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1. Cayetano vs. Monsod GR 100113 Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C.

Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void. Issue: Whether the appointment of Chairman Monsod of Comelec violates Section 1 (1), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution? Held: The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C, that there shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneys called "associates." Hence, the Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.

Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, he Court said that, Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. 2. Philippine Lawyers Association vs Agrava Facts: On May 27, 1957, respondent Agrava issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office, the said examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said office. According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take the said examination. It would appear that heretofore, respondent Director has been holding similar examinations. Petitioner contends that anyone has passed the bar exams and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law, has good standing, thus duly qualified to practice before the Patent Office, and therefore the act of requiring members of the Bar in good standing to take and pass an examination given by the Patent Office as a condition precedent to be allowed to practice before said office is a clear excess of his jurisdiction and violation of the law. On the other hand, respondent claimed that he is expressly authorized by the law to require persons desiring to practice or to do business before him to submit an examination, even if they are already members of the bar. He contends that our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, is patterned after the United States Patent Law; and of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases prescribes an examination similar to that which he had prescribed and scheduled. Issue/s: WHETHER OR NOT MEMBERS OF THE BAR SHOULD FIRST TAKE AND PASS AN EXAMINATION GIVEN BY THE PATENT OFFICE BEFORE HE COULD BE ALLOWED TO PRACTICE LAW IS THE SAID OFFICE. Whether or not appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitute or is included in the practice of law. WHETHER OR NOT DIRECTOR OF THE PATENT OFFICE IS AUTHORIZED TO CONDUCT AN EXAMINATION FOR PATENT ATTORNEYS IS CONTRARY TO LAW. Held: The petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent Director is hereby prohibited from requiring members of the Philippine Bar to submit to an examination or tests and pass the same before being permitted to appear and practice before the Patent Office. The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the practice of law in the Philippines1 and to any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may practice law anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the Philippines. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces

the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law corporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditors claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied). Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 (1953 ed.), p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices (Mass.), 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile Service Assoc. (R. I. ) 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours). The practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different from the provisions of the United States Patent Law as regards authority to hold examinations to determine the qualifications of those allowed to practice before the Patent Office. While the U.S. Patent Law authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to require attorneys to show that they possess the necessary qualifications and competence to render valuable service to and advise and assist their clients in patent cases, which showing may take the form of a test or examination to be held by the Commissioner, our Patent Law, Section 78, is silent on this important point. In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business in said office involves the interpretation and determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court. 3. People vs. Villanueva GR L-19450 On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with the Crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. Said accused was represented by counsel de officio but later on replaced by counsel de parte. The complainant in the same case was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his appearance as private prosecutor, after securing the permission of the Secretary of Justice. The condition of his appearance as such, was that every time he would

appear at the trial of the case, he would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he would not receive any payment for his services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was questioned by the counsel for the accused, invoking the case of Aquino, et al. vs. Blanco, et al., L-1532, Nov. 28, 1947, wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had been appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage in private law practice." Counsel then argued that the JP Court in entertaining the appearance of City Attorney Fule in the case is a violation of the above ruling. On December 17, 1960 the JP issued an order sustaining the legality of the appearance of City Attorney Fule. Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private Prosecutor in this Case," this time invoking Section 32, Rule 27, now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing. Counsel claims that City Attorney Fule falls under this limitation. The JP Court ruled on the motion by upholding the right of Fule to appear and further stating that he (Fule) was not actually enagaged in private law practice. This Order was appealed to the CFI of Laguna, presided by the Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio, which rendered judgment on December 20, 1961, the pertinent portions of which read: The present case is one for malicious mischief. There being no reservation by the offended party of the civil liability, the civil action was deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action. The offended party had, therefore, the right to intervene in the case and be represented by a legal counsel because of her interest in the civil liability of the accused. Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of the offended party. It does not appear that he was being paid for his services or that his appearance was in a professional capacity. As Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo he had no control or intervention whatsoever in the prosecution of crimes committed in the municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because the prosecution of criminal cases coming from Alaminos are handled by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and not by the City Attornev of San Pablo. There could be no possible conflict in the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule as Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo and as private prosecutor in this criminal case. On the other hand, as already pointed out, the offended party in this criminal case had a right to be represented by an agent or a friend to protect her rights in the civil action which was impliedly instituted together with the criminal action. In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule may appear before the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor in this criminal case as an agent or a friend of the offended party. WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna, allowing the apprearance of Ariston D. Fule as private prosecutor is dismissed, without costs. The above decision is the subject of the instant proceeding. The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being without merits.1wph1.t Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge, heretofore reproduced, and which we consider plausible, the fallacy of the theory of defense counsel lies in his confused interpretation of Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules), which provides that "no judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients." He claims that City Attorney Fule, in appearing as private prosecutor in the case was engaging in private practice. We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did

not constitute private practice within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as customarily and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy: Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative. CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs against appellant.. 4. Cui vs. Cui GR L-27654 Facts: Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of Mariano Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doa Benigna Cui. On 27 February 1960 the then incumbent administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned in favor of Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a "convenio" entered into between them and embodied in a notarial document. The next day, 28 February, Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office. Jesus Ma. Cui, however, had no prior notice of either the "convenio" or of his brother's assumption of the position. As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their respective qualifications to the position of administrator. Jesus is the older of the two and therefore under equal circumstances would be preferred pursuant to section 2 of the deed of donation. However, before the test of age may be, applied the deed gives preference to the one, among the legitimate descendants of the nephews therein named, "que posea titulo de abogado, o medico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos el que pague al estado mayor impuesto o contribucion." The specific point in dispute is the mealing of the term "titulo de abogado." Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of Laws from the University of Santo Tomas (Class 1926) but is not a member of the Bar, not having passed the examinations to qualify him as one. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar and although disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957 (administrative case No. 141), was reinstated by resolution promulgated on 10 February 1960, about two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of the Hospicio de Barili. Issues: Whether or not one could have the title of lawyer could include someone who has graduated from a degree but has not passed the exam Held: We are of the opinion, that whether taken alone or in context the term "titulo de abogado" means not mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law. In Spanish the word "titulo" is defined as "testimonies o instrumento dado para ejercer un empleo, dignidad o profesion" (Diccionario de la Lengua Espaola, Real Academia Espanola, 1947 ed., p. 1224) and the word "abogado," as follows: "Perito en el derecho positivo que se dedica a defender en juicio, por escrito o de palabra, los derechos o intereses de los litigantes, y tambien a dar dictmen sobre las cuestiones o puntos legales que se le consultan (Id., p.5) A Bachelor's degree alone, conferred

by a law school upon completion of certain academic requirements, does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession. The English equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer or attorney-at-law. This term has a fixed and general signification, and has reference to that class of persons who are by license officers of the courts, empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence. In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under the authority of the Supreme Court. According to Rule 138 such admission requires passing the Bar examinations, taking the lawyer's oath and receiving a certificate from the Clerk of Court, this certificate being his license to practice the profession. The academic degree of Bachelor of Laws in itself has little to do with admission to the Bar, except as evidence of compliance with the requirements that an applicant to the examinations has "successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially approved by the Secretary of Education." For this purpose, however, possession of the degree itself is not indispensable: completion of the prescribed courses may be shown in some other way. Indeed there are instances, particularly under the former Code of Civil Procedure, where persons who had not gone through any formal legal education in college were allowed to take the Bar examinations and to qualify as lawyers. (Section 14 of that code required possession of "the necessary qualifications of learning ability.") Yet certainly it would be incorrect to say that such persons do not possess the "titulo de abogado" because they lack the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws from some law school or university. As far as moral character is concerned, the standard required of one seeking reinstatement to the office of attorney cannot be less exacting than that implied in paragraph 3 of the deed of donation as a requisite for the office which is disputed in this case. When the defendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting from his previous disbarment were wiped out. This action must fail on one other ground: it is already barred by lapse of time amounting the prescription or laches. Under Section 16 of Rule 66 (formerly sec. 16, Rule 68, taken from section 216 of Act 190), this kind of action must be filed within one (1) year after the right of plaintiff to hold the office arose. 5. INRE: Atty. Vicente Almacin Facts:

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