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Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs

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Shaping the Public Image of Islam: The Shiis of Ireland as Moderate Muslims
Oliver Scharbrodt Available online: 15 Dec 2011

To cite this article: Oliver Scharbrodt (2011): Shaping the Public Image of Islam: The Shiis of Ireland as Moderate Muslims, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 31:4, 518-533 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13602004.2011.630860

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Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 31, No. 4, December 2011

Shaping the Public Image of Islam: The Shiis of Ireland as Moderate Muslims

OLIVER SCHARBRODT
Abstract Public discourse on Muslims in Europe has been characterized by a differentiation between moderate and radical Muslims. This discourse which distinguishes between acceptable and unacceptable forms of Islam also creates tensions and competitions among Muslims with organizations and individuals vying for leadership, recognition, and government sponsorship by presenting themselves as moderate voices within Muslim communities speaking out against extremism and radicalism. In Ireland, the Shii community, its clerical leader and other lay activists emphasize their moderate and integrationist understanding of Islam and appear as outspoken critics of radical and militant expressions of Sunni Islam. Thereby, representatives of the Shii community adopt the differentiation between moderate and radical Muslims in contemporary discourse and conflate it with the historical sectarian divide between Sunnis and Shiis, translated into a European diaporic setting. In addition to providing a profile of the Shii community in Ireland, this paper discusses the Shii selfrepresentation as a moderate group among Muslims in Ireland. The reasons and motivations for this particular self-representation in the public will be examined by considering the socio-economic background of early Shii migrants, current streams of Shii thought and its impact on Shiis in Ireland and the double-minority setting as a minority within a minority. Introduction Post 9/11, in the context of the securitisation of Islam1 public discourse on Muslims in Europe has been characterized by a differentiation between moderate and radical Muslims.2 While the former are perceived as acceptable partners for governments and other political and social actors and need to be supported in their efforts to counter radicalism, the latter are viewed as security risks, in opposition to integration and hostile to European values and norms.3 This bifurcation also results in a certain public pressure on Muslims to prove their moderate credentials based, for example, on their attitudes towards women,4 the use of violence or the Middle East conflict.5 While a growing body of academic literature has engaged with this phenomenon it has focused so far on either government initiatives to promote moderate Islam through sponsoring or coopting particular Muslim organizations or policing the activities of imams6 or on the public discourse on Islam and Muslims in the media, politics, or academia reflecting this bifurcation.7 The current European public discourse which distinguishes between acceptable and unacceptable forms of Islam also creates tensions and competitions among Muslims with organizations and individuals vying for leadership, recognition, and government sponsorship by presenting themselves as moderate voices within Muslim communities speaking out against extremism and radicalism.8 This paper
ISSN 1360-2004 print/ISSN 1469-9591 online/11/040518-16 2011 Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13602004.2011.630860

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investigates how this bifurcating discourse is used by Muslim leaders and organizations in Europe in order to achieve public recognition or ward off suspicion from a particular group, community, or organization. As an example the paper will use contemporary dynamics occurring among Muslims in the Republic of Ireland. Although the Irish government officially does not express particular concern about the potential security risks posed by radical Muslims resident in Ireland,9 the public debate on the various ideological orientations of Muslims and specific mosques and organizations has followed the aforementioned pattern of bifurcating Muslims between radical and moderate strands.10 In Ireland, the Shii community, its clerical leader and other lay activists emphasize their moderate and integrationist understanding of Islam and appear as outspoken critics of radical and militant expressions of Sunni Islam. Thereby, representatives of the Shii community adopt the differentiation between moderate and radical Muslims in contemporary discourse and conflate it with the historical sectarian divide between Sunnis and Shiis, translated into a European diaporic setting. This paper will provide some background information on the Shii community in Ireland and its relationship with Sunni Muslim groups, followed by a discussion of the Shii self-representation as a moderate group among Muslims in Ireland. Interviews with the leadership and members of the Shii community were conducted and the media coverage on Irelands Shiis analyzed for this purpose. In conclusion, the reasons and motivations for this particular self-representation in the public will be discussed by considering the socio-economic background of early Shii migrants, current streams of Shii thought and its impact on Shiis in Ireland and the double-minority setting as a minority within a minority11 with its particular pressure to gain public recognition. The Shiis of IrelandA Profile Estimates suggest that around 3,000-4,000 Shiis live in Ireland, about half of them in Dublin.12 The ethnic composition and socio-economic status of the Shii community reflect the overall development of Muslim migration to Ireland in the last decades. Up to the early 1990s, the community was primarily composed of educated professionals, medical doctors in particular, who came to Ireland for educational purposes, most of whom as students at the Royal College of Surgeons in Dublin. They arrived as students from Iraq and other countries of the Gulf region with significant Shii communities such as Saudi-Arabia and Bahrain. The clerical leader of the Irish Shii community, Iraqi-born Dr Ali Al-Saleh, represents this background in his own biography: he came from SaudiArabia to Ireland in 1985 to complete his medical studies and then continued his training as a Shii cleric in Iran until 1997.13 With the start of the so-called Celtic Tiger Years (19952007) and the major economic transformation of Ireland, Muslim migration increased significantly, also affecting the Shii community with a new influx of Muslim migrants from Pakistan, among them many Shiis as well. At the same time, the number of refugees admitted to Ireland and of asylum seekers increased rapidly in the 1990s and early 2000s changing the demographic composition of Muslims in general and of Shiis in particular. Iraq has been one of the top countries of origin of asylum seekers in Ireland,14 many of whom are Shiis fleeing from the continuing chaos and disorder of their country after the fall of Saddam Hussein. Therefore, as other Muslim communities in Ireland, Shiis can be divided into a group of more settled migrants who arrived in Ireland before the early 1990s, are usually well-educated and part of the middle- or upper-class and a group of recent of arrivals of labor migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers.15

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This demographic shift is also reflected in the centers Shiis use for their religious and social activities. The major center is the Ahlul-Bayt Islamic Centre in the Milltown area in South Dublin which was opened in 1996. This purpose-built center, placed right in the heart of a middle-class neighborhood, includes several meeting rooms, a library, a prayer room, kitchen facilities, guest rooms, and the apartment for the imam and his family. The center is independently financed through donations made by local Shiis in Ireland and by wealthy Shiis in the Persian Gulf region. Al-Salehs father was until his death the personal representative (wakil) of Grand Ayatollah Al-Sistani in Qatar and hence had access to a wide network of Shiis in the region who have secured the funding of the center. Initial funding to buy the land and build the center was also provided by the Maktoum Foundation, the sponsor of the Islamic Cultural Centre in Ireland, the major Sunni mosque in the country. The foundation is run by Sheikh Hamdan Al-Maktoum, member of the ruling family of Dubai and finance minister of the United Arab Emirates. The rather unusual partial sponsoring of the Shii center by a Sunni-oriented foundation results from the openness of Maktoum to fund Islamic philanthropic projects in general and from the religious background of the head of the Maktoum Foundations European office in London, Mirza Saig, who is a Shii.16 That the center receives its funding through private donations by wealthy individual Shiis from the Gulf region and is not dependent on support by governments or government-affiliated agencies, creates a certain degree of financial autonomy, which Al-Saleh and other representatives emphasize as a particular advantage of the local Shii community. The fact that the center is run by Al-Saleh and his family and financed through his fathers Shii networks in the Gulf region illustrates how the traditional leadership of the Shii clerics is also central in a diasporic setting.17 The facilities of the center have been shared by Shiis of different nationalities. However, apart from the ritual salat prayers each national group organizes its own events, catering for their particular linguistic and cultural needs. Several reasons account for this: first, the particular nature of Shii devotional practices which revolve primarily around the celebration of the birthdays and the commemoration of the martyrdoms of the Shii Imams differ culturally between different ethnic groups and also use local languages.18 For instance, central to religious gatherings of South Asian Shiis is the recitation of Urdu hymns in praise of the Shii Imams. Second, given that most Shiis are first generation migrants, the language of their country of origin is still their first language and consequently preferred for social interaction and community activities. Third, the religious and devotional meetings of the various Shii national groups also exhibit a strong socio-cultural dimension as they allow, apart from their actual religious purpose, the possibility to socialize with ones own community, Iraqi or Pakistani, in a familiar linguistic and cultural setting. In that sense, each national group of the Shii community uses its own language and meets on its own, which is evidenced as well in the childrens classes, offered every Sunday in the center which are held for Arab and South Asian Shiis separately. In June 2010, a group of Pakistani Shiis opened a Pakistani Shii center, the Azakhana-e Zahra, in the Stadium Business Park in Blanchetstown, North Dublin. This new Shii center represents a new type of meeting place, reflective of the social realities of newly arriving Muslim immigrants. While the Ahlul-Bayt Centre in the affluent Milltown area in South Dublin represents the more settled Shii Muslims of fairly advanced economic status, the new Pakistani center is based in a business unit rented in a remote industrial estate with a new African Pentecostal church as its immediate neighbor.

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The opening of a new Shii center in the north of Dublin is a result of the increasing number of Shiis in Ireland and part of the subsequent trend of diversifying Muslim religious activities in general. Although Pakistani Shiis have used the facilities of the Ahlul-Bayt Centre, there was a certain ambition to create their own center and the Babul-Ilm Society was created for that purpose.19 The location in north Dublin also reflects the social background of new arrivals. The social northsouth divide of Dublin with a middle-class south and a working-class north has turned the north into a more attractive location for Muslim labor migrants while the south of the city is the primary residential area of the more settled, middle-class Muslim families. As most Pakistani Shiis live in the north, the location of the Ahlul-Bayt center in south Dublin has caused some inconvenience and explains the choice of the industrial estate in the north. Unlike most initiatives to organize Shiis communities in Europe and North America which are primarily led by Shii clerics and thereby maintain their traditional leadership,20 the Babul-Ilm Society was launched by non-clerical Pakistani Shiis and is typical of the lay-oriented forms of local leadership of Sunni-Muslim communities in the West. Nevertheless, the importance of clerical leadership is evident by the presence of Al-Saleh at the opening of the Pakistani Shii center and of clerical representatives from the Shia Islamic Education Society from the UK, among them its head Siyyid Rizvi. Until recruitment of a permanent resident imam, either Al-Saleh, other Shiis in Ireland with some clerical training or South Asian clerics from Britain give lectures at the Pakistani Shii center in Blanchetstown. In addition to the Shii centers in Milltown and Blanchetstown in Dublin, Shiis from Kuwait use a flat as their own meeting center. Outside of Dublin, a new Husayniyya center opened in Cork in spring 2010 and Shiis in Galway meet at a private residence. While the Ahlul-Bayt Centre served as the major Shii center of Ireland in the past, attracting large numbers of Shiis from the Dublin area and the rest of the country, the numbers have decreased in recent years as a consequence of different nationalities such as Pakistanis and Kuwaitis opening their own centers in Dublin and elsewhere, turning the Ahlul-Bayt Centre increasingly into a Husayniyya for Iraqi and Gulf Arab Shiis in Dublin. These developments illustrate, on the one hand, the diversification of Shii communal activities due to the growth in numbers which makes the opening of community centers more feasible. On the other hand, they also reflect the national and ethnic fragmentation of Shii communities in the diaspora in Europe and North America where most Shii prefer to socialize with fellow Shiis from their countries of origin and of the same cultural and linguistic backgrounds.21 The relationship between Shiis and Sunnis in Ireland is ambivalent. In certain areas, co-operation between Shiis and Sunnis exists and various religious services provided by Sunni mosques and organizations are also used by Shiis. Before the opening of the Ahlul-Bayt Centre, Shiis would attend Sunni mosques in Dublin as Shiis still do in other Irish cities where a proper Shii center does not exist and usually only one major mosque is attended by Muslim residents of a city. In Dublin, Shiis use the educational services offered by the Islamic Cultural Centre such as the Quran school for children. Furthermore, Shii pupils attend the Muslim National School in Clonskeagh, based in the facilities of the Islamic Cultural Centre and headed by the Sunni imam of the Dublin City Mosque.22 Al-Saleh, who has sent his own children to this school, encourages in his sermons other Shiis to do the same.23 In addition to this shared use of mosque and educational services by Sunnis and Shiisnot uncommon among Muslim minorities in the West,24Al-Saleh is a member of the Irish Council of

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Imams, a body with 35 representatives from various mosques in Ireland, headed by the Sunni imam of the Islamic Cultural Centre, Hussein Halawa.25 Despite these collaborations in various forms, sectarian tensions between Sunnis and Shiis also become visible in the Irish context. Two factors have contributed to the manifestation of the sectarian rivalry in Ireland: the appeal of more Salafi-oriented expressions of Islam among Irish Muslims with its explicit anti-Shii stance plays a certain role.26 In addition, the political empowerment of Shiis in Iraq has also had repercussions on Muslims in Ireland, with a rising number of refugees from Iraq, both Shii and Sunni, bringing the sectarian conflict of Iraq to Ireland. The support of Iraqi Shiis for the removal of Saddam Hussein and hence for the American occupation of Iraq has separated them politically from most Sunni Muslims and their rejection of the Iraq war.27

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Shiis as Moderate Muslims The public discourse on Shii Muslims in Ireland emphasizes their moderate credentials as a voice speaking out against Islamic extremism and radicalism. In particular, the clerical leader of the Shii community, Dr Ali Al-Saleh, has played a pivotal role in buttressing the self-definition and self-representation of Shiis in Ireland as followers of a moderate and tolerant form of Islam.28 Three examples will be used to illustrate this discourse by Shiis and their leading representatives and their public reception as such in Ireland: (i) attitudes towards life in a liberal, secular and pluralistic society in Europe; (ii) the assessment of the Iraq war and its aftermath; and (iii) responses to suspected terrorist activities of Muslims in Ireland. In various interviews conducted with the author, Al-Saleh emphasizes the need of Muslims to integrate into and engage with Irish society and to avoid the ghettoization of Muslims as it has happened in other European countries and is also propagated by Salafi-oriented Muslims in Ireland.29 He also points at the benefits of living in a liberal society, allowing freedom of religion and freedom of speech, basic human rights not always guaranteed in Muslim-majority countries in the Middle East.30 To provide an example: although critical of the presence of Omar Bakri Mohammed, a Syrian-born Islamist activist based for many years in Britain, at an annual debate of the Trinity Philosophical Society on Islam in October 2007, at which Al-Saleh also participated, he still considers the attendance of such a controversial figure, who is banned from entering the UK, for example, as a sign that shows how beautiful liberal society is.31 Al-Saleh is also supportive of other European initiatives to promote moderate Islam and to counter Islamic extremism. Speaking at a conference of the Quilliam Foundation in June 2008, an organization founded by two former members of Hizbut-Tahrir in the UK,32 Al-Saleh applauds the organizers for their fight against extremism and emphasizes the need to protect young Muslims in particular against the influence of radical Muslims. Stating that Islam supports human rights, womens rights and democracy, he also underlines the essential harmony between religion and human rights, as all monotheistic religions promote human dignity as part of their teachings. In conclusion of his speech, he alludes to a hadith, attributed to the Prophet Muhammad, that one day the sun will rise from the West. While originally the hadith contains an apocalyptic prophecy describing one of the signs of the Day of Judgement, he ignores completely its eschatological background in order to convey an allegorical interpretation: it refers to the firm establishment of human rights and democracy in the West that will influence the rest of the world. For Al-Saleh, Muslims in the West have the opportunity to develop an Islam of

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democracy and human rights33 and convey this new understanding of Islam to Muslims elsewhere. The American occupation of Iraq and the downfall of Saddam Hussein with the subsequent empowerment of Iraqi Shiis and inter-sectarian struggle between Shiis and Sunnis provide another area to which Shiis in Ireland resort in order to underline their commitment to democracy. As in other parts of the world, demonstrations by Iraqi Shiis in support of the American occupation of Iraq occurred also in Ireland as well as public celebrations after the capture of Saddam Hussein in December 2003.34 While Iraqi Shiis in Ireland welcomed the toppling of Saddam Hussein, representatives of Sunni Muslim mosques and organizations were more skeptical of the Iraq war and participated in demonstrations against it together with other Irish peace activists.35 Al-Saleh contributed an article to The Irish Times in April 2006 presenting his views on the current political situation in the country.36 Commemorating the third anniversary of the invasion of Iraq, he criticizes the organizers and participants of demonstrations against the Iraq war and against the American occupation of the country who are unaware of the democratic benefits the toppling of Saddam Husseins regime has brought to the people of Iraq. Responding to criticism that the war has caused the deaths of thousands of Iraqis, he attributes these deaths to the activities of terrorists, most of whom from outside of Iraq, and not to the invading armies. His account of the Iraq war and its aftermath mirrors the discourse of political groups supportive of the invasion: the matter of whether Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, originally presented as main rationale for the war, is rendered irrelevant by referring to the possibility of turning Iraq to the role model for democracy and human rights which will spur democratic change across the Middle East.37 The current political chaos and sectarian violence is not caused by Iraqis but a result of the activities of foreign, Taliban-style terrorists. In addition, he also appeals to Irish historical sentiments by linking the need for sacrifices with democratic change. While he and his family have personally experienced the loss of relatives in Iraq due to the current violence, they believe that this terrible sacrifice is worth it for the sake of democracy.38 The link between sacrifices in the struggle for democracy and self-determination and its echoes in Irish history become more obvious when he creates a direct historical parallel between the current situation in Iraq and the aspirations of the Iraqi people and the struggle for Irish independence from British colonial rule in the early twentieth century: Iraqis today want what the Irish wanted in 1922: to live in peace, to rule ourselves, to raise our children according to the traditions of our religious faith and to be free of foreign oppressors.39 Since 9/11, the activities of suspected Islamist terrorists provide a major discursive dividing line between radical and moderate Muslims, requiring Muslim organizations and representatives to dissociate themselves explicitly from such activities in order to be counted as moderates. The interviewed Shiis present themselves as victims of radical Islam and its terrorist manifestations. During the Ashura commemorations to mourn the murder of Husayn, the Prophet Muhammads grandson and third Shii Imam, in Karbala in 680 C.E., a medical doctor from Kashmir described the ahl albayt [family of the Prophet Muhammad] as the first victims of terrorism. An Iraqi Shii juxtaposed the pacifist leadership of the first Shii Imam Ali to the early militant spread of Islam with looting and enslavement of inhabitants in the conquered territories. In contrast, Ali opposed the violent spread of Islam and sent emissaries to the nonMuslim world as part of peaceful missionary activities. For this young Iraqi Shii, it is

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therefore important for Muslims today to dissociate themselves from this violent past which is used by radical Muslims as a historical role-model.40 Al-Saleh has played a central role in his responses to alleged terrorist activities of Muslims in Ireland in order to prove the moderate credentials of Shii Muslims. In March 2010, seven people were arrested in Ireland in a major international investigation of a suspected plot to murder the Swedish cartoonist Lars Vilks, who depicted Muhammad in 2007, which involved the American convert Colleen LaRose, known as Jihad Jane and seven other suspected co-conspirators based in Ireland.41 While the response of leaders and representatives of Sunni organizations were rather muted,42 Al-Saleh was one of the few Muslim leaders43 speaking extensively to the media and presenting his interpretation of events. He attributes such terrorist activities to the increasing influence of Salafi groups in Ireland, among young Muslims in particularactivities which have, according to him, increased in recent years, as Ireland has provided a safe haven for militant Muslim groups which act secretively outside of the purview of major mosque organizations.44 In his public statements in the aftermath of the arrests, Al-Saleh appeals to both alleged indicators of radical Islam, such as the burqa, and general resentments in Irish society to the recent influx of refugees and asylum seekers. By opposing the burqa or full face veiling as unsuitable for the life of Muslims in Europe and supporting its ban in classrooms, for example, he not only follows discourses and policy and legal steps to outlaw or circumscribe its appearance in European societies, he also provides a further rationale for its rejection by presenting it as the first sign of extremism and its spread as concomitant with the spread of radical and militant interpretations of Islam among European Muslims.45 In addition, he also responds to anxieties within Irish society about the arrival of asylum seekers and refugees, their suspected exploitation of the states welfare system, and their potential danger. While the early Muslim migrants were of an educated background and are well-integrated into Irish society, the Muslim newcomers of the last two decades, who came as asylum seekers primarily, have brought more extremist views to Ireland.46 Al-Saleh attributes the rise of extremism to the lax Irish asylum policy and the welfare system which has easily granted Muslim extremists asylum and consequently provided financial support. He suggests that asylum policies should consider in addition to the personal background and ideological attitudes of the asylum seeker outward expressions of radical Islam: Any Muslim with a long beard and his wife wearing burka and hes not working. I would put a question mark on that.47 Reasons and Motivations The following section will explore the reasons and motivations for this type of selfrepresentation and self-definition of Shiis in Ireland by considering the socio-economic background of early Shii migrants to Ireland, the impact of the Iraq war and the subsequent ideological re-orientation of Iraqi Shiism on Shiis in Ireland and the doubleminority experience of Shiis in the diaspora. Socio-economic Status of Early Shii Migrants The dynamics of Muslim migration to Ireland have been different to those of other Western European countries. While Muslim migration to the UK, France, and Germany served the purpose to fill the shortage of labor force after World War II and originated from rural, underprivileged and poorly educated social segments of the countries

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of origin, Irelands experience of Muslim migration has been different. The first Muslim immigrants came primarily for study purposes, in the medical field in particular, and then decided to stay in Ireland to work as educated professionals, becoming part of the Irish middle- and upper-class. This has been characteristic of the social composition of Muslims in Ireland until the early 1990s. Likewise, early Shii Muslims, belonging to the more settled group, were fairly well-integrated into Irish society, given their educational background, language skills and economic status, and many of them married into Irish families. Experiences of social marginalization and ghettoization, characteristic of Muslim communities in other Western European countries, have not been shared by these early Muslim migrants, whether of a Shii or Sunni background, although instances of discrimination did occur.48 The recent large scale migration to Ireland, commencing in the early 1990s, has impacted on this rapport. The influx of refugees and asylum seekers has led to an increasing skepticism regarding the benefits of migration and to the fear of an exploitation of the social welfare system, leading to the 2004 Citizenship Referendum, restricting migrants access to Irish citizenship and social welfare services.49 The increasing number of Muslim migrants in the last 20 years has also caused unease among the more established segments of the Shii community. Muslim communities in Ireland have become more diversified in terms of ethnic and cultural background, sectarian and ideological orientation and socioeconomic status. As a result of large scale migration, Muslims entered Ireland who as part of their particular interpretation of Islamic identity espouse a strong rejection of Shiism with a negative impact on inter-sectarian relations. Furthermore, the new socio-economic complexity of Muslim communities has also yielded a certain sense of nostalgia for the pre-1990s years when Muslims, whether Shii or Sunni, were part of a very small middle- and upper-class community outside of the public spotlight and well-integrated. Representatives of the Shii community in particular refer to changing nature of Muslim communities in Ireland as a result of the post-Celtic Tiger waves of immigration and make the recent arrivals responsible for the tensions within the communities and the negative perception of Muslims by the Irish public. As one member of the Shii community in Cork stated: We [the Muslims] used to be a well-respected and recognized community. But with the arrival of asylum seekers, new forms of radical Islam were introduced, and we have lost this respect.50 It is therefore important, for the more established Shiis in particular, to portray their community as well-integrated, moderate, and open-minded in terms of its religio-cultural orientation and socio-economic status and to delineate a position of Shiis in Irish society outside of the problematic experience of Muslim migration in the last 20 years51notwithstanding that a large number of the growing Shii community is also constituted of refugees and asylum seekers who arrived in the last decades. Transnational InfluencesThe Iraq Factor Transnational influences on local Shiis in Ireland also account for their self-representation as moderate Muslims. The experiences of sectarian violence in Iraq which has affected many Iraqi Shiis personally whose family members have been murdered or who have come to Ireland as refugees explain the explicitly stated opposition to militant expressions of Sunni radicalism. Shiis in Iraq and elsewhere perceive themselves as victims of militant anti-Shii forms of Sunni Islam and, hence, of the same radical and militant forces that have been made responsible for various terrorist attacks across the world since 9/11.

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Recent developments in the political culture of Iraqi Shiism provide further clarification for the support for a pluralistic, democratic political system, expressed by representatives of the Shii community in Ireland. The particular arrangement of religious authority within Shii Islamunlike the more informal structures in Sunni Islam require any Shii believer to attach him/herself to the leading member of the Shii clergy who is regarded by his peers to be the most pious and knowledgeable Shii scholar of the time and the supreme source of emulation (marja al-taqlid). A lay Shii needs to follow and emulate the teachings, interpretations and fatwas of a marja al-taqlid, usually referred to as a grand ayatollah, signifying the highest possible scholarly rank within the Shii clergy. Although Shii religious authority is in this sense more formalized, usually several leading Shii scholars in the world are considered to be the marja al-taqlid, leaving individual Shiis with the option to choose one of several possible sources of guidance and emulation.52 This particular arrangement of religious authority peculiar to Twelver Shiis is also replicated in a diasporic setting in the West.53 Among the many high-ranking Shii scholars in the world today, Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Husseini Al-Sistani (b. 1930), based in the traditional Shii seminaries of Najaf, is considered to be most senior of the grand ayatollahs and hence among the different sources of emulation the most supreme. Sistani assumed political importance in post-Saddam Iraq when heas spiritual leader of Iraqi Shiis voiced strong support for the democratic transition of Iraq.54 Given his pre-eminence as leading source of emulation in the Shii world, he enjoys a wide following not only among Iraqi and Arab Shiis of the Gulf area but also among Pakistani and Iranian Shiis. The imam of the Ahlul-Bayt Centre, Al-Saleh, whose father was Sistanis representative in Qatar, follows Sistani as his marja and is in permanent contact with him, meeting him whenever he travels to Iraq. He acts as Sistanis representative in Ireland, communicating religious decrees to the Irish Shiis, submitting requests for legal opinions to Sistani and most importantly collects the khums, a religious tax payable by Shiis to their clerical authorities. Other Iraqi and Pakistani Shiis in Ireland follow Sistani as well, creating a certain sense of common allegiance to the same supreme authority despite the cultural and ethnic differences between Arab and South Asian Shiis in Ireland.55 Al-Saleh and other representatives of the Shii community in Ireland have expressed their support for the democratic and pluralistic conception of state and society. Such a positive appreciation is to a certain extent reflective of their positive experience of integration into Irish society and a reaction to their experiences of marginalization and discrimination in repressive and authoritarian Middle Eastern countries. However, it also illustrates current trends in Shii political discourse, spearheaded initially by the liberal senior cleric Muhammad H. Fadlallah (19352010) in Lebanon,56 but also gaining further momentum with Sistanis support for a democratic constitution in postSaddam Iraq.57 Although Sistanis idea of a democratic Iraq does not quite conform with the notion of secular liberal democracies, since he maintains that Islam and its fundamental beliefs and practices need to inform the new Iraqi constitution,58 references to notions of popular sovereignty,59 transparancy and legitimacy60 as well as political participation and active citizenship61 can be read as an encouragement of democratic and civic engagement of his followers not just in Iraq but worldwide, as evident in statements made by representatives of the Shii community in Ireland.62 Although Sistanis political interferences in the re-construction of Iraq were primarily directed towards Shiis there, his support for democracy has also wider repercussions on Shiis worldwide and those living in the West in particular.63 Sistanis constructive role in the efforts to create a democratic Iraq implicitly challenges Khomeinis notion of wilayat

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al-faqih (guardianship of the jurisprudent) as the standard model of modern Shii polity. Khomeini differed from the mainstream interpretation of wilayat al-faqih by arguing that the Shii clerics should in addition to their religious roles assume political functions and are the only legitimate rulers of a Shii state since they collectively deputize for the Hidden Imam during the time of his occultation. While even Shii clerics contemporary to Khomeini such as Sistanis teacher grand ayatollah Abul-Qassim Khoei (1899 1992) would restrict the notion of wilayat al-faqih to the spiritual and legal guidance of the Shii community, Khomeinis understanding is more politicized by demanding actual political power for the Shii clergy. Sistanis understanding of wilayat al-faqih is more nuanced: although he does not explicitly support Khomeinis more political understanding of the role of the clerics, he certainly does not restrict it to the mere guidance in spiritual and legal matters as his teacher Khoei did. For Sistani, the Shii jurisprudent also has the responsibility to interfere in social issues affecting the community and to defend the Shii community as a socio-political and cultural entity. This might require the jurisprudents occasional foray into politics, if deemed necessary, as evidenced by his own vocal involvement in the preparation of the new Iraqi constitution. However, this involvement is only temporary and does not imply actively seeking public office, as explicitly demanded by Khomeini.64 Although Sistani has never openly criticized Khomeinis conception of wilayat al-faqih, his own definition constitutes a dissociation, if not indirect criticism, affecting the political orientations of those Shiis following him worldwide. This becomes evident in the different attitudes Shiis in Ireland adopt towards Khomeinis politicized understanding of wilayat al-faqih. The interviewees among the local Shii community avoid similar to Sistani an open rejection but nevertheless express reservations to the universal applicability of Khomeinis concept. The most open rejection of Khomeinis understanding of wilayat al-faqih was expressed by a retired medical doctor from Iraq who argues that in the absence of an Imam a truly Islamic state is not possible. Hence, any political system that does not oppose basic Islamic principles is acceptable. In his view, a democratic system does not stand against fundamental Islamic beliefs and practices; in addition it also possesses the advantage of dealing fairly and effectively with societys actual diversity.65 An Indian-born Shii who expresses strong support for the secular conception of the public spaceas it exists in his country of originin order to facilitate diversity and multiculturalism still considers Khomeinis model to be the best in Islam, though admitting that it only works in Shii majority countries such as Iran and that it would be unsuitable for countries like Lebanon or Iraq. Khomeini still looms for him as a great Muslim thinker and anti-imperialist fighter, equal to Gandhi in this sense.66 The political views of the clerical leader of Irelands Shiis, Al-Saleh, are also reflective of the general ideological re-orientation of Iraqi and Arab Shiis. He studied in a religious seminary in Qom, Iran, in the 1980s and 1990s, right in the clerical center of post-revolutionary Iran where Khomeinis political reading of wilayat al-faqih was the common ideological reference point for Shiis in Iran and elsewhere. Hence, he himself subscribed to Khomeinis understanding at that time. However, two developments have caused a certain dissociation from these views: his migration to the West provides one factor. According to him, for suppressed Shiis coming from Iraq but also from Saudi-Arabia where they have been discriminated against, life in the West has offered an environment where they could practice their religion freely.67 The aforementioned political developments in Iraq provide another reason for the reassessment of Khomeinis interpretation. For Shiis in Iraq, the American occupation and the transition to a democratic Iraq become opportunities for communal empowerment

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and mobilization, as recognized by Sistani himself. Given the pluralistic nature of Iraqi society a pluralistic democratic system remains the only viable option, according to Al-Saleh. Sistanis leadership and support for the democratic transition is central here as well in terms of the ideological impact of his stance on his Shii following worldwide. Hence, Al-Saleh underwent his own ideological development from a supporter of Khomeinis political reading of wilayat al-faqih to an attitude of support for pluralistic conceptions of democracy. However, avoiding the appearance of any division between Khomeini and Sistani, he does not really perceive a contradiction between the two but rather considers their political ideas as reflective of different stages in the development of modern Shiism. While the Islamic Revolution in Iran of 1979 was central to the political empowerment of Shiis worldwide and therefore Khomeini remains the most important thinker and activist of modern Shiism, his revolutionary and ideological understanding of wilayat al-faqih only reflects for Al-Saleh a temporary stage with Sistanis approach constituting the next step in the development of modern Shii political thought which is more accommodating towards pluralism and diversity and embraces democratic principles.68 While Sistanis political intervention in support of Iraqs democratization targeted Iraqi Shiis in particular, Al-Salehs account of his own ideological development gives evidence of its possible impact on Shii communities outside of Iraq. Although Sistani has not produced a comprehensive formulation of a democratic conception of Shii political thought, his active support for democracy in Iraq has an effect on the global Shii community.69 Double-minority Status As one final consideration for the Shiis self-representation as moderate Muslims in the Irish context, the specific Shii experience in the West as a minority within a minority70 needs to be taken into account. Shiis living as a minority in Europe or North America need to ascertain and maintain not only an Islamic but also a specific Shii identity. The public profile of Shiis as moderate Muslims provides them with a niche of recognition in Irish society as being Muslims, yet being different at the same time. While the Irish public is not interested in the subtle historical and theological differences between Sunnis and Shiis, the self-delineation from radical Sunnis in order to appear moderate responds to the current discourse on Muslims and their place in European societies. Such an approach is also used by other minority groups within contemporary Islam in Europe and North America, such as the Ahmadis71 or certain Sufi orders like the Naqshbandi-Haqqani Sufi order72 which refer to their own experiences of marginalization, opposition and denunciation by Salafi-oriented forms of Sunni Islam in order to seek the public recognition as moderate Muslims. While the quest for such recognition and the claim to represent moderate Islam is shared by many Muslim groups and organizations, such claims appear more credible in the public when they come from historically and currently marginalized groups within Islam such as Shiis, Sufis, or Ahmadis. Conclusion The public perception of Shiis in Ireland as members of a moderate and tolerant expression of Islam has provided them with their own niche to be recognizable as being part of Islam in Ireland, yet distinct from other Muslim groups. In this sense, the Irish example provides an interesting case of how current debates about the relationship between moderate and radical forms of Islam and their respective place in Europe

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are used by representatives of the Shii community to mould a public image that allows Shiis to publicly assert a distinct identity which at the same time appears as an acceptable expression of Islam. Although efforts of leading representatives of the Shii community to gain such a public image have been quite successful, the construction of Shiis or other groups as moderate Muslims is problematic. First, it lends credence to the bifurcating discourse of radical vs. moderate Islam by using it as a means to receive public recognition and to be considered as acceptable representatives of Islam in Europe. The ongoing securitization of Islam in Europe is thereby justified by representatives of Muslim communities themselves, confirming the current bipolar construction of Islamic identities in Europe: this counter construction does not challenge the core stereotypes of Islam, it locates the bad Muslims elsewhere, but confirms them.73 Second, it is problematic as Muslim leaders also respond to fears around the presence of an increasing number of Muslim immigrants in Europe, thereby lending implicit support to the anti-immigrant rhetoric of extreme right-wing parties [that] has become markedly anti-Muslim.74 Third, while an increase in the number of Salafi Muslims can be observed in Ireland as in other parts of Europe and their hostility towards Shia Islam is also evident, the actual impact of Salafi groups in Ireland is difficult to estimate as well as the extent of which their presence constitutes a threat in Ireland and elsewhere in Europe. Finally, the complex religious and political allegiances of Shiis in Ireland undermine the simplistic dichotomy between moderate and radical Islam. The support for democracy and pluralism as expressed by representatives of the Shii community can be explained by recent political developments in Iraq and the religious backing of democratic change by senior Shii clerics. However, at the same time Shiis in Ireland also endorse Shii religious and political figures and entertain relations with Shii organizations that would not be deemed as representing moderate Islam in current European discourse. While Khomeini and his legacy are viewed with certain ambivalence, he remains a beacon of Shii empowerment for most Shiis with the anniversary of his death being commemorated in the Ahlul-Bayt Centre. Given the independent funding structures, the influence of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the running of Shii centers is not significant. Nevertheless, connections with organizations receiving funding from the Iranian government exist such as the Urdu Mashrabe Naab publisher which endorses the supreme leadership of Iran Ayatollah Khameinei and dismisses the Green Movement in Iran as a Western conspiracy in its publications.75 The endorsement of democracy by representatives of the Shii community in Ireland and the ambivalent attitudes to the Islamic Revolution and the Islamic Republic in Iran illustrate the complexity of identity constructions within the Shii diaspora in Ireland which defy the simplistic suggestion that there is a fault line running through Islam, a line that divides moderate Islam, called genuine Islam, and extremist political Islam.76 This article made a contribution to the study of Shii diasporic experiences, referring to the example of Ireland. Given the dearth of academic scholarship on Shiis in the West,77 further research is needed on Shii communities in Europe and North America, their transnational connections and their impact on Shii identity discourses in the diaspora78 and the particular minority experiences of Shiis which areas this article illustrates often different from the experiences of other Muslim immigrants. In particular, for Shiis coming from countries where they constitute marginalized minorities, the migration to Europe is often seen as an opportunity to express their religious identity without any discrimination and thereby creates a different rapport with the non-Muslim majority societies. At the same time, the experience of being the other within the other79

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requires particular efforts for the Shii diaspora to maintain both an Islamic as well as particular Shii identity in terms of both communal activities and practices and public perception and recognition.

Acknowledgements This article stems from a research project on the historical development and current situation of Muslim communities in Ireland, funded by the Irish Research Council for the Humanities and Social Sciences (IRCHSS) and the Department of An Taoiseach (Prime Minister of Ireland).

NOTES
1. Jocelyne Cesari, The Securitisation of Islam in Europe, CEPS Challenge Programme, Research Paper No. 15, 2009, accessed May 26, 2011, http://aei.pitt.edu/10763/1/1826.pdf 2. See also further corollary bifurcations between good imam and bad imam (Jonathan Birt, Good Imam, Bad Imam: Civic Religion and National Integration in post 9/11 Britain, The Muslim World, Vol. 96, No. 4, 2006, pp. 687705) or good mosques and bad mosques (Katherine Brown, The Promise and Perils of Womens Participation in UK Mosques: The Impact of Securitisation Agendas on Identity, Gender and Community, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2008, p. 487). See also Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and Michael J. Balz, Taming the Imams: European Governments and Islamic Preachers since 9/11, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, Vol. 19, No. 2, 2008, p. 222. 3. Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and Tylor Golson, Overhauling Islam: Representation, Construction and Cooption of Moderate Islam in Europe, Journal of Church and State, Vol. 49, No. 3, 2007, p. 499; Haddad and Balz, Taming Imams, op. cit., p. 216; Frdric Volpi, Constructing the Ummah in European Security: Between Exit, Voice and Loyalty, Government and Opposition, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2007, pp. 460462; Brown, Womens Participation in UK Mosques, op. cit., pp. 481484; Cesari, Securitisation of Islam, op. cit., p. 5. 4. See, for example, Haddad and Balz, Taming Imams, op. cit., p. 222 and Brown, Womens Participation in UK Mosques, op. cit., pp. 475484. 5. See also Richard Jackson, Constructing Enemies: Islamic Terrorism in Political and Academic Discourse, Government and Opposition, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2007, pp. 8395. On this discourse and its historical roots see Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror, New York: Three Leaves Press, 2005, pp. 1516, 2224, 260. 6. See Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and Michael J. Balz, Taming Imams, op. cit.; Jonathan Birt, Good Imam, Bad Imam, op. cit.; Frdric Volpi, Constructing the Ummah, op. cit. 7. See Richard Jackson, Constructing Enemies, op. cit.; Kevin M. Dunn, Representations of Islam in the Politics of Mosque Development in Sydney, Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie [Journal of Economic and Social Geography], Vol. 92, No. 3, 2001, pp. 291308. 8. See Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and Tylor Golson, Overhauling Islam, op. cit., p. 512. 9. See, for example, Migration Nation: Statement on Integration Strategy and Diversity Management, Dublin: Office of the Minister for Integration, 2008, p. 33. 10. See John Burke and Eoghan Rice, Fascist Fundamentalism is Rife among Young Irish Muslims, Sunday Tribune, August 13, 2006, accessed May 26, 2011, https://www.tribune.ie/article/2006/aug/ 13/fascist-fundamentalism-is-rife-among-young-irish-m/; Mary Fitzgerald, Muslims Divided over Clerics Teachings, The Irish Times, October 6, 2006, p. 12; Suspicious Minds, Prime Time, RTE1, December 18, 2006. See also The Muslim-Irish Prove to Be a Surprisingly Moderate Bunch, Irish Independent, December 19, 2006, accessed May 26, 2011, http://www.independent. ie/national-news/the-muslimirish-prove-to-be-a-surprisingly-moderate-bunch-65169.html. 11. Abdulaziz A. Sachedina, A Minority within a Minority: The Case of the Shia in North America, in Muslim Communities in North America, eds. Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and Jane Idleman Smith, New York: State University of New York Press, 1994, p. 3. 12. Estimates were provided by Dr Ali Al-Saleh and other representatives of the Shii community. 13. Interview Dr Ali Al-Saleh, October 29, 2010.

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14. See Oliver Scharbrodt, Muslim Migration to the Republic of Ireland: Past Perspectives and Future Prospects, ire-Ireland: A Journal of Irish Studies, Vol. 47, 2012, (forthcoming). 15. Tuula Sakaranaho, Religious Freedom, Multiculturalism, Islam: Cross-Reading Finland and Ireland, Leiden: Brill, 2006, pp. 276279. While in 2003 Al-Saleh estimated that around half of the Shii families were settled and the other half are new-comers (asylum seekers, refugees and labor migrants) (ibid., p. 287), given the recent influx of Shii migrants from Iraq and Pakistan the newcomers outnumber the more settled Shiis by now. 16. Interview Dr Ali Al-Saleh, October 29, 2010. 17. Liakat Takim, Multiple Identities in Pluralistic World: Shiism in America, in Muslims in the West: From Sojourners to Citizens, ed. Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 219222. 18. See Liakat Nathani Takim, Shiism in America, New York: New York University Press, 2009, pp. 54 80. This became particularly evident during the Ashura commemorations in December 2010 at the Ahlul-Bayt Centre in Dublin to mourn the death of the third Shii Imam Husayn. Iraqi and Pakistani Shiis met in different rooms in the Ahlul-Bayt Centre, holding sessions with lectures and poetry recitations in Arabic and Urdu, respectively. The different cultural customs in commemorating the death of Husayn also showed in the various ways of performing the ceremonial chest beating to mourn Husayns death or in the use of replica miniature coffins of Husayn and other members of his family killed in Karbala 680 C.E by Pakistani Shiis alone. 19. Babul Ilm Society, Ireland accessed April 19, 2011, http://www.babulilm.ie/. 20. Liakat Takim, Multiple Identities, op. cit., pp. 219222. 21. Liakat Takim, Shiism in America, pp. 5759. 22. Tuula Sakaranaho, Religious Freedom, op. cit., pp. 383408. See also Tuula Sakaranaho, For God and Eternal Values: Muslim National Schools in Ireland, in Islamische Erziehung in Europa/Islamic Education in Europe, ed. Ednan Aslan, Vienna: Bhlau, 2009, pp. 203218. 23. Interview Dr Ali Al-Saleh, June 13, 2010. 24. Liakat Takim, Shiism in America, op. cit., p. 82. 25. Interview Dr Ali Al-Saleh, June 9, 2009. 26. Interview Dr Ali Al-Saleh, June 12, 2010. On similar views, already expressed in 2003, see also Tuula Sakaranaho, Religious Freedom, op. cit., p. 289. 27. See Betwa Sharma and Zachary Goelman, Irelands Sunni-Shiite Divide, Time, April 9, 2008, accessed May 26, 2011, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1729341,00.html. See also Patsy McGarry, Imams Deny Rift between Shias and Sunnis in Ireland, The Irish Times, April 12, 2008, p. 7. 28. On Al-Salehs good rapport with the media, see also Tuula Sakaranaho, Religious Freedom, op. cit., p. 291. 29. Interview Dr Ali Al-Saleh, June 12, 2010. 30. Interview Dr Ali Al-Saleh, June 12, 2010. See also Mary Fitzgerald, Islam is Compatible with Western Society, Says Imam, The Irish Times, October 26, 2007, p. 14. 31. Ibid. 32. See Quilliam Foundation, accessed April 19, 2011, http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/. 33. Sheikh Dr Ali al-Saleh al Najafi, Youtube, accessed September 9, 2010, http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=4YRnpInL72c&feature=related. 34. David Cullen, Expatriates Stage Dublin Celebrations: Iraqis in Ireland, The Irish Times, December 15, 2003, p. 12. 35. Nuala Haughey, Irish Iraqis Voice a Mixture of Feelings, The Irish Times, April 11, 2003, p. 12. 36. As a cable of the US embassy in Dublin to the US State Department, published by Wikileaks, indicates, the article was written by Al-Saleh with assistance of the US embassy. See Patsy McGarry, US Sought Information on Muslims in Ireland, The Irish Times, April 27, 2011, p. 3; Mary Fitzgerald, Clonskeagh Mosque Rejects US Claims, The Irish Times, April 28, 2011, p. 6. 37. Dr Ali Al Saleh, What Future Do Iraqis Want?, The Irish Times, March 18, 2006, p. 15. 38. Ibid. 39. Ibid. 40. Interviews Ahlul-Bayt Islamic Centre, December 16, 2010. 41. See Irish Examiner, March 10, 2010, pp. 13. 42. June McEnroe, Muslim Leaders in Ireland Give Mixed Reactions to Alleged Murder Plot, Irish Examiner, March 10, 2010, p. 3.

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43. For another example see Shaheed Satardien speaking about the threat of Islamic extremism on the public radio programme RTE Drivetime, March 10, 2010. 44. See Irish Examiner, March 10, 2010, p. 1. See also Mark Tighe, An Enemy within Irish Society?, The Sunday Times, March 14, 2010, accessed May 26, 2011, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/ world/ireland/article7061014.ece. 45. June McEnroe, Community Faces a Fundamental Challenge Within, Irish Examiner, April 10, 2010. 46. Ali Bracken, Al-Qaeda Extremists are Taking Hold Here, Claims Muslim Cleric, Sunday Tribune, May 9, 2010, accessed May 26, 2011, http://www.tribune.ie/news/home-news/article/2010/may/09/alqaeda-extremists-are-taking-hold-here-claims-mu/. 47. June McEnroe, Challenge Within, op. cit. 48. See Humaira Altaf, Discrimination and Racism in the Irish Health System: A Study of Non EU Doctors in Cork, Ireland, MA Dissertation, University College Cork, 2008. 49. See Ronit Lentin, From Racial State to Racist State: Ireland on the Eve of the Citizenship Referendum, Variant, Vol. 20, 2004, pp. 78; Steve Garner, Ireland and Immigration: Explaining the Absence of the Far Right, Patterns of Prejudice, Vol. 41, No. 2, 2007, pp. 109130; Bernard Ryan, The Celtic Cubs: The Controversy over Birthright Citizenship in Ireland, European Journal of Migration and Law, Vol. 6, No. 3, 2004, pp. 173193. 50. Interview, private home, Cork, December 27, 2010. 51. See also June McEnroe, Challenge Within, op. cit. 52. Linda S. Walbridge, Introduction: Shiism and Authority, in The Most Learned of the Shia: The Institution of the Marja Taqlid, ed. Linda S. Walbridge, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 3 7. 53. Liakat Takim, Reinterpretation or Reformation? Shia Law in the West, Journal of Shia Islamic Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2010, pp. 143144. 54. See Babak Rahimi, Ayatollah Sistani and the Democratization of Post-Baathist Iraq, United States Institute of Peace, Special Report, No. 187, 2007. 55. See Liakat Takim, Shiism in America, op. cit., pp. 145151. 56. Haider Ala Hamoudi, Between Realism and Resistance: Shii Islam and the Contemporary Liberal State, Journal of Islamic Law and Culture, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2009, pp. 117120. See also Hilal Kashan, The Religious and Political Impact of Sayyid M. H. Fadlallah on Arab Shiism, Journal of Shia Islamic Studies, Vol. 3, No. 4, 2010, pp. 427441. 57. Babak Rahimi, Sistani and Democratization, op. cit., p. 10. 58. Reidar Visser, Sistani, the United States and Politics in Iraq: From Quietism to Machiavellianism?, Norsk Utenrikspolitis Institutt [Norwegian Institute of International Affairs], Paper 700, 2006, pp. 1113; Babak Rahimi, Sistani and Democratization, op. cit., pp. 813. 59. Babak Rahimi, Sistani and Democratization, op. cit., p. 10 (italics in original). 60. Ibid., p. 9. 61. Ibid., p. 10 (italics in original). 62. Liakat Takim, Shiism in America, op. cit., pp. 159160. 63. See Haider Ala Hamoudi, Between Realism and Resistance, op. cit., pp. 107120; Liakat Takim, Reinterpretation or Reformation?, op. cit., pp. 151152. 64. Reider Visser, Sistani, op. cit., pp. 1316. 65. Interview at Ahlul-Bayt Islamic Centre, May 8, 2010. 66. Interview, February 25, 2010. 67. Interview Dr Ali Al-Saleh, June 13, 2010. See also Sakaranaho, Religious Freedom, op. cit., pp. 289 290. 68. Interview Dr Ali Al-Saleh, June 13, 2010. 69. Haider Ala Hamoudi, Between Realism and Resistance, op. cit., pp. 114115. 70. Abdulaziz A. Sachedina, Minority within a Minority, op. cit., p. 3. 71. See Simon Ross Valentine, Islam and the Ahmadiyya Jamaat: History, Belief, Practice, London: Hurst, 2008, pp. 189203. 72. See Jrgen S. Nielsen, Mustafa Draper and Gaijna Yemelianova, Transnational Sufism: The Haqqaniyya, in Sufism in the West, eds. Jamal Malik and John Hinnells, London: Routledge, 2006, pp. 111112; David W. Damrel, Aspects of the Naqshbandi-Haqqani order in North America, in ibid., pp. 119121; Simon Stjernholm, A Translocal Sufi Movement: Developments among Nasqshbandi-Haqqani in London, in Sufism Today: Heritage and Tradition in the Global Community, eds. Catherine Raudvere and Leif Stenberg, London: I.B. Tauris 2009, pp. 8789.

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Kevin M. Dunn, Representations of Islam, op. cit., p. 303. Jocelyne Cesari, Securitisation of Islam, op. cit., p. 4. Mashrabe Naab, accessed April 19, 2011, http://www.mashrabenaab.com/iis6954.asp. Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim An African Perspective, After September 11, Essays, Social Science Research Council, accessed April 19, 201, http://essays.ssrc.org/sept11/ essays/mamdani.htm. 77. Liyakat Takim and Abdulaziz A. Sachedina published on the Shii communities in North America. In the European context, Kathryn Spellmans publications deal with Iranian Shiis in Britain. See Kathryn Spellman, Religion and Nation: Iranian Local and Transnational Networks in London, Oxford and New York: Berghahn Books, 2005; Kathryn Spellman, A National Sufi Order with Transnational Dimensions: The Maktab Tarighat Oveyssi Shahmaghsoudi Sufi Order in London, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 30, No. 5, 2004, pp. 945960; Kathryn Spellman, Gendered Spaces of Exchange: Iranian Womens Religious Practices in London, in Resituating Culture, ed. Gavan Titley, Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2004, pp. 151161; Karin Hesse-Lehmann and Kathryn Spellman, Iranische transnationale religise Institutionen in London und Hamburg: Ihr Einfluss auf das interkulturelle Zusammenleben [Iranian Transnational Religious Institutions in London and Hamburg: Their Influence on Intercultural Co-existence], in Zuwanderung und Integration: Kulturwissenschaftliche Zugnge und soziale Praxis [Immigration and Integration: Cultural Studies Approaches and Social Praxis], eds. Christoph Kck, Alois Moosmller and Klaus Roth, Mnster: Waxmann, 2004, pp. 141162. 78. On the interface of diaspora, transnationalism and Islam and a discussion of possible areas of research on transnational Islam in general, which could also be made relevant to the particular Shii experience, see Steven Vertovic, Diaspora, Transnationalism and Islam: Sites of Change and Modes of Research, in Muslim Networks and Transnational Communities in and across Europe, eds. Stefano Allievi and Jrgen Nielsen, Leiden: Brill, 2003, pp. 312324. 79. Liakat Takim, Shiism in America, op. cit., p. 143.