Philosophy Faculty Reading List 2011-2012

PART IB PAPER 03: ETHICS

SYLLABUS Responsibility and voluntariness. Morality, action and consequence; intention and foresight; acts and omissions. Reasons for action: Hume on reason, sentiment and passion; internal and external reasons. Universalization, impartiality and generality. Moral relativism. Life and death issues: suicide; euthanasia.
*Material marked with an asterisk* is important

WATSON, G., The Two Faces of Responsibility Philosophical Topics 24 (1996): 227-48. WILLIAMS, B., Making Sense of Humanity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) [chs. 1, 2] WOLF, S., 'Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility', in Responsibility, Character and the Emotions, edited by F. Schoeman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) Reprinted in G. Watson, ed. Free Will, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 372-387. [Also on Camtools]

MORALITY, ACTION AND CONSEQUENCE Intention and Foresight; Acts and Omissions. *BENNETT, J., The Act Itself (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) [chs. 4-8, 11. Also available from www.oxfordscholarship.com] *KAMM, F., 'Nonconsequentialism', in The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, ed. by H. LaFollette (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), pp. 205-26. Also available online at: www.netLibrary.com. An expanded version is reprinted in F. Kamm, Intricate Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 11-47. APPIAH, A.K., Experiments in Ethics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008). FOOT, P., 'The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect', in Virtues and Vices. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978), pp.19-32. Reprinted in B. Steinbock and A. Norcross, eds., Killing and Letting Die, 2nd ed. (New York: Fordham University Press, 1994), pp. 266279; and in D. Oderberg, Moral Theory: A Non-Consequentialist Approach (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), ch. 3. [This introduces the original trolley problem] GREEN, J.D., 'The Secret Joke of Kants Soul', in Moral Psychology, Vol. 3: The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Disease and Development, W. SinnottArmstrong, ed., (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 2007), pp. 25-80. QUINN, W., 'Actions, Intentions and Consequences: the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing.' Philosophical Review 98 (1989): 287-312. Also in his Morality and Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 149-174; Reprinted in B. Steinbock and A. Norcross, eds., Killing and Letting Die (New York: Fordham University Press, 1994). QUINN, W., 'Actions, Intentions and Consequences: the Doctrine of Double Effect.' Philosophy and Public Affairs 18, no. 3 (1989): 334-51. Reprinted in his Morality and Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 175-193. RAKOWSKI, E., 'Taking and Saving Lives.' Columbia Law Review 93 (1993): 1063156. Reprinted in J. Harris, ed., Bioethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 205-299. [esp. 4-5.8]

RESPONSIBILITY AND VOLUNTARINESS *FRANKFURT, H., The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) [chs. 1 & 3] *SCANLON, T., Moral Dimension: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame. (Cambridge, MA.: Belknap, 2008.) [ch. 4: Blame.] *STRAWSON, P.F., 'Freedom and Resentment', in Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays. (London: Methuen, 1974), pp.1-25. Also in G.Watson, ed., Free Will. 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 59-80. FISCHER, J.M., 'Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities', in D. Widerker and M. McKenna, eds., Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), pp. 27-52. Reprinted in his My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 38-62. KAMTEKAR, R., 'Situationism and Virtue Ethics on the Content of Our Character.' Ethics 114 (2004): 458-91. NOZICK, R., 'Coercion', in Socratic Puzzles. (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1997), pp. 15-44. OLSARETTI, S., Liberty, Desert and the Market : A Philosophical Study (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) [ch. 6] STRAWSON, G., 'The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility.' Philosophical Studies 75 (1994): 5-24. Reprinted in G. Watson, ed. Free Will, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 212-228. TAYLOR, C., 'Responsibility for Self', in The Identities of Persons, edited by A. Rorty (Berkeley: California University Press, 1976), 181-99. Reprinted in G. Watson, ed., Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 111-126.
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THOMSON, J.J., 'Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem', The Monist 59 (1976): 204-217. Reprinted in Rights, Restitution and Risk. (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1986), pp. 78-93. THOMSON, J.J., 'The Trolley Problem' Yale Law Journal, 94/ 6 (1985): 1395-1415 . Reprinted in her Rights, Restitution and Risk. (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1986), pp. 94-116. UNGER, P., Living High and Letting Die (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) [chs. 2-4. Also available online at: www.oxfordscholarship.com]

Internal and external reasons *PARFIT, D., 'Reasons and Motivation.' Aristotelian Society Suppl. Vol. 71 (1997): 99-130. *SMITH, M., The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994) [chs. 4] *WILLIAMS, B., 'Internal and External Reasons', in Rational Action: Studies in Philosophy and Social Science, edited by T.R. Harrison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp.17-28. Reprinted in B. Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 101-13. Also in P.K. Moser, ed., Rationality in Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 387-397. DANCY, J., Practical Reality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 26-48, 70-76. [Also available from www.oxfordscholarship.com] KORSGAARD, C., 'Skepticism about Practical Reason.' Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986): 5-26. Reprinted in S. Darwall, A. Gibbard and P. Railton, eds., Moral Discourse and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 373-387. MCDOWELL, J., 'Might There Be External Reasons?' in World, Mind and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams, edited by J.E. Altham and T.R. Harrison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) Reprinted in his Mind, Value, and Reality (Cambridge MA.: Harvard University Press, 1998), pp. 95-111. MILLGRAM, E., 'Williams' Argument against External Reasons.' Nous 30:2 (1996): 197-220. SCHROEDER, M., Slaves of the Passions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) [esp. chs. 1 & 11. Also available online at www.oxfordscholarship.com] WILLIAMS, B., 'Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame', in Making Sense of Humanity. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 35-45. WILLIAMS, B., 'Values, Reasons and the Theory of Persuasion', in Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), pp. 109118.

REASONS FOR ACTION Hume on reason, sentiment and passion a) General and Background *NORTON, D.F., 'Hume, Human Nature, and the Foundations of Morality', in The Cambridge Companion to Hume, edited by D.F. Norton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 141-81. [Also available online at http://cco.cambridge.org] BAILLIE, J., Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Hume on Morality (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 2000) [ch. 4-6. Introductory] DARWALL, S., 'Hume: Norms and the Obligation to Be Just', in The British Moralists and the Internal Ought'. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) [ch. 10] SCHNEEWIND, B., 'Hume: Virtue Naturalized', in The Invention of Autonomy. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) [ch. 17]

b) Reason, sentiment and passion *HUME, D., Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals [Especially sections I-II, VI, IX & appendix I-II] *STROUD, B., Hume (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977) [chs. 7, 8] HUME, D., A Treatise of Human Nature [Book II, ch. 3, sect. 3; Book III, ch. 1, . 1-2. Available online at: www.gutenberg.org/etext/4705] MILLER, D., Philosophy and Ideology in Hume's Political Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981) [ch. 2] PENELHULM, T., 'Hume', in The Cambridge Companion to Hume, edited by D.F. Norton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 117-47. [Available online at http://cco.cambridge.org] SNARE, F., Morals, Motivation, & Convention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) [chs. 1-5]

UNIVERSALISATION, IMPARTIALITY AND GENERALITY *DANCY, J., Ethics without Principles (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) [pp. 3-12 & 73-117. Available from www.oxfordscholarship.com] *HARE, R.M., Freedom and Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963) [chs. 2, 3. Available from www.oxfordscholarship.com] *MACKIE, J.L., 'Universalization', in Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. (London: Penguin, 1977) [ch. 4] COTTINGHAM, J., 'Ethics and Impartiality.' Philosophical Studies 43 (1983): 83-99. HARE, R.M., Moral Thinking (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981) [ch. 6. Also available at www.oxfordscholarship.com] KAGAN, S., Normative Ethics (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995), pp. 256-270.
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KORSGAARD, C., 'The Reasons We Can Share.' Social Philosophy and Policy 10 (1993): 24-51. Reprinted in C. Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 275-310. MCKEEVER, S., and M. RIDGE, Principled Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) [chs. 1-4. Also available online at: www.oxfordscholarship.com] WIGGINS, D., 'Universalizability, Impartiality, Truth', in his Needs, Values, Truth (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), pp. 59-86. WINCH, P., 'The Universalisability of Moral Judgements.' Monist 49 (1965): 196214. Reprinted in his Ethics and Action (Oxford: Blackwell, 1972), pp. 151-70. MORAL RELATIVISM *HARMAN, G., and J.J. THOMSON, Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996) [ch. 1-5 & 9.] *WILLIAMS, B., 'Relativism and Reflection', in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. (London: Fontana, 1985). [Also available online at: www.myilibrary.com/?id=62206] BLACKBURN, S., Ruling Passions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) [ch. 9] HARMAN, G., 'Moral Relativism Defended.' Philosophical Review 84 (1975): 3-22. Reprinted in G. Harman, Explaining Value (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 3-19, which is available online at: www.oxfordscholarship.com. Also in R. Shafer-Landau and T. Cuneo, eds., Foundations of Ethics : an anthology (Oxford : Blackwell, 2007), pp. 84-92. HARMAN, G., 'What Is Moral Relativism?' in Values and Morals, edited by A.I. Goldman and J. Kim, (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1978), pp.143-61. Reprinted in G. Harman, Explaining Value (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 2038. [Also available online at: www.oxfordscholarship.com.] LEAR, J., 'Ethics, Mathematics and Relativism.' Mind 92 (1983): 38-60. SCANLON, T.M., 'Relativism', in his What We Owe to Each Other? (Cambridge, MA.: Belknap Press, 1998), pp. 328-63. [ch. 8] WILLIAMS, B., 'The Truth in Relativism.' Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 75 (1974): 215-28. Reprinted in his Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp.132-143. WONG, D.B., Moral Relativity (Berkeley, CA.: California University Press, 1984) [chs. 3-6] WONG, D.B., Natural Moralities (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) [chs. 1-3]

LIFE AND DEATH ISSUES Suicide and Euthanasia *DWORKIN, R., Life's Dominion: an Argument about Abortion and Euthanasia (London: Harper Collins, 1993) [chs. 7, 8. Parts of ch. 8 are reprinted as 'Life
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Past Reason' in P. Singer and H. Kuhse, eds, Bioethics: An Anthology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999; 2nd ed. 2006), pp. 305-311.] *KEOWN, M., Euthanasia, Ethics, and Public Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) [chs. 1-7. Also available online at: http://cco.cambridge.org] BRUECKNER, A.L. and J.M. FISCHER, Why is Death Bad? Philosophical Studies 50:2(1986): 213-21. Reprinted in J.M. Fischer, ed., The Metaphysics of Death. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), pp. 222-29. DRESSER, R., 'Dworkin on Dementia.' Hastings Center Report 25 (1995): 32-38. Reprinted in P.Singer and H. Kuhse, eds., Bioethics: an Anthology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), pp. 312-20. FELDMAN, F., Confrontations with the Reaper (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) [Overview] FINNIS, J., 'A Philosophical Case against Euthanasia', in Euthanasia Examined, edited by J. Keown, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 2336, 46-56. HARDWIG, J., 'Is There a Duty to Die?' in Hastings Center Report. 27, (1997): 3442. Reprinted in P. Singer and H. Kuhse, eds., Bioethics: an Anthology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), pp. 339-48. HUME, D., 'On Suicide', in Selected Essays. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) Reprinted in P. Singer, ed., Applied Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 19-28. JAWORSKA, A., Respecting the Margins of Agency: Alzheimers Patients and the Capacity to Value Philosophy and Public Affairs 28:2, (1999): 105-138. NAGEL, T., 'Death.' Nous 4 (1970): 73-80. Reprinted in his Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), ch. 1. RACHELS, J., 'Active and Passive Euthanasia.' New England Journal of Medicine 292 (1975): 78-80. Reprinted in P. Singer, ed., Applied Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 29-36. Also in P. Singer and H. Kuhse, eds., Bioethics: an Anthology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), pp. 227-230. ROSENBERG, J., Thinking Clearly about Death 2nd ed. (Indianapolis : Hackett, c1998.) [Overview] SHIFFRIN, S.V., 'Autonomy, Beneficience, and the Permanently Demented', in Dworkin and His Critics, edited by J. Burley (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), pp. 195-217. VAN DER BURG, W., 'The Slippery Slope Argument.' Ethics 102 (1991): 42-65. WILLIAMS, B., 'The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality.' in his Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1973). Reprinted in J. Fischer, ed., The Metaphysics of Death (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), pp. 71-92.