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  • Sample Case Brief - Constitutional Convention 1990

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    Jonathan Pinkney-Baird
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    Constitutional Convention 1990 v. President, 4 FSM Intrm. 320 (App. 1990) The President allowed the act to become law without his signature, expressing concerns about the constitutionality of section 6(4). Does the FSM Supreme Court have power of judicial review over legislation enacted by congress? and May the Congress determine the rules by which a Constitutional Convention adopts proposals for constitutional amendments?

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    Constitutional Convention 1990 v. President, 4 FSM Intrm. 320 (App. 1990) The President allowed the act to become law without his signature, expressing concerns about the constitutionality of section 6(4). Does the FSM Supreme Court have power of judicial review over legislation enacted by congress? and May the Congress determine the rules by which a Constitutional Convention adopts proposals for constitutional amendments?

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    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
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    14 views2 pages

    Sample Case Brief - Constitutional Convention 1990

    Uploaded by

    Jonathan Pinkney-Baird
    Constitutional Convention 1990 v. President, 4 FSM Intrm. 320 (App. 1990) The President allowed the act to become law without his signature, expressing concerns about the constitutionality of section 6(4). Does the FSM Supreme Court have power of judicial review over legislation enacted by congress? and May the Congress determine the rules by which a Constitutional Convention adopts proposals for constitutional amendments?

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    ConstitutionalConvention1990v.President,4FSMIntrm.320(App.1990) Facts AfterareferendumapprovingthataConstitutionalConventionshouldbeheld,the CongressenactedPL624,providingfortheelectionofdelegatesandspecifying procedurestobefollowedbytheConvention.ThePresidentallowedtheacttobecome lawwithouthissignature,expressingconcernsabouttheconstitutionalityofSection 6(4).Thissectionrequiredanyproposalforaconstitutionalamendmenttobepassed byallfourstatedelegationsonfinalreading. Afterconvening,theConventionamendeditsrulestorequireanaffirmativevoteofonly threefourthsofthestatedelegationsonfinalreading,andfiledthisactionagainstthe PresidentchallengingtheconstitutionalityofSection6(4). ProceduralHistory TheCourtaccepteddirectfilingofthecasewiththeAppellateDivision,recognizingthe limitedtimeavailabletotheConventiontocarryoutitswork.

    work. Issues 1.DoestheFSMSupremeCourthavepowerofjudicialreviewoverlegislationenacted byCongress? 2.MaytheCongressdeterminetherulesbywhichaconstitutionalconventionadopts proposalsforconstitutionalamendments? 3.DoesArticleV,section2oftheConstitutiongrantCongressanindependentsourceof powertoprotectMicronesiantraditionssuchasunanimityindecisionmaking? Analysis 1.DoestheFSMSupremeCourthavepowerofjudicialreviewoverlegislationenacted byCongress? AdoptingthereasoningofSuldanv.FSM(II),1FSMIntrm.339(Pon.1983),theCourt foundithadtheconstitutionalpowerandobligationtoreviewlegislativeenactmentsof CongressandtosetasidenationalstatutestotheextenttheyviolatetheConstitution. 2.MaytheCongressdeterminetherulesbywhichaconstitutionalconventionadopts proposalsforconstitutionalamendments? TheCourtfirstlookedtothelanguageoftheConstitutionandtorelevantconstitutional history.ArticleXIV,section1oftheConstitutionstatesthatamendmentsshouldbe proposedinamannerprovidedbylaw.However,consideringtherelativelysparse 1
    JonathanPinkneyBaird,January2012

    constitutionalhistory,theCourtfoundthislanguageinsufficienttodeterminean intentiontogiveCongressthepowerofsettingvotingmethodsforaconstitutional convention.Italsofoundthatitcouldnotlooktoconstitutionselsewhereforguidance becausethislanguagewasnotdrawnfromanyotherconstitution. TheCourtthenconsideredtheroleandfunctionofconstitutionalconventionswithinthe generalframeworkoftheConstitution.Itfoundthatconstitutionalconventionswere outsidetheexistinggovernmentframeworkandweretaskedwithconsideringchanges totheexistingframework.Itthereforefounditanomaloustopermitcontroloversuch conventionsbyanyoftheexistinggovernmentalinstitutions,includingCongress.The CourtalsofoundthatCongresswasnotrequiredasacheckontheactionsof constitutionalconventions,giventhatsuchconventionsweredirectlyelectedbythe peopleandreportedbacktothepeopleviaareferendumonrecommended amendments. TheCourtthereforeconcludedthatthetaskofCongresswithrespecttotheConvention waslimitedtodirectingsuchmechanismsandproceduresnecessaryfortheconvention tocomeintoexistence,suchasthenumberofdelegatestobeselectedandtheduration, facilities,andbudgetoftheConvention. 3.DoesArticleV,section2oftheConstitutiongrantCongressanindependentsourceof powertoprotectMicronesiantraditionssuchasunanimityindecisionmaking? ThePresidentalsoarguedthatSection6(4),inupholdingunanimityindecisionmaking, wasavalidexerciseofthecongressionalpowertoprotectthetraditionsofthepeopleof Micronesiabystatute.TheCourtrejectedsuchaninterpretationonthegroundthatit wouldpermitCongresstousurpthepowersofstateandlocalgovernmentsandcontrol purelylocalmatters,solongasCongressactsinthenameofprotectingtradition. Rules TheFSMSupremeCourthasthepowerofjudicialreviewoverlegislationenactedby Congress. Congressmaynotdeterminetherulesbywhichaconstitutionalconventionadopts proposalsforconstitutionalamendments. ArticleV,section2oftheConstitutiondoesnotgrantCongressanindependentsourceof powertoprotectMicronesiantraditionsbutmerelyconfirmsitspowertomakespecial provisionsforMicronesiantraditionwhenexercisingitsgenerallegislativepowers. Conclusion TheCourtissuedadeclaratoryjudgmentvalidatingtherulesetbytheConstitutional Convention(threefourthsofdelegationssufficienttopassconstitutionalamendmenton finalreading)andinvalidatingSection6(4)ofPL624. 2
    JonathanPinkneyBaird,January2012

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