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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 DIGESTS (Atty. Gwen De Vera) All by LOUDETTE CALPO (A 2008) 4. No, A writ cannot be issued by the court to the respondent. Although Congress gave the Court the right to issue a writ of mandamus to any court appointed, for any person holding office, ART.3 SEC. 2 of US Constitution clearly outlines the original and appellate jurisdictions of the Court. While a writ may be issued to the respondent the basis of which is not the office but the nature of the thing to be done, it cannot be issued by the SC following the Constitution. The jurisdiction to issue writs to public officers lies within the inferior courts. To do otherwise would be to give the legislative supreme power over the law, and any act contrary to the Constitution cannot be valid and given effect by the courts.
1. MARBURY v. MADISON Action: A petition for writ of mandamus for delivery of document Facts: On the December Term, 1801, petitioner, with Dennis Ramsay, Robert Townsende Hooe and William Harper petitioned for a rule to compel respondent to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not issue. Petitioner is asking to be furnished with the commission as Justice of the Peace (JOP) of Washington, D.C. Witnesses Wagner (not all commissions signed, recorded; did not personally see commissions), Daniel Brent (almost certain of Marbury and Hooes appointment, signed and affixed with a seal but not recorded; Ramsay not included), Lincoln (Secretary of State during Adams, term) that no commissions were sent out. James Marshall (delivered commissions, returned some including Hooes and Harpers), and Hazen Kimball (Marbury and Hooe commissions signed) attested to the existence of the commissions, duly signed and affixed with US seal. Petitioners were denied requests for the commission, and thus appeal to the Court for a writ of mandamus. On February 24, 1803, the Court rendered its decision.
Issues: 1. 2. 3. 4. Held: 1. WON applicant has right to commissions demanded. WON this right, if violated, has a remedy in law. WON writ of mandamus is the remedy, and if so, WON writ can be issued by the Court to respondent. YES, the applicants have the right to the commissions demanded. When the commission was signed by the President, and the seal affixed verifying the verity of the signature, the commission is complete. The office of the JOP is independent of the Office of the President; once signed, commission is irrevocable. The transmission or acceptance of the commission is a practice of convenience and not law, since the document is delivered to one ALREADY appointed. The petitioner thus has a vested right to the office of JOP. The violated right has a remedy in law. The Secretary of State has both a public ministerial duty to the US and an agency to the President. It is in this former capacity that he is accountable to the people. His executive or discretionary power ended with the signing of the President of the commission. Mandamus is the proper remedy. There is no other adequate specific legal remedy. Since a detinue involves an object or its value. Mandamus is the proper remedy since the office is not to be sold (no attendant value; all or nothing).
WHEREFORE, Court holds that the petitioner has a legal right to the office of JOP for five years, and the refusal to deliver the commission is a violation of that right. While mandamus is the proper remedy, jurisdiction to issue the writ lies with the inferior courts.
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Facts:
ANGARA v. EC
On September 17, 1935, petitioner was elected member of the national assembly for the first district of Tayabas. The provincial board of canvassers proclaimed him on November 15, 1935, NA passed Resolution no. 8 confirming all members whose election has not been contested. On December 9, 1935, respondent Ynsua filed a protest of petitioners election, with a prayer that he be declared winner or election declared null and void. He filed on the last day set by the electoral commission. On December 20, 1935 petitioner filed a motion to dismiss protest before the Electoral Commission on the following grounds: 1. Res. No. 8 valid exercise of legislative powers 2. Resolution has the object of limiting protest period 3. Protest filed outside prescribed period Ynsua argued that there exists no constitutional provision or statute prohibiting protest of election of a NA member after confirmation. On January 23, 1936, the EC denied the protest of which are the following grounds: 1. Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction to EC as regards electoral disputes under Sec 4 Art 6 2. This excludes the power to regulate proceedings of said election contestsreserved to NA 3. EC can only regulate if Na has not availed of the power to do so 4. Resolution no. 8 valid 5. SC has jurisdiction over question; involves Constitutionality under Par 13 Sec 1, ordinance appended to constitution and Sec 1 and 3 of PC The Solicitor General replied: 1. EC on independent instrument of NA, and its fixing of the deadline is a valid exercise of its powers
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Respondent Ynsua argued: 1. No law prescribing protest period was in effect at the time EC set the deadline 2. He filed within the set deadline 3. EC has no jurisdiction, not reviewable by a writ of prohibition 4. No law requires confirmation of NA members 5. EC renders independent, final, and unappealable decisions 6. EC not inferior tribunal but empowered by Sec 226 and 516 of Code of Civil Procedure 7. The Tydings-Mcduffie Law as invoked by petitioner is not applicable to case at bar. Issue: 1. 2. Held: 1. The SC has jurisdiction. There is a need to determine the scope, characteristics, and extent of the Consti grant to EC under Sec 4 Art 6. No. The deliberation of the Constitutional Commissioners show that the purpose in creating the EC was to transfer all power related to judgment on electoral dispute from NA to independent tribunal. Absent a Consti provision stating otherwise, all powers to promulgate its judgment of election contests lies with EC. The argument of abuse is not relevant as everything can be actually met. Confirmation of elected officials is not necessary. The Constitution abrogated the Jones Law and Sec 478 of Act 3387, which gave NA the power to fix the time period within which protests can be filed. WON SC has jurisdiction over EC case at bar WON EC acted in excess of its jurisdiction, given the resolution passed by NA
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Wherefore, petition is denied, with costs to petitioner. Also, Abad-Santos concurring: The power of EC to judge electoral contests judicial in nature The power to regulate time to protest legislative in nature
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Facts:
TANADA v. CUENCO
On Feb. 22, 1956, the Senate on behalf of the Nacionalista Party elected respondents Cuenco & Delgado as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal upon the nomination of Senator Primicias, an NP member. The two seats, originally for
WHEREFORE, The Senate cannot elect members of the ET not nominated by the proper party, nor can the majority party elect more than 3 members of the ET. Furthermore, the CRS has no standing to nominate, and the election of respondents Cuenco & Delgado void ab initio. The appointment of the staff members are valid as it is a selection of personnel - a matter under the discretion of the Chairman.
The refusal of Taada to nominate must be considered a waiver of privilege based on constitutionality and reason, in order to reconcile two applications of Art. 6, Sec. 2.
Respondents argue that the questioned provision is a valid exercise of legislative power, and that the amending process in the Consti does not apply to transitory provisions. Furthermore, it is a political question, and the petitioners have no standing. Pending judgment, a temporary restraining order on RA 7056 was issued on June 27, 1991. Issues: 1. WON Court has jurisdiction over the matter 2. WON RA 7056 is unconstitutional 3. WON amending process applies to Transitory Provisions Held: 1. The Issue is a justiciable controversy. The act in question is not discretionary in nature. The question is the legality and not wisdom of RA 7056. Furthermore, the SC now has expanded jurisdiction over matters involving political questions, so long as Constitutionality is an issue, as evident in Sec. 1, Art. 8 of PC. Transcendental importance of cases to the public can merit brushing aside of procedure which is why procedural flaws (standing, etc.) of petitioners can be brushed aside. The Statute is unconstitutional. The Constitution specifically provides for the synchronization of elections, as seen from the discussion of its framers. The provisions of RA 7056 assailed by petitioners are violative of the Constitution. Transitory Provisions are Constitutional. The Transitory Provisions were not created to be applied as soon as practicable, but on a specific date: 2nd Monday of May, 1992. The Solicitor General merely focused on the
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Facts:
MUTUC v. COMELEC
Petitioner is campaigning to be delegate to the Constitutional Convention and was prohibited by respondent from using a taped jungle for campaign purposes. Respondent justifies prohibition as being pursuant to RA 6132 (Constitutional Convention Act), which makes it unlawful for candidates to purchase, produce, request, or distribute various forms of electoral propaganda. On October 29, 1970, petitioner filed a civil action for prohibition with a prayer for preliminary injunction. Though prayer was denied, the Court granted by minute resolution a writ of prohibition on November 3, 1970, agreeing with petitioner that prohibition is a violation of Sec. 4, Art. 3 of the Philippine Constitution (free speech). Issue: WON COMELEC has the authority to prohibit petitioners self-expression Held, Ratio NO, the Court believes that the COMELEC does not have a statutory authority through RA 6132. Its interpretation of the statute infringes upon the right to free speech. Statutes should always be consonant with the Constitution, which is the highest law of the land. COMELECs prohibiton, in effect, amounted to censorship. WHEREFORE, petition granted. Injunction issued on COMELEC order.
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6. RUBI vs. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO Action: For Habeas Corpus Facts: Plaintiff alleges that he and other Mangyans are being illegally detained by provincial officials in a reservation in Tigbao, Mindoro. Plaintiff further alleges that Doroteo Dabalos is being held in custody in Calapan by the provincial sheriff for escaping from the reservation.
Sec. 2145 (power to delegate tribes to lands) delegating power to the provincial governor, and Sec. 2759 of Act No. 2711 (detainment for violation) are alleged to be in violation of the August 29, 1916 Act of Congress, Sec. 3 of which guarantees equal protection under the laws. Defendant contends that the exercise of police power was valid and promulgated for the interest of the nation: the Mangyans need to be civilized Issue: Whether or not Sec. 2145 and 2759 of Act No. 2711 are invalid by virtue of: 1. Illegal delegation of power from legislative to provincial officials (legislative avoided full responsibility) 2. Discrimination based on religious belief 3. Denying plaintiff of right to equal protection of the laws 4. Illegal detention is tantamount to involuntary servitude *Act 547 expressly for Mangyans Held: 1. There is no illegal delegation of power. The legislative only conferred discretionary authority to the provincial governor considering his familiarity with the best places for relocation. Such delegation of power is necessary for the execution of the law. 2. No discrimination based on religious belief. Legal practice and legislative intent clearly show that the term Non-Christian does not discriminate on the basis of religion, or even geographical location. The term is used to indicate whether or not a particular community has been civilized. No denial of right to equal protection. While the law is universal in its application, liberty must be understood to mean liberty restrained by reasonable regulations to assure public safety. Thus, given the Mangyans
WHEREFORE, Writ denied. Habeas corpus cannot issue if plaintiff is not unlawfully restrained of liberty. CARLSON, concurring: The power to provide for the issuance of Sec. 2145 and 2759 is akin to orders governing children and persons of unsound mind. It is for their own good. MOIR, dissenting: The Mangyans are legal citizens of the Philippines, unlike American Indian tribes who have treatises with the government. The reasons of caingin practice and their subsequent burden to the State is not justification for incarceration. The arbitrary and unrestrained power to do harm (by provincial governor) must be measure of laws validity rather than the potential to do harm. 7. Facts: ROXAS & CO.,INC v. CA
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Petitioner is the registered owner of HAACIENDAS PALICA, BANILAD, and CAYLAWAY, all located in NASUGBU, BATANGAS. On June 15, 1999, RA 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law) took effect. Petitioner has tendered a voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway to DAR, and haciendas Palico & Banilad were later put under compulsory acquisition. On May 4, 19993, petitioner applied for the conversion of his lands from agricultural to non-agricultural, citing the SANGGUNIAN NG BAYAN NG NASUGBUs reclassification of the land; petitioner was denied. On August 24,1993, petitioner filed a case before the DARAB with a prayer to cancel the CLOAS issued in the name of several persons. Petitioner contended that the land was no longer suitable for agricultural purposes. DARAB remarked that the determination of the lands suitability for agriculture should be determined by DAR, and remanded the case to SDAR. The petition citing a lack of due process in the acquisition of lands was denied by the CA on April 28, 1994. Petitioner submitted the following assignment of errors: 1. CAs determination of a premature cause of action. (did not exhaust administrative remedies given patent illegality of DAR acts) 2. CAs ruling that land is subject to CARL. 3. DAR acquisition of land void for lack of due process. (no notice and identification of land)
Respondents argue that the Act was a valid exercise of Legislative Power, that there was only one subject in the title, that there was no infringement of any international treaty, and that in the case of hereditary succession, only the form and not the value of property was impaired. Moreover, the institution of inheritance is of statutory origin. Issue: WON exclusion of aliens from retail trade is unreasonable under sec1 Art 3 of PC. Held: No. It is a valid exercise of power. Police power is said to be the most positive & active of all governmental processes, and as such is essential, insistent & illimitable. The Constitution does not define the scope of police power, but only imposes limits in the form of due process & equal protection of the laws. Equal protection of the laws does not demand absolute equality among residents so long as there is like treatment under like circumstances. If it applies to all members of the same class, there is no infringement so long as the distinction is reasonable. Moreover, courts can only inquire into the legality & not the wisdom of the law. Alien domination is a fact proven by official statistics and felt by all Filipinos across industries. The alien group is a well organized and powerful group dominating the economic sphere and perpetrating abuses. Alienage is a reasonable distinction given that aliens are here for gain & profit. They have no real contribution to national economy & wealth (dont invest). The abuses done are against Filipinos goes against petitioners argument that retail trade is only a continuance of nationalistic protective policy laid down as law in the primary objective of the Constitution. Wherefore, Petition DENIED. 9. PEOPLE v. FERRER Facts: On May 5, 1970 a criminal complaint was filed against respondent FELICIANO CO charging him as a ranking leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines, in violation of RA 1700 (Anti-Subversion Law). On May 25, 1970 a criminal case against NILO TAYAG and others was filed for subversion respondent was a member of the Kabataang Makabayan, a subversive group, and tried to invite others to revolt against the government. On July 21, 1970, TAYAG moved to quash, arguing that RA 1700 is: 1. a bill of attainder; 2. vague; 3. with more than one subject expressed in title;
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WHEREFORE, The petition is granted in part. Acquisition proceedings are nullified because of lack of due process. The case is remanded to DAR for proper acquisition proceedings and determination of application of conversion. YNARES-SANTIAGO, dissenting: The remanding of the case should not be done, given how DAR has already sat on the petition for seven years. Fruits of wrongful acts must be nullified & the CLOAs revoked. The DAR acceptance of Presidential Proclamation 1520 which identified Nasugbu as a tourist zone implies recognizance that the land is non-agricultural. Vote to grant certiorari, declare lands non-agricultural and outside the scope of RA 6657. 8. ICHONG, ET AL v. HERNANDEZ & SARMIENTO Action: Petition for mandamus & injunction Facts: Petitioner alleges that RA1180, by limiting the participation of aliens in retail trade, is unconstitutional because: 1. denies alien residents equal protection & due process
On September 15, 1970, the statute was declared void on the grounds that it is a bill of attainder, vague, and overbroad. Issues: 1. 2. Held: 1. WON RA 1700 is a bill of attainder WON RA 17700 is overbroad and vague (due process)
No, it is not a bill of attainder. The act does not specify which CPP members are to be punished. The focus is not on individuals but on conduct relating to subversive purposes. The guilt of CPP members must first be established, as well as their cognizance as shown by overt acts. Even if acts specified individuals, instead of activities, it shall not be a bill of attainder not unless specific individuals were named. The court has consistently upheld the CPPs activities as inimical to public safety and welfare. A bill of attainder must also reach past conduct and applied retroactively; Section 4 of RA 1700 expressly states that the act will be applied prospectively to give members time to renounce their affiliations. The legislature is with reasonable relation to public health, morals, and safety and the government is with right to protect itself against subversion. No, the statute is not overbroad and vague. The respondents assertion that the term overthrow is overbroad is likewise untenable, since it could be achieved by peaceful means. Respondents disregarded the terms knowingly, willingly, and by overt acts, overthrow is understood to be by violent means. Whatever interest in free speech/associations that is infringed is not enough to outweigh considerations of national security and preservation of democracy. The title of the bill need not be a catalogue of its contents it is valid if it is indicative in broad but clear terms the nature, scope, and consequences of proposed law and operation.
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Guidelines Set Forth by the Supreme Court: 1. In the case of any subversive group a. establish purposes to overthrow and establish totalitarian regime under foreign domination; b. accused joined organization; c. knowledge, will and overt action. 2. in CPP case a. pursuit of objectives decried by the government; b. accused joined organization; c. knowledge, will, and overt action. WHEREFORE, Resolution set aside, cases remanded to court a quo for trial on merits.
Yes, Sec 40(m) of the Municipal Code requires all able-bodied men of specific characteristics to render service, and all householders to furnish relevant information in cases the community is infested by ladrones. This statute recognizes the common law right of the state to exercise police power. The powers of the country or posse comitatus, vests those with authority to maintain good order the power to call upon all able-bodied men to assist in maintaining the security of the community. Generally speaking, the Philippine Legislature can adopt laws on matters not expressly given to Congress, whereas the latter can only legislate on matters expressly granted to them by the Constitution. Police power is inherent on this power of the state and cannot be limited in the interest of presuming public order and preventing conflict of rights. Police power is so extensive that the courts have not been able to define it, such that each case is decided on its merits. Thus Act 1309 is a legitimate exercise of police power.
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Wherefore, Judgment affirmed and petition dismissed. Pertinent Provisions of Sec 40(m) of Act 1309 empowers municipal government, if province is overrun by ladrones and outlaws to: 1. require able-bodied males between 18-50(55) to assist for not more than 5 days per month in the apprehension of outlaws; patrol duty for not more than once a wee. 2. Exact a fine or issue penalty for failure to comply ( not more than P100; not more than 3 months) or both at the discretion of the courts 3. Docs not extend to US officers/employees 4. officers/employees of common carriers (sea and land), priests, ministers, physicians, druggists, physicians engaged in business, and lawyers when in court Purpose of Act 1309 1. amendment of Municipal Code for organization of municipal governor 2. amendment to create sec 40 (m) 3. enunciation of municipal council powers 4. empowerment on additional areas to the council
Yes. Respondents assert that LOI 229 is backed by factual data & statistics, whereas petitioners conjectural assertions are without merit. The statute is a valid exercise of police power in so far as it promotes public safety, and petitioner failed to present factual evidence to rebut the presumed validity of the statute. Early warning devices have a clear emergency meaning, whereas blinking lights are equivocal and would increase accidents. The petitioners contention that the devices manufacturers may be abusive does not invalidate the law. Petitioners objection is based on a negative view of the statutes wisdom-something the court cant decide on. No. The authority delegated in the implementation is not legislative in nature. Respondent Edu was merely enforcing the law forms part of Philippine law. PD 207 ratified the Vienna Conventions recommendation of enacting road safety signs and devices. Respondents are merely enforcing this law. Moreover, the equal protection under the laws contention was not elaborated upon.
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Wherefore: Petition is dismissed. Judgment immediately executory. Teehankee, dissenting: The rules and regulations outlined by the LTO Commission does not reflect the real intent of LOI229. 1. Effectivity and utility of statute not yet demonstrated. 2. public necessity for LOI not yet shown 3. big financial burden on motorists 4. no real effort shown to illustrate less burdensome alternative to early warning device 5. imperative need to impose blanket requirement on all vehicles -people still drive dilapidated vehicle -need for sustained education campaign to instill safe driving The exercise of police power affecting the life , liberty, and property of any person is till subject to judicial inquiry.
11. AGUSTIN v. EDU Action: Action for prohibition Facts: Petitioner assails Letter of Instruction No. 229 which provides for the mandatory use of early warning devices for all motor vehicles. Petitioner owns a Volkswagen Beetle equipped with blinking lights that could well serve as an early warning device. He alleges that the statute: 1. violates the provision against delegation of police power 2. immoral will only enrich the manufacturer of the devices at the car owners expense 3. prevents car owners from finding alternatives Petitioner prays for a declaration of nullity and a restraining order in the meantime. On the other hand, respondents answers are based on case law and other authoritative decisions of the tribunal issues.
Issues: 1. WON LOI 229 is constitutional (due process) 2. WON LOI 229 is an invalid delegation of legislative power, as far as implementation is concerned
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Facts:
US v. GOMEZ JESUS
On July 17, 1913 a complaint was filed before the COFI MANILA charging defendant with practicing medicine without a license 1. Contrary to SEC. 8 ACT 310 of the PC. Defendant contends that: 1. Complaint was not in the form required by law 2. Facts stated do not constitute a crime 3. Complaints allegations are justifications to legally exempt the accused.
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Facts:
MORFE v. MUTUC
Petitioner alleges that RA 3019 (ANTI-GRAFT PRACTEICES ACT) by requiring periodic ruling of the SAL of public officers is an unlawful exercise of police power and is unconstitutional because: 1. It violates the right to privacy 2. Violates ban against unreasonable search and seizure and the prohibition against self-incrimination. The lower court ruled in favor of the petitioner and granted the petition for injunction. Appellant contends that RA 3019 is a valid exercise of public power to safeguard public morals. Appellee contends the statutes presumption of guilt is an affront to dignify tax law & tax census law already require documents relevant to RA 3019s purposes. Issues: 1. WON case exhibits evidence to rebut presumption of constitutional validity 2. WON statute violates the right to privacy, self incrimination & unreasonable search & seizure (valid exercise of police power?) Held: 1. The evidence is not enough to rebut the presumption of its constitutionality. There is no factual basis for the allegation, and the validity of the statute must be upheld. It has been said that when freedom is impelled by law, freedom must be respected, but if property is curtailed, the legislators judgment must be respected. There is no violation of any right to privacy, self-incrimination and unreasonable search and seizure. 3019 (Sec 7) was drafted in order to address the rampant corruption in politics. Restriction of liberty is done for the greater good, and is allowable so long as due process is observed. Public servants are protected in so far as they cannot be removed from office without just cause. RA 3019 is thus not arbitrary exercise of police power. There is no unconstitutional intrusion to the public servants privacy nor an unreasonable search & seizure. The statute is with reference to a determinate provision and a procedure that must be followed. Invoking the violation of the self-incrimination clause will have to wait until charges have been filed. Arguing that the statute is an affiant to dignity is likewise untenable. The court can only decide in the legality & not the wisdom of the statutes.
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Facts:
On July 5, 1963 petitioner filed for a writ of prohibition against respondent, challenging the Municipal Board of Manila from enacting Ordinance No. 4760. Petitioner alleged that said ordinance was unconstitutional, unreasonable, oppressive, arbitrary, denies rights to privacy and self-incrimination, and void since the respondent was without authority to regulate motels (not expressly granted by law or the Revised Charter of the City of Manila). The petition was granted by the lower court and the statute declared null and void. Respondent, in appealing to the Supreme Court, contended that: 1. petitioner was without cause of action; 2. ordinance had a reasonable relation to a public purpose (curb immorality); 3. ordinance a valid exercise of police power; 4. only guests/customers can argue for abridgement of right to privacy and self-incrimination; 5. preliminary injunction issued is contrary to law, and the petition should be dismissed. Issues: 1. WON case at bar has shown that the ordinance is unconstitutional; 2. WON ordinance violates due process rights; 3. WON ordinance is vague or uncertain. Held: 1. The case at bar has not shown that the ordinance is unconstitutional. The presumption of a statutes constitutionality is presumed and the burden to prove otherwise rests with the petitioner. The absence of evidence does not impair the statutes validity. Police power, being the most essential, insistent and least limitable of powers aims to safeguard public morals, and must be respected until clearly shown to violate constitutional rights. The ordinance did not violate due process. There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It is the standard to which governmental action must conform in order that life, liberty or property deprivation is valid. The test of an ordinance is its responsiveness to reason and the dictates of justice. Much wider discretion is afforded to the state in terms of licensing non-useful corporations, and the state generally does not interfere with such discretion. The fact that some may lose their jobs does not curtail police power, which is exercised in the interest of the community. Liberty is not absolute and is regulated by law. When the liberty curtailed by statutes affects property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is wide.
The ordinance is not vague. The petition seems to indicate that the problem with the statute is that it is too detailed rather than vague. It concerns (such as whether it is the owner or operator who determines profits) such as those raised by the petitioner are not enough to invalidate the ordinance. As Justice Holmes said, there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean.
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Facts:
BUCK v. BELL
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Plaintiff is a feeble minded woman, daughter of a feeble-minded woman committed to the same institution. She is likewise the mother of a feeble minded, illegitimate child. The petition is to review the decision of SCA Virginia upholding the order of salpingectomy issued by the Circuit Court of Amherst City. Plaintiff alleges that such order, under the act of assembly; is unconstitutional as it violates plaintiffs right to bodily integrity, and is repugnant to the due process provision of the 14th Amendment. In Mann vs. Illinois the Court ruled that the inhibition against deprivation extends to all limbs and faculties through which life is enjoyed, and of what God has given everyone with life. While the statute provides for a hearing before the operation, and may be in a court of law in case of appeal, it does not meet the constitutional requirement of due process of law (form of procedure cannot convert process to due process if constitutional rights are denied). The test of due process of law must show that proceedings are legal & preserves liberty of citizens. Furthermore, the statute denies institutionalized individuals equal protection of the law as the classification is not enough to justify the statute. Such classification must be on reasonable grounds considering the legislative purpose; it cannot be arbitrary. The statutes objective of preventing the reproduction of mentally defective people would give the state legislature, as they are the ones who determine the standards for mental capacity. Tyranny of medical professionals & its system of judicature would be established. For its part the defense contends that the statute does not constitute cruel & unusual punishment, which necessarily involves torture. In State vs. Felin it was held that the asexualization process is not a cruel punishment. The statute is a valid exercise of police power, as provided for in Sec 159 of the Virginia Constitution (police power never to be abridged). The states confinement of the feeble minded precludes their procreation, and is a deprivation of liberty that was never questioned. Compulsory vaccinations are similar ways to protect the individual & society. Issues: 1. WON Virginia statute is a constitutional deprivation of liberty 2. WON classification is reasonable 3. WON plaintiff has been denied due process of law
Held: 1.
Yes, the Virginia statute is constitutional. The Virginia statute has for its purpose the protection of individual & and societal health by the sterilization of mental defectives, who may be safely discharged by virtue of sterilization. The plaintiff contends that the statute is patently unjustifiable. Yet public welfare can call upon some citizens to sacrifice their lives it is reasonable to call upon those who already burden the state to make lesser sacrifices. It is better for the world to execute degenerates for crime now, and prevent imbeciles from starving. It is a reasonable desire to prevent the manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. The principle sustaining compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover salpingectomy. Given the policy, the law has done all that is needed by striving to bring all similarly situated within the scope of the policy. Yes, the classification is reasonable. The statue is based on a reasonable classification. In Virginia, marriage with feeble minded is prohibited, and consummation is heavily penalized. In Peterson vs. Widule, the Court upheld the necessity of requiring males applying for marriage to present a physicians certificate attesting in their freedom from disease. No. The statutes strict guidelines on the procedure to be followed in the case at bar illustrates the protection the state affords to the feeble minded. The power of the state superintendent must be preceded by strict compliance to procedure. In the case at bar, every step taken was in keeping with the procedural requirements.
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Police power is limited by: 1. impairment (only remedy, never the substantive right) determinate and reasonable suspension 2. justified by emergency situation, temporary and reasonable conditions The statute protects war sufferers from debtors, and gives them the opportunity to rehabilitate themselves. However, creditors in effect will have to wait for 12 years before they can collect under RA 342, which is an unreasonable amount of time given the local situation of progress due to American aid and local spirit. Thus while RA 342 has a reasonable relation to public welfare, the rime of the moratorium is impossible. Wherefore, Act 342 unreasonable and oppressive, declared null and void. EO 25 and 32 are likewise lifted, given it has no limitations and can only be lifted once declared null and void. Decision reversed. Notes: Sec 2 RA 342 All debts and monetary obligations incurred before December 8, 1941 are due and demandable after 8 years after settlement of war damages claims before the Philippine War Damage Commission. Sec 3 RA 342
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Facts:
RUTTER v. ESTEBAN
On Aug. 20, 1941 appellant sold to appellee two parcels of land in Manila for P9,600 ( P4,800 up front, P2,400 on August 7, 1942 and 1943, at 7% interest). A mortgage to secure the first payment was taken in the name of the plaintiff, whereupon a deed of sale in favor of defendant was executed. On August 2, 1949, plaintiff filed a petition before the COFI to recover the unpaid balance and accrued interest, as well as attorneys fees. There was also a prayer for the sale of the properties pursuant to law should the plaintiff fail to collect. Defendant contended that he is protected by: 1. Moratorium clause in RA 342 2. He is a war sufferer with a claim with the Philippine War Damage Commission for losses 3. The liability was incurred as a pre-war obligation 4. Sec 2 of RA 342 suspend the payment of obligations until after 8 years from the settlement of claims
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Facts:
Evidence shows that appellant slaughtered a carabao for human consumption without a permit from the municipal treasurer pursuant to sec. 30 and 33 of Act 1147, regarding the registration, branding, and slaughter of large cattle. Appellant contends that since there are no municipal slaughter house in Carmen, Bohol, the provision of Act 1147 do not apply, since the wording of the statute limits the prohibition and slaughtering in a municipal slaughterhouse. The defendants previous application for a permit to slaughter was denied because the animal was not found to be unfit for agricultural or draft purposes. He further alleges that penalizing those who slaughter animals without a permit is unconstitutional by violating sec 5 of the Phillippine Bill (due process). The prohibition unjustly limits defendants enjoyment of his property. Issues: 1. WON provision of ACT 1147 apply despite an absence of a municipal slaughterhouse. 2. WON Act 1147 is unconstitutional for violating due process rights of defendant. Held:
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Yes, provisions apply. Sec 30 and 33 of Act 1147 must be taken in the context of the legislators intent. Given that the purpose of the bill is to protect large cattle theft and facilitate the return of the cows/cattle to owners, the interpretation of the Act must be consistent with the intent. The court holds that in general, the Act prohibits the slaughter of large cattle anywhere, and in particular, the slaughter of large cattle in municipal slaughterhouses (both without permits). When a statutes language is susceptible to 2 or more constructions, interpretation should be according to the intent of the legislator. No. It is not clear whether the defendant assailed the statue for being (1) unlawful taking of property by right of eminent domain (without compensation) or (2) an undue and unauthorized exercise of police power.
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All property acquired and held under the condition that it is not used to injure the equal rights of others, or impair public rights. While the statute detracts from the enjoyment of property by owners, it does not constitute a taking of property. Act 1147 is not an exercise of the right to eminent domain, but a reasonable limitation of the law of rights of property in keeping with the police power for public welfare. The state can interfere whenever public interests so demand. A large discretion is vested in the legislative to determine public interests
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WHEREFORE, the judgment is reversed. Case remanded to the Court of Claims for evidentiary hearing. Justice Black, dissenting: The Courts opinion seems to be that it is the noise and glare of planes, rather than the flying of the planes themselves, which constitutes taking. The appellees claims are at best an action in tort (nuisance, statute violation, negligence). The Government cannot be sued in the Court of Claims unless over matters of implied or express contracts. There is no contract involved in the case at bar. The concept of taking has been given a sweeping meaning. The old concept of land ownership must be made compatible with the new field of air regulation. The damages should not be elevated to the level of the Constitution, as it would be an obstacle to a better-adapted, vital system of national progress. 20. US v. CALTEX Facts: At the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, oil companies had terminal facilities in Pandacan. The US army restricted the distribution of products for civilian use requisitioning most of the supplies for the war effort. On December 26, 1941, the order for the demolition of all unused products and terminals was issued to prevent the approaching enemy from using the supplies. On December 31, 1941, demolition was completed just as the enemy entered Manila. Following liberation, appellees are demanding compensation for the property the US Army used and destroyed. While the US Government paid for the petroleum stocks, transportation equipment used and destroyed, they refused to compensate appellees for the Pandacan terminals. The appellees concede that the US army had the right to destroy such installations, but argue that they are entitled to compensation just the same. Appellees cite Mitchell v. Harmony and US v. Russel as legal basis for their claim.
3.
21.
Facts:
Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of PD 564 (Revised Charter of PTA) and proclamation No. 2052 (declaring certain Cebu towns and municipalities as tourist zones). They contend that expropriation cannot continue because: 1. To do so would be uconstitutional (no specific constitutional provisions for tourism expropriation, and that expropriation under PP 1533 does not offer unjust compensation) 2. Land in question is part of the Land Reform Program (jurisdiction under Court of Agrarian Relations, and tourism concerns cannot be superior to land reform concerns) 3. Expropriation proceedings / Writ of possession issued premature (necessity of taking unestablished) 4. Forcible ejectment of tenants criminal under PD 583 (prohibits orders contrary to the Land Reform Act) Issues: 1. WON expropriation for tourism purposes is unconstitutional. 2. WON land meant for land reform can be expropriated for tourism purposes. 3. WON the taking was premature 4. WON ejectment of tenants is unconstitutional Held: 1. Expropriation for tourism purposes is constitutional. The taking of the land for tourism purposes is supported by the constitution. Sec 2 Art 4 provides for taking with just compensation. Sec 6 Art 14 empowers congress to expropriation of private lands with just compensation.
4.
Wherefore, Petition dismissed for lack of merit Makasiar, dissenting: The rights to land under the Land Reform Law is greater than the states right to develop land for tourism. But since petitioners are not tenants of the land, petition must be dismissed.
22.
Facts:
Petitioner is with judgment against defendant in an ejectment suit dated August 14, 1959, the land in question being in Sampaloc, Manila and of 20,500 square meters. Writs of ejectment and demolition were issued despite appeals of defendants. On August 5, 1963 the Land Tenure Administration (LTA) filed for the expropriation of the land for subdivision and sale to its tenants. Respondent argues that the condemnation is in keeping with Sec. 2 of RA 1400, since the land was
Held: No, the land is not. Various laws support the legitimacy of expropriation of private lands (Commonwealth Act 539, sec1 provides for expropriation/ purchase of private lands & expropriation for subdivision of small lots, sec2 provides for the designation of authority to any agency to carry out expropriation, and sec4 art13 PC empowers CONGRESS to expropriate private lands). Whether or not private lands can be expropriated regardless of location, area or nature is reflected in the purpose for the Constitutional provision, which is to break up large estates for the benefit of small landowners. The constitution does not seek to undermine property rights, and sec 4 art 13 allows only for expropriation for public benefit of a few families does not constitute public benefit. There is no line to determine when public use can be used as basis for expropriation; decisions must be made on a case-to-case basis. Deciding in favor of the respondents may only give rise for more oppressive cases of expropriation. Wherefore, Petition GRANTED
2.
26. LUTZ v. ARANETA Facts: Appellant contests the legality of the taxes imposed by Commonwealth Act No. 567 (Sugar Adjustment Act) alleging that the tax is unconstitutional as it is only for the benefit of the sugar industry and not the public. Appellant seeks to recover P14, 666.40 in taxes.
Issue: Whether or not Commonwealth Act No. 567 is unconstitutional on the grounds that no benefit directly accrue to the public. Held: No, the appellants assumption that CA No. 567 is a pure exercise of taxing power is untenable. Sec 6 of CA No. 567 indicates that the tax is for a regulatory purpose and to rehabilitate and stabilize the threatened sugar industry. The protection and advancement of sugar industry affects the public welfare greatly as the industry is the biggest contributor to GDP. The authority of the legislature to enact laws for the promotion of the industry is subject only to the test of reasonableness. As such, taxation can be made the implement of the States police power. It is inherent in the power to tax that the state be free to select the subjects of taxation. The inequalities that may arise from the choice of who to tax or to exempt are not unconstitutional. Even if other industries may be in like danger, the protection of the sugar industry is not wrong. Wherefore, Judgment affirmed. Notes on CA No. 567 (introduction): 1. Sec 1- state of emergency due to the Tydings-McDuffie Act, and the imposition of export taxes and corresponding loss of preferential position in US markets. There is a need to stabilize the industry. 2. Sec 2- an increase in the tax of sugar manufacturers on a graduated basis. 3. Sec 3- owners/controllers of sugar land ceded to sugar manufacturers to pay taxes equal to the difference between rent and 12% of the land tax. 4. Sec 6- all tax collections for the Sugar Adjustment & Stabilization fund is to be used for achieving the objectives set by law. CA 567 Objectives 1. to place sugar industry in a competitive position despite increasing competition
27.
Facts:
Appellants are sister companies under one controlling management. The lower court found them liable for special assessments under Sec. 15 of RA 632 (Charter of Philippine Sugar Institute or Philsugin). Appellants contend that they are exempt/ not liable for said tax given Philsugins unlawful acquisition and disastrous management of Insular Sugar Refinery. They allege that: 1. RA 632 does not authorize the purchase of sugar mills. 2. There is only an obligation to pay the special tax as long as benefits accrue to the taxpayers, since RA 632 is not an act for revenue generation. The lower court decided in favor of the plaintiff because: 1. Sec 3 of RA 632 authorizes Philsugin to acquire sugar refineries. 2. Claim of fund misappropriation and lack of benefits to appellants untenable; Philsugin board is composed of members recommended by National Federation of Sugar Cane Planters and Philippine Sugar Association, of which appellants are members. 3. All financial transactions by Philsugin audited by a variety of agencies. 4. Wrongness of petition: anyone can then refuse to pay taxes if he suspects fund misappropriation. To which the appellants rejoined: 1. Safeguards do not ensure legality of actions 2. Philsugin without authority to acquire sugar refineries given the difference between central experiment stations and sugar refineries (Collector vs. Ledesma, Commonwealth Act No. 470) 3. Refusal to pay under RA 632 is a refusal to pay a special tax. Refusal to pay ordinary tax would impede government functions. 4. Norwood vs. Baer indicates the imposition of special benefits without accruing benefits as a denial of due process. Issues: 1. WON Philsugin is authorized to acquire sugar refineries under RA 632 2. WON special assessments are justified by benefits accruing to taxpayers. Held: 1. YES. The acquisition of a sugar refinery is authorized by Sec 2 (A) of RA 632, which provides for the conduction of research work for the improvement of the sugar industry in all its phases. Even if the operation
28.
Facts:
KILOSBAYAN v. GUINGONA
Petitioners filed a case for the prohibition / injunction with a prayer for a TRO & preliminary injunction against the implementation of the Contract of Lease between PCSO & PGMC in connection to an online lotto system. Petitioners are suing in their capacity as members of Congress and as taxpayers. On DECEMBER 17, 1993 the Contract of Lease was executed and approved by the president on DECEMBER 20, 1993. Petitioner claims that the respondents & the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT gravely abused their discretion tantamount to a lack of authority by entering into the contract, because: 1. Section 1 of RA 1169 (PCSO Charter) prohibits the PCSO from conducting lotteries in cooperation with any entity 2. RA 3846 & jurisprudence require Congresional franchise before a telecom system (public utility) can be established 3. Article 12 of Section 11 of the Constitution prohibits companies with less than 60% Filipino Ownership from operating a public system 4. PGMG is not authorized by its charter or by RA 7042 (Foreign Investment Act) to install an online Lotto system a. The contract shows that PGMC is the actual operatior while it is a 75% foreign-owned company. RA 7042 puts all forms of gambling on the negative list Respondents answered the allegations by contending: 1. PGMC is only an independent contractor. There is no shared franchise 2. PCSO will not a operate a public system as a telecom system is an indispensable requirement of an online lottery system. Petitioner interpretation of Section 1 of RA 1169 too narrow. 3. There are no violations of laws 4. The issue of morality is a political one and should not be resolved in a legal forum 5. Petitioners are without legal standing, as illustrated in Valmonte vs. PCSO a. The PCSO is a corporate entity and can enter into all kinds of contracts to achieve objectives. Arguing that PCSO will operate a public utility, it is still exempted under Section of Act 3846, where legislative franchisees are not necessary for radio stations Issues: 1. Whether or not petitioners have standing 2. Whether or not the contract is legal under Section 1 of RA 1169 Held: 1. Yes, petitioners have standing. Standing is only a procedural technicality that can be set aside depending on the importance of an issue. As taxpayers and citizens to be affected by the reach of the lotto system, petitioners have standing. No, the contract is illegal. The Court rules in the negative arguing that whatever is not unequivocally granted is withheld. PCSO cannot share
the franchise in any way. The contracts nature can be understood to form the intent of the parties as evident in the provisions of the contract. Article 1371 of the CC provides that the intent of contracting parties are determined in part through their acts. The only contribution PCSO will be giving is the authority to operate. All risks are to be taken by the lessor; operation will be taken by the PCSO only after 8 years. Further proof are: a. Payment of investment acts in the even of contract suspension / breach b. Rent not fixed at 4.9% and can be reduced given that all risks are borne by the lessor c. Prohibition against PGMC involvement in competitor games; strange if gaming is PGMC; business d. Public stock requirement of 25% in 2 years, which is unreasonable for a lease contract. It indicates that PGMC is the operator and the condition an attempt to increase public benefit through public involvement. e. Escrow deposit may be used as performance bond. f. PGMC operation evident in personnel management, procedural and coordinating rules set by the lessor. g. PCSO authority to terminate contact upon PGMC insolvency The contract indicates that PCSO is the actual lessor of the authority to operate given the indivisible community between them. Wherefore, Petition granted. Contract invalid and TRO made permanent Cruz, Concurring: The respondent was not able to prove the allegations that the contract was intentionally crafted to appear to be a lease. PCSO cannot operate without the collaboration of PGMC. The rental fee underscores the PGMC interest in the success of the venture, since their income depends on the degree of success. The transaction is immoral insofar as the activity is fixed by the foreigners on us with government approval. Feliciano concurring: Locus standi reflects an important constitutional principle: the separation of powers. The rules is that those assailing statute must show the adverse effect of its implementation has on them. But it is not a rigid rule. It is not enough that the court invoke public mistrust or national concern in brushing aside the requirement, as it would mean standing is dependent on a majority and is far from being intellectually satisfying. While no principle has been set for determining standing, the guidelines are: 1. character of funds involved (is it public in nature? in this case, the funds are from the general populace); taxpayer with right to see taxes used properly. 2. clear disregard of a law prohibiting certain actions of a public agency the judicial conclusion on case merits interact with the notion of locus standi
2.
Padilla, concurring: Gambling is immoral. Petitioner must show a clear, personal or legal right violated by the assailed law, but the requirement must be relaxed in the face of paramount national interest. The PCSO-PGMC contract is clearly a joint venture as each party contributes its share in the enterprise or project PCSO contributes the market. Melo, dissenting: The petition must be dismissed for lack of standing. Petitioners are without a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy; to invoke public interest is too broad and indeterminate. Their capacity as taxpayers does not give them standing; a taxpayer suit can arise only w\hen public funds derived from taxation are improperly disbursed. PCSO is not a revenue-collecting fund and as such no public funds are involved. The funds in question are corporate in nature and will not fo into the National Treasury. If the petition is entertained, it may give rise to nuisance suits. Puno, dissenting: The requirement of standing to sue inheres from the definition of judicial power. It is not merely a technical rule. Section 1, Article 8 of Consti outlines the requirements to be satisfied / complied with before coming to court: a) actual case / controversy b) question of constitutionality raised by the proper party with actual or potential injury c) question raised ASAP d) judicial decision on question raised necessarily to determine the case. Even a relaxation of the requirement of standing does not mean all cases should be heard. Petitioner has no standing because: a) not part of the contract b) petitioners are not personally injured; they wont even play c) no ordinary tax is involved or tax money used, given that PGMC assumes all risk d) an action on behalf of other parties must exhibit personal injury and a need to prevent the erosion of a third party right The invocation of constitutional rights and the allegation of vioalation are untenable. Section 1 Article 13(enhance right to dignity and equality through property regulation) is a mere policy direction for the legislative, reminding them to prioritize certain concerns. Section 11, Aticle 12 (60% Filipino ownership) violations cannot be determined by the Court as PGMC has not been proven to be foreign-owned or controlled. The rulings in DE GUIA VS. COMELEC the Court treated standing as a procedural rule when in fact it is a constitutional requirement under Sec 1,
29. 30.
PHILCONSA v. ENRIQUEZ
AVELINO v. CUENCO
31. UNTAL v. CHIEF OF STAFF Action: Resolution on motion for reconsideration Facts: Petitioner is a first class private of the 212 th Military Police Company of AFP, stationed in Manicani, Guiuan, Samar, which was stationed for the sole purpose of guarding surplus supplies in the area.
On November 4, 1947, petitioner killed Sgt. Francisco Estrada with a rifle and charged with a violation of 93rd Article of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408). Petitioner pleaded not guilty, contending that the offense occurred in time of peace, and thus the General Court Martial is without jurisdiction. The defense alleges that WW II was terminated by the Japanese surrender on September 2, 1945 in Tokyo
Question No. 3 vote for approval of amendments proposed by BP No. 105, which provides that grant shall be an additional mode for the acquisition of lands, as part of Sec 11 Art XIV of consti.
Question No. 4 vote for the approval of amendments proposed by BP No. 113, which provides that a paragraph will be included in Section 12 Article XIV of the Consti. The additional paragraph shall provide that the state will undertake an urban land reform and social housing program wherein reasonable opportunities to acquire land and decent housing will be made available, consistent with Section 2 Art IV of consti. Petitioners deem that there has been no fair and proper submission to the people prior the plebiscite. The petitioners are asking for more time for the people to study the meaning and implications of Res. No. 105 and 113. Issue: WON there are enough grounds for cause for postponement of the plebiscite.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 643 provides for a plebiscite on 27 January 1984 to either approve or reject the amendments to the Constitution proposed by BP Resolutions Nos. 104, 105, 1120, 112, and 113. There are four separate questions answerable by YES or NO.
Held: No, The 1976 amendments gave it the same functions, responsibilities, rights, and privileges as the Interim National Assembly and regular National Assembly, one such power being the power to propose amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by majority vote. Thus, IBP could and did propose the amendments embodied in the assailed resolutions. b. The proposed amendments are so extensive in character that they actually revise, and not merely amend, and thus go beyond the limits of the authority conferred on the IBP.
Held: No. The Constitutional Convention has the discretion to either propose amendments only or entirely overhaul the Consti and then submit it to the people for ratification. Amendment includes revision or total overhaul. The fact that only a majority vote and not the vote is required to convene as the agency proposing amendments. NO. Ratio: The Consti specifically requires only a majority vote. Besides, extraordinary majority was in fact obtained when the IBP exercised its constituent power to propose amendments. c.
Republic Act No. 4913 provides that the amendments on the Constitution proposed by Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elections on 14 November 1967. Resolution for Both Houses (RBH) No. 1 proposing that Section 5 Article VI of the Constitution be amended so as the membership of the House of Representatives be increased from 120 to a maximum of 180. RBH 2 calling a convention to proposed amendments to Constitution RBH 3 proposing that Section 16 Article VI of the Constitution be amended so as to authorize Senators and members of the House of Representatives to become delegates of the constitutional convention without forfeiting their slots in the Congress.
Wherefore, Petitions DISMISSED. Separate Concurring Opinions: Makalintal, J.: (1) The means of informing people is enough. (2) (2) RA 4913 constitutional. To declare unconstitutionality, there should proven an irreconcilable conflict between it and the consti.
Petitioner Gonzales prays for judgment to restrain (1) Comelec from enforcing RA 4913 or to hold any plebiscite, (2) Director of Printing from printing the ballots, and (3) auditor general from disbursing any funds related to RA 4913. He deems the Act as unconstitutional and void.
Several particular questions held to be justiceable (there are 6). Among the examples given are: 1. validity of proceedings in Senate Electoral Tribunal (SEL) refer to Tanada vs. Cuenco; the constitution sets limitations on the choice of members of SEL. 2. determination of number of votes essential to constitute a quorum refer to Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito and Avelino vs. Cuenco. 45. PLANAS v. COMELEC (by Diane Sayo) Facts:
Proclamation No. 1081 Issued on Sept. 21, 1972. Placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law. Presidential Decree No. 73 Issued on November 30, 1972. Submitting the proposed constitution to the people for ratification or rejection, appropriating funds therefore, and setting the plebiscite on January 15, 1973. PD 86 Organizing Citizens Assemblies to be consulted on certain public questions General Order No. 20 issued by the president on January 7, 1973. Directing the postponement of the scheduled plebiscite on January 15, 1973, until further notice, and temporarily suspending the effects of Proc. No. 1081 for purposes of free and open debate on the proposed constitution Proclamation No. 1102 issued on January 15, 1973. Announcing the ratification by the Filipino people of the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
The instant petitions were filed after the issuance of PD 73 seeking to nullify it, on the grounds that the powers exercised therein are lodged exclusively in Congress, and that there was no proper submission of the proposed constitution to the people for lack of time and lack of freedom of speech, press and assembly. The petitions enjoin the Comelec from fulfilling its duties regarding the plebiscite referred in PD 73. The president already issued an order temporarily suspending the effects of Proc. No. 81 on December 17, 1972, and announced the postponement of plebiscite on December 23, though these were only formalized through GO 20.
3.
Wherefore, Petitions DISMISSED. Separate Opinions: (Each justice was required to share their own views from which the final decision, based on the votes cast on the points in issue, was derived. A recapitulation of the opinions, arranged by issue/points raised, is in the latter part of the syllabi. This one is arranged per justice ) Makalintal and Castro, JJ., concurs: The issues on the validity of PD 1102, that is WON the president has the power to call a plebiscite, is moot and academic because the plebiscite in question did not take place, anyway. Its postponement of some indefinite date rendered the petitions immature. The contention that the 1972 Draft was unfit for proper submission is also moot because the ratification has already taken place. Petitions DISMISSED. Zaldivar, J. dissenting opinion: The issues are not moot and academic because there remains substantial rights and issues that are controverted which are not yet settled. The Court should not indulge too much on technicalities! Even though Zaldivar views PD 1102 as merely a proclamation, he contends that the Court must not ignore it.