TheFSMConstitutionandthe2001ConstitutionalConvention ByJohnR.Haglelgam RegentProfessor CollegeofMicronesiaFSM ABriefHistory TheConstitutionoftheFederatedStatesofMicronesia(FSMConstitution)was draftedbytheMicronesianConstitutionalConvention,whichconvenedinSaipanin Juneof1975.TheCongressofMicronesiaconvenedtheConventiontodrafta constitutionforaMicronesianstate.Thismovewasintendedtosupportthe MicronesianpositionatthefuturepoliticalstatusnegotiationwiththeUnitedStates, whichhadremaineddeadlocked.Duringthenegotiationproceedings,the MicronesianshadarguedthatsovereigntyinMicronesiaresideswiththepeopleand thattheMicronesianshavetheinherentrighttodrafttheirconstitutionandform theirgovernment.

nt.TheUnitedStatesnegotiatorshadarguedthattheCompactof FreeAssociationwouldformthebasisofaconstitutionforafutureMicronesian state.ThiswouldmeanthattheCompactwouldbethesupremelawina Micronesianstate.FromtheperspectiveoftheCongressofMicronesia,thiswould meanthattheUnitedStatescouldrestricttheexerciseofsovereignrightsofthe Micronesianstofreelydrafttheirconstitution.Inordertolendmeaningtothe exerciseofthisright,theCompactmustconformtotheconstitutionandnotthe otherwayaround. AllthedistrictsoftheTrustTerritoryofthePacificIslandselecteddelegatestothe Convention.Eventhedistrictsthathadadvocatedforseparation,namelythe MarshallIslandsDistrict,PalauDistrict,andtheMarianaIslandsDistrict, participatedinthedraftingoftheFSMConstitution;thustheinclusionofthese districtsinthetextoftheConstitution. TheFSMConstitutionwasnotratifieduntil1978.Thelongdelayforthereferendum wasduetotheUnitedStatesobjectionstoseveralprovisionsofthedraft constitution.Themostsignificantonesweretheobjectionstothesupremacyclause andthetwohundredmileexclusiveeconomiczone(EEZ).TheAmericanshad originallyarguedthattheConstitutionshouldbesubservienttotheCompactofFree Association.TheobjectiontotheEEZprovisionwasthestandardAmerican argumentthatnoonestateshouldexercisecontrolovertuna,ahighlymigratory species. In1977,PeterRosenblatt,thenewlyappointedheadoftheOfficeofMicronesian StatusNegotiation,heldseveralinformalmeetingswiththeMicronesiandelegations whichculminatedintheStatementofAgreedPrinciplesforFreeAssociation, generallyknownastheHiloPrinciples.TheHiloPrincipleswasthebreakthrough thatrestartedthestalledMicronesianstatusnegotiationin1977.

Inadditiontocontrolofdomesticaffairs,theHiloPrincipleshadallowedthefuture MicronesianstatestoexerciseauthorityoverforeignaffairswhiletheUnitedStates retainedcontrolofsecurityanddefense.Thisgrantofauthorityoverforeignaffairs completelyalteredtheintentofthefreeassociationfromitsoriginal conceptualizationasthesteppingstonetoindependence,tobeingtheconduitfor politicalindependence.Thenegotiationsin1977werehistoricbecausetheUnited Stateshad,forthefirsttime,allowedseparatenegotiationwithdelegationsfromthe MarshallIslandsDistrictandPalauDistrict.Previously,theUnitedStateshad negotiatedacommonwealthstatuswiththeMarianaDistrict. Aftertheroundsofnegotiationin1977,theUnitedStatesnegotiatorshaddropped theirobjectionstoprovisionsofthedraftFSMConstitution.Thisallowedthe referendumontheConstitutiontotakeplacein1978.Inthereferendum,votersin theMarshallIslandDistrict,PalauDistrict,andtheMarianaDistrictrejectedtheFSM ConstitutionwhilevotersinKusaieDistrict,PonapeDistrict,TrukDistrict,andYap Districtapproveditoverwhelmingly.(LaterthespellingofKusaie,Ponape,andTruk werechangedtoKosrae,Pohnpei,andChuukrespectively.) ByapprovingtheFSMConstitutioninthe1978plebiscite,thevotersinKusaie, Ponape,Truk,andYapDistrictshadfinallyexercisedtheirsovereignrightstoform theirowncountrycalledFederatedStatesofMicronesiawiththeConstitutionasits supremelaw. ABriefAnalysisoftheFSMConstitution Thisshortanalysiswillbelimitedtothesystemandformofgovernment,conceptof separationofpower,checksandbalances,theroleoftraditionalchiefsembodiedin theFSMConstitution,issuesatthecenterofdisputebetweenthestatesandthe nationalgovernment,andfinallyissuesthatmightdominatetheFSMConConthis year. TheFSMConstitutionisachildofpolitics.Itisapoliticaldocumentthatwascrafted amidstcompetinginterests,politicaldemandsandcontroversies,butintheendthe delegatestotheMicronesianConstitutionalConvention(alsoreferredtoasMicro ConCon)wereabletoreachcompromisesonkeyissuesthatcontributedtothe successoftheConvention. ThePreambleexpressesthewishoftheMicronesianstolivetogetheramongst themselvesandwiththerestofhumanity,inpeaceandharmony.Italsotracesthe beginningofaMicronesiannationtothetimewhentheirancestors,usingraftsand canoesandnavigatingbythestars,setoutonepicvoyagestomaketheirhomeson theseislands. TheConstitutionestablishesafederalsystemwithasubstantivelypresidentialform ofgovernment.Itsmainfeaturesare(1)theseparationofpower;(2)checksand balances;and(3)thecreationofthesemiautonomousstates.

 TheConstitutionestablishesthreelevelsofgovernment:(1)thenational;(2)the state;and(3)themunicipal.Thestategovernmentshaveexclusivepowertodeal withsuchlocalissuesasland,primaryandsecondaryeducation,healthcare,the environmentandconservationwithintheirrespectivejurisdictions,includingthe territorialsea,lagoonsandrivers.UndertheConstitution,thestatesarealsogiven theresidualpower,i.e.,thepowersthatarenotexpresslydelegatedtothenational governmentandarenotnationalincharacter.Inotherwords,thepowersofthe nationalgovernmentarelimitedtothosethatareexpresslydelegatedandare nationalincharacter. AfederalsystemofgovernmenthadmoreappealwiththedelegatestotheMicro ConConbecauseunderthissystemthestatesintheFederatedStatesofMicronesia wouldretaintheirculturaldistinctions.Inaddition,eachstatecanundertaketo legislateforthepreservationofitsculturesandtraditionsandprescribetheroleof itstraditionalleadersinthestategovernment.Furthermore,theMicronesianshad badexperiencelivingundertheunitaryTrustTerritorygovernmentthatwasat timesquiteautocraticinitsdealingwiththedistrictgovernments. TheMicroConConcreatedagovernmentthatissubstantiallypresidentialinform. Theseparationofpowersandchecksandbalancesareembodiedinthecreationofa legislature,anexecutive,andajudiciary. Basically,theFSMCongressisthelawmakingbody,butacongressionalactdoesnot becomelawuntilthepresidentapprovesitorletitbecomeslawwithouthis signature.TheCongress,however,hastheultimatepowertooverrideapresidential vetobyavoteofatleastthreeofthestatecongressionaldelegations,eachcasting onevote.WhentheFSMCongressoverridesapresidentialveto,thebillbecomeslaw withoutanyfurtheractiononthepartofthepresident.Theonlyactionremainsfor thepresidenttodoistoassignanumbertothelaw,apurelyadministrativeact. TheFSMCongressisaunicamerallegislature,whichhasfourteen(14)members,10 servingtwoyeartermsand4fouryearterms.Thetwoyeartermmembers representelectiondistricts,withroughlyequalpopulation,intheirrespectivestates. Chuukhasfivetwoyearmembers;Kosraehasone,Pohnpeithree,andYapone. Eachofthestateshasonefouryearmember.Thefouryearmembersrepresentthe equalityofthestates.Thefouryearmembersaretheonlyoneseligibletorunfor presidentandvicepresident.Tolowerthecostofoperatingthecongress,theMicro ConConcombinedthetwoyeartermandfouryeartermmembersinonechamber. ButtodispelthesmallerstatesfearsofbeingoutvotedintheCongress,theMicro ConCondelegatesadoptedaningeniousvotingprocess.Eachbillmustpasstwo readingsinCongress;meaningthatitmustbevotedontwiceonseparatedays.On firstreading,theentiremembersoftheCongressvote,butonsecondreadingeach statedelegationcastsonevote.Inotherwords,allfourteenmembersofCongress voteonfirstreadingandonlyfourcastvotesonsecondandfinalreading,onevote foreachstate.Thisvotingprocessdoesmorethandispelthefearofthesmaller

states;italsoequalizesthevotingpowerintheFSMCongress.Onsecondreadingof bills,allfourstatessmallandlargecastonevote. Anothermatterofconsiderableimportanceistheinternalorganizationofthe Congress.TheFSMCongresshassixstandingcommittees.Eachstatehasatleastone representativeoneachcommittee.Thebiggerstatesusuallyhavemorememberson eachcommittee.Atthestartofeachnewcongress,thespeaker,inconsultationwith statedelegations,appointsmemberstothevariouscommittees.Thecommittee assignmentreflectstheinterestandexpertiseofeachmember.Thesecommittees arepermanentsubjectmattercommittees,meaningeachcommitteesjurisdiction extendstospecificissues.Thesecommitteesformthebackboneandtheworkhorses ofcongress;thusthecommitteechairmenarenotonlyimportantpoliticians,but politicallypowerfultoo.Thecommitteesholdhearingsonbillsandresolutionson issuesundertheirrespectivejurisdictionsandmakedecisionregardingtheir disposition.Acommitteecanreportabilltothefloorofcongressforfavorable actionorforfiling.Sometimesacommitteewilldecidetoholdabillorresolutionin thecommitteeindefinitely,aeuphemismforkillingit. Asaheadoftheexecutivebranch,thepresidentislegallychargedwith implementingnationallawsandpolicies.Hecan,however,initiatepublicpolicy.But substantivepolicymattersaresubjectedtocongressionalapprovalandsoare nominationsofprincipalofficialsintheexecutivebranch.Additionally,thepresident isconstitutionallydelegatedtherolesas(1)headofgovernment,and(2)headof state.Astheheadofstate,thepresidentsymbolizesandrepresentsthesovereignty ofthepeopleoftheFederatedStatesofMicronesia.Thismakesthepresidentthe onlyinternationallyrecognizedsymbolofsovereigntyandnationalindependencein theFSM. Thevicepresident,whoisalsoelectedbytheCongressfromamongitsfouryear members,isthesecondrankingofficialintheexecutivebranch.TheConstitution delineatesnoseparatefunctionforthevicepresident,excepttosucceedtothe presidencywhenthepresidentdiesorisdisabled.Inessence,thevicepresidentis thepresidentinwaiting.Thevicepresident,however,performstasksassignbythe presidentandparticipatesasafullfledgedmemberofthePresidentCabinet. TheFSMSupremeCourtinterpretstheConstitution;thus,thepowertoreviewacts ofthelegislativeandtheexecutivebranches.Thispowerisknownasthejudicial review.Thejusticesare,however,nominatedbythepresidentwiththeadviceand consentoftheFSMCongress.TheCongresshasthepowertoconfirmorrejecta nominationtotheFSMSupremeCourt.Theroleoftheexecutiveandlegislative branchesinthenominationandapprovalprocessofnominationstotheFSM SupremeCourtensuresthattherepresentativesofthepeoplewillhaveasayingin whositsontheCourt.ItbringslegitimacyandpoliticstotheCourt.TheCongress canrefuseapprovalofanominationtotheSupremeCourtbecauseofnominees socialviewsandpoliticalbeliefs.Sofar,theFSMCongresshasrefusedtoactononly onenominationbecauseofquestionsabouthiseducationalqualification.

 Withitsexclusivepowerovertaxesandappropriationoffunds,theCongressis certainlythePrimusinterparesinthenationalgovernment.TheCongresscanuse itstaxpowertoraiserevenuesandappropriatetheserevenuesinanymannerit seesfit.Nationallawrequiresthepresidenttosubmittheconsolidatednational governmentbudgettotheFSMCongressnolaterthanApril1steachyearforits reviewandapprovalduringitsMaysession.TheCongressusesthisreviewpowerto examinethemeritofeverylineiteminthebudgetandmakeanyadjustments(i.e., reduce,increase,ordeleteentirely)asitseesfit. Additionally,theFSMCongresselectsthePresidentandtheVicePresident.This addedfunctionhasmadetheCongresstheconstituentofthePresident.Assuch, congressionalpowervisvisthePresidentisgreatlyenhanced.Inotherwords, themodeofelectingtheFSMPresidentdiminishesthepresidentialpowerinits dealingwiththenationallegislature.Apresidentoravicepresidentwhowishesto seekreelectionmustalwaystrytoavoidalienatingmembersofCongress.Thishas resultedinsituationswherethepresidenthasallowedCongresstoencroachonits constitutionallydelegatedpower.Thishasthreatenedthefinelineofchecksand balancesestablishedundertheFSMConstitutionandmayhavetippedthebalance ofpowerbetweenthetwopoliticalbranchesinfavoroftheCongress. TheFSMSupremeCourthasuseditspowertointerprettheConstitutiontogive itselfjurisdictionoverlandcasesthatinvolveddiversityofcitizenship.Additionally, theCourthasusedthelegalfictionofdormantconcurrentjurisdictiontohear casesrisingfromfishingactivitiesintheterritorialsea.Thesedecisionshave expandedthejurisdictionoftheFSMSupremeCourtintoareasthatarenot stipulatedintheConstitution.Thesedecisionsmayhavebeeninviolationofthe letterand/orthespiritoftheFSMConstitution. TheConstitutionempowersthestategovernmenttovoluntarilyutilizetheFSM SupremeCourtasthecourtoflastresort.Sofar,theKosraeStateConstitutionisthe onlyonethatmandatestheuseoftheFSMSupremeCourtforappellatecases TheConstitutionwrestledwiththecontentiousissueoftraditionalleadersrolesin thenewnationalgovernment.ThetraditionalchiefshadparticipatedintheConCon asfullfledgedmembersbyvirtueoftraditionaltitles.Someofthedistricts supportedthetraditionalchiefsroleinthenationalgovernment,butothersdidnot. Intheend,however,theargumentthattheproperplaceforthetraditionalleadersis atthestatelevelseemedtobeacceptedbythedelegates.TheConstitutionleavesit uptoeachstatetodecidewhethertoallocateoneofitstwoyearseatsintheFSM Congresstothetraditionalchiefs.Sofar,nostatehasallocatedanyofitstwoyear seatstothetraditionalchiefsandthechiefs,asfarasIknow,havenotmadeany requestsforit. TheConstitutionauthorizestheFSMCongresstocreate,whenneeded,aChamberof ChiefsconsistingoftraditionalleadersfromeachofthestatesintheFSM.Thestates

thathavenotraditionalleadersmayelecttheirrepresentativestothisbody.The ConstitutionissilentonwhetherthisChamberwillhavealegislativeoranexecutive function.Thestatesmayalsoprovideanactive,functionalrolefortheirtraditional chiefsintheirconstitutions.Sofar,YapStateConstitutionistheonlyonethat providesthisroleforthetraditionalleaders. TheConstitutionensuresthatnoconflictariseswithregardtocustomaryroleof traditionalchiefsandtheircustomaryrecognitionandhonor.Itseemstoallowthem toserveinanyrolesatanylevelofgovernmentasmaybeprescribedby constitutionorstatute. Additionally,theConstitutionallowstheprotectionoftraditionsofthepeopleof theFederatedStatesofMicronesiabystatute.Itgoesfurthertodeclarethatifsuch statuteischallengeasinviolationoftheDeclarationofRightsprovision,then protectionofMicronesiantraditionshallbeconsideredacompellingsocialpurpose warrantingsuchgovernmentalaction.Thisimpliesthatastatuteprotecting traditionisimmunefrombeingdeclaredunconstitutionalevenifitdirectlyviolates theDeclarationofRightsprovisionoftheFSMConstitution. TheConstitutionmandatesthattheFSMconstituentstateshavedemocratic constitutions.Someexpertshavepointedtothisrequirementfordemocraticstate constitutiontoquestiontheconstitutionalityoftheYapStateConstitution,which createstwotraditionalchiefscouncilstofunctionessentiallyasthefourthbranchof government. ThePeripheryAgainsttheCenter:The2001FSMConstitutionalConvention Ishouldprefacethisdiscussionbysayingthatpoliticaldisputesbetweenthecenter andtheperipheryarenotuncommoninafederalsystemofgovernmentsuchasthe oneintheFederatedStatesofMicronesia.Infactdisputesandfrictionsseemtobe endemictoafederalsystemofgovernment. TheissuesdiscussedbelowarecertainlygoingtosurfaceintheFSMConstitutional Conventionthisyear.Theseissuesareeconomicinnatureandarenotnew.The votershavealreadyvotedagainsttheminnationwideplebiscites,butthestatesare preparedtobringthemupagain.Thestatepositionsontheseissuesarenotfully articulatedyet,butIwilloutlinethemherewiththehopeofstimulatingdiscussion.I certainlywanttogetasmanyviewsandcommentsontheseissuesaspossible. FortheFSM,acontentiousissueisthepowerofthenationalgovernmenttoregulate foreigninvestmentpermit.TheJournaloftheMicronesianConConhadmentioned theissuanceofforeigninvestmentpermitsasoneexampleofissuesthatcouldfall understatepowertoregulate.WithoutthebenefitoftheFSMSupremeCourts interpretation,thestatesarguethatthepowertoissueforeigninvestmentpermitis theirs;thusitisbeyondthenationalgovernmenttoregulate.Inspiteofitbeing listedintheMicroConConJournalasanexampleofastatepower,theimplicationof

foreigninvestmentonforeignaffairsandinternationalcommerceneedtobe addressed.Itishardtodenythefactthatforeigninvestmentisanareadirectly linkedtointernationalcommerce.Issuanceofinvestmentpermitstoforeign investorstodobusinessintheFSMisalsodirectlylinkedtothenationalpowerto conductforeignaffairs.Thislinkageallowsthenationalgovernmentto constitutionallyexerciseitspowerthroughtheresidualclausegrantofpower. Anotherrecentdisputebetweenthestatesandthenationalgovernmentisthe ownershipoftheFSMexclusiveeconomiczone,i.e.,theareaoftheoceanoutsideof thetwelvemileterritorialseaextendingtotwohundredmilesfromtheisland baselines.TheFSMConstitutionempowersthenationalgovernmenttoregulatethe ownership,exploration,andexploitationofnaturalresourceswithinthemarine spaceintheexclusiveeconomiczone.Tocomplywithitsobligationunder internationallaw,thenationalgovernmentneitherclaimedownershiporcontrolof theexclusiveeconomiczone,butonlythesovereignrightsforthepurposeof exploringandexploiting,conservingandmanagingthenaturalresources,both livingandnonliving. Thestatesforcedareferendumonthisissue,butthevotersdefeatedtheproposed amendmenttotheFSMConstitutionthatwouldhavemadethestatesownersofthe resourcesintheexclusiveeconomiczone.Thecruxofthisdisputeiscontrolofthe revenuederivedfromsellingfishingpermitstoforeignfishingboats.Theamounts varyfromyeartoyear,butitissubstantialforanationwithfewresourcesandsmall locallyderivedrevenue. Thestateshavetakenthenationalgovernmenttocourttoforcethelattertoshare thefishingpermitrevenuewiththem.ThetrialdivisionoftheFSMSupremeCourt grantedasummaryjudgmentinfavorofthenationalgovernmentandthestates appealed.Theappellatedivisionupheldthetrialcourtdecision.Ingrantingthe summaryjudgment,thecourtrejectedthestatesclaimofownershipofthe exclusiveeconomiczoneandtheadditionalclaimthatthefishingpermitfeeis revenuethatmustbedividedinaccordancewithSection5ofArticleIXoftheFSM Constitution.Oneinterestingaspectofthestatesargumentswastheuseofcustom andtraditiontosupporttheirclaimofownership.Thestatesarenewinventionsand withweaklinkstocustomandtradition.Accordingtocustomandtraditioninsome states,individualpersons,lineagesandclansownthereefswithinandwithoutthe territorialsea.Butthecustomaryownershipofreefsisnotuniversalinthe FederatedStatesofMicronesia. Thedefeatoftheproposedamendmentintheplebiscitedidnotsignaltheendofthe statesattempttoclaimownership.Thestatesarenowlookingtothe2001FSM ConContoadvancetheirclaimsagain,butbeforethestatesbringthisissueupthey needtoexaminetheirpolicytowardtheoutlyingareas.Thevotersintheoutlying villagesanddefeatedtheproposedamendmentforareason.Overtheyears, membersofthenationalcongress,throughcongressionalappropriations,have providedassistancetobuildschoolsanddispensaries,extendedpower,andbuilt

andmaintainedsecondaryroadsinremoteareas.Tothepeoplelivinginthese areas,theclosestandmostvisiblepresenceoftheanygovernmentalagencyisthe FSMCongressfundedprojects.Theyviewthestatesclaimtotheexclusiveeconomic zoneasathreattotherelationshipthattheyhaveestablishedwiththeir representativesinthenationalcongress.Afterallitistheirnationalrepresentatives thathaveprovidedtheporkwhentheyneededitmost.Perhapsthevotersalsosee thenationalgovernmentasalesserevilthanthestategovernment.Forthestatesto succeedinconvincingthevoters,Ibelieveachangeinpolicytowardtheremote villagesandtheoutlyingislandsisinorder:aproactivepolicythatwould incorporatetheneedsoftheremoteareasinthecurrentstatebudgetwillhelp. Anotherissuerelatedtotheownershipofresourcesintheexclusiveeconomiczone isthedivisionofrevenuebetweenthenationalgovernmentandthestates. Currently,nationallawrequiresthatthenationalgovernmentretains30percentof taxrevenuefromallthestatesand70percentisremittedtothestatewherethetax iscollected.Althoughthecurrentrevenuesharingformulafavorsthestates,the stateswantittobeincreasedto80percentforthemand20forthenational governmentandbeconstitutionallymandated.Fromthestatesperspective,a constitutionallymandatedformulawillobstructanycongressionaltampering.It seems,however,thataformulamandatedbytheconstitutionwillbesorigidthatit mightnotbeinthebestinterestofthenationtorequireit. Forfishingpermitrevenue,thenationalgovernmentkeepsallofit,buttheFSM Congressappropriatesthisfundforprojectsinthestates.Themeritofsomeofthese appropriationsisquestionable,butthedistributionwithineachstateis,forthemost part,equitable.Theremotevillagesandoutlyingislandsreceivetheirfairshare. Themethodofelectingthepresidentisanotherissuethatmustbereexaminedin thisyearsConstitutionalConvention.Apopularelectionofthepresidentwill enhancethelegitimacyandthusthepoweroftheFSMpresidencyvisvisthe othertwobranchesofthenationalgovernment.Itwillfreethepresidencyfromthe politicswithincongressandcreatesagenuinecheckandbalancebetweenthetwo branchesofthenationalgovernment.Additionally,itwillcreateasenseof ownershipamongthevoterstowardthepresidencyandperhapsafeelingof nationalunitytoo.Inotherwords,thepresidencymightjustbecomethefocalpoint fornationalunity.ThepopularelectionoftheFSMpresidentmust,however,include thenecessarysafeguardstoensurethattheprocessdoesnotpoliticallymarginalize thesmallerstates,thuscreatingapoliticallydangerousandexplosivesituation. ThelastissuethatIwanttodiscusshereistermlimitformembersoftheFSM Congress.Someofmyfriendshavearguedagainsttermlimitforcongressmembers becauseitisreallyuptothepeople,sotheyargued,toeitherretainthemorkick themout.Butacloseranalysisofthisissuewillshowthattheincumbentsarewell entrenchedintheirelectedpositionsbecauseoftheclientvoterswhohavereceived materialbenefitsinexchangefortheirsupportinelectionafterelection.Inother words,theincumbentsarecommandeeringresourcesofthestatetoretaintheir

electiveoffice.Theseresourcesarenotavailabletononincumbentcandidates.Soa levelplayingfieldneverexistedinthepoliticalarenaintheFSM.Inelectionafter election,thepoliticalplayingfieldalwaystippedheavilyinfavoroftheincumbent becauseofuseofpublicfundstocurryfavorsfromvoters. Ibelievetheaddedpoliticalvaluesoftermlimitsforcongressareseveral:(1)it mightbringanewbreedofpoliticianstoofficewithdifferentideasandwaysof doingthingsandnewvisionforthefuture.Itcouldbringexcitementthatmight invigorateandanimatethepoliticalprocessincreativeways;(2)itmighterasethe senseofpoliticalhopelessnessamongvoterswhofeelleftoutoftheprocess;and(3) itwouldcreateagenuinepoliticalcompetitionamongthecandidates. Theabovediscussionrepresentsjustasmallportionofpublicconcernsandpossible issuesattheupcoming2001FSMConstitutionalConvention.Ihaveonlytriedto raisesomeimportantissuesfordiscussion;newoneswillundoubtedlyemergeas wegointotheconvention;andtheconventionitselfwillbeacomplexprocessof negotiationandcompromise.Iwouldappreciateyourcommentsandpositions regardingtheseissues.Youcanreachmeatthisemailaddress:johnh@comfsm.fm