The Arab Spring and the Nth Power Problem Revisited: Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East By Regina

Joseph
ABSTRACT: Governance changes in a turbulent area long ruled by autocracies and monarchies may forge not only new national identities but also different balance-of-power dynamics at the international level. With these changes, potential regional leaders like Turkey and new proliferation challenges may emerge, requiring proactive foreign policy consideration.

As the initial surges of euphoria, optimism and hope caused by the downfall of autocracies across the Middle East become supplanted by the uncertainty and violence that accompany governance transitions, deeper questions regarding global security emerge. The so-called Arab Spring of 2011 serves as an optimal inflection point for gauging how the region s geopolitical future may unfold, and with it, how nuclear weapon states (NWS) should structure policy decisions. Energy, recurring sectarian disputes, and the complex political role of Israel are not the only critical matters of national interest affected by new rulers and coalitions; indeed, the Arab Spring augments opportunities for reshaping the balance-of-power both regionally and globally. The confluence of economics, soft and hard power dynamics and timing that surround events in the Middle East now elicit a key question: Does the Arab Spring impose a new Nth power problem? TRACKING PROLIFERATION HISTORICALLY Predicting which country could be the next to gain nuclear weapons has always been a blind man s game, resulting in some spectacularly flawed analyses and forecasts. Bearing that in mind, projecting how the Arab Awakening of 2011 may affect proliferation depends upon a careful assessment of regional and global variables. To that end, an evaluation of historical proliferation forecasts serves an important purpose in assessing which variables matter in nuclear breakout and which ones lead to misjudgment. Since the detonation of American atomic bombs in 1945, National Intelligence Estimates have overestimated horizontal proliferation to a degree that illustrates the myopia of neorealist

pessimism. In 1957, the Office of National Estimates (ONE) released the first NIE to track Nth power weapons pursuits Nth power or Nth state used interchangeably as terms denoting

states that seek to develop nuclear weapons. In it, ten countries were identified as having the potential to produce nuclear weapons by 1970, including Sweden, Canada and Japan;[1]more importantly, the estimate concluded that by the mid-1960s, an increasing number of countries will obtain possession of nuclear weapons and that effective international control will be increasingly difficult to achieve. [2] Given the Cold War assumptions of that time, the high projections of Nth country proliferation could be seen as rational expectations of states living in an anarchic structural system shaped by two nuclear superpowers locked in an ideological dialectic. Great Britain s atomic test detonation in 1952 made it the third nuclear power after the Soviet Union s acquisition of the bomb in 1949, leading to questions over the so-called fourth country problem resolved when France detonated the Gerboise Bleue bomb in 1960, and yielding the general Nth designation to signify subsequent members of the nuclear club. But in retrospect, such forecasts reveal the gap between the implications of seemingly rapid proliferation in the first phase of the Nuclear Age versus the reality of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) acquisition. More than fifty years on from that NIE, only eight countries are declared nuclear weapon states (including India, Pakistan and North Korea as non-Nuclear Proliferation Treaty [NPT] powers in addition to the five NPT states: US, Russia, UK, France, and China) and one undeclared, Israel. When the focus on Nth state horizontal proliferation in NIEs switched from developed world powers to developing countries after 1964, when China detonated its first device, the failings of an American emphasis on supply-side technological dynamics as the singular driver behind proliferation became apparent; as Moeed Yusuf asserts in his overview, Predicting Proliferation: The History of the Future of Nuclear Weapons, emergence of the more critical emphasis on demand-side intent to acquire nuclear weapons dovetailed with the greater fear generated by the idea that developing countries were more dangerous and irresponsible

nuclear states than developed countries. [3] This conversion in approach, albeit driven by biases that were not necessarily borne out by reality , represented the advent of considering nationalist , identity-based reasons for pursuing nuclear weapons a concern that gets closer to the gestalt of why states go nuclear. Alarmism over Nth power proliferation has not ebbed throughout six decades of tracking threshold states, despite the slower-than-predicted pace of weapon acquisition. Though focus has shifted away from individual Nth states to regions specifically South Asia, North-East Asia and the Middle East when considering vertical proliferation Iran has attracted the greatest attention as the most likely Nth state. But here too, dire warnings of imminent weaponization have been proffered since 1979, and yet more than 30 years on, no hard evidence of either a detonation or a viable device exists.[4] Despite its economic isolation through increasingly severe sanctions, Iran continues to defy International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors, the United Nations Security Council and global opprobrium while claiming that it only pursues a peaceful nuclear energy program. The latest report from the IAEA assert s the contrary, that aspects of Iran s nuclear program have a military dimension.[5] But these many years of conflict over Iran s program elucidate that country s longstanding calculation : the domestic survival of the political regime of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (on which the nuclear intransigence perceived Western domination a proxy for resistance to

appears to be predicated) is worth the terrible price the

country and its people pay for its nuclear pursuits. [6] As new regimes and permutations of power establish their initial platforms across several countries in the Middle East, shattering old structures and forging new identities, could the same kind of intent that compels Iran to transgress international norms for the sake of its nuclear independence take hold? MODELS AND CONDITIONS FOR ANTICIPATING PROLIFERATION As mentioned above , an early theoretical preponderance of emphasis on the technological, material-based (supply-side) environment as the main driver behind proliferation led to great

inaccuracy in determining who would proliferate and when. While access to enriched uranium, trained physicists, and research laboratories are all requisite factors in developing a nuclear weapon, they are not sufficient in themselves to determine proliferation as a direct result. Moreover, states may have all the components necessary to build a bomb, but never assemble or test one. Estimating the process of acquiring all the material components, a subsequent procession to latency, and then an ultimate drive towards nuclear breakout is, according to Scott Sagan , an exercise in forecasting that frequently errs too heavily on the technical factors without weighing the domestic and strategic dynamics; Sagan point s out the converse is also true, that political science studies of proliferation often fail to account for the technical aspects of fuel cycles and material generation, consequently yielding incomplete and erroneous arguments.[7] In estimating what effects the Arab Spring may have on future proliferation, attention to both the technological factors as well as the political factors must be equally weighted. However, given the primordial and formative effects of the changes enveloping several countries in a turbulent region, three additional dimensions on the strategic , demand-side level should be considered. The psychological dynamic of potential nuclear actors represents a critical facet for assessment. Jacques Hymans, whose identity-driven conception of foreign policy decision-making can be crystallized by his assertion that decisions to go or not to go nuclear result not from the international structure, but rather from individual hearts , [8] bases proliferation on desire and a unique personality typology. His notion of a National Identity Conception (NIC), defined as leaders conceptions of their nation s identity, [9] conveys a dispositional preference akin to an emotional need for a nuclear weapon. The complexities, dangers and costs inherent to building a bomb are so enormous that they require a very specific orientation in leaders who choose to pursue such a path. Hymans plots this unique orientation across a matrix of four distinct NICs, where nationalists (whose self-defined status to others is either equal or superior) and subalterns (whose self-defined status to others is lower) are categorized via a solidarity dimension of either sportsmanlike ( us and them ) or oppositional ( us against

them ) dispositions. In Hymans view, the NIC held by oppositional nationalists driven by fear and pride harbors the greatest potential to proliferate.

a typology

To further round out the demand-side scope of assessment, any plausible scenario would need to take Etel Solingen s concept of domestic models of political survival into account. According to Solingen, nuclear aspirants are most likely to be inward-looking nations whose regimes resist attempts to integrate into larger global orders and institutions. While this serves as a general guideline, Solingen is quick to note that her argument is probabilistic,[10] and that cases may occur where internationalist regimes may choose to pursue a weapons program. However, her theory provides an appropriate heuristic that illuminates the most basic conditions that may propel a state to become (or conversely, to reject becoming) an Nth power. When viewed through Solingen s lens, Iran s defiant posture on its nuclear program can be seen as both a manifest expression of the governing regime s entrenchment as well as a powerful method to keep its restive population in accord. A third dimension in determining where future proliferation might take place comes not from the defensive realist kit of balance-of-deterrent and survival notions, but rather the realm of ideas purveyed by constructivism. Though the common constructivist argument of a nuclear taboo holds a certain value in explaining why so few countries have actually developed weapon s ( in contrast to parsimonious defensive realist-driven arguments that predicted far greater numbers of proliferators by this time ), a more useful guide may lie in Jeffrey Legro s conception of change. In the constructivist paradigm, states define themselves through their relationships; in anticipating future change, the fluidity and interlocking nature of interactions and ideas allow us to more accurately view events through a predictive prism. Legro s synthesis of ideas, power and interest groups yield s a theory for change built around a two-stage model: when old thinking is disrupted by a shock, Legro anticipates change if the shock generates some kind of systemic collapse AND if that collapse also leads to a consolidation in the prescriptive thinking that results in reaction to that first stage of collapse. The greater the contradiction between expectations and outcomes, the greater the potential for change.[11] A shock and its

consequent breakdown are not sufficient premises to engender change. Only a situation in which a desired, prescribed outcome leads to failure can prompt a conversion in behavior. Taken together, these theories help to more accurately identify the pieces in the complex puzzle of proliferation. As Philip Tetlock and Charles McGuire proclaim in their essay, Cognitive Perspectives on Foreign Policy, decision-makers have a tendency to be cognitive misers, and thus apply simplified reasoning to multi-faceted situations a procedural knowledge approach

that often misses the mark at the predictive level.[12] Therefore, when viewing how the evolving situation in the Middle East may lead to changes in the balance-of-deterrence within the international system, efforts must be made to avoid the pitfalls of realist parsimony that dogged years of intelligence estimates and instead aim for a deeper, more identity-based understanding of the region s developments . A DEMOCRATIC AWAKENING? Forging new identities or at least attempting to throw off the shackles of old ones lies at the heart of the transformations in North Africa and the Middle East. The economic , and in many cases ideological, oppression of citizens by the autocrats and despots of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria inevitably had to reach a boiling point. Advances in communication and technology dictated that once news of Tunisia s revolution reached Arab countries in similar straits of undemocratic governance, a cascade of protest and regime change would gather with conceptual force. Each country s individual situation differed to greater or lesser degrees , but as the notion of an Arab Spring as a distinct , regionally self-defined vehicle for citizen empowerment acquired stickiness through media and interpersonal accounts , its snowball effect was sufficient to draw in such external actors as the US and European NATO states. This mass cluster of civilian, largely youth-driven uprising s in the Middle East , for once not centered on perceived Western exploitation but rather on rejection of the status quo, certainly marks a new era in the political behavior of the region. Within each revolt s core laid a critical need to destroy the trappings that defined how external observers saw each country whether

identified with Western-friendly dictators or ossified rulers too embedded in seeking their own gain to provide credible governance for their own citizens.

Casting the nature of the Middle Eastern insurrections as a triumph for democracy as an enduring human aspiration, however, may be a vision obscured by an irresistibly romantic narrative. Not all of the rebellions associated with the Arab Spring were fostered by endogenous factors, digitally adept teenagers or even a vague desire for an all-purpose notion of freedom. In the case of Gulf states like Bahrain , Saudi Arabia , Oman and Kuwait (and in non-Gulf states like Yemen and Iraq), violent Shiite opposition to ruling Sunni monarchies ( and elected rulers in the case of Yemen and Iraq) was encouraged and supported financially by Iran shrewdly using the agitated regional mood as an opportunity to pry open any strategic advantage it can for hegemony in a n area where Arab dominance , and US containment by association, rankles the historic Persian sense of entitlement to lead .[13] Here too, the notion of identity and the strong drive to assert it, trumps a more equivocal account of the events of the Arab Spring as manifestations of democratic yearning. Even countries in the region whose rulers remain unchallenged are seized by the identity implications of the Arab Spring s events. Turkey, whose nominally secular government has been led by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AK) for nearly a decade, has found itself in a n enviable position: by leveraging both hard and soft power options, it is now maneuvering itself into a role as a model for Arab countries to emulate. Turkey sees its time of opportunity, and has pursued a vigorous foreign policy on the back of the events of North Africa and the Middle East with gusto. In countries still slogging through the turmoil of nation-rebuilding after the chaos of the Arab Spring , Turkey is idealized as a state that can manage diverse faiths and Islam, build a strong economy (which stood at 8% growth in 2010)[14] , and have a voice in international affairs without sacrificing sovereignty to Western powers . Its willingness to extend itself to countries like Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and now to revolutionary forces from Syria has garnered Turkey a position of influence within the international system that it previously struggled to chase, whether via a berth within the European Union or as a decision-maker alongside , rather than under, the US. Even as the situation in Syria until recently a staunch Turkish ally deteriorates into a

bloody civil war, Turkey is commandeering a leadership role in how the proceedings will play

out. By creating buffer zones and democratic platforms for Syrian opposition groups, [15] Turkey is asserting , as Jacques Hymans would classify it, a strong sportsmanlike nationalist NIC one that emphasizes international institutionalism and diplomacy over military intervention . In doing so, it appears to be energizing action on the part of other regional Arab powers, even though it simultaneously puts Turkey at odds with its neighbor and economic partner Iran, Syria s singular supporter. The case of the Iran-Syria tandem, once a powerful axis in the middle of the Arab world, could prove to be a lynchpin in the Arab Spring s denouement. The extraordinary steps taken by the Arab League in November 2011 to suspend Syria from the organization, issue a call for the end of the Syrian situation, and conduct economic sanctions against the Bashar al-Assad regime[16] are not merely a watershed moment in the history of Middle Eastern institutional politics; the parallel cooperation with Turkey, whose own set of Syrian sanctions include suspension of all financial dealings with the regime (with trade between the countries valued at USD$2.5 billion in 2010[17] ), freezing Syrian government assets and closing off transportation routes between the two countries ,[18] signifies an increasingly tough united stance against Syria and Iran-by-proxy. As these forces coalesce in the region, one cumulative observation could be that an increasingly multi-polar scenario may play out: one in which a post-Arab Spring triadic environment emerges pitting Iran, Gulf Arabs, and secular Turkey in competition with each other. For the moment, Turkey is working together with Gulf states in an attempt to resolve the violence within Syria. However, Gulf interests, predicated on oil export and thus dependent on a variety of stakeholders including the US , run naturally counter to those of competing oil-exporter Shiite Iran, and potentially against those of an energy-importing Turkey ( who may retain an option to ally with stakeholders whose agenda s clash with those of the Gulf states) . Foreign direct investment is of critical importance for Turkey, and economic stability is of paramount concern to all three potential poles; each group s financial survival may dictate choices that can provoke conflict a particularly troubling scenario when considering Iran s nuclear latency. TRIADIC IRAN : ASSURED NUCLEAR BREAKOUT?

For over three decades, Iran has drawn intense scrutiny and provoked fear that it would become a new Nth power but after all this time Iran remain s in a state of latency. Political

efforts at bringing any possible Iranian breakout aspirations to heel have been delivered mostly through sanctions, notwithstanding the shadowy assassinations of Iranian scientists, mysterious plant explosions, and the Stuxnet worm developed by an all-but-unverified joint Israeli/US act ion. Though Russia and China typically shy away from sanctioning Iran over its UN and NPT violations due to the trade investments they have with the country (with a notable exception in 2010 and agreement to less restrictive sanctions from 2006-2008 in the UN Security Council [19] ) , it would be fair to say that no single state has any desire in seeing Iran reach nuclear breakout. However, the economic sanctions that Western powers have levied over Iran have raised questions over their efficacy :[20] the critical targets, namely the Iranian oil and gas exporting industries, have been mostly off the table thanks to the considerable volume that China (the largest consumer of Iran s energy, accounting for a full 9 % of China s total crude oil imports[21] ) and southern European states import. As a result, Iran s principal source of income remains mostly unharmed and the country s leaders continue to play a cat-and-mouse game with IAEA and UN inspectors . Iran s identity has become wrapped up in playing this game of nuclear ambiguity even

though playing it may ultimately cause the frustrated progressive movement within Iran to foster its own foreseeably bloody Persian Spring in the near future. In light of the extraordinary changes engendered by the Arab awakening, the question worth asking is: will the geopolitical events of the last year in the region have any material effect, either in terms of acceleration or deceleration, on Iran s ability to become an Nth state? Certainly the Arab Spring and the accompanying isolation and hostility it has built around Israel s borders have quickened that country s desire to pre-emptively eliminate the existential threat they see in Iran s activities . But Israel also must calculate that to unilaterally risk military intervention would cause it to lose the few remaining friends it has in the international system. Iran has warned that an Israeli strike would invoke automatic tactical responses against the US and other Western powers via a strike on the NATO ballistic missile defense shield site in

Turkey[22]

a consequence that would only ensure disaster for Israel . As much as the threat

of an Iranian nuclear weapon poses danger for Israel, a unilateral Israeli attack on Iran could prove far more dangerous still , unleashing such consequences as the possible rupture of its relations with the US ; global condemnation; increased enmity from Islamic states and nonstate actors; and economic deterioration via boycotts or embargoes. Iranian breakout represents a vexing Hobson s choice for Israel in which both options threaten Israel s survival; thus eradication of Iran s ability to develop a nuclear weapon by an Israeli strike, while highly plausible, seems also somewhat improbable, given the enormously detrimental impact such a strike would have on Israel. Even though Israeli domestic political chatter remains insistent on the matter, logic and international obligations would appear to favor diplomatic and institutional solutions even if that means Iran s activities essentially continue.

Syria n events would appear to serve a more catalytic function in determining Iran s willingness to push onwards to breakout. Unlike Iranian sanctions, the recent economic actions taken against Syria by Turkey and the Arab League have had a drastic effect relatively quickly,[23] hastening an end-game for the al-Assad administration. Iran has relied upon Syria for extension of Shia regional influence, and by association, Iran s interests. Should the al-Assad government fall to be replaced by a regime that is influenced more by Turkey (and this could very well be a plausible outcome, given Turkey s active support and protection of the Syrian Free Army members intent on overthrowing al-Assad[24] ) , Iran may find itself cornered in much the same way as Israel: facing a broad line of countries it deems hostile on its borders and ac ross the Persian Gulf . The sectarian differences between Iran and the Gulf Arabs have always discouraged friendly ties between them, although after the recent botched assassination attempt allegedly ordered by Iran against Saudi Arabia s ambassador to the US, there may be a whiff of payback -by-proxy in the unusually decisive Arab League Syrian sanctions . But until a few months ago, Turkey enjoyed good relations with Iran to the extent that for years it was willing to indirectly condone Iran s nuclear activities. In the past, Turkey would typically defend Iran by noting the hypocrisy of allowing Israel to have nuclear weapons. In 2010, it was even willing to broker, in association with Brazil, a nuclear fuel deal with Iran to avert a crisis in the United Nations.

But the days of cooperative Turkish-Iranian relations are now over. Iran sees Turkey as an agent of the West, and Turkey will not stand by and allow Iran to threaten ballistic missile attacks on its territory. As Semih Idiz succinctly asserts :
When the growing Sunni-Shiite / Alevi conflict in the region is also factored in, it is clear that time will prove it is hard to gloss over the cracks that have appeared in Turkish-Iranian ties. In the 1990s Turkey was considered ripe territory by Iran for exporting its Islamic revolution. After the advent of an apparently Iran-friendly Islamist government in Turkey, Iran s expectations in this regard increased. Now the same Mullah regime is angry that the same Islamist government in Turkey is promoting what they have hatefully labeled as liberal Islam and is trying to export it to the region and Iran. But what must anger Tehran the most presently is that the Arab masses, which it still hopes will spawn an Islamic revolution, appear to be looking more to Turkey than Iran for inspiration. [25]

Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu told his Iranian counterpart Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh in December that the threats against Turkey s NATO radar facilities were unacceptable , as was the attack on the British embassy in Tehran. A s conditions in Syria are pushed to a terminal point, the war of words between Iran and Turkey may evolve into a game of brinksmanship that drives a threatened Iran advantages of obfuscation no longer able to harness the political

to finally step up from latency to breakout.

Such a turn of events would fit the rationales proposed by Sagan, Hymans, Solingen and Legro . Iran, a country with an oppositional nationalist identity whose domestic political survival has been predicated for years on an independent nuclear posture, would be faced with a situation in which the outcome of expected, prescribed events contradict expectations: a resulting change could be ending the ambiguity of latency for once and for all. But it won t be easy. Despite a variety of reports proclaiming the ease and swiftness by which Iran could develop a bomb, more nuanced studies suggest that not only will it require possibly years, it will require testing and detonation that will almost certainly be discovered by sensors .[26] However, once such hard evidence of Nth power breakout becomes clear, then the likelihood of multi-lateral military action, should all diplomatic efforts fail to bring Iran into line with other responsible nuclear nations, increases dramatically. TRIADIC GULF STATES: BUYING Nth POWER STATUS? Unrest directed at the Sunni ruling monarchies rippled throughout the Gulf states in 2011 . While a certain percentage of it consisted of legitimate grievances against restrictive

governance that often place s the greatest pressures on guest workers from outside the Gulf , much of it was sectarian in nature and cultivated by an opportunistic Iran through Shia nonstate actors. While Arab monarchies of the Gulf have experienced fluctuations between stability and volatility (with the highest levels of turbulence ongoing in the kingdom of Bahrain s Hamid bin Isa al Khalifa), the ruling families have managed to avoid yet succumbing to revolutions by promising limited reforms. In a scenario in which the unspooling effects of the Arab Spring establish a tri-polar future for the Middle East, it s worth considering how the Gulf states may react to a potential nuclear neighborhood. While all the Gulf states have sufficient capital to explore weapons programs if they choose , only one is considered as having been likely to actually consider one. Saudia Arabia, as a function of its geostrategic importance and the predominance of its energy reserves, will be the focus of this paper s attempt to envision possible future outcomes. Saudi Arabia has lived with a nuclear Israel since the late 1960 s , and has not been compelled to see this as a sufficient trigger to undertake the building of a nuclear weapon , mostly because Israel s military forces have never posed a threat on the Kingdom s borders . Informal security guarantees from the United States have provided Saudi Arabia breathing room, but even so, in 2010, the country spent almost USD$400 billion an estimated 10.4% of its GDP on its own defense (including public order and safety). [27] I f current unfolding events moving Syria towards a new government lead to a decisive change in the nuclear posture of Syria s benefactor Iran, could a subsequent Iranian breakout be the appropriate proximate trigger for Saudi Arabia to consider becoming an Nth state? After a 2003 report in The Guardian newspaper alleging Saudi consideration of a nuclear program after NIE and IAEA revelations concerning Iran s bomb-making attempts as well as the American invasion of Iraq, emphatic denials were made by the King and various policy makers; not only did they lack a domestic nuclear energy program to produce the plutonium necessary for a bomb, they were vehemently opposed to a regional arms race and reiterated a demand for a nuclear-free-zone in the Middle East.[28]

Despite the opacity of decision-making within the Kingdom s ruling hierarchy and the passing of a decade full of transformations within the region, little would directly suggest that Saudi Arabia would change its position on setting up its own nuclear program. I t has neither the technical capacity to do so, nor the will to acquire the facilities, materials, and personnel to produce such a program. [29] However, speculation has not completely bypassed the possibility of Saudi Arabia buying a nuclear weapon from another country to reserve for its own protection should it feel the threat level adequate enough. Though to reach that threat level, not only would there need to be clear evidence of an Iranian nuclear weapon , Saudi Arabia would also have to reach the conclusion that the American security guarantee was no longer reliable. On the latter point, even when bi-lateral relationships between the US and Saudi Arabia were at their lowest point historically after the September 11th 2001 plane hijackings by a group composed predominantly of Saudi nationals, security cooperation between the two countries were not suspended. Still, a reassessment of a Saudi nuclear posture would be required if for whatever reason, the royal family felt that the US would be either unwilling or unable to protect the Kingdom from external threats. Pakistan, a staunch ally of Saudi Arabia and a nuclear state, has been often mentioned as a potential conduit through which Saudi Arabia could explore its own nuclear weapons options.[30] It has been reported that Saudi defense ministers have been present at facility tours of Pakistani nuclear operations, such as a 1999 meeting with Pakistan s then-prime minister Nawaz Sharif to visit the Kahuta site where the Ghauri missile is manufactured , in addition to reports of a delegation led by Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdel Qadeer Khan to Saudi Arabia in the same year .[31] In a 2005 account, the former Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan, G. Parthasarathy , claimed that Saudi Arabia provided USD$1 billion in financing to assist Pakistan in the construction of an Islamic bomb to counter the Hindu nuclear threat. [32] However, no hard evidence has ever surfaced of definitive cooperation between Riyadh and Islamabad on either the purchase of weapons, the establishment of a Saudi-financed program , or the creation of a nuclear security umbrella agreement between the two countries.

Given the plethora of realist arguments advocating an inevitable Saudi aspiration to develop a nuclear weapon should Iran get its own, a careful review of the identity-based theories would argue the contrary. In particular, Etel Solingen s research into the connection between economic domestic survival and proliferation establishes a persuasive case against Saudi Arabia seeking a bomb, even if current regional events precipitate others to do so. The entirety of Saudi Arabia s economy rests upon integration with the international energy market; without it, Saudi s ruling family would lose not only the financial engine that holds the state intact , it would also lose the principle element that assures it legitimacy and authority among its country s citizens. Pursuit of a nuclear weapons program would potentially invalidate the security protections afforded Saudi Arabia by others like the US, and more importantly would risk harming the country s ability to participate in the global economy unimpeded by sanctions for violating the NPT. That the bargain Saudi Arabia s people have made to forego nuclear autonomy in exchange for the financial prosperity the oil and gas business provides continues to afford citizens and rulers alike with comfort also precludes the kind of change Jeffrey Legro might forecast. As mentioned earlier, the lack of the scientific and technological resources Saudi Arabia would need to undertake a weapons program, layered on to these constructivist barriers, would satisfy factors Scott Sagan cites as being critical to understanding the improbability of Saudi Arabia turning to its own nuclear deterrent option . But perhaps one of the clearest identitybased explorations of whether Saudi Arabia could change its stance regarding the exploration of a domestic nuclear weapons program lies in Ibrahim al-Mashari s u s e of Jacques Hymans NIC theory. Al-Mashari analyzed speeches by King Abdallah of Saudi Arabia to arrive at the conclusion that Saudi Arabia is a sportsmanlike subaltern, an identity conception at odds with a high probability to proliferate.[33] Of course, this potential is entirely subject to change, should the US revoke for reasons other than proliferation itself its security pledges. While both these prospects appear highly

unlikely, regional events over a span of ten years from now may offer a very different image of the region one that may be filled with hostile neighboring regimes, a nuclear Iran, and a peak

oil environment that may compromise Saudi Arabia s ability to effectively partake of international markets and consequently ensure domestic stability. Under a confluence of these conditions, Saudi Arabia s current stance may necessitate alteration. TRIADIC TURKEY: WILL TURKISH EXCEPTIONALISM FOSTER FUTURE BREAKOUT? With a vibrant economy growing at 8% recognized as the world s 17th largest ;[34] an increase in GDP of 7.3 % in 2010 ;[35] a solidly re-elected AKP administration in 2011 ; and a pole position of influence in the Middle East region at a time when leadership is sorely needed after a year of rebellions and power vacuums , Turkey s star is unquestionably in ascendance. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu s foreign policy conception based on zero problems with neighbors and strategic depth has clearly resonated with constituencies across the Arab world, leading to a form of hero worship of Turkey in such places as Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. Even though Turkey s soft power has attracted many observers to Davutoglu s vision, the zero problems element hasn t really panned out at all. Despite Turkey s robust efforts, the country has found itself moving from a pre-Arab Spring position of solid relationships with such bordering nations as Iran and Syria, as well as close neighbors like Israel, to , in just over a year, an embattled and encircled situation in which it finds itself in conflict with all three, as well as most of its other bordering neighbors, including Iraq and Armenia (not to mention Greece and Cyprus, where conflict has never been fully resolved since 1974). On the matter of strategic depth, however, Turkey has found true success. Despite a roller coaster relationship with the US, Turkey s geographic location, as well as its identity as a hybridized East-West bridging nation, has made it an invaluable ally to America a fact most

pointedly reaffirmed in Secretary of State Hillary Clinton s remarks during the 2011 Annual Conference on US- Turkey Relations on 31stOctober . Obliquely referencing such bi-lateral low points such as Turkey s and Brazil s joint effort in 2010 to intervene in Iran s nuclear fuel swapping , thereby scuppering Secretary of State Clinton s diplomatic efforts, as well as various other sticking points that remain between the superpower and the aspirant great power , Clinton asserted both countries common interest in Turkish economic leadership [ as ] a powerful force for progress across the region. [36]

While the US looks to leverage the economic power of Turkish influence, countries in the Middle East place a greater emphasis on Turkey s Islamic identity model an irony for a

country whose emergence as a modern power was predicated on Kemalist secularity. As regional uprisings have cascaded through its neighborhood, Turkey has seized the good fortune of timing to wrest the Islamic awakening leadership mantle from Iran for itself. In so doing, it has manifested the strategic depth it has sought. However, the Turkish identity of exceptionalism Prime Minister Erdogan and Foreign Minister Davutoglu have forged is riddled with difficulties and paradoxes. While enjoying its moment of historical international indispensability, its domestic environment suggests a less salubrious condition. In July 2011, Turkey s top military commander, together with the leaders of the army, air force and navy took the unprecedented step of resigning en masse in protest of conspiracy investigations instigated by Prime Minister Erdogan ;[37] crackdowns on journalists and opposing politicians, often resulting in indefinite incarceration without due process, have spread fear through the country s academic elite and middle classes. Interestingly, the military leaders (who espouse the Kemalist line of secularism, in contrast to the crypto-Islamist view embraced by the AK Party ) and the journalists are typically accused of involvement in a shadowy deep state anti-Erdogan quasi-terrorist network called Ergenekon a charge that many people in Turkey believe to be a government witch hunt and an organization many see as a bogus diversion tactic invented by the Erdogan-supporting Gulen Movement, a civil society sect headed by Islamic theologian Fethullah Gulen .[38] Gulen Movement supporters who would prefer Turkey to reject secularism in favor of a more Islamic profile are said to have infiltrated the highest levels of both the government and the military: a factor that reinforces suspicions that the devout Muslim AK Party members Erdogan, Davutoglu and President Abdullah Gul might one day be pressed to instigate laws or reforms that would strip laicity from Turkey s domestic order. The combined effect of these incidents conveys a sense of a national system in which the democratic ideals advocated externally can fail to find traction internally. Consequently, the legitimacy that Turkey seeks through foreign policy

rhetoric that exhort s others to join together and cooperate within an international system does not appear wholly justified . Compounding this variance is the torsion Davutoglu s foreign policy conception undertakes in using a hybrid or liminal representation of Turkish exceptionalism to justify state actions and policies, an important idea advanced by Lerna K. Yanik .[39] The need for Turkey to present itself as a European state to gain access to the EU, only to find itself rejected by Europeans who see it as an Islamic country, leads to the contortion of subsequently offering itself as an Islamic role model to Middle Eastern states in search of identity-oriented leadership a state of

liminality ( being neither here nor there [40]) that is at odds with the purity of Kemalist secularism.[41] In doing this, Davutoglu s intent, as Yanik argues, is to create and promote the belief that Turkey is a special case outside the common patterns and laws of history. [42] Though Turkey has branded itself as a unique player in the international system, its NIC would fall under that of a sportsmanlike nationalist, a country who sees itself in solidarity with others, even as its status ranks as equal to or superior than others. The country s reliant relationship with the US and NATO; its close cooperation with the Arab League as events in Syria and elsewhere across the Middle East and North Africa advance; and its acquis communautairedriven stance on reform and rule of law as a concession to keeping hope alive in EU accession all these factors suggest a strong international institutionalism at work in Turkey s externallyfacing activities. Should events in the Middle East evolve into a tri-polar arrangement between Iran, the Gulf Arab states and Turkey, and even if Iran were to acquire a nuclear weapon, Turkey would be unlikely to follow suit. As Jacques Hymans has noted, a national identity that coheres with a sportsmanlike nationalist NIC is unlikely to seek nuclear weapons. At the economic level, Turkey has undergone tremendous changes to reach the enviable success it currently enjoys. As a result of building closer trade ties with its neighbors and with countries in Europe, Central Asia and the United States, Turkey s growth in the face of global recession viewed through the lens of Etel Solingen s theory of why states choose or forego would also preclude a desire to take the extraordinary step towards

nuclear weapons

proliferation. Assuming the political regime of Erdogan s AKP still holds an attraction for the

majority of the electorate based on the improving economic benefits they receive, a volte face on the issue of weapons and the subsequent opprobrium it would bring from international allies, particularly the US , would threaten the survival of both Turkey s markets as well as ultimately the AKP. This circumstance would also obviate a forecast of change if using Jeffrey Legro s model; in his parlance, this follows the if it ain t broke model, in which change is impeded on the basis of satisfaction. Technically speaking, Turkey does not currently have the materials or the technical infrastructure to build out a weapons program. While it has negotiated with several countries to import technical components to develop a peaceful nuclear power program, Turkey s close cooperation with the IAEA and its demonstrated adherence to all the major treaties governing nuclear acquisition and use (as well as proliferation prevention constructs like the Proliferation Security Initiative [PSI]), suggests a strong awareness of the ramifications of deviating from its current nuclear energy pursuits by exploring a military dimension. At this time, the most optimistic (and most likely unrealistic) projections foresee Turkey bringing its first nuclear power plant online in 2015, with two further power plants slated for completion in 2020, all of which will conform to IAEA safeguards and depend on external assistance and fuel.[43] As Scott Sagan would note, this very fact alone precludes the possibility with which Turkey would even be able to consider nuclear breakout in the immediate future short of the even more unlikely

option of buying a weapon, which has its own daunting obstacles . Aside from the theoretical reasons why Turkey s ability to become an Nth power remains doubtful in light of the regional changes precipitated by uprising s ( even if Iran gets a bomb) , the reality of the US s formal security guarantee via NATO stands as the principal motivation to stay on the non-proliferation side of the fence. For more than fifty years, Turkey has relied upon both the conventional and the nuclear deterrent s the US/NATO axis has provided , including hosting approximately 60-70 tactical nuclear weapons at its Incirlik Air Force base.[44] While Turkey may have one of the largest armies in the region, its security sits squarely on the shoulders of larger, richer Western powers. Most recently, Turkey has agreed to house the site of a radar system for the US/NATO ballistic missile defense shield. Exploration of a Turkish

nuclear weapons program would violate agreements between Turkey and its security partners to the degree that its protection from its notoriously dangerous neighborhood would be revoked. A lesser barrier to the potential for Turkish proliferation lies in the all-but-dead negotiations for accession to the European Union. German and French objection to full Turkish accession, in addition to the current chaos rendering the seams of the EU apart, make this obstacle to weapons exploration less salient currently; however, Turkey s desire to participate within the Euro market as long as the Euro remains to expand its vigorous economic development and modernization into a potential Great Power is a key driver behind Turkey s non-proliferation calculations . That is not to say that there aren t voices within Turkey urging a nuclear option. According to Turkish nonproliferation scholar Dr. Sebnem Udum, circles within the policy community advocate maintaining at least an exploratory option, should security deficiencies arise for whatever reason.[45] As stated earlier, the immediate picture does not give rise to pressing need for Turkey to follow such an option. But catalytic changes can accompany shocks, thereby rendering such a current view moot, and it is not so hard to imagine scenarios in which such shocks may arise. Indeed, the groundwork for a major change may already be forming . Iran s breakout into Nth power status would not be a sufficient shock to precipitate change from Turkey s current stance; but there are others that, accompanied by the aforementioned lability in Turkish identity, could propel Turkey s NIC from a sportsmanlike nationalist to an oppositional one, the conception most likely to incur a desire to acquire weapons. Under what circumstances could such a change happen? The most obvious and dangerous shock to Turkey s current system would be a revocation of the US/NATO security guarantee, or at the least a demonstration that such a guarantee is unreliable. Despite all assurances to Turkey, both the US and NATO face an uphill battle. Faced with an economy edging into a second recessionary dip of possibly devastating proportions, the US

must consider the greater likelihood of budget cuts and offshore balancing strategies that can cut into the heart of NATO operations.[46] Europe has neither the money nor the will to support ongoing military investment in costly NATO security initiatives, and the US will be very hard-pressed to make up the difference. A congressional supercommittee failed to meet a mid November deadline to reduce the American budget deficit by USD$1.2 trillion, triggering a law mandating automatic cuts through Federal budgets, including a particularly large tranche of defense spending to be excised: [47]
While it is not known what military spending would be cut, an expensive program aimed primarily at defending Europe is unlikely to be spared. The U.S. sees the missile defense system, aimed at countering a threat from Iran, as part of its contribution to the NATO military alliance. With the United States often complaining that it makes a disproportionately large contribution to NATO, missile defense could be especially vulnerable to budget-cutters. A missile defense system for NATO? Its going to be hard to keep people committed if they think the U.S. is picking up the tab for Europe, says Kurt Volker, who was ambassador to NATO at the end of the George W. Bush administration. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta has warned that the European missile defense program could be threatened if the special deficit reduction committee should fail to work out a deal A decade-long expansion of

military spending appears to be coming to an end, and the Obama administration has indicated it is shifting its foreign policy toward Asia, where it sees the greatest opportunities and threats of coming decades. Where does that leave Europe? Lower down the list, says Todd Harrison, senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.[48]

An additional motivation for the US to review its missile defense shield and spending on Middle East security lies in an increasing divide between the US and Israel. At the Saban Forum in December 2011, Hilary Clinton delivered unusually sharp criticism about current Israel crackdowns on dissent and democratic ideals; and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta has also been voicing increasing frustration with Israel s unwillingness to deal with its own diplomatic and security problems in the region without threatening military action. [49] Should tensions between the US and Israel deepen, a financially-strapped US may decide to avoid getting stuck into a deeper quagmire through guaranteeing Israel s security an outcome whose consequences would have a knock-on effect on Turkey s security. Layered on top of this possible sea-change in Turkey s security profile lie two potential existential threats, one real, one possibly illusory: the PKK, the Kurdish insurrection force described by both US and Turkey as a terrorist organization, poses a threat directly on Turkish borders that has already drawn Turk conventional forces into violent conflict in October 2011 . If the Kurdish Regional Government and Turkey fail to reach a resolution on how to deal with this group, the Turks will not hesitate to further escalate the matter. [50]

A second existential threat has recently emerged, this one from Russia. Recent statements by current President Dmitry Medvedev have proclaimed a hard line on the US/NATO missile defense shield. After several reassurances from the US that the NATO missile defense shield is targeted at Iran and not Russia or former Soviet satellites, Russia continues to interpret the existence of the shield as a provocation. Medvedev claims Russian missiles have been stationed at Kaliningrad , close enough to reach the radar system in Turkey , and has issued further warnings that if the US and NATO do not provide Russia with legal guarantees that its nuclear deterrent will be unthreatened (and consequently its conventional forces as well), then it will take military countermeasures. [51] While Russia has communicated its displeasure over the defense shield since the George W. Bush Jr. administration was in office, the threat to move tactical weapons in position indicates escalation to a higher threat level, and one that increases the level of insecurity to Turkey. However, the timing of the threat indicates perhaps a different motivation rather than concern over any US/NATO threat to Russia s strategic deterrent; instead, the strong man tactics of the statement are more likely a s op for domestic Russian audiences about the power and strength of Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. With an upcoming election in 2012, Putin s reign is under threat from populist restiveness, and thus repositioning the US as the old nuclear boogeyman serves Russian propaganda objectives more than the shield constitutes any serious material threat against Russian security interests. Nevertheless, the threats still ratchet up the potential for threatening Turkey s integrity. Consequently, Turkey must consider the potential for conflict if Iranian breakout triggers the actual use of the defense shield, thereby setting off a Russian response that may put Turkey in harm s way. But the likely scenario is that Russia may offer more potential opportunity than threat to Turkey: in spite of its tough talk regarding the missile defense shield, Russia has embarked upon a campaign of reintegration aimed at forging closer economic integration with its former satellites. The formation of a so-called Eurasian Union by Russia has already elicited the cooperation of Belarus and Kazakhstan in an effort to create an EU-like trade zone that encompasses the countries of Central Asia, as well as others in an effort to rival the EU.[52] For

Turkey, snubbed by the EU and in need of the energy resources that Russia has in abundance, the liminal narrative it has created may be the right story for the right moment, and may compel it to become a member of Russia s fledgling institution. Only time will tell whether the Eurasian Union pans out into a viable vehicle for trade and cooperation, or stagnates as just another Putin election year tactic. If however, threats from the PKK, Iran and even Russia dovetail as the US/NATO are forced by the economy to retract any measure of the Middle East security dimension from Turkey, it would not be difficult to envision an us versus them sentiment creeping into Turkish rhetoric a critical axis plot point in establishing an NIC disposed towards proliferation . Turkey is already finding itself in conflict with so many of its neighbors neighbors strategy despite the zero problems with

that any meaningful threat made at a time when the US may not have the

wherewithal to make good on its security promise will force Turkey to consider its vulnerability. In short, Turkey would not in the immediate future be disposed to exploring a proliferation option , but as events morph within the region and on its borders over time , thanks to the worsening global economic picture ; enduring conventional and irredentist threats from groups like the PKK ; threats of tactical strikes from Great Powers like Russia; and removal of institutional partnerships like U S/NATO s security umbrella and the promise of EU accession, then we may see Turkey s labile identity shift yet again to accommodate a narrative that sees a vulnerable Turkey projecting an identity of a bullied do-gooder in its regional neighborhood that must seek self-help to counter the extensive variety of threats it can no longer rely upon the financially hamstrung US to contain. Should these events happen over the course of the next few years, then perhaps we may by the end of this decade see a Turkey exploring its options of becoming an exceptional, aspirant Great Power that requires a nuclear deterrent for its own self-realization. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION When confronted with accusations against Iran s alleged nuclear weapons program, Turkey s foreign policy decision-makers insisted to the US and other nations bent on sanctioning Iran s activities that diplomatic resolution over the conflict could only be accomplished through

identity-and country-specific psychologies and notions. Western powers, Turkey claimed, needed to view the perspective of Iran s security needs through its cultural, regional and political lenses, in much the same way that these powers were able to make allowances for Israel s proliferation. In this respect, Turkey has made an important point. The identity component of why countries make proliferation decisions is critical to forecasting the emergence of likely Nth powers. The shifting of political constituencies and leadership in the Middle East and North Africa has provoked a rash of identity-seeking change, not only in the countries experiencing rebellions first-hand, but also within the regional states that must reconfigure their own policy to accommodate or contain incipient national transformations. In a potential tri-polar environment within the Middle East , the chance of immediate change (say within the next 1-2 years) in Nth power status as a result of the alterations engendered by the Arab Spring are roughly the same as they were prior to the revolts. But beyond the immediate-term into medium term, 3-5 years from now, scenarios involving Iran cornered into proliferation by regional isolation, or even Turkey exploring a nuclear deterrent option in the face of a weak US security guarantee, seem possible. The history of sanctions against Iran has not had the intended outcome, and should a diminished US security presence in the Middle East provoke a threatened Turkey, sanctions would certainly be counter-productive and push the country into a yet more oppositional status. Thus clever diplomatic solutions and institutional arrangements will need to be offered as structural barriers to nuclear self-help. One key may lie in using Russia as a lever. Russia s current sabre-rattling seems tactical, aimed at Russian citizens who need to see their leaders as strong-willed and macho. But Russia has serious practical concerns demographic, economic, and geographic that require it to engage with other countries for partnerships , including the US as well as European, Middle Eastern and Central Asian states . The proposed Eurasian Union would appear to be a salvo aimed at the reintegration concept of bringing former Soviet satellites under Russian control in the economic model of the European Union. However, there can be less to gain in the long run if

only economies like Belarus and Kazakhstan are willing to join . If Russia can be diplomatically encouraged to expand its vision, and work through the US and NATO to create security and financial zones in which each Great Power can transfer the technology, capital , knowledge and alliances needed to weather the distinct geostrategic challenges of the future for the global system (specifically in areas like energy, water and agricultural resources , immigration and technical innovation) then a Eurasian Union may develop real meaning beyond an empty electorally-motivated project. And should a union like this arise, Turkey could truly assume a bridging role in keeping with the neo-Ottoman vision to which the AK Party aspires. To do this would require a vast reordering of the current security environment between Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia. But as it stands, both NATO s Western security umbrella bracketing Europe and the Middle East and Russia s Eastern and Southern security system across former Soviet states are vehicles facing challenges. Russia and the US need each other to withstand the enormous complications posed by climate change, dwindling resource s, and financial restrictions. The motivations of Cold War politics are no longer as salient as the new calculus posed by globalization. To be sure, Russia s governance orientation towards Putin s strong arm tactics are supported by a calcified, clientelist system that bears resemblance to historical Soviet behavior; but the same awareness that motivated the revolutions of the Arab Spring appear s to be finally dawning on the Russian people as well. The US could use this opportunity to diplomatically strengthen its relationship with Russia; by the same token, the US could partner with Turkey in helping make a robust union that helps all three countries: the US could strengthen its diplomatic position in a region with vast resource reserves and exclusive access to them; Turkey can maintain a sportsmanlike nationalist identity and preserve the face it needs to serve its identity-specific aspirations (one denied by the EU snub) as well as reduce security threats by engaging Russian cooperation , thus decreasing the need for a nuclear deterrent; Russia can work with the US and Turkey to strengthen its position in the Middle East, where it has both security (like its only warm water naval base positioned in Tartus, Syria) and trade interests (like

Iranian nuclear fuel and technical supplies), as well as Central Asia, where many of the Muslim leaders have shown warm receptions to the moderate Islamic Turkish governance model. Of course, this would require years of careful proactive negotiating and above all, sensitivity to cultural and historic identities. But the alternative is an increasingly chaotic environment in which the instability of the oil-rich Middle East spreads through the Caucasus, Central Asia and into Russia itself factors which appear to be happening already and which, if left unchecked,

could make the Nth power problem of the Middle East look mild by comparison. ENDNOTES
[1] National Intelligence Estimate 100-6-57, Nuclear Weapons Production in Fourth Countries Likelihood and Consequences, 18th June, 1957. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB155/prolif-2.pdf [2]National Intelligence Estimate 100-6-57, Nuclear Weapons Production in Fourth Countries Likelihood and Consequences, 18th June, 1957. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB155/prolif-2.pdf [3]Moeed Yusuf, Predicting Proliferation: The History of the Future of Nuclear Weapons, Brookings Institute, Policy Paper Number 11, January 2009, p.4. [4] Scott Peterson . Imminent Iran nuclear threat? A timeline of warnings since 1979 . Christian Science Monitor, th 8 November 2011. http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/1108/Imminent-Iran-nuclear-threat-Atimeline-of-warnings-since-1979/Earliest-warnings-1979-84 [5] Yukiya Amano . Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran . International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors Report, 8th November 2011. http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/bog112011-65.pdf [6] Fredrik Dahl . Analysis: For Iran regime, sanctions and isolation over nuclear program may be price worth paying . Reuters, 29th November, 2011. http://news.nationalpost.com/2011/11/29/analysis-for-iran-regimesanctions-and-isolation-over-nuclear-program-may-be-price-worth-paying/ st [7] Scott Sagan, Nuclear Latency and Nuclear Proliferation, Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21 Century: Volume 1: The Role of Theory. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010 , pp . 80-101. [8] Jacques Hymans. The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions and Foreign Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 1. [9] Ibid. p.16. st [10] Etel Solingen. Domestic Models of Political Survival. Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21 Century: Volume 1: The Role of Theory . Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010, pp. 38-57. [11] Jeffrey W. Legro . Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005 , pp. 1-83. [12] Philip E. Tetlock , Charles B. McGuire Jr ., Cognitive Perspectives in Foreign Policy, American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays (ed. G. John Ikenberry), Boston: Wadsworth Publishing, 6th Ed., 2011 . pp. 499-514. [13] Peter Alsis, Maris s a Allison, Anthony H. Cordesman, US and Iranian Strategic Competition in the Gulf States and Yemen (draft) Center for Strategic and I nternational Studies, 16thNovember 2011. http://csis.org/files/publication/111121_Iran_Ch5_GulfState.pdf [14] Ian Black, Turkish president says Syria crisis at a dead end and change is inevitable, The Guardian, st 21 November 2011. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/21/turkish-president-syria-abdullah-gul [15] Ibid. th [16] Video, Arab League gives Syria three days to end crackdown, The Guardian, 17 November 2011. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/video/2011/nov/17/arab-league-syria-crackdown-video?intcmp=239

[17] Gokhan Kurtaran , Trade with Syria hit by Turkey s sanctions, Hurriyet Daily News, 30 November, 2011. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/trade-with-syria-hit-by-turkeyssanctions.aspx?pageID=238&nID=8201&NewsCatID=338 [18] Video, Syria faces fresh sanctions from Turkey, The Guardian, 1st December, 2011. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/video/2011/dec/01/syria-sanctions-turkey-video?intcmp=239 [19] Robert Dreyfuss, Iran Sanctions: Not Just Useless but Counterproductive, The Nation, 9thJune, 2010. http://www.thenation.com/blog/iran-sanctions-not-just-useless-counterproductive [20] Ibid. [21] Anonymous , China renews Iran oil deal with steady volume , Daily Times , 22 January 2011 . http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011%5C01%5C22%5Cstory_22-1-2011_pg5_32 [22] Anonymous, Iran to hit Turkey if nuclear program targeted by Israel, US, Associated Press, 26th November, 2011. http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/iran-to-hit-turkey-if-nuclear-program-targeted-by-israelu-s-general-says-1.397862 [23] Neil MacFarquhar, Syrians Say They Are Feeling The Grip of Sanctions, The New York Times, 2 December, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/03/world/middleeast/syrians-say-they-are-feeling-grip-of-economicsanctions.html?hp [24] Anonymous, Syrian opposition to coordinate with free Syrian Army, BBC News, 1st December, 2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-15984682 [25] Semeh Idiz, Cracks appear in Turkey-Iran ties, Hurriyet Daily News, 1st December, 2011. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/Default.aspx?PageID=238&nID=8258&NewsCatID=416 [26] Joseph Cirincione, Elise Connor, How Iran Can Build a Bomb, Foreign Policy, 1stJuly, 2010. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/07/01/how_iran_can_build_a_bomb [27] Anonymous, Defense costs, The Economist, 8thJune, 2011. http://www.economist.com/blogs/dailychart/2011/06/military-spending [28] Ibrahim al-Marashi, Saudi Petro-Nukes? Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21stCentury: Volume 2: A Comparative Perspective . Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010, pp. 77- 7 8 . [29] Ibid. [30] Ibid. [31] Ibid. [32] Beyond the Challenges Facing Iran and the IAEA Concerning the Nuclear Dossier, Speech by Supreme National Security Council Secretary Hassan Rohani to the Supreme Cultural Revolution Council, published in Rahbord, 30th September , 2005, OSC document, pp. 7-38. st [33] Ibrahim al-Marashi, Saudi Petro-Nukes? Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21 Century: Volume 2: A Comparative Perspective. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010, pp. 82. [34] James Traub, Turkey s Rules, The New York Times, 20th January 2011 [35] CIA World Fact Book, Turkey. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html [36] Hillary Clinton, Remarks at the 2011 Annual Conference on US-Turkey Relations, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/10/176445.htm th [37] Gul Tuysuz and Sabrina Tavernise, Top Generals Quit in Group, Stunning Turks, The New York Times, 29 July, 2011 , http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/30/world/europe/30turkey.html?pagewanted=all [38] Gareth H. Jenkins, Between Fact and Fantasy: Turkey s Ergenekon Investigation, Silk Road Paper, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute& Silk Road Studies Program, Johns Hopkins University-SAIS, August 2009. http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/silkroadpapers/0908Ergenekon.pdf [39] Lerna K. Yanik, Constructing Turkish exceptionalism : Discourses of liminality and hybridity in post-Cold War Turkish foreign policy, Political Geography , Vol. 30, Issue 2, February 2011, pp. 80-89. [40] Ibid. [41] Ibid. [42] Ian Tyrrell , American exceptionalism in an age of international history. American Historical Review, Vol. 96 , no. 4 , 1991 . pp. 1031 1055 [43] Jessica Varnum. Turkey in Transition, Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21stCentury: Volume 2: A Comparative Perspective . Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010, p. 249. [44] Turkey Profile, Nuclear Threat Initiative, nti.org. http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Turkey/index.html

th

[45] Udum, Sebnem. Turkey s non-nuclear weapon status: A theoretical assessment, ISYP Journal of Science and
World Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2007. http://www.scienceandworldaffairs.org/PDFs/Vol3No2_Sebnem.pdf th [46] Judy Dempsey, NATO s Noble Words Go For Naught, The New York Times, 7 November, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/08/world/europe/08iht-letter08.html [47] Butler, Desmond. US Budget Woes Could Hit European Missile Defense, Salon.com , 19 th November 2011. http://www.salon.com/2011/11/19/us_budget_woes_could_hit_european_missile_defense_2_2/ [48] Ibid. th [49] Jonathan Guyer. Israel s chilling relations with the US, The Guardian, 6 December, 2011. http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/dec/06/israel-chilling-relations-us [50] Video, Turkey seek Iraqi Kurdish support against PKK, Press TV, http://www.presstv.ir/detail/208612.html th [51]Anonymous, Russia says missiles to target US nuclear shield in Europe, The Guardian, 24 November, 2011. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/24/russia-targets-us-missile-shield [52] Gleb Bryanski, Russia s Putin says wants to build Eurasian Union , Reuters, 3rdOctober, 2011. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/03/us-russia-putin-eurasian-idUSTRE7926ZD20111003