No:09-3966 ____________________________________________________________________________ UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS _________________________FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT________________________ JAMES L. PARKEY, Plaintiff - Appellant v.

JASON E. SAMPLE, State Trooper, BERNARD CARTER, Lake County Prosecutor, R J BOWLING, Magistrate Judge, et al., Defendants - Appellees _____________________________________________________________________________ _ Appeal From the United States District Court Northern District of Indiana - South Bend Division Case No: 3:07-CV-00267-WCL-RBC The Honorable Judge William C. Lee BRIEF AND REQUIRED SHORT APPENDIX OF PLAINTIFF APPELLANT JAMES L. PARKEY

Doug A. Bernacchi, Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 215 W. Eighth Street P.O. Box 289 Michigan City, IN 46361

CIRCUIT RULE 26.1 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT Appellate Court No: No:09-3966 Short Caption Parkey v. Sample, et al. To enable the judges to determine whether recusal is necessary or appropriate, an attorney for a non-governmental party or amicus curiae, or a private attorney representing a governmental party, must furnish a disclosure statement providing the following information in compliance with Circuit Rule 26.1 and Fed. R. App. P. 26.1. The Court prefers that the disclosure statement be filed immediately following docketing; but, the disclosure statement must be filed within 21 days of docketing or upon the filing of a motion, response, petition, or answer in this court, whichever occurs first. Attorneys are required to file an amended statement to reflect any material changes in the required information. The text of the statement must also be included in front of the table of contents of the partys main brief. Counsel is required to complete the entire statement and to use N/A for any information that is not applicable if this form is used. (1) The full name of every party that the attorney represents in the case (if the party is a corporation, you must provide the corporate disclosure information required by Fed. R. App. P. 26.1 by completing item #3); James Parkey (2) The names of all law firms whose partners or associates have appeared for the party in the case (including proceedings in the district court or before an administrative agency) or are expected to appear for the party in this court: Chelsea A. Pejic (3) If the party or amicus is a corporation: i) Identify all its parent corporations, if any; and N/A ii) list any publicly held company that owns 10% or more of the partys or amicus
stock.

N/A Attorneys Signature: s/ Doug A. Bernacchi Date: 05/07/10 Attorneys Printed Name: Doug A. Bernacchi Please indicate if you are Counsel of Record for the above listed parties pursuant to Circuit Rule 3(d) Yes X No Address: 215 West 8th Street, P.O. Box 289, Michigan City, IN 46361-0289 Phone Number: (219) 879-2889 Fax Number: (219) 879-9554
E-Mail Address: dbernacchi@hotmail.com

TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE Corporate Disclosure Statement ........................................................................................... Table of Contents .............................................................................................................. i Table of Authorities .......................................................................................................... ii JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT ................................................................................. 1 STATEMENT OF ISSUES .............................................................................................. 1 STATEMENT OF THE CASE ......................................................................................... 2 STATEMENT OF FACTS ................................................................................................ 3 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ...................................................................................... 5 ARGUMENTS ..................................................................................................................5 I. Standard of Review ....................................................................................................... 5 II. The district court erred when it found no sufficient evidence to establish that there is a genuine issue of Material fact that the Defendant violated James Parkey's rights afforded to him by 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution; III. The district court erred when it found defendant Jason Sample was entitled to qualified immunity. Conclusion.........................................................................................................................10 ATTACHED REQUIRED SHORT APPENDIX

i Cases A.M. v. Butler, 360 F.3d 787 (7th Cir. 2004)..............................................................................8 Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964)..............................................................................................6 Betaco, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 32 F.3d 1126 (7th Cir. 1994)............................................5 Bielanski v. County of Kane, 550 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 2008).......................................................8 Boyd v. Owen, 481 F.3d 520 (7th Cir. 2007)..............................................................................9 Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).................................................................................7 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)..................................................................................10 Hirschfeld v. United States, 54 F.2d 62 (7th Cir. 1931)............................................................7 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002).........................................................................................8 Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224 (1991).....................................................................................6 Johnson v. Snyder, 444 F.3d 579 (7th Cir. 2006).......................................................................5 Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 2008)...........................................................................9 Malinowski v. DeLuca, 177 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 1999)...............................................................6 Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986)......................................................................................5 Purtell v. Mason, 527 F.3d 615 (7th Cir. 2008).........................................................................8 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001)........................................................................................8 Siebert v. Severino, 256 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2001).....................................................................10 Thompson v. Wagner, 319 F.3d 931 (7th Cir. 2003)...................................................................6 United States v. Bentley, 825 F.2d 1104 (7th Cir. 1987)............................................................7 United States v. Brooks, 285 F.3d 1102 (8th Cir. 2002).............................................................7 United States v. Causey, 9 F.3d 1341 (7th Cir. 1993).................................................................6 ii

United States v. Copeland, 321 F.3d 582 (6th Cir. 2003)............................................................6 United States v. Cortina, 630 F.2d 1207 (7th Cir. 1980).............................................................7 United States v. Hammond, 351 F.3d 765 (6th Cir. 2003)...........................................................7 United States v. Jackson, 103 F.3d 561 (7th Cir. 1996)...............................................................7 United States v. Skinner, 972 F.2d 171 (7th Cir. 1992)................................................................7 United States v. Warren, 310 U.S. App. D.C. 1, 42 F.3d 647 (D.C. Cir. 1994)............................7 Villanova v. Abrams, 972 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1992)......................................................................6 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999)..........................................................................................5 STATUES, CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND OTHER AUTHORITIES 28 U.S.C. 129.............................................................................................................................1 28 U.S.C. 1331..........................................................................................................................1 28 U.S.C.1343(a)(3)......................................................................................................................1 28 U.S.C. 2201..............................................................................................................................1 42 U.S.C. 1983, et seq.......................................................................................................passim Fourth Amendment...............................................................................................................passim

iii

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291 in that this is an appeal from the district courts November 4, 2009, Judgment and Entry Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. This Entry was a final judgment as to all parties and issues. Following entry of that final judgment, Parkey filed a notice of appeal on December 4, 2009. The district court had federal question jurisdiction of the underlying case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1331, 1343(a)(3) and 2201, as the cause was brought as a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 for relief to redress the deprivation, under color of statute, rights secured by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1. The district court erred when it found no sufficient evidence to establish that there is a genuine issue of Material fact that the Defendant violated James Parkey's rights afforded to him by 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution; 2. The district court erred when it found defendant Jason Sample was entitled to qualified immunity.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE On June 6, 2005, Defendant Indiana State Trooper Jason Sample (Sample) submitted an affidavit in support of an application for a search warrant. Therein, Sample, alleged that the Plaintiff James L. Parkey (Parkey) was a suspected narcotics dealer and further accused Parkey of dealing marijuana. On June 6, 2005, Sample stated in the sworn affidavit that Parkey had a criminal history. Parkey asserts that he had a unrelated criminal arrest in January of 1981, more than 24 years prior to Sample asserting that Parkey had a criminal history. (Second Amended Complaint, 4). May 24, 2006, all criminal charges originating from Parkey's arrest subsequent to service of the search warrant were dismissed with prejudice. (Doc. 68 - Second Amended Complaint, 4). June 5, 2007, Parkey filed a pro se Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 for an illegal search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. (Doc. 1). In his First Amended Complaint, filed on July 9, 2007, Parkey named the following individuals and entities as defendants: 1) the State of Indiana; 2) Jason E. Sample, an Indiana State Trooper; 3) Bernard Carter, a prosecutor in Lake County, Indiana; 4) R.J. Bowling, a Magistrate Judge in the Lake County Superior Court; 5) the United States Drug Enforcement Administration; and 6) Lake County, Indiana. (First Amended Complaint, pp. 2-3. Docket at 5). On May 6, 2008, Parkey filed a motion for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint. Docket at 64. That motion was granted on May 22, 2008 and on that date the Second Amended Complaint was filed. All of the named defendants with the exception of Sample have been dismissed from this case. 2

Sample moved for summary judgment August 17, 2009, arguing that he did not submit a false probable cause affidavit to the state court, that his affidavit set forth adequate grounds for the issuance of the search warrant and, consequently, he did nothing to violate Parkeys Fourth Amendment rights. (Doc.90-91) The district court granted Sample summary judgment on November 4, 2009. (Doc. 99101). This appeal followed with the filing of Plaintiff's Notice of Appeal. (Doc. 102) STATEMENT OF THE FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES Parkey alleges in his Second Amended Complaint that he was a victim of an illegal search and seizure on June 6, 2005 by Jason Sample. Id., p. 2. He claims that on that date, Jason Sample, armed with a warrant, searched his home and seized certain items that then formed the basis for the filing of criminal drug charges against him. Id. While Parkey admits that Sample did have a warrant to search his home, he states that it was obtained based on groundless and misleading information supplied by Sample, the Indiana State Trooper, the individual who signed the Search Warrant Affidavit. Id., p. 2 (and Exhibit 1 thereto). Parkey alleges that his rights granted under the Fourth Amendment from illegal search and seizure were violated. Based on these allegations, Parkey brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983. He seeks compensatory damages as a result of the illegal June 6, 2005, raid on plaintiffs home and subsequent arrest. Id. In his First Amended Complaint, Parkey states as follows concerning his allegations against Sample: Jason E. Sample . . . [w]illfully and wantonly [sic] mislead Judge-Magistrate 3

Bowling on June 6, 2005, in his June 6, 2005, sworn Affidavit; accused plaintiff of being a suspected narcotics cultivator/dealer with no grounds; accused plaintiff of Dealing Marijuana with no grounds; accused plaintiff of Reckless Possession of Paraphernalia with no grounds; accused plaintiff of Possession of Controlled Substance with no grounds; accused plaintiff of having a criminal history through Indiana. First Amended Complaint, p. 2. In his Second Amended Complaint (docket at 68), Parkey states that Defendant, Sample, also misled Magistrate Bowling, in his June 6, 2005, Affidavit when he stated that plaintiff had a criminal history through Indiana. The District Court noted in its order: ...However, it is also true that while Sample states in his declaration and in his probable cause affidavit that he ran a criminal history check on Parkey, Sample also fails to present any supporting documentation on this fact issue. In fact, later in his reply brief, Sample claims that he ran a criminal history check for James Parkey using the Computerized National Crime Information Center/Indiana Data and Communication System that confirmed [Parkey] had a criminal history. Id., p. 6, n. 4. But that is not what Sample stated in either his declaration or his affidavit. Sample made no mention of the NCIC database or the IDCS database. He also did not produce a copy of this alleged criminal history report in support of his motion. Had he done so, it would at least clarify what he saw that he used as the basis for his statement that Parkey had a criminal history through Indiana. Sample had intentionally and knowingly misrepresented material facts in his probable cause affidavit for the purpose of securing a search warrant, and is not entitled to qualified immunity. Parkey's right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure is a clearly established right of which Sample a reasonable police officer would be well aware. Lying in the probable 4

cause affidavit in order to obtain a search warrant vitiated any qualified immunity defense.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS A. Whether Sample violated the Fourth Amendment when he knowingly and

intentionally submitted false information/facts to the warrant issuing judge; B. Sample is not entitled to qualified immunity

ARGUMENTS I. Standard of review. This case comes before this court on review of a grant of summary judgment, so the plaintiff, Parkey, must have the benefit of all conflicts in the evidence and all reasonable and favorable inferences that might be drawn from the evidence. See Johnson v. Snyder, 444 F.3d 579, 583 (7th Cir. 2006); Betaco, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 32 F.3d 1126, 1132 (7th Cir. 1994). Public officials performing discretionary functions are generally entitled to qualified immunity and are "shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Qualified immunity provides "ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). They are accorded this ample protection not as a license to violate constitutional rights

without recourse nor as an excuse to turn a blind eye to the requirements of the law, but to preserve the vigilance of those individuals vested with the obligation to protect the public interest in the face of ambiguity. See Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228-29 (1991); see also Malinowski v. DeLuca, 177 F.3d 623, 626-27 (7th Cir. 1999) A. First, Parkey contends that his arrest violated his Fourth Amendment rights

because it was not based on probable cause to believe he'd violated any law, but the lies of Jason Sample. It was never proved who the marijuana or paraphernalia belonged to that Sample allegedly recovered as the criminal case was decided in Parkey's favor. The District court erred when it stated that Parkey had to dispute Sample found evidence in his trash pull. It was never shown to be Parkey's! Planted or trumped up evidence cannot support summary judgment or probable cause. At the time Sample signed the affidavit there was no evidence to support his contention that Parkey was a suspected narcotics dealer with a criminal history. So it was not a fact that Sample knew at the time of Parkey's arrest; and "what an arresting officer does not know is inadmissible to show that he had probable cause for the arrest--otherwise hindsight would validate every arrest of a person who turned out to be a criminal." Villanova v. Abrams, 972 F.2d 792, 799 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, (1964); Thompson v. Wagner, 319 F.3d 931, 934-35 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Copeland, 321 F.3d 582, 592-93 (6th Cir. 2003). The only basis for a finding of probable cause on which the state relies in this case, however, was a falsely sworn affidavit whose falsity was, so far as appears, unknown to the judge at the probable-cause hearing. (Compare United States v. Causey, 9 F.3d 1341, 1343-44 and n. 1 (7th Cir. 1993), where the judge was informed that a pseudonym had been used in an 6

affidavit to protect the identity of a confidential informant.) The prospect and pressure were weakened in this case by the forgeries. Sample could be prosecuted for perjury; he presumably would be estopped by his fraud to deny that the allegations that was a Parkey was a suspected narcotics dealer with a criminal history representation made "under Oath or affirmation." United States v. Brooks, 285 F.3d 1102 (8th Cir. 2002). Sample did not and cannot use the line of defense that the fraud was harmless, as in cases of typographical errors and other inadvertent technical irregularities, United States v. Skinner, 972 F.2d 171, 177 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Bentley, 825 F.2d 1104, 1109 (7th Cir. 1987); Hirschfeld v. United States, 54 F.2d 62 (7th Cir. 1931); United States v. Warren, 310 U.S. App. D.C. 1, 42 F.3d 647, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Immaterial falsehoods, even deliberate ones, in an affidavit that is presented to a judge or magistrate in support of a request for the issuance of an arrest or search warrant do not invalidate the warrant should it be issued. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, (1978); United States v. Jackson, 103 F.3d 561, 573-75 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Causey, supra, 9 F.3d at 1342-44. But this isn't such a case. There is no indication that Sample failed merely by inadvertence to truthfully state that Parkey was a suspected drug dealer and implying he had an extensive criminal history; and a fraudulent complaint cannot provide the sole basis for a finding of probable cause. See United States v. Cortina, 630 F.2d 1207, 1213-17 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. Hammond, 351 F.3d 765, 773-74 (6th Cir. 2003). B. Sample is not entitled to qualified immunity. Parkey has shown that Sample acted

deliberately or with reckless disregard for the truth or made misrepresentations to the issuing judge that were necessary to the probable cause determination. Therefore, the plaintiff can establish that Sample violated his Fourth Amendment rights, and is not protected from suit by the 7

defense of qualified immunity. Here the contours of the constitutional right were so defined as to put the official, Sample, on notice that his conduct was not within the bounds of the law and violated the Constitution." citing Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002). To prevail under
1983 for this claim, Parkey must establish that the governments conduct constituted a

seizure and that the seizure was unreasonable. Bielanski v. County of Kane, 550 F.3d 632, 637 (7th Cir. 2008). A seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes as an intentional limitation of a persons freedom of movement. Bielanski, 550 F.3d at 637. To prevail under 1983 for this type of claim, Parkey must establish that the governments conduct constituted a seizure and that the seizure was unreasonable. Where an arrest occurs without probable cause, the plaintiff may bring a claim for unreasonable seizure. See A.M. v. Butler, 360 F.3d 787, 798 (7th Cir. 2004). Whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity is a legal question for the court. Purtell v. Mason, 527 F.3d 615, 621 (7th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), the United States Supreme Court set forth a two step analysis for determining qualified immunity. First, the court determines whether the facts as alleged by the plaintiff make out a constitutional violation. Id. at 201. If there was no constitutional violation, a Section 1983 claim cannot survive and there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity. Id. However, if there was a constitutional violation, the court then determines whether the constitutional right was clearly established. Id. The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. Id. at 202 (citing Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999). As discussed above, 8

Plaintiff has alleged a violation of his constitutional right under the Fourth Amendment to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. In granting summary judgment in favor of Sample, the district court erroneously determined that Parkey does not contest any of the following facts as presented by Sample: 1. Sample received information from the U.S. DEA that Parkey had received shipments from a company known to the DEA to provide products used in the cultivation of marijuana; 2. Sample personally observed that the basement windows at Parkeys home were covered and obscured; 3. Sample conducted trash pulls on two separate occasions, during which he discovered marijuana (or at least remnants of marijuana) in Parkeys trash; and, 4. Sample based his probable cause conclusion on that evidence as well as the fact that he had extensive training and experience in law enforcement. Even if the fact of Parkeys decades-old arrest is removed from Samples probable cause affidavit, the affidavit remains sufficient (overwhelmingly so, in fact) to support a finding of probable cause and the basis for the issuance of the search warrant. For all of these reasons, Parkey has failed to establish that there is so much as a single issue of material fact to preclude the entry of summary judgment in favor of Sample on Parkeys Fourth Amendment violation claim. As Sample correctly states it, [n]o false information was supplied [to the state court judge], and Parkey does not dispute Sample found what he found in the trash pull. Such evidence alonediscovered in the trash pullwould have been enough for the issuance of the search warrant. Defendants Memorandum, p. 14. Parkey is not required to disprove a negative, that the contraband was not his. The criminal case, where determination of ownership of the illegal materials was an issue, was decided in Parkey's favor. The district court was fully aware of the acquittal. There was no evidence to refute or deny. Parkey had the burden of establishing that the constitutional right at issue was clearly established. See Boyd v. Owen, 481 F.3d 520, 526 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789, 802 (7th Cir. 2008) (A plaintiff seeking to defeat an assertion of qualified immunity must establish that the law concerning the plaintiffs asserted right was clearly established at the time the challenged conduct occurred.). For a constitutional right to be

clearly established, its contours must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right; however, an official action is not protected by qualified immunity when Parkey can demonstrate that the right was clearly established by presenting a closely analogous case that establishes that the Defendant's conduct was unconstitutional or by presenting evidence that the Defendants conduct was so patently violative of the constitutional right that reasonable officials would know without guidance from a court. See Hope, 536 U.S. at 739-40; see also Siebert v. Severino, 256 F.3d 648, 654-55 (7th Cir. 2001) (identifying two routes for proving that a right is clearly established: (1) the violation is so obvious that a reasonable officer would know that what he is doing violates the Constitution; or (2) a closely analogous case establishes that the conduct is unconstitutional). In this case Samples lying was a patently obvious constitutional violation. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 399 (1989). CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, this Court should vacate the District Courts order granting the summary judgment motion of Jason Sample and remand this matter for trial. Respectfully submitted, s/Doug A. Bernacchi Doug Allen Bernacchi, MBA/JD Attorney at Law 215 West Eighth Street P.O. Box 289 Michigan City IN 46361-0289 (219)879-2889 (219)879-9554 Facsimile bernacchi@adsnet.com1

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH TYPE-VOLUME LIMITATION, TYPEFACE REQUIREMENTS AND TYPE STYLE REQUIREMENTS 1. This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)

(7)(B) because: This brief contains no more than 10,000 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii), 2. This brief complies with the type requirements of Fed. R.App.32(a)(5) and

the type style requirements of Fed. R.App.32(a)(6) because: This brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using MS Word Times New Roman Font 12

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on the 7th day of May, 2010, a copy of the foregoing was filed by placing in the U.S. Mail and electronically. Notice of this filing will be sent to the following parties by operation of the Courts electronic filing system. Parties may access this filing through the Courts system.

Kathy Bradley Deputy Attorney General Office of Attorney General Indiana Government Center South - 5th Floor 320 West Washington Street Indiana, IN 46204-2770 Telephone: (317) 233-8213 Fax: (317) 232-7979

s/Doug A. Bernacchi Doug Allen Bernacchi, MBA/JD Attorney at Law 215 West Eighth Street P.O. Box 289 Michigan City IN 46361-0289 (219)879-2889 (219)879-9554 Facsimile bernacchi@adsnet.com1

No:09-3966 ____________________________________________________________________________ UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS _________________________FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT________________________ JAMES L. PARKEY, Plaintiff - Appellant v. JASON E. SAMPLE, State Trooper, BERNARD CARTER, Lake County Prosecutor, R J BOWLING, Magistrate Judge, et al., Defendants - Appellees _____________________________________________________________________________ _ Appeal From the United States District Court Northern District of Indiana - South Bend Division Case No: 3:07-CV-00267-WCL-RBC The Honorable Judge William C. Lee Appellant REQUIRED SHORT APPENDIX 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Brief STATEMENT PURSUANT TO CIRCUIT RULE 30(d) Comes now the Appellant, by his counsel of record, and pursuant to Circuit Rule 30(d) certify that the Appendix in this cause, consisting of a Short Appendix bound in this volume contain all the materials required by Circuit Rule 30(a) and (b). Specifically, the Short Appendix contains the trial courts Judgment and Entry.

No:09-3966 ____________________________________________________________________________ UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS _________________________FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT________________________ JAMES L. PARKEY, Plaintiff - Appellant v. JASON E. SAMPLE, State Trooper, BERNARD CARTER, Lake County Prosecutor, R J BOWLING, Magistrate Judge, et al., Defendants - Appellees _____________________________________________________________________________ _ Appeal From the United States District Court Northern District of Indiana - South Bend Division Case No: 3:07-CV-00267-WCL-RBC The Honorable Judge William C. Lee REQUIRED SHORT APPENDIX OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, JAMES PARKEY Entry Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Judgment ............................................................................................. Doc.100-101