Chaos in the Courtroom Reconsidered: Emotional Bias and Juror Nullification Author(s): Irwin A. Horowitz, Norbert L.

Kerr, Ernest S. Park, Christine Gockel Reviewed work(s): Source: Law and Human Behavior, Vol. 30, No. 2, Emotion in Legal Judgment and Decision Making (Apr., 2006), pp. 163-181 Published by: Springer Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4499467 . Accessed: 02/01/2012 10:02
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Law Hum Behav (2006) 30:163-181 DOI 10.1007/s10979-006-9028-x ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Chaosin The CourtroomReconsidered: EmotionalBias and JurorNullification

Irwin A. Horowitz Norbert L. Kerr . Ernest S. Park . ChristineGockel ?

Publishedonline: 23 May 2006 C AmericanPsychology-LawSociety/Division 41 of the AmericanPsychological Association 2006

Abstract A widespread in instructions presumption the law is thatgivingjurorsnullification wouldresultin "chaos"-jurorsguidednotby lawbutby theiremotionsandpersonal biases.We that betweenthe natureof the trial proposea model of jurornullification posits an interaction the and biases (viz. whether fairnessof the law is at issue), nullification instructions, emotional on jurordecision-making. Mockjurorsconsidereda trial online which variedthe presencea nullification whether trialraisedissues of the law's fairness(murder profit the for instructions, vs. euthanasia), emotionally and (that biasinginformation affected jurors'likingfor thevictim). instructions a nullification-relevant in trial Only when jurorswere in receiptof nullification weretheysensitiveto emotionally Emotional biasesdidnotaffectevidence biasinginformation. to processingbut did affect emotionalreactionsand verdicts,providingthe strongestsupport datefor the chaostheory. nullification Chaoshypothesis. Emotional bias Keywords Juror . Thejury'spowerto decidea criminalcase by its own lights withoutfear of reprisals been has a hallmark Anglo-American of The jurisprudence. powerof jurorsto returnverdictsthat are counter boththe law andthe evidenceis knownasjurynullification its occurrence both to and in criminal civil trialshas beendocumented and havethis 2000). Jurors (e.g., Noah,2001;Pepper, and or is powerbecausejurydeliberations verdictsareopaque(i.e., no explanation justification of thejurors). Thisnullification hasbeenthe subjectof a resurgence scholarly of required power
I. A. Horowitz(Q]) OregonState University, Corvallis,Oregon97331-4501 e-mail: ihorowitz@oregonstate.edu N. L. Kerr. C. Gockel Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan48824 E. S. Park North DakotaState University, Fargo,North Dakota58102 Springer

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and public interest in recent years, partly as a response to a number of high profile criminal trials (e.g., the 0. J. Simpson criminal case and the Rodney King case; (Brown, 1997; Green, 1985; King, 1998; Leipold, 1996; Marder, 1999; Pepper, 2000). Although jurors clearly have the power to nullify, given the opaque nature of verdicts, the question of whetherjurors have the right to nullify has been the subject of much legal discussion (Brown, 1997; Conrad, 1998; Leipold, 1996; Marder, 1999). The "right"of the jury to nullify has more supportamong legal academics than among judges (Amar, 1998; Butler, 1995; Magliocca, 1998 Scheflin & Van Dyke, 1991). Most legal scholars appear to strongly oppose the jury's exercise of its nullification power (Schopp, 1996; Scott, 1989; St. John, 1997). On the other hand, there is at least some public support for legitimizing juries' nullification powers; for example, some grass roots organizations have attempted to amend state constitutions to permit juries to be fully informed of theirpower to nullify (Conrad, 1998), although see Hannaford-Agor Hans, (2003). The prevalentview of the courts is that laws should flow out of deliberate procedures, derived from the lawmaking powers of duly elected officials, to which jurorsmust strictly adhere (Pepper, 2000). This perspective concedes that although juries in English Common Law had been given the power which permitted sympathetic juries to acquit those who are legally guilty but morally upright, this power was vitiated when the United States Supreme Court in Sparf and Hansen v. United States (1895) ruled that no such explicit right existed. Subsequent appellate decisions, although sparse, have conformed to Sparf (see, notably, United States v. Dougherty, 1972). Nonetheless, the competing view concedes nothing to the normative perspective. Indeed, nullification proponents note that courts (e.g., Dougherty) have routinely recognized and even commended the history of nullification beginning in the colonial period and extending into the present. Examples of nullification involving acquittals of legally guilty but morally sympathetic defendants are numerous including, among others, cases involving seditious statements, violations of the 1850 Fugitive Slave laws, infractions of the 18th Amendment prohibiting the sale of liquor, refusal of some juries to convict Vietnam War era draft evaders and jurors' reluctance to enforce draconian drug laws (Conrad, 1998). Jurors who returnverdicts that are merciful are exercising what we term "conventional" nullification (Horowitz, Kerr, & Niedermeier, 2002). Juries, however, nullify for a variety of reasons and in a variety of circumstances (Brown, 1997). Perceived injustice can arise from the notion that illegal behavior was justified to some degree. That is, jurors may believe that any reasonable person would have acted the same way in similar circumstances (Finkel, 1995). A second variant of nullification can occur when jurors reason that the defendant was not a free agent and acted under compulsion or diminished capacity (Scheflin & Van Dyke, 1991). Or,jurors may conclude that a defendant's actions were prompted by admirable motives or intentions. This may be exemplified in some cases of euthanasia or doctor assisted suicide (Brown, 1997). Even if jurors do not regard a defendant's behavior as justified, they might nullify if they believe that the penalty prescribed by law is disproportionate to the offense, either because the usual penalty is seen as too severe or because the defendant has "already suffered enough" (St. John, 1997). Nullification can also be motivated by jurors' rejection of the law or statute itself, ratherthan by concern for the fate of particulardefendants (Solan, 2003).

Juridic biases and nullificationinstructions

The chaos theory The issue in Dougherty was whether it was properfor a trialjudge to issue a nullification instruction to the jury, a request made by the defense. The defense at trial petitioned, unsuccessfully,
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that a nullification instruction be included as an addendum to the standardjury instructions provided by the trial judge. This addendum would have informed the jury that they could return a verdict counter to the law and evidence if they felt such a verdict would be unfair or unjust. The Dougherty Court decided, by a 2:1 majority that, the trial judge had acted properly in his decision not to include such a nullification instruction. The reasoning of the court (both the majority and minority) is relevant and crucial to the present study. First, in the majority opinion, Judge Howard Leventhal conceded that jurors had the power to nullify and had used that power in an appropriateand even laudatory manner on many occasions. ... thepages history of shine instances thejury's on of of exercise itsprerogative disregard to uncontradicted and of evidence instructions thejudge.(p. 1130) Nevertheless, the majority held that to overtly inform jurors of that power would focus the jury on emotional ratherthan evidentiary factors and thereby invite "chaos" into courtrooms. of a ... the or in of ... to compel juror to assume burdens mini-legislator judge,as is implicit thedoctrine is strains thejurysystem. Totell [ajuror] on of nullification, to putuntoward expressly a nullification .... ... the This him,in effect,thatit is he whofashions rulethatcondemns. is an prerogative is to inform an burden thejurors' for overwhelming responsibility, extreme psyche. 1136) (p. The majority view was that informing jurors of the nullification option would allow or encourage jurors to stray from the facts and decide cases primarily on their emotional reactions, personal biases, and other nonevidentiary factors. Thus, the Dougherty majority suggested that nullification may occasionally be a good thing, but jurors definitely ought not be informed of this option. Judge David Bazelon, writing the minority opinion in Dougherty, suggested first that there is no reason that will in abusive of their use Trust thejuryis, after one ... to assume jurors makerampantly all, power. of thecornerstones ourentirecriminal of and is we foundation, must jurisprudence, if thattrust without re-examinegreat morethan thenullification a deal doctrine. 1142) just (p. For Bazelon, the key issue was not anarchybut candor. Tell the truth, arguedBazelon; inform jurors that they have nullification powers but caution them to use it carefully, sparingly, always in the service of those deserving mercy. By doing so, the law can channel this power into avenues that strengthen the law, and increase its credibility, ratherthan raise havoc with it. Empirical evidence on the chaos theory What happens when jurors are explicitly informed of the nullification power? The empirical findings are mixed. On the one hand, some mock jury studies suggest that juries in receipt of standardjudicial instructions are more focused on the evidence and the judge's presentation of the relevant law than those jurors in receipt of instructions that explicitly permit nullification, who tend to concentrate relatively more on nonevidentiary matters (Horowitz, 1985; Horowitz, 1988; Pfeifer, Brigham, & Robinson, 1996). However, we should note that these nonevidentiary matters are promptedand encouraged by nullification instructionswhich suggest thatjurors ought to apply their notions of justice. Pfeifer et al. (1996) found that mock (nondeliberating)jurors were significantly less likely to find a defendant accused of euthanasia guilty when in receipt of nullification instructions and when the act was committed compassionately (disconnecting a respirator) rather than violently (two gunshots to the head); this difference was not significant under standardinstructions. Similarly, Hill and Pfeifer (1992) found that defendant race in a rape trial had a significant effect on jurorjudgment under strong nullification instructions,but not with standardinstructions. On the other hand, in neither of these studies was the key interactioneffect between the biasing factor (means of death; defendant race) and type of instruction significant,
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norwerecomparable interaction in Meissner, tests and Brigham, Pfeifer(2003).Infact,Meissner et al. (2003) foundthatfollowingmockjury deliberation, relationship the betweeneuthanasia attitudes potential sourceof juridicbias)andjurorguiltratings wereactuallyweakerfor those (a instructions. receivingnullification Thereis also considerable evidencedirectlycontradicting chaos theory.In a series of the fourexperiments Horowitz Kerr1999;Niedermeier, & & Horowitz, Kerr,2001) (Niedermeier, thatalthough number extralegal a of biasessignificantly affectedmockjurors'verdicts reported status,defendant remorse, (viz. defendant gender,severityof penalty,defendant occupational defendant instructions did not directlymagnifyjurors'biases. nullification ethnicity), generally The only exceptionwas that defendantoccupationshowed a strongerbiasing effect among individual in this did instructions; however, interaction notreplicate jurors receiptof nullification at thejurylevel. In summary, althoughthere are some hints that nullificationinstructions might increase to biasinginformation, thereis littlestrongor directevidencefor thechaos jurors'susceptibility in hypothesisadvanced Dougherty. Varieties bias anda hypothesis of The conceptof bias impliesdeviation fromsomeprescribed standard judgment Hastie& of (cf. & Rasinski,1988;Kerr, MacCoun, Kramer, 1996).Injuries,this couldinvolvepayingattention to information which is legally irrelevant or (e.g., evidenceruled as inadmissible) failing to which is legally relevant(e.g., ignoringjudicial instructions on pay attentionto information the burden proof).In its broadest of the interpretation, chaos theoryof Doughertyimpliesthat that any and all suchjurorbiases could be exacerbated judicialinstructions legitimizejury by nullification. as we haveseen, thereis at best mixedevidencefor this prediction. But, But perhaps is too broada readingof the chaos theory.Perhaps is only certaintypes this it of jurorbiases that are facilitatedby nullification instructions. Dougherty,the court was In confronted with a particularly of volatiletrial.Nine members the Catholicclergywerecharged with breakinginto and ransacking offices of the Dow ChemicalCompanyand smearingfake blood aroundthe offices to protestthatfirm'smanufacture napalm,which was being used of in the VietnamWar.More thanthe typicalcriminalcase, this trial touchedon many widely emotionallychargedissues for thejurors-their feelings aboutthe Vietnamwar,the effects of In napalmbombing, jurors'religiousconvictions,andthe motivesof the defendants. addition, the defenseandthe defendants rambunctious indecorous. was in the context wererather and It of thesestrongemotional factorsthattheDougherty theirconcernaboutthe majority expressed nullification instructions. likely effectof providing A distinction beendrawn has & Kerr, Carroll, 1990;Wilson,& Bornstein, 1998) (e.g., Kramer, betweenjurorbiasesthatarefactual versusthose thatareemotional.Factualbiases stemfrom information whichalters or of jurors'interpretation evaluation the factsof thecase. An example of a factually eventmightbe knowledge a priorconviction anunrelated of in case.Factual biasing biasesinvolvethe use of information froma strictlylegal pointof view, is not probative. which, Emotional which altersjurors'emotionsbut biases, on the otherhand,stem frominformation is neitherdirectlyor indirectlyprobative. exampleof emotionallybiasing information An is irrelevant character information aboutthe victim of a crime;e.g., celebrated defense negative case attorney PercyForeman (e.g., Dorman,1969) suggestedthatthe best defensein a murder wasto so vilify thevictimthatthejurors wouldthemselves havewillinglycommitted murder. the Thereis considerable research evidencethatsuchemotional reactions trialevidencecanaffect to jurorjudgments(e.g., Bomstein, 1998; Feigenson,2003; Feigenson,Park,& Salovey, 1997; Voss& VanDyke, 2001).
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Kramer al. (1990) suggestedthatthesetwo typesof bias can sometimeshavequalitatively et different effects.Forexample,in theirstudy,they foundthata continuance--delaying start the of a trial-reduced the impactof a factually biasingpiece of prejudicial publicity(PTP; pretrial viz. inadmissible physicalevidenceandthe reportof a priorconviction)but did not attenuate the impactof some emotionallybiasingPTP (viz. personalfamiliarity with a crime victim). information seemedto persistandbias longerthanless emotionally charged Highlyemotionally factualinformation. charged, In a similarvein, we hypothesize herethatif nullification instructions accentuate juridic any biases. Most proposednullification are most likely to do so for emotional biases, they juridic instructions (e.g., Conrad,1998;VanDyke, 1970)tell jurorsthattheirpersonalsense of justice or conscienceare valid concernsas they reachtheirverdict.Commonexperienceas well as research Smith,& Sadovsky, 2003;vande Bos, 2003) suggests 2004;Roberts, (e.g., Eisenberg, of thatjudgments justiceor morality tendto be highlyemotionally Thus,nullification charged. for onhowonefeels as a validcriterion evaluating one'sverdictinstructions legitimizefocusing if onedoesnotfeel thata particular verdict fairorjust,one mayrefuseto accedeto it, regardless is of whatthe law requires. Nullification biasesin severalways.First,emotional instructions couldaccentuate emotional responsesthatstemfromthe emotionally biasinginformation, se, maybe confusedwithor per attributed theemotional to fromjusticeorfairness concerns (andvice versa). responses resulting The emotionaldistressone wouldfeel at reachingan unjustverdict(e.g., sendingsomeoneto fromthe distressone would or jail for reasonable defensibleactions)may be indistinguishable feel at the prospectof convicting,say, a well-likeddefendant. it feels wrongto convict a If theninformation whichaffectsthosefeelingsmightbe expectedto haveparticularly defendant, one's strongeffects on jurors'verdictsif one's feelings are made a valid basis for evaluating trial when nullification instructions combinedwith emotionallycharged are verdict.Similarly, elements(e.g., a very sympathetic with praiseworthy victim;a defendant motives),jurorsmay heuristics(Schwarz& Clore, 1983). makejudgmentsby relying on "how-do-I-feel-about-it" Fromsuchanaffect-as-information if perspective, ajuroris makinga justicedecision,sympathy and emotionalupsetmay be perceivedas relevant the judgment(Forgas,1995). Finally,an to instructional license to considerpersonalconscienceor fairnessconcernsmay,by legitimating relianceuponone's emotionalreactions, actionsto minimizeemotional reduceself-corrective biases (Wegener, & Petty,2000). Kerr, Fleming, acAs noted earlier,there is only weak empiricalevidencethat nullification instructions is if in centuate biases. This pattern unsurprising the biases thathave been considered juridic been factualratherthanemotionalbiases. It is possible (and previousstudieshave primarily to for For usuallyplausible) makethisargument mostof thepriorresearch. example,knowledge is that a defendant female could lead to relianceon genderstereotypes, which-although not bias evidence---could jurors'judgmentsaboutthe plausibilityof elements legally permissible of the prosecution defense narratives. vs. thereis no conceptualor empirical Unfortunately, basis for definitivelyclassifyingthese variousjurorbiases as factual.And, it is also possible thatsomepieces of information biasingin bothways (e.g., euthanasia shotgunmay both are by distressjurorsand have factualimplications[e.g., an animustowardthe victim; emotionally motivesotherthanrelievingsuffering]; rapedefendant's maybothtrigger race racialprejudice a and relianceon probative The weak and nonsignificant hints featuresof a racialstereotype). of instructional moderation thanthe factualaspectsof could derivefromthe emotionalrather the biasinginformation used in priorstudies.Clearly,whatis neededto test our hypothesisis that examiningbiasing information shouldstronglyaffectjuroremotionwithouthaving any for implications the defendant's culpability. Providingsuch a test was the primary purposeof the presentstudy.
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Stimulus Trial

Law or
Procedure Unfair?.
IfYes

If No

Verdict Compliant

Emotionally biasinginfo?

~f

Yes

Emotional Response Negative

Emotional Response Emotional Response

Nullification IfZYes
Instructions? Emotional
IfNo

Bias

Compromise Verdict

ProNullification Verdict (Just)

Verdict Individual Predeliberation Juror

Jury
Deliberation

Fig. 1 Modelof juror decision-making

A model of nullification instruction effects In order to make our logic more explicit, we present in Fig. 1 a tentative model of juror nullification.1 The model incorporates both the factual and emotional pathways to juror bias. We assume that the juror proceeds through several decision points before an individual verdict is reached. The model assumes that a juror makes a judgment as to whether the case (i.e., fact situation, law, procedures, and judicial instructions) raises the possibility of unjust outcome. If not, a compliant verdict, consistent with the law and rules of evidence will tentatively be reached. However, if an unfair outcome is seen as possible, two things should occur sequentially: (1) the jurorexperiences some negative emotional responses (e.g., anxiety about contributingto an unjust verdict; dissatisfaction with the law or procedures; sympathy towards certain legal actors), and (2) a second nullification judgment must be made, based on the instructions received. If the instructions prescribe strict adherence to the law (i.e., if there are no nullification instructions), relatively few jurors will nullify (e.g., only those who strongly believe that a just outcome is 1 Our the of for at logic alsohas implications nullification thejurylevel,butthisportion the modelis beyond scopeof thepresent paper.
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moreimportant fidelityto thelaw,or who see theinjustice wouldresultfromobedience than that to the law as particularly if noxiousin the presentcase). However, instructions permit do juror a of effectsmayoccur(alongthe"Ifyes"path).First, nullification, number distinctive jurorswill be relativelylikely to favora "pronullification verdict"- thatis, one thatresultsin an outcome that they personallyview as just. Second,the legitimization emotion-laden of judgments(of conscience, of fairness)should facilitatemutualinfluencebetween the differentsources of emotion. In particular, emotionalresponsesthat stem from emotionallybiasing information one's attitude towardthe defendant victim)may be confusedwith or attributed the or to (e.g., emotionalresponsesresultingfromjustice concerns,per se. Third,an instructional license to takeconscienceandfairnessconcernsmay legitimate relianceuponone's emotionalreactions. Thelattertwo moderating effectsarerepresented thedashedarrows thefigure; in by theysignify the enablingeffect of nullification instructions boththe mutualinfluenceof the two sources on of emotionandon emotionalbiases,per se. The net effect of these two processesshouldbe to that instructions wouldnot magnifythe emotionalbias. The modelalso presumes nullification moderate effectsof anypurelyfactualbiases. the In the presentstudy,we manipulated threefactors.To inducean emotionalbias, we varied the characterization a victim. In one condition,the victim was portrayed highly attracof in tive and sympathetic Care terms;in the other,he was portrayed very unsympathetically. was takento insurethatthe depictionof the victim had no evidentiary for the guilt or implication innocenceof the defendant-that is, the resultingbias shouldbe wholly nonfactual nature. in We expectedjurorsto be less upset at the killing of the unsympathetic victim and conseThe was quentlyto be less inclinedto convictin this condition. secondmanipulation of judicial instructions-standard versusstandard instructions with a nullification adjudicialinstructions dendum. was Finally,the samebasic fact situation used to createtwo paralleltrials,one which raisedno questionaboutthe fairnessof the application the law to the defendant charge of (a of murder wherethe defendant's motivewas simplegreed)and another did (a euthanasia that motivewas to relievethe sufferingof the victim, a terminally-ill case, wherethe defendant's patient). Ourconceptual model suggeststhata nullification instruction shouldactuallyincreasethe case), but degree of emotionalbias if the case raises issues of justice (e.g., the euthanasia not otherwise(e.g., the murdercase). Thus, the model predictsthat the emotionalbias effect (i.e., effect of victim sympathy) when a nullification shouldbe greater instruction used is for the nullification case than in any othercombination trial and instructions. of Confirmation of this prediction would confirmthe Doughertycourt'sworstfear-that a kind of chaos can emerge as a result of nullificationinstructions. Here, this takes the form of what one term "jurorvilification," darkside of nullification, which defendantsaccusedof in a might crimes againstunsympathetic victims are treatedmore lenientlythan the evidence warrants
after receiving nullification instructions for a trial that raises questions about the fairness of the law.

Method Participants
Mock jurors were 520 volunteer participants (207 males, 303 females, 10 not reporting sex). Most (442) were recruited from basic psychology courses at a large midwestern university, but some (viz. 78) were volunteers recruited through on-line websites for those interested in social

scienceresearch. Participants rangedin age from 18 to 64 (mean= 21.0, SD = 6.05).

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Design Two versions of a Trial (nonnullification/murder nullification/euthanasia), levels of vs. two Victim Sympathy(sympathetic victim vs. unsympathetic victim), and two types of Judicial in Instructions standard nullification) werecombined a 2 x 2 x 2 between(standard pattern, plus participants design. trialsandmanipulation independent of variables Stimulus We createdtwo trials,bothof whichcontained same essentialfact situation. basic trial the The scenarioinvolvedan elderlymanwho died as a resultof a drugoverdoseadministered while he was a hospital Inthenonnullification murder thedefendant thevictim'sdoctor was case, patient.2 and the prosecution allegedthathis motive was to obtainaccess to the victim's fortune.The euthanasia versionsuggestedthatthe defendant couldnothaveprofited nullification, financially from the defendant's the prosecution that the defendanteuthanized the death;rather, alleged victimto alleviatesuffering causedby a terminal cancer.Thus,in the nonnullification version, thedefendant's of couldbe proven allegedmotivewasgreed;if theelementsof thecharge murder doubt,thenthereshouldhavebeen littlereasonforjurorsto nullify.In the beyonda reasonable nullification motivewas to relievehis patient's version,on the otherhand,the defendant's pain; evenif theelementsof thecharge couldbe proven doubt,manyjurors might beyonda reasonable see a convictionas unjustandbe willingto nullify.We shouldnoteherethatunlikehistorically classic nullification did trials,in these trialversionsthe defendant not explicitlyconcedeguilt. We suspectthatsucha scenario moretypicalthanthosewhichcontainovertor veiled appeals is fromthe defensefor nullification.

of Manipulation victimsympathy Thiswas accomplished manipulation the characteristics the victim,MrHenryBates.In via of of one condition,Bates was portrayed a sympathetic and as grandfather generousphilanthropist,
bravely enduring a 2-year ordeal of battling a terminal illness while living in the house of his granddaughter, Nurse Nancy Kepes. In the other condition he was portrayed in most unsympathetic terms. Evidence was presented showing that his fortune, mainly in offshore depositories, was made during his career as a mobster. To further embellish this unsympathetic picture,

2 The basic trial involved a chargeof murder against Dr Daniel Wood. Dr Wood treatedpatientHenry Bates,76, who was ill with cancerand sufferedfrom severeabdominalpain when he arrivedat the hospitalwhere Woodwas a seniorphysician.Dr Wood had not previouslyprovidedmedical care for Mr Bates, but was casually acquainted with Bates who was the grandfather his surgicalnurse,Ms Kepes. MrBates had been caredfor by Nurse Kepes of in her home since he had become ill. Wood performedsurgeryon Bates to repaira perforationin the proximal duodenumwhich had led to diffuse peritonitis,an inflammation the stomachwall. Over the next 8 days, patient of Bates remainedunderDr. Wood's care in the surgicalintensivecare unit. On the ninth day, Bates took a turnfor the worse. The evidence suggestedthattherewere chemical imbalancesin Bates' blood workand Dr Wood treated that conditionvigorously.Dr Wood administereda drug in dosages well above the hospital's guidelines and at a much faster rate than deemed safe. The testimony of the other doctors and some nurses suggested strongly that Dr Wood, who brusquelydismissed the concerns of other nurses and physicians, was in fact too aggressive and Wood's treatmentvery likely was the immediateand proximatecause of the patient'sdeath.The county coroner agreedwith this assessment.The hospitalinvestigatedand so did the local police. The hospitalsuspendedDr Wood pending the outcome of judicial proceedings.The investigationtook a numberof months, and subsequentlyDr Wood was indictedfor the murderof HenryBates. In all trialversionsDr Woodwas portrayed a ratherabrasive as surgeon,aggressive,self-assured,dismissive of the opinions of others,but highly competent. Springer

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evidenceshowedthatBateswas a convictedchildmolesteranda mostungrateful demandand thatMr.Bates may have ing guest while living in Ms Kepes' home. Evidencealso intimated madeimproper advances Ms Kepes'two youngdaughters to that during period.

of Manipulation judicialinstructions All jurorswere given standard instructions all containing essentialcomponents (e.g., elements of a chargeof murder, admonitions focus solely on the evidence,andreminders the burden to of of proof and reasonabledoubtcriterion). However,mock jurorsassignedto the nullification instructions conditionwere also providedwith an addendum the usualjudicialinstructions, to basedon recommendations VanDyck (1970). of
While you must give respectfulattentionto the laws aboutwhich you have just been instructed,you have the final authorityto decide whetheror not to apply a given law to the acts of the defendanton trial. As to jurors you representthe community and it is appropriate bring into your deliberationthe feelings of the communityand your own feelings based on your conscience. You must respect the law, that is clear. However,regardlessof your respect for the law nothing should stop you from acquittingthe defendantif you feel thatthe law, as appliedto the fact situationin this case, would lead to an injustice.

Procedure dependent and measures Mockjurors, whowererandomly to assigned oneof theversionsof thetrial,accessedthatversion at a website.Theyreada versionof the 27-pagetrialtranscript. trialincluded The photographs, The werepresented theconclusionof at ostensiblyof all of the participants. judge'sinstructions the trial. We then presented interest,of course,was jurorswith an extensiveverdictform. Primary in jurors'verdicts,but a numberof additional measureswere also collected,includingratings of confidencein verdict,probability guilt, andsentencerecommendation. addition, of In mock were asked to assess the defendantand the victim on a numberof bipolarevaluative jurors measures The (viz. bad-good,sympathetic-unsympathetic, likeable-unlikable). victim-relevant itemsservedas a checkof theeffectiveness theVictimSympathy of We manipulation. examined the effectiveness the case manipulation checkingjurors'views on the defendant's of motive by and key elementsof the prosecutionand defense cases. These were assessed throughtruefalse items (e.g., "Theprosecution theoryof the case was thatDr Woodkilled HenryBates to obtainmoney.") in embedded a 30-itemmemorytest.To probeoursuggestion nullification that instructions can accentuateemotionalreactionsin certaintrials, participants were asked to indicatetheir emotionalreactionsto the trial on three bipolarscales (viz. not angry-angry; information upset-notupset;calm-agitated). Finally, jurorsprovidedsome demographic (e.g., were given a genderand age). Followingcompletionof the responseinstrument, participants writtendebriefing. Results checks Manipulation Theprimary the of bias manipulation. The objectivewas to confirm effectiveness the emotional threeevaluative measuresof the victim (bad-good,sympathetic-unsympathetic, likeableand were examinedin a 2 x 2 x 2 MANOVThe only significant multivariate effect was unlikable) the maineffect for VictimSympathy, Wilks'A(3, 502) = .449, p < .001, r2 = .551. Likewise,
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the only significant effect in the univariate ANOVAsof these scales was the VictimSympathy
main effect, F(1, 504) > 330, q2 > .39, p < .001 for each. As intended, the sympathetic victim

was evaluated muchmorepositivelythanthe unsympathetic victim;the latterwas seen as less good (3.26 vs. 7.45 on the 9-pointbad-good scale), moreunlikable(3.20 vs. 6.80), andmore (2.90 vs. 6.43). unsympathetic To confirmthatthe differences betweenthe nonnullification and (murder) nullification (euversionsof thetrialwereperceived intended, association as the betweentrialcondition thanasia) As and participants' true/falseresponseson a numberof relevantquestionswas determined. to mock jurorsin the murdercase were (compared those in the euthanasia intended, case) more likely to agree that the defendant's motive was greed, X2(1)= 7.36, p < significantly .01, N=516, 9(2 =.014) and that this was the prosecution'sclaim, X2(1) = 176.6, p <
.001, N=514, (2 = .344, and less likely to recall the victim's pain as constant and severe, X2(1) = 120.2, p < .001, N= 516, (2 = .233, or that the prosecution claimed that relieving this pain was the defendant's motive, X2 (1) = 91.3, p < .001, N= 516, (2 =.177. Jurorverdicts and related judgments

The dependent variable primary of interest the dichotomous, was guilty/not guiltyverdict.Prior to the main analysesof the verdictdata, we did some preliminary analysesto see whether the verdictswere moderated any of threejurorattributes-jurorsex, participant by population vs. (student nonstudent citizenship(US vs. non-US).Strictlyspeaking, sample),andparticipant some of ourparticipants the 30 identifying themselvesas noncitizens perhaps and some of (viz. the 11 who failedto providethis demographic data)werenot eligibleto serveon a US jury,and it was of some interestto see if verdictswere affectedby sucheligibility.The only significant effect to emergefromthese analyseswas a maineffect of jurorsex, F(1, 492) = 6.88, p < .01, wereless likelyto convict(49.8%)thanmen(61.7%).It is noteworthy q2 = .014;womenoverall thattherewas no overalldifference conviction for the student the nonstudent in rate vs. sample, attributes moderate effectsof anyof the the F(1, 502) = 1.90,ns).Inno casedidanyof thesejuror in effectwas unmoderated the variables; particular, key predicted independent 3-wayinteraction of thesejurorattributes > .47). Thus,the analysesreported hereafter basedupon are by any (ps
the full sample; small variations in degrees of freedom are due to occasionally missing data,

failuresto respond. reflecting

Verdict data were analyzed using a planned contrast to test the model's key prediction, and to examine other effects, the usual contrastsimplicit in a standard2 x 2 x 2 ANOV [Note that if con-

victionratesarenottoo extremeandthe degreesof freedomfor erroraresufficiently large(conditionsmetin thepresent dataset), analysisof variance suchdichotomous is quiterobust of data
to the violation of usual ANOVA assumptions (e.g., of normality; Lunney, 1970). Our model's key prediction was that of all conditions, the emotionally biasing victim information would have its greatest impact when nullification instructions were used in a nullification-relevantcase (such as the euthanasia case). This was tested with a planned contrast comparing the size of the bias effect (viz. the simple effect of victim sympathy) in the nullification instructions-euthanasiacase with the corresponding simple effects in the remaining conditions. This contrast was significant, t(510) = 2.12, p < .03, r2 = .008. The plot of the conviction rate data in Fig. 2 shows that, as our model suggests, jurors who had received nullification instructions for the euthanasia case did show greater sensitivity to the biasing victim information than the jurors in any of the remaining conditions. It was in this condition only thatthe simple effect of Victim Sympathy was significant, t(510) = 2.49, p < .02, 72 = .012; here, conviction was much more likely when the victim of the crime was highly sympathetic (59% guilty) than unsympathetic (37% guilty), whereas victim sympathy failed to significantly affect verdicts in any of the other Trial/Instructionconditions
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Victim O Symp.Victim[ Unsymp.

0.75

0.5 0 0.45

0.35

0.25

Murder
Fig. 2. Verdictmeans

Standard Instructions

Euthanasia

Murder

Nullification

Euthanasia

(t < .77, p > .44 for the remaining simple effect tests) . Thus, for the present case, the extra-legal information about the crime's victim only biased jurors' verdict when they received nullification instructions for a nullification-relevant case; by itself, the emotionally biasing information was not biasing enough to significantly affect jurors' verdicts. The ANOVA on verdicts revealed only two other significant effects: the conviction rate was higher for the murdercase (61.6%) than for the euthanasia case, 51.1%; F(1, 510) = 5.81, p < .02, q2 = .011, and with standardinstructions (60.9%) than with nullification instructions, 51.7%; F(1, 510) = 4.47, p < .05, 72 = .009. Although our focused contrast was significant, as noted above, the unfocused test of the three-way interaction effect was not, F(1, 510)= 2.30, p = .13. The same main effects also emerged on estimates of "the probability that Daniel Wood deliberately and intentionally killed Henry Bates" (Trial main effect F(1, 512) = 6.36, p < .02, 72 =.012; Instruction main effect, F(1,512)= 8.49, p < .01, 172= .016. However, it is noteworthy that the model contrast was not significant, t(512) =. 84, ns; indeed, there was no indication that information about the victim had any effect on this judgment (neither the overall Victim Sympathy main effect, nor any of the simple main effects were significant). Thus, as intended, the bias induced by the victim sympathy treatment was not a factual bias, that altered jurors' beliefs about the defendant's likely culpable behavior. Nor was their sensitivity to the victim information in the euthanasia-nullification instruction condition a result of some evidentiary inference from the information provided about the victim. Finally, as a probe of how punitive the mock jurors were toward the defendant, participants were asked to rate how severe a penalty he should receive, if he were convicted (ranging from minimum under the law to maximum under the law on a 9-point scale). Unsurprisingly, they were more punitive for a defendant with a motive of greed (5.76) than a
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motive to relieve pain, 5.09; F(1, 511) = 10.57, p < .001, 2 = .020. In addition,they were morepunitivewhengivenstandard instructions instructions, 5.23;F(1, (5.63) thannullification the 511) = 3.87, p < .05, = .008. However, lattereffect was not moderated the natureof -q2 by the case and how sympathetic victim was [modelcontrastt(511)= 1.13, p > .25]. Thus, the the penalty data did not mirrorthe more complex patternshown in Fig. 2 for the verdict data.3 Emotional reactions Ourmodel suggeststhatin a trialthatraisesnullification instructions issues, nullification may resultin confusionandmisattribution emotional of In responses. the presentdesign,this means thata particularly shouldoccurunderthese strongemotional responseto the victiminformation andfurther, this emotionalresponseshouldmediatethe resultingaccentuatedthat conditions, emotional-biaseffect. To examine these possibilities, the data on mock jurors' emotional reactionsto the trialwere analyzedin the same way as the verdictdata(viz. with the planned modelcontrast 2 were alongwithomnibus x 2 x 2 ANOVAs). Participants askedto ratehowthey felt when they finishedreadingthe trialtranscript threescales, assessinghow angry,upset, on andagitated effectson the agitation but measure, therewere theyfelt. Therewereno significant interaction effectson boththe anger, F(1, 504) = 5.43,p < .02, 72= .011, significant three-way andupsetF(1, 505)= 3.88,p < .05, q2= .008, measures. The interaction effect for angerwas anddid not parallel illuminate modelprediction verdicts; modelcontrast or the for the complex was not significant, t(504)= 1.13,ns, andneitherwereanyof the victimsympathy simplemain effects(p > .19 for all).However, interaction the "forfeelingupset" parallel illudid and pattern minatetheverdictdata.As Fig. 3 indicates for such (withthe scalereversed readability, thathigh valuesindicatefeelingmoreupset),it showsthe pattern predicted ourmodel[modelcontrast by it int(505)= 2.17, p < .03, 12= .009]. Specifically, is only whenjurorsreceivednullification structions thenullification-relevant thatthe attributes thecrime'svictimaffectedhow for trial of victimsympathy upsettheyfelt [t(505)= 2.62,p < .01,92 = .013;t<.89 fortheremaining simple effects]. We thenlookedto see if feelings of being upsetcould mediatethe pattern predicted our by model (i.e., Fig. 2), followingthe procedures recommended BaronandKenny(1986). First, by to recapitulate originalverdictanalyses,verdictswereregressed the modelcontrast the on along with the othertwo effects thatwere foundin the originalANOVA,Trialand Instructions (all dummycoded). Again, all threepredictors significantly predictedverdicts,and in particular, the regression was significant, = .096, t(514)= 2.20, p < .03. weightfor the model contrast / Second, we confirmedthe link between the model contrastand the presumptive mediator, in verdictsas thecriterion thepreceding upsetratings feelingupset.Whenparticipants' replaced

3 The penaltyrecommendation asked "If the defendantwere to be found guilty, how severe a penalty would you favor?"Responses were made on a 9-pointbipolarscale anchoredby minimum underthe law andmaximum under the law. Hence, ourmockjurorswere askedto assumethe same role as the trialjudge, anddeterminean appropriate sentenceregardlessof theirown personalverdictpreferences.However,it is possible thatthose who had found the defendantguilty wouldfindit difficultto recommenda sentence.To explorethis possibility,two additionalanalyses were conducted.First,we addedparticipant verdictas a factorin the ANOVAof the penaltydata.Unsurprisingly, those who thoughtthat the defendantwas guilty recommendeda harsherpenalty (mean= 6.12) than those who acquitted[mean= 4.52, F(1, 501) = 62.56, p < .001, r12 .111], but the verdictfactordid not interactsignificantly = with any of the remainingfactors.The Casemaineffect remainedsignificant,F(1, 501) = 6.75,p < .015, r/2= .013, butthe Instruction main effect did not. Second,the penaltydatawere reanalyzedexcludingall participants who had acquittedthe defendant.Again, the model contrastwas not significant,t(283) = 1.26, ns; the only othersignificant effect was the Case main effect, F(1, 283)= 5.61, p < .02, 92 = .011. Springer

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EJ Symp.VictimMUnsymp.Victim

5.5

U,

4.
5

LLD
4.5

Murder

Euthanasia

Murder

Euthanasia

Standard Instructions

NullificationInstructions

so valuesindicate for feelingmoreupset) Fig. 3 Means feelingsof upset(scalehasbeenreversed thathigher analysis, the model contrast was again a significant predictor, 3 = .093, t(509) = 2.12, p < .04. Third, we confirmed the link between the mediator and verdicts. When verdicts were again the criterion and upset ratings (rather than the model contrast) was included as a predictor, the presumptive mediator, upset ratings, predicted verdicts significantly, / = .258, t(507) = 6.08, p < .001. Fourth, when both the model contrast and upset ratings were included as predictors of verdicts, the latter still predicted verdicts significantly, 3 = .251, t(506) = 5.89, p < .001, but the former did not, / = .078, t(506) = 1.84, p > .05. Finally, a Sobel test indicated that the mediation effect was itself significant (z = 1.99, p < .05). These findings are consistent with the complete mediation of the prediction for verdicts by mock jurors' emotional responses (viz., feelings of being upset).

Discussion
The American jury represents an attempt to produce a solution to the tensions between law and anarchy. No issue so much stands at the nexus between law and anarchy as does the concept of juror nullification. We expect juries to follow the law but we also expect them to occasionally deviate from the strict application of the law when unjust outcomes might result. Indeed, although the United States v. Dougherty (1972) majority did not allow a nullification instruction,the judges expressed a sotto voce hope that juries would intuit when to nullify and when not to do so. The Court's fear, now enshrined in case law, was that if juries were made explicitly aware of their power to returnnullifying verdicts, juries would recklessly ignore evidence and the law, and the furies of emotion and prejudice would be released. We have called this view the chaos theory.
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The empirical nullification literature at best, agnosticon the theory'spredicted "chaotic" is, effect. Some researchhas hinted that nullificationinstructions of producean amplification certain jurorbiases (e.g., Hill, & Pfeifer,1992;Pfeifer,Brigham,& Robinson,1996), whereas othersfind that severaljurorbiases (e.g., of race, social class, ethnicorigin,and gender)are not potentiated nullification instructions & (Meissner, by Brigham, Pfeifer,2003; Niedermeier, & Kerr,1999). Ourtheoretical modelproposesa resolution this mixed empirical to Horowitz, It suggeststhatnullification instruction wouldstrengthen particular of jurorbias a kind pattern. emotionalbias) in a particular kindof trial(viz. trialsin whichtherecould be confusion (viz. betweenthe emotionsaroused the injusticeof the law andby the biasinginformation). Most by if not all of the priorwork on nullification effects have been concernedwith biases that are factual(notemotional) biases.Themodelsuggeststhatperceptions justice of clearlyor arguably areemotionally andnullification instructions tendto legitimizeemotionsas valid charged may information be usedin decidinga verdict(Alicke,2000).Thus,thechaoseffectshouldemerge to whenjurorsaremost likely to use theiremotional reactionsas validinformation they seek a as just outcome. The presentstudyoffereda firstempiricaltest of this model. And, as the model predicted, jurorsconsideringa case in which the fairnessof the law was in question(viz. a euthanasia instructions were especially sensitiveto emotionallybiasing case) who receivednullification information the (viz. how sympathetically victimwas portrayed). Onlyin this conditiondid we observea robust biaseffect.Thus,the chaoticeffectoccurred only in the delimited in emotional circumstances identified the model. by It shouldbe notedthatthe unsympathetic victimwas stronglydislikedby jurorsin all conditions.However, whengivenstandard instructions affected jurors'verdictswerenot significantly by this emotionallybiasingattitude.In otherwords,they functionedin a legally appropriate manner. even whengivennullification Moreover, instructions, jurorsfollowedthe law whenno fairnessissues were evokedby the trial (i.e., in the murdertrial).When a murderdefendant was motivatedsolely by greed,jurorssaw nothingwrongwith convictingthat defendant reof how theyfelt aboutthe victim.However, the euthanasia version,the fairness in trial gardless of law becamea prominent issue-is it just to convicta physicianof murder when he hastens the deathof a terminally- patient,solely to relieve his suffering? ill And how much less just woulda conviction if thatpatientis a veryunlikable be human a being(a violentcriminal, child In addendum let theirfeelings and molester)? this latterevent,jurorsinvokedthe nullification aboutthe victim influencetheirverdicts.Clearly,the euthanasia case is preciselythe type of trialwherewe mightexpect(andeven want)jurorsto nullify,withor even withoutnullification instructions. was notchaosto refuseto treata mercykilleras a murderer; It it rather, wasjurors' aboutthe victim that inabilityto ignoreotheremotionallychargedbut extralegalinformation as in One mightfairlybe characterized "chaotic." wouldpresumethatthe majority Dougherty wouldnot havebeen distressed whenin receiptof nullification if, instructions, jurorsacquitted a sympathetic defendant who, drivenby nothingbutgenerousmotivesanda courageous spirit, a euthanized sympathetic victim.Thatwouldhave been a resulteasily rationalized one in and which most observerswould have intuited.But that is not what we found. Whatappearsto a admirable victim causeda strongnegativeemotional happenis thateuthanizing particularly reaction("upset"), whereaseuthanizing very unsavoryvictim causedlittle emotionalupset a on the partof jurors(and,we speculate,a "goodriddance" The defendantwas not attitude). held as culpablein the lattercircumstances. This seems to us not to be the kind of benignor nullification eitherJudgeLeventhal his majority that in nor "principled" opinionin Dougherty, Bazelonin his dissent,hadin mind.It appears the decisionwas driven a judgment that Judge by aboutthe worthof the life of the likedversusthe dislikedeuthanasia victimwhenjurorswerein instruction. about receiptof a nullification Clearlytheremayhavebeensomething idiosyncratic
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thisvictimor this"crime," if chaosmeansunpredictable perhaps but and verdicts, mean-spirited thentheseresultsareindeed"chaotic." This patternof verdictscould not plausiblybe attributed jurors' inferencesaboutthe to in defendant's the was likely behavior; pattern not mirrored jurors'estimatesof the probability thatthe defendant brokethe law.Thisjudgment influenced the trialmanipulation; was by greed for seemedto be a moreplausible motivethancompassion intentionally givinga drugoverdose. Butit wasnotaffected theportrayal thevictim.Thejurors thefactsright; of got theydidnotlet by theirreactions thevictimdistort weightof evidence.Thepattern verdicts to the of could,though, be attributed the effects of jurors'emotionalresponsesto the trial.The verdictpattern to was of in bothmirrored mediated jurors'reports upsetemotion.Of course,it will be important and by to of biasesto moderation futureresearch probethe relativesusceptibility factualvs. emotional such biases and comparing them instructions systematically by nullification by constructing in a single study). directly(e.g., Jurors'recommendations an appropriate of sentenceproduceda less complex patternof a had effects.Reasonably, recommended moreseveresentencewhenthe defendant comjurors for to focus mittedmurder profit versuseuthanasia of compassion. out Morerelevant ourcurrent on nullification such also recommended sentences. instructions, instructions mitigated However, unlikefor theirverdicts,our mockjurorswereneverswayedby emotionalbiases in theirsenit realmof judgingguiltyandresponsibility, notin and tencing.Apparently, was in theuncertain the moreprescribed realmof assigningpunishment the present"chaotic" that effectsemerged. Giventhatjuriescurrently assignpenaltyin all US deathpenaltycases, andmay,in lightof do recentSupreme Courtrulings(Blakelyv. Washington, 2004), be moredirectlyand frequently is involvedin sentencing decisions,thispattern noteworthy. and of Implications limitations the presentfindings Theseresultsprovide strongest the evidenceto dateforthechaostheoryof nullification empirical courts'aversionto nullification instrucinstructions. least in some circumstances, At appellate It be to tionscanbejustified. would,though, anoverstatement saythetheoryhasbeenvindicated. littleevidenceforthetheory. And Mostpriorwork(ostensibly factualbiases)provides involving the support ourmodelanddatais verylimited-to emotional of biasesfor nullification-relevant fruit.Indeed,for to trials.It tooka specialset of circumstances enticejurorsto eat the forbidden in thosewho wouldpromote jury'sindependence decidingguilt,thereis thenotinsubstantial the of chaosdid not reign. consolation in most conditions this experiment, that
Moreover, our findings strictly apply only to the particularnullification instructions employed

here.Those instructions jurorsthatthey could nullifyif convictionviolatedtheirsense of told justice or their consciences,but did not identify and warn againstthe dangerof confusing
different sources of emotion in a trial. Even advocates of nullification instructions, like Judge Bazelon in the Dougherty ruling, grant that it might be risky to give jurors extremely broad or unlimited nullification powers. Bazelon argued that limits must be placed on such powers, that jurors must be cautioned to use them carefully, sparingly, and exclusively in the service

of those deservingmercy.It remainsan open but interesting questionwhethermore carefully achievethe severalbennullification instructions could simultaneously constructed, alternative in efits imputedto nullification instructions general(i.e., being honestwithjurors,occasional to but appropriate nullification laws they view as clearlyunjust,generalinsensitivity factual of kind andavoidthe particular to emotionalbiasesin nonnullification biases,insensitivity cases) biasesin nullification of chaosobserved here(viz. sensitivity emotional to cases).
Our conclusions are clearly circumscribed by the particularsof our study-not only a specific nullification instruction, but a specific set of trial facts and a particularmanipulation of victim Springer

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characteristics evoked specific attitudinal emotionalreactions.Psycholegalscholars that and have only begunto pose a number fascinating of questionsaboutthe role of emotionin juror behavior.What aspects of a trial will triggerwhich emotions?Which emotions then affect whichjuror In fromtheir judgments? thepresent study, jurorverdictscouldbe reliablypredicted emotionalfeelings of being upset-presumablyat the potentialfate of the defendant-but the otheremotionsthatwereassessed(viz. angerandagitation) eitherwerenotaffected thevictim by factoror,if affected,did not mediate sympathy jurorverdicts.It maybe thata diffuseemotion, withouta particular referent(e.g., being upset), may capturethe net effect of the emotional herebetterthananemotionwithparticular perhaps, confusionandmisattribution (and predicted severalpotential) referents toward law,toward defendant, toward victim, the the the (e.g., anger hasreported sympathy a victimcanmediatetheeffect that for Bornstein etc.) Elsewhere, (1998) of outcomeseverityon mock jurors'responsibility judgments.In a productliability lawsuit the manufacturer a birthcontrolpill, mock jurorswere more sympathetic the of to against moreseriouslyinjured andthis greater led to moreliabilityverdictsagainst sympathy plaintiff, the defendant. Emotionstend to produceactionsthat are congruentwith the appraisals that those emotions.Thus,for example,anger(whichdid not appear mediatejuror to engendered verdictsin the presentstudy),is generallyassociatedwith a blamingappraisal presumably and witha moreharsh reaction the sourceof thatanger(e.g., Tiedens,& Linton,2001). Hence,we to more mightexpectthatwhenjurorsareaskedto sentence,any feelingsof angerwouldprompt victimor upset 2003). Here,jurors'dislikeof the unsympathetic punitivesentences(Feigenson, to but feelings did not appear affecttheirpenaltyrecommendations; wouldbiasinginformation which arousedtheirangerhave done so? And which such emotionaleffects can be controlled and which cannot?Limitingjudicialinstructions have often been shown to ratherineffective in (Wissler& Saks, 1985). However, the presentstudy,the effects of jurors'feelings aboutthe victim werecontrolled standard but through judicialinstructions, werereleasedby nullification instructions. Theseandotherrelatedquestionsclearlydeservefurther systematicstudy. Weareaware certain of limitations thepresent of research. Likethemodalexperimental study of jurorbehavior was Its 1999;Bray& Kerr,1982),oursimulation fairlyunrealistic. (Bornstein, mockjurors werefairlyunrepresentative were,on average, and educated than (e.g., younger better the typicalactualjuror).It presented with a relativelybrief writtentrialtranscript participants ratherthan a live trial.The stimulustrial was presentedand responseswere obtainednot in a courtroom via the Intemet.And it focused on the behaviorof individualjurors,not but choicesweremadedeliberately, for juries.Thesemethodological deliberating primarily reasons of cost effectiveness,experimental control,and statisticalpower (cf. Kerr& Bray,in press). it could limit the ecological Nevertheless, is possible that one or more of these artificialities that statusof ourparticipants validityof our findings.It is encouraging the student/nonstudent did not moderateany resultsof interest,the usual conclusionof studiesthat have made this contrast(Bornstein,1999). And a numberof recent studiesby (e.g., O'Neil, 2002; O'Neil, foundfew differences betweenfindingsobtained Webon Penrod,& Bornstein, 2003) similarly based and comparable studies.The absenceof jury deliberation could be of laboratory-based interest.Some (e.g., Marder,1999) explicitly arguethat nullification definedby is particular a consciousexerciseof the jury's powerto nullify to avoid an unjustoutcome.This implies thatjury deliberations role in nullification. Indeed,some researchers may play an important have suggestedthatjury deliberations curejurors'judgmental biases (e.g., Kaplan generally & Miller, 1978; Kerwin& Shaffer,1994). However,otherresearchhas shown thatjuries do recruitinformation theirinitial,prejury biases. (e.g., Sommer, Horowitz, selectivelyto support & Bourgeois, revealthatjuror-level maynotbe ameliorated bias 2001).Reviewsof the literature and by jury deliberation may, in some instances,even be enhancedby it (Devine, Clayton, and Dunford, Seying& Pyrce,2001). Kerret al. (1996) also showboththeoretically empirically
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thatbiases exhibitedat the individual jurorlevel are generallymore likely to be accentuated rather thanattenuated thejury level. Thus,therearea number reasonsto believethatour at of simulation presentfindingsmay well generalize beyondthe confinesor ourartificial study.Of and course,suchissuesof external ecologicalvaliditycanultimately only be settledempirically.
Conclusions Contraryto most priorresearch,the present study suggests that at least some instructionsdesigned to describe and legitimate jurors' nullification powers can indeed result in a kind of "chaos"-a

to Courtshavewidely accepted greater susceptibility emotionally charged, biasinginformation.

the validity of a pervasive chaos theory. As a scientific matter, however, much remains to be learned about the effects of nullification instructions and aboutjurors' and juries' willingness to nullify the law. Through such research, psycholegal scholars may be able to better inform the judges and policy makers who must ultimately decide whether risks of nullification instructions, like those demonstratedhere, outweigh a number of demonstrable benefits of such instructions. This was #SES-0214428 theNational from Science Foundation Acknowledgements study supported a Grant by
to the firsttwo authors.The authorsthankJamesWarmelsfor his help in datacollection andcoding. In additionwe thankThomasWillging, Barbara O'Brien, and KristinSommerwho offeredcogent commentson earlierversions of this manuscript.

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