On October, 7, 1958, President Iskandar Mirza staged a coup d'tat.

He abrogated the 1956 constitution, imposed martial law and appointed General Mohammad Ayub Khan as the Chief Martial Law Administrator and Aziz Ahmad as Secretary General and Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrator. Aziz was the first civilian to hold such an office that made the civil servants partners in the coup d'tat. However, only three weeks later General Ayub -- who was openly questioning the authority of the government prior to the imposition of martial law [1] -- deposed Iskandar Mirza on Oct. 27, 1958 and assumed the presidency that practically formalized the militarization of the political system in Pakistan. After three and half years of martial law rule, President Ayub Khan introduced his constitution in May 1962 to reinforce his authority in the absence of martial law. The new constitution, in its much watered down formulations, recognized Islamic principles, a presidential form of government which lacked the necessary checks and balances and a federal structure which formally provided for a maximum degree of provincial autonomy in the legislative sphere. The federal structure was offset by the unitary character of organization of the executive authority insofar as the President was to appoint provincial governors who would, in turn, form the provincial cabinets without being responsible to the provincial legislatures. The provincial governments, consequently, would be directly responsible to the president of Pakistan. There were no fundamental rights but were added later through a constitutional amendment. The Ayub's system was neither presidential nor federal, nor representative either in form or in substance. In fact, what it did was to provide for an authoritarian political system which could be geared to the process of economic development and militarization of the political system in the wake of Pakistan's military alliances with the West within the framework of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO). The word "Islamic" was omitted from the name of the state in the new constitution. [A martial law ordinance had earlier declared that the Islamic Republic of Pakistan will be known as Pakistan.] There was reference in the directive principles to Quran and Sunnah and the Islamic way of life but the responsibility of giving effect to laws made in pursuance of such principles was that of the organ of the state and nobody could question the organ's discretion. There was to be an Advisory Council of

Islamic Ideology but it consisted of lawyers and administrators and the Ulemaof liberal views, one of them being the blind Hashim from East Pakistan who was quite modern in his views. He also set up Islamic Research Institute of which Fazal-ur-Rehman, a modernist, was the President. [2] However, the conservative element in the indirectly-elected National Assembly began to clamor for restoration of the Islamic features of the 1956 constitution. Ayub could not resist the demand and they had to be restored in 1963 through constitutional amendments. The provision in the new constitution that no law should be repugnant to Islam was not enforceable in a court of law, while article 198 of the 1956 constitution dealing with the same subject was enforceable in a law court. There was no provision in the new constitution to bring the legal code of the country in conformity with the laws of Islam. It was, however, ensured through the first amendment that "all existing laws shall be brought in conformity with the Holy Quran and Sunnah." Further, while in the original constitution of 1962 it was simply provided that "no law shall be repugnant to Islam," it was elaborated with the additional words: "No law shall be repugnant to the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and Sunnah." The amendment restored the footnote of Article 198 of the 1956 constitution stating that the expression Quran and Sunnah shall mean the Quran and Sunnah as interpreted by the sect concerned. Like 1956 constitution Ayub Khan's constitution did not make Islam the State religion of Pakistan. Ayub Khan was against using Islam as a clich in politics but at the same time he was well aware of the dangers of abandoning Islam as a state policy. In his autobiography Friends Not Masters, while discussing the role of religion in Pakistan's politics, he said: "Any attempt at interpreting the tenets of Islam and adapting the laws to conform to the requirements of the time is a signal for the Ulema to raise the slogan of heresy."[3] However, like the former Law Minister, A.K.Brohi [4] Ayub believed that the Quran does not present a constitution for an Islamic state. He said: "The Holy Quran contained the principles of guidance but did not prescribe a detailed constitution for running a country. The example of the Holy Prophet in organizing an Islamic State was, of course, available. After the Holy Prophet, the four caliphs organized and administered the State according to their understanding of Islamic principles. Each one of them had applied the principles of Islam and the teachings of the Holy Prophet in accordance with their circumstances. No specific pattern of

government or even of the election of the Head of Government had been established. The conclusion was inescapable that Islam had not prescribed any particular pattern of government but had left it to the community to evolve its own pattern to suit its circumstances, provided that the principles of the Quran and the Sunnah were observed."[5] Arguing that the burden of thinking about the interpretation of the Islamic principles must rest on the community, Ayub Khan says: " In all this, I was guided by my understanding of the institution of ijma (consensus) provided in Islam. According to one school of thought ijma represents the agreement, in a matter requiring opinion or decision, of the mujthahids, people who, by virtue of their knowledge of Islam, have a right to form their own judgment. Another school of thought interprets ijma to form as the opinion of the majority of all Muslims. There is yet another view that the right to formulate independent judgment on matters affecting the life of the people rests in the Legislative and not in any body of scholars."[6] In this view Ayub Khan was probably influenced by Dr Mohammad Iqbal who argues: "The growth of republican spirit, and the gradual formation of legislative assemblies in Muslim lands constitutes a great step in advance. The transfer of the power of ijtehad from individual representatives of school to a Muslim legislative assembly which, in view of growth of opposing sects, is the only possible form ijma can take in modern times."[7] Iqbal also holds that on a question of legal interpretation, even the unanimous decision of the Companions of the Prophet would not inescapably bind later generations.[8] Continuing his argument on ijma, Ayub Khan writes: " I did not want to prejudge the issue and therefore in the constitutional arrangement I left it to the representatives of the people to decide how they would like to form their judgment in matters relating to the Quran and the Sunnah. I thought it necessary to provide an Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology backed by an Islamic Research Institute to assist the Legislature in framing laws based on the concepts of Islam. The Council was to have as members not only those persons who possessed a knowledge of Islam but also those who understood the economic, political, legal and administrative problems of the country so that the requirements of Islam and the requirements of the time and circumstances could be harmonized."[9] Realizing that Ulema would not be satisfied with this arrangement, he said: "They claimed the exclusive right to interpret and decide matters pertaining to Islam. While they maintained this claim they refrained from

producing any detailed constitutional document, knowing that such an attempt would only expose their internal differences. Their demand was that the government should agree to adopt an Islamic Constitution, leaving it to the Ulema to decide whether any law or measure was Islamic or not."[10] Elaborating on Ulema's demand for an Islamic Constitution, Ayub Khan went on to say: Since no one had defined the fundamental elements of an Islamic Constitution, no constitution could be called Islamic unless it received the blessings of all Ulema. The only way of having an Islamic Constitution was to hand over the country to the Ulema and beseech them, 'lead kindly light.' This is precisely what the Ulema wanted. A constitution could be regarded as Islamic only if it were drafted by the Ulema and conceded them the authority to judge and govern the people. This was a position which neither the people nor I was prepared to accept."[11] Ayub Khan's liberal interpretation of Islam reflected in his constitution. The Constitution Commission appointed by him in 1960 recommended that "we should set up an International Muslim Commission to advise us as to how our laws could be made to conform to the injunctions of the Holy Quran and the Sunnah. I doubted whether a Commission of this kind would serve any useful purpose. I sounded some Heads of State at the time but they showed no enthusiasm for the idea. It was obvious that we would have to address ourselves to our problems and work out our own solutions." [12] The Constitution Commission also pointed out that "the bringing of the laws into conformity with the Quran and Sunnah does not by itself make a good Muslim."[13] Ayub Khan's skepticism about the role of Ulema in politics culminated in outlawing the most organized and vocal religious group in the country, Jamat-i-Islami, in 1963. His government saw the activities of this religious party incompatible with the security of the state. All the government servants and military personnel were asked to file an affidavit declaring that they do not belong to Jamat-i-Islami. Before the promulgation of the constitution, Ayub Khan introduced the Muslim Family Laws through an Ordinance on March 2, 1961 under which unmitigated polygamy was abolished, consent of the current wife was made mandatory for a second marriage, brakes were placed on the practice of instant divorce where men pronounced it irrevocably by pronouncing talaq thrice in one go. The Arbitration Councils set up under the law in the urban and rural areas were to deal with cases of (a) grant of

sanction to a person to contract a second marriage during the subsistence of a marriage; (b) reconciliation of a dispute between a husband and a wife; (c) grant maintenance to the wife and children. All Muslim marriages were to be compulsorily registered with registrars to be appointed by union councils, one in each ward. The registrars were also empowered to perform marriages. For such services they were to be paid substantial fees. The offices of registrars were filled by Imams and Khatibs. A sum of Rs. 5 crore annually went into the pockets of these religious leaders as a result of the fees prescribed by the ordinance. When Jamat-i-Islami launched an agitation against this "un-Islamic" Law, religious leaders either supported the President or kept aloof from the movement.[14] President Ayub promulgated the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1961 on October 23, 1961 under which the government took over huge and valuable properties of Muslim trusts. Enormous funds recovered from the Waqf properties, which previously went into private pockets, were now at the disposal of the government. Some of these funds were spent on the salaries of the Imams and Khatibs of important mosques. The President was able thus to get further support from these religious leaders who were already indebted to him for being provided with jobs under the Family Laws Ordinance, 1961.[15] Ayub Khan's liberal interpretation of the Islamic principles antagonized Ulema who opposed his Family Law Ordinance to regulate Islamic personal law in a modern Islamic society. His attempts to popularize the family planning program was declared un-Islamic by orthodox mullahs who quoted verses from the Holy Quran to plead that the use of contraceptives was prohibited in Islam. Although the 1968-69 political agitation against Ayub's regime was mainly directed against the system of indirect elections, but during the demonstrations, the conservative section of population was easily aroused to turn against Ayub Khan to protest his "anti-Islamic" policies. During Ayub Khan's talks with the political leaders on 10th March, 1969, in Rawalpindi, leader of Jamiat-e-Ulema-ePakistan, Mufti Mahmood, objected to the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance and demanded that the 22 points agreed by Ulema in 1951 should be implemented in order to make Pakistan a true Islamic state. Despite Ulema's vehement opposition to the Family Laws Ordinance, the role of Islam in politics remained eclipsed during the Ayub era. However, in 1967, he faced the wrath of Ulema on two other religious issues. The

first was a controversy over the sighting of the crescent of Shawwal when the religious leaders gave public-heeded fatwas against celebrating Eid-alFitr according to the decision of the government-sponsored central moonsighting committee. The religious leaders claimed that the people of Pakistan follow them on religious issues and do not have any confidence in the government in this sphere. Another issue was the book "Islam" written by Dr. Fazal-ur-Rehman, the Chairman of the Islamic Research Institute.There was a mass protest by the Ulema against the book. The author was forced to resign his job as Ayub's government decided to avoid confrontation with the religious lobby. The campaign against the liberal interpretation of Islam by Dr. Fazal [16] was seen as the second mass agitation the country had witnessed after the 1953 anti-Qadiani movement. President Ayub Khan military regime's attention was mainly focused on its relationship with the international capitalist system and gaining some degree of political legitimacy from the west. Ayub had been instrumental in allying Pakistan with the Unite States. He made a deep impression on President Eisenhower and even more so on Vice-President Richard Nixon and Secretary of state John Foster Dulles. In 1954 the Eisenhower-Nixon administration signed its initial military assistance program with Pakistan. The same year Pakistan joined SEATO and then the Baghdad Pact in 1955. the Pakistani Army's first indigenous Commander- in- Chief, Ayub was committed to the modernization of the armed forces and he had turned to the United States at a most opportune moment. The United States government was eager to meet Ayub's request for assistance and thus began a long period of mutual cooperation and goodwill between the two countries. When Ayub seized power in 1958, the United states government did not necessarily approve, but neither was it very upset. [17] "His foreign policy was one of vassalage to the United States which he believed would keep him in power."[18] During his era one sees the first institutionalization of corruption in the country. He resorted to high appointments in the army without consideration of merit. Instead of reorganizing the army to meet the requirement of an independent and free country he retained its colonial structure and tradition. "The British ethnicization of regiments was maintained, the mess tradition left untouched to the extent of the display of old battle standards won on our soil. The army was kept tuned by him to serve the adventurers like him, not the nation's interest."[19]

His era witnessed rapid industrial progress (mainly in the western wing of the country) with two five-year economic development plans. However his so-called 1958-68 "development decade" actually became a decade of exploitation and deliberate promotion of inequality between classes and regions with the 22 big industrial families amassing most of the wealth. The record reveals that Pakistan's Second Year Plan (1960-1965), the one that covered a good part of the martial law period, was a substantial success from a statistical point of view. But there was little overall improvement in the life-style of the general population.[20] President Ayub Khan introduced industrial development program under the doctrine of "functional inequality on the familiar plea that government should tolerate "some initial growth in income inequalities to reach high levels of saving and investment." This growth was to be achieved through a system under which income inequalities were to be permitted for a long time until the benefits of such a system would trickle down to the disadvantaged groups at the later stage. Dr. Mahbub ul Haq, probably the most influential adviser of his government and drafter of the Second Five-Year Plan, was responsible for much of the thinking embodied in the Plan. He accepted the proposition that "the route to equality lay through inequality" on the ground that during the earlier phase of industrialization such inequality was inevitable. He argued that "the under-developed countries must consciously accept a philosophy of growth and shelve for the distant future all ideas of equitable distribution and welfare state. It should be recognized that these are luxuries which only developed countries can afford."[22] The theory of "social utility of greed" was also championed by Pakistan's Harvard adviser to the Planning Commission, Gustav F. Papanek, who advocated that income inequalities not only contributed to the growth of the economy but also made possible a real improvement for the lowerincome groups.[23] In his work on Pakistan's economic development model pursued in the sixties, Gustav Papanek defended the very high rates of profit allowed to the private sector on the plea that since the bulk of these profits were being reinvested, they produced economic growth which was essential for reducing poverty and thereby reducing inequality. It was apparent that this system of "functional inequality" involving disparities among the various classes and regions could operate with far fewer checks under an authoritarian system like that of Pakistan.[24]

The policy of income inequality between classes was pursued simultaneously with a policy of regional inequality in terms of East and West Pakistan and in terms of regions within West Pakistan. During the decade 1959-60 to 1969-70, per capita gross domestic product in terms of 1959-60 constant prices grew only by 17 percent in East Pakistan, but by 42 percent in West Pakistan. The central government also conceded that disparity measured by the difference between per capita incomes in West and East Pakistan expressed as a percentage of the per capita income of all Pakistan had increased from 38.1 percent in 1964-65 to 47.1 percent in 1969-70.[25] President Ayub introduced land reforms in West Pakistan in 1959 [26] under which ceilings of 500 acres of irrigated and 1,000 acres for nonirrigated lands were fixed. However, the mere size of the ceilings suggested that certainly the medium-sized landowners whose scions were heavily represented in the army and civil services were not going to be adversely affected. In addition, there were so many loopholes in Ayub's land reforms that landlords could still own and cultivate up to about 2,000 acres of irrigated or 4,000 acres of non-irrigated land if they transferred some of their land to their legal heirs and converted some into orchards, nurseries and game preserves. The big landlords did not suffer any eclipse in the political power and they were able to transfer some of their wealth and savings to investment in industries.[27] At the time when the Ayub regime was facing urban militancy largely as a result of the decline in real wages and the growing awareness among urban groups of industrial and economic concentration, the Planning Commission reiterated in November 1968 the basic premise of the government's developmental strategy: "We cannot distribute poverty. Growth is vital before income distribution can improve."[28] However, the commission admitted that in spite of rapid growth, Pakistan continued to be one of the poorest and most illiterate societies. It failed to admit that the strategy that it had followed implied that because growth was vital before income distribution, the poor had to remain poor for a long time so that growth might continue at an accelerating pace. This vicious circle of more and more growth with poverty increasing or remaining the same or improving very little could only be broken if the poorer groups were to acquire political power.[29] It was in his regime that one saw a clear unfolding of certain trends and developments represented what may be described as an ideological change

in Pakistan. Under him there was economic change through industrialization, improved agriculture and modest land reforms spreading to areas other than Karachi, particularly to Punjab and a few urban centers in Sindh and the Frontier. It may be suggested that as a result of these changes the masses in many parts of West Pakistan could no longer be aroused by appeals to vague and emotional notions of Islamic unity. This explains why during the 1970 elections Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party made such serious inroads in the semi-prosperous areas of Punjab. It offered a new but vague ideological program under the name of Islamic socialism or Musawat.[30] Ayub, not being able to satisfy Bengaliexpectations that he had aroused through his constitutional assurances that disparity would soon be removed and by his policies of coercion of urban elements in East Pakistan, laid the foundations for the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971. It was in Ayub's regime that in both East and West Pakistan there was a growing skepticism as to whether the appeal of Islam could continue to keep the two disparate wings together. This represents the other side of ideological change, that is to say, Islam could neither be used to justify nor explain the increase in egalitarian society that had emerged in Pakistan, nor could the Islamic factor serve any longer as the only cementing force between the two disparate wings of the country.[31] President Ayub flouted his own constitution which stipulated that in the event of frailty or failure to discharge his duties, the President would hand over to the Speaker of the National Assembly, which was hand-picked and who would be only too glad to carry out orders. But Ayub took no chances, and handed over to General Yahya Khan when he lost his nerve and could no longer face an agitation conducted by people who had been disenfranchised. To complete the narration, in the aftermath of the 1965 war and the Tashkent declaration, a mass agitation had also started against the Ayub regime in West Pakistan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto mobilized the agitation to build up support for himself and later for the PPP. In 1968, Ayub Khan finally began to lose his grip on power because of his serious illness. By March 1969, he realized that he had to go. However, instead of handing over to the Speaker of the national Assembly, as his own constitution

provided, he decided to impose martial law once again. Ayub's biographer Altaf Gauhar, says General Yahya Khan, had led Ayub to believe that the army would put down the agitation, eliminate his political opponents and put him back in power in about three months. However, Yahya Khan had his own agenda and abrogated the constitution. He thus eliminated Ayub Khan much the same way as the latter had eliminated Iskandar Mirza, after seizing power, on October 27, 1958. General Yahya was indeed waiting in the wings for such an opportunity. He lost no time in assuming new powers and ventured on the democratic path in order to publicly expose its inadequacies. He was convinced that no political party would secure a working majority and that he could continue to play the role of a benevolent arbiter who enjoyed the support of the most well-organized political party of the country, i.e. the Pakistan Army. It was his misfortune, however that his own constituency was decisively humiliated in Dacca and all the reassuring forecasts of the intelligence agencies proved totally incorrect.[33]
1. A statement by Abdul Qadir, Governor of State Bank of Pakistan, so annoyed him that he sent a strongly worded message to the Prime Minister on 24 Aug. 1958: "I see from the press that Mr. Abdul Qadir, Governor of State Bank of Pakistan, is going about saying that the way to check inflation in the country is to cut expenditure on the army and reduce America's military aid as it leads to inflation..... the army is fed up to the teeth with this man's fulmination." Altaf Gauhar, Ayub Khan: Pakistan's First Military Ruler - cited by Dawn 18.7.1993 2. Mohammad Munir, From Jinnah to Zia - p-83 3. Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters - p-106 4. It is not possible to derive from the text of the Quran the constitution of any state. CA debates March 1949. 5. Ayub Khan, op. cit., P-128 6 . Ayub Khan op. cit., P-199 7. The Reconstruction of the Religious Thought in Islam, p-174 8. Ibid. p-175 9. Ayub Khan, Op. Cit., p-199

10. Ibid. p-200 11. Ibid. p-203-204 12. Ibid. p-198 13. The Constitution Commission report p-125 cited by Afzal Iqbal, Islamization of Pakistan - p-74 14. Afzal Iqbal, op. cit., p-76 15 Ibid. p-76 16. Dr. Fazal-ur-Rehman advocated reformation of Islam on the basis of postProphetic formative period of Islam. "The task of rethinking and reformulating Islam at the present juncture is much more acute and radical than has faced the Muslim since the 3rd/9th century and the requisite performance is equivalent to the performance of the first two centuries and a half. In other words, the thinking Muslim has to go right behind the early post-Prophetic formative period itself and reconstruct it all over again." { Dr. Fazal-ur-Rehman, Islam, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London 1966 p-251} He also questioned the practice of five prayers : The five daily prayers are not all mentioned in the Quran....It was in the post-Prophetic period that the number of prayers was inexorably fixed without any alternative at five and the fact of the fundamental three prayers was submerged under the rising tide of Hadith which was put into circulation to support the idea that prayers were five. { op. cit p-36} 17. Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: Enigma of Political Development, p-93 18. Comment on "Rise and Fall of Ayub Khan," Dr. Akbar Naqvi, DAWN 19.8.1994 19. Ibid 20. Ziring, op. cit., p-92 21. Mehbub ul Haq, The Strategy of Economic Planning Karachi: Oxford, 1963, p32 22. Ibid. p-113 23. Gustav F. Papanek, Pakistan's Development: Social Goals and Private Incentives (Cambridge, Mass.: Havard University Press, 1967, p-242 (cited by Khalid B. Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan) 24. The Report of the Committee on Islamization in 1980 rejected the economic philosophy embodied in the Second Five-Year Plan (1960-65), under which the

government consciously let profits multiply while increases in wages were restricted in order to maximize the flow of invisible surplus in the corporate sector. "Such a strategy was based on an explicit acceptance of income and wealth differentials, which were allowed to grow even further as a means of achieving rapid growth rates." The committee rejected this approach; in the Islamic system, social betterment was not to be achieved through personal greed: the path to ultimate quality must not lie through initial inequality. [An Agenda for Islamic Economic Reforms: The Report of the Committee on Islamization 1980 p-14, 8] 25. Khalid B. Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan, p-57 26. In East Pakistan State Acquisition and Tenancy Act was promulgated in 1950 under which, all rent-receiving interest between cultivating tenant and the state was abolished and a ceiling of 33 acres was placed on individual ownership of land. 27. Khalid B. Sayeed op. cit., p-56 28. Planning Commission, Socio-Economic objectives of the Fourth Five Year Plan 1970-75- Karachi,1968 p-17 29. Khalid B. Sayeed, op. cit., p-61,62 30. Ibid. p-62 31.Ibid. p-63 32. General Yahya's military rule was declared illegal by the Supreme Court in Asma Jilani's case in 1973. 33. Afzal Iqbal, Democracy without dissent, Dawn Karachi 24.6.1994.