a

The operations of the 44th Infantry Diison, Sarre Valley, Thrance, 15 Feb 45, by Lt Col H. L. Olson, Command and Staff'
Colleges

1946-47,

This Documient
IS A HOLDING OF THE

ARCHIVES SECTION
LIBRARY SERVICES FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

DOCUMENT NO.

N-22 -,-52,c
Army-CGSC-P21797

N.1
Mar 52-5M

13 Mar 51

COIM,.?;D

AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

FORT LEAVENWOTOTH

KANSAS

School

of Combined Arms

Regular Course

1946-1947

THE OPERATIONS SARRE VALLEY,

OF THE FRANCE,

44TH

INFANTRY DIVISION 1945

15 FEBRUARY,

Type of Operation Described:

Limited Objective Attack,;

Lt.

Col. Hardin L.

Olson

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
Index 1

Bibliography
Introduction Geographical Features

2
3

6
Mission 7

44th Infantry

Division

Enemy Situation
Division' Plan The Attack Defense on New Line of Attack

8
11

14 15

Summary Lessons

16

Map Map

Seventh Army Front Area Vic. Dimling,

30 Dec. France,

1947 showing action of

44th Infantry Division on 15 Feb.,

1945.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A-i

Report of Operations,
Chapter XXV,

Seventh

U.

S.

Army

1944-1945

Vol. II

A-2 A-3

FO 12,

Hq. 44th Inf. Div. 122400, Instructions No.

Feb. Historical Inf. Div., 1945

Feb. Hq.

1945 Inf. Div.

Operations

45,
-

44th

141100, A-4 G-3 Section Hq. A-5'

Report

February 1945

1945

44th

March

FO 16, Hq.

114th Inf.

130800,

February 1945

A-6
A-7 A-8 A-9
A-10

F035, Hq. 324th Inf. 122100, February 1945 Report of Operation, FM 100 5,

Ho. 324th Inf.,

14 March 1945

June 1944

General Marshall's Report, 1 july 1943 - 30 June 1945

G-2 Report, Hq. 44th Inf. Div. 15 February 1945

INTRODUCTION

The purpose

of this

monograph

is

to

illustrate, that

by means

of a

historical example, some tactical principles limited objective attack.

may be employed in a

Limited Objective

Attacks

in

General

A limited

objective

attack

is

not

a form of

offensive

action

which

FM 100-5 describes as either a description to attain its

a penetration or envelopment.

It

is

rather

of- the relatively short distance objective

the attack must progress

and may be either a penetration or envelopment.

Some are made are

of the circumstances as follows:

under which limited objective

attacks

1. cause of the Such attacks serves

Secondary attacks are normally limited wide are zones of action further characterized power in the that are

objective attacks assault reduction

1

be-

assigned the of depth, echelon.l

units. of re-

by lack attacking

and maximum fire

2.

Main

attacks

may sometimes feature or

have limited objectives ground

in

the to

securlaunch

ing of a key terrain a general offensive.

more desirable

from which

3."
attacks.

The phases

of a

river

crossing

are

normally limited

objective

4.
often portant front

When committed to the defense,

seize centers more easily and attacks

limited objective attacks are

key terrain features, im-

made to road line.

defended ground, to restore, rectify

or straighten the

Historical

Example Selected

The

historical

example

to be presented was a

limited

objective

(1)

A-s, P-110

-3--

attack made by the 44th Infantry this has of attack the was made to

Division on 15 a

February, 1945. defensive in It that front it

lthough line, it

rectify and straighten of a secondary

normal characteristics minimum reserves consequences, few people outside it.

attack, action. the

has lack

depth,

and a wide' Zone of as far the as determining

was not a battle and no back

of great doubt

outcome of the war, friends

44th Division,
However, operation from a

the XT Corps and standpoint of rather

home ever tion, it important detailed is

heard about an interesting principles.

planning and execustrongly several

and emphasizes

Of special note is the importance of detailed planning, surprise and security.

enemy information,

To provide a background of the events leading up to this

for

the particular

action

to situation

be described, are

short cited.

resume

hereby

When the Germans launched their a number of divisions

to its the south flank of

Ardennes

counter-offensive

in

Dec. 1944,

of THhIRD
the

AR Y
(1)

were rapidly transferred from the Sarre

The SEVENTH these

"Bulge t .
to

A..MY

was required

to

extend

already

extended front

relieve

Divisions.

Being considerably committed to a defensive

weakened by this role. Though far 2300, 31 December,

over-extension,

Seventh Anny was

over-shadowed 1944,

by the a

Ardennes offensive, on the

the

enemy, front

at

launched is

determined attack assumed to

of the

6th army Group.

This

attack

usually

have been a

diversionary

and containing measure However,

documents rather

to prevent shifting

of

American

forces

to the t"Bulge".

it

was not a limited objective attack.

and later objective.

As brought

out by captured
it had encircle thrust

and plans,

by statements of enemy commnanders, It was to be a pincher movement to

an ambitious the Sarre drive

and destroy from the with a

major portion of and "Bitche" area

the STW.NTH and meet in area.(2)

ARMY. the

One prong was to

vicinity

of Sarrebourg

from the

"Colmar pocket"

The enemy had over-estimated of the 6th Army Group, situation for was the finally attack

his

capabilities or under-estimated those failed. Although without loss the to enemy gained the Allies some of

ground, the

stabilized

(1) (2)

A=-9, p-44~ A-l, p-5 6 l

any militarily

essential

ground.

In the Division, of the for

Sarre

Area on the

front

of

the

XV Corps,

the

44th Infantry full impetus

deployed between Rirrnling and Sarrequemines, enemy's right flank drive. Although the situation

bore the

was rather critical several miles into

several

days,

with elements

of the

enemy penetrating

the position, the attack was stopped without serious loss of terrain. ever, the enemy had left a definite sag in the XV Corps front.(l)

How-

The

C Corps front became quite stabilized during the latter part of February. There were a few sharp clashes

part of
and

January and first

aggressive patrolling, but the lines remained generally the same.

On
the to
;\T

8 February,

1945, after

several weeks of purely defensive activity,

general plan for The principal a limited offensive to be

Corps issued

a warning the

order and Corps front.

rectify

and straighten

advance was

ade by the 44th Infantr

advance their flanks in

Division
conjunction

while the two adjacent Divisions were to

with the 44th. Four additional FA ?ns.

were

to be attached to the
the atack

4th Infantry
in

Div.

for this attack.

The Corps

indicated

would come off

about one wtieek,

At this

time the 44th infantry Division was

holding a line from a

point about 800 yards south of URBACK (70.0-55.6) exending west to include BETTVILLER (67.2-53.4), This line was the

'GROS rDrRCRIING (62.3-52.3) and RJ (60.5-54-9).

nose and flanks of the salient.(l)

f_

-5-

GEOGRAPHICAL

?JiATURES

The sag in
Division was later

the line of the X)V Corps front, which the

required to close, contained a rather

L th 1

important

terrain

feature .

A high round top ridge protruded from the ener The highest portion of the ridge

lines directly into the salient. was in enemy hands just west of

Rimling.
the enemy holding-this Corps zone. higTh ground

It in a salient

is

needless to had excellent

say that

observation of the

urthermore,

the
fire

ridge was almost completely bald aid afforded excellent

as well as observation.

fields of

The ridge was capable

a serious obstacle to

of being.

strongly defended ad. would be

offensive.

any future

general

On the western flank

of the salient

the Bliesbruckener

";goods,

now held
attack.

by the enemy,

would be a serious obstacle

to an Almerican

A
the left

railroad flank

with of the

many cuts salient

and fills enemy

ran generally side

parallel to of

on the

and was capable

being strongly

defended.

Three

built-up

areas,

Bellvue

Farm

(61.3-55.0),

Brandelfingerhof

Farm (61.6-54.4) and 1oronville

shot to pieces, but basements of strong

Farm (63.6-54.8)
remnants

had long since been

offered

and

of concrete walls

the possibilities

centers

ofresistance,(l)

(1)-4

-6-

44TH INFANTRY DIVISION MISSION

The

objective

assigned

the 44th Division

for

elimination

of the
-

sag

was generally an east-west line

including

BUt.TCK 4{ENBUSCH "fOOD5 (Q6756)

HILL 392 (Q6 45 6 ) and north edge BLII SBPUCK NTEBR 00D5 (56-61).
distance separating the present thereby attack.(2) front

The greatest
line was as little a

line and the

the

objective

over 3000 yards, limited objective

characterizing

contemplated

offensive

The situation receipt of the

and problems order

confronting are roughly

the

Division Commander

on

Corps warning

as follows:

The Division was presently holding a front yards with two regiments,
was an extremely wide sector ing in that width.

of approximately

13,000
This

the 324th and 114th,

to hold defensively,

the 324th on the right.

to say nothing of attack-

EERY
As
for the enemy

SITUATION

situation,

it was known that the

front this generally Division

17 SS Panzer
to the

Grenadier Division front casualties, 44th Division line outfit. of

was holding the

corresponding was quite

the 44th Division. as a the result first of their part

2though

depleted by

unsuccessful it

attempt to was a battle-

break through the hardened first

of January,

The 17th Assault

Panzer the

Grenadier 17th

Division was

supported

by the

17th SS Rocket

Gun Battalion,
(1)

SS Artillery

Regiment

and the

34th

Gun Regiment.(

Enemy attacking

Reservbs

were limited

and consisted

of small

local

counterenemy

forces.

There

was reasonable intervene prior

assurance that seizure of the

no sizeable objective.(2)

force was near enough to

The LE
on the left and

BUCKENBUSCH "-OODS on the

held,
FR!T.

right and the BI..UESBRUCKENER T1OODS

as the center fortified of the areas sector, of BELLVUE ridge,

were strongly BPhiDELFI

as In

well the

FA! (1~)

N(RHOF
(2)

on the

A-0, P-1

A-4,

p-1
_7_

the

enemy. and friendly

lines

w ,ere

quite in the

widely

separated

because of the During daynatural fire

non-exstence light, a rabbit

of cover or concealment

any shape lines; in

or form. spite

in

that

area between

of his

camouflage, by either well back

could no doubt have been brought side. on the Therefore, ridge

under observed artillery in the center and folds

the main enemy positions of reverse

were
in the

taking advantage

slopes

ground. pared

;NVTLLE FARM was strongly posts

defended and fairly

a number of well preridge

7 1

observation

were maintained

well down on the

By this to take

time

the

enemy positions of the terrain. The

were

well

prepared and layed out

maxirmum advantage

Qverhead cover was provided to front was protected by extensive as well as wire entariglement .

reduce effect

of Artillery fire.

Anti-tank and Anti-personnel mine-fields

Enemy
unaggressive operating at

petrolling,

during the stabilized in periods nature during and pretty the

period,

had become

quite

and very routine only definite

much. on a On the

time schedule, other hand,

night.

the patrolling of the

quite some detail familiar

44th

Division had been aggressive

outposts, of the lax wire, enemy.

and had located in

minefields and had

the enemy positions, with the habits

become quite found the able to

These

American regularly

patrols

enemy security well to

measures somewhat the rear

ard were
positions

quite

penetrate

of the

enemy's

withcit detec-

tion.(l)

This latter

fact no doubt figured prominently in

the final

Division plan of attack.

Weather
The ground had been covered with a thaw had. started making the heavy blanket of and muddy. snow. This An early of

ground very soggy

condition

the ground precluded the use of tanks on any large scale. lion, the 749th wras attached to the Division.

One Tank

B3atta-

DIVISION

PLAN OF ATTACK

The Division Commuander decided on the following plan of

To attack with all three regiments abreast and penetrate the

attack:

enemy positions.

uNo

reserve was held out but

strings were

tied

to

a reserve

battalion

(1)

A-4,

p-2

in

each regiment in

that they could not be committed were as follows:;

except on Division

Order.

The regimental objectives

324th Infantry 71st Infantry Infantry and

The LE BUCKEC RIMLL G and the

The northern

USCH

WOODS
the northwest

high ground to

114th

edge of

LB wI MS

iJCK'1R WOODS and

MTOODS at (62.3-55-7)
The right

(63.0

55.7) e(1)

two regiments (324th and 71st) left

were to attack

at 0545
The

hours, one hour before daylight and the

regiment at 0630. (1)

decision to attack on the right, one hour before daylight,

the open terrain in attack. this area would give the enemy excellent The 114th Infantry attack

was because
observation

of any daylight

was delayed

45

minutes

because contact with the enemy was very close and part of
would have to be made through the woods. If

the

advance

the 114th were

to, jump off

at

0545 (same time as other regiments)

enemy. The enemy in attempt front to of the

they would ,ain. immediate contact

other two regiments would be

with

alerted, defensive

and their fire.

close by stealth

would be. met with German

The 749th Tank Battalion

was to

attack

at

daylight

' 0645 with three

companies

abreast,

pass through the

Infantry and dominate

the

regimental

objectives until operate initially

consolidated by the Infantry. in

Although a company was to

each regimental zone, Division retained control, and muddy ground it was not known just where

Because of the mine-fields

the tanks would be able

to get through.(2)

Four additional FA Battalions this operation. the-Division But in spite of this elected

were

attached available

to

the

Division Corps

for

and the to

Artillery pre-

support,

Comander

attack

without

artillery
it

paration.

Since the enemy was well dug in

with over-head cover,

was effects
on

believed that the surprise gained would far

of an Artillery preparation. However, the

outweigh the destructive

Artillery was sited to fire

all

known and suspected

as

enemy artillery
the attack

positions
was

and prepared to fire

counter-battery

soon as

discovered.

(1) A-2, p-i (2-) -4

The Division

immediately passed on tentative

plans

for

the attack

to the regiments to give them maximum time for. preparation of plans:

The 324th 3rd) abreast,

Infantry battalions

planned to in of coluns the of

advance with companies,

two battalions penetrate and attack the the

(2nd and enemy enemy the center guns lines

by stealth position to

on both sides from the rear.

BUCK YB1TSCH WOODS Battalion of both was battalions.

The 1st distance were

to move

forward in

be within

supporting

The heavy machine east

and other

supporting weapons

to be laid

to cover the

and west

flank of BUCKU2NBUSCF
in an attacking for by the position.

WoODS in

case the advance was discovered prior to being

was to on the be placed east only when and if

This fire battalion

called

respective

or west flank,

The leading comzpanies,

were to immediately send locations to cover the

on passing the northern edge of the woods,

security groups to attack predetermined the woods.(
1

out designated

battalions

while they turned to

The battalions two the

71st Infantry, abreast and the in

in

the

center

also

planned

to attack

with two distance. The slip through

lst following within

column of companies

supporting were to initially to seize

assault battalions enemy lines between

:MO NVILLE

FARM and RI; MNIJ,

the regimen-

tal objective.

Co.

E,
it

of the 2nd Battalion, had beeh by-passed.

was to attack MORONTVI.LLE FARM! Co. L, 3rd Battalion, was to

from the rear after

seize RTMTJlING from the rear.(2)

The 114th Infantry and BRANDLEFINGERHOF FARMS

had a were

tough closely

assignment. tied in

The woods

and BELLVUE

and well

defended.

The final

plan was to

attack

through

the woods

on the

left

with the

1st -Battalion. initially,

the Farms

The 2nd Battalion on the right was to by-pass seize the

from the

the two farms

rigt

half
(2)

of the

Regimental Objective and then attack

rear.

The

regiments,

since Division to prepare

had issued. prompt warning detailed plans for scheme the

orders,

had

adequate time thoroughly 1- e--

(one week) all

operation

and to

orient w, h4re

individuals

on the

of maneuvers. to o.

Every man

exactly

he was to

go an -wh4at he was

The Regmenal

Field Orders (1) A2-7, p- 2

and Operating Instructions, especialy (2) -4 -10-

those of the 32Lth,

wsere3

very

detailed, including It of is

movement and locations not'normally desirable to

of some companies instruct subordinate However, generally plans and in this

and units situaon were

even platoons. in tion, Battalion therefore the details since

how to

accomplish their the

mission.

time w as adequate, Commander's a

regiment plans were The resultant and battalion.

based orders

recommendations. of both regiment

combination

THE

ATTACK
The night of

On 13 February,

D-Day was announced

as 15 February.

14-15

February was,

in

comarison with the previous two weeks,

normal in The Artiliery

all

outward respects.

The same number of patrols were sent out. No doubt the doughboys,
waiting for H-hour, felt

carried on the normal harassing fires.

ly but restlessly in their positions,

lying quietanything but

no rmnal. At 0545, Infantry advanced crept rapidly

one hour before daylight,

silently from their toward

the men of the 324th and 71st

and, like ghosts in the night,

fox holes the

but quietly

enemy lines.(l)

On the
outposts

right the 2nd and. 3rd Battalions

and passed to They arrived firing a shot. in As the rear it right

of the 324th avoided all

respectively, of LE without security to attack groups

and patrols

and left,

BUCKrnT3USCH FOODS. being detected were sent or

of the enemy position began to get light, direction

out to the

north as the

battalions

turned

the woods.
woods.

At a given signal the battalions attacked

rapidly into the

that he

The enemy was so completely surprised

and unprepared

offered only slight resistance.

foxholes before they were fled fully

Many of the enemy were killed in awake or

knew what was the

their
Those woods and

going on.

who were able, into their

from the

attack

toward

south edge of the using

own wire entanglements.

The doughboys,

marching fire,

moved rapidly and relentlessly through the woods, into every.conceivable hiding place.

pouring a hail

of lead

As the.two battalions converged on the southern edge of the woods,.

they flushed out before them over 160 enemy who, by this time, were only

too w~aillingE tco srrender.

Leaving 3rd Battalions

small group rapidly

to

take care of the through

prisoners, and started

the 2nd and immediately

moved

back

the woods

to organize and dig in

defensive positions.

324th Infantry objective

seized by 0820.(l)

The 71st

Infantry in

the

center

had moved rapidly forward along the

ridge.
without

The 2nd Battalion on the left

detection had seized the left

had by-passed M0,AI\ThTLL

portion of the regimental

F.. } M and
objective

by 0900.
completed

Company E
its

maneuvered to attack M0}& NVILLE FABRM from the rear and

mission by 0950.

The 3rd Battalion on the held up by machine gun and rifle

right fire

slope just

of the west

ridge

was

temporarily Tanks were

of RILTING.

promptly moved forward at tance.

the

daylight and rapidly overcame the enemy forward to the right

little swung

resis-

Companies I
objective

and K moved directly

portion of
opposition. into the north

regimental

which was seized by 1000 with I and K companies,

Company L,

which had been following

of RIMi,'LN. tured

With the support of tanks,

1025. (2)

TDs and Artillery,

Company L cap-

RThLING by

The 114th Infantry attacked attack had moved forward only a

at 0615, distance

shortly

before daylight.

The

short

before meeting

very heavy

and determined

resistance.

The 1st Battalion, anti-personnel mines

attacking through the woods,

encountered fire.

numerous Progress woods

as well as heavy machine gun and rifle

was slow but steady and the battalion reached the northern edge of the
and its objective by 1300.

The 2nd Battalion

attacking

with G andB E Companies in

column and

Company F foring by-pass

half

a base of fire

to cover BBIIVUE FAR M, had attempted to to seize the right

attack the two

BELLVUE FARM and BRANDEtLFINGBRHOF F.ARM initially

regimental objective. The Battalion

of the

was then to

(1)

A-7

(2) r;1

-12-

farms as

from the

north.

Hoever,

here is

one place the

operation

did not go

planned.

The road track

leading north of

platoon

of Company G had

succeeded in

crossing the heavy fire in a bad

railfrom spot Heavy

BELLVUFJ FARM1 when it and woods ordered it to

suddently received to the north. south It was

positions along the railroad and the Company Commander

withdraw

of the tracks.

machine gun, rifle

and mortar fire It

were being received from

BELLEUB

and cculd

BRANDBLFING BRHOF FARMS.

not advance in its

was then evidert first

that the 2nd Battalion

zone without

reducing these two centers of resistance.

The 2nd Battalion, At this time the Division

114th

Infantry

had made little the left

progress boundary

by 0930. 71st

Commander shifted

of the

Infantry to the West to include the right half of the 114th Infantry objective.
reserve

He then ordered the Commanding Officer,

battalion to seize this objective. Co.

71st Infantry to employ his

A, 749th Tank Battalion

was ordered to support this operation.

The 1st Battalion flank. Supported by the

moved tanks,

forward the

and launched

its

attack

from the cleared

east

objective

was completely

by 1515.

In

the meantime

the 2nd Battalion,

114th

Infantry,

after

some desper-

ate fighting had succeeded ih

and seized were unable several to drive of the the

capturing
in

BE LVUB FARM.
the

They had advanced

but

buildings

BRANDELFINGERHOF FATRM area

enemy out of the others.

The tanks of Company B,

from operating through railroad in the

749th Tank Battalion

Which had been prevented

moved around along in the

114th Infantry Infantry

zone because of mines, and attacked the from the north. positions

the zone of the 71st and BRANDELFIN

BHOF F,

This attack

conjunc-

tion with renewed

efforts of the 2nd Battalion broke the last German resisby

tance in the area

18O.(l)
had cost the 114th
the Company the

This attack on BELLVIE and BRANDELFINGERHOF FARIS

Infantry 154 casualties. Of the five officers in

Company G,

Commander and two enemy had lost

Lieutenants were killed

and one wounded.

However,

129 as prisoners and over 100 killed

and wounded.(2)

()A-l, p-6 72 -13-

Prior to
lion, 114th

the

final attack
had been to relieve

on BR to

NDELFINCGERRIOF
move around 71st

F?AF,

the 3rd Battazone of

Infantry

ordered the 1st

through the Infantry. 71st

the 71st

Infantry

Battalion,

This relief and 114th Infan-

was accomplished try was shifted

by 1930 back to

and the its original

boundary between the position. (1)

D~'ENSE ON NrJvl LINE

All units
organize struct

upon reaching their

objectives

proceeded This prompt had

immediately

to

and construct defensive positions. paid dividends.

effort to conthe attack

defenses,

The Engineers

followed

closely with trucks loaded with Engineer tools,

personnel mines and also provide fox hole cover. counter a battalion. enemy, however, many loads For the attacks of following with tanks, All not these attacks without some logs cut

wire,
to the

anti-tank and antiproper length to

two days the assault guns

enemy made repeated and Infantry in

and determined strength losses to up to the (1) the

were beaten losses radar by the set

off with heavy 44th Infantry which effectiveforces. This

Division. ly spotted

The Division German efforts

used an experimental to

form-up counter-attacking

radar set, in this

called the "Jolly

theater

Roger", was the

first

of its

kind to

be issued

for experimental

Purposes.

(1)A4

SU

ARZY

In making a study

of this operation one finds very little to critiby the 44th Division.
As a matter of

cize about the planning andexecution fact, the Division accomplished its

mission rapidly and efficiently with The front had been straightSuffi-

comparatively little loss in men and equipment.

ened, over 600 prisoners taken,
was available

plus a large number of enemmy killed. the operat ion in detail.

cient time

for planning

Division

Headquarters

issued timely orders and instructions to allow subordinate

The detailed information security of the

units thorough planning and preparation. enemy positions, and lack of'adequate

.measures no doubt influenced

the Division Commanders in

paration. In this particular

his decision to attack without an Artillery precase it turned out to be a

wise

decision.

Had the ly

enemy employed

better

security

measures the

operation

certain-

wouldnt t have gone off so smoothly for the 44.th Division. this case that the enemy was

It

seems

apparent in in

literally caught napping, at least

Had he (the enemy) established

the right part of the Division zone.

more night outposts along the front of the 44th Infantry with active and
aggressive night patrolling, it seems quite improbable that they could

have been so completely surprised.

Also had he provided for

all around pro-

tection, he would have been better able to

the

defend against the elements of

Of course, under these

44th

Division that the

did penetrate

his position.

circumstances, different

Division Commander would probably have come up with a

plan of attack.

The 114th Infantry- on the left had considerable difficulty to be assisted by the. 71st Infantry in
largely due to the following reasons:

and had

seizing its

objective.

This was

i.

The enemypositions

were more strongly

organized

and security

measures were apparently better.

2,- The heavy woods in the left

well defended and the attack through

of the 114th Infantry sector were

them was slow.

-15-

LSSOS

Some

of the lessons

to be learned,

from this

operation are:

1.
objective

Surprise is
where a unit

even more important in the attack of a limited

is normally committed toowide front and has few

or no reserves

to force a penetration.
pays big

Any advantage that can be gained

over the enemy by surprise

dividends.

2.
desirable

An Artillery
in that it is

preparation
a definite

of an enemy

position is

not always

warning of an impending attack.

3. for detailed

When

planning and ,executing

an attack of his

there strength,

is

no substitute locations and

enemy information, but also of his

not only habits.

installations,

4.
tion. ing

The manner,

efficiency, measure all levels as possible

and success to the time of the to

of the available

excecution for units. an operation.

of

an operaplann--

corresponds

in large

careful

and preparation at

participating prepare for

Give subor-

dinate units

as much time

5.
attack battalions Division reserve

When all three

regiments a

of a Division must

are committed to the or one or more only on this

on a broad front, earmarked order. at

small reserve Division Commander influencing

be held out

as possible

Reserve

and committed to use

The Division

must not hesitate the tide

the opportune time in

of battle.

6.

In

prolonged

period

of inactive

stabilized

warfare, we

must

guard very vigorously against acquiring a false patrolling must be maintained

surprise. All around protection

sense of security.

Active

to determine enemy actions

must be secured in

and

prevent

all positions.

-16-

9-o
a
L -

60
-

MILES

taco

2000

3o00

4000

6,000