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Turkey and Eurasia: Frontiers of a new geographic imagination

NEW PERSPECTIVES ON TURKEY

Blent Aras Hakan Fidan Abstract

Turkey has adopted a new course in foreign policy toward Eurasia. This article employs the notion of geographic imagination to analyze how Turkish policy-makers have developed a new political rhetoric and foreign policy towards the Eurasian region, specifically Central Asia, the Caucasus and Russia. Turkish policy-makers aim to further Turkeys interests ranging from security, over regional trade, to energy issues in this geography, in addition to creating an environment of cooperation and eliminating regional power constellations. We conclude that Turkeys renewed activism has opened new horizons for its relations in this region and that this new foreign policy orientation is linked to reform and change in Turkeys domestic landscape. Keywords: Critical geopolitics, Turkey, Eurasia, Russian Federation, Caucasus

The literature on critical geopolitics questions the relationship between space and place, as well as the cultural and political dimensions that enter into close interaction with them.1 It especially focuses on how the geoBlent Aras, Department of International Relations, Ik University, Kumbaba Mevkii, 34980, ile, stanbul. abulent@isikun.edu.tr. Hakan Fidan, Deputy Undersecretary of the Prime Ministry of Turkey, hakandan@bilkent.edu.tr. Authors Note: The views expressed here reflect the views of the two authors alone and do not those of the Turkish government. 1 For a sample of works in the tradition of the new geopolitics, see, John A. Agnew, Geopolitics: revisioning world politics (London: Routledge, 1998), Simon Dalby and Gearid . Tuathail, The Critical Geopolitics Constellation: Problematizing Fusions of Geographical Knowledge and Power, Political Geography 15, no. 6-7 (1998), Gearid . Tuathail, Rethinking Geopolitics (London: Routledge, 1998), Gearid . Tuathail, Geopolitical Structures and Geopolitical Cultures: Towards Conceptual Clarity in the Critical Study of Geopolitics, in Geopolitics: Global Problems and Regional Concerns, Bison
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graphic imagination shapes the cognitive maps of political elites and thus paves the way for naming regions (i.e., Middle East), constructing mental zones (i.e., East and West), and the making of a culture of geopolitics. Geographic imagination is based on (and leads to) a number of attributions and categorizations, shaping the rhetoric and practices of policymakers. For example, there is a certain kind of understanding and perception about a region if it is located in the West. This conceptualization is socially constructed through historical experiences and interactions. The language and rhetoric used to describe such a region from policy formulation to the perception of its traffic order are influenced by the long-standing image and interpretation of the West. These attributions, categorizations, and perceptions lead to the emergence of a culture of geopolitics, which influences the making of regional foreign policy. The creation of new geopolitical images of threat plays an important role in the determination of foreign policy preferences. Geographic imagination may also re-define potential enemies as potential allies and a previous zone of conflict as a potential area of influence. Such changes reflect a distinct form of relationship between power and geography.2 Traditionally, geopolitics has been considered a concrete science dealing with natural, objective and static realities vis--vis the vague boundaries of foreign policy analysis. The premise of critical geopolitics has challenged this traditional view with the idea that geographical space is a product of social construction. This new approach is concerned as much with maps of meaning as it is with maps of states. The boundarydrawing practices [] are conceptual and cartographic, imaginary and actual, social and aesthetic.3 Imaginative creativity plays an important role in constructing and interpreting geography. In this process, concepts (such as identity, perception, and bias) are as important as material factors (such as proximity, territory, and spatial borders). In this article, we argue that geographic imagination provides a framework of assumptions and representations for policy-makers. These assumptions and representations are the practical implications of interactions between knowledge, power, and spatiality in shaping the relationship between politics and geography. We analyze the role of geographic imagination as determinant of political language and rhetopaper 4, ed. L. Tchantouridze (Winnipeg: Centre for Defense and Security Studies, 2003), . Gearid Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics (Minnesota: University of Minnesota, 1996). As Said noted, just as none of us is outside or beyond geography, none of us is completely free from the struggle over geography. That struggle is complex and interesting because it is not only about soldiers and cannons but also about ideas, about forms, about images and imaginings. Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (London: Chatto and Windus, 1993), 7. Dalby and Tuathail, The Critical Geopolitics Constellation, 4.

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ric, which finds its expression in foreign policy behavior. In this sense, the geographic imagination integrates both agent- and structure-level factors into regional foreign policy analysis. We argue that the role of geographic imagination in determining regional policy provides a useful tool for understanding Turkish foreign policy towards Eurasia. We hold the idea that Turkey adopted a new course in foreign policy due to political transformations at home, which resulted in a reconstruction of the previous geographic imagination in policy-making circles. The flexibility and adaptability of the new geographic imagination seems greater considering the dynamic harmonization process with the EU foreign policy line. Turkeys adoption of a zero-problem policy towards its neighbors, in connection with this new understanding of geography, has resolved previously contentious issues to a considerable degree. The Turkish policy-makers new geographic imagination of bordering regions cast aside the former bad neighborhood atmosphere and made Turkey a more active regional participant and partner. Turkeys zero-problem policy, as an imitation of the EUs neighborhood policy, has allowed Turkey to reach beyond its immediate borders. In the following sections, we will use the notion of Turkish policymakers geographic imagination in order to analyze the development of the new political discourse and foreign policy currently applied to the Eurasian region, specifically Central Asia, the Caucasus and Russia. We will conclude the article with a general assessment of the new policy approach and its implications for Turkeys future role in the region. The origins of Turkeys new geographic imagination The geographic imagination of Turkish policy-makers has been strongly influenced by Turkeys recent domestic political transformation and, to a lesser extent, by changes in regional and international politics. The old geographic imagination regarded Turkeys neighborhood as a geography of chaos and a source of instability. This resulted in Turkeys conscious alienation and limited involvement in the region. Turkeys domestic transformation, a favorable international environment, and the advent of a new geographic imagination changed this old pattern in regional policy. The meaning of the nations geography has changed; territorial limitations to involvement in the region have been eliminated in the minds of the policy-makers; domestic security has been tied to regional security; social sectors have increased their role in policy-making; and de-securitization has changed the security-first approach to foreign policy-making. As a result, the altered geographic imagination has created a new framework for Turkish policy in neighboring regions and beyond.

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The shift from bad neighborhood to zero-problem zone in less than a decade is very telling about the transformation of Turkeys geographic imagination. Domestic changes in Turkey, primarily the consolidation of stability and the deepening of democracy, are the main drivers behind the recent change in policy-makers geographic imagination. There is a direct connection between domestic stability and regional security, and even domestic stability should be considered a precondition for positive attitudes toward regional security. Turkey has undergone a process of serious reforms and political transformation, which have accelerated after Turkeys official recognition as a candidate country by the European Union (EU) at the Helsinki Summit in 1999. The membership prospect provided Turkey with a common goal around which different elite groups came together. The coalition government of the time adopted structural reforms in the economy and started a major democratization program. In the elections of November 2002, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalknma Partisi, AKP) won a landslide victory by running a pro-EU campaign. The reform process has continued under this new government. This domestic reform process has contributed to the emergence of a new geographic imagination, with significant implications for Turkeys foreign policy. The result of relative domestic stability was not only the prevention of trans-border destabilization, but also a bolstered selfconfidence in foreign policy, the emergence of a new sense of neighborhood, and the re-evaluation of the merits of peace and stability in regional terms. Turkeys peaceful transformation led to its emergence as a peace-promoter in neighboring regions. As a result of these domestic transformations, various social groups increased their role in the making of foreign policy. Business organizations, civil society, intellectuals, think-tanks, and other actors now provide input into the foreign policy-making process. The new role of these institutions is part of this geographical imagination, in contrast to a past when these regions were imagined in such a way that there was no room for these actors in the foreign policy-making process. Turkish politicians have also promised to contribute to the security, stability and prosperity in a wide range of territories beyond Turkeys immediate neighborhood, such as Central and South Asia. Turkeys renewed interest in these territories is the result of putting its internal affairs in order, gaining self-confidence in international relations, developing a broader perspective in foreign policy, and seeking an influential role in world politics. As argued by Ahmet Davutolu, the chief advisor to the Prime Minister and the intellectual architect of the foreign policy

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of the ruling Justice and Development Party, Turkey is a country with a close land basin, the epicenter of the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus, the center of Eurasia in general and is in the middle of the Rimland belt cutting across the Mediterranean to the Pacific. 4 Although the distances remain the same, the perception of these geographic regions has significantly changed through the lens of a new geographic imagination. The imaginative creativity is the product of both official and societal actors. Support and resistance at the societal level is an important determinant of the frontiers of this geographic imagination. The physical distance and prior difficulties of involvement in these regions no longer make sense to policy-makers or the public. Turkey has discovered the proximity of these geographic regions and their availability for involvement by remembering past relations, unfolding cultural and civilizational affinities, and exploring opportunities for engagement. In the perspective of policy-makers, the new foreign policy places Turkey within various regions in such a way that it occupies not only an important geo-political position, but that it also would be able to emerge as a meaningful player in political and economic settings. The Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan exemplified this rhetoric when he said: Istanbul is not only a center combining the continents but also a central symbol combining and synthesizing the civilizations.5 He places Istanbul at the center of a vast landscape, and Turkeys geography gains new meaning from this wider territorial context. As underlined by Kirii, according to Turkish policy-makers, the political development, economic capabilities, dynamic social forces, and ability to reconcile Islam and democracy at home are the qualities that offer Turkey the possibility to develop and implement such active and influential policies in distant geographic regions, from Africa to the Far East, in the same context.6 The new geographical imagination gave rise to novel interpretations of the Eurasian region in the minds of foreign policy-makers. Many security challenges emerging in Eurasia continue to occupy the agenda of international and global security. Eurasian countries and their neighbors are acutely sensitive to regional dynamics, and a number of factors such as the changing regional security structure, the emergence of new republics, increasing outside interference, regional power rivalries, the
4 5 The World of Business Now Spearheads Foreign Policy: An Interview with Ahmet Davutolu, TurkishTime, 15 April 15 May 2004. Recep Tayyip Erdoan, Speech to 38th Annual Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Asian Development Bank, 5 May 2005, http://www.adb.org/annualmeeting/2005/Speeches/prime-ministerspeech.html. Kemal Kirii, Turkeys Foreign Policy in Turbulent Times, in Chaillot Paper 92 (Paris: EU-ISS, 2006), 96.

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operations of international terrorist networks, and the integration of the Caspian region into global energy geopolitics have forced the regions countries to restructure their policies towards Eurasia. Turkeys profile is rising in the region, at a time when Eurasian actors face increasingly complex challenges. This region has been considered by Turkish policy-makers as a potential area of influence and opportunity since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.7 The new regional discourse and policy aims to pursue an active foreign policy, in order to achieve the goal of a zero-problem policy in its relations with countries of the region. Turkeys new approach seeks to benefit from closer economic and political relations in order to make Turkey an energy hub through regional energy projects, to facilitate solutions to regional problems, and to engage with international actors and institutions with the aim to ensure regional stability and security. Central Asia Turkey was among the first countries to recognize the independence of the Central Asian republics in the early 1990s. The emergence of sister states, sometimes called Turkic (or Turkish) republics, including Tajikistan, precipitated an outbreak of excitement in almost all political wings in Turkey. The potential for a Turkish world stretching from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China became a new topic of discussion in Turkish policy circles and the media. There were many reasons behind the interest caused by the reunion with Central Asian peoples, from whom Anatolian Turks had long been separated. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the immediate perception among Turkish policy-makers was that Turkeys strategic value for the US was in decline. Moreover, Turkeys full membership application to the EU had been rejected. The Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) and a renewed focus on the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) were part of Turkeys search for a new foreign policy.8 As an attempt to counter Irans potential role, the new Turkish Model was touted by the West and presented to the Central Asian states. The idea behind the promotion of this model was that Turkeys secular and democratic political structure and its free market economy would set an example for the newly emerging republics.9 Within this paradigm,
7 8 9 Blent Aras, Turkeys Policy in the Former Soviet South: Assets and Options, Turkish Studies 1, no. 1 (2000). Kemal Kirii, The End of the Cold War and Changes in Turkish Foreign Policy Behavior, Foreign Policy 17, no. 3-4 (1993). dris Bal, Turkish Model and the Turkic Republics, Perceptions 3, no. 3 (September-November

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and as a result of the late President Turgut zals dynamic approach to Turkeys foreign policy, political and economic relations were established with the Central Asian republics. The Wests proffering of Turkey as a new model meant the recognition of Turkeys Western identity in the aftermath of the Cold War era. But the great enthusiasm generated by the proximity to the sister states led to promises that Turkey would prove unable to keep. Turkeys economic crises in the 1990s and in 2001 prevented the country from strengthening its economic ties to the region. Turkeys interest in the Central Asian countries also declined rapidly beginning in the late 1990s. The role ascribed to Turkey as a model and bridge country failed. The circles that had put forward the thesis of a power gap to be filled by Turkey began to claim that the Russian Federation was the only country with real influence in the region. As Turkey makes progress on the path towards the EU, its relations with other regions have gained depth and influence. The changes in its understanding of national security, new patterns in civil-military relations, the new dynamic role of civil society in foreign policy-making, and the emerging civil-economic role in regional affairs exemplify the impact of domestic transformation a result of the reforms within the EU membership process on foreign policy behavior. While moving towards the West, Turkey is generating new areas of engagement in the East. Although Turkeys borders have remained the same, Turkish policy-makers new geographic imagination and new-found self-confidence have created momentum in extending Turkeys sphere of influence to the Middle East, the Gulf region, Central Asia, and beyond. In the minds of Turkish politicians, Turkey has started acting according to its new identity as a central country, leaving the bridge country rhetoric behind.10 With its new geographical aspirations and in the context of this new strategy the Central Asian region and the Caspian Basin stand out as potential spheres of influence in which Turkey seeks an active role. Turkeys policy towards Central Asia reflects the new characteristics of the geographical imagination and its manifestation in a different foreign policy approach. Prime Minister Erdoan visited Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan once, Tajikistan twice, and Turkmenistan three times since October of 2003. President Abdullah Gl visited Turkmenistan once and Kazakhstan twice.11 The shift from enthusiastic and sentimental policy attitudes to a more realistic and constructive policy line towards Central Asia is not likely to be smooth and easy,
1998). 10 Ahmet Davutolu, Turkeys New Foreign Policy Vision, Insight Turkey 10, no. 1 (2008). 11 For details of these visists, see http://www.basbakanlik.gov.tr and http://www.cankaya.gov.tr.

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but it is an ongoing project under the assertion of the new geographic imagination. Turkeys other priority regarding Central Asia is to make sure that its new states acquire the capacity to establish stability and security at home and that they develop the capability to effectively cope with regional and domestic problems. In this regard, the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA), as an official development aid organization, has played a crucial role.12 Through TIKA, Turkey has provided funds to Central Asian countries since their independence, and TIKAs role has only grown under the auspices of Turkeys new foreign policy vision. Its substantial development aid and diverse activities in various fields are important in terms of demonstrating Turkeys vision of sharing its gains with its sister states and communities. Sixty percent of TIKAs USD 702 million in development aid in 2007 went to Central Asia and the Caucasus. These funds sponsored projects in economic and industrial infrastructure development, the health and education sectors, academic cooperation between Turkish and Eurasian universities, internship programs in Turkey for Central Asian and Caucasian university students, Turkish language programs, and the promotion of business and trade.13 Turkeys new policy is also backed by civil society activities. The impact of the new policy is visible in the overall performance of civil and official activities in Central Asia. Turkish businesspeople, contractors, and civil society organizations have launched numerous initiatives and projects in Central Asian states. President Abdullah Gl, for instance, was accompanied by representatives of the Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB) and a large number of businesspeople during his visit to Turkmenistan in December of 2007.14 TIKA also supports civil society organizations, research centers, and universities pursuing relevant projects in this region. Businesspeople and civil society organizations are seen as essential for Turkeys commitment to the stability and welfare of the region. The Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists of Turkey (TUSKON) has established a framework, entitled the Turkey-Eurasia Foreign Trade Bridge, to facilitate Turkeys business relations in Eurasia. TUSKON represents 150 asso12 Hakan Fidan and Rahman Nurdun, Turkeys Role in the Global Development Assistance Community: the Case of TIKA (Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency). Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans 10, no. 1 (2008). 13 2007 TKA Faaliyet Raporu, (Ankara: TKA Yaynlar, 2008), 2007 Trkiye Kalknma Yardmlar Raporu, (Ankara: TKA Yaynlar, 2008). 14 Sabah, 8 December 2008.

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ciations of businesspeople and their 12,000 members, which operate in 80 provinces of Turkey. In December of 2007, TUSKON organized its second convention, during which 500 businesspeople from twelve Eurasian countries met with 1,200 Turkish colleagues to explore joint business opportunities. This convention also hosted 72 high-level economic bureaucrats from Eurasian countries. TUSKONs Eurasian framework aims to connect the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, and the Caspian Sea regions and to transform this region into a free trade zone.15 In May of 2008, the Marmara Foundation organized a similar event, called the Eurasia Economic Summit, with the aim to foster economic relations between Turkey and Eurasian countries.16 These initiatives target Central Asian countries and provide societal support for more active state policies in this region. Turkeys other priority is to transport the regions rich energy resources to world markets via its own territory, thereby transforming Turkey into an energy hub. Turkeys new policy thus aims to secure and diversify oil and gas transportation to Europe. Turkey is an important actor in bringing about the East-West Energy Corridor, which was initially championed by the US and later appropriated by the European Union. This project aims to connect Caspian resources to Western markets. The US supports these alternate routes in order to bolster Azerbaijans and Georgias economic development and independence from Russias sphere of influence. The major development to date is the 1,768-kilometer-long BakuTbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, which was signed after years of negotiation and rivalry between Azerbaijan, Russia, Turkey, and several multinational companies. The BTC has a capacity of 1 million barrels per day and 50 million tons of oil per year. But Turkey has other ambitious gas pipeline projects in mind, such as Nabucco and the Trans-Adriatic pipeline, for transporting Caspian and other gas reserves through the country to European markets. During his visit to India in February of 2008, the Turkish foreign minister Ali Babacan even proposed a project to transport Caspian oil from Turkey to India via Israel.17 This proposal gained more strength during Prime Minister Erdoans visit to India in November of 2008.18 There are agreements and ongoing feasibility studies under way for the transportation of oil and gas reserves from Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to world markets.
15 16 17 18 For more information see TUSKON web site at http://www.tuskoneurasia.com. For more information see, Marmara Foundation web site at http://www.marmaragrubu.org/aez.htm Milliyet, 2 August 2008. Hrriyet, 24 November 2008.

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South Caucasus Turkey pursues a special relationship with Azerbaijan, which has been influential in Turkeys regional policy and bilateral relations with Caucasian countries. Their common ethnic, cultural, and religious ties, and the Azerbaijani governments warm attitude toward Turkey have strengthened relations between the two states. There is also strong support in Turkeys nationalist circles and society at large in favor of close relations with Azerbaijan. The new geographical imagination has strengthened this perception with an additional emphasis on the need for a solution to the Karabakh question, a region disputed between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Turkish politicians support existing international settlement mechanisms, pursue a dual-track policy of normalization with Armenia while bridging the gap between Armenia and Azerbaijan on the Karabakh question, and try to create a region-wide platform to facilitate a solution to the problem. Turkey also hopes to find guaranteed access to vital energy resources, such as the lucrative oil transport revenues in the Caspian basin, especially in Azerbaijan, and achieved a certain degree of success when the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline was finished and became a main export pipeline in 2006. The Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) pipeline has been established in parallel with BTC and carries Azerbaijani gas to Turkey. The BTE has the potential to supply Caspian gas to Europe through additional planned projects.19 Alongside these benefits, however, Turkeys close relationship with Azerbaijan has certain drawbacks. It is a major factor preventing the normalization of relations between Turkey and Armenia. Armenia has occupied Nagorno-Karabakh and one-fifth of the Azerbaijani territory and disregards UN Security Council decisions against the occupation. Ankara has close ties to Baku and benefits from energy cooperation deals. Azerbaijan is Turkeys major partner and likely to remain the most important country in the region. For its part, the Armenian state considers Turkey and Azerbaijan to be serious threats to its national security and territorial integrity.20 The Armenian administration therefore pursues a balancing policy through the maintenance of close relations with Russia and Iran. Russia has military bases in Armenia, and Russian soldiers provide security for Armenian borders. In the eyes of the Armenian administration, Russia is a strategic partner and protector against potential Azerbaijani and Turkish aggression. Armenias balancing policy has
19 Emre eri, Geopolitics of Oil and Pipelines in the Eurasian Heartland, in The Politics of Oil ed. Bulent Gkay (London: Routledge, 2006). 20 Taline Papazian, From Ter-Petrossian to Kocharian: Explaining Continuity in Armenian Foreign Policy, 1991-2003, Demokratizatsiya 14, no. 2 (2006).

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remained a major tenet of its foreign policy in the post-independence period. Turkish-Armenian relations are shaped by the wider framework of Turkeys Caucasian policy and the impact of the Armenian Diaspora. A fear of encirclement lurks in the background of Armenias domestic politics and foreign policy. The immediate effect of this fear is an inward-oriented domestic policy and an insecure foreign policy line. Armenia has problems with all of its neighbors except for Iran. Energy supply lines and new transportation networks in the region have excluded Armenia, while generating considerable foreign income for Azerbaijan as an energy-rich country and for Georgia and Turkey as the hosts of pipelines extending to world markets. Armenias difficulties with Georgia stem from the formers close ties to Russia; its clashes with Azerbaijan stem from the occupation and the Karabakh question; and its relations with Turkey are uneasy due to territorial demands and genocide allegations. In addition to this tense regional situation, Armenia also feels the effects of an unstable domestic political environment, economic difficulties, and rising levels of unemployment. Armenian foreign trade is overwhelmingly dependent on Georgian ports, and the Russian bombing of the Georgian port of Poti during the crisis in August of 2008 only worsened the countrys economic situation. Armenia thus feels an urgent need to reconsider its regional relations. Its economic and political alienation in the region creates an impetus to normalize relations with Turkey. Political will to normalization is reflected in the Turkish policy-makers search for a zero-problem policy in its neighborhood and Turkeys desire to stabilize the Caucasus through a region-wide inclusive platform. In such a fragile regional environment, Armenia has begun to take on new meaning in the minds of policy-makers, and this new attitude has created an impetus to normalize relations. Davutolu has pointed out that [w]e want to have the best relations with Armenia. [] We do not see Armenia as a threat or enemy.21 The vulnerability of Georgian territory has also caused worry in Ankara in terms of the sustainability of the BTC pipeline and future pipeline projects. The normalization of relations with Armenia and a solution to the Karabakh problem may create chances for new venues for future regional pipeline projects. Despite historically strained relations between Turks and Armenians, Turkey recognized Armenia earlier than many other states and invited Armenia to join the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization as a founding member in 1993, despite the fact that Armenia has no shore21 Davutolundan Ermenistana Net Mesajlar, Star, 29 September 2008.

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line on the Black Sea. Yerevan-Istanbul flights are operational despite the closure of the land borders between Armenia and Turkey, and Turkey tolerates thousands of illegal Armenian workers within its borders. There is a notable softening towards Armenia among Turkish policymakers and within Turkish society.22 Turkish authorities have renovated several Armenian cultural and historic monuments in different places in Turkey.23 In December of 2008, a group of 200 Turkish intellectuals issued an apology for what they call the Great Catastrophe that the Ottoman Armenians were subjected to in 1915. The apology stated that they share in the feelings and pain of [their] Armenian brothers, and apologize to them. 24 The Turkish President Gl considered this declaration as an opportune sign for the beginnings of a democratic discussion in Turkey about this chapter in its history.25 The official statement of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs was similar to Gls response and underlined the possibility of alternative voices in a democratic environment.26 Although this declaration was not supported by Prime Minister Erdoan and criticized by nationalist circles in Turkey, it touched the Armenian taboo and demonstrated that attitudes toward the Armenian issue are changing. 27 Although Turkey and Armenia do not have official diplomatic relations, behind-the-scenes diplomacy continues. Turkeys response to Irans offer of mediation we are already talking to Armenia revealed this hidden diplomacy.28 The developments in 2008 have shown that there are possibilities for closer ties. In a historic gesture, the Armenian President Serge Sarkisian invited President Abdullah Gl to watch the World Cup-qualifying football match between the national teams of the two countries. This invitation came amidst hopes for a breakthrough in relations between Turkey and Armenia. President Gl did in fact visit Armenia to watch the match as a goodwill gesture on 6 September 2008.29 The Armenian as well as the Turkish public harbor mixed feelings about President Gls visit to Armenia and the normalization of rela22 The Armenian historian Ara Saraan has pointed out this recent softening and added that the Turkish public has openly started to discuss Armenian history, culture and cuisine. See, APdeki Ermeni Konferans, (2008), http://www.abhaber.com/ozelhaber.php?id=1940. 23 The renovated artifacts include, among others, the Church of Akhtamar, the Armenian Catholic Church in Diyarbakr, historical Armenian houses in Beykoz, and the Armenian Church in Ordu. 24 The apology was made through an online campaign, which is available at http://ozurdiliyoruz.com. 25 smet Berkan, Kiisel Bir ey, Radikal, 19 December 2008. 26 Kampanya Ak Toplumun Gstergesi, Taraf, 18 December 2008. 27 Cengiz andar, Genelkurmay, Sivil Bireyler ve Ermeni Tabusu... Radikal, 20 December 2008. 28 Milliyet, 20 July 2008. 29 Hrriyet, 7 September 2008.

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tions in general. In Armenia, the opposition favors normalization, while the Tasnaksutyun Party opposes any rapprochement.30 The latter has strong economic and political links with the Armenian Diaspora and acts as a strong anti-Turkish group in Armenia. In Turkey, both major opposition parties namely, the Republican Peoples Party and the Nationalist Action Party criticized President Gls visit to Armenia. Turkeys Prime Minister Erdoan backed the visit, considering it a constructive step towards a normalization of relations.31 For its part, the Azerbaijani government refrains from commenting on Turkish-Armenian relations, although some weak voices express hope that Turkeys developing relations with Armenia may serve as a prelude for freeing the Azeri territories under occupation. At the same time, there is strong criticism among the Azerbaijani opposition against any progress in Turkish-Armenian relations.32 Turkish politicians also pursue trilateral talks among Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan for the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations and a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Babacan met with both the Armenian Foreign Minister Eduard Nalbandian and the Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov in September in New York and then later separately in December of 2008 in Helsinki. The new imagination of policy-makers has created a strong political will to pursue an active policy in the Caucasus for the solution of regional problems. As Babacan has argued, I can say that things are going well both in the process between Azerbaijan and Armenia as well as between Turkey and Armenia and I hope that the talks would yield the desired result, which is the total normalization of relations.33 Turkish policy-makers also pursue shuttle diplomacy in the region to prepare the regional actors for their involvement in regional affairs. For example, Babacan and Erdoan visited Georgia, Russia, and Azerbaijan after the Russian-Georgian crisis. President Gl and Babacan again visited Azerbaijan to address the concerns in the country and pursue talks among Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan simultaneously. There is increasing contact on the ministerial level between Armenia and Turkey.34 Turkish policy-makers also continue to
30 Hovhannes Nikoghosyan, Fair Dialogue, the Best Way Forward, Turkish Daily News, 26 August 2008.. 31 brahim Kaln, From History to Realpolitik in Armenian-Turkish Relations, Todays Zaman, 11 September 2008. 32 Semih diz, Azerbaycan da Geni Adan Bakabilmeli, Milliyet, 8 September 2008. 33 Babacan Azeri ve Ermeni Bakanlarla Helsinkideydi, Taraf, 5 December 2008. 34 aban Karda, Armenian Foreign Minister Visits Turkey, Reaffirms Determination for Dialogue, Eurasia Daily Monitor 5, no. 228 (2008).

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contribute to settlement mechanisms, such as the Minsk process, for a solution to the Karabakh question. In fact, Babacans meeting with Nalbandian and Mammadyarov happened after the Minsk group gathered to discuss the results of the meeting. Turkey was one of the first countries to formally recognize Georgias independence. Throughout its political reconstruction process, Turkey adopted a friendly and cooperative approach towards Georgia. This was mainly due to Turkeys aspiration for stability in its neighboring regions. Georgias stability is important for two main reasons: first, the political and territorial integrity of Georgia affects Turkeys border security, and second, in economic terms, Georgia is a major passageway for energy resources from the Caspian Sea region to Turkey and the rest of the world market. However, the ethnic clashes that took place in Georgia right after independence threatened the economic and trade packages. One of the major security issues to adversely affect relations between Turkey and Georgia were the civil war and military conflicts that occurred in South Ossetia in the north and Abkhazia in the northwest, both of which threatened the political and economic stability of the country.35 Although Turkey did not take sides in these conflicts, Russias involvement raised tensions between the two countries. Oil transportation is one of the most important factors for the rapprochement between Turkey and Georgia. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline project gave Georgia the chance to promote its independence from Russia by enhancing its strategic significance.36 It can be assumed that Russias involvement in Georgias civil disorder is directly related to its goal of regaining control of energy routes in the region. Accordingly, for Turkey, the BTC pipeline became the only possible way to reach Azerbaijani oil because of the closed borders with Armenia. In 2003, with the bloodless velvet revolution, President Shevardnadze was ousted and Mikhael Saakashvili rose to presidency. Georgian politics took a decidedly pro-American swing and searched for more genuine US and EU backing for the BTC. 37 Since 1998, Turkey and Georgia have signed many mutual defense agreements. Turkish military forces helped on numerous occasions to modernize Georgian military institutions. In 2000, the Turkish Air Force visited Georgia to help construct the Georgian military airport and assist in the training of air force officers. Turkish and Georgian of35 Georgia Crisis, International Debates 6, no. 6 (2008). 36 Manos Karagiannis, The Turkish-Georgian Relationship and the Transportation of Azerbaijani Oil, Caspian Crossroads Magazine 4, no. 1 (1998). 37 Charles Scaliger, Fanning the Flames in Georgia, New American, 13 October 2008.

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ficers also developed a joint military program to protect pipelines. Georgian soldiers operated under Turkish command in Kosovo as part of UN-led peace operations.38 Turkish companies modernized the Batum airport, which was opened for joint use by Turkey and Georgia. As expressed by Erdoan in February of 2006, Turkish politicians aimed to increase Turkish-Georgian trade to two billion dollars by 2009.39 Prime Minister Erdoan visited Georgia three times since August of 2004, and these visits also brought a number of railway projects between Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan to the agenda. One is the Kars-Tbilisi-Baku railway project, which was approved by the three heads of state in Georgia in July of 2007.40 The volume of trade was more than one billion dollars in 2008, until the Georgia-Russia conflict. Turkey immediately took action to support Georgia by sending 100,000 tons of food aid and started a project to build 100 houses for refugees in Gori, close to South Ossetia. The Turkish company TAV did not stop the operation of Tbilisi airport during this military conflict.41 As a product of Turkeys new regional policy, in the wake of the Georgia-Russia crisis, Ankara has conceived of a multilateral diplomatic initiative, the Caucasian Stability and Cooperation Platform, which will consist of Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. This platform aims to develop a shared regional perspective and policy instruments to deal with issues such as regional peace and security, energy security, and economic cooperation. The Turkish Prime Minister Erdoan pointed out that this platform should appropriate the principles and norms of the OSCE and further argued that [t]he failure of the Minsk group to produce any results is a fact that makes us think [...] The Caucasian Cooperation and Stability Platform will contribute to the efforts for the establishment of peace and stability in the region.42 Turkeys attitude indicates Ankaras preference for an inclusive approach to the regional context. Armenia, the Russian Federation, Azerbaijan, and Georgia have responded positively to the offer and have praised the proposed project as a constructive attempt.43 Turkeys fresh approach that includes both Azerbaijan and Armenia in regional peace efforts aims to end the hegemony of Cold War-style binary oppositions. And the Armenian administration recognizes the need to put an end to the
38 39 40 41 42 43 Georgia: Hopeful President Pays First Official Visit to Turkey, RFE/RL Report, 20 May 2004. Altay Atl, Turkey and Georgia: Opening the Roads for Trade, Eurasianet, 8 February 2006. Kars-Tiflis-Bak Demiryolu Projesi ve Beklentiler, Hrriyet, 21 September 2007.. 2008de Trkiye-Grcistan likileri, Hrriyet, 19 December 2009. Kafkasya birliine Aliyev Destei, Radikal, 20 August 2008. Turkey Spearheads Creation of Caucasian Union, Global Insight, 18 August 2008.

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inimical patterns that create cycles of violence in the region.44 Officials from the five countries met in Helsinki to discuss the aims, principles, and mechanisms of the Stability Platform after the OSCE meeting in Helsinki in December of 2008.45 The armed conflict and escalation of tension between Russia and Georgia have given Turkey a heavier burden in the region. Trying to mediate among different parties in the area, Turkey faced a critical test of its neutral stance when US warships passed through the Turkish straits to deliver aid to Georgia. As a member of NATO, and also as a neighbor, Turkey has always supported Georgia both economically and politically since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Turkeys dilemma is the fact that Russia is an important trade partner for Turkey and a major supplier of natural gas, while Georgia has been a key partner for Turkeys pipeline and transit railway connection projects in Eurasia. The Russian Federation The new geographic imagination of Turkish policy-makers has instilled the political will to develop relations with Russia. Turkish policy-makers geographic imagination of Russia is part of their general priority to adopt good neighborhood and zero-problem policies in the bordering regions. Turkish politicians have made developing bilateral political and economic relations with Russia a priority, and they also consider Russia a necessary partner for regional peace and stability in Eurasia. Prime Minister Erdoan mentions Russia as an important country from the perspectives of trade, investment, tourism, and energy security.46 Historically, there were many wars between Russia and the Ottoman Empire until the end of World War I. Both countries have imperial legacies and have experienced post-imperial trauma. Great imperial legacies and feelings of isolation following the collapse of the respective empires are important factors shaping the national memory of both countries. The new attitude of Turkish policy-makers has had a positive impact on foreign policy, allowing them to consider better relations with Russia and the possibility of cooperation to solve regional issues. Turkeys then-Prime Minister Blent Ecevits visit to Moscow in November of 1999 was a turning point in the relations between Turkey and Russia. Ecevits visit resulted in Turkeys change of attitude on the Chechen question as an internal problem of Russia, in exchange for Russias acceptance of a policy of non-involvement in the Kurdish prob44 Glle Sarkisyan Kafkaslar Grt, Dnya, 7 September 2008. 45 Hrriyet, 5 December 2008. 46 Mensur Akgn, Rusyann nemi, Referans, 1 September 2008.

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lem.47 Ecevits visit prepared the ground for better relations. After the Russian President Vladimir Putins visit to Turkey in December of 2004, Turkeys prime minister paid a one-day official visit to Russia in January of 2005. The number of high-level visits has increased since then, paving the way for a solid political and economic cooperation agenda. An analysis of the current factors determining relations between these two states is necessary here. Domestic politics in Russia are often the result of the competing views of Westerners, anti-Westerners, Eurasianists, ultra-nationalists, and nostalgic communists.48 Russian foreign policy is generally determined along the lines of domestic political preferences. There is a symbolic pendulum in Russian foreign policy that oscillates between Europe and Asia, depending on the political balances at play. Under the current administration, Russian foreign policy is more critical of the West and follows a more Eurasia-oriented path.49 For Moscow, the existence of a conflicted national memory and an East-leaning geopolitical orientation makes it difficult to determine a fixed and well-functioning foreign policy towards Turkey. Like Russia, Turkey has Caucasian, Balkan, Middle Eastern, and European identities and different interests at stake in all of these regions. Another significant factor is that both countries are going through dynamic domestic and economic transformations. The changes that have occurred during the eight years of the current decade are dramatic at both societal and state levels. High-level reciprocal visits in the recent period have highlighted a number of important issues of concern for bilateral relations. Officials on both sides have signed several agreements that are likely to facilitate the establishment of more constructive relations. These include trade, investments by Turkish and Russian businesspeople, tourism, natural gas purchases, joint pipeline projects, and Russian arms sales. The volume of bilateral trade reached USD 32 billion in 2008, and both sides aim to increase the annual trade volume to USD 50 billion.50 Turkeys construction sector is active in Moscow and has continually increased its market share in Russia since 2005. Turkish contractors finished 59 construction projects worth USD 3.6 billion in Russia in 2007.51 Russian businesspeople closely follow Turkeys privatization process and are involved in Turkish telecommunication and energy projects.52 Another
47 Cenk Balam, Rus Doal Gazna Erteleme, Milliyet, 6 November 1999. 48 See, Andrei P. Tsygankov, Finding a Civilizational Idea: West, Eurasia, and Euro-East in Russias Foreign Policy, Geopolitics 12, no. 3 (2007). 49 Ibid. 50 Milliyet, 13 February 2009. 51 Rusya lke Blteni, (stanbul: DEK, 2008), 39. 52 For a detailed analysis, see, Hasan Seluk, Trkiye-Rusya Ekonomik likileri (stanbul: TASAM,

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major cooperation area is Russian arms sales to Turkey. Turkey looks to Russia for a number of military procurement projects, such as a medium-range anti-tank weapon system. The Russian S-300 or S-400 missile systems are attractive to the Turkish military industrys proposed multibillion-dollar long-range missile defense project.53 Finally, two million Russian tourists visit Turkey annually and increasingly prefer Turkeys Mediterranean coast for their vacations. The degree of interdependence between Turkey and Russia is higher than ever since the establishment of the Turkish Republic. Although there is much talk about the convergence of interests between Turkey and Russia, contentious issues remain. In mid-August of 2008, Russian customs officials began inspecting Turkish trucks with exceptional diligence; the trucks were taken to a red lane and checked one by one for extensive lengths of time. Although this act was interpreted by many as Russias punishment for Turkeys decision to permit American and European naval ships to pass through the Black Sea to Georgia, this was in fact the result of deadlocked customs regulations negotiations between the two countries, which had started earlier in the year but coincided with the Russian-Georgian conflict.54 On the verge of losing its long-standing and beneficial commercial relations with Turkey, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov insisted during a joint news conference with his counterpart, Ali Babacan, that this is not an action directed against Turkey. Turkey is not being singled out. He added, [t] here can be no politics involved in trade.55 The customs crisis between the two countries came to an end when Russia and Turkey signed an agreement on a simplified customs procedure in mid-September.56 Turkish-Armenian relations, which have been and continue to be determined by historical enmities and Turkeys pro-Azerbaijan policies in the Caucasus, constitute another concern in bilateral relations and regional politics. Russia is currently Armenias main ally, and possible Russian mediation between Turkey and Armenia on a number of issues
2005). 53 Lale Saribrahimolu, Turkey, Russia Begin to Overcome Military Distrust, Todays Zaman, 15 April 2008. 54 Sinan Ogan, Rusya ile Gmrk Krizinin Gerek Sebebi ve Alnacak nlemler, Turkishforum, 2 September 2008. Also see, Trkiye Cumhuriyeti Gmrk Mstearl, Trkiye Cumhuriyeti Gmrk Mstearl ile Rusya Federasyonu Federal Gmrk Servisi Arasnda Gmrk lemlerinin Basitletirilmesine Dair Protokol Hakknda Bilgi, available at www.gumruk.gov.tr/duyurular/ Rusya19EylulBasinToplants.pdf. 55 Russia Denies Punishing Turkey over Georgia, The International Herald Tribune, 2 September 2008. 56 Trkiye ile Rusya Arasnda Gmrk Protokol, CNN Turk (2008), http://www.cnnturk.com/HaberDetay/Ekonomi/4/Genel/303/Turkiye_ile_Rusya_arasinda_gumruk_protokolu/493999/0.

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can be expected. Russia has adopted a new activism towards a solution of the Karabakh problem. To this end, Sergei Lavrov met several times with his Azerbaijani and Armenian counterparts. The Russian administration brought the Azerbaijani and Armenian presidents together in Moscow to discuss the Karabakh issue.57 Turkey emerged as an unexpected partner for Russia in the attempt to solve this chronic Caucasian problem. Following recent positive developments on this front, the future may see joint Russian-Turkish attempts to solve the ArmenianAzerbaijani conflict. The mutual agenda for Russia and Turkey is extensive. It revolves around Russias energy policy, its foreign policies, the Russia-Georgia crisis, the future of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Turkeys rival pipeline projects, ethnic secessionist movements in the Caucasus, the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations, finding a solution to the Karabakh problem, the reduction of Russian military forces in the region in accordance with international agreements, the Chechen question, and the actions of Kurdish separatists on Russian soil. Russia dislikes the BTC pipeline, which bypasses its territory to transport Azeri and Kazakh oil to the West. Moscow regards this pipeline as a challenge to its status in the Caspian basin and an obstacle to its oil trade. Although the major conflict surrounding the BTC pipeline has been between Russia and a number of former Soviet states, it has also influenced Turkish-Russian relations. The Blue Stream project, a natural gas pipeline that runs from Russia to Turkey underneath the Black Sea, and several other TurkishRussian oil pipeline projects have led to the emergence of some degree of tolerance towards the BTC pipeline. Russia also aims to carry more Turkmen gas to the European market, which may stymie the projected Turkmenistan-Iran-Turkey-Europe pipeline. Although Turkey and Russia cooperate in the Blue Stream projects and although there are potential joint projects, they also compete in providing alternative routes for oil and gas transfer to Europe. Russia has a regional profile to maintain and is sensitive about losing its influence in former Soviet territories. Since 1991, Turkey has emerged as a significant regional player, pursuing a special relationship with the EU and paying serious attention to building good relations in the Caucasus and Central Asia. During Erdoans visit to Moscow in January of 2005, then-President Putin said: I hope that Turkeys integration in the European Union will open up a new horizon for Russian-

57 Hurriyet, 2 November 2008.

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Turkish business cooperation.58 Putins support is meaningful in terms of showing the potential of bilateral relations, but the situation is more complicated at the regional and international levels. After receiving a negotiation date for EU membership, Turkey has emerged as a European actor in the region. There is no guarantee that the Turkish politicians projection of good relations with Russia will be possible without endangering its relations with the EU and the US59 Thanks to the dynamic nature of regional politics, Turkeys new orientation was tested during the subsequent domestic transformations of Georgia and the Ukraine. Turkey adopted a low-profile attitude towards Russian policies vis--vis Ukraine and Georgia and sensitively displayed a constructive outlook by pointing to relevant international norms and agreements as the way to resolve the crises. Under the strong influence of its new geographic imagination of Russia, Ankara tries to avoid taking sides in any Russia versus the West struggles, while developing its own relations with Moscow. Turkey pursued this policy also during the Russia-Georgia crisis in August of 2008. Turkish policy-makers acted carefully in order to minimize tension during the crisis and put forward the idea of a regional platform to settle regional problems. During the crisis, the Turkish Prime Minister Erdoan pointed out the importance of relations with Russia in the following way: America is our ally and the Russian Federation is an important neighbor. Russia is our number one trade partner. We are obtaining two-thirds of our energy from Russia. We act in accordance to our national interests. [...] We cannot ignore Russia.60 Turkish policy-makers aim to limit the Russian-Georgian crisis to the Caucasus region and prevent its expansion to the wider Black Sea region. At present, there is a clear tendency to seek support from outside actors and wider regional alliances for providing security in the region. Azerbaijan and Georgia rely on NATO and the Western powers and seek regional alliances with the Ukraine, Moldova, and Turkey. Armenia relies on Russia. Russia calls on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to support the Russian cause in the Caucasus.61 In contrast, Turkey has suggested a Caucasian Stability Platform to configure a dialogue between the three Caucasian states, Russia, and Turkey in order to contain any crises in the region. Turkish policy-makers stress the need
58 Turkey-Russia Relations, EurActiv, 9 November 2006. 59 For a comprehensive discussion see, mer Tapnar and Fiona Hill, Turkey and Russia: Axis of the Excluded?, Survival 48, no. 1 (2006). 60 Fikret Bila, Erdoan: Rusyay Gzardi Edemeyiz, Milliyet, 2 September 2008. 61 The Russian President Medvedev briefed SCO heads of state on the Georgian crisis on 28 August 2008. The Dushanbe declaration did not extend a clear support while issuing a vague call for peaceful negotiations of the conflict. Hurriyet, 29 August 2008.

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to create a confidence- and trust-building mechanism to foster a regional understanding of security. The EU gave the green light to this initiative, and the EU progress report on Turkeys accession negotiations with the EU positively mentioned the project.62 NATO supported the platform as a constructive step for security in the wider Black Sea region with reference to Turkeys constructive policy line during the crisis.63 The current developments indicate that Turkish and Russian policymakers have the political will to improve bilateral relations in the realms of politics, economy, and security. However, these relations are not free from a number of serious problems that could threaten to derail the growing ties; both countries have converging and conflicting interests in neighboring regions. This fact, in combination with the high-profile status of both countries, makes Turkish-Russian relations promising, yet difficult. Turkey and Russia are two influential actors in Eurasian geopolitics, and their relations have implications for the whole region. For this reason, if Turkeys new approach for developing multi-dimensional relations with Russia succeeds, this policy may have far-reaching positive consequences for the Eurasian region. Conclusion We have argued that Turkeys new activism towards the Russian Federation, Caucasia, and Central Asia has opened new horizons in its relations with Eurasia and that this new foreign policy orientation results from reform and change in Turkeys domestic landscape. We hold the view that geographic imagination may re-define regional policy, re-cast enemies as potential allies, and have a widespread impact on the cultures of national security and geopolitics. The result is the emergence of new attitudes in foreign policy among policy-makers. These attributions, categorizations, and perceptions pave the way for the emergence of new meanings and mindscapes of geography, which influence regional policy-making. Under the premises of a new geographic imagination, Eurasia takes on novel significance in the minds of Turkish policy-makers, and they now have the self-confidence to boost their involvement in this region with cooperative approaches. They seek participation in regional political and economic groups and work to develop ties with a number of Eurasian countries. Turkish policy-makers have made it clear that their activism should not be interpreted as a narrow regional policy, but rather as part of a universal vision of foreign policy. From the perspective of Turkish
62 See, Turkey 2008 Progress Report, available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/press_corner/ key-documents/reports_nov_2008/turkey_progress_report_en.pdf. 63 Kafkasya stikrar ve birlii Platformuna Destek Var, Sabah, 19 August 2008.

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policy-makers, Turkeys current policy toward Eurasia is realistic and has attainable goals. It aims to create an environment of cooperation and eliminate regional power constellations. Although confronted with many destabilizing factors such as growing nuclear activities, international terrorism, violent regional rivalries, ethnic tensions, drug trafficking, illegal immigration, and international competition for domination Turkeys policy towards Eurasia seeks to contribute to peace and stability. The recent Russia-Georgia crisis has shown regional countries the importance of achieving these conditions. The regional status quo should change, and the new regional order should be based on both a novel rhetoric and the practice of economic interdependence, political cooperation, and regional stability and prosperity. In this sense, Turkeys cooperative attitude and new active foreign policy are positive steps towards this new regional order. The growing number of high-level mutual visits and the diverse activities designed for the region are strong signs that Turkeys positive contributions to the region will continue. References
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