Probable Cause, Defined Such facts and Circumstances which would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that

an offense has been committed and the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched (20th Century Fox Film. Corp. vs. CA) Probable cause refers to facts or evidence that would make a reasonable person believe that a crime or wrong doing has been, is being, or will be committed. G.R. No. L-23051 October 20, 1925 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ISLANDS, plaintiffappellant, vs. JOSE MA. VELOSO, defendant-appellant. In May, 1923, the building located at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, was used by an organization known as the Parliamentary Club. Jose Ma. Veloso was at that time a member of the House of Representatives. He was also the manager of the club. The police of Manila had reliable information that the so-called Parliamentary Club was nothing more than a gambling house. Indeed, on May 19, 1923, J. F. Townsend, the chief of the gambling squad, had been to the club and verified this fact. As a result, on May 25, 1923, Detective Andres Geronimo of the secret service of the City of Manila, applied for, and obtained a search warrant from Judge Garduo of the municipal court. Thus provided, the police attempted to raid the Parliamentary Club a little after three in the afternoon. They found the doors to the premises closed and barred. Accordingly, one band of police including policeman Rosacker, ascended a telephone pole, so as to enter a window of the house. Other policemen, headed by Townsend, broke in the outer door. Once inside the Parliamentary Club, nearly fifty persons were apprehended by the police. One of them was the defendant Veloso. Veloso asked Townsend what he wanted, and the latter showed him the search warrant. Veloso read it and told Townsend that he was Representative Veloso and not John Doe, and that the police had no right to search the house. Townsend answered that Veloso was considered as John Doe. As Veloso's pocket was bulging, as if it contained gambling utensils, Townsend required Veloso to show him the evidence of the game. About five minutes was consumed in conversation between the policemen and the accused the policemen insisting on searching Veloso, and Veloso insisting in his refusal to submit to the search. Policeman Rosacker took hold of Veloso only to meet with his resistance. Veloso bit Rosacker in the right forearm, and gave him a blow in another part of the body, which injured the policeman quite severely. Through the combined efforts of Townsend and Rosacker, Veloso was finally laid down on the floor, and long sheets of paper, of reglas de monte, cards, cardboards, and chips were taken from his pockets. ISSUE: Whether the resistance of the police was justifiable on account of the illegality of the John Doe search warrant. HELD: No. John Doe' Warrants. It follows, on principle, from what has already been said regarding the essential requirements of warrants for the apprehension of persons accused, and about blank warrants, that a warrant for the apprehension of a person whose true name is unknown, by the name of "John Doe" or "Richard Roe," "whose other or true name in unknown," is void, without other and further descriptions of the person to be apprehended, and such warrant will not justify the officer in acting under it. Such a warrant must, in addition, contain the best descriptio personae possible to be obtained of the person or persons to be apprehended, and this description must be sufficient to indicate clearly the proper person or persons upon whom the warrant is to be served; and should state his personal appearance and peculiarities, give his occupation and place of residence, and any other circumstances by means of which he can be identified. Person apprehended in act of committing a crime, under a "John Doe" warrant, on the other hand, the apprehension will not be illegal, or the officer liable, because under such circumstances it is not necessary that a warrant should have been issued. A.M. No. RTJ-93-983 August 7, 1995 GUILLERMA DE LOS SANTOS-REYES, complainant, vs. JUDGE CAMILO O. MONTESA, JR., Pairing Judge, Branch 18, Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan, respondent. This case came from the Criminal Case for the murder of Reyes et. al in San Juan Del Monte Bulacan. After the submission of an investigation by the State Prosecutor, RTC of Malolos Bulacan issued a warrant of Arrest. First, the accused filed a petition to grant bail and to Reduce Bail, subsequently withdrawn and rather filed an urgent motion to quash warrants of arrest for lack of existence of probable cause.

After an examination of the lower court of the case and documents forwarded to him by the prosecution, the trial court found the existence of probable cause, but instead of issuing of correspondent Arrest Warrant for acquiring jurisdiction of the persons involved in the crime, the respondent judge granted the petition for bail despite of the its withdrawal and lack of hearing where the prosecution would have been accorded the right to present evidence showing the evidence of guilt is strong. Thus the petitioner filed an administrative complaint charging the respondent judge with gross ignorance of the law and evident dishonesty in his exercise of his function. Issue: What should be the procedure in the determination of the existence of a probable cause? Held: What the respondent judge had in mind in the case at bar is that, since he believed that the evidence agisnt the accused are purely circumstantial and weak, he resolved to granting the petition of the accused to grant bail in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction over these persons instead of issuing warrant of arrest and set hearing for the prosecutions presentation of evidence. He is thus then confused in the procedure of determining the existence of probable cause in the issuance of arrest warrant and proceedings for admission to bail. 1. What the court is given prerogative by the constitution in accordance to Sec. 2 Art III is that, it is sufficient that he personally evaluates the report and supporting documents submitted by the prosecution in determining probable cause, hearing is not necessary. In satisfying the existence of probable cause, the judge shall either Personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause, and in basis thereof, issue arrest warrant and 2. If there is no sufficient establishment of probable cause, he may disregard the prosecutors certification and require the submission of the supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. The judge is not tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation. Thus, once a judge found the probable cause, what he should have to do is to issue warrants of arrest and admission to bail shall only be granted once persons are apprehended and are under their jurisdiction. G.R. Nos. 94054-57 February 19, 1991 VICENTE LIM, SR. and MAYOR SUSANA LIM, petitioners, vs. HON. NEMESIO S. FELIX and HON. ANTONIO ALFANE, respondents. G.R. Nos. 94266-69 February 19, 1991 JOLLY T. FERNANDEZ, FLORENCIO T. FERNANDEZ, JR., NONILON A. BAGALIHOG, MAYOR NESTOR C. LIM and MAYOR ANTONIO KHO, petitioners, vs. HON. NEMESIO S. FELIX and PROSECUTOR ANTONIO C. ALFANE, respondents. The petitioners. Lim et al, was charged of the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder of Congressman Espinosa of Masbate among others. Private respondent, Alfane was designated to review the case and was raffled to RTC Makati Br. 56 of the respondent judge, Nemesio Felix. After transmittal of the case, the respondent Judge issued warrant of Arrest against the accused by virtue of the prosecutors certification in each submitted information recommending the existence of a probable cause. Issue: Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecutions certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists. Held: Yes. But by itself, it does not bind judges to come out with the warrant of arrest. Issuance of warrants calls for the exercise of judicial discretion on the part of the issuing judge. If the judge is satisfied from the preliminary examination conducted by him or by the investigating officer than an offense complained of has been committed and that there is a reasonable grounds to believe that the

accused has committed it, he must issue a warrant or order for an arrest. A judge is not required to personally examine the complainants and witnesses, what the constitution mandates in satisfying the existence of probable cause, the judge shall either; 1. 2. Personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause, and in basis thereof, issue arrest warrant and If there is no sufficient establishment of probable cause, he may disregard the prosecutors certification and require the submission of the supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

Whether or not the certification of a prosecutor is sufficient to issue a warrant of arrest. Held: No. The constitution mandates that the determination of probable cause depends upon the judgment and discretion of the judge or magistrate in issuing warrant of arrest. It simply means that sufficient facts must be presented to the judge or magistrate issuing the warrant to convince him, not that the particular person has committed the crime, but that there is probable cause for believing that the person whose arrest is sought committed the crime charged In the case at bar, the petitioners certification that he had already conducted a preliminary investigation in the case does not sufficiently warrant the existence of probable cause. Nor the single affidavit submitted to the respondent as it is not enough for the respondent judge to exercise his judicial function to determine the existence of probable cause. However, the petition is granted to continue the hearing of the case in the ground of lack of prosecution and that refusal of the prosecution to submit additional affidavit is not a valid ground for the dismissal of a case. G.R. Nos. 76649-51 August 19, 1988 20TH CENTURY FOX FILM CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, EDUARDO M. BARRETO, RAUL SAGULLO and FORTUNE LEDESMA, respondents. After surveillance and investigation, petitioner, with the NBI applied for three separate search warrants against the video outlets owned by private respondents, Barretto et al, and was subsequently granted and issued by the lower court. The applicants did not present the master tapes and the pirated tapes upon their application of search warrant. Instead, only the deposition of two NBI witnesses served as the basis for the existence of probable cause. Subsequently, the lower court lifted the three issued search warrants in the ground that the articles seized, which were still under the custody of NBI, could not be a basis for any criminal prosecution. Issue: Was there an establishment of probable cause for the issuance of search warrant against the respondent? Held: None. The probable cause is wanting in the issuance of the search warrant. As ingrained by law and jurisprudence, probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offenses are in the place sought to be searched. The existence of probable cause requires that there should be a personal knowledge by the complainant and witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified. In the case at bar, the lower court lifted the issued search warrant on the ground of the discovery that the NBI witnesses does not have personal knowledge that the crime of Piracy has been committed. The deposition of such witnesses cannot provide a sufficient existence of probable cause necessary for the issuance of search warrant. Moreover, in accordance with PD 49 (Anti Film Piracy), the essence of such law is the similarity of the pirated and the copyrighted work. Thus, the applicants must present the court the copyrighted films and compare them with the evidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated to determine whether or not the crim has been violated. In the case at bar, the applicants does not provide any evidences 9master tapes and pirated tapes) that would convince the judge that violation of PD 49 has been committed, and therefore for the existence of probable cause. The articles included in the search warrant is couched in general term, making it a general warrant which is prohibited under the Constitution. Note: Search and Seizure, guaranteed rights. Protects a citizen against unreasonable searchers invasion of his privacy and liberty as to his person, houses, papers and effects. The privacy of a person must not be disturbed except in case of overriding social need and only under stringent procedural safeguards. Thus, the government so as not to make arrest, search and seizure unreasonable should strictly follow constitutional and statutory guidelines. G.R. No. L-35149 June 23, 1988

Moreover, the constitution pursuant to Sec 2 Art III also mandates that x x x probable cause should be personally determined by the judgex x x. This means that 1. The determination of probable cause is a function of the judge. 2. Preliminary inquiry made by a prosecutor does not bind the judge. 3. Judges and prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry, which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper, which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or release. In the case at bar, the only basis of the respondent judge in issuing warrants of arrest is only the certification of the prosecutor, without personally examining the information (which still in Masbate, and wherein the respondent denied the motion for transmittal of such records of the cases in the ground that certification id enough ground for the determination of probable cause and issuance of warrant). Thus, there is no personal examination conducted by the judge to establish the existence of probable cause, thereby, the respondent committed abuse of discretion. Note: Preliminary investigation for the determination of sufficient ground for filing of information and investigation for the determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, Distinguished. The former is executive in nature and part of a PROSECUTORS JOB. While the latter aka preliminary examination is judicial in nature and is lodged to the JUDGE. [G.R. No. L-8666. March 28, 1956.] NATALIO P. AMARGA, provincial fiscal of Sulu, Petitioner, vs. HONORABLE MACAPANTON ABBAS, as Judge, of the Court of First Instance of Sulu, Respondent. The respondent Judge, Macapanton Abbas, after receiving; 1) An information with a certification stating that the petitioner fiscal, Amarga has conducted a sufficient preliminary investigation pursuant to the provision of RA 732, and 2) One supporting affidavit of one witness (Jubair) stating that he saw the deceased Dugusan Paspasan was shot and killed by three gunmen, Dismissed the criminal handled by the petitioner against Appang et. al on the ground that; 1) 2) The affidavit of Jubair is hearsay and does not possess gravity for the establishment of the existence of probable cause. So as the certification of the petitioner fiscal wont warrant the existence of probable cause.

Therefore, there can be no prima facie evidence as to necessity for the issuance of warrant of arrest against the accused. Thus, the petitioner filed a petitioner for certiorari and mandamus contending that petitioner has already conducted a preliminary examination and thus it is ministerial function for the respondent to issue arrest warrants. Upon the other hand, the respondent judge argues that the issuance of a warrant of arrest involves a judicial power which necessarily imposes upon him the legal duty of first satisfying himself that there is probable cause, independently of and notwithstanding the preliminary investigation made by the provincial fiscal under Republic Act No. 732; and to that end he may require the fiscal to submit such evidence as may be sufficient to show at least a prima facie case. Issue:

EDUARDO QUINTERO, petitioner, vs. THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, HON. ELIAS ASUNCION, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and HON. JOSE FLAMINIANO, City Fiscal of Pasay City, respondents. After the expose of the petitioner, Eduardo Quintero of the 1st district of Leyte in the 1971 Con-con alleging that some delegates, including him, in the Con-con are under the payroll of the first lady and then President Marcos, NBI agents raided the houses of the petitioner by virtue of the search warrant issued by the respondent Judge Elias Asuncion. The raid confiscated an amount of money amounting to 379K. The said search warrant was base from the application of two persons. One is from the affidavit of Congressman Artemio Mate, also from 1st district of Leyte and an NBI Agent Samuel Castro, alleging that the petitioner committed the crime of bribery. The affidavit of the latter applicant however showed that he has no personal knowledge about the allegations against the petitioner. The affidavit of the statements of the Congressman also shows that his allegations are anchored upon speculations. No sufficient evidence is presented to the respondent judge. Issue: Was there an establishment of the existence of a probable cause? Held: No. The allegations and the statements of the applicants are merely anchored on hearsay and speculations. As ingrained under jurisprudence (Roan vs. Gonzales as cited), in application for a search warrant, if based on hearsay, sannot, standing alone justify the issuance of search warrant. Thus, it is indispensable that the applicants should have personal knowledge of the crime committed. In the case at bar, the deposition of the NBI agent is based on hearsay in which only and anchored on the information given by Cong. Mata. Moreover, the deposition of Cong. Mata cannot establish that he has a direct personal knowledge of the alleged bribery of the petitioner since his affidavit shows that it is only based on speculation. The element of directness and definiteness is wanting so as to establish his personal knowledge. Not to mention, there is no concrete evidence that would support their accusation, so as to validly establish probable cause. Irregularities: 1) Moreover, there is also irregularity in the printing of the search warrant, wherein the crime of bribery Art 210 of RPC was superimposed by ink, which was originally Art. 282. In the case at bar, the search warrant presented was in the case of grave threats directed against the nephew of the petitioner (nephew), thus, the confiscation of he money is not related to the articles seized. The search team also violated statutory guidelines for a lawful search since there is no members of the household present while others are searching the premises. Thus it is planted and orchestrated search. Also the respondents also violated the statutory guidelines that they should issue a detailed receipt of articles seized.

The respondent CA initially favored the petitioner stating that it is a quasi judicial body that ranks with RTC and that, lower courts has no jurisdiction to declare the issued search warrants of the petitioners null and void. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner Karamfil and subsequently, November of the same year, the respondent CA reversed itself. Thus, the petitioner filed an appeal alleging that the respondent CA committed grave abuse of discretion and acted in excess of its appellate jurisdiction by validating the restraining of the lawful orders or decrees issued by the petitioner as a quasi judicial body by the lower Court. This is so since the petitioner contends that they are quasi-judicial body that ranks with the RTC. Issue: As we have observed, the question is whether or not the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is, in the first place, a quasi-judicial body, and one whose decisions may not be challenged before the regular courts, other than the higher tribunals ---- the Court of Appeals and this Court. Held: Quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule making." Thus, these bodies has the basic function to adjudicate claims and/or to determine rights, unless its decisions are appealed to proper reviewing authorities. In the case at bar, the PADS is not meant to exercise quasi judicial function, that is to decide and try claims and execute its judgments, its only task is to handle the prosecution of salting or black marketing activities and nothing more. However, the enabling statute of the petitioner empowers them to determine the existence of probable cause and therefore power to issue warrants of arrest or search and seizure however it does not make them co-equal with RTC nor make this agency semicourt. Note: Kinds of quasi-Judicial agencies: (1) Agencies created to function in situations wherein the government is offering some gratuity, grant, or special privilege, like the defunct Philippine Veterans Board, Board on Pensions for Veterans, and NARRA, and Philippine Veterans Administration. (2) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to carry on certain government functions, like the Bureau of Immigration, the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the Board of Special Inquiry and Board of Commissioners, the Civil Service Commission, the Central Bank of the Philippines. (3) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is performing some business service for the public, like the Bureau of Posts, the Postal Savings Bank, Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage Authority, Philippine National Railways, the Civil Aeronautics Administration. (4) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to regulate business affected with public interest, like the Fiber Inspections Board, the Philippine Patent Office, Office of the Insurance Commissioner. (5) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking under the police power to regulate private business and individuals, like the Securities & Exchange Commission, Board of Food Inspectors, the Board of Review for Moving Pictures, and the Professional Regulation Commission. (6) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to adjust individual controversies because of some strong social policy involved, such as the National Labor Relations Commission, the Court of Agrarian Relations, the Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor, the Social Security Commission, Bureau of Labor Standards, Women and Minors Bureau. 31 PD 1936, the enabling statute of PADS is unconstitutional, reason. Under the constitution, the existence of probable cause is under the sole responsibility and discretion of a judge, who, must be neutral and prudent enough for his exercise of conducting preliminary examination of the facts and circumstances of the case submitted by the fiscal.

2)

3)

The lifting of the respondent judge of the search warrant are null and void. G.R. No. 83578 March 16, 1989 THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-DOLLAR SALTING TASK FORCE, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE TEOFILO L, GUADIZ, JR.,Presiding Judge, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 147: NCR (MAKATI), and KARAMFIL IMPORT-EXPORT CO., INC., respondents. The petitioner, PADS, is the presidents arm assigned to investigate and prosecute :dollar-salting activities in the country pursuant to PD 1936. Sometime 1985, PADS issued a search warrant against respondent Karamfil Import-Export Co. et al. Atty. Gatmaitan of Bureau of Customs applied for a Search warrant, a deputized member of PADS with attached affidavit by Castro, an investigator and operative of PADS. After the search procedure, the respondent contested the search warrant and subsequently declared by the lower court null and void.

Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force exercises, or was meant to exercise, prosecutorial powers, and on that ground, it cannot be said to be a neutral and detached "judge" to determine the existence of probable cause for purposes of arrest or search. Unlike a magistrate, a prosecutor is naturally interested in the success of his case. Although his office "is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused," he stands, invariably, as the accused's adversary and his accuser. To permit him to issue search warrants and indeed, warrants of arrest, is to make him both judge and jury in his own right, when he is neither. That makes, to our mind and to that extent, Presidential Decree No. 1936 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002, unconstitutional.

On June 30, 1987, the Supreme Court unanimously adopted Circular No. 12, setting down guidelines for the issuance of warrants of arrest. The procedure therein provided is reiterated and clarified in this resolution. It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to the issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained. Pendon vs. CA (Similar Case with the 20th Century Fox) Sometime February of 1987, 1st Lt. Felipe Rojas, Officer in charge of the Philippine Constabulary - Criminal Investigation Service (PCCIS), Bacolod City, filed an application for a search warrant, alleging that KENER Trading is the possession of some NAPOCOR Properties, contrary to anti-fencing law. His application was subscribed before Judge Demosthenes Magallanes of MTC Bacolod City supported by the joint deposition of two (2) witnesses, Ignacio L. Reyes, an employee of NAPOCOR (National Power Corporation) and IAI Eduardo Abaja of the CIS of Bacolod City. Search warrant was issued by the lower court and then proceeded the search operation, seizing some articles from the premises. The petitioner, Pendon, filed an application for the return of the articles seized by the PC-CIS contending that the search warrant is illegally issued, which, however denied by the lower court. The petitioner subsequently filed a petition for mandamus certiorari and prohibition in the CA assailing the legality of the Search Warrant, which also was denied by the CA stating that there is an existence of a probable cause. The petitioner contend that the applicants for the assailed warrants has no personal knowledge that the articles sought to be seized were stolen. Moreover, he also alleged that there is irregularities with the contents of the joint deposition of the two witnesses and that there is no personal examination conducted by the judge as required by the law and the rules. Issue: Whether or not the search warrant is illegally issued. Held: Yes. The assailed search warrant was illegally issued. The constitution provides that search warrants are issued based solely on probable cause. And in determining probable cause, it is required that 1) 2) 3) The judge (or) officer must examine the witnesses personally; The examination must be under oath; and The examination must be reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers

G.R. No. 82585 November 14, 1988 MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, ANTONIO V. ROCES, FREDERICK K. AGCAOLI, and GODOFREDO L. MANZANAS, petitioners, vs. THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 35, UNDERSECRETARY SILVESTRE BELLO III, of the Department of Justice, LUIS C. VICTOR, THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA and PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO, respondents. G.R. No. 82827 November 14, 1988 LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the Regional Trial Court, at Manila, THE HON. LUIS VICTOR, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SUPERINTENDENT OF THE WESTERN POLICE DISTRICT, and THE MEMBERS OF THE PROCESS SERVING UNIT AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, respondents. G.R. No. 83979 November 14, 1988. LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY CATALINO MACARAIG, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SEDFREY ORDOEZ, UNDERSECRETARY OF JUSTICE SILVESTRE BELLO III, THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA JESUS F. GUERRERO, and JUDGE RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the Regional Trial Court, at Manila, respondents. (A controversial case) This case softens the doctrine laid down by the BACHE case where the court states that the judge should personally depose the complainants and witnesses under oath and in writing in determining the existence of probable cause. This is a responsibility that should not be delegated to clerk of court or other authority. This is a consolidated petition for certiorari and prohibition to review the decision of the respondent Judge Ramon Makasiar. In the case filed by Beltran, he alleged that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when the respondent judge issued a warrant of arrest against the petitioner for the crime of libel, without the respondent judge personally examining the complainant and witnesses for the determination of probable cause. The petitioner contend that the constitution requires that the judge should personally examine the complainant and/or witness for the determination of probable cause and therefore issue an arrest warrant. Issue: Was the contention correct? Held: No. (Sadly) What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) Personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) If on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.

And also, such finding of probable cause should be substantiated by the records. In the case at bar, We find that the requirement mandated by the law and the rules that the judge must personally examine the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers before issuing the warrant, was not sufficiently complied with. The applicant himself was not asked any searching question by Judge Magallanes. The records disclose that the only part played by the applicant, Lieutenant Rojas was to subscribe the application before Judge Magallanes. The application contained pre-typed questions, none of which stated that applicant had personal knowledge of a robbery or a theft and that the proceeds thereof are in the possession and control of the person against whom the search warrant was sought to be issued. Affidavits of the complainants and witness are not sufficient for determining a probable cause. Pursuant to the Anti fencing law, the records also shows that the questions asked during the deposition cannot support the finding of the probable cause There was also no statement in the joint deposition that the articles sought to be seized were derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or a theft or that applicants have any knowledge that a robbery or theft was committed and the articles sought to be seized were the proceeds thereof. Moreover, the items to be confiscated listed in the SW is couched on general terms, therefore considered as a prohibited general warrants. (Galvanized bolts, aluminum wires and other Napocor tower and line parts and accessories) The items confiscated does not also fall under the personal properties that are allowed to be seized under the law. Thus the petition is granted and the articles are ordered to be return since possession thereof is not prohibited by the law.

Note: Anti Fencing Law, commission of, in the case at bar, The offense which petitioner was sought to be charged was violation of the anti-fencing law which punishes the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy or sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should have known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft (Sec. 2a, P.D. 1612) Personal properties that may be confiscated in accordance with the law, enumerate Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure a) The subject of an offense; b) Stolen or embezzled property and other proceeds or fruits of an offense; and c) Used or intended to be used as a means of committing an offense. If the law does not prohibit the possession of the articles sought, it should be returned to the owner. G.R. No. 88919 July 25, 1990 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE ENRIQUE B. INTING, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 38, DUMAGUETE CITY, AND OIC MAYOR DOMINADOR S. REGALADO, JR., respondents. Preliminary inquiry of the prosecutor does not bind the judge for the determination of probable cause Sometime 1988, Editha Barba filed a letter complaint against OIC Mayor of Tanjay, Negros oriental with the Comelec for transferring her to a remote barangay without prior clearance from the Comelec. The complaint was handled by the provincial election Supervisor of Dumaguete City, atty. Gerardo Lituanas . after his investigation, he found prima facie evidence and then filed to the respondent Trial court under Judge Enrique Inting a criminal case in violation of Sec. 261 of the Omnibus Election Code against the OIC Mayor. An arrest warrant was issued but later set aside on the ground that Atty. Lituanas is not authorized to determine the existence of probable cause. Hence this petition. Issue: Does the Provincial Election Supervisor of the Comelec has the jurisdiction to find the existence of a probable cause? Held: No. the phrase under Sec 2 Art II of the Constitution which reads and such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law has been deleted, making the determination for the existence of a probable cause under the sole responsibility and discretion of a Judge. It should be distinguished that preliminary investigation for the determination of a probable cause is vested with the authority of Judges (Judicial in nature) and while preliminary investigation in determining whether or not the accused is guilty of the offense charged and therefore should be subjected to litigation is vested to the authority of the prosecutor (executive in nature). The separate kinds of preliminary investigation has been delineated and that the latter kind has been deleted to the authorities of judges (preliminary investigation proper). What the constitution vested the Comelec is to investigate and prosecute cases in violation of election laws (Art. IX Sec 2), however, this does not mean that the power to determine the existence of probable cause is within the scope of their authority, but rather, they are empowered only in purpose in assisting the Judge to determine the probable cause and for filing for an information. Note: The Prosecutor cannot assume roles in the prosecution of election offenses, if he has, it is because he is deputized by the Comelec to handle such election offenses. G.R. No. 81567 July 9, 1990 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO VILLANUEVA. MANOLITA O. UMIL, and NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS V. SESE, petitioners, vs. FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, respondents. G.R. Nos. 84581-82 July 9, 1990

AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO BUENAOBRA, petitioners, vs. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA and GEN. RAMON MONTANO, respondents. G.R. Nos. 84583-84 July 9, 1990 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ATTY. DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE. DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE, petitioners, vs. HON. FIDEL V. RAMOS, GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, COL. EVARISTO CARINO, LT. COL. REX D. PIAD, T/SGT. CONRADO DE TORRES, S/SGT. ARNOLD DURIAN, and Commanding Officer, PC-INP Detention Center, Camp Crame, Quezon City, respondents. G.R. No. 83162 July 9, 1990 IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VICKY A. OCAYA AND DANNY RIVERA. VIRGILIO A. OCAYA, petitioner, vs. BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL. HERCULES CATALUNA, COL. NESTOR MARIANO, respondents. G.R. No. 85727 July 9, 1990 IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF: DEOGRACIAS ESPIRITU, petitioner, vs. BRIG. GEN. ALFREDO S. LIM, COL. RICARDO REYES, respondents. G.R. No. 86332 July 9, 1990 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF NARCISO B. NAZARENO. ALFREDO NAZARENO, petitioner, vs. THE STATION COMMANDER OF THE MUNTINGLUPA POLICE STATION, Muntinglupa, Metro Manila, P/SGT. JACINTO MEDINA, P/SGT. ELADIO TAGLE, P/SGT. LEVI SOLEDAD, and P/SGT. MAURO AROJADO, respondents. This is a consolidated petition for habeas corpus where the petitioners alleged that their detention is illegal and unlawful as their arrests were made without warrant and that no preliminary investigation was first conducted, making the informations filed against them are null and void. The respondents contends otherwise. In this consolidated case, all of the petitioners are charged under the Anti Subversion Law, with an exception to the case of Enrile vs. Lim (Inciting to sedition) and Nazareno vs. Station Commander. The rest are charged guilty of rebellion, a crime against the State, and is a continuing crimes in nature. They were found of the possession of unlicensed firearms and ammunitions as well as subversive documents. Issue: Was warrantless arrest in the case at bar illegal, as the arrest was not made pursuant to the constitutional and statutory guidelines for the issuance of warrantless arrest? Held: Warrantless arrest conducted in the case at bar is lawful. Pursuant to 5 Rule 113 of RRC, arrest of a person without a warrant of arrest or previous complaint is recognized by law. The instances where a valid warrantless arrest may be effected are the following. Sec5. Arrest without Warrant: When lawful A peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committees, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement or another. Thus, pursuant to the RRC, warrantless arrest is justified when a person arrested is caught in flagranti delicto or in the act of committing an offense; or when an offense has just been committed and the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has committed it. The rational behind the concept o warrantless arrest is laid down in the PPI vs. Malasugui, that to sustain that arresting a person without warrant illegal would leave the society, into a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances. In the case at bar, the petitioners had freshly committed or were actually committing an offense.

In the case of the petitioners who were charged of rebellion and inciting to sedition, the court held that they are lawfully detained and the informations filed against them are valid. This is since the crime in which they are arrested are continuous crime which is against the State, thus, the continued possession of subversive materials and unlicensed firearms and ammunitions, even without preliminary investigation and without warrant, as long as the authorities have confiscated such prohibited materials under their possession and that in the case of Enrile vs. Lim, they had actually done what is prohibited by law as long as they are positively identified by a witness having a personal knowledge of the committed crime, their arrest are lawful. This is justified since under the doctrine of Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile, persons arrested of rebellion does not need to follow strict procedures, since their crimes committed are violence against the State, which concerns the very survival of the society and government. In the case of Nazareno vs. station Commander, the warrantless arrest is justified since there was a prior information filed against the petitioner for the same offense, and that he was positively identified by a witness who has a personal knowledge about the crime he committed. He was arrested while he was at large. G.R. No. 96080 April 19, 1991 ATTY. MIGUEL P. PADERANGA petitioner, vs. HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, HON. SILVESTRE H. BELLO III, ATTY. HENRICK F. GINGOYON, HELEN B. CANOY and REBECCA B. TAN, respondent Felizardo Roxas, was included as a co-accused in an amended information for the murder of Bucag et. al. The respondent state prosecutor Henrick Gingoyan was designated by the DOJ to conduct the preliminary investigation and directed to include the petitioner Roxas as a co-accused in the criminal case. Contending that the preliminary investigation was not yet completed so as to include Roxas as a Co-accused in the case and that he was deprived of his right to present a corresponding counteraffidavit and additional evidence crucial to the determination of the allege linkage to the crime charged, the petitioner filed a Motion for reconsideration, but was later denied. A petition for Review was subsequently filed in the DOJ but was also denied. Thus, the petitioner filed a suit before the SC contending that preliminary investigation is not yet completed thereby, there is no existing prima facie evidence or probable cause that would justify the petitioners inclusion to the crime charged. Issue: Whether or not the preliminary investigation is the proper forum to present evidence to prove or disprove the guilt of the party. Held: No. A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. The quantum of evidence now required in preliminary investigation is such evidence sufficient to "engender a well founded belief" as to the fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent's probable guilt thereof. A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof Preliminary investigation is generally inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof, and it does not place the person against whom it is taken in jeopardy. G.R. No. L-56443 December 19, 1981 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and City Fiscal NESTORIO M. PLACER and Assistant City Fiscal ERNESTO M. BROCOY of Butuan City, petitioners, vs. CITY JUDGE NAPOLEON D. VILLANUEVA of Butuan City and ROGELIM YEE, respondents. A clear difference between the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutional provision on Sec 2 Art III (responsible officers authorized by law)

Sometime 1980, the petitioners, city fiscal and assistant City fiscal filed an information against Rogelim Yee with serious slander by deed. The petitioners certified that they have already conducted a preliminary investigation and find probable cause. Instead of issuing an arrest warrant, the respondent Judge, Napoleon Villanueva conducted an ex parte preliminary examination for scanning the records to determine the existence of probable cause. After such examination, the respondent judge found out that the crime committed may wither be slander by deed or slight physical injury. However, since the information was filed 64 days after the commission of the crime, the judge dismissed the case by prescription. Hence, this petition for certiorari and mandamus on the ground that the respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In his defense, the respondent judge contends that he was not satisfied in the existence of probable cause and that he needed to conduct a separate examination for its determination and that, the case was dismissed because of prescription. Issue: Whether or not the judge may dismiss the case outright upon the absence of probable cause. Held: No. Under the 1973 constitution, the judge has the power and legal duty to determine the existence of probable cause, also, in cases where he is not satisfied with the certification of the prosecutor in the information, he may conduct preliminary investigation authorized under Sec 6 Rule 112 of the RRC. But that power does not include the authority to dismiss outright the information if the judge believes that there is no probable cause. The judge should require the fiscal to present additional evidence to show probable cause. If the fiscal refuses to do so, then the case may be dismissed for "lack of prosecution" as also stated under the case of Amarga vs. Abbas. The fiscal is a "responsible officer authorized by law" within the meaning of Section 3 of the Bill of Rights. His determination of probable cause is a sufficient justification for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Thus, it was held that "in a clash of views between the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those of the fiscal's should normally prevail" Thus, during the 73 constitution, it is a rule that the certification that probable cause exist by the preliminary investigation of the prosecutor is a sufficient ground for a judge to issue probable cause. The judge, therefore shouldnt conduct another examination. Note: Fiscals certification is sufficient, reason: The time-saving practice has been for the judge (municipal, city or Court of First Instance) to rely on the preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal as the basis for issuing the warrant of arrest. That practice is supported by the presumption that the fiscal performed his duties regularly and competently (Edillon vs. Narvios, Administrative Case No. 1753, August 21, 1980, 99 SCRA 174). And that practice existed even under the old Constitution when Section 1(3) of the Bill of Rights did not contain the terms "warrant of arrest" and "such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law." We hold that, as a rule, a trial judge should not hold another preliminary examination to determine probable cause in case the fiscal has filed an information and certified that he has conducted the requisite preliminary investigation. That certification means that there is a prima facie case against the accused and that the issuance of a warrant of arrest is justified.