G.R. No. L-40195 May 29, 1987 VICTORIA R. VALLARTA, petitioner, vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE HONORABLE JUDGE FRANCISCO LLAMAS, Pasay City Court, respondents. Francisco G.H. Salva for petitioner.

CORTES, J.: The petitioner seeks a reversal of the Court of Appeals decision dated December 13, 1974 affirming the Trial Court's judgment convicting her of estafa. We denied the petition initially but granted a motion for reconsideration and gave the petition due course. As found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, Rosalinda Cruz, the private offended party, and accused Victoria Vallarta are long time friends and business acquaintances. On November 20, 1968, Cruz entrusted to Victoria Vallarta seven pieces of jewelry. In December of the same year, Vallarta decided to buy some items, exchanged one item with another, and issued a post-dated check in the amount of P5,000 dated January 30, 1969. Rosalinda Cruz deposited said check with the bank. However, upon presentment, the check was dishonored and Cruz was informed that Vallarta's account had been closed. Cruz apprised Vallarta of the dishonor and the latter promised to give another check. Later, Vallarta pleaded for more time. Still later, she started avoiding Cruz. Hence, this criminal action was instituted. Based on the foregoing facts, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found Vallarta guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa. WE affirm. Petitioner is charged under Art. 315 (2) (d) as amended by Rep. Act No. 4885, of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes any person who shall defraud another "(b)y postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check." By virtue of Rep. Act No. 4885, "(t)he failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds" is deemed prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act. To constitute estafa under this provision the act of post-dating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation must be the efficient cause of defraudation, and as such it should be either prior to, or simultaneous with the act of fraud. The offender must be able to obtain money or property from the offended party because of the issuance of a check whether post-dated or not. That is, the latter would not have parted with his money or other property were it not for the issuance of the check. likewise, the check should not be, issued in payment of a pre-existing obligation (People v. Lilius, 59 Phil. 339 [1933]). In seeking acquittal, petitioner stresses that the transaction between her and Cruz was a "sale or return," perfected and consummated on November 20, 1968 when the seven pieces of jewelry were delivered. The check issued in December 1968 was therefore in payment of a pre-existing obligation. Thus, even if it was dishonored, petitioner claims that she can only be held civilly liable, but not criminally liable under Art. 315 (2) (d), Revised Penal Code. She also argues that at any rate, what prompted Cruz to deliver the jewelry was the social standing of petitioner Vallarta and not the postdated check. She thus assigns as errors the finding of that Court a quo that the jewelries were entrusted on November 20, 1968, but the sale was perfected in December 1968, and the finding that there was deceit in the issuance of the postdated check. In order to arrive at the proper characterization of the transaction between Vallarta and Cruz, that is, whether it was a "sale or return" or some other transaction, it is necessary to determine the intention of the parties. The following excerpts from the transcript of stenographic notes are significant: I. Direct Examination of Rosalinda Cruz Q: Now, what happened with that business transaction of yours with Mrs. Vallarta? A: After that and after she finally agreed to buy two sets and changed the ruby ring with another ring, she gave me postdated check; I waited for January 30, 1969. 1 deposited the check in the

Security Bank. And after that I knew (learned) that it was closed account (TSN, June 29, 1972, p. 9) (Emphasis supplied). II. Cross-Examination of Rosalinda Cruz Q: Now, you mentioned about certain jewelries in Exh. "A. Could you tell under your oath whether all the jewelries listed here (Exh. "A") were taken by Mrs. Vallarta at one single instance? A: Yes, Sir. It was on one (1) day when I entrusted them to her so she can select what she wants (Id at p. 22) (Emphasis supplied). III. Cross-Examination of Rosalinda Cruz COURT: But could you still recall or you cannot recall whether you agreed to reduce the cost to Five Thousand Eight Hundred ( P5,800.00) Pesos? A Yes, Sir. I agreed to reduce it to Five Thousand Eight Hundred (P5,800.00) Pesos, Sir, when I went to see her in her house to finalize what jewelries she wanted (Id. at p. 26). Note that Vallarta changed the ruby ring because it was not acceptable to her, and chose another ring. Likewise, the price to be paid for the jewelry was finally agreed upon only in December 1968. Thus, there was a meeting of the minds between the parties as to the object of the contract and the consideration therefore only in December 1968, the same time that the check was issued. The delivery made on November 20, 1968 was only for the purpose of enabling Vallarta to select what jewelry she wanted. Properly, then, the transaction entered into by Cruz and Vallarta was not a "sale or return." Rather, it was a "sale on approval " (also called " sale on acceptance, " "sale on trial." or "sale on satisfaction" [CIVIL CODE, art. 1502]). In a "sale or return," the ownership passes to the buyer on delivery (CIVIL CODE, art. 1502). (The subsequent return of the goods reverts ownership in the seller [CIVIL CODE, art. 1502]). Delivery, or tradition. as a mode of acquiring ownership must be in consequence of a contract (CIVIL CODE, art. 712), e.g. sale. If there was no meeting of the minds on November 20, 1968, then, as of that date, there was yet no contract of sale which could be the basis of delivery or tradition. Thus, the delivery made on November 20, 1968 was not a delivery for purposes of transferring ownership the prestation incumbent on the vendor. If ownership over the jewelry was not transmitted on that date, then it could have been transmitted only in December 1968, the date when the check was issued. In which case, it was a "sale on approval" since ownership passed to the buyer. Vallarta, only when she signified her approval or acceptance to the seller, Cruz, and the price was agreed upon. Thus, when the check which later bounced was issued, it was not in payment of a pre-existing obligation. Instead the issuance of the check was simultaneous with the transfer of ownership over the jewelry. But was the check issued simultaneously with the fraud? Republic Act No. 4885, amending Art. 315 (2) (d), Revised Penal Code, establishes a prima facie evidence of deceit upon proof that the drawer of the check failed to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice of dishonor for lack or insufficiency of funds. Admittedly, (1) the check was dishonored as Vallarta's account had been earlier closed; (2) she was notified by Cruz of the dishonor: and, (3) Vallarta failed to make it good within three days. Deceit is therefore presumed. Petitioner lays stress on her being an alumna of a reputable school, on her having a husband who is a bank manager, and on the big land-holdings of her father, and argues that it was these qualifications and not the post-dated check which prompted Cruz to deliver the jewelry (Rollo, pp. 78-79: Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 10-11). Hence, there was no deceit. It is thus suggested that a person of petitioner's social standing cannot be guilty of deceit, at least in so far as issuing bouncing checks is concerned. This reasoning does not merit serious consideration. If accepted, it could result in a law that falls unequally on persons depending on their social position. Did Cruz part with the jewelry solely because she knew Vallarta to be rich, or did she do so because of the check issued to her? As the trial court and the Court of Appeals found, petitioner was able to obtain the jewelry because she issued the check. Her failure to deposit the necessary amount to cover it within three days from notice of dishonor created the prima facie presumption established by the amendatory law, Rep. Act No. 4885, which she failed to rebut. Petitioner, however, contends that Rep. Act No. 4885 is unconstitutional. She claims that even as the presumption of deceit established by Rep. Act No. 4885 is stated under the guise of being prima facie. It is in effect a conclusive presumption, because after the prosecution has proved that: (1) the check has been dishonored; (2) notice has been given to the drawer; and, (3) three days from notice, the check is not funded or the obligation is not paid, the accused is held guilty. Thus, it is alleged, the constitutional presumption of innocence is violated.

Contrary to petitioner's assertion, the presumption of deceit under Rep. Act No. 4885 is not conclusive. It is rebuttable. For instance, We ruled in the case of People v. Villapando (56 Phil. 31 [1931]) that good faith is a defense to a charge of estafa by postdating a check, as when the drawer, foreseeing his inability to pay the check at maturity, made an arrangement with his creditor as to the manner of payment of the debt.* Moreover, it is now well settled that "there is no constitutional objection to the passage of a law providing that the presumption of innocence may be overcome by a contrary presumption founded upon the experience of human conduct, and enacting what evidence shall be sufficient to overcome such presumption of innocence" (People v. Mingoa, 92 Phil. 856 [1953] at 858-59, citing I COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 639-641). And the "legislature may enact that when certain facts have been proved they shall be prima facie evidence of the existence of the guilt of the accused and shift the burden of proof provided there be a rational connection between the facts proved and the ultimate fact presumed so that the inference of the one from proof of the others is not unreasonable and arbitrary because of lack of connection between the two in common experience" (People v. Mingoa, supra. See also US v. Luling, 34 Phil. 725 [1916]). There can be no doubt that the "postdating or issuing of a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check," is a false pretense or a fraudulent act. It is so characterized by Art. 315 (2) (d), Revised Penal Code. Republic Act No. 4885 does nothing more than limit the period within which the drawer/issuer must pay the creditor. Petitioner also argues that Rep. Act No. 4885 violates the constitutional injunction against imprisonment for non-payment of debt. Ironically, she does not question the constitutionality of Art. 315 (2) (d), Revised Penal Code, which defines the crime she is being accused of, and provides for its punishment. In fact, she concedes the constitutionality of the latter statute. She further concedes that a person may be imprisoned for "criminal fraud" covered by Art. 315 (2) of the Revised Penal Code. In People v. Sabio (No. L-45490, November 20, 1978, 86 SCRA 568), this Court ruled that Rep. Act No. 4885 has not changed the rule established in Art. 315 (2) (d) prior to the amendment; that Republic Act No. 4885 merely established the prima facie evidence of deceit, and eliminated the requirement that the drawer inform the payee that he had no funds in the bank or the funds deposited by him were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. Thus, even with the amendment introduced by Rep. Act No. 4885 it is still criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check which is made punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and not the non-payment of the debt. Petitioner also assigns as error the denial by the trial court of her motion for reconsideration. Her motion was directed at the finding of the trial court that no payments were made. Alleging that a check drawn by one Sison was given by petitioner to Cruz in payment of the rubber check, petitioner claims that had her motion for reconsideration been granted, she would have called to the witness stand the Branch Manager of Security Bank and Trust Company, Pasay City, where the check was allegedly deposited by Cruz, for said bank manager to Identify the owner-holder of the savings account to which the amount in Sison's check had been credited (Brief for Petitioner, p. 46). Granting that the bank manager's testimony would have been as alleged by petitioner, Our decision would remain. As correctly observed by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals (Court of Appeals Decision, pp. 2-3), the payments petitioner allegedly made were not shown to have any relevance to the obligation in question. WHEREFORE, finding no error in the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals, the same is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 131714 November 16, 1998 EDUARDO R. VACA and FERNANDO NIETO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.: Petitioners seek a review of the decision, dated October 25, 1996, 1 and the resolution, dated December 2, 1997,2 of the Court of Appeals, affirming their conviction by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 100) for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, otherwise known as the "Bouncing Checks Law." The facts are as follows: Petitioner Eduardo R. Vaca is the president and owner of Ervine International, Inc. (Ervine), which is engaged in the manufacture and sale of refrigeration equipment, while his son-in-law, petitioner Fernando Nieto, is the firm's purchasing manager. On March 10, 1988, petitioners issued a check for P10,000.00 to the General Agency for Reconnaissance, Detection, and Security, Inc. (GARDS) in partial payment of the security services rendered by GARDS to Ervine. The check was drawn on the China Banking Corporation (CBC). When deposited in the Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCIBank) branch at Shaw Boulevard, Mandaluyong, the check was dishonored for insufficiency of funds. On March 29, 1988, GARDS wrote Ervine a letter in which it demanded payment in cash of the amount of the check within seven days from notice. The letter was received by Ervine on the same day, but petitioners did not pay within the time given. On April 13, 1988, petitioners issued a check for P19,860.16 to GARDS. The check was drawn on the Associated Bank. The voucher accompanying it stated that the check was to replace the dishonored check, the P9,860.16 balance being partial payment for Ervine's outstanding account. The check and the voucher were received by a GARDS messenger, Nolan C. Pena, on April 15, 1988, but GARDS did not return the dishonored check. On April 14, 1988, GARDS Operations Manager Jovito C. Cabusara filed a criminal complaint against petitioners for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. After preliminary investigation, an information was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 97). However, the case was dismissed by the court on May 11, 1989, upon motion of the prosecution, on the ground that Ervine had already paid the amount of the check. On September 18, 1989, GARDS, through its Acting Operations Manager Eduardo B. Alindaya, filed another complaint for violation of B.P. Bldg. 22 against petitioners. This resulted in the filing of an information against petitioners in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 100). After trial, petitioners were found guilty of the charge and each was sentenced to suffer one (1) year imprisonment and to pay a fine of P10,000.00 and the costs. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. It subsequently denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition. Petitioners contend: A. Respondent Court gravely erred in not holding that the prosecution failed to prove petitioners' guilt beyond reasonable doubt. B. Respondent Court gravely erred in basing conviction on the alleged weakness of the evidence of the defense rather than on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution. C. Respondent Court erred in not acquitting petitioners on grounds of "mistake of fact" and "lack of knowledge." Petitioners pray that the case against them be dismissed or, in the alternative, that the decision of the trial court be modified by sentencing each to an increased fine but without imprisonment. By supplemental petition, dated January 29, 1998, petitioners submitted an affidavit of desistance executed by GARDS president Dominador R. Santiago which states that the case arose from a mere "accounting difference" between petitioners and GARDS, that the latter had not really suffered any damage as a result of the issuance of the check in question and, that GARDS was no longer interested in prosecuting the case.

On May 28, 1998, petitioners filed another supplemental petition, this time invoking the recent decision in Lao v. Court of Appeals, 3 in which this Court reversed a conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 upon a showing that the accused had no knowledge of the insufficiency of funds. The Solicitor General opposes the appeal. He contends that the facts of Lao v. Court of Appeals are different from those of the case at bar and that the affidavit of desistance of Dominador Santiago is of no moment, such affidavit having been made only after petitioners' conviction. After due review of the decision in this case, we find that petitioners' conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is well founded. First. The elements of the offense penalized under B.P. Blg. 22 are: (1) making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value; (2) knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor of the check for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop paymnent. 4 The maker's knowledge is presumed from the dishonor of the check for insufficiency of funds. 5 Thus, 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 expressly provides: Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee. In this case, after being notified on March 29, 1988 of the dishonor of their previous check, petitioners gave GARDS a check for P19,860.16. They claim that this check had been intended by them to replace the bad check they had previously issued to the GARDS. Based on the testimony of a GARDS accountant, however, the Court of Appeals found that the check was actually payment for two bills, one for the period of January 16 to January 31, 1988 in the amount of P9,930.08 and another one for the period of March 16 to March 31, 1988 in the same amount. But even if such check was intended to replace the bad one, its issuance on April 13, 1988 15 days after petitioners had been notified on March 29, 1988 of the dishonor of their previous check cannot negate the presumption that petitioners knew of the insufficiency of funds to cover the amount of their previous check. Sec. 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 requires that such check be given within five (5) days from the notice of dishonor to them. Petitioners contend that, in accordance with the ruling in Lao v. Court of Appeals, 6 they should be acquitted because the preparation of checks is the responsibility of the company accountant and all they do is sign the checks. They claim that they rely on the word of the accountant that there are sufficient funds in the bank to pay for the checks. In the Lao case, the accused, as the Court found, had merely been made by her employer, Premiere Investment House, to countersign checks in bank. The accused was a mere employee who did not have anything to do with the issuance of checks for the company. She did not know to whom the checks would be paid as the names of payees were written only later by the head of operations. Moreover, no notice of dishonor was given to her as required by B.P. Blg. 22 2. It could thus rightly be concluded that the accused issued checks to apply to account not knowing that at the time of issuance funds were insufficient to pay for the checks. Petitioners in this case cannot pretend ignorance of the insufficiency of funds. While it may be true that it was the company's accountant who actually prepared the rubber check, the fact remains that petitioners are the owners and officers of the company. Sec. 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 provides that "Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company, or entity, the person or persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act. In fact, petitioner Nieto testified that after the check in question was dishonored, he instructed their company accountant to prepare a replacement check. 7 This belies petitioners' claim that they had no hand in the preparation of checks 8 and shows that petitioners were in control of the finances of the company. Second. The affidavit of desistance of the GARDS president deserves no more than passing mention. The claim that this case was simply the result of a misunderstanding between GARDS and petitioners and that the former did not really suffer any damage from the dishonor of the check is flimsy. After prosecuting the case below with tenacity, complainants going so far as to file another complaint after their first one had been dismissed, it is trifling with this Court for complainants to now assert that the filing of their case was simply a mistake. It is for reasons such as this the affidavit of desistance, like retractions, are generally disfavored. 9 The affidavit in this case, which was made after petitioners' conviction, is nothing but a last-minute attempt to save them from punishment. Even if the payee suffered no damage as a result of the issuance of the bouncing check, the damage to the integrity of the banking system cannot be denied. Damage to the payee is not an element of the crime punished in B.P. Blg. 22. Third. Petitioners pray that, in the alternative, the penalty be modified by deleting the sentence of imprisonment and, in lieu thereof a fine in an increased amount be imposed on them. In support of their plea, they allege that they do not have any record of prior conviction; that Eduardo Vaca is of advanced age (late 60s); and, that they come from good families. Petitioners claim that "with their family background and social standing there is no reason why they, will refuse to pay a due and demandable debt of only P10,000.00. It

is precisely because of their founded belief that the subject obligation has been paid that they refused to be intimidated by a criminal charge." The Court of Appeals dismissed these allegations as irrelevant to the question of petitioners' guilt. We think so ourselves. However, we believe that they can be considered in determining the appropriate penalty to impose on petitioners. B.P. Blg. 22, 1, par. 1 provides a penalty of "imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than, but not more than double, the amount of the check which fine shall in no case esceed two hundred thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the Court." Petitioners are first-time offenders. They are Filipino entrepreneurs who presumably contribute to the national economy. Apparently, they brought this appeal, believing in all good faith, although mistakenly, that they had not committed a violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Otherwise, they could simply have accepted the judgment of the trial court and applied for probation to evade a prison term. It would best serve the ends of criminal justice if in fixing the penalty within the range of discretion allowed by 1, par. 1, the same philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is observed, namely, that of redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of the social order. 10 In this case we believe that a fine in an amount equal to double the amount of the check involved is an appropriate penalty to impose on each of the petitioners. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the modification that the sentence of imprisonment is deleted and petitioners are each ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 equivalent to double the amount of the check. SO ORDERED

ROSA LIM, petitioner, vs., PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. DECISION PARDO, J.: The case is an appeal from the decision [1] of the Court of Appeals affirming in toto that of the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City. Both courts found petitioner Rosa Lim guilty of twice violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22[3] and imposing on her two one-year imprisonment for each of the two violations and ordered her to pay two fines, each amounting to two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00). The trial court also ordered petitioner to return to Maria Antonia Seguan, the jewelry received or its value with interest, to pay moral damages, attorney's fees and costs.[4]
[2]

We state the relevant facts.[5] On August 25, 1990, petitioner called Maria Antonia Seguan by phone. Petitioner thereafter went to Seguan's store. She bought various kinds of jewelry -- Singaporean necklaces, bracelets and rings worth P300,000.00. She wrote out a check dated August 25, 1990, payable to "cash" drawn on Metrobank in the amount of P300,000.00[6] and gave the check to Seguan. On August 26, 1990, petitioner again went to Seguan's store and purchased jewelry valued at P241,668.00. Petitioner issued another check payable to "cash" dated August 16, 1990 drawn on Metrobank in the amount of P241,668.00[7] and sent the check to Seguan through a certain Aurelia Nadera. Seguan deposited the two checks with her bank. The checks were returned with a notice of dishonor. Petitioner's account in the bank from which the checks were drawn was closed. Upon demand, petitioner promised to pay Seguan the amounts of the two dishonored checks. She never did. On June 5, 1991,[8] an Assistant City Prosecutor of Cebu filed with the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City, Branch 23 two informations against petitioner. Both informations were similarly worded.The difference is that in Criminal Case No. 22128, the bouncing checks is Metro Bank Check No. CLN 094244392 dated August 26, 1990 in the amount of P241,668.00. The informations read:[9] Criminal Case No. 22127"The undersigned Prosecutor I of the City of Cebu, accuses ROSA LIM for VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22 committed as follows: "That on or about the 20th day of August, 1990, and for sometime subsequent thereto, in the City of Cebu Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, knowing at the time of issue of the check she does not have sufficient funds in the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, with deliberate intent, with intent of gain and of causing damage, did then and there issue, make or draw Metro Bank Check NO. 1 CLN 094244391 dated August 25, 1990 in the amount of P300,000.00 payable to Maria Antonia Seguan which check was issued in payment of an obligation of said accused, but when the said check was presented with the bank the same was dishonored for reason "Account Closed" and despite notice and demands made to redeem or make good said check, said accused failed and refused, and up to the present time still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of said Maria Antonia Seguan in the amount of P300,000.00, Philippine Currency. "CONTRARY TO LAW." Criminal Case No. 22128"The undersigned Prosecutor I of the City of Cebu, accuses ROSA LIM for VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22, COMMITTED AS FOLLOWS: "That on or about the 20th day of August, 1990, and for sometime subsequent thereto, in this City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, knowing at the time of issue of the check she does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, with deliberate intent, with intent of gain and of causing damage, did then and there issue, make or draw Metro Bank Check No. CLN-094244392 dated August 26, 1990 in the amount of P241,668.00 payable to Maria Antonia Seguan which check was issued in payment of an obligation of said accused, but when the said check was presented with the bank, the same was dishonored for reason "Account Closed" and despite notice and demands made to redeem or make good said check, said accused failed and refused, and up to the present time still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of said Maria Antonia Seguan in the amount of P241,668.00, Philippine Currency. "CONTRARY TO LAW. "Cebu City, Philippines, 30 May 1991."[10] Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded "not guilty" in both cases.

After due trial, on December 29, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision in the two cases convicting petitioner, to wit:[11] "WHEREFORE, prosecution having established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, judgment is hereby rendered convicting the accused, Rosa Lim and sentencing her in Criminal Case No. CBU-22127, to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period of ONE (1) YEAR and a fine of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND (P200,000.00) PESOS and in Criminal Case No. CBO-22128, the same penalty of imprisonment for ONE YEAR and fine of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND (P200,000.00) is likewise imposed. "The accused is hereby ordered to pay private complainant Maria Antonia Seguan, the sum of P541,668.00 which is the value of the jewelries bought by the accused from the latter with interest based on the legal rate to be counted from June 5, 1991, the date of the filing of the informations, or return the subject jewelries; and further to pay private complainant: "(a) The sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages in compensation for the latter's worries with the freezing of her business capital involved in these litigated transactions; "(b) The sum of P10,000.00 for attorney's fees, plus costs. "SO ORDERED."[12] In due time, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.[13] On October 15, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, dismissing the appeal in this wise: "WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto. "SO ORDERED."[14] Hence, this appeal.[15] In this appeal, petitioner argues that she never knew Seguan and much more, had any "transaction" with her. According to petitioner, she issued the two checks and gave them to Aurelia Nadera, not to Seguan. She gave the two checks to Aurelia Nadera from whom she got two sets of jewelry, as a "security arrangement" or "guarantee" that she would return the jewelry received if she would not be able to sell them.[16] The appeal has no merit. The elements of B.P. Blg. 22 are:[17] "(1) The making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; "(2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and "(3) The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment." Petitioner never denied issuing the two checks. She argued that the checks were not issued to Seguan and that they had no preexisting transaction. The checks were issued to Aurelia Nadera as mere guarantee and as a security arrangement to cover the value of jewelry she was to sell on consignment basis.[18] These defenses cannot save the day for her. The first and last elements of the offense are admittedly present. To escape liability, she must prove that the second element was absent, that is, at the time of issue of the checks, she did not know that her funds in the bank account were insufficient. She did not prove this. B.P. No. 22, Section 2 creates a presumption juris tantum that the second element prima facie exists when the first and third elements of the offense are present.[19] If not rebutted, it suffices to sustain a conviction.[20] The gravamen of B.P. No. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or one that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment. And the accused failed to satisfy the amount of the check or make arrangement for its payment within five (5) banking days from notice of dishonor.[21] The act is malum prohibitum, pernicious and inimical to public welfare.[22] Laws are created to achieve a goal intended and to guide and prevent against an evil or mischief. [23] Why and to whom the check was issued is irrelevant in determining culpability. The terms and conditions surrounding the issuance of the checks are also irrelevant.[24] Unlike in estafa,[25] under B. P. No. 22, one need not prove that the check was issued in payment of an obligation, or that there was damage. The damage done is to the banking system.[26] In United States v. Go Chico, we ruled that in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, "has the law been violated?" When dealing with acts mala prohibita[27]--

" it is not necessary that the appellant should have acted with criminal intent. In many crimes, made such by statutory enactment, the intention of the person who commits the crime is entirely immaterial. This is necessarily so. If it were not, the statute as a deterrent influence would be substantially worthless. It would be impossible of execution. In many cases, the act complained of is itself that which produces the pernicious effect the statute seeks to avoid. In those cases the pernicious effect is produced with precisely the same force and result whether the intention of the person performing the act is good or bad." This case is a perfect example of an act mala prohibita. Petitioner issued two checks. They were dishonored upon presentment for payment due to the fact that the account was closed.Petitioner failed to rebut the presumption that she knew her funds were insufficient at the time of issue of the checks. And she failed to pay the amount of the checks or make arrangement for its payment within five (5) banking days from receipt of notice of dishonor. B.P. No. 22 was clearly violated. Hoc quidem per quam durum est sed ita lex scripta est. The law may be exceedingly hard but so the law is written. However, we resolve to modify the penalty imposed on petitioner. B.P. No. 22 provides a penalty of "imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one year or a fine of not less than, but not more than double, the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed two hundred thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the Court."[28] In Vaca v. Court of Appeals,[29] we held that in determining the penalty to be imposed for violation of B.P. No. 22, the philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law applies. The philosophy is to redeem valuable human material, and to prevent unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of the social order. There, we deleted the prison sentence imposed on petitioners. We imposed on them only a fine double the amount of the check issued. We considered the fact that petitioners brought the appeal, believing in good faith, that no violation of B.P. No. 22 was committed, "otherwise, they would have simply accepted the judgment of the trial court and applied for probation to evade prison term."[30] We do the same here. We believe such would best serve the ends of criminal justice. Consequently, we delete the prison sentences imposed on petitioner. The two fines imposed for each violation, each amounting to P200,000.00 are appropriate and sufficient. The award of moral damages and order to pay attorney's fees are deleted for lack of sufficient basis. WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM with modification the decision of the Court of Appeals. [31] We find petitioner Rosa Lim guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. We SET ASIDE the sentence of imprisonment and hereby sentence her only to pay a fine of P200,000.00 in each case, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency or non-payment not to exceed six (6) months.[32] We DELETE the award of moral damages and attorney's fees. The rest of the judgment of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals shall stand. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.