TANADA VS.

TUVERA, 136 SCRA 27 (1985) Invoking the peoples right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 constitution, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette, of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. The respondents would have this case dismissed on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality to bring this petition. Petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel public duty, they need not show any specific interest. Respondents further contend that publication in the OG is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. ISSUE: Whether or not publication in the Official Gazatte is an indispensable requirement for the effectivity of the PDs, LOIs, general orders, EOs, etc. where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. RULING: Yes. Publication is mandatory even if the law provides its own date of effectivity. It is the peoples right to be informed on matters of public concern and corollarily access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, shall be afforded the citizens subject to such limitation as may be provided by law (Sec. 6 Art. IV, 1973 Constitution). Laws, to be valid and enforceable, must be published in the OG or otherwise effectively promulgated. The fact that a PD or LOI states its date of effectivity does not preclude their publication in the OG as they constitute important legislative acts. The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due process. Before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially informed of its contents. TANADA VS. TUVERA, 146 SCRA 446 It is a motion for reconsideration on the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise provided as when the decree themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. ISSUE: To what does the clause unless otherwise provided in Article 2 of the CC refer to? DECISION: The clause unless otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in an event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication. Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual 15 day period be shortened or extended. An example is the Civil Code which was one year after such publication. Publication must be full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts, the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the OG cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantive compliance. PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK EMPLOYEES UNION VS VEGA In 1985, Central Bank of the Philippines filed a petition for assistance in the liquidation of the Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB), in the RTC of Manila Branch 39. Thereafter, the PVB employees union herein petitioner filed claim for accrued and unpaid employee wages and benefits. On January 2, 1992, RA 7169 (An Act to Rehabilitate the PVB) which was signed into law by Pres. Corazon Aquino and which was published in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992.Thereafter, petitioners filed with the labor tribunals their residual claims for benefits and for reinstatement upon reopening of the bank. In May 1992, Central Bank issued a certificate of authority allowing the PVB to reopen despite the late mandate for rehabilitation and reopening, respondent Judge Vega continued with the liquidation proceedings of the bank alleging further that RA 7169 became effective only on March 10, 1992 or 15 days after its publication in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7169 became effective on January 2, 1992. HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court upheld that while as a rule laws take effect after 15 days following completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, the legislature has the authority to provide for exceptions as indicated in the clause unless otherwise provided. Citing Tanada vs Tuvera, this clause refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication, which cannot in any event be omitted. The reason is that such omission would affect due process in so far as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. SENATE VS ERMITA This case is regarding the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group as well as the Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP, and the Fertilizer scam. The Senate Committees sent invitations to various officials of the Executive Department and AFP officials for them to appear before Senate on Sept. 29, 2005. Before said date arrived, Executive Sec. Ermita sent a letter to Senate President Drilon, requesting for a postponement of the hearing on Sept. 29 in order to afford said officials ample time and opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that they may better enlighten the Senate Committee on its investigation. Senate refused the request. On Sept. 28, 2005, the President issued EO 464, effective immediately, which, among others, mandated that all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress. Pursuant to this Order, Executive Sec. Ermita communicated to the Senate that theexecutive and AFP officials would not be able to attend the meeting since the President has not

yet given her consent. Despite the lack of consent, Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani, among all the AFP officials invited, attended the investigation. Both faced court marshal for such attendance. ISSUE: WON EO 464 contravenes with the power of inquiry vested in Congress HELD: Yes. The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Sec. 21, Art. VI. But as early as 1950 (the 1935 Constitution did not contain a similar provision) in Arnault v. Nazareno, the Court already recognized that the power of inquiry is inherent in the power to legislate. That this power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch may be deduced from the same case. The power of inquiry...is co-extensive with the power to legislate. The matters which may be a proper subject of legislation and those which may be a proper subject of investigation are one. It follows that the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation. xxx the power of inquiry, with process to enforce it, is grounded on the necessity of the information in the legislative process. If the information possessed by executive officials on the operation of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to that information and the power to compel the disclosure thereof. Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected. The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. SABIO VS GORDON On February 20, 2006, Sen MD Santiago introduced Senate Res. No. 455 directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors. Pursuant to this, on May 8, 2006, Sen Gordon, wrote Chairman Sabio of the PCGG inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment.[7] At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance. Apparently, the purpose is to ensure PCGGs unhampered performance of its task. Gordons Subpoenae Ad Testificandum was repeatedly ignored by Sabio hence he threatened Sabio to be cited with contempt. ISSUE: WON Sec4(b) of EO No. 1 constitutes a limitation on the power of legislative inquiry HELD: Considering these jurisprudential instructions, The Court finds Section 4(b) directly repugnant with Article VI, Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress' power of inquiry. This cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting such exemption. The Congress' power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends "to government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish." PCGG belongs to this class. Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress, in the absence of any constitutional basis. ARNAULT VS NAZARENO This case arose from the legislative inquiry into the acquisition by the Philippine Government of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates sometime in 1949. On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted its Resolution No. 8, which created a special committee to investigate the transactions surrounding the estates. The special committee created by the resolution called and examined various witnesses, among the most important of whom was Jean L. Arnault. An intriguing question which the committee sought to resolve was the apparent unnecessariness and irregularity of the Governments paying to Burt the total sum of P1,500,000 for his alleged interest of only P20,000 in the two estates, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before October, 1949. The committee sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the Government. Among the witnesses called to examined by the special committee created by a Senate resolution was Jean L. Arnault, a lawyer who delivered a partial of the purchase price to a representative of the vendor. During the Senate investigation, Arnault refused to reveal the identity of said representative, at the same time invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Senate adopted a resolution committing Arnault to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned until he shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate . . . the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions in connection therewith. Arnault petitioned for a writ of Habeas Corpus ISSUE: WON the Senate can impose penalty against those who refuse to answer its questions in a congressional hearing in aid of legislation. HELD: Yes. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate, or to expel a Member; and every question which the investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to the subject of the inquiry or investigation. The materiality of the question must be determined by its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation. The reason is, that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and the form and character of the action itself are determined by the sum total of the information to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited from a single question.

ARNAULT VS BALAGTAS This an appeal from judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, Honorable Jose F. Flores presiding, in habeas corpus proceeding, declaring that the continued detention and confinement of Jean L. Arnault in the new Bilibid Prison, in pursuance of Senate Resolution No. 114, dated November 8, 1952, is illegal, for the reason that the Senate of the Philippines committed a clear abuse of discretion in considering his answer naming one Jess D. Santos as the person to whom delivery of the sum of P440,000 was made in the sale of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estate, as a refusal to answer the question directed by the Senate committee to him, and on the further ground that said Jean L. Arnault, by his answer has purged himself of contempt and is consequently entitled to be released and discharged. ISSUE: WON the continued confinement and detention of the petitioner as ordered in Senate Resolution of November 8, 1952, valid, if it did not believe the statement of the petitioner? HELD: The authority of the Senate to cite him in contempt is upheld. Since the Senate is a continuing body, the contempt is effective even beyond the session during which the contempt was made. The next question concerns the claim that the petitioner has purged himself of contempt, because he says he has already answered the original question which he had previously been required to answer. In order that the petitioner may be considered as having purged himself of the contempt, it is necessary that he should have testified truthfully, disclosing the real identity of the person subject of the inquiry. No person guilty of contempt may purge himself by another lie or falsehood; this would be repetition of the offense. It is true that he gave a name, Jess D. Santos, as that of the person to whom delivery of the sum of P440,000 was made. The Senate Committee refused to believe, and justly, that is the real name of the person whose identity is being the subject of the inquiry. The Senate, therefore, held that the act of the petitioner continued the original contempt, or reiterated it. Furthermore, the act further interpreted as an affront to its dignity. It may well be taken as insult to the intelligence of the honorable members of the body that conducted the investigation. The act of defiance and contempt could not have been clearer and more evident. Certainly, the Senate resolution declaring the petitioner in contempt may not be claimed as an exertion of an arbitrary power. BENGZON VS SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE It was alleged that Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez and his wife together with the Marcoses unlawfully and unjustly enriched themselves at the expense of the Filipino people. That they obtained with the help of the Bengzon law office and Ricardo Lopa Corys brother in law, among others, control over some of the biggest business enterprises in the country including MERALCO, PCI Bank, Shell Philippines and Benguet Consolidated Mining Corporation. Sen. Enrile subsequently delivered a privilege speech alleging that Lopa took over various government owned corporations which is in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Contained in the speech is a motion to investigate on the matter. The motion was referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers or the Blue Ribbon Committee. After committee hearing, Lopa refused to testify before the committee for it may unduly prejudice a pending civil case against him. Bengzon likewise refused invoking his right to due process. Lopa however sent a letter to Enrile categorically denying his allegations and that his allegations are baseless and malicious. Enrile subsequently took advantage of the Senates privilege hour upon which he insisted to have an inquiry regarding the matter. The SBRC rejected Lopas and Bengzons plea. Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and require their attendance and testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard of their constitutional rights, and to their grave and irreparable damage, prejudice and injury, and that there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the Bengzon et al filed the present petition for prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief. ISSUE: WON the inquiry sought by the SBRC be granted HELD: No. The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not absolute or unlimited. Thus, it is provided that the investigation must be in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure and that the rights of the persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. The speech of Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." In other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by the Blue Ribbon Committee was to find out whether or not the relatives of Cory, particularly Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Kokoy to the Lopa Group. It appears therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by the respondent Committee is not really in aid of legislation because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress and the herein petitioners are private citizens. ROMERO VS ESTRADA This is a petition for prohibition with application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction under Rule 65, assailing the constitutionality of the invitations and other compulsory processes issued by the Senate Committee on Labor, Employment, and Human Resources Development (Committee) in connection with its investigation on the investment of Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) funds in the Smokey Mountain project. The inquiry/investigation is specifically intended to aid the Senate in the review and possible amendments to the pertinent provisions of R.A. 8042, "the Migrant Workers Act" and to craft a much needed legislation relative to the stated subject matter and purpose of the aforementioned Resolutions. Petitioner Romero II requested to be excused from appearing and testifying before the Committee at its scheduled hearings of the subject matter. He predicated his request on grounds he would later substantially reiterate in this petition for prohibition. The Committee sent petitioner Romero II a letter informing him that his request, being unmeritorious, was denied. The following day, Senator Jinggoy Estrada, as Chairperson of the Committee, caused the service of a subpoena ad testificandum 4 on petitioner Romero II directing him to appear and testify before the Committee at its hearing on September 4, 2006 relative to the aforesaid Senate resolutions. The Committer later issued separate subpoenas5 to other petitioners, albeit for a different hearing date. Petitioners filed the instant petition, docketed as

G.R. No. 174105, seeking to bar the Committee from continuing with its inquiry and to enjoin it from compelling petitioners to appear before it pursuant to the invitations thus issued n this petition, petitioners in gist claim that: (1) the subject matter of the investigation is sub judice owing to the pendency of the Chavez petition; (2) since the investigation has been intended to ascertain petitioners criminal liability for plunder, it is not in aid of legislation; (3) the inquiry compelled them to appear and testify in violation of their rights against self-incrimination; and (4) unless the Court immediately issues a TRO, some or all of petitioners would be in danger of being arrested, detained, and forced to give testimony against their will, ISSUE: WON the investigation made by the committee is in aid of legislation HELD: Yes. A legislative investigation in aid of legislation and court proceedings has different purposes. On one hand, courts conduct hearings or like adjudicative procedures to settle, through the application of a law, actual controversies arising between adverse litigants and involving demandable rights. On the other hand, inquiries in aid of legislation are, inter alia, undertaken as tools to enable the legislative body to gather information and, thus, legislate wisely and effectively; and to determine whether there is a need to improve existing laws or enact new or remedial legislation, albeit the inquiry need not result in any potential legislation. On-going judicial proceedings do not preclude congressional hearings in aid of legislation. The mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or administrative investigation.

Broadly defined, the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are properly administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority, and (d) to assess executive conformity with the congressional perception of public interest. The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative power itself and integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. Congress, thus, uses its oversight power to make sure that the administrative agencies perform their functions within the authority delegated to them.

ESTRADA VS MACAPAGAL ARROYO Accused by Governor Singson for receiving money from the jueteng lords Teofista Guingona, in his privilege speech accused the petitioner of receiving money (P220 million) from Governor Singson and from the excise tax in the cigarette. It was then referred to the BRC for further investigation The petitioner was called by several people to resign and leave his position for he is not anymore capacitated to discharge his duties, however the petioner strenuously held on to his office and refused to sign. On January 20, 2011 after respondent Gloria Macapagal Arroyo took her oath as President of the Philippines, petitioner claims that he did not resign as President and that therefore respondent is merely the Acting President

ISSUE: WON Petitioner Estrada is petitioner on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President HELD: It is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment.78 The validity of a resignation is not government by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his act and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. We hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacaang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears: (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner's valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the part tense. Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative investigation that, under section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from resigning. We hold otherwise. The exact nature of an impeachment proceeding is debatable. But even assuming arguendo that it is an administrative proceeding, it can not be considered pending at the time petitioner resigned because the process already broke down when a majority of the senator-judges voted against the opening of the second envelope, the public and private prosecutors walked out, the public prosecutors filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance, and the proceedings were postponed indefinitely. There was, in effect, no impeachment case pending against petitioner when he resigned. CLU VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Petitioners: Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83896 and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83815. Both petitions were consolidated and are being resolved jointly as both seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality

of Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987. Executive Order No. 284, according to the petitioners allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other than government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions. The pertinent provisions of EO 284 is as follows: Section 1: A cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department may in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the government and government corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor. Section 2: If they hold more positions more than what is required in section 1, they must relinquish the excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any official hold more than two positions other than his primary position. Section 3: AT least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant secretary. The petitioners are challenging EO 284s constitutionality because it adds exceptions to Section 13 of Article VII other than those provided in the constitution. According to the petitioners, the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in government are those provided in the Constitution namely: 1. The Vice President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3 par.2 of Article VII. 2. The secretary of justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec. 8 of article VIII. ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional. HELD: No. It is unconstitutional. Petition granted. Executive Order No. 284 was declared null and void. The phrase unless otherwise provided in this constitution must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the constitution itself: Sec. 3 Art VII and Sec. 8 Art. VIII. It was the intent of the framers of the Constitution to impose a strict prohibition on the president and the cabinet with respect to the holding of other offices. This prohibition covers both public and private employment. Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may only do so when authorized by the Constitution. CRUZ VS. COA The COA issued a memorandum directing all unit heads, auditors, and team leaders of the national government agencies and government-owned and controlled corporations who have effected payment of any form of additional compensation or remuneration to cabinet secretaries, their deputies and assistants, or their representatives, in violation of the rule on multiple positions to effect the refund of the same. Petitioners, appealed from the notice of disallowance of the COA on the ground that the SC decision held that the constitutional ban against dual or multiple position applies only to the members of the cabinet, their deputies and assistants. It does not cover other appointive officials with equivalent rank or those lower than the position of Assistant Secretary. They claim that as NHA directors, they are alternates of the cabinet secretaries that are suppose to assume said position in an ex-oficio capacity. As such, they occupy positions lower than the position of Assistant Secretary. ISSUE: WON COA erred in disallowing the compensation in favour of NHA BOD HELD: Since the Executive Department Secretaries, as ex-oficio members of the NHA Board, are prohibited from receiving extra (additional) compensation, whether it be in the form of a per diem or an honorarium or an allowance, or some other such euphemism," it follows that petitioners who sit as their alternates cannot likewise be entitled to receive such compensation. A contrary rule would give petitioners a better right than their principals.

NAC VS COA Petitioner National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a government agency composed of seven members: a Chairperson, three regular members appointed by the President, and the Secretaries of Justice, National Defense and Interior and Local Government as ex officiomembers. It appears that after personally attending the initial NAC meetings, the three ex officiomembers turned over said responsibility to their representatives who were paid honoraria. The payment of honoraria to these representatives was disallowed in audit pursuant to COA Memorandum No. 97-038 dated September 19, 1997. Petitioner invoked Administrative Order No. 2, approved by President Estrada, which authorized the ex officio members to designate their representatives to the Commission and are entitled to per diems, allowances, bonuses and other benefits as may be authorized by law. ISSUE: WON COA has committed grave abuse of discretion in the disallowance of honoraria of the representatives in the NAC meetings HELD: The COA is correct that there is no legal basis to grant per diem, honoraria or any allowance whatsoever to the NAC ex officio members official representatives. The NAC ex officio members representatives who were all appointive officials with ranks below Assistant Secretary are covered by the two constitutional prohibitions. In declaring Section 1, Rule II of Administrative Order No. 2 series of 1999 null and void, the Supreme Court (SC) ruled that, on its face, it is valid. The problem lies not in the administrative order but how the NAC and the COA interpreted it. The administrative order itself acknowledges that payment of allowances to the representatives must be authorized by the law, that is, the Constitution, statutes and judicial decisions. However, the payment of such allowances is not allowed, prohibited even by the Constitution. The SC disagreed with NACs position that the representatives are de facto officers and as such are entitled to allowances. The representatives cannot be considered de facto officers because they were not appointed but were merely designated to act as such. Furthermore, they are not entitled to something their own principals are prohibited from receiving. Neither can they claim good faith, given the express prohibition of the Constitution and the finality of SCs decision in Civil Liberties Union prior to their receipt of such allowances.

FUNA VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Petitioner argues that Bautistas concurrent positions as DOTC Undersecretary and MARINA OIC is in violation of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner further contends that even if Bautistas appointment or designation as OIC of MARINA was intended to be merely temporary, still, such designation must not violate a standing constitutional prohibition, citing the rationale in Achacoso v. Macaraig.[10] Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not enumerate temporariness as one (1) of the exceptions thereto. And since a temporary designation does not have a maximum duration, it can go on for months or years. In effect, the temporary appointment/designation can effectively circumvent the prohibition. Allowing undersecretaries or assistant secretaries to occupy other government posts would open a Pandoras Box as to let them feast on choice government positions. ISSUE: WON Undersecretary Bautistas designation as MARINA OIC falls under the stricter prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. HELD: On its face, the language of Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple government offices or employment. Verily, wherever the language used in the constitution is prohibitory, it is to be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation. The phrase unless otherwise provided in this Constitution must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself. The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution was held inapplicable to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein, without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said office. The reason is that these posts do not comprise any other office within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials.[30] Apart from their bare assertion that respondent Bautista did not receive any compensation when she was OIC of MARINA, respondents failed to demonstrate clearly that her designation as such OIC was in an ex-officio capacity as required by the primary functions of her office as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport. As to respondents contention that the concurrent positions of DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport and MARINA OIC Administrator are not incompatible offices, we find no necessity for delving into this matter. Incompatibility of offices is irrelevant in this case. LAUREL VS GARCIA This is a petition for prohibition seeking to enjoin respondents, their representatives and agents from proceeding with the bidding for the sale of the 3,179 square meters of land at 306 Roppongi; 5-chome Minato-ku Tokyo, Japan scheduled on February 21, 1990. The subject property in this case is one of the four (4) properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan on 9 May 1956. The properties and the capital goods and services procured from the Japanese government for national development projects are part of the indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses in life and property and their suffering during World War II. ISSUE: Whether or not the Chief Executive, her officers and agents have the authority, and jurisdiction to sell the Roppongi property. RULING: The Court ruled in the negative. The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public service is expressly spelled out. It is dictated by the terms of the Reparations Agreement and the corresponding contract of procurement which bind both the Philippine government and the Japanese government. There can be no doubt that it is of public dominion and is outside the commerce of man. And the property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being such (Ignacio vs. Director of Lands, 108 Phil 335). It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on his or her own sole will. Any such conveyances must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence. Petition is granted.

MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS The call is about the request of Marcos family to the court to order the respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the presidents decision to bar their return to the Philippines. ISSUE: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. HELD: Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers. According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines. However, it does not define what is meant by executive power although in the same article it touches on exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons (art VII secfs. 14-23). Although the constitution outlines tasks of the president, this list is not defined & exclusive. She has residual & discretionary powers not stated in the Constitution which include the power to protect the general welfare of the people. She is obliged to protect the people, promote their welfare & advance national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the Constitution). Residual powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the President can do anything which is not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153), inevitable to vest discretionary powers on the President (Hyman, American President) and that the president has to maintain peace during times of emergency but also on the day-to-day operation of the State. The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. Theyre flexible depending on the circumstances. The

request of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied. DENR VS DENR EMPLOYEES Regional Executive Director of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources for Region XII, Israel C. Gaddi, issued a Memorandum[3] directing the immediate transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal (formerly Marbel), South Cotabato. The Memorandum was issued pursuant to DENR Administrative Order No. 99-14, issued by then DENR Secretary Antonio H. Cerilles. Respondents, employees of the DENR Region XII who are members of the employees association, COURAGE, represented by their Acting President, Baguindanai A. Karim, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato, a petition for nullity of orders with prayer for preliminary injunction. On December 8, 1999, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining petitioner from implementing the assailed Memorandum. However, the petitioner claimed that the power to transfer the Regional Office of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) is executive in nature. On January 14, 2000, the trial court rendered judgment that the respondents herein to cease and desist from enforcing their Memorandum Order dated November 15, 1999 relative to the transfer of the DENR Regional Offices from Region 12 to Region 11 at Koronadal, South Cotabato for being bereft of legal basis and issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on their part, and they are further ordered to return back the seat of the DENR Regional Offices 12 to Cotabato City. ISSUES: Whether the DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR. HELD: Yes. The DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to be the acts of the President for the latter had not expressly repudiated the same. As head of the Executive Department, the President cannot be expected to exercise his control (and supervisory) powers personally all the time. He may delegate some of his powers to the Cabinet members except when he is required by the Constitution to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he acts personally.

DE LEON VS CARPIO Estavillo and de Leon are two NBI agents terminated by then Minister of Justice Neptali A. Gonzales. Upon appeal to the Review Committee, the said body declined to act on their petitions for reconsideration on the ground that it had lost its jurisdiction with the ratification of the new Constitution. They were advised instead to seek relief from the Civil ServiceCommission. The Merit Systems Protection Board of CSC held that their dismissals were invalid and unconstitutional, having been done in violation of their security of tenure under the 1987 Constitution. Accordingly, the Board ordered their reinstatement. However, respondent Carpio, as Director of NBI, returned the orders issued by the Secretary of Justice to CSC without action, claiming that they were null and void for having been rendered without jurisdiction. ISSUE: Whether or not the Director of the NBI can disobey an explicit and direct order issued to him by the Secretary of Justice HELD: It is an elementary principle of our republican government, enshrined in the Constitution and honored not in the breach but in the observance, that all executive departments, bureaus and offices are under the control of the President of the Philippines. The Presidents power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department. The constitutional vesture of this power in the President is self-executing and does not require statutory implementation, nor may its exercise be limited, much less withdrawn, by the legislature. Theoretically, the President has full control of all the members of his Cabinet and may appoint them as he sees fit or shuffle them at pleasure, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, and replace them in his discretion. Once in place, they are at all times under the disposition of the President as their immediate superior. Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the various departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the President. Hence, their acts, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. (Villena v. Secretary of the Interior) In the case at bar, there is no question that when he directed the respondent to reinstate the petitioners, Sec. Ordonez was acting in the regular discharge of his functions as an alter ego of the President. His acts should therefore have been respected by the respondent Director of the NBI, which is in the Department of Justice under the direct control of its Secretary. As a subordinate in this department, the respondent was (and is) bound to obey the Secretarys directives, which are presumptively the acts of the President of the Philippines. BLAQUELA VS. ALCALA Petitioners are officials and employees of several government departments and agencies who were paid incentive benefits for the year 1992. Then Pres. Aquino issued AO 268 which granted each official and employee of the government the productivity incentive benefits in a maximum amount equivalent to 30% of theemployees one month basic salary but which amount not be less than P2, 000.00. Said AO provided that the productivity incentive benefits shall be granted only for the year 1991. Accordingly, all heads of agencies, including government boards of government-owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions, are strictly prohibited

from granting productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 and future years pending the result of a comprehensive study being undertaken by the Office of the Pres. Then, on Jan. 19, 1993, then Pres. Ramos issued AO 29 authorizing the grant of productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 in the maximum amount of P1,000.00 and reiterating the prohibition under Sec. 7 of AO 268, enjoining the grant of productivity incentive benefits without prior approval of the President. Sec. 4 of AO 29 directed all departments, offices and agencies which authorized payment of productivity incentive bonus for the year 1992 in excess of P1, 000.00 to immediately cause the refund of the excess. In compliance therewith, the heads of the departments or agencies of the government concerned caused the deduction from petitioners salariesor allowances of the amounts needed to cover the alleged overpayments. ISSUE: WON AO 29 and AO 268 were issued in the validexercise of presidential control over the executive departments Held: The Pres. is the head of the government. Governmental power and authority are exercised and implemented through him. His power includes the control of executive departments as provided under Sec. 17, Art. VII of the Constitution. Control means the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. The Pres. can, by virtue of his power of control, review, modify, alter or nullify any action or decision of his subordinate in the executive departments, bureau or offices under him. When the Pres. issued AO 29 limiting the amount of incentive benefits, enjoining heads of government agencies from granting incentive benefits without approval from him and directing the refund of the excess over the prescribed amount, the Pres. was just exercising his power of control over executive departments. The Pres. issued subject AOs to regulate the grant of productivity incentive benefits and to prevent discontent, dissatisfaction and demoralization among government personnel by committing limited resources of government for the equal payment of incentives and awards. The Pres. was only exercising his power of control by modifying the acts of the heads of the government agencies who granted incentive benefits to their employees without appropriate clearance from the Office of the Pres., thereby resulting in the uneven distribution of government resources. The Presidents duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his control of executive departments.

HUTCHINSON PORTS VS SBMA The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority conducted a bidding for the development and operation of a modern marine container terminal. It awarded the contract to the herein petitioner, HPPL . The Office of the President set aside the award and ordered a new bidding. Petitioner filed action for specific performance. Out of the seven (7) bidders, three (3) were deemed to have qualified: ICTSI, RPSI and HPPL. The bidders were subsequently required to submit their business plans. Before the envelopes containing the business plans could be opened, RPSI formally protested that ICTSI is legally barred from operating a second port, on the ground of E.O. no. 212 and the fact that it was already operating the Manila International Container Port, giving rise to a conflict of interest. SBMA-PBAC rejected ICTSIs bid and awarded the winning bid to HPPL. However, ICTSI filed an appeal with the SBMA and the Office of the President. In a memorandum, the President ordered then SBMA Chairman Gordon to reevaluate the bids together with the Commission on Audit. Again, the SBMA awarded the bid to HPPL, on the basis of it having a realistic business plan offering the greatest financial return to the SBMA and the most advantageous to the government. Notwithstanding the SBMAs board recommendations, then Executive Secretary Reuben Torres submitted a memorandum to the Office of the President, recommending a rebidding. Feeling aggrieved by the SBMAs refusal to begin negotiations, HPPL, on July 7, 1997, filed a complaint against the SBMA before the RTC alleging that a binding and legally enforceable contract had been established between HPPL and SBMA under Article 1305 of the Civil Code, considering that the SBMA had repeatedly declared and confirmed that the HPPL was the winning bidder. Pursuant to the Presidents memorandum to conduct another bidding, the SBMA sent notices to the bidders who initially qualified, including HPPL, to declare their interest in participating in a rebidding of the proposed project. Upon learning that the SBMA had accepted the bids of ICTSI and RPSI, HPPL filed a motion for maintenance of the status quo. It was denied. ISSUE: WON the president can set aside the awarding of the project to HPPL by the SBMA? If yes, can the Office of the President direct SBMA to conduct rebidding of the proposed project? Held: Yes. The SBMA Board of Directors and other officers are subject to the control and supervision of the Office of the President. All projects undertaken by the SBMA require the approval of the Office of the President, as per LoI no. 620, which places the SBMA under its ambit as an instrumentality. Letters of Instruction No. 620 mandates that the approval of the President is required in allcontracts of the national government offices, agencies and instrumentalities includingGOCCS involving P2M and above, awarded through public bidding or negotiation. The President may, within his authority, overturn or reverse any award made by the SBMA Board of Directors for justifiable reasons. When the President issued the memorandum setting aside the award previously declared by SBMA in favor of HPPL, the same was within authority of the President and was a valid exercise of his prerogative.

NEA VS COA NEA did not implement the salary increases in accordance with the schedule of payment specified in EO 389 and NBC No. 458. Instead, NEA implemented in one lump sum beginning January 1, 1997 the salary increases required to be paid in two tranches, the first tranche on January 1, 1997 and the second tranche on November 1, 1997. Otherwise stated, NEA accelerated the implementation of the salary increase by paying the second tranche starting January 1, 1997 instead of November 1, 1997 which resulted to the disallowance of NEA made by Conmmision resident auditor. ISSUE: WON the disallowance made by the Commission on Audit to NEA is valid HELD: The Constitution and existing laws[14] mandate the Commission to audit all government agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations. The Constitution specifically vests in the Commission the authority to determine whether government entities comply with laws and regulations in the disbursement of government funds and to disallow illegal or irregular disbursements of government funds. The presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends to all executive employees from

Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk.[18] The constitutional vesture of this power in the President is self-executing and does not require statutory implementation, nor may its exercise be limited, much less withdrawn, by the legislature.[19] Executive officials who are subordinate to the President should not trifle with the Presidents constitutional power of control over the executive branch. There is only one Chief Executive who directs and controls the entire executive branch[20], and all other executive officials must implement in good faith his directives and orders. This is necessary to provide order, efficiency and coherence in carrying out the plans, policies and programs of the executive branch. This case would not have arisen had NEA complied in good faith with the directives and orders of the President in the implementation of the last phase of the Salary Standardization Law II. The directives and orders are clearly and manifestly in accordance with all relevant laws. The reasons advanced by NEA in disregarding the Presidents directives and orders are patently flimsy, even illconceived. This cannot be countenanced as it will result in chaos and disorder in the executive branch to the detriment of public service. RUFINO VS ENDRIGA President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Executive Order No. 30 (EO 30) creating the Cultural Center of the Philippines as a trust governed by a Board of Trustees of seven members to preserve and promote Philippine culture. President Marcos issued PD 15,9 the CCP's charter, which converted the CCP under EO 30 into a non-municipal public corporation free from the "pressure or influence of politics."10 PD 15 increased the members of CCP's Board from seven to nine trustees. Later, Executive Order No. 1058, issued on 10 October 1985, increased further the trustees to 11. President Corazon C. Aquino asked for the courtesy resignations of the then incumbent CCP trustees and appointed new trustees to the Board. President Joseph E. Estrada appointed seven new trustees to the CCP Board for a term of four years to replace the Endriga group as well as two other incumbent trustees. Endriga group filed a petition for quo warranto before this Court questioning President Estrada's appointment of seven new members to the CCP Board. he Endriga group claimed that it is only when the CCP Board is entirely vacant may the President of the Philippines fill such vacancies, acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the CCP. T he Endriga group refused to accept that the CCP was under the supervision and control of the President. ISSUE: WON there is an invalid delegation of the President's appointing power under the Constitution HELD: No. The presidential power of control over the Executive branch of government extends to all executive employees from the Department Secretary to the lowliest clerk.35 This constitutional power of the President is self-executing and does not require any implementing law. Congress cannot limit or curtail the President's power of control over the Executive branch. The CCP does not fall under the Legislative or Judicial branches of government. The CCP is also not one of the independent constitutional bodies. Neither is the CCP a quasi-judicial body nor a local government unit. Thus, the CCP must fall under the Executive branch. Under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, any agency "not placed by law or order creating them under any specific department" falls "under the Office of the President." There can be no instance under the Constitution where an officer of the Executive branch is outside the control of the President. The Executive branch is unitary since there is only one President vested with executive power exercising control over the entire Executive branch. REVIEW CENTER ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES VS ERMITA On 11 and 12 June 2006, the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) conducted the Nursing Board Examinations nationwide. In June 2006, licensure applicants wrote the PRC to report that handwritten copies of two sets of examinations were circulated during the examination period among the examinees reviewing at the R.A. Gapuz Review Center and Inress Review Center. George Cordero, Inress Review Center's President, was then the incumbent President of the Philippine Nurses Association. The examinees were provided with a list of 500 questions and answers in two of the examinations' five subjects, particularly Tests III (Psychiatric Nursing) and V (Medical-Surgical Nursing). The PRC later admitted the leakage and traced it to two Board of Nursing members. 3 On 19 June 2006, the PRC released the results of the Nursing Board Examinations. On 18 August 2006, the Court of Appeals restrained the PRC from proceeding with the oath-taking of the successful examinees set on 22 August 2006. Consequently, President Gloria MacapagalArroyo (President Arroyo) replaced all the members of the PRC's Board of Nursing. President Arroyo also ordered the examinees to retake the Nursing Board Examinations. On 8 September 2006, President Arroyo issued EO 566 which authorized the CHED to supervise the establishment and operation of all review centers and similar entities in the Philippines. On 3 November 2006, the CHED, through its then Chairman Carlito S. Puno (Chairman Puno), approved CHED Memorandum Order No. 49, series of 2006 (IRR). It is the petitioner contention that the jurisdiction of CHED had been expanded on the ground that RA 7222 should be observed. ISSUE: Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the Executive of legislative power as it expands the CHED's jurisdiction; and Whether the RIRR is an invalid exercise of the Executive's rule-making power. HELD: The exercise of the President's residual powers under this provision requires legislation, 31 as the provision clearly states that the exercise of the President's other powers and functions has to be "provided for under the law." There is no law granting the President the power to amend the functions of the CHED. The President may not amend RA 7722 through an Executive Order without a prior legislation granting her such power. The President has no inherent or delegated legislative power to amend the functions of the CHED under RA 7722. Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them,32 and this power is vested with the Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Hence, the petition was granted and DECLARED Executive Order No. 566 and Commission on Higher Education Memorandum Order No. 30, series of 2007 VOID for being unconstitutional. PIMENTEL VS AGUIRRE President Ramos issued AO 372 where it requires local government units to reduce their expenditures by 25 percent of their authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services. Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking (1) to annul Section 1 of Administrative Order (AO) No. 372, (2) to enjoin respondents from implementing Section 4 of the Order, which withholds a portion of their internal revenue allotments.

ISSUE: Whether or not the president committed grave abuse of discretion [in] ordering all LGUS to adopt a 25% cost reduction program in violation of the LGU[']S fiscal autonomy HELD: YES. It was emphasized that the two terms -- supervision and control -- differed in meaning and extent. Under our present system of government, executive power is vested in the President. [10] The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos. As such, they are subject to the power of control of the President, at whose will and behest they can be removed from office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspended or reversed.[11] In contrast, the heads of political subdivisions are elected by the people. Their sovereign powers emanate from the electorate, to whom they are directly accountable. By constitutional fiat, they are subject to the Presidents supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers. By the same token, the President may not withhold or alter any authority or power given them by the Constitution and the law. Section 4 of AO 372 cannot, however, be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than the Constitution.[28] The Local Government Code[29] specifies further that the release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned within five (5) days after every quarter of the year and "shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose."[30] As a rule, the term "shall" is a word of command that must be given a compulsory meaning.[31] The provision is, therefore, imperative. BERMUDEZ VS TORRES Petitioner Oscar Bermudez, the First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac and Officer-in-Charge of the Office of Provincial Prosecutor, was a recommendee of then Sec. of Justice Guingona for the position of Provincial Prosecutor. Private respondent Atty. Conrado Quiaoit had the support of then Representative Yap of the Second District of Tarlac. Quiaoit was appointed by Pres. Ramos to the office. Quiaoit took his oath and assumed office. Bermudez refused to vacate the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Nonetheless, Quiaoit, performed the duties and functions of the Office of Provincial Prosecutor. Petitioner Bermudez challenged the appointment of Quiaoit primarily on the ground that the appointment lacks the recommendation of the Sec. Of Justice prescribed under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. Section 9, Chap. II, Title III, Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code provides that all provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants shall be appointed by the Pres. upon the recommendation of the Secretary. Issue: Whether or not the absence of a recommendation of the Secretary of Justice to the President can be held fatal to the appointment of Quiaoit Held: An appointment to a public office is the unequivocal act of designating or selecting by one having the authority therefor of anindividual to discharge and perform the duties and functions of an office or trust. The appointment is deemed complete once the last act required of the appointing authority has been complied with and its acceptance thereafter by the appointee in order to render it effective. The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing authority has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities. When the Constitution or the law clothes the Pres. with the power to appoint a subordinate officer, such conferment must be understood as necessarily carrying with it an ample discretion of whom to appoint. The Pres. is the head of government whose authority includes the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices. Control means the authority of an empowered officer to alter or modify, or even nullify or set aside, what a subordinate officer has done in the performance of his duties, as well as to substitute the judgment of the latter, as and when the former deems it to be appropriate. The Pres. has the power to assume directly the functions of an executive department, bureau and office. It can therefore be inferred that the Pres. can interfere in the exercise of discretion of officials under him or altogether ignore their recommendations. The phrase upon recommendation of the Secretary found in Sec. 9, Chap. II, Title III, Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code should be interpreted to be a mere advice, exhortation or endorsement, which is essentially persuasive in character and not binding or obligatory upon the party to whom it is made. The recommendation is here nothing really more than advisory in nature. The Pres., being the head of the Executive Department, could very well disregard or do away with the action of the departments, bureaus or offices even in the exercise of discretionary authority, and in so opting, he cannot be said as having acted beyond the scope of his authority.

SARMIENTO VS MISON Petitioners brought this suit for prohibition in their capacity as taxpayers, members of the Bar and law professors, to enjoin respondent Commissioner of Customs from performing his functions on the ground that his appointment, w/o confirmation by the CA, is unconstitutional. ISSUE: WON the appointment made by the President to Commissioner of Customs is unconstitutional HELD : No. In the 1987 Constitution it was held that only the appointments of the first group of officers are subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The heads of the exec. depts, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in the Consti, i.e., (1) Regular members of the Judicial and Bar Council [Art. VIII, Sec. 8(2)] (2) Chairman and Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission [Art. IX-B, Sec. 1 (2)]; (3) Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC [Art. IX-C, Sec. 1 (2)]; (4) Chairman and Commissioners of the COA [Art. IX-D, Sec. 1 (2)]; (5) Members of the regional consultative commission (Art. X, Sec. 18.) The rest of the appointments mentioned in sec. 16 are not subject to confirmation. These are: (1) all other officers of the Govt whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; (2) those whom the Pres. may be authorized by law to appoint; and (3) officers lower in rank whose appointments Congress may by law vest in the Pres. alone.

CONCEPCION-BAUTISTA VS SALONGA Pursuant to the second sentence in Section 16, Art. VII, that is, without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments because they are among the officers of government "whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint and Section 2(c), Executive Order No. 163, 5 May 1987, authorizes the President to appoint the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights On 27 August 1987, the President of the Philippines designated herein petitioner Mary Concepcion Bautista as "Acting Chairman, Commission on Human Rights." Subsequently, on 17 December 1988, extended the petitioner to a permanent appointment as Chairman of the Commission submitting such appointment (more accurately, nomination) to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. On 20 January 1989, or even before the respondent Commission on Appointments had acted on her "ad interim appointment as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights" petitioner Bautista filed with this Court the present petition for certiorari with a prayer for the immediate issuance of a restraining order, to declare "as unlawful and unconstitutional and without any legal force and effect any action of the Commission on Appointments as well as of the Committee on Justice, Judicial and Bar Council and Human Rights, on the lawfully extended appointment of the petitioner as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, on the ground that they have no lawful and constitutional authority to confirm and to review her appointment." ISSUE: Whether or not the presidents appointment of the petitioners ad interim appointment needs confirmation by the CA. HELD: Under the Constitutional design, an ad interim appointment does not apply to appointments solely for the President to make. Ad interim appointments, by their very nature under the 1987 Constitution, extend only to appointments where the review of the Commission on Appointments is needed. That is why ad interim appointments are to remain valid until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress; but appointments that are for the President solely to make, that is, without the participation of the Commission on Appointments, cannot be ad interim appointments. The Court holds that petitioner Bautista is the lawful incumbent of the office of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights by virtue of her appointment, as such, by the President on 17 December 1988, and her acceptance thereof, is not to say that she cannot be removed from office before the expiration of her seven (7) year term. She certainly can be removed but her removal must be for cause and with her right to due process properly safeguarded. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Petitioner Bautista is declared to be, as she is, the duly appointed Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights and the lawful incumbent thereof, entitled to all the benefits, privileges and emoluments of said office. The temporary restraining order heretofore issued by the Court against respondent Mallillin enjoining him from dismissing or terminating personnel of the Commission on Human Rights is made permanent CALDERON VS CARALE Under the RA 6715, the Chairman and the Commissioners of the NLRC are appointed by the president, subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The president then appointed respondents as NLRC Commissioners without submitting their appointments to the Commission on Appointments. ISSUE: WON RA 6715 is unconstitutional and WON the appointment of the respondents were valid HELD : Yes. The only confirmation required is for presidential appointments mentioned in the 1 st sentence of Sec. 16, Art VII of the Constitution. Under the second sentence, the appointment of officers whom the president may be authorized to appoint is not subject to confirmation. RA 6715 is unconstitutional in so far as the requirement that the appointments of the Chairman and the Commissioners of the NLRC be confirmed by the commission on appointments is concerned. MANALO VS SISTOZA Under the RA 6975, the commission on Appointments should confirm the appointment of police officers from the rank of senior superintendent. The president appointed respondents as director and chief superintendent without submitting their appointments to the commission on appointments for confirmation ISSUE: WON their appointments were invalid HELD: Only presidential appointees belonging to those mentioned in the first sentence of Sec 16, Art. VII of the Constitution require confirmation by the commission on appointments. Respondents are not within the category and need not be confirmed by the commission on appointments. Congress, cannot by law, require the confirmation of appointments of other governmental officials. The police force is different from the armed forces and the ranks in the military are not similar to those in the Philippine National Police. SORIANO VS. LISTA, G.R. NO. 153881, March 24, 2003 Petitioner filed a Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court questioning the constitutionality and legality of the permanent appointments of the public respondents to different positions in the Philippine Coast Guard, made by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and their subsequent assumption of office without confirmation by the Commission on Appointments under the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner bewails the fact that despite the non-submission of their names to the Commission on Appointments (CA) for confirmation, all of the said respondent officers of the PCG had assumed their duties and functions. According to the petitioner, their respective appointments are illegal and unconstitutional for failure to undergo the confirmation process in the CA. Thus, they should be prohibited from discharging their duties and functions as such officers of the PCG. Accordingly, he prays that respondent Secretary Boncodin be ordered to desist from allowing such disbursements until the confirmation of their respective appointments by the CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the permanent appointments of the public respondents to different positions in the PCG made by the President is constitutional and legal HELD: Yes. It is clear from the provision of Sec. 16 Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, that only appointed officers from the rank of colonel or naval captain in the armed forces require confirmation by the CA. The clause officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain refers to military officers alone. Therefore, since the promotions and appointments of respondent officers are not covered by the above-cited provision of the Constitution, the same need not be confirmed by the CA. Moreover, since the PCG is now under the DOTC and no longer part of the Philippine Navy or the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the promotions and appointments of respondent officers of the PCG, or any PCG officer from the rank of captain and higher for that matter, do not require confirmation by the CA. Accordingly, the Court declares that no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction was committed by respondent officers of the PCG. Their assumption to office as well as the disbursement of their respective salaries and other emoluments by the respondent Secretary of the DBM is hereby declared valid and legal.