The Mechanisation of Mind: A Deconstruction of Two Contemporary Intelligence Theorists Marcus T.

Anthony
Futures Research Quarterly, Fall 2006, 22 (3)
Introduction Dominant mainstream modernist depictions of mind and intelligence invariably posit intelligence and mind in mechanistic terms. Typically rational, linguistic and mathematical cognitive capacities form the locus of what it means to be intelligent in such depictions, consistent with Wilbers eye of reason. (Wilber, 2001) In this paper, the representations of mind and intelligence found in two contemporary leading theorists in fields directly related to mainstream consciousness and intelligence discourse are deconstructed. The texts to be deconstructed are Arthur Jensens (1998) domain-general concept of mental ability (g theory), and Daniel Golemans (1996, 1999) idea of emotional intelligence. Within both deconstructions, the interplay between intuitive and rational conceptions of intelligence and mind will be the focus. As my own research interest has been with the intuitive concept of integrated intelligence, the analysis will often indicate the ways in which integrated intelligence has been effectively excluded from Jensens and Golemans representations of intelligence. (1) The method Inayatullahs (2002a) Causal Layered Analysis (CLA) is the poststructuralist method that is utilised within this paper. CLA is a means to conduct inquiry into the nature of past, present and future.

It problematises the present and the past, allowing the possibility of alternative futures to emerge (Inayatullah, 2002a). The purpose of CLA is to elucidate the deeper meanings imbedded within texts via the application of four specific components, and to allow the acknowledgement of other ways of knowing (Ibid.). The first level of CLA is the litany, which examines the rational/scientific, factual and quantitative aspects of texts. The second level - the social/systemic - deconstructs the economic, cultural, political and historical components. The third level of CLA explores the discourse/worldview of texts, identifying the deeper social, linguistic, and cultural structures. The final component of CLA is the mythical/metaphorical level. This reveals the hidden and explicit mythologies, narratives, symbols and metaphors contained in texts. This includes any emotional, unconscious and archetypal dimensions (Inayatullah, 2002a). The selections Amidst numerous possible selections, these two theorists have been chosen for the following specific reasons. Firstly, both the theorists have been highly influential and successful (both have achieved a certain degree of fame in their respective fields) indicating that they have been valorised within the dominant mechanistic paradigm of modernity and western civilisation in general. Arthur Jensens (1998) construction of the g factor is an academic and strictly mechanistic model, which is the prime reason it has been chosen. Further, the way in which Daniel Goleman constructs emotional intelligence - and in turn intuition - is an excellent exemplar of the way that reductionist and brain-based constructions of mind effectively exclude transpersonal and spiritual elements from their central tenets.

Arthur Jensen: the g Factor Arthur Jensens (1998) The g: Factor is essentially the summation of the four decades of research of this highly influential academic in the field of human intelligence theory. Jensens essential claim is that the concept of a domain-general measure of human mental ability (which is referred to as g after Spearmans original concept) is a justified one. Jensens definition of mental ability Jensen finds no place for the word intelligence as such, because of difficulties in defining it - he finds that the word intelligence has too much ambiguity and emotional baggage. (Ibid.: 49) Instead he prefers to use the term mental ability. Jensens definition of mental ability comprises two components. Jensens first definition defines mental abilities as abilities that exist within a group of physically normal, people where individual differences in those abilities are insignificantly correlated with measures of sensual acuity, physical strength, endurance, agility, dexterity. (Ibid.: 52) However Jensens second definition is more notable, stating that: An ability is a mental ability if, with respect to information transmission per se, the receptor and effector mechanisms are nonspecific. In other words, an individuals performance is not essentially dependent on any particular sensory or motor system. (Ibid.: 52: Italics added, except for the final one) Here it can be seen that information processing (predicated in turn on computer analogies (Gross, 2005) underpins Jensens model. The term mechanism explicitly betrays the mechanistic worldview, while the phrase receptor and effector mechanisms situates Jensen within the stimulus and response formulations of the behaviourists - who

themselves denied the affective domains of mind and consciousness itself. (Dossey, 2001; Ross, 1993) Yet for Jensen, mental ability in itself is founded upon more essential predicates. To put the study of mental ability on a firm scientific footing, we must begin by using theoretically neutral, objective, operational definitions Science begins by first recognizing certain objective realities and asking questions about them. In the domain of human abilities, what are these realities? To answer this, we must first become familiar with the technique known as factor analysis. (Jensen, 1998: 49) It can bee seen that Jensen is one who believes firmly in the separation of object and perceiver that underpins modernist science. By implication Jensens scientific worldview is one where there is a purely objective domain of human enquiry. Yet there is an inherent contradiction in the statement that Science begins by first recognizing certain objective realities and asking questions about them. The very act of recognising reality as purely objective (which fails to probelmatise perception) in itself is a product of the western rationalist hegemony, and the modernist worldview. (Foucault, 1984; Sardar, 2000) That one must begin with this, place it first, and then first employ factor analysis (in itself a product of the western mathematical and rationalist lineage) to gain an understanding is clearly a value statement and not in itself objective. The questions which Jensen asks us to pose to determine objective reality are in themselves inevitably going to reflect the tenets of the modernist worldview, as all paradigms delimit the range of acceptable questions. (Grof, 1985) Jensen, like modernist science in general, fails to probelmatise the very foundations of the worldview upon which his research and its guiding presuppositions are founded,

Jensens definition of objective in itself betrays the limitations of the concept. objective simply means agreement among observers of an external event, or between measurements or recordings of events by some device, and agreement among persons who read these records. (Jensen, 1998: 49-50) Given the paradigmatic constrictions within modernist science and the mechanistic paradigm (especially, in this instance, in regard to theories of mind) and the self-limiting boundaries within academic institutions (Sheldrake et al., 2001) the very act of agreement between observers operating within such a paradigm renders any such agreement as being far from objective in any real sense. Jensens concept of mental ability, or g, in terms of the layered analysis of CLA, is itself a construct of a primarily level one process (the litany). This is because factor analysis is the defining method which underpins the construction of g theory. Factor analysis constitutes a number of statistical processes which attempt to correlate various factors with the purpose of determining if the factors are constituted within a larger set of independent variables. (Jensen, 1998; Reber & Reber, 2001: 265) Notably it is data reduction which is the primary feature of factor analysis. (Reber & Reber, 2001: 264) Yet while the processes inherent within factor analysis are all strictly statistical, there is still the requirement of subjective determination of whether the factors are representative of significant psychological conceptions. As an exemplar, a group of IQ test scores may be identified as having significant correlation with each other, and thus be deemed a statistical factor. Yet the correlation may be indicative of common mathematical elements within the tests. (Reber & Reber, 2001: 264)

A problematic with factor analysis is that observation and measurement (data analysis) is a fundamental component of its process. Thus cognitive processes and mental attributes which are not easily measured or observed are inevitably excluded from the process. Given the often inner, visual, affective, non-linear, extra-sensory and nonverbal predilections of integrated intelligence (1) and intuitive experiences in general, factor analysis is ultimately an inadequate process to investigate it. Thus Jensens work, predicated upon the concept of g, and this in turn upon factor analysis, is inevitably work that finds no place for the intuitive, or for integrated intelligence. It is a highly mechanistic depiction of intelligence, and acknowledges only what can be measured. Jensens social analysis reflects his worldview In his chapter A Little History - his history of the development of g theory - Jensen incorporates a social level to his analysis. His attempt to account for the historical absence of the idea of a general mental ability posits several social causes. The first cause identified is the medieval social system predicated up aristocracies and serfdoms (Jensen, 1998: 5), which allowed little part for the conception of mental ability as an important quality. Thus Jensen sees the industrialisation of society as a crucial step, as specialised occupations and formal schooling made individual differences in mental ability more obvious. (Ibid.) Jensen also offers a more linear intellectual casual factor the influence of Platos dualistic representation of mind, where mind and soul were seen as the same essentially universal and eternal properties. Platos concept was incompatible with the idea of differences in human mental ability (Ibid.: 4) Yet this is where Jensens analysis ends at the social/systemic level.

Thus Jensen fails to probelmatise the issue of ways of knowing, nor does he identify civilisational differences in knowledge structures and processes. He simply explicitly finds that the quantitative analysis is the only valid means of positing knowledge claims in intelligence theory. There are no references to spiritual or mystical knowledge, other than to dismiss them as irrelevant or as obstacles to be overcome on the road of quantitative sciences comprehension of higher mental processes of rationality, as is the case with his dismissal of Platos mysticism. Thus Jensens model unconsciously reinforces the social biases which underpin his worldview. Jensens empirical and mathematical focus Jensen is an empiricist, valorising the empirical, and empiricists such as the founders of modern psychology Galton, Wundt, Binet, Spearman especially the latters five quantitative principles of cognition. (Ibid.: 38) Jensens potted history of psychology consists almost entirely of empiricists. Mathematician Karl Peterson, whom Jensen describes as the father of statistics (Ibid.: 10) is revered by Jensen for his revamping of Galtons formulation of co-relation to make it mathematically more elegant. (Ibid.) Spencers philosophical embrace of Darwinism in the late nineteenth century is praised - using Spencers own words - for achieving the adjustment of internal to external functions. (quoted in Ibid.: 6). Spencers is the embrace of Wilbers (2000c) Flatland, where all inners are reduced to surfaces, to empirical and quantifiable denominations. Jensens brief biographical sketch of pioneering psychologist Sir Francis Galton is particularly telling. Indeed Galton is described as a polymath and genius (Ibid.: 7) and as having what Hollywood calls star quality. (Ibid.) His position in the history of behavioral science

is described as stellar. (Ibid.: 9) Galtons obsession with measuring and testing devices is defended as a seminal innovation the objective measurement of human capacities. (Ibid.: 11) Jensens use of italics demonstrates what is valorised in Jensens worldview, and what is the dominant focus objective measurement. Jensen writes as a prelude to his biographical sketch of Galton: The empirical study of mental ability and individual differences could not begin until someone took up the methods of empirical science, that is asking definite questions of nature and discovering the answers through analysis of data based on systematic observation, objective measurement, and experimentation. The first person to do this was the Victorian eccentric, polymath, and genius Sir Francis Galton (Ibid.: 7. Italics added) It is Galtons ways of knowing, deeply embedded within the western rationalist hegemony questioning, collecting and analysing data, observation, objective measurement and experimentation that establishes him as a star and a genius in Jensens worldview. Inner worlds and intuitive perceptions are systematically excluded as valid ways of knowing. Jensen later enthuses about Galtons obsession with counting measuring things (Ibid.: 8), and his having devised mechanical counters devices to help in counting and tabulating. As Jensen writes, He loved data. (Ibid.) Jensen relates how Galton devised an objective measure to test how much a lecturer bored the audience. (Ibid.) Jensen seems to valorise Galtons obsession with numbers, a philosophy of (to use Galtons own words): When you can, count. (quoted in Ibid.: 8)

Jensens language reveals his worldview as being embedded with the western mechanistic paradigm. Darwins theory of evolution is described as the mechanism of biological evolution (Ibid.: .6, 14. Italics added) Further, hereditary individual variation is the raw material on which natural selection works (Ibid.: 14. Italics added) The metaphor is essentially materialist. Again, inners are reduced to outers; the left hand side of Wilbers four-quadrant model reduced to the surfaces of the right. Likewise, Jensens preferred verbs of knowing reflect his modernist worldview and mechanistic leanings. (1) Spearman read Galton. (Ibid.: 22) Galton and others were working on the measurement of mental abilities. (Ibid.) Spearman formalised the idea of margin of error. (Ibid.). Testing is common (Ibid. 29, 53, 311,315) as is experiment. Variants of the word measure occur repeatedly (Ibid.: 23, 50, 311, 314) on pages too numerous to list in total. Jensen sees the rational, logical and mathematical as the pinnacle of human cognition. He describes intelligence (his mathematically/rationally/linguistically focused g factor) as the higher mental processes. (Ibid.: 11) and refers to the higher mental processes that people think as intelligence. (Ibid.: 14) Finally he is explicit, describing the higher mental processes reasoning, judgment, planning, verbal comprehension, and acquisition of knowledge. (Ibid.: 15) Summary note Jensen is a product of the western rationalist hegemony, and the mechanistic paradigm. His worldview finds value primarily in the objective, the measurable, and the mathematical. There little place for inner worlds, the intuitive, or the spiritual. Indeed he makes this explicit:

But intuition and informed guesses, though valuable in generating hypotheses, are never acceptable as evidence in scientific research. (Ibid.: 16) Jensen thus stands as an example of the self-limiting methods and tools of empirical science when applied to intelligence and mind. In turn he grants further understanding of the way that integrated intelligence has been paradigmatically excluded from mainstream IQ theory. Daniel Goleman: Emotional Intelligence Daniel Goleman (1996a, 1999) points out that traditional notions of intelligence fail to take into account emotionality. Goleman argues for the need to introduce the idea of emotional intelligence (EQ) into intelligence discourse. Using research into brain physiology to establish the importance of emotions in the thinking process, Goleman explains why emotions so often overpower reason. Golemans concept of EQ incorporates wisdom, empathy, self-discipline, introspection and intuition. Emotional intelligence defined Goleman states explicitly that his depiction of intelligence will stand as a challenge to those who subscribe to a narrow view of intelligence, especially those who maintain that IQ is a genetic given that cannot be changed by life experience. (1996a: xii) Golemans emotional intelligence is not specifically about intuition. In Golemans model intuition is merely an aspect of emotional intelligence, which includes self-control, zeal, persistence and the ability to motivate oneself. (Ibid.) Elsewhere he adds that it incorporates the ability to reign in emotional impulse; to read anothers innermost feelings; to handle relationships smoothly (Ibid.: xiii), as well as

self-awareness, self-control, and empathy, and the arts of listening, resolving conflicts, and cooperation. (Ibid.: xv) Emotional selfawareness is another crucial factor. (Goleman, 1999: 65) In short it is how - to bring intelligence to emotion. (Goleman, 1996a: xiii) In Working With Emotional Intelligence, Goleman (1999) expands his definitions and more explicitly refers to the intuitive realm. Thus Goleman finds that emotional intelligence means to be intuitive, passionate, bold but grounded. (Goleman, 1999: 54) This includes our deepest sense of what feels right and what is off. (Ibid.: 58) A scientific model of mind Yet Goleman constructs the emotional and intuitive mind in the terms of modernist brain science, a methodological approach which ultimately severely restricts his thesis. Goleman finds that intuitive decision making is really just utilising data. Though there are no easily quantifiable ways of measuring such important aspects of a decision, we do nevertheless have an immense amount of relevant data in the form of hunches. And... we ignore such data at our own risk. (1999: 58) By reducing intuitions to data Goleman effectively colours them in mechanistic terminology, and rather self-contradictingly quantifying them. An anecdote that quickly follows, involving a person commenting upon the fallacy of trying to be purely rational, reinforces the attempt at validation via association with the quantifiable: When you do that and youre completely objectiveall you really have are cold statistics. But inside, its almost as if you had a meter that

measures all of that dataThe needle is measuring feeling. (1999: 59.

Italics added) A further anecdote told by a highly successful entrepreneur (1999: 62) is notably reductionist and mechanistic: An intuitive decision is nothing but a subconscious logical analysis. Somehow the brain goes through these calculations and comes up with what we would call a weighted conclusion (1999: 62. Italics added) The prefix nothing but establishes the reductive and selfobfuscating premise that intuitions are merely logical analysis in disguise, supported by calculation, and resulting in a physical outcome (weighted), suggesting a material substrate that can be measured. Thus this anecdote involves the explication of a way of knowing that has been essentially discarded in the wake of the western rationalist hegemony (intuition) and explicates it in the valorised ways of knowing of that same hegemonic process logic, analysis, and mathematics (calculation). In short intuition is explicated according to the tenets of materialism, another defining facet of the mechanistic paradigm. (Davies & Gribbin, 1992) Goleman then explicitly reinforces the mechanistic explanation by positing the source of these intuitions as their having primordial roots in evolution. (Goleman, 1999: 59) Hunches start much deeper in the brain. They are a function of the emotional centers that ring the brain stem atop the spinal cord most particularly the amygdala and its connected neural circuitry Every experience that we have an emotional reaction to, no matter how subtle, seems to be encoded in the amygdala. (Goleman, 1999: 59. Italics added)

Further, the amygdala is the repository for everything we feel about what we experience. (1999: 59) In such a reductionist, materialist, and mechanistic model there can be no place for integrated intelligence, as the blanket phrase every experience effectively excludes all other hypotheses. A Darwinian, neurophysiological and reductionist model Golemans theory of the emotional mind is a primarily biological one, predicated upon the Darwinian theory of natural selection. Commenting upon the fact that emotional responses are often faster than rational ones, Goleman writes: In evolution this quickness most likely revolved around that most basic decision, what to pay attention to, and, once vigilant while, say, confronting another animal, making split-second decisions like, Do I eat this, or does it eat me? Those organisms that had to pause too long to reflect on these answers were unlikely to have many progeny to pass on their slower-acting genes. (Goleman, 1996a: 335) Golemans claims are not only questionable science (repeating what Stephen J. Gould states are the often untestable claims about adaptive behaviour via natural selection often seen in evolutionary psychology). (King, 1999: 143) Like purely biological and reductionist models of mind and consciousness in general, the thesis ultimately produces a selflimiting theory of mind. It leaves no space for discourse on the transpersonal, as mind in the neo-Darwinian paradigm is implicitly - an emergent property of neurobiology, explicable only as evolutionary epiphenomena. (Bloom, 2001; Grof, 1985) Recurring reductionism is inherent in Golemans constant references to neurophysiology and brain parts. At times the language seems almost paradigmatically representative of Newtonian science.

LeDoux calls it precognitive emotion, a reaction based on neural bits and pieces of sensory information that have not been fully sorted out and integrated into a recognizable object. Its a very raw form of sensory information, something like a neural Name That Tune. (27. Italics added, except for last) Golemans construct of mind is a sensory information processing system, built up from bits and pieces. Reactions of the brain within the system come from the recognition of an object, suggesting the observer and object methodology of mechanistic science. There is no genuine attempt to distinguish clearly amongst types of feelings, the distinction between intuition and emotion, nor between classicist and inferential-intuitionist intuition. (Ben-Zeev and Star, 2001: 31, 51) Mechanistic language Goleman criticises the mind-as computer model which dominates cognitive psychology as inaccurate, because (unlike the computer) the mind is strongly affective. He writes: the brains wetware is awash in a messy, pulsating, puddle of neurochemicals, nothing like the sanitized, orderly silicon that has spawned the guiding metaphor of mind. (Goleman, 1996a: 44) Yet somewhat self-contradictingly, Golemans thesis is replete with mechanistic language and images. As with Jensen, Goleman often resorts to mechanistic metaphors to explicate his thesis. For example: in the mechanics of emotion, each feeling has its own direct repertoire of thought, reactions, even memories. (Goleman, 1996a: 340)

one of the tasks of the left frontal lobe is to act as a neural thermostat, regulating unpleasant emotions. (Ibid.: 29) Strong emotion can create neural static (Ibid.: 30) Since the interval between what triggers an emotion and its eruption can be virtually instantaneous, the mechanism that appraises perception must be capable of great speed This appraisals needs to be automatic The emotional mind is our radar for danger(Ibid.: 335) It is difficult to imagine explicating brain physiology and mind without references to metaphor and imagery. (Maddox, 1999) Yet Golemans constant employment of machine metaphors, as opposed to many other possible metaphors (such as natural or biological) suggests strongly that the author conceives of the brain and mind as essentially machinelike, mirroring one of the defining tenets of modernist cognitive science. Indeed Golemans construct of mind operates like the empiricists and behaviourists mind of sensory stimulus and response. (Gardner et al., 1996) (2) Referring to a neural connection between the thalamus and the amygdale, Goleman writes: This smaller and shorter pathway allows the amygdala to receive some direct inputs from the senses and start a response before they are fully registered by the neocortex. (Ibid.: 20-21) And: That information and our response to it is coordinated by the prefrontal lobes (Ibid.: 28) Golemans brain is a sensory processing unit, shuttling data around from sub-component to subcomponent in almost linear fashion.

The emergency route from eye to ear to thalamus to amygdale is crucial But this circuit from thalamus to amygdale carries only a small portion of sensory messages, with the majority taking the main route to the neocortex. (Ibid.: 26) In this model, there seems to be little place for consciousness, and no sense of a self-conscious awareness is seen. The brain and its information processes are seen to control the individual. This is all the more remarkable given Golemans background in transpersonal studies. Golemans model, and the examples he employs, predominantly refer to a stimulus and response world of fright and flight emotions as evolutionary protectors of the human animal. There is a direct reference to this when Goleman writes of intuitive astuteness immediately and intuitively assessing people in initial encounters. This, according to Goleman may be the remnant of an essential early warning system for danger, one that lives on today in feelings such as apprehension. (Goleman, 1999: 62) Thus a problematic of his entire thesis is that Goleman fails to clearly identify any affective domains within the brain/mind which are not mediated by this stimulus and response, fright or flight model of human emotions and feelings. In particular, intuition is not clearly defined, and in Golemans model it is depicted simply as an extension of this neo-Darwinian emotional adaptation. Golemans self-limiting emotional mind Golemans construction of the emotional mind, founded upon Freuds concept of primary process (Goleman, 1996a: 338) is self-limiting, and severely restricts potential explications of the intuitive realm, including the transpersonal and integrated intelligence. Goleman writes:

In primary process thought, loose associations determine the flow of a narrative; one object symbolizes another; one feeling displaces another and stands for it; wholes are condensed into parts. There is no time, no law of cause and effect. Indeed there is no such thing as No in the primary process; anything is possible. The psychoanalytic method is in part the art of deciphering and unraveling these substitutions in meaning... with one element standing for another, things need not necessarily be defined by their objective identity: what matters is how they are perceived; things are as they seem while the rational mind makes logical connections between causes and effects, the emotional mind is indiscriminate, connecting things that merely have similar striking features. (1996a: 339) While Goldmans explication may be quite applicable to a certain range of content of the human psyche, it does not permit a broader range of exploration of the intuitive elements that he himself incorporates within his concept of emotional intelligence. The affective domain of cognition is a crucial dimension of intuitive and integrated intelligence. Yet Golemans explication of the emotional mind descries it as essentially symbolic and indiscriminate, constituting no objective reality, and where the perceiver creates what matters, and where anything is possible. The conclusion of the reader can only be that the emotional mind does not deal with anything real. Further, in Golemans concept of emotional intelligence, emotions and intuitions are essentially included under the same label of the emotional mind. This creates a self-limiting problematic, as the sources of emotions is posited in physiological and reductionist terms as emerging from their storehouse in the amygdale. (Goleman, 1996: 22) Intuitions and gut feelings emerge from our internal store of emotional memory our own reservoir of wisdom and judgment. (1999: 62) The storehouse and reservoir metaphors, and their sources in

previous personal experience once again reinforce the stimulus a response model of mind. Similarly, a successful entrepreneur is quoted as saying: I think there are fewer people with strong intuitions at a young age than old, because life experiences add up its like your gut tells you things and theres a chemical reaction thats going on in your body, which is triggered by your mind, and tightening your stomach muscles, so your gut is saying, This doesnt feel right. (Goleman, 1999:60) In such a representation of mind there is no room for intuitive and affective perceptions from any source beyond the sub-components of the brain itself. It is thus an essentially materialist model. There is no attempt to explicate consciousness itself. The rational placed above the emotional Despite the subject matter of EQ, in Golemans model it is clearly the analytical and rational mid that is valorised above the emotional and intuitive. Goleman begins with a quote from Horace Walpole: Life is a comedy for those who think and a tragedy for those who feel. (Goleman, 1996a.: 15) Later the reader is informed that in a certain experiment a group of rats had learned an emotional reaction without any higher cortical involvement. (Ibid.: 21: Italics added here and in rest of paragraph) In precognitive emotion certain emotional mistakes are based on feeling prior to thought (Ibid.: 27), implying that thought should precede feeling. Also, the neocortical area of the brain brings a more analytic or appropriate response to our emotional impulses. (Ibid.: 28) The emotional mind is immature. Goleman writes that there are many ways in which the emotional mind is childlike. (Ibid.: 338) This is because of categorical thinking (where everything is black and

white) and personalized thinking (where the focus is upon oneself). (Ibid.) This childlike mind is self-confirming denying confronting realities and focusing upon affirming data. (Ibid.: 339) Further, feelings are self-justifying, with a set of perceptions and proofs all their own. (Ibid.: 339) That intuitive perceptions might move beyond the ego and into the transpersonal is not discussed. The reader is also told that the emotional mind reacts to the present as if it were the past. (Ibid.: 339) It colors how we react to the moment. (Ibid.) When the emotional mind is dominant it has entrained the rational mind, putting it to its own uses. (Ibid.: 340) Clearly in Golemans model of mind, the emotional mind is not to be trusted unless the rational mind is in control. Thus Goleman follows the example of western mind science, situating rationality as the pinnacle of cognition. (Anthony, 2005b) Finally, Goleman depicts the rational as purely objective. The beliefs of the rational mind are tentative; new evidence can disconfirm one belief and replace it with a new one it reasons by objective evidence. (Ibid.: 339) No problematisation is offered as to the limitations of sensory experience, nor the issue of objectivity, consistent with the valorisation process of mainstream dominant theories of mind and intelligence. Conversely, many Buddhist and mystical traditions posit the rational mind as subservient to the greater wisdom of the intuitive/transpersonal mind. (Broomfield 1997; Bussey, 2004; Ferrer, 2000, 2002; Hawkins, 2002; Inayatullah, 2002b; Krishnamurti 1956; Nisker, 1998; Wilber, 2000c) Yet this is not considered in Golemans thesis.

Summary Golemans texts do indeed stand as a challenge to those who subscribe to a narrow view of intelligence. (Goleman, 1996a: xii) He urges a new paradigm which will harmonize head and heart. (Ibid.: 32) The emotional realm is incorporated, making it expansive of the essentially rational computer analogue models that dominate mainstream intelligence theory. Further, as Goleman himself points out, he moves a step beyond Gardners (1993) intrapersonal and interpersonal intelligences, in that he pursues the role of feeling in these intelligences, while Gardner focuses more on cognitions about feeling. (Gardner, 1996: 43) Finally it may be noted that Goleman finds little function for intuition in terms of spiritual development. His is undoubtedly a construct of mind which encourages introspection, self-awareness (1996a: 46-47; 1999: 65) and self-reflection. His reference to the inner contentment that arises from attuning ones life to be in keeping with ones true feelings (1996a: 41) may be interpreted as an essentially spiritual focus. Yet there is no intrinsic transcendent, transpersonal, mystical or numinous component to Golemans inner worlds. The two texts deconstructed here find the prime uses of emotional intelligence and its intuitive components in terms of developing human relationships, in education, and in the workplace and profit-making. The discussion of intuition (Goleman, 1999) focuses upon its employment in career and entrepreneurial settings only. Golemans texts are an examination of emotional intelligence and how to control it and use it in everyday life. As intuitions are incorporated under the term emotional intelligence, they are texts implicitly about the intuitive mind. The way in which Golemans valorisation of the material/physical and reductionist as explanatory tools, stands as a

paradigmatic example of mechanistic representations of intelligence, mind, and intuition. Conclusion The two theorists deconstructed in this paper reveal some striking similarities, presenting predominantly mechanistic depictions of mind and intelligence. Each incorporates neo-Darwinian paradigmatic assumptions about the nature of consciousness and intelligence, and its essentially epiphenomenal status in cotemporary science. The texts are both heavily reductionist. Most notably both the texts fail to adequately problematise the tenets of mechanic science and its mechanistic representations of mind. Neither of the theorists raises the issues of reductionism, materialism, nor the western objective focus which attempts explication via the observer/subject split. Ways of knowing and the paradigmatic and civilisational constrictions of these are not addressed in any of the texts. The concept of mind extended beyond the brain is also not addressed at any point, despite the fact that Goleman explicitly incorporates intuition into his discussion. As the paradigmatic presuppositions of mechanistic science are not probelmatised, it is not surprising that both theorists deconstructed here reproduce a consistently mechanistic representation of mind where integrated intelligence is absent. This paper has employed CLA to deconstruct two contemporary depictions of mind and intelligence. It has been found that these two representations perpetuate the western mechanistic and rationalist hegemony at the expense of intuitive and integrated depictions. Yet once the discourse is deconstructed, alternative futures may be posited. Those futures will not be elaborated upon in this paper. Suffice to state that such deconstructions as this potentially clear the

path for a movement beyond purely critical and rational representations of mind and intelligence. Until such deconstructions are more common within intelligence theory, the intuitive realms of mind will remain inadequately represented in contemporary mainstream intelligence theories. The futures of intelligence will be constricted. Notes: 1. Integrated intelligence incorporates a transpersonal awareness that transcends the boundaries of the individual it is in effect a collective human and universal intelligence, and is most often associated with spiritual texts and discourses. See Anthony (2003; 2005a,b) for an expanded explanation of integrated intelligence. 2. The verbs have been standardised and written in the past tense for purposes of consistency. 3. It should be acknowledged that a large part of Golemans two texts are devoted to how these conditioning processes can be transcended via education and healing. Bibliography Anthony, M. (2004) Integrated Intelligence: The Future of Intelligence? In Inayatullah, S. (Ed.) The Causal Layered Analysis Reader, 453-470. Taipei: Tamkang University Press. Anthony, M. (2005a) Education for Transformation: Integrated Intelligence in the Knowledge Economy and Beyond. Journal of Futures Studies. Vol. 9, no.3. 31-46. Anthony, M. (2005b) Integrated Intelligence and the Psycho-Spiritual Imperatives of Mechanistic Science. Journal Of Futures Studies. Vol. 10, no.1. 31-48. Broomfield, J. (1997). Other Ways of Knowing. Rochester: Inner traditions.

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