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Operations of the 757th Tank Battalion, Italian Campaign, Nov 4-Jun 45, by Lt Col R. C. Erickson, Inf. Command & Staff College. 1946-47.

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52-5M

COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE FORT LEAVENWORTH KANSAS

School of Combined Arms Regular Course 1946-1947

The Operations of the 757th Tank Battalionp Italian Campaign2November 1943-June 1945 (Personal Experience of a Battalion Commander)

Type of Operation Described:

Coordinated Tank-Infantry Attack

Lt.

Col. R. C. Erickson,

Infantry

^T~j~hj T

~'tSNs

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Index Bibliography Introduction 757th Tank Bn. Conclusions Lessons Learned Operations '

1 2 3 4-10 11-14 15

Map:

ITALY 1:50,000 Sheet 160 II Cassino (S. Andrea-S.Ambrogio-S.Apollinare) S. Andrea-S.Ambrogio-S. Apollinare triangle.

Chart:

Bibliography

S-11116 Armored Section, Fifth Army,

Observer Report

Fifth Army History, 1 April - 4 June 1944 Fifth Army History, 16 August - 15 December 1944 "19 Days from the Apennines to the Alps" - The Story of the Po Valley Author: Fifth Army U. S. Campaign.

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INTRODUCTION

I am presenting this monograph for two reasons.

First, I want very

much to graduate from this institution and become one of those 'future commanders and high level staff officers' which we hear so much about, and second,,to give you an idea of how one separate tank battalion operated in Italy in the past war, and to present for your consideration some of the

problems and difficulties a unit of this type encounters. Having seen several maps of Italy here in will agree that it said one in is the classroom, I believe you has often been

a very mountainous country and that it

which tanks could not be effectively used.

This rather ties in

with our problems here at the school in

which we often found our attached

tank battalion trailing along in reserve behind some infantry division, being held until terrain permitted its This is the doctrine laid down in use as a battalion striking force.

Field Manuals on the employment of armor.

However,. tre

must be exceptions to all good books and the terrain in

Italy dictated an un-orthodox method of employment which violates every principle in the book. This type of terrain wasn't that over which battalions made mass breakthroughs and exploited all over the front pages of the newspapers, I'd like to remind you that there were several tank battalions in Italy, they were there a long time, and did a lot of fighting. were greatly outnumbered by the infantry divisions, The tank battalions spite of the but

and in

fact that units of this type weren't making history, it

seemed that none of

the infantry divisions could or rather would get along without a battalion or any part of one that they could get. Now with this brief background, Tank Battalion in I'd like to tell my story of the 757th

Italy, and to carry you through one operation with the in which we were used as a battalion, and which,

Corps Expeditionary French, by the way, is

the only time in our twenty-three months in Italy.

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THE 757th TANK BATTALION OPERATIONS

After training in

the California Desert for between five and six months,

we landed at Casablanca, North Africa, on the 18th of March, 1943, with the idea of and feeling fully capable of going up into Tunisia and either relieving the 1st Armored Division to give them a much needed rest, or joining them and getting the African Campaign over in a hurry. At this time we were a light

tank battalion, composed of a Headquarters Company, three light tank companies, a service company, and a small medical detachment.

Two days after landing we were amazed and disappointed when we found ourselves operating as a battalion of stevedores, doing guard duty around the dock area at night. read in unloading ships by day and None of us could recall having However, there

a field manual that tank battalions were so employed.

was a perfectly good reason for it.

On the way to Africa several ships had Our

been torpedoed and a goodly portion of our equipment had been lost.

services were utilized at the docks only until new equipment arrived for us. It was only a matter of a couple of weeks when with full T/O equipment we

were moved north two hundred miles to a place near the Spanish Moroccan border known as Port Layutey. Here we ran into another means of employing a tank the city. By now we were quite

battalion and found ourselves doing MP duty in

resigned to the fact that we weren't going to win the African war. Shortly after our arrival in the area, the 2nd Moroccan French Infantry Upon their arrival we received a

Division moved into an area adjacent to us.

training directive from Seventh Army outlining an extensive tank-infantry training program to be carried on with the French troops. perfect example of prior planning or a coincidence, Whether it was a

I do not know, but just Italy.

nine months later we were fighting with this same division in

To get along with my little war, we went into Italy in the fall of 1943. Our ftst bit of excitement happened with an American task force along the highAfter getting settled in a bivouac area, the

way a few miles south of Cassino.

battalion commander was called to this higher headquarters of capturing a small mountain down the road a few miles. that the attack was to be made immediately.

and

given the mission

He was instructed

He remarked that he would like time

to make a reconnaissance, make a plan, and inform his battalion of the operation,

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whereupon he was informed that there was no time for that. instructed to use the radio in his vehicle,

He was further

call his battalion and get them

started down the highway, prepare a plan where he was, meet his battalion on the road, give them their instructions enroute, and make the attack. About

the time this was happening, a higher commander walked into the CP, and when advised of the plan, he immediately called it The point I wish to make here is off.

that a commander who Should have been

familiar with the capabilities and limitations of the units under his command, ordered such an attack without time for even a hasty reconnaissance, mention of a combined tank-infantry action, with no

and no consideration to the fact to seize a hill

that he was ordering a light tank battalion, with 37 mm guns,

mass which was nothing less that a huge rock formation protruding up from the vall r floor. Shortly after this the battalion was ordered back to a rear area to be re-organized into what we know as a tank battalion. In other words, there

were to be no more light and medium battalions, but all

battalions to be a three medium tank

standard organization, composed of a headquarters company, companies, one light tank company, a service company,

and a medical detachment

of twenty-five men. About this time the Corps Expeditionary French was in the process of relieving the American VI Corps which held a sector farther to the east. We,

along with another tank battalion, were attached to these people and moved to their sector. As I recall, we closed in bivouac at 1400 hours and by 1600 one

of our medium companies was attached to one division, and the battalion minus to another division. Time does not permit covering our operations in can be summarized by saying that we moved tanks up in direct firing for the infantry, detail, but I believe it the mountains, did some located fairly strong

established road blocks,

forces on or near critical terrain features, fired as artillery, and spent the winter being miserable in the cold and snow like everyone else. Our greatest problems here, as were true throughout the entire campaign, were supply and maintenance-trying supplied with gasoline, ammunition, operational. to keep these widely scattered units and rations, and keeping the vehicls

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Before going on, I might mention the difficulty experienced by both units when a group of non-French speaking Americans were put to work with a group of non-English speaking Frenchmen. However, with the assistance of

interpreters and liaison officers supplied by the French, and effort on the part of each, we were able to get along without too much difficulty. After the winter campaign, which had produced half successes in some sectors, a major regrouping of all Allied Forces in Italy took pl ae. This

took British units out of Fifth Army and gave them back to the British Eighth Army, put all the American units together in the II Corps and put the French Corps in and on the right flank of the Fifth Army.

PLANS FOR MAY 11th OPERATION The plans for the May 11th operation were such as to deal the enemy a decisive blow and carry the Fifth Army to Rome. Because of the fact that

three of the four divisions in the French Corps were made up of native mountain fighters, this unit was to make the main

Army effort. The 1st Free

French Division, to which we were attached for the operation, was to operate on the right flank of the Corps. For further orientation, I have here a chart of the particular sector in which we are interested. (Appendix A).

With the 2nd and 3d French Divisions attacking abreast at 2400 hours and the mission of securing a huge feature known as Mt. MAJO, the 1st Free French
Division was to attack at H$3, secure the high ground in the vicinity of S. ANDREA, continue on to capture LA GUARDIA HILL, and clean out the S. ANDREAS. AMBROGIO-S. APOLLINARE triangle. Our tank battalion was to cross TIGER BRIDGE with the artillery fire at 2300 hrs, move to attack position shown on chart, and at daylight to cross an anti-tank ditch, get on the road and proceed to S. APOLLINARE to cut off and destroy the enemy between and in S. APOLLINARE A D S. SMBROGIO. "A" Company

was to lead the attack, "B" company to support their movement by fire from the high ground just east of the anti-tank ditch, then to follow "A" Company and cut south along the ridge line to S. AMBROGIO. "C" Company was to be initially

in reserve, prepared to pass through "A" Company at S. APOLLINARE.

PRIOR PLANNING Before going farther, I'd like to take a minute to mention the prior planning of this operation. Cub planes had been made available to us by the

French and every officer in the battalion had flown over the area in which we were to operate. area. We were well supplied with air photos and maps of the

Then for ten days, the operation had been rehearsed with the French

infantry, putting our companies with the Infantry battalions with which they would later be working. Here I have a chance to get in a plug for Lt. Col. Duncan's training aids. lad. Our battalion operations sergeant was a very capable and ambitious After spending two full days on an OP which overlooked the area of the in depth. It was a fine

attack, he built a sand table 12' in \length by 6' piece of work and on it

was placed every piece of G-2 information available.

Over a period of a week, in which daily conferences were held, almost the entire plan for the operation, not only our plan but the French Division Commander' s as,well, was made at the sand table. was oriented and explained the complete plan. Every man in our Battalion

MAY 11th ATTACK To get back to the attack, on the night of 10th May the battalion moved to a forward assembly area a mile from the river. Under cover of the noise

of the artillery preparation at 2300, on 11th May, the combat elements of the battalion, less the assault gun platoon which had been attached to the French artillery, moved to the attack position. By daylight the infantry had secured the high ground behind S. ANDREA and had started up the slopes of LA GUARDIA HILL. been filled The anti-tank ditch had

sufficiently to permit a crossing.

"A" company had just crossed

the ditch and had two platoons of tanks up on the road, when the infantry was hit with a strong counterattack only a few hundred yards in front of him and apparently directed at the road junction which he was about to pass. When

the company commander saw what was happening, he called his third platoon on the radio and told them not to get on the road, but to deploy where they were and direct their fire well up on the hill. Being in column on the road with

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the other two platoons, only the company commander's tank and the one following him were in a position to fire. T his quick action rather upset the enemy plans,

and permitted the French infantry to withdraw to a positiai along the road at the base of the hill. After a short conference between our "A" company five more tanks were moved off giving 12 tanks which All 12 tanks started

commander and the infantry battalion commander,

the road into firing positions just east of the road, could direct fire on the ill to the immediate front.

firing when the infantry was ready to go, and laid a rolling barrage about 50 yards ahead of the infantry up the hill. It was taken with comparative ease.

However, this unforeseen delay had consumed time, two tanks had hit mines, two had been damaged by mortar fire in the suspension system, one had had the bow gun put out of commission, portion of their ammunition load. on tbh and twelve of the tanks had used a good This left "A" Company in no shape to go

S. APOLLINARE, and we were about to commit the reserve company before "C" company was moved up and passed thru "A" APOLLINARE. They had moved just about

the attack had gotten started.

company to continue the attack to S.

a thousand yards and were at a very narrow spot in the road with very steep banks on either side when the first tank was hit by an anti-tank gun from

the ridge extending south to S. AMBROGIO. Here the weather had a damaging effect on our plans. morning there was a heavy fog over the GARIGLIANO RIVER. On this particular You will remember

t that 'B" company had moved to a position just east of the anti-tank ditch to

support the movement of "A" company, and which was now "C" company, along the road. nil. As the first "C" company tank was hit, we, like everyone else in trouble called for artillery fire. However, it seemed other people were also having In the meantime, The fog had extended to their position and visibility was practically

trouble and no fire was available to us for fifteen minutes. the second "C" compac

tank had been hit, and it began to look like we The only thing left to

wouldn't need any artillery fire in fifteen minutes.

try was our mortar platoon, which was ordered to move into a position and fire n. the ridge from which the AT guns were firing. Two of the three

mortar half-tracks were hit by enemy mortar fire before they could fire a round.

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The remaining one did get a few round, including some smoke, position, purely by guess and Kentucky windage.

on the enemy

Maybe I haven't made it

clear that the anti-tank guns were firing from a position higher and farther from the river and were not harassed by the fog. "A" Compare had been

advised of the happenings and they too being out of the fog had fair visibility. In a short time the company commander was directing the fire Then

of his tanks along the ridge line where the fire was coming from.

things began to brighten and 'B" company was able to also fire on the target. With this fire on the AT guns, "C" company was able to pull the disabled by-pass them and proceed to S.

tanks back to a wider portion of the road, APOLLINARE.

"B" company immediately followed as planned and directed their AMBROGIO. In spite of the delay, when "B" company began

attack toward S. their close in left

fire at S.

A BROGIO,

several enemy vehicles and foot troops APOLLINARE where "C" company was waiting

the town and withdrew toward S.

for them and had them cut off. estimated compaiy of infantry in guns.

Also "C" company had shot up or captured an S. APOLLINARE and had destroyed two anti-tank GIGRGIO,

Without delay the attack was continued by "C" company to S.

a road center to the north. I have presented this particular action for several reasons. to emphasize the prior planning, reconnaissance, infantry coordination, fire and movement, First, tank-

use of reserves, and flexibility of plans necessary Second, to show that with effective tank support

in 'a tank-infantry action.

infantry can be most successful with a minimum of casualties and effort. Third, to show that when the guns of several tanks can be brought to bear on permits the movement of other forces with ease. And last,

point targets, it

this was presented because it

was the only time until we reached thePo Valley

just twelve months later that we had a chance to use the battalion together as one unit, or rather the greater part of the battalion as a unit. After this operation we were soon in the hills and mountains again and some companies

found our companies attached out to the various regiments, broken do wn into platoons, of infantry. ever possible. they in

turn attached to battalions and companies going ahead whenIt was an

The tanks worked with the front line infantry,

The chief concern again was supply and maintenance.

extremely difficult problem keeping the vehicles supplied with gasoline and -9-

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ammunition when they were passing over terrain which could often not be negotiated by wheeled vehicles. In each company the company executive During the day he followed as best

was charged with supplying his company. he could, keeping track of all

his company units, finding out where each

stopped for the night, and then getting the supply vehicles to the tanks before daylight. Two service company trucks were attached to each company to be used where wheeled vehicles could

as well as a platoon of light tanks, not go.

PO VALLEY OPERATIONS

Now,

just a word about operations in

the flat

PO VALIEY.

Until we

reached the PO RIVERl and the battalion (-) in

"C" company worked with the 88th Inf1airy Division, was attached to the 91st Inf. Division. We worked

task forces normally consisting of a medium tank company with a battalion The attack was

of infantry following, or at times riding on the tanks.

carried on on parallel roads, but often the units were not mutually supporting. Too, we were never permitted to by-pass strong points as is true with

Armored Divisions. force, it

Each time we ran into a strong point or opposition in Most of

we

necessitated a fight until the opposition was overcome. the towns and in

the strong resistance encountered was in

these towns/were

materially assi ded by the Partisan Forces. In this movement across the PO VALLEY, have tanks. it seemed that everyone had to There

Even the Division CP called for tanks for protection. the battalion, and it

just weren't that many tanks in

was a constant struggle

to keep the companies together as units. The PO VALLEY Campaign was most successful and resulted in and destruction of thousands of the enemy. Italy by being the capture

The operations of the 757th Tank Battalion were climaxed in

part of a task force of the 91st Division which made contact with the American Seventh Army coming south through BRENNER PASS from Germany.

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CONCLUSIONS

Now let

me briefly run over some of the difficult problems we. encountered, and to leave with you several

my own ideas of what can be done to lessen them, things which need further consi 1. is Artillry Support.. ration.

One of the principles taught here at the school This is borne

that tank attacks should always be supported by artillery.

out by the fact that in

our school problems there are always several additional When separate units easy to talk

artillery battalions attached to the armored divisions. are working with infantry divisions, about, but extremely hard to get. the division infantry, and it

this artillery support is

The division artillery was there to support

was difficult to convince many commanders that Operating as small units, artillery wasn't wasn't

tanks needed artillery support. needed often, but when it available to us. 2. Attachment vs. support.

could have saved men and equipment, it

In my experience,

it

seemed to be SOP

that when an infaitry division received a Corps order attaching a tank battalion to them, they immediately published an order attaching a medium tank company to each of their regiments and our assault gun platoon to the division artillery. It has been stated from the platform here at the school, that attacha

ments are normally made so that the necessary coordination can be effected in combined tank-infantry action. placed in support of or attached In my opinion, regardless of whether a unit is planned,

to, when a combined operation is necessary to make it

exactly the same amount of coordination is workable. When attached to a unit, if

successful and

they were to be entirely responsible for

and take care of all necessary supply and other administrative matters of the unit, then I can see whereman attachment might be desirous. With a tank battalion,

I don't believe any infantry division can supply itself moving tank battalion in ammunition, and where it gasoline alone.

properly and keep a

By this I mean keeping gasoline, is needed made it has

and rations available to the tank companies when it is needed. So,

in my opinion, when an attachment is

a tendency to take the commadd away from the battalion commander and place it

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with three or four infantry commanders, different ideas about how to use tanks. tanks to be used only in

who usually all have entirely I am not one to campaign for I

the role of break-throughs and pursuits.

firmly believe that whenever they can assist the infantry to move they should be used. But my point here is, that I'firmly believe that the to the commander who is

decisions as to where and how many,

should be left

trained in the use of and knows the capabilities and limitations of his vehicles, and knows whether two tanks can do the job or whether a company

is necessary. 3. Morale. Next let's take a look at the morale problems a unit of One

this type encounters. damaging morale fact is

First, there is the subject of decorations.

that many divisions are awarded quotas of DSCs,

Silver Stars, etc., but too often these don't seem to get down to include the attachments which may be there for only a few weeks or a month. It is

much easier to get a man decorated when people are available to write glowing tales of heroism. In a separate tank battalion of only 39 officers it is If there is such a character, he is

rather hard to find such a journalist.

usually one of your good tank platoon leaders or someone else who can't be replaced to become an expert on decorations. Chaplains and dentists were never plentiful in battalions had neither. It is the army and separate

true that originally tank battalions were placed

under a Group Headquarters which was provided with a Chaplain and two dentists. However, in Italy, the Group Headquarters under which we operated, never

functioned as a Group Headquarters because all the tank battalions were attached our separately to the divisions. Later this same Group Headquarters was made

into an Infantry Regimental Headquarters and functioned as a composite infantry regiment. The infantry divi si ons had Chaplains, but they didn't reach the In our rear area, Sunday services

personnel who needed the spiritual relief.

were often available to our personnel of Service and Headquarters company. As for dentists in the divisions, they were extremely busy with their own people.

As an example, when a division dentist offers to handle ten patients a week for a tank battalion, battalion is it is a matter of about fourteen months before the

completely gone over. I am familiar with

4.

Lack of understanding and questionabl-: t judgment.

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two cases where a regimental commander ordered an officer to send two tanks down a highway to reach
.

certain point in so many minutes.

In both cases,

it was positively known that enemy AT guns were covering the road, and that the tanks were absolutely restricted to the roads. knocked out, and the crews killed or captured. The tanks were sent, all

The principle that infantry

always attacks and destroys anti-tank guns for the armor is often forgotten in tank-infantry action. If there is a chance that such a maneuver will do

some good, it may be justified, however, when such orders are issued in a state of excitement and merely as an excuse to use tanks, it cannot be justified. acquainted. To go fur1ter into the lack of understanding of some commanders, one particular example may bring out the point. company was working with an infantry regiment. rather bare hill, one vich tanks could climb. On a certain attack my "A" The objective was a large, The hill was well defended This did not happen to my unit, but to one with vich I am well

and covered by several bunkers which could not be identified from a distance. The plan called for our tanks to lead the assault, to be followed closely by the infantry. The attack jumped off as scheduled. The first hundred yards

or so the infantry stayed close behind the tanks.

However, as the attack

progressed, the infantry troope received flanking fire and were pinned down. Being busily engaged, the tanks drew away and were a good distance ahead of the infantry when the tank commander noticed the infantry people behind him in trouble. He called his platoon leaders over the'radio, told them to turn

around, go back down the hill, let the infantry soldiers get behind and under their tanks until he could locate and destroy the flaking fire which had held them up. He then proceeded to move his reserve platoon to the flank Then the advance started

to offer protection against the small arms fire. again.

After another advance of about 300 yards, the tanks again slowly For the second time, the company commander Through

pulled away from the infantry.

turned his tanks around and went back to pick up his infantry.

this officers previous experience with infatry and his commendable judgment, the infantry was put on top of the objective with very light losses. The disturbing part of this story comes when a telephone call was received by the battalion commaser demanding to know why the taks were turning around and coming back down the hill when they had gained so much ground, and

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furer again.

demanding that immediate action be taken to see that it

didn' t happen

What this officer did not know, was that smart infantry dug-in on and I believe the Germans must be given credit climb out of their holes to

the forward slope of a hill,

for being well trained soldiers, normally don't

knock out tanks coming directly at them and which are firing on everything that moves. Further, that very often tanks will be allowed to pass through

and all fire will be concentrated on the infantry following behind them, then the tanks will be destroyed from the rear. This lack of understanding did not occur between the battalion and company commaders who were on the spot and engaged in the operation. people worked well together, Those

understood each others problems, and worked out The people who did not understand were

their difficulties as they arose.

those who were not there, but were watching the operation from a distance. In my opinion, an attack has started, the only people qualified to make decisions once are those small unit commanders actually engaged, operations of this type. and

who have had day to day experience in 5. Replacement problems.

During a good portion of the Italian Campaign, This meant that each

trained tank replacem ets were not available to us. time a group of replacements were received,

it was necessary to conduct a to acquaint the replacements

school over a period of approximately two weeks, with maintenance, otherwise engaged, driving, and gunnery.

When our light tank company was not Often

the training personnel came from these people.

insufficient vehicles and areas were available to train these people. During certain stages of the campaign, no replacements were available over long periods of time. Tank crews were trying to operate with four, and At one time in our operations it was necessary

sometimes three men to a tank.

to take a complete platoon of light tank crews and use them as replacements in a medium company, to keep our medium tanks working with the infantry.

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LESSONS, LEANED
1. Tanks can be used effectively in mountainous terrain, but not in

accordance with the principles and doctrine prescribed in field manuals. 2. team, To gain the maxhm degree of effectiveness from a tank-infantry

everyone concerned must have a thorough understanding of the operation,

of the capabilities and limitations of each type unit, and after an attack has started the decisions must be left 3. with the small unit commanders engaged.

That the five hundred series radio, with which this tank battalion was not sufficient to maintain control and contact, when the

was equipped,

unit was broken down into small, widely separated units. 4. Morale problems of separate units are great and must be given

consideration by the larger units to which they are attached. 5. That the reconnaissance platoon, of four 1/4 ton trucks and one use in mountainous

half track, terrain. 6.

was ineffective and found to be of very little

That five-man assault gun crews were not sufficient to carry on the

extensive fire programs prescribed by division artillery when the platoon was so attached. 7. That some provision must be made for additional liaison officers when

the unit is to be broken down and attached to various other units, each requiring a liaison officer. battalion. The T/O provided for one liaison officer per

However,

with the present T/0 giving tanks to the infantry regiments, organic tank battalion, most of these difficulties

and each division having its experienced in

the last.war should be alleviated.

-15-

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