separate numbers of those favouring the Integration within the EU or
the Integration/ Stay within the CIS would be probably higher. Starting with the January
2001 BPO, the number of respondents who chose one of the two options from Diagram 3.1
was separately quantified, without offering the compromise option in the August 2000 BPO.
The January 2001 BPO is a better reference point to measure the evolution of the European
option than the August 2000 BPO, as the same questionnaires were used from January 2001,
to May 2004.
Table 3.1 below is complementary to Diagram 3.1 and features the correlation Power
Foreign Policy Options including the option for integration within the EU, for August 2000
May 2004.
What do you think is the path our country
should follow?
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
EU CIS
EU 38 51 47 40 38 42 51,3 46,9
CIS 20 43 35 41 38 29 26,6 30,4
Aug. 2000 Jan. 2001 Nov. 2001 Apr. 2002 Nov. 2002 Apr. 2003 Nov. 2003 May 2004
Table 3.1 What do you think is the path our country should follow?
Authorities
/ Options
Aug.
2000
Jan. 2001 Nov.
2001
Apr.
2002
Nov.
2002
Apr.
2003
85
Nov.
2003
May
2004
Gov. Braghis Braghis Tarlev Tarlev Tarlev Tarlev Tarlev Tarlev
Parliament ADR* ADR* PCRM PCRM PCRM PCRM PCRM PCRM
President Lucinschi Lucinschi Voronin Voronin Voronin Voronin Voronin Voronin
EU 38 51 47 40 38 42 51.3 46.9
CIS 20 43 35 41 38 29 26.6 30.4
* As ADR was left by PCDP, there was no stable majority. ADR remained de jure as the ruling coalition, while
de facto it was not, Braghis Cabinet being appointed by PCRM and PCDP.
Starting from more the relevance of the findings of the January 2001 BPO for measuring the
evolution of European option, the number of persons who opted for the EU in January 2001
(3
rd
column from Table 3.1: Braghis Government, de jure but not de facto parliamentary
majority of Alliance for Democracy and Reforms, and President Petru Lucinschi) declined
by 4.1 percent until May 2004 (last column: Tarlev I government, parliamentary majority of
the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova and President Vladimir Voronin). For
comparison, the number of respondents who opted for the CIS in the same period decreased
by 12.6 percent.
Although the May 2004 BPO was the last one to include the question on Moldovas
foreign orientation, the adhesion to the European idea may also be observed on the basis of
the question whether respondents would vote For or Against at an eventual referendum
on Moldovas accession to the EU. This question is included for the first time in the April
2003 BPO and it is part of BPOs conducted till November 2007, except for the February 2005
barometer. Diagram 3.2 below was built on the basis of answers to this question.
85
A multiple answer was available for the question in this BPO.
Diagram 3.2
Diagram 3.2 indicates the distribution of answers for two options included in the barometer
surveys conducted from April 2003, to November 2007: (1) For and (2) Against. The
diagram shows that the number of people who would vote For at an eventual referendum on
Moldovas accession to the EU grew by 15.2 percentage points from April 2003 to November
2007. At the same time, the number of people who would vote Against grew by 2.2 percent.
The number of respondents who chose For grew by 11.9 percent and that of respondents
who would vote Against dropped by 0.3 percent from December 2005, to November 2007,
in the period when the EU-Moldova Action Plan was being implemented.
The 76.2 percent of respondents who would vote For at a referendum on Moldovas
accession to the EU, according to the November 2007 BPO, reveals a permissive consensus
in Moldovan society regarding the European integration. The concept was introduced by
Lindberg and Scheingold in the realm of European Integration Studies in 1970, in order to
explain the public support enjoyed by European integration process in its early years of
construction.
The options from barometer surveys conducted from August 2000, to November 2007
were stratified on the following criteria: (a) sex; (b) residential area; (c) age; (d) nationality;
(e) education; (f) socioeconomic condition of respondents. Following are the conclusions of
an in-depth analysis of findings of barometer surveys conducted in the period concerned:
(a) Although the majority of women are Europtimistic, their share is smaller than of
men. At the same time, more men than women have opted for Integration/ Stay
within the CIS in August 2000May 2004 and chose Against in the surveys
conducted from April 2003, to November 2007 regarding an eventual referendum on
Should there be a referendum next Sunday on Moldova's accession to EU
, how would you vote?
0
20
40
60
80
For Against
For 61 67.87 56.6 66.4 64.3 70.2 68.4 72.2 76.2
Against 6 6.21 9.5 5.4 8.5 7.6 6.3 7.2 8.2
Apr. 2003 Nov. 2003 May 2004 Nov. 2004 Dec. 2005 Apr. 2006 Nov. 2006 May 2007 Nov. 2007
Moldovas accession to the EU. On the other hand, more women than men answered
Dont know to both questions from diagrams.
(b) The majority of respondents from urban areas are Europtimistic, but their share is
lower than in rural areas. More respondents in urban areas voted for the Integration/
Stay within the CIS than rural respondents, in BPOs conducted from August 2000, to
May 2004, and Against in surveys conducted from April 2003, to November 2007.
The number of respondents from rural areas who did not know to answer is higher
than that of respondents from towns.
(c) Generally, the degree of Europtimism or Euroscepticism of respondents is directly
proportional with their age. The answers from BPOs were stratified on the following
age categories: 18-29; 30-44; 45-59 and 60 years and over. The younger the
respondents are, the more Europtimistic they are and vice versa.
However, a specificity should be mentioned. Respondents aged between 45-59 years
would tend more than the persons aged between 30-44 years to vote For and less
Against in the case of an EU accession referendum. The older the persons are, the
more increases the number of respondents who choose the Dont know answer
option.
Drawn from the above-presented, it would seem at a first glance that the public
support for the European integration would grow concomitantly with the change of
generations. Data from Diagram 3.2 confirm the growth of this support for the time
being. However, this hypothesis could be refuted in the long term. According to the
European experience, the more people get elder, the less ready they become to support
the European building process. Then, in states once advance in the European
integration processes, the permissive consensus is gradually eroding.
(d) Moldovans/ Romanians
86
are more Europtimistic than representatives of Russian
and Ukrainian minorities.
87
Considering data for the entire examined period, August
2000November 2007, representatives of the Russian minority seem to be at the first
glance more Europtimistic than respondents of Ukrainian ethnic. However, Russian
representatives Europtimism is undermined by their tendency to choose at the same
time more the Integration/ Stay within the CIS answer option or Against in the
86
This category represents in fact the same ethnic, linguistic and cultural group. The difference consists only of
their different self-identification, which is a legacy of change in statute of the present territory of the Republic of
Moldova through the history.
87
Only answers of representatives of Russian and Ukrainian minorities were analysed. Answers of
representatives of other national minorities are absent in all BPOs.
case of EU accession referendum. Therefore, this type of attitude is a false
Europtimism. Generally, the numbers of Europtimist or Europessimist
representatives of Russian and Ukrainian minorities are comparable. Judging upon the
repartition of answers for Dont know option, Russians seem to be more informed
than Ukrainians.
As regards the question about Moldovas foreign orientation included in BPOs
conducted from August 2000, to May 2004, most Moldovans/ Romanians chose the
Integration within the EU while most Russians and Ukrainians chose the
Integration/ Stay within the CIS. The situation is changing as regards the answers of
representatives of national minorities to the question about referendum on accession to
the EU, according to BPOs conducted from April 2003, to November 2007. The
majority of them would vote For. Their number is nearly 4-fold higher than that of
respondents who would vote Against.
(e) The degree of adherence to the European idea is directly proportional to the education
level of respondents. The more educated they are, the more they back the European
integration of Moldova and vice versa.
(f) There is the same kind of direct proportionality for the socioeconomic condition of
respondents. The better the lives of the interviewed persons are, the more
Europtimistic they are and the number of those who do not know to answer
declines.
Findings for criteria (a), (c), (e) and (f) confirm the trends of the EU public opinion. Men, the
younger, the more educated people with better living standards support more the European
building process.
88
The high concentration of Russian and Ukrainian minorities
representatives in Moldovan cities explains digression from the European public opinion
trend, where urban areas are generally supporting more the EU building process.
The profile of the Europtimistic group of people for August 2000November 2007
may be established after an in-depth analysis of BPO findings. If the number of all
Europtimists in Moldova were to be reduced to 100 persons, the profile of this category
would be as follows: 52 persons would be men, compared with 48 women; 54 persons would
be from villages, compared with 46 from towns; 29 persons would be aged between 18 and
29 years, 27 people between 30 and 44 years, 26 between 45 and 59 years, and 18 persons
would be older than 60 years; 44 persons would be Moldovans/ Romanians, compared with
equal numbers of 28 representatives of Russian and Ukrainian minorities; 30 persons would
88
Simon Hix, The Political System of the European Union, 2
nd
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2005).
have higher education, 28 persons would be graduates from high schools or post-lycee
schools, 24 people would be graduates from secondary or professional schools, and 18
respondents would have incomplete secondary education.
89
An analysis of the BPO findings also allows establishing a hierarchy of criteria that
divide the public opinion concerning the European integration. Following is the hierarchy for
August 2000November 2007: (1) Education; (2) Age; (3) Nationality; (4) Residential area;
(5) Sex.
Differences in education of respondents divide the public opinion the most regarding
the European integration opportunity of Moldova, while the different genders induce the
smallest difference between options of respondents for the European idea.
3.2 Conclusions: Need for a Well-Defined Targeted Communication
The hierarchy of criteria that divide the public opinion concerning the European integration
reveals that authorities should focus on the following categories while trying to popularise the
European idea in Moldova: (1) persons with secondary or professional education; (2) the
elderly; (3) representatives of national minorities. These categories should be taken into
account in the process of raising the public awareness on the European integration of
Moldova. At the same time, the urban population should learn more from the Europtimism
of rural people. And not the last, men and women should learn more from each other. More
communication would serve this purpose.
89
The socioeconomic condition of Europtimistic persons was not indicated when their profile was established
because this criterion is not present in all BPOs.
CHAPTER 4 MOLDOVA-EU ECONOMIC RELATIONS
4.1 EU-Moldova Trade
4.1.1 Bilateral Trade Regimes
4.1.1.1 EU-Moldova PCA
As shown above in par. 2.3, the PCA between Moldova and the EU along with other similar
documents replaced the agreement between the EEC, EURATOM and the USSR on trade and
economic and commercial co-operation. Three out of four objectives of the PCA were related
to economic, including trade-related matters.
The PCA stated that Parties undertake to consider, depending on Moldovas progress
in economic reforms, new developments with a view to the establishment of a free trade area
(FTA) between them. Title III Trade in goods of the PCA provided that Parties offer to one
another most-favoured-nation treatment in a number of areas
90
. A declaration by the EU,
besides the PCA, provided for the Community`s engagement to help Moldovan authorities
and economic operators to benefit in full from the advantages granted under the Community
General System of Preferences (GSP) applied to Moldova. Since October 1, 2000, Moldova
has benefited from a reduction of tariffs up to 10-30% depending upon the sensibility of
exported goods. This became possible due to the European Commission Regulation no.
1649/2000, as of July 25, 2000, granting to Moldova a special regime in the framework of
GSP.
The PCA Title III stated that it does not apply to trade in textile products to be
governed by a separate agreement, initialled on May 14, 1993 and applied provisionally since
January 1, 1993. Given the importance of the wine sector for its economy, Moldova expressed
in a unilateral declaration, outside the PCA, its wish to negotiate with the Community a
bilateral agreement on trade in wine.
4.1.1.2 ENP & EUMAP
The ENP set out objectives based on commitments to shared values and effective
implementation, among others, of economic reforms. By the means of the ENP and EUMAP,
Moldova was invited to enter into intensified relations with the EU, including in the economic
90
Areas: customs duties and charges applied to imports and exports, including the method of collecting such
duties and charges; provisions relating to customs clearance, transit, warehouses and transhipment; taxes and
other internal charges of any kind applied directly or indirectly to imported goods; methods of payment and the
transfer of such payments; the rules relating to the sale, purchase, transport, distribution, and use of goods on the
domestic market.
sphere. The EUMAP also expressed the will of the EU to encourage and support Moldovas
further integration into European economic structures. In this context, the EUMAP aimed at
building solid foundations for further economic integration based on the adoption and
implementation of economic and trade-related rules and regulations with the potential to
enhance trade, investment and growth.
Additionally, the EUMAP has formulated new partnership perspectives: the opening
of economies to each other, and the continued reduction of trade barriers; deepening trade and
economic relations. The EUMAP also provided for setting up a mechanism to ensure regular
exchanges on import and export regulations and procedures (objective 27), and to facilitate
trade through reforms and modernisation of the sanitary and phytosanitary sectors (objective
30).
Given the PCA`s provision to consider the establishment of a FTA between Moldova
and the EU, a feasibility study has been conducted. Although the feasibility study was not
made publicly available, the Wider Europe Communication of March 11, 2003 concluded
that for Moldova which does not currently possess the competitive strength or administrative
capacity to take on the reciprocal obligations of an FTA yet, the EU is ready to consider
developing new initiatives to grant better market access, in line with WTO obligations.
91
Therefore, one of the EUMAP priorities for action provided working towards the EU`s
granting Autonomous Trade Preferences, by ensuring effective control of the origin of goods
from Moldova.
Under the ENP and EUMAP, Moldova has benefited since January 1, 2006 from the
special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance known as
GSP+. Due to the GSP+, 7,200 types of Moldovan goods enjoyed tax-free access to the EU
market. As a result, preferential exports from Moldova to the EU increased in 2006, reaching
185.7 million.
Shortly, as Moldova had reformed and improved its system of certification and
customs control, the EU agreed to grant Autonomous Trade Preferences to Moldova. The
ATPs regime became operative as of March 1, 2008 and goes beyond the GSP+ in that it
extends to 12,000 the list of Moldovan goods exported to the EU market without duty and
91
European Commission, Wider Europe Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern
and Southern Neighbours, March 11, 2003, European Commission,
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/world/enp/pdf/com03_ 104_en.pdf; Moldova is a member of WTO since July 26,
2001.
quota trade barriers
92
. The list includes almost all products originating in Moldova, except
for certain sensible products, e.g. sugar, meat, wine, fruits and vegetables, dairy. For these
products, specific tariff rate and quotas are applied. The ATPs allow thus Moldova to export
more to the EU. This should not have visible negative effects on the EU market, given the
low share of Moldova in the EUs total imports.
4.1.2 Bilateral Trade Relations
4.1.2.1 Development of Trade, Volume and Balance
Moldovas trade with the EU has grown constantly in the recent years from 558 million in
2002, to 1.755 million in 2007 (See Table 4.1 below). Overall, both Moldovan imports
from the EU and exports to the EU have grown constantly in this period. The only exception
was the recession of Moldovan exports to the EU from 238 million in 2004, to 232 million
in 2005. At the same time, the negative balance of Moldovas trade with the EU has also
grown in the recent years from a trade deficit of 196 million in 2002, to an alarming
amount of 745 million in 2007.
Table 4.1 Evolution of the Moldovas trade balance with the EU
(Mio euro)
* Data for 2007 are early estimations and converted from USD to euro.
Source: IMF; NBS.
As could be seen from Table 4.1 above, the share of trade between Moldova and the EU has
increased significantly since Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU on January 1, 2007. In
2006, Romania was Moldovas 4
th
trading partner with 9.9% share of the total trade (362
million), while Bulgaria was the 10
th
trading partner. According to the National Bureau of
Statistics (NBS), in 2007, the exports of Moldova to the EU market increased with 26.3%
92
European Commission, European Commission proposes additional autonomous trade preferences (ATPs) for
Moldova, November 14, 2007, European Commission,
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/moldova/pr141107_en.htm.
Year Imports
Yearly
%
change
EU
Share
of total
imports
Exports
Yearly
%
change
EU
Share
of total
exports
Balance
Imports +
Exports
2002 377 - 34.46 181 - 26.60 -196 558
2003 447 18.4 36.12 187 3.0 26.71 -260 633
2004 467 4.6 32.92 238 27.7 30.15 -229 705
2005 605 29.5 32.92 232 -2.4 27.42 -372 837
2006 906 49.7 34.39 400 71.9 38.48 -506 1,305
2007* 1,250 38.0 45.6 505 26.3 50.6 -745 1,755
compared to 2006. In 2007, Moldovas exports to the EU accounted for 50.6% in the total of
Moldovan exports, compared with 38.48% in 2006 (See Diagram 4.1 below).
Diagram 4.1
Source: NBS.
Another factor which explains this increase in exports is the fact that since 2006 many
Transnistria-based companies started to register with Moldovan authorities responsible for
trade and to export their goods to the EU market within the framework of the Moldovan
custom system. In 2007, 87.7% of goods exported to the EU by Transnistria-based
companies benefited from the GSP+ applied to Moldova since January 2006. In 2007, the
exports of goods by the Transnistrian firms to the EU accounted for 183 million, which
represents an increase of 18.4% compared with 2005.
Along with the rise in exports, Moldovan imports from the EU have also increased
since Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU on January 1, 2007. Imports from the EU
increased with 38.0% in 2007, compared with 2006, accounting for 45.6% in the total of
Moldovan imports (See Diagram 4.2 below).
Structure of Moldovan exports in 2007 (%)
EU
50.6
CIS
41
Other
8.4
EU
CIS
Other
Diagram 4.2
Source: NBS.
The structure of Moldovan exports to/ imports from the EU clearly shows that the
latter is the most important trade partner of Moldova. Although there are no overall data for
2007, the data for 2006 are evocative in this respect as well (See Table 4.2 below).
Table 4.2 Moldovas trade balance with its main partners
(2006)
The major import partners The major export partners The major trade partners
Partners
Mio
euro
% Partners
Mio
euro
% Partners
Mio
euro
%
World 2,633 100.0 World 1,038 100.0 World 3,672 100.0
1 EU 906 34.4 1 EU 400 38.5 1 EU 1,305 35.5
2 Russia 579 22.0 2 Russia 233 22.5 2 Russia 812 22.1
3 Ukraine 471 17.9 3 Romania 110 10.5 3 Ukraine 569 15.5
4 Romania 252 9.6 4 Ukraine 98 9.4 4 Romania 362 9.9
5 Turkey 91 3.5 5 Belarus 58 5.6 5 Belarus 142 3.9
6 Belarus 84 3.2 6 USA 28 2.7 6 Turkey 113 3.1
7 Kazakhstan 66 2.5 7 Turkey 23 2.2 7 Kazakhstan 83 2.3
8 China 28 1.0 8 Kazakhstan 17 1.6 8 USA 55 1.5
9 USA 26 1.0 9 Canada 17 1.6 9 China 28 0.8
10 Bulgaria 20 0.8 10 Bulgaria 8 0.7 10 Bulgaria 28 0.8
Source: IMF (adapted).
At the same time, Moldova , in 2006, only ranked the 94
th
on the list of the EUs trade
partners, with an insignificant share of ~ 0.1% in the EUs total bilateral trade (See Table 4.3
below).
Structure of Moldovan imports in 2007 (%)
EU
45.6
CIS
36.1
Other
18.3
EU
CIS
Other
Table 4.3 EU trade with main partners
(2006)
The major import partners The major export partners The major trade partners
Partners Mio euro % Partners Mio euro % Partners Mio euro %
World 1,350,494 100.0 World 1,166,109 100.0 World 2,516,604 100.0
1 China 191,769 14.2 1 USA 267,895 23.0 1 USA 444,410 17.7
2 USA 176,514 13.1 2 Switzerland 86,752 7.4 2 China 255,130 10.1
3 Russia 137,022 10.1 3 Russia 71,944 6.2 3 Russia 208,966 8.3

98 Moldova 439 0.0 88 Moldova 823 0.1 94 Moldova 1,263 0.1
Source: EUROSTAT (adapted).
Among the EU member states, Moldovas main trade partners are: Romania, Italy, Germany,
Poland, France, the UK, Hungary, Belgium, Bulgaria, Austria and Slovakia. In 2007,
Moldovan exports grew to Romania (35.8%), Germany (1.7-fold), Italy (20%), Poland
(23.3%), the UK (24.8%), Austria (2.3-fold), Bulgaria (1.9-fold) and France (3.8%). In the
same year, Moldovan imports grew from Romania (29.8%), Germany (49.2%), Italy
(37.2%), France (1.5-fold), Poland (21.4%), and Bulgaria (43.7%)
93
. Paradoxically, while
FTAs with Romania and Bulgaria were suspended as of January 1,2007, both Moldovan
exports to/ imports from Romania and Bulgaria increased.
4.1.2.2 Product Pattern, Main Imported and Exported Items
In 2007, 45.6% of Moldovan imports were from the EU. The EU exports to Moldova mainly
machinery, textiles and clothing, and agricultural products (See Table 4.4 below)
94
.
Table 4.4 EU exports to Moldova, by product grouping
(Mio euro)
SITC Rev.
3
Product
Groups
2002 % 2004 % 2006 % Share of
total EU
exports
TOTAL 521 100.0 735 100.0 823 100.0 0.07
Primary
Products
of which:
90 17.4 101 13.7 121 14.7 0.08
Agricultural
prod.
80 15.3 83 11.3 102 12.3 0.14
93
National Bureau of Statistics, Not informativ. Activitatea de comert exterior al Republicii Moldova n anul
2007, NBS, http://www.statistica.md/statistics/dat/1105/ro/Activ_com_ext_anul_2007.pdf.
94
For a more detailed picture see Appendix 3.
Energy 4 0.7 10 1.3 10 1.2 0.02
Manuf.
Products
of which:
420 80.7 627 85.3 691 83.9 0.07
Machinery 116 22.3 152 20.7 204 24.7 0.06
Transport
equipm.
49 9.5 165 22.5 92 11.2 0.05
Chemicals 60 11.5 65 8.8 87 10.6 0.05
Textiles and
cloth.
89 17.2 97 13.2 135 16.4 0.37
Source: EUROSTAT.
At the same time, 50.6% of Moldovan exports went in 2007 to the EU. The EU imports
mainly from Moldova textiles and clothing, agricultural products and transport equipment
(See Table 4.5 below)
95
.
Table 4.5 EU imports from Moldova, by product grouping
(Mio euro)
SITC Rev.
3
Product
Groups
2002 % 2004 % 2006 % Share of
total EU
imports
TOTAL 288 100.0 452 100.0 439 100.0 0.03
Primary
Products
of which:
93 32.3 69 15.2 114 25.9 0.02
Agricultural
prod.
84 29.0 58 12.9 81 18.5 0.09
Energy 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.00
Manuf.
Products
of which:
193 67.0 380 84.2 321 73.0 0.04
Machinery 6 1.9 7 1.4 8 1.9 0.00
Transport
equipm.
1 0.3 61 13.4 49 11.2 0.05
Chemicals 1 0.4 1 0.3 1 0.2 0.00
Textiles and
cloth.
105 36.6 116 25.6 158 35.9 0.19
Source: EUROSTAT
For the near future, it is expected that the EU-Moldova trade will increase, particularly due to
ATPs in operation for Moldova since March 2008. However, experts foresee that increase in
trade thanks to ATPs will not contribute to significant changes within the Moldovan economy
structure. Such an effect is expected to be brought about by an eventual FTA between
95
For a more detailed picture see Appendix 4.
Moldova and the EU.
4.2 FDI from the EU
Since its independence until the end of 2007, Moldova has accumulated $1.85 billion as
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). FDI was constantly growing until 1998. Due to regional
economic circumstances, FDI decreased almost 3 times in 1999, compared with the previous
year. After a period of FDI growth stability, since the new electoral cycle in 2001 when Party
of Communists came in power, FDI reached another critical point in 2003. Since then, FDI
only grew reaching in 2007 approximately $450 million
96
. FDI almost doubled in 2007,
compared with 2006. The main explanation of the FDI growth in Moldova rests on the fact
that, in 2007, Moldova became an immediate neighbour of the EU. For 2008, MET
anticipates a 40-50% growth of FDI.
Diagram 4.3
86,2
29,8
142,9
159,8
107,7
78,3
150,8
225,4
280
450
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
FDI attracted by Moldova in 1998-2007* (Mio USD)
* Dates for 2007 estimated.
Source: Constantin Doltu; MET.
In spite of FDI growth, this indicator per capita remains still low approximately $116.4 in
2007, compared with FDI per capita in the new EU member states. The FDI per capita in
Moldova for 2007 was similar to that reached by Bulgaria and Romania 4-7 years ago before
their accession to the EU, but much less compared with FDI per capita attracted by these
countries in 2006 $672.3 and, respectively, $529.2.
96
Other sources indicate a different volume of FDI: $530 million for 2007, and $1.7 billion for 1991-2007
period. Moldpres, La nceputul anului, investitiile strine directe n economia trii constituiau circa 1,7 mlrd
dolari SUA, 00980, February 16, 2007.
The failure of Moldova to attract more FDI was due to several factors, such as: a
small-scale market, difficult and unpredictable legal and administrative environment and
unclear and contradictory decisions of the administration concerning some important foreign
investors.
Most of FDI in Moldova has been made in commerce, the processing industry, the
energy sector, agriculture, real-estate, transport and telecommunications. In 2007, the largest
part of FDI (28%) was made in fixed capital, particularly, banking sector and leasing.
The main part of FDI in 2006 came to Moldova from the EU. The FDI from the EU
countries reached, in 2006, 49% of total FDI attracted by Moldova, while the FDI from CIS
accounted for only 22%.
Diagram 4.4
Geographic structure of FDI attracted by Moldova
in 2006 (%)
EU
49
CIS
22
Other
29
EU
CIS
Other
Source: Constantin Doltu (adapted).
The main investors in Moldova from the EU are The Netherlands, Spain, Italy, Germany, the
UK, Romania and France.
4.3 EU Assistance to Moldova
4.3.1 Volume and Forms since 1991
The EC/ EU has provided approximately 321 million of assistance to Moldova since 1991.
The EC/EU assistance to Moldova was provided in the framework of TACIS programmes
(including its national, regional and cross-border components), and under several thematic
budget lines such as the Food Security Programme, the European Initiative for Democracy
and Human Rights (EIDHR), macro-financial assistance, humanitarian assistance, etc.
Table 4.6 EC assistance to Moldova, 1991-2006
( million)*
1991-
1998
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total
TACIS National
Programme**
41.1*** 14.7 - 14.8 - 25.0 - 42.0 - 137.6
TACIS Cross-border
Co-operation****
- - 2.0 3.0 1.1 2 1.0 3.6 10 22.7
TACIS Regional
Programme****
- - 0.9 - 1.25 - 6.6 5.1 12.3 26.15
Food Security - - 5.5 - 10.4 - 10.0 - 10.0 35.9
Macro-Financial
Assistance
87.0
- - -
-
- - - -
87.0
Humanitarian
Assistance
- 3.9 0.8 0.8
- - - - -
5.5
PVD-NGO
Cofinancing
- - - - - 0.5 - - - 0.5
Human rights
(EIDHR)
- - 0.2 0.47 - - - - - 0.67
SPP - - - 4.7 - - - - - 4.7
Total 128.1 18.6 9.4 23.77 12.75 27.5 17.6 50.7 32.3 320.72
* 2006 figures indicative and not available for each item.
** Including TEMPUS.
*** Overall figure for technical assistance in 1991-98 (mostly TACIS).
**** Estimated pro-rata share for Moldova in cross-border (NP and CB) and regional programmes.
Source: European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument. Republic of Moldova Country Strategy Paper
2007-2013.
Under the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument for the 2007-2010 period, the
EU committed itself to provide assistance to Moldova as much as 209.7 million
97
. The ENPI
National Indicative Programme (NIP) for Moldova for 2007-2010 specifies also that this
allocation may be increased through allocations under the Governance Facility (GF) if
Moldova shows good performance in relation to governance issues. As Moldova was not a
forerunner in governance matters, the first allocations in 2007 under GF were made to
Morocco and Ukraine, 28 million and, respectively, 22 million.
4.3.2 Main Fields of EU Contribution
Under the TACIS national programme, especially since 2001, the EU`s assistance has been
focussed on three main priorities: institutional, legal and administrative reform; private sector
and economic development; and addressing the social consequences of transition.
97
European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument. Republic of Moldova. National Indicative Programme
2007-2010, European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_nip_moldova_en.pdf.
At the same time, TACIS cross-border and regional programs addressed such issues as
infrastructure, environment protection, border management, improving the asylum system and
fight against trafficking in human beings and drugs.
Under the Food Security Programme, the EU`s assistance aims at alleviating poverty
and improving food security, through measures in the agriculture sector, land and social
reform, and public finance management. FSP helps Moldova to achieve progress in meeting
the SPS standards of the EU to allow it to export meat and plant products to the EU market.
Until 2006, Moldova received under this budgetary line approximately 36 million.
The EU macro-financial assistance (MFA) is provided to support the state budget of
the Republic of Moldova. MFA has been made conditional upon the IFI assistance
programmes. Due to the fact that for a number of years the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) suspended its assistance to Moldova, the EU MFA was not provided to Moldova,
either, in the absence of an IMF programme. Following the adoption of the new IMF
programme, a new grant of MFA for an indicative amount of 45 million is expected to be
provided to Moldova.
Under EIDHR, Moldova has received assistance in support of civil society initiatives
that aim to promote democracy and human rights.
Under the ENPI for the 2007-2010 period, the EU`s assistance is to be focussed on
three priority areas: democratic development and good governance; regulatory reform and
administrative capacity building; poverty reduction and economic growth. Out of 209.7
million assistance foreseen by the NIP for the 2007-2010 period, 25-35% are to be spent on
the first priority area; 15-20% on the second and 40-60% on the third
98
. Additionally, the NIP
specifies that depending on developments with regard to the Transnistrian conflict resolution,
the EU will provide specific assistance, within the overall resources available.
4.3.3 The Impact of EU Assistance
The most recent Commission evaluation of the TACIS programme made in 2006, like the
previous one undertaken in 2000, came to the conclusion that TACIS interventions were
overall highly relevant and responded to the needs identified
99
. A Monitoring Review of the
TACIS Programme in Moldova in 2003-2005 confirmed that a majority of TACIS projects
was perfectly in line with national priorities.
98
Ibidem.
99
European Commission, Evaluation of Council Regulation 99/2000 (TACIS) and its implementation ref.
728, European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/evaluation/document_index/2006/728_docs.htm.
However, certain drawbacks of the TACIS assistance programme should be noted.
Firstly, TACIS programme, particularly in the early years, was mainly governed by a top-
down approach. According to evaluators, this was partly a consequence of the need for
institution-building and partly due to an insufficient sense of ownership on part of the national
authorities. Secondly, National Indicative Programmes tended to be too detailed which
restricted adaptability at project identification level to respond flexibly to evolving needs.
Thirdly, TACIS programme was characterised by a large number of stand alone technical
assistance projects, particularly in the area of institutional and administrative reform. In this
respect, evaluators concluded that these actions often achieved good results at project level
but had less impact at sector and national policy level partly due to a lack of continuity and
coherent long-term sector planning. Moreover, the projects were not always affiliated to
concrete initiatives funded by the government
100
, which had a negative impact on project
sustainability.
On the contrary, evaluators noted that the FSP had a bigger impact at policy and
sectoral level due to higher national ownership leading to stronger commitment to implement
reform proposals and policies.
The 2006 Commissions evaluation concluded also, in the specific case of Moldova,
that limited administrative and absorption capacity was another factor which undermined the
efficiency of assistance programs. Additionally, poor co-ordination between different donors
in some areas is regarded as another shortcoming of the assistance programs for Moldova
101
.
Taking into account these shortcomings, the EU`s assistance under ENPI was
conceived to focus on certain priority areas rather than on specific technical assistance
projects
102
. In the process of defining these strategic areas, the EU has involved national
authorities as well, which are presumed to show a greater level of commitment and
ownership. Drawn upon the positive experience of FSP for Moldova, the EU`s assistance is to
be directed through the state budget linked to the fulfilment of pre-defined conditionalities
and accompanied by targeted technical assistance
103
.
100
Ibidem.
101
Vic Heard, Has EU Development Assistance Helped? in The EU & Moldova. On a Fault-line of Europe,
ed. Ann Lewis (London: Federal Trust, 2004), 211-8.
102
European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument. Republic of Moldova. National Indicative Programme
2007-2010, European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_nip_moldova_en.pdf.
103
European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument. Republic of Moldova. Country Strategy Paper 2007-
2013, European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_csp_moldova_en.pdf.
4.4 Conclusions: Progressive Expansion of the EU-Moldova Economic Relations
The EU became gradually the main trading partner of Moldova. Progressive developments
within the EU-Moldova relations have triggered also a progressive expansion of their
economic relations. ENP and EUMAP have brought a new dynamics in bilateral trade. With
the projection of ENP and the implementation of EUMAP, the EU`s commitments toward
Moldova in economic terms became more serious, while the latter became more responsive
with regard to EU requirements. Elements of economic conditionality used by the EU played
an important role in this. The EU`s promise to grant GSP+ and then ATPs to Moldova proved
to be a valuable incentive for Chisinau. The important progress of Moldova in reforming its
custom system and improving the control on origin of goods is particularly the result of well-
employed economic conditionality. Unfortunately, the increase in Moldovan trade with the
EU is not underpinned by significant structural economic changes. The increase in
consumption, sustained by the progressive rise in money transfers of Moldovan citizens
working abroad, the EU`s enlargement to a number of 27 member states and the recession of
trade flows especially with Russia since 2006 better explain the expansion of the EU-
Moldova trade. Although still very early to estimate, one could assume that ATPs will not
have a significant impact on the Moldovan economy and will not bring along the so desired
structural changes into the Moldovan economy. An eventual FTA would be better equipped
for such a purpose.
CHAPTER5 LEGAL ADAPTATION
5.1 Legal Adaptation Brief Overview
The legal adaptation of the Moldovan legislation to that of the EU started in 1999, by the
means of an EU technical assistance project supporting the implementation of the PCA
104
.
The project envisaging assistance in legal approximation has been drawn upon the provisions
of Art. 50 of the PCA and hence focused on legal approximation in areas spelled out by this
PCA article.
The project was implemented with the support of a working group, of approximately
10 civil servants, established by the Ministry of Justice (MJ). It was aimed at using its
expertise in the process of the legal harmonisation of draft laws submitted to the MJ for a
legal opinion. For this purpose, the working group was additionally trained, as part of the
project, in several fields of EU legislation. Until March 2004, when the project ended, about
250 opinions on legal harmonization of new legislation had been issued. An important
number of opinions on the draft laws were introduced into or attached to the MJ opinions
which accompanied the draft laws submitted for the government or for the parliaments
approval.
The core team of the project co-operated in its activity with the Centre for Legislative
Drafting (CLD)
105
, other government bodies, especially in the process of drafting the laws on
conformity assessment of products, on audit, on limited liability company, on investments,
etc. Apart from this, as part of the project, a number of about 20 comparative studies in
different areas were supported.
Other EU technical assistance projects aiming at supporting the legal adaptation of the
Moldovan legislation to that of the EU have been implemented in such areas as
standardisation (launched in 2003) and industrial property (launched in 2004).
104
For more details see: MFAEI and IPP, ed., European Strategy of the Republic of Moldova, 2007 updated
version (English), Institute for Public Policy, http://www.ipp.md/biblioteca1.php?l=ro&id=142.
105
CLD was established in August 2001. It had nothing to do with the harmonisation of the Moldovan legislation
to that of the EU. It was set up to overcome the problem related to the low quality of legislative acts drafts
prepared by public administration bodies. Hence, it was tasked to work out legislative acts drafts; to provide
expertise on the drafts of normative documents; to ensure compatibility of national legal framework with the
Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, other domestic legislative acts and with international agreements
applied by Moldova. In September 2004, due to optimisation of central public administration structure the
CLD was dissolved. See: Government Decision # 842 as of Aug 14, 2001 on the Centre for Legislative Drafting,
Official monitor, 97-99/871 as of Aug 17, 2001; Government Decision # 1080 as of Sep 30, 2004 on the Centre
for Legislative Drafting and on modification, completion and abrogation of some Government decisions, Official
monitor, # 181/1263 as of Oct 01, 2004.
Moreover, there were sporadic attempts concerning legal adaptation from the side of
several public institutions, such as: the Ministry of Transport and Road Management, the
Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources, the National Bank of Moldova, etc.
5.2 Official Positions on Legal Adaptation
5.2.1 Framework Set by the EU-Moldova Agreements for Legal Approximation
The EU-Moldova PCA provided for the approximation of the Moldovan legislation to that of
the EU. Its Art. 50 states that Parties recognize that an important condition for strengthening
the economic links between the Republic of Moldova and the Community is the
approximation of the Republic of Moldovas existing and future legislation to that of the
Community. The second paragraph of this article points to the areas where approximation of
laws should be promoted, in particular: customs law, company law, banking law, company
accounts and taxes, intellectual property, protection of workers at the workplace, financial
services, rules on competition, public procurement, protection of health and life of humans,
animals and plants, the environment, consumer protection, indirect taxation, technical rules
and standards, nuclear laws and regulations, transport
106
.
The EUMAP also provided for the approximation of Moldovan legislation, norms and
standards to those of the EU in a wide number of areas. The EU identified as new partnership
perspectives, opened up by the ENP and EUMAP, the opportunity for convergence of
economic legislation and support for legislative approximation through a mechanism such
as TAIEX.
5.2.2 Domestic Legal and Institutional Basis
The need for the Moldovan legislation to be harmonized to that of the EU was set out most
explicitly for the first time by the Law # 168-XVI as of June 15, 2006 for the completion and
modification of some legislative acts
107
. The Law, in force since September 1, 2006,
amended: the Law # 780-XV as of Dec 27, 2001 on legislative acts
108
; and the Law # 317-XV
as of July 18, 2003 on normative acts of the government and other central and local public
administration authorities
109
. The Law # 168-XVI approval was part of a wider legislative
106
European Commission, Partnership and Co-operation Agreement, Art. 50, European Commission,
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/ceeca/pca/pca_moldova.pdf.
107
Law # 168-XVI as of June 15, 2006 for completion and modification of some legislative acts, Official
monitor, # 112-115/521 as of July 21, 2006.
108
Law # 780-XV as of Dec 27, 2001 on legislative acts, Official monitor, # 36-38/210 as of March 14, 2002.
109
Law # 317-XV as of July 18, 2003 on normative acts of the government and other central and local public
administration authorities, Official monitor, # 208-210/783 as of Oct 03, 2003.
approach of the parliament linked primarily to the necessity to implement the EUMAP and
additionally to the need to bring Moldovan legislation in compliance with that of the EU. The
laws being amended set out the organizational and legislative technique procedures to be
considered by the harmonisation process. They require for the new documents issued by the
parliament, government and other public administration authorities to be in accordance with
the EU correspondent legislation. The entire process of elaboration of legislative and
normative domestic acts was demanded to consider carefully the EU norms and legislative
practice, including that of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The elaboration of these
documents should be preceded by a comparative analysis with the correspondent EU pieces of
legislation. The analysis is supposed to cast out necessary amendments to be approved
bringing thus domestic legal acts in line with those of the EU. The other subsequent stages in
promotion of a legislative and normative act should also be strictly linked to the EU standards
in legislative process matters. Moreover, while providing the reasons for the necessity of a
legal domestic document, the laws require references to the corresponding EU pieces of
legislation. The above-mentioned requirements are to be applied also in the case of re-
examination of already approved national acts.
The Law # 168-XVI obliged the government, in a period of three months, to work out
and approve the harmonisation mechanism of national legislation to that of the EU. This
mechanism was approved through a Government Decision with a two months delay on
November 24, 2006
110
. The Decision states that the harmonisation of the Moldovan
legislation to that of the EU is to be promoted in stages, particularly in the main areas
envisaged by the bilateral documents that regulate relationships between Moldova and the
EU. All public central authorities with the right to initiate legislation have been made
responsible for harmonsation. The MJ has been made responsible for co-ordination and
monitoring of the legislative harmonisation process. The same institution has been also
obliged to work out annual national plans for legislative harmonization and to put forward
proposals concerning the creation of the Centre for Legislative Harmonization (CLH). The
Decision also made operable a Regulation on the harmonisation mechanism. The latter
established the method and institutional mechanism of the harmonisation of the national
legislation to that of the EU. The Regulation was accompanied by a Concordance Table
model to be filled in by the authors in the process of elaborating a piece of legislation. The
Concordance Table is supposed to show the exact differences between national and
110
Government Decision # 1345 as of Nov 24, 2006 on the harmonisation of legislation of the Republic of
Moldova to the community legislation, Official monitor, # 189-192/1470 as of Dec 15, 2006.
corresponding EU acts, responsible domestic institutions for their amendment and deadlines
in ensuring their compatibility.
In line with the requirements of the above mentioned Government Decision, the
Centre for Legislative Harmonisation was established on February 21, 2007
111
. The Centre is
subordinated to the MJ and empowered to support the harmonisation process of the national
legislation to that of the EU. Among the main tasks of the CLH are: working out annual
national plans drafts for the harmonisation of the Moldovan legislation to that of the EU;
assessing the compatibility with EU legal documents and issuance of declarations on
legislative compatibility; co-ordination and monitoring of the implementation process of
annual national plans for legislative harmonisation; establishing and updating a data basis on
the EU legislation
112
; etc.
In August 2007, the first ever harmonisation national plan for 2007 was approved by
the government
113
. The plan included 14 national legislative acts to be harmonised with the
EU legislation in 2007. The document made references to the EU`s corresponding legal
provisions, indicated responsible national authorities and set deadlines for accomplishing
harmonisation.
Apart from the above-mentioned official documents on legal adaptation, the European
strategy of the Republic of Moldova (unofficial) also refers to this issue
114
. In comparison
with these documents, the European strategy is more ambitious in that it makes an explicit
reference to the necessity to adjust national legislation to the acquis communautaire.
Although envisaging in fact acquis communautaire, the official documents on legal
adaptation use a different wording Community/ European/ EU legislation, but definitively
are less ambitious in their approach. The strategy points to the importance of legal
approximation; identifies its short- and medium-term priorities; mentions the scope of
reference of EU documents for this process; indicates actions to be taken in advancing a more
appropriate legal and institutional framework for legal adaptation. The European strategy puts
at the heart of the legal approximation process the European Integration Department and
provides for a specialised unit managing the entire process of legal approximation to be set up
111
Government Decision # 190 as of Feb 21, 2007 on establishing the Centre for Legislative Harmonisation,
Official monitor, # 29-31/205 as of March 02, 2007.
112
The Regulation of the CLH requires from this Centre to establish and update a data basis on the EU
legislation (primary, secondary and other sources of EU legislation) in Moldovan language.
113
Government Decision # 883 as of Aug 06, 2007 on approving the harmonisation national plan for 2007,
Official monitor, 127-130/928 as of Aug 17, 2007.
114
MFAEI and IPP, ed., European Strategy of the Republic of Moldova, 2007 updated version (English), 455-
464, Institute for Public Policy, http://www.ipp.md/biblioteca1.php?l=ro&id=142.
within the EID. In comparison, according to existing official acts, the main responsibility of
the co-ordination the process of legal approximation lies with the MJ.
In the medium term and/ or upon invitation [of Moldova] to accession negotiations,
the strategy provides for legal approximation to advance into all chapters of the acquis. It also
provides for the preparation of a national program for the adoption of the Acquis (NPAA),
sectoral harmonogrammes to be compiled in a national harmonogramme on the degree of
legal approximation. The strategy refers to the co-operation with the EU in legal adaptation
matters, to the methodology and stages of legal approximation, to monitoring and evaluation
activities to be undertaken as part of the process. Finally, the strategy states the need for civil
servants to be additionally trained in their areas of competences and for the government to
identify and assign the necessary resources with regard to legal approximation.
Although the European strategy is not an official document, nor a binding one, some
of its elements have been translated into official documents already approved on legal
approximation. For example, the Concordance Table
115
needed to accompany the draft of a
normative document has been largely derived from the European strategy provisions.
Until December 2007, the harmonisation national plan for 2007 had not been largely
fulfilled. The greatest majority of its 14 national legislative acts were not harmonised.
Moreover, the parliament laws and government decisions concerning the harmonisation of
national legislation to that of the EU are rarely observed in the legislative practice. This has
been confirmed by the Speaker Marian Lupu on the occasion of opening the 2007 Autumn-
Winter plenary session of the parliament. He observed in his opening remarks that though the
law on harmonisation of national legislation to that of the EU entered into force in September
2006, it remains to be disregarded in many cases.
116
115
See for details: Government Decision # 1345 as of Nov 24, 2006 on harmonization of legislation of the
Republic of Moldova to the community legislation, Official monitor, # 189-192/1470 as of Dec 15, 2006.
116
Marian Lupu, Discursul Presedintelui Parlamentului Republicii Moldova Marian Lupu, cu prilejul
deschiderii sesiunii plenare de toamn iarn 2007, October 4, 2007, Parliament of the Republic of Moldova,
http://www.parlament.md/news/04.10.2007.
5.3 Conclusions: Legal Adaptation Quite Well on Paper, Bad in Practice
The first institutionalised attempts of Moldova to approximate its legislation to that of the EU
started in late 1990s. Since then, Moldovas approach towards legal approximation was not
systematic and not efficiently co-ordinated. Only with the ENP projection on Moldova and,
thus, with start of the EUMAP implementation process, Moldova began to develop a more
coherent vision on legal adaptation. However, the approach of the existing official documents
on legal adaptation is neither satisfactory nor sufficient.
Nevertheless, they provide reasonable conditions for a smooth start of Moldova in
bringing its legislation in compliance with that of the EU. Given this incipient framework, the
results achieved already in the approximation of the Moldovan legislation to that of the EU
are encouraging on paper but disappointing in practice.
CHAPTER6 EFFECTS OF EUCONDITIONALITY ANDPROSPECTS OF EU
MEMBERSHIP
6.1 EU Conditionality
The EU`s conditionality had so far, generally, a low impact upon the reform process in the
Republic of Moldova. This impact of EU conditionality was rather proportional with the
length of the carrot the EU had offered to Moldova. The longer was the EU carrot, the
higher was the EU`s influence over the reform agenda of the Republic of Moldova. The EU
stick could not prove to be a relevant tool of influence over developments in Moldova. The
few existing examples of using negative conditionality to trigger the desired policies in
Moldova in line with the EU`s interests seem to show the relative usefulness of sticks as a
tool of EU influence over Moldova. The EU`s decision in January 2000 to postpone for an
indefinite period of time the disbursal of EUR 15 million as macro-financial assistance did not
make Moldova more co-operative with the IMF, as requested by the EU.
The EU`s conditionality was low because the EU`s incentives offered to Moldova
were relatively small, compared with those offered to CEECs. The PCA was not a generous
offer for Moldova and the EU assistance, either.
At the same time, the small incentives the EU had offered to Moldova were rarely
made conditional upon further progress on the part of Moldova. The EU did not have a well-
established strategy on how to trigger progress in Moldova by using rationally its assistance.
The PCA, as conceived, had meager elements of conditionality, which were badly used
because of a low interest of the EU to do so and of low determination of Moldovan authorities
to accept them while receiving little in turn. Additionally, the meager PCA conditionality
could not be used efficiently because the EU did not establish monitoring mechanisms
evaluating the implementation of this document, as it did in the case of Association
Agreements signed with CEECs. Periodical evaluations of EU-Moldova PCAs
implementation would help the EU better apply and focus its elements of conditionality.
The EUMAP brought in 2005 new elements of conditionality which were deployed in
a more efficient manner. The Europeanization effect of this sort of conditionality is more
visible in the case of Moldova, though not that expected. Experts agree that Moldova made an
important progress in reforming its custom system and ensuring the control on the origin of
exported goods
117
. The reform process in this area was prompted by the EU`s promise to grant
117
Sergiu Buscaneanu, ed., Moldova and EU in the European Neighbourhood Policy Context. Implementation of
the EU-Moldova Action Plan (February 2005 January 2008), February 2008, ADEPT, http://www.e-
democracy.md/en/publications/realizarea-pauem.
Moldova GSP+ and then ATPs. This example shows the tremendous effect of the EU`s
conditionality when conditions for reform are spelled out very clearly and when the promised
rewards are perceptible enough. Being more or less effective on economic developments, the
EU`s conditionality exerted on governance and democracy matters did not prove to have a
similar impact. Therefore, the EU could use economic conditionality to trigger in the future
progress in democracy related fields. What would be the results if the EU made the granting
of ATPs to Moldova conditional upon reforming its custom system and, additionally, the
public broadcasting company Teleradio-Moldova? Definitively, more complex and better.
Due to its thin conditionality with regard to governance issues, seemingly understood
by the EU, Brussels conceived additional elements of conditionality complementary to those
used by the means of EUMAP. Under the Governance Facility, the EU started to reward
ENP countries, including Moldova, upon their performance in relation to governance issues.
However, allocations for 2007 under the Governance Facility of EUR 28 million to
Morocco and of EUR 22 million to Ukraine are unlikely to set a strong competition among
ENP countries that would bring desired indicators related to governance issues in the ENP
region. At least in the case of Moldova there are few, if any, signs that it could be mobilized
to achieve better results in democracy related fields through such allocations. Probably, the
same rewarded two countries would have the incentive for further performance in 2008, so
that to be rewarded again. If the overall reward under the Governance Facility was more
substantial, not limited to only EUR 50 million, and split between a higher number of ENP
countries (3-4), then the outcome of such a competition would be more visible.
The very normative conditionality exerted by the EU via the Copenhagen criteria still
has a low impact over developments in Moldova. Moldovan elites did not see perceptible and
tangible results due to appear while complying fully with these criteria. Yet, they have a very
vague presence in the political discourse and understanding from the side of the general
public. Though being tailor-made, the EUMAP fell short of making an explicit reference to
the Copenhagen criteria. At least in the case of Moldova and Ukraine, for which the ENP
action plans acknowledged their European aspirations, the EU could insert an explicit
reference to these criteria. By not doing this, the EU missed the chance to raise at least the
public awareness of the so-called accession criteria.
The institution carrying the most influence exerted by the EU`s conditionality was
MFAEI. However, due to the internal structure of power in Moldova, the MFAEI did not have
enough leverage to force other institutions to comply with the EU requirements. Although the
Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration was appointed also as the Deputy Prime
Minister, the change seems to widen just a little the leverages of MFAEI over other public
institutions.
6.2 Prospects of EU Membership of Moldova
Since 1998, with some intermittency, Moldova has been declaring that its main foreign policy
priority is European integration. This has been capitalized in a number of institution building
measures, legislative acts, procedures and developments within the framework of EU-
Moldova relations. However, this was not enough to convince Brussels and other European
capitals that Moldova deserves a membership perspective, particularly due to the lack of
coherence, shifts at the level of practical actions and discourse, which have narrowed
Moldovas credibility. Although when it joined the much desired SPSEE in 2001, Moldova
could not succeed to sign following the model of some Western Balkan countries a
Stabilization and Association Agreement. For a number of years, joining the Stabilization and
Association Process was seen as the most optimal scenario for Moldova to be promised a
membership perspective. The failure of doing so let Moldova be subject to other spatial and
geo-political rationalities from the side of the EU. Two additional factors made Moldova be
placed in a different sort of strategic rationalities: Russian un-hidden interests in its near
abroad, including Moldova, and the EU`s fatigue related to enlargement and institutional
reform. The EU was generally unwilling to countervail Russian interests and tired to embark
upon new commitments. The most appropriate way to address its lack of assertiveness as a
strategic actor and fatigue was to design the ENP.
Although it is not about enlargement, at least for the time being, the ENP does not
close any doors to European countries with membership aspirations, such as Moldova and
Ukraine
118
. Therefore, their membership credentials are totally dependent upon their
performance while implementing ENP action plans and other subsequent enhanced
agreements. Moldova would probably follow the example of Ukraine and will start to
negotiate a new framework agreement to substitute the EU-Moldova PCA. Due to the
insufficient progress of Moldova in implementing the EUMAP, it is unlikely that such an
agreement will be signed before the parliamentary election campaign to be held in the spring
of 2009. If Moldova manages to sign such an agreement in 2009, it will not enter in force
118
Gnter Verheugen, The European Neighbourhood Policy, Speech/04/141, European Commission,
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/04/141&format=HTML&aged=0&langua
ge=EN&guiLanguage=fr; Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Press Conference to launch first seven Action Plans under
the European Neighbourhood Policy, Speech/04/529, European Commission,
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_ relations/news/ferrero/2004/sp04_529.htm.
probably before 2010. Starting with 2010, it will be a wonder if Moldova manages to join the
EU in a timeframe shorter than a ten-year period. The wonder will depend primary upon the
governing elites in Moldova and secondly upon the internal developments of the EU, linked
to a broader international environment. At this point in time, judging upon Moldovas
behaviour in relation with the EU, and the capacity of Moldovan authorities to fulfil their
obligations assumed under PCA and EUMAP, the most realistic scenario would be to foresee
the integration of Moldova into the EU after 2020.
6.3 Conclusions: Need for a More Explicit Positive Conditionality and Perceptible
Rewards
In spite of the thin conditionality deployed so far by the EU, it has contributed to advance the
Europeanisation process of Moldova. The impact of the EU`s conditionality has increased
with the projection of ENP and EUMAP, as the main vehicle in advancing the EU-Moldova
relations in the framework of ENP. The new added elements of conditionality have proved to
be effective. However, this was not enough. The EU fell short of defining very clear
conditions, setting clear-cut benchmarks and creating tight relations between conditions
imposed, expected results and possible rewards dependent upon the quality of those results.
At the same time, while setting clear conditions, the EU did not always succeed in letting
rewards be perceptible for Moldovan elites. In addition, the impact of the existing EU
conditionality upon the reform process of Moldova could be higher if the EU made use of
elements of economic conditionality to encourage progress in democracy related fields.
At this stage, Moldovas way to the EU is as long as could be thought in an attempt to
anticipate when Moldovas accession to the EU might occur. To set a specific year for this is
as difficult as it was in the case of CEECs at the beginning of the 1990s when they started
their race to one terminus station the EU.
Appendices
Appendix 1
PCAs between the EU and...
Country Entered in force
Armenia July 1, 1999
Azerbaijan July 1, 1999
Belarus Signed in March 1995 but is not in force yet.
The Interim Agreement is not in force either.
Georgia July 1, 1999
Kazakhstan July 1, 1999
Kyrgyzstan July 1, 1999
Moldova July 1, 1998
Russia December 1, 1997
Turkmenistan Signed in May 1998 but is not in force yet.
The Interim Agreement is not in force yet.
Ukraine March 1, 1998
Uzbekistan July 1, 1999
Source: European Commission.
Appendix 2
Structure of the EU-Moldova PCA and Action Plan
EU-Moldova PCA EU-Moldova Action Plan
TI General principles
TII Political dialogue
TIII Trade in goods
TIV Provisions affecting business and investment (Labour conditions:
Co-ordination of social security; Conditions affecting the establishment
and operation of companies; Cross-border supply of services; General
provisions)
TV Current payments and capital
TVI Competition, intellectual, industrial and commercial property
protection and legislative co-operation
TVII Economic co-operation (Industrial co-operation, Investment
promotion and protection, Public procurement, Co-operation in the field of
standards and conformity assessment, Mining and raw materials, Co-
operation in science and technology, Education and training, Agriculture
and the agro-industrial sector, Energy, Environment, Transport, Postal
services and telecommunications, Financial services, Monetary policy,
Money laundering, Regional development, Social co-operation, Tourism,
Small and medium-sized enterprises, Information and communication,
Consumer protection, Customs, Statistical co-operation, Economics, Drugs)
TVIII Cultural co-operation
TIX Financial co-operation
TX Institutional, general and final provisions.
Introduction
2.1 Political dialogue and reform (Democracy and the Rule of law; Human
rights and fundamental freedoms; Co-operation on foreign and security
policy, conflict prevention and crisis management; Regional co-operation)
2.2 Co-operation for the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict
2.3 Economic and social reform and development (Improve welfare;
Sustain growth, consolidate public finance, and address the issue of public
debt; Functioning market economy; Regional and rural development;
Employment and social policy; Sustainable development)
2.4 Trade-related issues, market and regulatory reform (Movement of
goods: Trade relations, Customs, Standards, technical regulations and
conformity assessment procedures, Elimination of restrictions and
streamlined administration, Sanitary and phytosanitary issues; Right of
establishment and Company Law: Company law, Services, Financial
services; Movement of capital and current payments; Movement of
persons, including movement of workers and co-ordination of social
security; Other key areas: Taxation, Competition policy, Intellectual and
industrial property rights, Public procurement, Statistics, Financial control
and related matters, Enterprise policy)
2.5 Co-operation in Justice and Home Affairs (Migration issues; Border
management; Fight against organised crime; Drugs; Money laundering
financial and economic crime; Police and judicial co-operation)
2.6 Transport, energy, telecommunications, environment, and Research,
development and innovation (Transport; Energy; Information Society;
Environment; Research, development and innovation)
2.7 People-to-people contacts (Education, training and youth; Culture and
audio-visual issues; Civil society co-operation; Cross-border and regional
level co-operation; Public health)
3. Monitoring.
Sources: EU-Moldova PCA and Action Plan.
Appendix 3
EU exports to Moldova by Sitc Section
(2006)
Products (Sitc Sections)
by order of importance
Mio euro %
Share of total
EU exports
TOTAL 823 100.0 0.1
Machinery and transport equipment 296 35.9 0.1
Manuf goods classif. chiefly by material 199 24.2 0.1
Miscell. manuf. Articles 112 13.6 0.1
Chemicals and related prod. n.e.s. 87 10.6 0.0
Food and live animals 72 8.7 0.2
Crude materials inedible, except fuels 20 2.5 0.1
Beverages and tobacco 12 1.5 0.1
Mineral fuels, lubricants and rel. materials 10 1.2 0.0
Commodit. and transactions n.e.c. 9 1.1 0.0
Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 3 0.4 0.1
Source: EUROSTAT.
Rank of Moldova in EU trade: exports
(2006)
Rank
SITC Rev. 3
Product Groups
Mio
euro
Share of total
EU exports
% Balance
84 Total 823 0.07 100.0 384
37 Textiles and clothing 135 0.37 16.4 -23
70
Non-agricultural raw
materials
5 0.02 0.7 5
73 Agricultural products 102 0.14 12.3 20
75
Office/ telecom.
Equipment
71 0.08 8.6 70
85
Power/ non-electrical
mach.
102 0.05 12.4 99
86 Transport equipment 92 0.05 11.2 43
88 Chemicals 87 0.05 10.6 86
93 Energy 10 0.02 1.2 10
112 Iron and steel 5 0.01 0.6 -32
Source: EUROSTAT (adapted).
Appendix 4
EU imports from Moldova, by Sitc Section
(2006)
Products (Sitc Sections)
by order of importance
Mio euro %
Share of total
EU imports
TOTAL 439 100.0 0.0
Miscell. manuf. articles 185 42.2 0.1
Manuf. goods classif. chiefly by material 77 17.6 0.0
Machinery and transport equipment 57 13.0 0.0
Food and live animals 55 12.6 0.1
Crude materials inedible, except fuels 40 9.1 0.1
Beverages and tobacco 11 2.6 0.2
Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 7 1.6 0.1
Commodit. and transactions n.e.c. 1 0.3 0.0
Chemicals and related prod. n.e.s. 1 0.2 0.0
Mineral fuels, lubricants and rel. materials 0.0
Source: EUROSTAT.
Rank of Moldova in EU trade: imports
(2006)
Rank
SITC Rev. 3
Product Groups
Mio euro Share of total
EU imports
%
93 Total 439 0.03 100.0
38 Textiles and clothing 158 0.19 35.9
43 Iron and steel 37 0.13 8.5
55 Transport equipment 49 0.05 11.2
77 Non-agricultural raw materials 0.00
80 Office/ telecom. Equipment 2 0.00 0.4
81 Power/ non-electrical mach. 3 0.00 0.8
93 Agricultural products 81 0.09 18.5
105 Energy 0.00
107 Chemicals 1 0.00 0.2
Source: EUROSTAT (adapted).
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