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Islam and Authoritarianism Author(s): M. Steven Fish Source: World Politics, Vol. 55, No. 1 (Oct., 2002), pp. 4-37 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054208 . Accessed: 07/04/2011 15:21
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ISLAM AND AUTHORITARIANISM

ByM. STEVEN FISH*

predominantly Muslim
democratization? Some

societies distinctly disadvantaged

what

in

appears noting ARE especially high incidence of authoritarianism in the Islamic world, have held that Islam may be incompatible with open government.1 Others to democratiza not antithetical necessarily argued that Islam is to establish tion.2 Yet few studies have attempted empirically whether deficit really exists and, if so, how it can be explained. democratic examina cross-national The present article offers a straightforward have of democracy, sketching my conception of political the determinants regime. The countries that Muslim for the hypothesis es. The causal connection conventional between assumptions plored. Many I conduct test an empirical a

observers,

to be an

tion of the relationship between Islam and regime type. After briefly
test of provides are democratic about strong support underachiev

Islam

and regime type is then ex Islam and politics do not

* For a great deal of help on earlier drafts, the author is indebted to Christopher Ansell, Pradeep Chhibber, Omar Choudhry, Christopher Gelpi, Andrew Janos, Matthew Kroenig, Rose McDermott, David Nasatir, Conor ODwyer, James Robinson, Ani Sarkissian, Jason Seawright, Valerie Sperling, reviewers. The author also appreciates helpful and four anonymous Robert Tignor, Daniel Treisman, World Politics after September "The New Era in feedback received at the conference, 11," Princeton that remain. for all shortcomings University, May 3,2002. The author alone is responsible 1 13 (Janu and the Democracy Adrian Karatnycky, "Muslim Countries Democracy Gap," Journal of in Ghassan Salame, ed., Democracy ary 2002); John Waterbury, "Democracy without Democrats?" I. B. Tauris, without Democrats? The Renewal 1994); V. S. of Politics in theMuslim World (London: York: Random House, 1982); Elie Kedourie, Naipaul, Among the Believers: An Islamic Journey (New God Has Ninety-nine Democracy and Arab Political Culture (London: Frank Cass, 1994); Judith Miller, Names 1997); Daniel Pipes, In the Path of God: Islam and Political Power (New (New York: Touchstone, York: Basic Books, 1983). 2 and John O. Voll, Islam and Democracy Press, (New York: Oxford University John L. Esposito in Indonesia (Princeton: Princeton and Democratization 1996); Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims "Islam, Islamists, and Democracy," Middle East Review of Press, 2000); Ali R. Abootalebi, University International Affairs 3 (March 1999); Hamid Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought (Austin: Uni "Can Islamists Be Democrats?" Middle East Journal versity of Texas Press, 1982); Glenn E. Robinson, in Kuwait," Stud "Patterns of Culture and Democratization 51 (Summer 1997); Mary AnnTetreault, To 30 (Summer 1995); Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, ies in Comparative International Development Civil Liberties, Human Rights, and International Law (Syracuse, N.Y.: ward an Islamic Reformation: "Two Visions of Reformation," Journal ofDemocracy Press, 1996); Robin Wright, Syracuse University 1 (April 1996); Charles Kurzman, Press, ed., Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook (Oxford: Oxford University of California Press, 1997); 1998); Joel Beinin and Joe Stork, eds., Political Islam (Berkeley: University of Texas Press, 1997); Kevin in North Africa (Austin: University Fran?ois Burgat, The Islamic Movement in theMiddle East (Berkeley: University of California Dwyer, Arab Voices: The Human Rights Debate Press, 1991).

WorldPolitics 55 (October 2002), 4-37

ISLAMAND AUTHORITARIANISM
withstand nor

societies are not more prone to political vi scrutiny. Muslim are less "secular" than non-Muslim and in societies; olence; they trust is not societies. But one lower inMuslim necessarily terpersonal the subordination factor does help explain the democratic deficit: of I furnish elements of a provisional theory linking the station of

women.

females and regime type and I discuss the implications of the findings
for democracy. societies has scriptural Many he labeled I further an ironic that patriarchal social order inMuslim since it cannot be accounted for in character, contend are available. I the electoral

terms. definitions of democracy adopt

procedural definition offered by Robert Dahl.3 Dahls definition, which

as an unachiev since he regarded "democracy" "polyarchy" amounts to a list of able ideal type, include "procedural minima." These are as well as to ensure that elections decisions major policy provisions run for office. Dahl rights necessary ing themselves dom House House issues also included the communicative to be informed and associational of organiz

vested in elected officials and that practically all adults have the right to
for the electors for political the worlds and capable

participation. leading agency that evaluates countries

An essentially Dahlian conception of democracy is adopted by Free

(fh),

according to the extent of political liberties and civil rights. Freedom

a freedom for each of the worlds rating (hereafter countries. Scores FH score) on an annual basis range from 1 (most free) to 7 I reversed the scale so presentation, openness. I use a ten-year aver

age of FH scores (the 1991-92

variable. To dependent measure of the dependent check

intuitive (least free). For a more that higher numbers represent greater

to the 2000-2001

surveys).This

is the

an nually by the Polity Project. Data are available though 1998.1 use scores range from 10 eight-year average (the 1991-98 scores). Polity
to -10 of cases is The universe (most autocratic). (most democratic) scores on the over half a million for which countries with populations are available. FH scores are available for 157 coun variable dependent tries; Polity scores, for 154 countries.

I also use an alternative the findings, variable, namely, the Polity scores put out an

Determinants

of Regime Type: Hypotheses

analysis and that I examine Thus,
1982).

are

that are tractable to quantitative I test only hypotheses variable. distinct from the dependent manifestly
3 Dahl, Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy (New Haven: Yale University

Press,

WORLD POLITICS

are as structural and cultural variables, commonly regarded only what as well as several historical to in variables that are amenable coding or "no" terms. A further limitation of my study arises from the "yes" of the world with of case selection. all countries Including problem

populations over half amillion helps mitigate

analysis tain in contemporary politics. As all of history, I cannot confidently at other times. Whether the world an is not free from selection bias.

the problem, but the

I test only relationships that ob not use a random I do sample from from my sample to extend inferences or not a study of, say, the interwar attention, but one that cannot be

period or the late nineteenth century would turn up similar findings is

empirical problem that deserves

addressed here. In short, this inquiry is bounded in terms of both the hypotheses it tests and the period of time towhich it applies. If the pre
sent article and has anything to offer The aim temporally that links Islam specific. to authoritarianism at all, its contribution is to assess whether is provisional the hypothesis one support when

enjoys empirical of political determinants regime. possible I use a dummy variable for countries where Islamic tradition religious is predominant. In one country, Eritrea, each of two major confessions is therefore excluded. of adherents. Eritrea has an equivalent proportion or clear a is of the population In all other countries majority plurality controls for other associated tradition with a is Islam. In forty-seven countries that single religious tradition. of of course cover a large portion Islamic countries to to Morocco and from Albania Kyrgyzs Malaysia

the globe?from a quarter of them are located in the Middle tan. East, and in only Only A "percentage Muslim" the principal about a third isArabic language. a seem to to a measure superior alternative might provide by country two reasons. First, data on dummy variable, but I prefer the latter, for religious Muslim" sources. on differ across Figures "percentage composition across sources are available for that are consistent only about under examination. Whether with the percentage confidence. of the the

half of the countries

population
Muslim governments publicize as much

living in Belarus and Armenia

one something of these countries can establish

is 0 percent or 5 percent
Even

is not

them if they as one-third Muslim according

not do not have good data?and might or is as litde as one-sixth Macedonia did. Whether is the source of bitter dispute to official government is closer figures, to one in in the country no more than

about one in twenty people is Christian; but the Coptic church and
some observers claim that the number
Kindersley, University

itself. In Egypt,

eight.4

4 World Desk Reference tionary ofWorld Religions

(New York: Dorling (New York: Oxford

2000); John Bowker, Press, 2000).

ed., Oxford Concise Dic

ISLAMAND AUTHORITARIANISM
Whatever dence the disparities that Belarus, Armenia, in data, however, and Macedonia one can state with confi are not

predominantly

Muslim
while former dummy whether than than a

countries and that Egypt

is predominantly Muslim. Thus,

is a blunter measure than a ratio variable, the dummy variable in terms of reliability. has its own advantages the Second, I am interested in variable better suits my theoretical purposes. Islamic societies is more that are more or less or less resistant with whether to have a to democratization is one I am not concerned that society an authoritarian

others.

likely regime is one-eighth I have no reason, based on Muslim. or debates a to formulate in the literature, hypothesis to test whether Muslims I do not wish about such a question. per se are or bad for am but rather whose good democracy asking whether polities are coun "Muslim put, Muslim?crudely populations predominantly more or less as tries"?are for democracy. My working hospitable at which is that the tipping point, if there is one, therefore, sumption, is a society either intuition Islam matters is predominance, for democracy meaning the country's main tradition. religious one controls If the variable for Islam is not robust when tentially control important for six other determinants variables. between associate economic and development levels of economic of political regime, that Islam is

tenth Muslim

one cannot

for other po estab

lish with confidence that religious tradition influences regime type. I The most widely embraced causal hypothesis in the study of political
a regimes posits positive attainment. democratic development populations, Some recent does not with relationship higher conflict, more sophisticated and broader and deeper social support for popular rule.5 studies have found that economic empirical development of social Analysts lower levels

mocracy, measure capita. opment.

but that the durability of de inexorably generate democracy once established, is greater in wealthier countries.6 A standard is gross domestic of economic (GDP) per product development GDP per to control log capita in 1990 are available for all 157 countries. Data for economic devel

I use

What

may be dubbed the sociocultural division hypothesis

is em

East

(Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday, 1960); Andrew C Janos, Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man Central Europe in theModern World (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2000); Valerie Bunce, "Comparative Democratization: Big and Bounded Generalizations," Comparative Political Studies 33 (August-September Consolidation," Schedler, "Measuring Democratic 2000); Andreas 36 (Spring 2001). Studies in Comparative International Development 6 E. Alvarez, Jos? Antonio and Fernando Limongi, Democ Adam Przeworski, Michael Cheibub, racy and Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

8 braced almost as

WORLD POLITICS
reflexively societies diverse as the economic are development hypothesis. seen as and ho disadvantaged to this ethnic differences logic,

Ethnically usually ones as fortunate.7 mogenous According difficult. divide and consensus Ethnic society and make compromise can of intercommunal which raises the risk violence, heterogeneity quickly undermine the ethnolinguistic generated and 1 represents high logue project:8 0 represents complete uniformity est fractionalization. Koreas Countries range from the homogeneous democracy. To fractionalization measure scores sociocultural I use division, the Ethno by

(both .00) to highly fractionalized Papua New Guinea

available for all 157 countries. Economic

(.99). Data are

is often held to influence regime. political performance economic democracies. Bad may protect fledgling Strong performance so alienate powerful may generate popular dissatisfaction, performance that stabilize democ cial groups, and damage the cross-class alliances regimes may also be vulnerable racy.9 Yet the stability of authoritarian to economic that bad performance may open meaning performance, for democratization.10 The of authoritarian possibilities legitimacy rests on the often of better economic regimes promise performance also enjoy the legitimacy conferred by popu alone, while open regimes lar selection of the rulers and the state's respect for rights. Prolonged prosperity popular become under an authoritarian regime may have contradictory ef

fects. Itmight generate good will for the regime; but itmight also raise
as and increase the costs of repression expectations populations more au It may thereby ultimately undermine sophisticated. no reason to is thoritarianism. There strong economic expect logical in a democracy, the demo contrast, ever to undermine by performance cratic regime.11 The preponderance of theory therefore that suggests sustained
7 Donald

high

rates of economic

growth

will

help

democratic

regimes

Arend

in Divided L. Horowitz, Societies," Journal ofDemocracy 4 (October 1993); "Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); Robert A. Lijphart, Democracy and Kenneth A. Shepsle, Dahl, Polyarchy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971); Alvin Rabushka Politics in Plural Societies (Columbus, Ohio: Merrill, 1972). 8 SIL International, Barbara F. Grimes, ed., Ethnologue Languages of the Worldy 14th ed. (Dallas: 9 in Jorge I. Domingez, in the Caribbean," Robert A. Evelyne Huber, "The Future of Democracy Pastor, and R. DeLisle Worrell, eds., Democracy in the Caribbean (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University in Brazil," Latin American Research "The Collapse of Democracy Press, 1993); Michael Wallerstein, Review 15, no. 3 (1980). 10 Lessons Karen L. Remmer, from South America," "The Sustainability of Political Democracy: 1996). Comparative Political Studies 29 (December 11 (Baltimore: Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems ofDemocratic Transition and Consolidation Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

2000).

ISLAMAND AUTHORITARIANISM
one and may either help or hurt authoritarian regimes. On balance, to be conducive to democratization. would expect strong performance I use average annual percentage To measure economic performance,

growth of GDP per capita from 1975 to 1998, data for which are avail able for 150 countries. Countries range from flourishing China (7.5) to
unfortunate Azerbaijan for popular persuasive (-9.8). rule. Myron explanation Weiner asserted that the most em world

British colonial heritage has long been considered a boon for the
prospects pirically for democracy in the developing

isBritish colonial heritage. According to Weiner,

of imposing limits duct of those who management democratic tarism, which democracy.13 Thirty-one colonies. been seen as A of on government, exercise power,

"The British tradition

of conflict systems some

norms for the con of establishing for the and of creating procedures on the creation of influence has had a powerful The British are often basis also for

in the Third World."12

credited with

leaving behind theWestminster

model of parliamen
heritage. British

as a strong constitutional analysts regard is used for British variable colonial dummy countries under examination are former

the

Since the beginning of the 1990s, another type of legacy has also
a communist Most scholars regard the important: heritage. commu as to many, of communist negative. According legacy an antidemocratic culture.14 Soviet nist party rule political bequeathed to a greater extent than other types of authoritarianism, type regimes, effects

destroyed political and civil society,15 leaving behind what Juan Linz andAlfred Stepan have called a "flattened landscape," a condition that
for political "creates problems representation" riod.16 I use a dummy variable for postcommunist the twenty-eight of the former USSR, countries in this category. communist Eastern Europe in the post-Soviet pe and classify heritage and post Mongolia,

12 inMyron Weiner and Ergun ?zbudun, eds., Myron Weiner, Theory," "Empirical Democratic Countries (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1987), 20. Competitive Elections inDeveloping 13 and Marc F. Plattner, eds., The Global Guy Lardeyret, "The Problem with PR," in Larry Diamond ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 175-80; Anthony Resurgence ofDemocracy, 2d inDomingez, Caribbean," Payne, "Westminster Adapted: The Political Order of the Commonwealth (fn. 9). Pastor, andWorrell 14 Ken Jowitt, "The Leninist Legacy," in Ivo Banac, ed., Eastern Europe inRevolution (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1992). 15 Marc Morj? Howard, "Free Not to Participate: The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Commu of Stathclyde, 2000); M. Steven nist Europe," Studies in Public Policy no. 325 (Glasgow: University (Princeton: Prince Fish, Democracy from Scratch: Opposition and Regime in theNew Russian Revolution ton Press, 1995). University 16 Linz and Stepan (fn. 11), 247.

10 Natural often resource

WORLD POLITICS
endowment has been as influencing regarded polit of oil, has and particularly resources, It may enable the state antagonist.

to buy off society with low taxation and high welfare spending and thereby allay popular demand for political accountability. So too may it
reduce manage large over control to a political competition fight the distribution of oil rents. It may enable of the agencies that the state to sustain a

ical regime. Abundance of natural been regarded as democracy's

of repressing and powerful internal apparatus security capable also distort modernization, Resource abundance may challengers. income without the socioeco of national spurring expansion inducing an increase in wealth nomic changes and that that usually accompany favor democracy.17 To control for this factor, I include a dummy may

variable for membership in the Organization

Countries Table pothesized provides Muslim. worse (OPEC). OPEC ismade Muslim. predominantly 1 shows the mean values up of eleven

of Petroleum Exporting
ten of which are

countries,

for Muslim predictors a list of the countries whose As the table

of the dependent and non-Muslim

variable are

and the hy countries. It also

on the variable, whether dependent scores. But so too do FH scores or the latter is measured Polity using in terms of countries Muslim appear to have some disadvantages possi are not due to Islam per se. For ex that ble determinants of democracy inMuslim countries is somewhat and a higher ample, ethnic diversity countries smaller percentage of Muslim have a history of British colo to assess the be nization. Analysis of the data is necessary relationship tween Islam and regime. political

shows, countries than non-Muslim

populations Muslim predominandy

predominantly score far countries

Analysis Results

of Data

in Table 2, the I use OLS regressions. In the bivariate analyses, presented of the postcom with the exception coefficient, sign of each regression countries have is in the expected direction. Islamic munist variable, worse is associated with bet development FH scores; ter FH scores; with worse ethnic fractionalization, higher economic rates, with better FH scores; and OPEC mem higher growth worse FH scores. Former British have better FH colonies bership, with Higher economic
17 Michael The Paradox

FH scores.

L. Ross, "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" World Politics 53 (April 2001); Terry Lynn Karl, of California Press, 1997). of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro- States (Berkeley: University

Table Mean Scores on Freedom Hypothesized

1 and and

House Polity Scores, Scores, of Regime Type for Muslim Determinants Non-Muslim Countries"
Muslim

Non-Muslim Countries 4.74

Variable Freedom House freedom ten-year 1991-98 rating, average; (eight-year -10=most 1991-92 7=most average; autocratic) to free, l=least

Countries 2.61

2000-2001

free) (iV=47)
-3.11

(iV=109)
4.86

score, Polity 10=most democratic, Economic 2=lowest Sociocultural zation Economic development income, division index; 0=most

(AM6)
3.00

(A/=107)
3.32

GDP per (log capita1990; 4.66=highest income)

(N=47)
.55

(iV=109)
.40

fractionali (ethnolinguistic l=most uniform, diverse) (growth of GDP

(N=47)
-0.73

(iV=109)
0.78

performance

per capita1975_98

aveannual % change ;

(A/=43)

(AT=106)

British colonial heritage

Communist

7 of 47 24 of 109 countries (15%) countries (22%) 8 of 47 20 of 109 countries (17%) countries (18%) 10 of 47 lof 109 countries (21%) countries (1%)

heritage

OPEC

membership

SOURCES:

For

Freedom

House

scores,

"Annual

1972-73 to 2000-01" (freedomhouse.org, accessedAugust 2001). For Polity scores,Ted R. Gurr,Monty G. Marshall, and Keith Jaggers, Polity Data Archive (isere.colorado.edu/pub/
datase

Survey

of Freedom,

Country

Ratings,

Factbook 2000 (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 2000); and WorldDesk Reference (New York:
Dorling cept

ts/polity9

8, accessed 2000).

September

2001).

For

Islamic United

religious

tradition,

CIA World Pro

gramme,Human Development Report 2000 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); ex
data for Cuba, Djibouti, which

Kindersley,

For

economic

development,

Nations

Development

and Qatar, Myanmar, Income and Economic

Eritrea, Libya, Germany, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Macedonia, on are from United Nations Statistics "Indicators Division, accessed April di 2002). For sociocultural (unstats.un.org, Activity" SIL In 14th ed. (Dallas: vision, Barbara F Grimes, ed., Ethnologue Languages of the World, For economic United Nations ternational, 2000). Programme, performance, Development for Iraq, Libya, and Myanmar, which are from World Indicators 2001 (Wash

Human Development Report 2000 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); except data ington, D.C.: World Bank, 2001), and for Liberia, which are fromAfrican Development Re port 2001 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001) (data on economic performance for Iraq,Libya, andMyanmar are for 1965-99; for Liberia, for 1980-1990).
aThe countries Algeria, d'Ivoire, khstan, Azerbaijan, whose is Islam are tradition Albania, Afghanistan, predominant religious Burkina C?te Bahrain, Bosnia, Faso, Chad, Comoros, Bangladesh, Gambia, Guinea, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kaza Ethiopia, Egypt, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. Emirates, Uzbekistan, Development

Djibouti, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Kyrgyzstan, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Nigeria, Senegal, United Arab Tunisia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan,

12

WORLD POLITICS
Bivariate Regressions on Hypothesized Table 2 of Freedom House Scores

Determinants1
Number

VariableCoefficient Islamic religious tradition (dummy variable)

Economic development Sociocultural division (log GDP per capita1990) -2.13*** 1.66***

Adj.R2
27 .34

ofCases
156 157

(Ethnologue ethnolinguistic fractionalization index)

Economic (growth performance of GDP per capita1975.98 aveannualchange%)

-1.90***

.09

157

0.20***

.09

150

British colonial heritage (dummy variable) Communist heritage (dummy variable) OPEC membership (dummy variable)
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 aEntries are unstandardized

0.27 0.28
-1.91***

.00 .00
.06

157 157
157

regression

coefficients.

scores. There variables. heritage The other The models. tistically over one The

are

large differences for British variables

in the statistical colonial

statistically significant are variables statistically significant. are in Table multivariate analyses presented Islam, economic development, in all specifications.

are not

of the significance and communist heritage at the most level. undemanding 3. The first column are sta score well

presents the fully specified model. The other columns show trimmed
significant worse in all specifications point countries. non-Muslim To check the results I used Polity scores and OPEC membership countries Muslim on a seven-point

scale than do

an alternative

measure

variable, substituting results of the bivariate regressions. scores as the measure ables for Islam, Islamic The colonial nor does nomic tradition The

for FH scores. Table those

for the dependent 4 presents the

results

and Table regressions are consistent with

5 those of the multivariate obtained

for the dependent development, with

economic

FH using variable. Again, only the vari are sta and OPEC membership

tistically significant. In the final model

is associated results does are as not

inTable 5, a predominantly
of seven points?one ones. British

a reduction

third of the empirical range?in Polity score.

negative interesting as the positive heritage a Soviet-type advantages; necessarily significant provide Eco pose insurmountable past disadvantages. Greater is not shown to be of great importance.

performance

ISLAMAND AUTHORITARIANISM 13
Table 3 on of Freedom House Scores Regressions hypothesized determinants" Modell Variable Constant
Islamic religious tradition

Model 2 -0.15

Model 3 0.27

Model 4 -0.15

Model 5 0.19

0.17

(0.84)
-1.24***

(0.70)
-1.27***

(0.81)
-1.26***

(0.60)
-1.34***

(0.62)
-1.68***

(0.27)
Economic development
Sociocultural division

(0.27)
1.48***

(0.27)
1.40***

(0.27)
1.50***

(0.27)
1.39***

1.40***

(0.21)
-0.32

(0.19)
0.06 (0.04) 0.18 (0.30)

(0.20)
-0.30

(0.17)

(0.17)

Economic performance British colonial heritage Communist heritage

OPEC membership

(0.43) 0.07 (0.05) 0.25 (0.30) 0.20 (0.27)

-1.36**

(0.42) 0.06 (0.04)

-1.46**

-1.42**

-1.53**

(0.46)
Adj.R2 .55 N_149
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 in this table and aEntries White-corrected robust all others errors

(0.45)
.55 149

(0.46)
.55 149

(0.48)
.55 149 149 .51

are unstandardized in parentheses.

regression

coefficients

with

standard

ethnic

a firmer does not provide uniformity litical regime than does greater heterogeneity. between The strong, positive relationship is consistent with long-standing

basis

for a more

open

po

The negative unsurprising. that the hypothesis and OPEC membership mocracy supports dance of oil may conduce authoritarianism. or to an understandable to cultural Due sensitivity perhaps tance to characterize of the world's nearly one-third polities rule, scholars popular Islam and democracy relationship it rigorously. The steered clear of examining tractably resistant between however, dismiss. reveals to have tended

development and is therefore

and economic democracy social-scientific thinking between de relationship abun reluc as in the

to treat

circumspectly evidence here, presented or a link that is too stark and robust to ignore, neglect,

and have

14

WORLD POLITICS
Table Bivariate Regressions Hypothesized 4 of Polity Determinants3
Number of

Scores

on

VariableCoefficient
Islamic Economic religious tradition (dummy variable) GDP per capita1990) -7.97*** 4.34***

Adj.R2
.29 .18

Cases
153 154

development

(log

Sociocultural division (Ethnologue ethnolinguistic

fractionalization Economic per index) (growth of GDP -6.88*** .09 154 performance

capita1975_9g

British colonial heritage (dummy variable) Communist heritage (dummy variable) OPEC membership (dummy variable)
**p<0.01; *p<0.05; ***p<0.001 aEntries are unstandardized

aVeannualchange%J

0.64** 0.33 1.42

-9.01***

.06 .00 .00

.11

148 154 154

154

regression

coefficients.

Comment
A word scores used

on Data

and Controls
the indicators used and the operations variable, variables. car I also The

is in order

regarding

ried out to check the findings. In addition to substituting the Polity

for the FH scores alternative measures as a measure for of the dependent two of the independent variables are

data for several

of the independent

admittedly

imperfect.

Although
are not

the dummy variables and the data for economic performance

the measures for economic development highly problematic, are open to criticism. division and sociocultural as an measure GDP per of regarded inadequate capita is sometimes economic development. the size of the agrarian sociotconomic I therefore herding, I therefore proportion conditions also used better an alternative This measure: statistic may of the population. than plain

capture figures. culture,

specifications.18

product per capita in agri of the population used percentage employed and fishing rather than log GDP per capita in alternate are robust. The variable for agrarian The findings

population is substantively and statistically significant in all specifica tions.The regression coefficient for theMuslim variable is equally large
and ment statistically is used. significant when is even identity the alternative harder measure for develop than economic and

Ethnic development,
18 The

fractionalization as ethnic

to measure

is a notoriously
(Washington,

slippery
D.C.: Brassey

concept
s, 2000).

source of the data is CIA World Factbook 2000

ISLAM AND

15 AUTHORITARIANISM 5 Table on hypothesized Model2

-6.96**

regressions Variable
Constant

of polity

scores Modell
-5.20

determinants Model4
-7.25**

Model3
-5.07

Model 5
-5.83*

(3.15)
Islamic religious tradition -5.28***

(2.30)
-5.49***

(3.05)
-5.31***

(2.39)
-5.63***

(2.53)
-7.02***

(1.23)
Economic development
Sociocultural division

(1.24)
3.63***

(1.22)
3.31***

(1.22)
3.75***

(1.12)
3.30***

3.25***

(0.78)
-1.93

(0.71)
0.14 (0.17) -0.26 (1.18)

(0.76)
-2.08

(0.64)

(0.69)

Economic performance British colonial heritage Communist heritage

OPEC membership

(1.73) 0.19 (0.21) 0.10 (1.22) 0.95 (1.06)

-5.52***

(1.66) 0.12 (0.17)

-6.04**

-5.81***

-6.19***

(1.68)
Adj.R2 W
*p<0.05;**p<0.01;***p<0.001

(2.66)
.45 147

(1.67)
.46 147

(1.75)
.45 147 147 .41

.45 147

of ethnic fractionalization. The Ethnologue data that I use are based on

ambitious research, but in order to check the effect of I also conducted the analysis using several al ethnic fractionalization ternative measures. iswhat might One be called an ethnic homogene is the percentage of the population accounted for by ity score, which on the largest national group.20 The second is data frac ethnolinguistic and extensive

it is observing complicated.19 inescapably never will?have the benefit and perhaps

Social

science

does

of uncontroversial

not yet? measures

tionalization published by Charles Taylor andMichael Hudson and re cently refined byMatthew Krain.21 All the same problems of relying
19 versus Graded Mea Nominal S. Kaplan, "Categorically Wrong? Henry E. Brady and Cynthia sures of Ethnic International Development 35 (Fall 2000); David Identity," Studies in Comparative Laitin and Daniel Posner, "The Implications of Constructivism for Constructing Ethnic Fractional ization Indices," Newsletter of the Comparative Politics Section of theAmerican Political Science Association 12 (Winter 2001), 13-17. 20 The source of the data is Freedom House, Freedom in theWorld, 1999-2000 (New York: Freedom House, 2000). 21 World Handbook Taylor and Hudson, of Political and Social Indicators, 2d ed. (New Haven: Yale Data" "Ethnic Fractionalization Press, 1972); Matthew Krain, University (wooster.edu/polisci/ accessed September 2001); idem, "State-Sponsored Mass Murder," Journal of Conflict mkrain/Ethfrac, Resolution 41 (June 1997).

16 upon a measure

WORLD of a subjective alternative measures

POLITICS concept obtain, but sub a check on the results. indicators. Ethnic com remains

and contested

stituting are robust The findings does not influence position

at least provides to the use of the other regime

type, and the Islam variable

highly significant in substantive and statistical terms in all specifications. Even given limitations in the quality of the data, it is possible to con
clude from especially on the nature light the analysis that predominantly to authoritarianism. The prone of the causal link. Muslim task ahead countries may be is to shed some

between Islam and Authoritarianism: The Connection Some Plausible but Unsatisfactory Ideas
Some claims may

that there is no link between democratic deficit and Islam per se but
that Muslim opment tarianism. countries ment countries Muslim therefore are far poorer than others and that underdevel between Islam and authori the relationship explains countries are

be dispensed

with

based

on the above

analysis. One

is

than non-Muslim indeed poorer on average, but the for develop controlled analysis empirical countries and Muslim still scored much lower on both FH scores perfor also in

scores. So too did the and Polity analysis control for economic was OPEC is not decisive. this variable mance; membership cluded. While the variable for OPEC was substantively

and statistically Ethnic frac

significant, it clearly did not account for all of the effects of Islam; oil
not rents alone probably do explain was as well. tionalization included are, on average, Muslim countries The somewhat are not more the democratic Predominantly diverse because deficit. Muslim countries

ethnically

than non-Muslim

countries. But the factor is not decisive in determining political regime;

less democratic variable erogeneous. dummy of or serving as a proxy for any other Some other possible for the tie between Islam and au explanations cannot be ruled out based on the however, thoritarianism, preceding I Here analysis. quantitative inspect these ideas. for Islam are more het they is not picking up the effects variable tested here.

Are Muslim
Over had anism: tleness two a violent

Societies More
streak

Prone to Political

Violence?

centuries asserted that Islam ago, Montesquieu to authoritari societies that predisposed Muslim remote from pure "The Christian the gen religion is despotism; so recommended to the in the gospel stands opposed despotic

and a half

ISLAMAND AUTHORITARIANISM
fury with which his cruelties_The sword, it."22 Some continues a prince would Mohammedan still embrace holds mete out his own religion, the destructive which justice speaks and exercise only with that founded Samuel

17
a

to act on men

with

scholars

for example, Huntington, to prone political violence. poses to popular achievement.23 Is Huntington war

Montesquieu's that Muslim

spirit assessment.

societies the hazards

are

If he is right, given may help

especially that violence under

rule, this problem right? Monty

explain

democratic a

Marshall

has assembled there have been

comprehen of in

sive list of incidents of political violence in the world during the post
account, period.24 By Marshall's intrastate political violence. All major cluded events, in the universe 72?or 35 percent of cases 207 of them occurred episodes in countries Of

under

examination place

here.

these

of the total?took than s

in Muslim

countries.

The data show that theMuslim world has had its fair share of political
violence?indeed, Since 30 percent evidence does not a bit more of the world show that its fair share. But are polities the Islamic a bit more. only the Muslim, predominantly world has been the site of a indicators" on extensive

grossly disproportionate source Another useful that Daniel Kaufmann

of political violence. is the set of "governance and colleagues have created based of data

amount

is "political stability/lack indictors of surveys.25 One of their governance to 2.5, with violence." Scores range from about -2.5 values cor higher to better outcomes and political (less violence responding instability born of violence). The data are imperfect but provide another window on the problem. To assess Muslim analysis Here of variance countries test in comparative (ANOVA), comparing an I conducted context, mean scores on the the

stability/lack of violence
and with groups before proceeding ers. I use Catholic countries they, like Muslim countries,

index forMuslim
examined

and Catholic

countries.

the other variables

below, I compare these two versus all oth to examine Muslim countries as a have comparative often been referent characterized in part because as resistant

Louis de Second?t The Spirit of the Laws, ed. Anne M. Cohler, Basia (Montesquieu), and Harold Samuel Stone (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 461-62. Carolyn Miller, 23 and the Remaking Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations of theModern World (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996). 24 G. Marshall, of Political Violence, 1946-1999" (members.aol.com/ Monty "Major Episodes accessed December 2001). CSPmgm/warlist, 25 Indicator Dataset," from Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton, "Composite no. 2195 (world Bank Policy Research Department Working "Governance Matters," World Paper bank.org/wbi/governance/gov_data, accessed May 2001).

22 Charles

18

WORLD POLITICS
Table 6 Scores inMean _for of Violence and Trust Stability/Lack and Muslim Catholic Countries'1_
Trust Score (Mean

Difference

Percentage

Stability/Lack of
Violence Muslim Catholic countries countries Score -0.45 20.3 0.22 24.9

ofRespondents Saying That

People Can Be Trusted)

F 11.11
SOURCES: Pablo Data for stability/lack "Composite of violence Indicator

0.80
index: Daniel Dataset" from Kaufmann, "Governance and Kraay, World Matters," Aart

Zoido-Lobaton,

Bank Policy Research Department Working Paper no. 2195 (worldbank.org/wbi/govern

ance/gov_data, accessed May 2001). For trust scores: World Values Survey, data provided by

Ronald Inglehart, chair of the World Values Surveys Executive Committee, 2002. aSample for stability/lack of violence analysis is 84 countries (43Muslim); sample for trust analysis is 36 countries (7 Muslim). economic (as well as to good governance, democracy development, and other desirable like Muslim countries, Furthermore, things).26 Catholic and include many nations of Latin America countries, which as well as of Southern a Africa and Eastern constitute Europe, large to and extremely results The There with diverse group. are shown in left-side significant column of numbers between violence. the difference countries in Table 6.

is a statistically countries Muslim

difference from more

controls

suffering for level of economic development Catholic and Muslim

the categories, one But when loses statisti of

cal significance. Model

regression using cases. It includes countries economic greater gression,

1 inTable 7 shows the results of amultivariate

as the universe

the dummy variable for Muslim countries; Catholic are the excluded one controls for It shows that when category.

not is not significantly violence development, lower/stability in Catholic countries countries. The than inMuslim second re shown in model 2, compares Muslim countries with the rest

of the world, including not only Catholic countries but also all others. Economic development is indeed related to stability/lack of violence,
with income associated with higher is not statistically the Islam variable violence. But stability/less one controls for When significant. greater

26 Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vish Lipset (fn. 5); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, 15 (April 1999); of Government," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization ney, "The Quality Political Science Quarterly 99 "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" Samuel P. Huntington, (Summer 1984).

ISLAMAND AUTHORITARIANISM
Regressions of Stability/Lack Table 7 of Violence and Trust Determinants3 Hypothesized
Dependent Variable:

19
Scores on

Stability/Lack of Violence Modell Model 2

Constant -3.45** -2.94***

Dependent Variable: Trust

Model 3
-39.48*

Model 4
-18.41

(0.58)
Economic development tradition 1.03**

(0.34)
0.89***

(16.46)
16.98**

(16.91)
12.75**

(0.15)
Islamic religious -0.12

(0.09)
-0.21

(4.45) 11.51 (6.94) MC

.34 36

(4.40)
2.46

Sample Adj. R2 AT
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 aMC =Muslim and Catholic

(0.19) MC
.45 84

(0.15) all
.43

(6.24) all
.24 59

145

countries;

all = all available

countries.

economic lence How,

development, isweak at best. then,

the evidence

for a link between

Islam which

and vio own

does Huntington arrives at

reach his

conclusions, evidence

my

findings contradict? Huntington

ation of data. He

has different standards for the evalu

for the greater vi

"overwhelming"

olence ofMuslim societies by totaling up "ethnopolitical conflicts" in 1993-94 and "ethnic conflicts" in 1993, then within each group divid
societies. Hunting and non-Muslim ing the site of strife into Muslim ton he means "intercivilizational" violence, by which emphasizes on countries. His evidence conflict between Muslim and non-Muslim intercivilizational (thirty-six countries. world. adds, He of conflicts two-thirds unequivocal: were between Muslim and non-Muslim of fifty-one cases) of saying that "in takes the further But Huntington step strife conflict is also much more common are in the Muslim bloody" but also for our of "in not seems

tracivilizational"

only argues that "Islam's borders "and so are its innards." Its innards are most here the data are

But purposes. tracivilizational" cent?were polities are

strife, only inMuslim societies.

important In the category ambiguous. of fifty-eight conflicts?or eighteen Given that 30 percent evidence Huntingtons

31 per of the worlds

is less than Muslim, predominandy on intracivilizational conflict pro his evidence Indeed, overwhelming. not allow this detail vides no support for his argument, though he does to interfere with his fails to con Finally, Huntington generalizations.

20 trol for any other unanalyzed variables.

WORLD POLITICS
presented Simple correlation, serves as his statistics, empirical in the form of evidence.27

descriptive

Is Interpersonal
Many Ronald can be from social

Trust
have has found

Lower
linked a

inMuslim

Societies?
trust and democracy. between the percent

scientists

Inglehart

interpersonal correlation positive

World Values Surveys that people age of respondents who say in the
trusted, on 1972 to 1997, wave to measure on FH scores the one hand, and country averages on the other.281 used the data from the most recent Values trust. An Surveys, ANOVA test which were conducted in the coun the seven Muslim

available

ofWorld

1990s, using tries and the twenty-nine countries Catholic for which data are avail trust able in Muslim shows countries that the level of is not lower than in Catholic countries, substantially 6. The first multivariate hand column of Table model of 3 inTable variable countries. cases. in the right in shown regression, as the universe countries and includes the as the countries as is shown

and Muslim 7, uses Catholic It controls for economic development for Muslim Model countries 4 in Table with

dummy Catholic

Catholic

excluded category. Trust

is not lower inMuslim

countries than in

7 presents the results of a regres sion that compares Muslim the rest of the world; countries with again, in levels of trust. there is no significant difference

Are Muslim
A

Polities

Less "Secular"?

embraced but rarely scrutinized argument holds that reli commonly are in Islamic and secular authority both in the societies, joined gious

popular imagination and in institutional practice, and that this fusion

asserts the democratic deficit. that Jamal al-Suwaidi helps explain to assume that only a 'religious "Muslims have continued leader' can to for the Muslim provide good government community."29 According "God and Caesar, church and state, spiritual and temporal Huntington, in have been a prevailing dualism Western culture." In con authority, is Caesar."30 trast, "In Islam God

Two assumptions underlie this thinking. The first is that religion is

more important toMuslims than it is to adherents
inMark E. Warren,

of other

faiths

and

and Democracy," Press, 1999). (Cambridge: Cambridge University 29 "Arab andWestern Al-Suwaidi, Conceptions Tessler, eds., Democracy, War, and Peace in theMiddle 1995), 87. 30 Huntington racy: A Historical

27 Huntington 28 Inglehart,

(fn. 23), 256-58. "Trust, Weil-Being

ed., Democracy

and Trust

in David Garnham of Democracy," and Mark East (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, "Islam and Liberal Democ

(fn. 23), 70. For a similar argument, see Bernard Lewis, Overview," Journal ofDemocracy 7 (April 1996).

ISLAMAND AUTHORITARIANISM
structures. Muslims are more Muslim than Christians are Christian,

21

that this difference is reflected in political preferences and authority and political life in predominantly Muslim
saturated with

societies is farmore heavily

is that religiosity second assumption per se religion. The is the ally of authoritarianism, and secularism of democracy. examination Brief leaves room for skepticism both as regarding are more the notion that Muslims is com First, sumptions. "religious,, on aNew Yorker inMecca To pletely dependent subjective perspective. Muslim seem is in Christian than Christianity societies may a South African to a in Kazakhstan, in Mississippian a Pole in Syria, or an Irish person in Java, the situation Azerbaijan, not be so clear. Indeed, to a Kazakh it may be equally unclear in might societies But irrefutable.

or a Berliner inTeheran, the idea that Islam ismore deeply ingrained in

Mississippi,
seem

anAzeri

in South Africa, a Syrian in Poland, or a Javanese

of one's own

in Ireland. The

less conspicuous, tal"?than do those raised view in small churches inMuslim

culture, at any rate, naturally and exotic?indeed, less "fundamen imposing, of other cultures. The present author, who was cities in the American South and Midwest, does not fundaments and trav

radio networks eling

or Christian the landscape television blanketing the airwaves as particularly filling striking. While

the author countries, however, regards the sight of as a formidable in prayer demonstration together people facing Mecca of mass religiosity. Some of the author's associates who grew up in pre

dominantly Muslim
United festations of As'ad

societies have a different view. While

sees as unobtrusive society

in the
mani is satu associa

the author States, they regard what of everyday social life as signs that American

ratedwith (Christian) religious influence. Their outlook is akin to that

who has rightly criticized AbuKhalil, tion between secularism and Christianity."31 notion One may also question Huntingtons are strictly separation countries Christian separated of God in theWest and Caesar "the mistaken

gious authority lim world. The

that political and reli and fused in the Mus in is far less complete realize. Until a substantial

predominantly 1995 all long-standing

would be hard pressed to find it in Poland, Ireland, Brazil, or Chile.

31 and I. William AbuKhalil, "Against the Taboos of Islam," in Charles E. Butterworth Press, 2001), 115. eds., Between the State and Islam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Zartman,

In Germany Lutheran had church majority in education, and state are intertwined taxation, social service provision, between church and state and finance. Nor does a rigorous separation in many countries where Catholic traditions One predominate. prevail

European established

than many Americans with democracies state churches.

22

WORLD

POLITICS

to say, are state in Israel. What Nor, needless religion and the separated is more, in the Muslim the extent to which is Caesar" "God world in, say, Iran and Taliban-era Afghanistan. to state with cal. It is difficult confidence temporal power is substantially

is

often greatly exaggerated. Religious and political power may be joined

are But these polities atypi that the fusion of sacred and greater in former So

and consistently

viet Central Asia, North Africa, Muslim West Africa, Muslim

east Asia, Bangladesh, than it is in non-Muslim

South

to say that Muslims one would to in the Islamic world expect most political heroes munity, most of the Muslim leaders. But many world's be religious popular Indonesias Sukarno and Megawati politicians?including Sukarnopu

and Albania Iraq, Syria, Turkey, Azerbaijan, countries. is correct al-Suwaidi If, moreover, com seek a religious leader to guide the political

tri, Pakistans Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto, Malaysias Mo hamad Mahathir, Senegal's Leopold Senghor, Mali's Alpha Oumar Konar?, and Egypt's Gamal Abd al-Nasir?hardly fit that profile. If by
means not a religious authority but merely "religious leader" al-Suwaidi a person who to hold some belief, he is on firmer religious professes are are the But in this case, Muslims What ground. unexceptional. a atheist becoming of Costa Rica, chances of president self-proclaimed

the Philippines,
Christian

or the United
may does not.

States? Social scientists in predomi

ignore candidates' religion; much more of the

nantly rest of the electorate In short,

societies

the assumption

that religion

is consistently

important

toMuslims than it is to adherents of other faiths and that this differ ence is clearly reflected in social and political life is open to doubt. Of course I might be wrong. The evidence I have adduced on this
point sessing is the best the weight I can muster, but it is scarcely definitive. in consciousness of religion popular Values Rigorously is exceedingly as

difficult; here we truly see through a glass darkly.The shortage of data

is acute. The World tivities and the importance the data available on still are precious little data on Muslim countries; so in the surveys are almost all from Christian religion predominantly inMuslim cieties. Perhaps is really more countries important religion explain the greater incidence in Islamic countries? This question of authoritarianism touches on the that religiosity mentioned second assumption per se is above?namely, of democracy. In some clas the ally of authoritarianism, and secularism sical theories of modernization, secularization is often portrayed as than it is elsewhere. Would this fact then on their ac religious Surveys query people in their lives. But to date there of religion

ISLAM AND AUTHORITARIANISM progress in social itself?a science. claim rarely questioned But how sound is it? and hence seldom examined

23

Examining countries outside the advanced industrial world helps shed some light on the matter. As of 1994, 110 of the 157 countries
under power fifths examination parity of the world's FH here had annual that did not exceed per capita at purchasing account for about four They these countries, Among only nine of the ten annual surveys between incomes $6000.

maintained

population. scores in each

1991-92 and 2000-2001

them?Benin,

that qualified them as "free"polities. All of

Costa Rica, Jamaica, Lithuania, Botswana, Bulgaria, to the "rule" that de and Poland?are Namibia, exceptions Mongolia, can afford or can sustain for is a luxury that only rich countries mocracy a longer than fleeting spell.

This

is a diverse group; itsmembers are united by little other than

If secularism were conducive their exceptionally open politics. especially one would to find another to democratization, however, expect regular within of relatively this group: a preponderance secular societies. ity world's is the with this expectation. Benin social life of Vodou, which the country's permeates stronghold a As also occupies and politics. Religion prominent place in Botswana. are of great in Benin, native religions traditional importance, though and late efforts by missionaries successful among the chiefs in the midBut the reality is inconsistent among century established the elite. Costa Rica are practicing of strong Christian religiosity over two-thirds is deeply religious; of the in mosaic is a confessional Catholics. Jamaica a tradition

ninteenth

which most people actively practice their religion. Namibia

population

is, as Philip

deeply rooted in both, played a central organizational and spiritual role

in the anticommunist fact relatively religiosity secular are in which and Mongolia, Bulgaria are the to the pattern of societies, high exceptions world's most open polities.32 the developing resistance.

an ab "the most Christian of African notes, countries"; Steenkamp are is active in churches. Poland and Lithuania solute majority arguably in the postcommunist societies world. Catholicism, the most religious

among

32 Abdi Ismail S amatar, An African Miracle (Portsmouth, N.H.: Heinemann, 1999); John A. Booth, Gossai and Nathaniel Costa Rica: Quest for Democracy (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1998); Hemchand Samuel Murrell, eds., Religion, Culture, and Tradition in the Caribbean (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, Press, 1996); V. 2000); Grzegorz Ekiert, The State against Society (Princeton: Princeton University 1997). (Boulder, Colo: Westview, Stanley Vardys and Judith B. Sedaitis, Lithuania: The Rebel Nation in Colin Leys and John S. Saul, eds., "The Churches," Quoted passage from Philip Steenkamp, Namibias Liberation Struggle (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1995), 94.

24 In sum, that people there

WORLD POLITICS

are for skepticism the claim regarding ample grounds are more observant re in predominandy Muslim societies so too is there room for than people of elsewhere; ligionists plenty the usual association of secularism with democracy and re questioning seem wise to with authoritarianism. At the very least, itwould ligiosity caveat that "the concept heed Alfred of secularism must be Stepan's radically Thus, democracy? rethought" the question as it relates remains to modernity unanswered: how and democracy.33 does Islam disfavor

The Connection The Problem

that may affect Some scholars,

between Islam and Authoritarianism: A Hypothesis That Works Subordination

of Female

In one demonstrable

are distinct societies in a manner way, Muslim the treatment and status of women and girls. politics: on research and deep knowledge relying ethnographic appears to be an unusual degree societies. Some have suggested

of specific societies, have noted what inMuslim of subordination of women but also

that this factor may affect life not only in the family and immediate
at levels as well.34 Several scholars have higher status and to of women's the problem democracy rig begun subjecting on sur orous but they have relied mosdy investigation, public opinion are I rely of great value. Here, however, veys.35 Such studies potentially on indicators other than those gleaned from either in-depth ethnogra community or surveys. opinion to assess the station of women. I use multiple indicators The first is rates. I assume that a and female the difference between male literacy in favor of males reflects lower esteem for the education of larger gap relative to males. and negatively affects the life chances of females girls phy
Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 222. Comparative 34Stepan, ArguingPrice Honor: Muslim Women Lift the Veil of Silence in the Islamic World (New York: Jan Goodwin, of A Theory ofDistorted Change inArab Society (New Sharabi, Neopatriarchy: 1995); Hisham Penguin, York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 6-8, 32-39; Ali Zay'our, The Psychoanalysis of theArab Self (Beirut: Dar al-Tali'ah, 1977), cited in Sharabi, 41-42; Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Islam and Human Rights: Male-Female Tradition and Politics (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1998); Fatima Memissi, Beyond the Veil: Indiana University in aModern Muslim Press, 1987); Yesim Arat, Dynamics Society (Bloomington: in Turkey," Political Psychology 19 (March 1998); Arab and Political Change Islamists, "Feminists, Human Development Report 2002 (New York: United Nations Development 2002). Programme, 35 to Equal Representation,"/oKTTZ?/ofDi? Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, "Cultural Barriers of mocracy 12 (July 2001); Katherine Meyer, Helen Rizzo, and Yousef Ali, "Islam and the Extension to in Kuwait," Journalfor the Scientific Study ofReligion 37 (March 1998); Women Rights Citizenship on in the Middle East: The Impact of Religious Orientations Mark Tessler, "Islam and Democracy in Four Arab Countries," Comparative Politics 34 (April 2002). Attitudes toward Democracy 33

ISLAMAND AUTHORITARIANISM
Table Difference Government, inMean and the Catholic
Literacy Gap,

25
in for

Literacy

Gap, Sex Ratio, Women Empowerment Gender Measure and Muslim Countries3
Sex Ratio, Women in Govern-

Gender

1990 (Male LiteracyRate

Minus Female

2000 (Mean Number of

Males per 100

ment, 199S (Mean Percent of

Ministerial and Sub-

Em powerment
Measure,

Literacy rate) Muslim

Catholic

Females) 1025.2
12.2 97

ministerial Officials) .29

.50

1998

countries
countries

18.7
4.3

F 60.80
SOURCES: Data for literacy Census rates: World

13.05
Bank, Genderstats

38.12 74.59
(genderstats.worldbank.org, ac

WorldFactbook 2000 (Washington, D.C.: Brassey s, 2000). For cessedMarch 2002); and CIA
sex ratio: U.S. sus.gov/ipc/www/idbsum, tions Development University Data (cen Summary Demographic in government: For women United Na 2000 York: Oxford (New Programme, Development Report women in government in terms of "women in 2000). The UNDP measures Bureau, assessed January Human 2002). International Database

Press, at all levels" which secretaries refers to "ministers, of state and heads government (p. 267), as well as of central banks and cabinet (or their equiv agencies," "deputy and vice ministers secretaries directors (or their equivalent); secretaries, alent); permanent permanent deputy their equivalent)." For the Gender United Na and advisers (or Measure, Empowerment

tions Development Programme, Human Development Report 1998 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).
aSample for literacy gap analysis is 89 countries (46 Muslim); sample for sex ratio analy

Mus sis is 88 countries (45 Muslim); sample forwomen in government is 90 countries (47 forGender Empowerment Measure is 54 countries (20 Muslim). lim); sample

I use data for literacy rates in 1990. The first (leftmost) column of Table
8 shows the ANOVA test for Catholic and Muslim countries. The differ

ence between the groups is large and statistically significant.Model

1 in

that includes economic devel Table 9 shows the results of a regression uses Catholic as the universe countries of cases, and Muslim opment, as the excluded countries and treats Catholic category. The difference between when The Catholic one controls and Muslim countries retains for income. Model 2 in Table significance 9 presents the results for which there are data. statistical

of the regression that includes all countries is large. is statistically and its coefficient Islam variable significant on average over women rates between men is The gap in literacy and inMuslim six percentage countries than in non-Muslim larger points

for income per capita. countries, controlling in it isworth Since Islam appears to affect differences literacy rates, test while the analysis to the next logical step, which requires pushing

26

WORLD

POLITICS

regressions and the

of literacy Gender

TABLE 9 in government, gap, sex ratio, women on Hypothesized Empowerment Measure determinants"
Dependent Variable: Women in Dependent Variable: Gender Empowerment Measure Model7 0.12 Model8 -0.05

Dependent Variable Literacy Gap Modell Constant 26.98*** Model2 42.69***

Dependent Variable: Sex Ratio Model3 86.56*** Model4 95.82*

Government Model5 15.50** Model? 5.07

(6.01)
Economic development Islamic religious tradition Sample Adj. R2 N 89 11.10**' -6.46**'

(3.90)
-10.21**

(6.87)
2.99

(3.11)
0.53

(3.68)
-0.95

(2.75)
1.83*

(0.09)
0.10**

(0.07)
0.15**

(1.58)

(1.04)
6.65**

(1.95)
6.68**

(0.92)
4.65**

(0.99)
-7.46**'

(0.87)
-5.35**

(0.02)
-0.15***

(0.02)
-0.11***

(2.09) MC
.51

(1.77)
all .47

(2.21) MC
.17

(1.56)
all .11

(1.23) MC
.29 90

(0.95)
all .19

(0.03)

(0.03)
all

.73 54 92

.64

153

154

155

***p<0.001 *p<0.05; **p<0.01; aMC =Muslim and Catholic

countries;

all = all available

countries

ing the effects of the difference in literacy rates on FH scores.The first

two models of FH scores countries nomic in Table on log for which data 10 present GDP per the results. The and on first shows capita are also available are highly the Muslim literacy regression for all variable eco and a

rates. Both in substantive

development variable variable.

and Islam

significant

statistical terms. The

rates. The Muslim its inclusion

second model

adds the differential

and statistical in the coefficient

in literacy
terms, and for the

in substantive is significant a moderate reduction produces As model 2 in Table

for eco controlling in the literacy nomic development and Islam, each percentage point in FH score. Thus, the dif is associated with a change of .04 points gap no and a gap of between men and women ference between literacy gap a reduction of 0.8, or about one 20 percentage points is associated with range, in the FH score. eighth of the empirical sex ratio, measure is the population of the status of women Another sex ratio often is the number of males per 100 females. A higher which 10 shows, reflects lower status for and poorer treatment of women and girls. As

ISLAMAND AUTHORITARIANISM
Regressions Table 10 of Freedom House Determinants Model4 Model5
5.90** 0.23

27
on

Scores

Hypothesized
Variable Constant

Modell
0.14

Model2
1.81*

Model3
-0.21

Model?
-0.19

Model7 Model8
0.51 0.67

(0.63)
Economic development Islamic religious tradition Literacy gap -1.70** 1.39s?*

(0.91)
0.99**

(0.62)
1.49**

(1.62)
1.52**

(0.62)
1.37**

(0.56)
1.21**'

(0.82)
1.36**

(0.83)
0.88*

(0.17)

(0.23)
-1.43*"

(0.17)
-1.55**

(0.16)
-1.25**

(0.17)
-1.71***

(0.16)
-1.27***

(0.22)
-1.66***

(0.38)
-1.29"

(0.27)

(0.27)
-O.04**

(0.27)

(0.26)

(0.26)

(0.25)

(0.37)

(0.36)

(0.01)
Sex ratio -0.06**

(0.02)
Women in 0.08**

government Gender empowerment

(0.02)
3.32*

(1.51)
.57 .58 92

Adj. R2 N

.50

.53

.51

.54

.50

.55

153

154

155

*p<0.05;**p<0.01;***p<0.001

Reference the Population females relative to males discrimination and health from Muslim numbers care inTable against

Bureau often

states stems

in a recent "various

from

report, forms

a deficit

of

"sex-selective

early abortions 8 shows

girls and women?particularly in life and during childbearing or infanticide."36 The that there is a substantial

of lifelong inferior nutrition as of

as well years," second column difference between

and Catholic

countries

in sex ratio. Qatar

and the United

Arab

36 Bureau, Women of Our World2002 (prb.org, accessed June 2002). See also Population Reference S. Bagchi, The Endangered Half 1995); Barbara D. (New Delhi: Vedams, Phillip and Kathakali in Asia: Patterns, Policies, and Debates," American Anthropologist "Female-Selective Abortion Miller, 103 (December 2001); Baochang Gu and Krishna Roy, "Sex Ratio at Birth in China, with Reference to Other Areas in East Asia," Asia-Pacific Population Journal 10, no. 3 (1995); Ulla Larsen, Woojin in Korea," Population Studies 52 (No Das Gupta, "Fertility and Son Preference Chung, and Monica and Jack Snyder, "Racism and Sexism inMedically Assisted Con vember 1998); Jonathan Berkowitz Mini 12 (January ception," Bioethics in India, 1981-1991: Disadvantage "Female Demographic 1998); S. Sudha and S. Irudaya Rajan, and Sex Selective Abortions and Female Infanticide," Development

Change30 (July1999).

28 Emirates have are excluded

WORLD from

POLITICS

since they are outliers the analysis, that in part to the number of (predomi very high large resident workers from abroad. Even without these cases, nandy male) in sex ratios between Muslim the difference is and Catholic countries sex ratios due large and statistically significant, that as is the difference between Muslim

and all non-Muslim

finding. pendent Table variable,

countries. Models

3 and 4 inTable 9 show this

10 shows

FH scores as the de in a regression using sex ratio differences are even statistically significant

when controlling for Islam and level of development. The difference between a sex ratio of 105/100 and 95/100 is associated with a differ
ential also of reduces .6 in the dependent the magnitude variable. Inclusion of the sex ratio variable coefficient of the Islam of the regression that

variable. The ferentials United fundamental Nations patriarchalism and sex ratio is also found Development of high-ranking in literacy rate dif levels of government.37 The high furnishes data on (UNDP) Programme in executive branch agencies positions is evident at

the percentage

occupied by women.38 The third column inTable 8 shows the disparity between Muslim and Catholic countries. Models 5 and 6 inTable 9
show well when that one the difference Muslim controls between Muslim and Catholic countries, When as between and all non-Muslim as countries, is large even

FH scores are development. as the vari variable and the women-in-government dependent as a in multiple the latter variable able is included regression, predictor is statistically and its regression coefficient significant large. Its inclu for economic treated sion diminishes additional the regression coefficient of the Muslim variable sub

stantially.The results are reported inmodels 5 and 6 inTable 10. Each

women 1 percent of officialdom is asso that is occupied by an of .08 in the FH score. Thus, the difference improvement a that is 5 percent women and one that is 25 per between government a difference one cent women is associated with of 1.6 points?nearly ciated with variable. the dependent quarter of the empirical range?in Further evidence may be found in analysis of the Gender Empower ment Measure (hereafter GEM) used in UNDP studies. The GEM, an index that extends from 0 (low) to 1 (high), measures women's incomes, status in the in the legislature. The relevant re and presence workplace,
see Andrew of women in high government, discussion For a more extensive comparative at the of theWorld: Knocking and Executives "Women in the Legislatures Highest Glass Reynolds, Ceiling," World Politics 51 (July 1999). 38 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2000 (New York: Oxford Press, 2000). University 37

ISLAM AND AUTHORITARIANISM

29

suits, shown in the far-right column of Table 8, inmodels 7 and 8 in Table 9, and inmodels 7 and 8 inTable 10, only reinforce the findings
status for the other variables. Women's presented rior inMuslim and this factor appears societies; the link between Islam and authoritarianism. I am not want" eties. This sion. There women's tempted the status Islam remotely the treatment thorny is a qualified they and to comment infe is, on the whole, to account for part of women

matter

"really soci their daughters receive inMuslim is far beyond the scope of the present discus scholars Here data I have indicate over at that

on whether

rights, to assess

debate among knowledgeable vigorous world.39 roles, and lives in the Muslim available accounts

only whether of women and girls

quantitative for part of the

link between

and authoritarianism.

The findings support the hypothesis.

In the analyses inwhich FH

of the Islam for female

scores are the coefficient variable, the regression dependent in each regression when variable diminishes the measures status are included. There

is an obvious of bias due to endo danger in govern in the case of the variables for women geneity, particularly ment station of women and be and the GEM. Treatment may more democratic by regime type, with regimes status for women the basis for better treatment of and higher least squares (2SLS) two-stage using Exploratory analysis conditioned produced substantively identical results, but good instruments run from providing and girls. regression are ad the treat

mittedly difficult to find for this research problem. Despite

of endogeneity, ment of females the direction to regime of causation type. The may well bases possible

the hazards

for this connection

are the subject of the following brief discussion. The Link between the Station of Females and Political Regime: Some Provisional Theory
of women and girls affects po how the status and treatment Precisely research before litical regime must be the subject of a great deal more I can suggest only several tenta be drawn. Here firm conclusions may
39 Muslim World (Syra For example, Mahnaz Afkhami, ed., Faith and Freedom: Women's Rights in the and Erika Friedl, eds., In the Eye of the cuse, N.Y: Syracuse University Press, 1995); Mahnaz Afkhami Iran (Syracuse, N.Y: Storm: Women in Post-Revolutionary Press, 1994); Leila Syracuse University Press, 1993); Alison Baker, Voices of Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam (New Haven: Yale University of New York Press, 1998); Y Y. Moroccan Women (Albany: State University Resistance: Oral Histories of Haddad and John L. Esposito, Press, eds., Islam, Gender, and Social Change (Oxford: Oxford University under the Taliban (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, Skaine, The Women ofAfghanistan 1997); Rosemarie Protest: Working Women, theNew Veiling, and Change in 2001); Arlene E. MacLeod, Accommodating Islam and Gender (Princeton: Cairo (New York Columbia University Press, 1990); Ziba Mir-Hosseini, University Press, 1999).

Princeton

30

WORLD POLITICS
some

tive ideas. Sociological, psychological, and demographic explanations

offer Differentials between promise. rates and sex-ratio imbalances reflect social the immediate male relations literacy in the family and of these relations may re and female

and the character community, at themselves levels. Several leading writers have argued produce higher that the repressiveness dominance of the father in and unquestioned the family and of the male in relations between men and women repli a culture of domination, cate themselves in in broader society, creating in social and life.40 The notion and of tolerance, political dependency in social relations and those that obtain between primary isomorphism broader a in social science. One must of course society has long history some culturalist theories that assumed the idea with caution; approach

congruence between the family and the polity have not fared well in light of evidence. Still, the possibility of a connection should not be ig
nored. lations Individuals who are more accustomed to in their lives may be less prone personal in The generalization authority applies politics. as much as to the thority objects. One of Martin sayings there with was that in order to hold aman him. One reformulate rigidly to resist hierarchical re such patterns of to the wielders of au King's favorite to stay down

Luther

down, the adage as, in order to hold might women a man needed to stay down there with down, them?meaning, own as a habit of life blocks of course, that the oppressor's oppression advancement and freedom. Furthermore, tions in which not. men women behave are under organizational differently and under those in which present condi they are

one needed

in the school, the and places of workplace, Segregation for social relations? leisure creates a fundamentally different setting does integration. What and for authority relations among males?than is more, the social marginalization that women conducive that men women of women in some that men An may remove distinctive

of the sexes

voices and influences from politics. Some political psychologists have

found more showed women; sensus.41 Other are to men superior researchers have shown to have are authoritarianism. a con aspects of building hold attitudes that are study than and in

generally

stronger less comfortable

recent important orientation "social dominance" with hierarchy

of Chicago The Victim and ItsMasks (fh. 34); Abdeliah Hammoudi, (Chicago: University Moroccan Authori Press, 1988), 46-47,150-51; idem, Master and Disciple: The Cultural Foundations of of Chicago Press, 1997); David S. Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of tarianism (Chicago: University Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor (New York: Norton, 1999), 410-15. 41 and Sex in a Crisis Rose McDermott "The Effects of Uncertainty and Jonathan A. Cowden, Simulation Game," International Interactions 27, no. 4 (2001).

40 Sharabi

ISLAMAND AUTHORITARIANISM
Some scholars have equality.42 averse to extremism and violence has the effect found in that women tend to be more

31
are valid,

the relegation of women to the sidelines of public life?which

politics.43

If such findings

illiteracy

of doing and which the women-in-government variable GEM and the the influence of antiauthor help measure?circumscribes itarian voices. The question is not whether Margaret Thatcher or In

dira Gandhi governed with a feminine touch that distinguished

colleagues; rates in the in literacy general manner that influences politics. from her male it is, instead, whether population may gaping shape social life

her
in a

sex differentials

manifestations may also affect poli Patriarchy's purely demographic at tics. Sex ratios, analyzed attracted much above, have not heretofore in tention for but crucial science, prove political they may in coming decades. Of the thirty-two countries understanding politics are sex ratios that exceed with 102/100, twenty-two predominantly In a few oil-rich Muslim. countries of the Persian Gulf, imbalances may Most to of (mostly male) guest workers. large numbers are themselves coun of the foreign workers from other Muslim sex ratio for and their absence from home lowers the tries, however, extent labor mi to what their home countries. It is not clear precisely be attributed affect sex ratios overall sex ratios. In any case, in most countries with In do not affect the numbers.

grations high

labor migrations for example, all of which Iran, and Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, cannot be have sex ratios over 104/100, the imbalance explained with out reference to neglect of girls' health care and nutrition and selective abortion.

sex

sex ratios themselves make for a social Extremely high and may dim the prospects for popular rule. They may cre men are more ate conditions to under which young join militant likely time bomb in threatening, anomic behavior that provokes offi groups and engage coun in some Muslim cial repression. for males, who Late marriages tries must by custom be economically capable of supporting wives who to male do not work, may contribute sheer numbers exacerbate the problem. aggression Countries with and frustration, sex ratios but that

42 in Political At Felicia Pratto, L. M. Stallworth, and Jim Sidanius, "The Gender Gap: Differences titudes and Social Dominance British Journal of Social Psychology 36 (March 1997). Orientation," 43 Pamela Johnston Conover and Virginia andWar," Sapiro, "Gender, Feminist Consciousness "In a Different Voice: American Journal of Political Science 37 (November 1993); Carol Gilligan, inDiana Tietjens Meyers, Feminist Social Thought (New Women's of Self and Morality," Conceptions York: Routledge, Women's Political Voice (Philadelphia: Temple University 1997); Janet Flammang, a New York Times, November 4, Press, 1997); Barbara Crossette, "Living in World without Women," 2001.

32

WORLD POLITICS include Afghanistan, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait,

exceed 103/100?which
Libya, bereft erhoods.

Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Somalia, social stress and movements of mass

not and Syria?are Sudan, of militant broth religious

the causal mechanism Just as understanding linking female subordi a great deal more so too is nation and authoritarianism requires study, to grasp further the link between Islam necessary investigation fully more as the above and authoritarianism Even generally. analysis pro vides evidence between picture. station Islam helps explain the relationship a and regime it by no means furnishes type, complete in Table the regressions 10 suggest that the Indeed, presented of women is not the only factor to the effect of contributing Islam regime when coefficient of the Islam variable declines in type. The are in the variables measuring the status of women that the station of women

on

magnitude more in than one-third cluded, but the former does not diminish by treatment of women and girls may be an im any of the equations. The of the story, but it is very likely only one of several factors. portant part Natural resource endowment as the analysis and sociocultural Others, cluded of clan such showed as well, may explain some of the problem are often ad above. Some candidate factors that were shown to have little explanatory and were statistically is one to be the unusual and have scholars

duced to explain political regime type, such as a British colonial past

however, in the analysis. The have and tribal diversity, are much harder structure inMuslim to test power. not in such fac tenacity that that

of social networks appears societies

tor. Some writers

noted what

relations

ties are inimical do regimes so in

Soviet-type could not world.45 facets

to democracy.44 Other decimated familialism Muslim

argued have shown

in non-Muslim parts of the

areas but communist

how specific recently investigated In a affect the position of women. power political of three North African she countries, rigorous qualitative comparison in state-formation, has illuminated how variation and state-building, may affect kin-based power and nation-building experiences political of kin-based help account for cross-national differences in women's status.46

One

predominantly social scientist has

44 in the Arab World," Saad Eddin Ibrahim, cited in Iliya Harik, "Democratic Thought in Butter worth and Zartman (fn. 31), 143-44. 45 Pauline Jones Luong, Institutional in Post-Soviet Central Asia Change and Political Continuity inTajik Press, 2002); Muriel Atkin, "Thwarted Democratization (Cambridge: Cambridge University and Bruce Parrot, eds., Conflict, Cleavage, and Change in Central Asia and the istan," in Karen Dawisha Caucasus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Kathleen Collins, Clans, Pacts, and Politics: Understanding 46 Mounira Morocco 1999). Regime Change in Central Asia (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, M. Charrad, States and Women's Rights: The Making of Postcolonial Tunisia, Algeria, of California Press, 2001). (Berkeley: University and

ISLAMAND AUTHORITARIANISM
resistance ists have of Muslim countries to democratization. But some

33

The resilience and durability of primordial ties may help explain the
special that clan cleavages and networks may fur argued, by contrast, nish social bases for the growth of civic associations and the extension of citizenship and may, under some circumstances, de promote rights mocratization.47 a Advancement more research, great deal quire and single-country and small-N of understanding including both studies. There re will undoubtedly cross-national analysis is still a lot to explain.

Implications

for Democracy

The findings may hold implications for democracy's prospects, both within and outside theMuslim world. First, they point to the need to
study variation countries Some male and female in the extent have sex ratios rates of sex disparities of 104/100 of 20 or more across Muslim or higher, gaps countries. between and

literacy

percentage

points,

rates of women's participation in high office that do not exceed the mean for all Muslim countries. They includeAfghanistan, Bangladesh,
Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, Somalia, Libya, Oman, are less unfavorable but conditions other polities starkly Syria. on balance still inauspicious. Sudan, Iraq, Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt, and Yemen each have sex ratios in the 102-3/100 Tunisia, Turkey, C?te d'Ivoire, In some iswomen's range and large literacy gaps, and only in Turkey participa mean. Morocco does not tion in government well above the Muslim sex ratio, but the is wide and women's have an unbalanced literacy gap av in government is not substantially above the Muslim participation as severe as in many erage. In Iran and Jordan the literacy gap is not are absent from high poli but women other Muslim countries, virtually unbalanced. Several of these coun tics and the sex ratio is dramatically tries?most some notably, Bangladesh, traditions and institutions leading The and Turkey?have Pakistan, Nigeria, of open government and are often seen for thoroughgoing, candidates lasting de

as the Islamic world's mocratization.

re for skepticism present analysis provides grounds in any of these polities. the chances for robust democracy garding favorable elsewhere. be more may prospects Despite Democracy's whose inherited the prominence of Megawati personal Sukarnoputri,

47 of Middle East Politics?" PS: Political Eva Bellin, "Civil Society: Effective Tool for the Analysis Science and Politics 27 (September 1994); Sheila Carapico, Civil Society in Yemen (Cambridge: Cam in Senegal," "Political Turnover and Social Change Press, 1998); Dennis Galvan, bridge University in Layne, ed., Elections Journal ofDemocracy 12 (July 2001); Linda L. Layne, "Tribesmen as Citizens," in the in theMiddle East (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1987); Timothy J. Piro, "Liberal Professionals and Zartman in Butterworth Arab World," (fn. 31).

34 authority resented more smaller carried in high her

WORLD

POLITICS rep are

are not well to the of state, women pinnacle in Indonesia. But other conditions government

the sex ratio is not unbalanced and the literacy gap is auspicious: in other coun than the Muslim is mixed The picture average. sex ratio is tries as well. Malaysia's the literacy unbalanced, only mildly women are in govern and gap is moderate, relatively well represented

ment.

sex ratios are ex states of the Persian Gulf, In the small, wealthy are absent or absent from high and women tremely lopsided virtually or even But in these countries the literacy gap is moderate politics. nonexistent?a

a substantial that might condition provide advantage for possible future democratization. Burkina Faso, Gambia, and Mali have no sex ratio problem Muslim moderate lit and, by standards, only

eracy gaps. They also have high rates of female political participation in
may help part because com not bear the full of stark sexual inequalities they do complement mon in many countries. Other other Muslim levels factors, including on oil exports, will of course of economic and dependence development as well. affect democracy's prospects within to attention variation directing potentially important the present article raises questions world, regarding countries. Large literacy gaps, future in some non-Muslim democracy's sex ratios, and women in high male-dominant lopsided, scarcity of In addition the Muslim to These countries, government. soften the link between Islam or some of portion and authoritarianism?in them,

are acute inMuslim but these conditions countries, politics especially are no means two The world's Muslim. by distinctively largest polities, neither of them suffer from all three condi Muslim, predominantly China, 19.Women's participation in government in both countries

tions. In India the literacy gap in 1990 was 26 percentage points; in

is

meager. In India the proportion of women

same as the mean sex ratio for Muslim

in high officialdom is the

in each country is rampant, and child mortality of girls' health for girls greatly glect over the rate of infanticide is controversy ceeds that for boys. There China, present-day remains dire. What since but

in China it is even lower. The countries; In India infanticide exceeds 106/100. and ne ex in

litde question of girls' health care that neglect is more, abortion has risen steeply sex-selective of ultrasound in China now and amniocentesis stands at an astound in

introduction the widespread sex ratio the 1980s. The at-birth

ingly disproportionate 117/100. In neither India nor China are rates of

infanticide, neglect selection markedly nese than among or sex care and education, of girls' health prenatal the majority lower among Hindus and Han Chi In neither minorities. is imbal the Muslim country

ISLAMAND AUTHORITARIANISM
anee in the sex ratio a new in both Further, phenomenon. as urbanization acute rather than is growing more abating, of modernization have would not seem done to anything to

35
the problem and other mitigate the

aspects problem.48 India's vanced

the arguments ad challenge shows that the the Indian experience not of patriarchy analyzed here do necessarily problems spell doom for India has a well-established for violating open government. reputation open politics in this article. Indeed, social-scientific exceptional generalizations; perhaps in terms of the link between it is that it is also unsurprising societal patriarchy and politi

cal regime. Nonetheless, the findings of this article furnish grounds for skepticism regarding the viability of democracy in India. Ethnic divi
sions Indian adding lenges. and poverty seen as the most formidable to challenges usually The findings here suggest the merits of democracy. reported sex ratio and the sex gap in rates to the list of chal literacy Sex Indian ratio has become the focus of intense discussion in India. are

officials consider and government scholars, journalists, Many acute is growing more the year with the spread the problem, which by a social in the making. of inexpensive ultrasound machines, catastrophe are to force the issue to the top of the working public agenda.49 If They in India may darken the prospects for the endurance of de conditions for its emergence. those in China may undermine mocracy, possibilities now exceeds and the sex 140/100 Sex ratio in some regions of China

disparity nationally iswidening

by men, already predominantly in several regions. Police officials

rapidly. "Bachelor villages," inhabited

cover parts of the Chinese countryside a steep rise in crime in these report

48 the Family-Building Process and Fred Arnold, Minja Kim Choe, and T. K. Roy, "Son Preference, and Ranbir S. in India," Population Studies 52 (November Child Mortality 1998); Sabu M. George in Rural Haryana," Economic and Political Weekly 33,32 "Female Foeticide (August 14,1998), Dahiya, of and Increased Manifestation 2191-98; Monica Das Gupta and P. N. Mari Bhat, "Fertility Decline Sex Bias in India," Population Studies 51 (November 1997); Gita Aravamudan, "Chilling Deaths," Week accessed December (the-week.com, 2001); Gilbert Rozman, Population and (India), January 24,1999 Settlements in Ch'ing China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Yi Zeng et al., Marketing at Birth in China," of the Recent Increase in the Reported Sex-Ratio "Causes and Implications Popu Girls 19 (June 1993); S ten Johansson "The Missing and Ola Nygren, lation and Development Review 17 (March 1991); Erik Eckholm, "Desire for Sons Dri of China," Population and Development Review ves Use of Prenatal Scans in China," New York Times, June 22,2002; J. H. Chu, "Prenatal Sex Deter in Rural Central China," Population and Development Review 27 mination and Sex-Selective Abortion (June 2001). 49 Malini Karkal, "Invisibility of the Girl Child in India," Indian Journal of Social Work 52 (January Times of India, November 6, 2000; Unchecked, Unheard," 1991); "Female Infanticide Continues Old Prejudices Blamed for India's Vanishing Girls," Panos "New Technologies, Sudha Ramachandran, accessed March 2002); Sampath Kumar, "Changing Views (London), September 2001 (panos.org.uk, on Female Infanticide," BBC News, December accessed April 2002); R. P. 11, 2001 (news.bbc.co.uk, "The Campaign Ravindra, against Sex Determination against Violence (Calcutta: Shree, 1993). Tests," in Chhaya Datar, ed., The Struggle

36 areas, leaders as well are as an

WORLD POLITICS
explosion of trade in kidnapped women and traf

ficking inwomen

from Vietnam

and North Korea. While

Chinese

less concerned than some of their Indian counter perhaps are indeed alarmed for democracy, parts about the implications they by threats to social order.50

Finally, the findings presented in this article highlight a fundamen

tal difference that have a between reputation sex do not exhibit family honor but that nevertheless large disparities on the other hand, those that do exhibit in basic indicators, such and, Southern and countries with Iberian colonial her disparities. Europe itage are often regarded of economic is 22, as highly on the one hand, two types of societies: those on clan and for male dominance and emphasis

areas does one find gaping differentials

here. Levels these development 5, and 2 percent, and overall

patriarchal. as well

But

in few places

in these rates

in the basic indicators used

as overall illiteracy the

are broadly similar inTurkey,Mexico,

countries

and Brazil. Yet the literacy gap in

respectively; rates are Yet sex ratio is

102/100
economic

inTurkey and 97/100

in both Mexico
literacy and Nicaragua.

and Brazil. Levels of

in Jordan higher the literacy gap

is 18 percent in both Jordan and Iran,while there is virtually no literacy gap inHonduras orNicaragua. Sex ratio is 105/100 in both Jordan and Iran; it is 100/100 inHonduras and 97/100 in Nicaragua. Women make up about 1 percent of high officialdom in the former countries and over 10 percent in the latter. Syria and the Philippines have nearly
identical national incomes per capita. In Syria the sex ratio is 104/100,

development and Iran than they are inHonduras

the literacy gap is 35 percentage points, and women fill one in thirty high-ranking posts in government. In the Philippines the sex ratio is
the literacy gap government jobs. These 99/100, and women occupy one in six top are in no way are they examples exceptional; In short, patriarchy varies. A cul and broadly illustrative. representative ture may in some senses be male dominated but still eschew prenatal is 1 percent, sex selection or and value the health and basic and basic weights education education nearly a culture may tively, as much as the health assign of girls as much of boys. Alterna to the value of male and

disparate

female life.The difference may have implications for political regime.

50 in Society: There Is a Natural Zhou, "Artificial Sex Selection Can Create Disorder Xingwang to Females," Workers Ratio of Males Daily (usembassy-china.org.cn, [Gongren Ribao], August 9,1999 of China, "Further Efforts to Seek Solu accessed March 2002); State Family Planning Commission in the Population tions for Problems Structure" (2001) (sfpc.gov.cn, accessed March 2002); John Pom It's a Boy!' Too Often," Washington Post, May 29, 2001; Maureen fret, "In Chinas Countryside, J. in Anhui Province, China," International Graham, Ulla Larsen, and Xiping Xu, "Son Preference Family Planning Perspectives 24 (June 1998).

ISLAMAND AUTHORITARIANISM The Nothing

tion

37

Irony of Female

Subordination

could be less heartening to democratic idealists than the no

tradi only tradi and re

to is inimical that a particular democracy. Religious religion are are variables constants tions within societies; they usually are "stuck" with across societies. their religious Societies usually tions and the social and psychological and the orientations salience are more they encode produce. Yet religious practices ifMuslim change. Even than non-Muslim respects such a state of affairs must to sex and male Koran genital Koran's provides mutilation domination no

countries

can of particular beliefs in some male dominated

there is no logical reason why countries, be immutable. segregation Rigid according does not have a firm scriptural basis.51 The

for practices such as female whatsoever justification as a heinous and it condemns all infanticide sin, even

if it ismotivated
instruction

by a fear of want
on marriage,

(17:31; 81:1-14). Much

and other aspects

of the

divorce,

of relations

between the sexes (for example, 2:222-41; 4:3; 4:128; 33:1-5; 58:1-4) ismore liberal than the sharia (religious law) as practiced in some mod
as dubious to try to locate the It is therefore societies. ern-day Muslim sources of social and order in scripture in Islamic settings as it practice is to try to locate them there in Christian and Jewish settings, because as with all traditions based on sacred text, interpretive holy injunction are status of women The and ultimately determine powerftd practice.

in Muslim

societies is thus both paradoxical and mutable.

coun the evidence shows that Muslim At the present time, however, more authoritarian even tries are markedly than non-Muslim societies, one controls for other and the sta influential when factors; potentially tion of women, ocratic deficit. more than other factors that predominate in Western

thinking about religious systems and politics, links Islam and the dem

51 See Fazlur Rahman, Press, 1979), 38-40, 231-32; Islam, 2d ed. (Chicago: Chicago University an Intellectual Tradition of Chicago idem, Islam andModernity: (Chicago: University Transformation of Male Elite (Cambridge, Mass.: Perseus, 1992); The Veil and the Press, 1984), 13-20; Fatima Mernissi, Farid Esack, Quran Liberation and Pluralism 1997); Amina Wadud, (Oxford: Oneworld, Quran and Woman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).