Jiabs 6-2

THE JOURNAL
t)F THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF

BUDDHIST STUDIES
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
A. K. Narain
University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA
L. M.Joshi
Punjabi University
Patiala, India
Alexander W. Macdonald
Universite de Paris X
Nanterre, France
Bardwell Smith
Carleton College
Northfield, Minnesota, USA
EDITORS
Ernst Steinkellner
University of Vienna
Wien, Austria
J ikido T akasaki
University of Tokyo
Tokyo, Japan
Robert Thurman
Amherst College
Amherst, Massachusetts, USA
ASSISTANT EDITOR
Roger Jackson
Volume 6 1983
Number 2
THE JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF BUDDHIST STUDIES, INC.
This j oumal is the organ of the International Aisociation of Buddhist Stud_
ies, Inc., and is governed by the objectives of the Association and accepts
scholarly contributions pertaining to Buddhist Studies in alI the various
disciplines such as philosophy, history, religion, sociology, anthropology,
art, archaeology, psychology, textual studies, etc. The }lABS is published
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Manuscripts for publication and correspondence concerning articles should
be submitted to A. K. Narain, Editor-in-Chief,}lABS, Department of South
Asian Studies, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin 53706, U.S.A.
Please refer to the guidelines for contributors to the }lABS printed on the
inside book cover of every issue.
The Association and the Editors assume no responsibility for the views
expressed by the authors in the Association's journal and other related
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Books for review should be sent to the Editor-in-Chief. The Editors cannot
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the senders.
EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD
. Andre Bareau (France) joseph M. Kitagawa (USA)
john BrQugh (U.K.) jacques May (Switzerland)
M.N. Deshpande (India) Hajime Nakamura (japan)
R. Card (USA) john Rosenfield (USA)
B.C. Cokhale (USA) David Snellgrove (U.K.)
P.S.jaini (USA)
E. Zurcher (Netherlands)
I w. de jong (Australia)
----------------------
The Editor-in-Chief wishes to thank Rena Haggarty for assistance in
the preparation of this volume.
Copyright The International Association of Buddhist Studies 1983
ISSN: 0193-600X
Sponsored by Department of South Asian Studies, University ofWis-
consin, Madison.
CONTENTS
1. ARTICLES
'1.
A reconstruction of the Madhyamakiivatara's Analysis of
the Person, by Peter G. Fenner. 7
2.
Cittaprakrti and AyoniSomanaskiira in the Ratnagotravi-
bhaga: Precedent for the Hsin-Nien Distinction of
The Awakening of Faith, by William Grosnick 35
3.
An Excursus on the Subtle Body in Tantric Buddhism
(N otes Contextualizing the Kalacakra) 1, by Geshe
Lhundup Sopa 48
4.
Socio-Cultural Aspects of Theravada Buddhism in Ne-
pal, by Ramesh Chandra Tewari 67
5. The Yukt4a.sMakiirikii of Nagarjuna, by Fernando Tola
and Carmen Dragonetti 94
6. The "Suicide" Problem in the Pali Canon, by Martin G.
Wiltshire 124
II. BOOK REVIEWS
l
Buddhist and Western Philosophy, edited by Nathan Katz 141
,2.
A Meditator's Diary, by Jane Hamilton-Merritt 144
3. The Roof Tile of Tempyo, by Yasushi Inoue
146
4. Les royaumes de l'Himalaya, histoire et civilisation: le La-
dakh, le Bhoutan, le Sikkim, le Nepal, under the direc-
tion of Alexander W. Macdonald 147
5. Wings of the White Crane: Poems of Tshangs dbyangs rgya
mtsho (1683-1706), translated by C.W. Houston
The Rain of Wisdom, translated by the Nalanda Transla-
tion Committee under the Direction of Chogyam
Trungpa
Songs of Spiritual Change, by the Seventh Dalai Lama,
Cyalwa Kalzang Cyatso 149
III. NOTES AND NEWS
1. A Report on the International Seminar: Aspects of Indi-
an Thought 157
A "Reconstruction of the
Madhyamakavatara's Analysis of the Person 1 .
by Peter C. Fenner
'The Madhyamakiivatiira (Introduction to the Middle Way, hereafter
Cited as the MA2 is central to the theory and practice of empti-
;'ness and is a key text in the establishment of emptiness through
logical analysis (viciira). Rather than being the primer that its
title implies, the MA represents a text electric with profound
. and subtle ideas. Each turn of the text signifies a response to .
. philosophical ideas within a dynamic system of formal and less
formal viewpoints and theses that arose in the heady atmo-
sphere of Buddhist intra- and inter-religious monastic debate.
. Central to the MA's inquiry is the notion of emptiness and
demonstration of the selflessness of the person (pudgalanairiit-
mya). The MA's analysis of the non-self of the person is intri-
cate and deep. This paper reconstructs the key and relevant
verses of the analysis, adding a philosophical commentary with
a view to clarifying and systematizing the arguments.
1. Analysis of the person
Though the MA introduces its presentation of emptiness
with an analysis demonstrating the non-self of phenomena
(dharma-nairiitmya) and only on completing this turns its atten-
tion to analyzing the non-self of the person, the opening verse
(6.120) of the analysis indicates that the practice and realization
by yogins of the non-self of the person, was regarded as more
important, and in a developmental context was thought to pre-
cede the practice of meditating on the non-self of phenomena.
The verse reads: "Having seen with [their] intellects that all the
7
8 JIABS VOL. 6 NO.2
afflictions and faults ari.se from the view individuality ('jig_
tshogs-la lta,satkiiya-dntz), and from reahzmg the self (bdag
atma) as its yo gins act to root out (,gog-pa) the self."
idea here, repeated elsewhere in theMA (l.3ab and 6.164-165)
is that the concept of "mine" presupposes the concept of a self
such that if the-concept of a self ceased to arise, s.o the
at phenomena as real would necessarily subside also. Hence
first people grasp the self, from which they develop a
(bden-pa) attachment for things. As the notion of "mine" de-
pends etiologically and for its maintenance on the notion of "I,"
when the latter is destroyed so is the former. Thus the Bhi4ya
(234) says that the abandonment of the wrong view of individ-
uality (i.e., of "I" and "mine") is accomplished by realizing the
selflessness of the self (bdag-gi bdags-med).
The concept of "mine," which is raised subsequent to at-
tachment to the self, means specifically the aggregation
(skandha, phung-po) of mental and corporeal elements that are
normally taken to comprise the person. Here it is denoted by
the technical equivalent of the individual (satkaya, '.jig-tshogs) ,
lit., perishable collection. The aggregation is composed of
forms (rilpa), feelings (vedana) , discriminations (samjiia) , im-
pulses (sarhskiira), and consciousness (vijiiana). The first aggre-
gate, form, in Abhidharma treatises
3
includes all corporeal and
non-corporeal forms, and so the aggregation grasped as "mine"
in fact includes all things except for the self, though in the
context of meditation the corporeal form figures most promi-
nently.4
The primacy of the notion of "self' in the process of kar-
ma-creation and existential self-perpetuation means that, from
the point of view of yogic practice, the analysis of the yogin's
own person is the more direct route of practice. The Bhi4ya
(234: 14-20) hence explains that at the beginning of their prac-
tice, yo gins analyze only the self (bdag kho-na).
II. The self or person negated
The conceptions of a self refuted in the MA are non-Bud-
dhist viewpoints and Buddhist conceptions other than the Mad-
hyamika's. The non-Buddhist conceptions mentioned in the
ANALYSIS OF THE PERSON
9
t:MA's refutation are specifically those of the Hindu Samkhya
5
l,hnd The selves they conceive, though different
(from each other, are refuted (6.122) on the grounds that, being
;unborn, they have a similar ontic status to the sons of barren
women, i.e., are utterly non-existent, and also because they
contravene a conventional criterion of existence.
For Candraklrti, the archetypal non-Buddhist conception
appears to be the Samkhya notion of pUTWia skyes-bu),.which
.is distinguished by five characteristics, namely (6.121ab), thatit
isan eater (zha-po), a permanent thing (rtag-dngos) , not a cre-
ator, and devoid of both qualities (yon-tan) and action (bya).7
Being an eater means that can receive experiences of
objects, suffering, happiness, etc. Being a non-creator means
that is inactive. All of these defining characteristics of
are absent in the Samkhya's notion of phenomena (pra-
krti, rang-bzhin), for is completely separate from prakrti.
Thus, the conception of a person at hand here is one of a self
that is completely different from and independent of both
"." mental and corporeal factors. This conception of a self as a
:quite separate and independent entity from all mental and
iphysical factors is a course not unique to the Samkhya philos-
ophy. Hence, mutatis mutandis, the MA can be seen as refuting
. all transcendental concepts of the self, such as the Advaitan
atman, Platonic soul, and Cartesian ego.
_ The non-Buddhist viewpoints are regarded by Madhyami-
kas as coarse or gross misconceptions. They have their basis in
thought-constructs such as one finds in religious and philo-
sophical systems. As devised or acquired conceptions (abhisarhs-
kiirikii) they are considered to be comparatively easily removed,
for their eradication requires only the convincing refutation of
some formal system of thought that supports an intellectual or
theoretical (parikalpita, kun-btags) self-grasping.
Buddhist conceptions of the self, as we have said, are also
the subject of the MA's refutations. Where (MABh; 286.10-14)
the non-Buddhists consider the person to be different from the
. aggregation, the Buddhists accept that it is the same as the
mere aggregation, and in this the Buddhist schools are locating
a non-transcendental self. (In refering to the Buddhists, Can-
draklrti uses the phrase "the Madhyamika's own community
[rang-gi sde-pa, svayuthya], which is semantically equivalent to
10 JIABS VOL. 6 NO.2
nang-pa and sangs-rgyas-pa.) This conception of a self differs in
that it is claimed to describe a natural, non-intellectual or "in-
nate" (sahaja, lhan-skyes) self-.conception, rather than the Hin-
du's philosophical self, which is a logical 'or rational fabrication.
The innate conception is that which is revealed by the common_
sense and spontaneous way in which people relate to them_
selves.
8
It is a self-concept said to be had by all the creatures of
samsara who, though they do not realize it, are placed in sam-
sara because of grasping the "I" and its possessions, such as the
internal organs, the eye, etc., and external forms. The Madhya_
mika position is that this non-analytically established self is es-
tablished by ignorance-in fact, it does not exist in the sense of
being established through having an entity or essence of its
own. The cause for not realizing the non-self of this person is
(MABh; 20.5-7) that the aggregation is perceived as though it
were the self Though it is the Madhyamika view that the refer-
ent of the terms "self' is based on the aggregation, such a
conception represents a conception to be negated, and in this
the Madhyamika differs from the Samkhya and who
are at pains to substantiate their transcendental conceptions of .
the self Candraklrti seeks to refute both the transcendental .
and mundane self-conceptions. His view, even though he says
that Hindus conceive transcendental selves where Buddhists
locate mundane ones, must be that Hindus also function and
operate in life with a mundane conception, for otherwise the;
Hindus would be spiritually more advanced than the Buddhists .
vis-it-vis their eradication of errant conceptions, as the transcen-
dental conceptions are purportedly more superficial and more
easily eradicated than mundane conceptions.
9
Certain specific Buddhist conceptions mentioned in the
MA are that the self is impermanent, and that in some way it is
not exactly the same entity as the aggregation and on the other
hand not entirely different from it either. The first view, that
the self is not permanent
IO
is regarded by Candraklrti (6.140)
as still capable of providing a basis for self-grasping (ngar-'dzin
rten) and so is an insufficiently refined and subtle view of the
self 11
The reason here is that the mere apprehension of the self
as changing does not preclude grasping towards such a self, for
permanent and selves alike could be viewed as
11
'having a self-nature and so provide bases for attach-
rn
ent
, karma-creation, etc. The realization of the non-self or
ernptiness of the person is regarded as a finer and more subtle
realization than that of the impermanence of the person, and
SO (6.141)' the latter is no substitute for the former.
.. The second view (6.146), that the person and aggregation
are not exactly the same or different and that the self is not
really permanent or impermanent, is ascribed (MABh; 268) to
.the Sammitlyas, a subschool.l
2
Their position here,
'though it uses the logical syntax so characteristic of the Madh-
!yamikas themselves in describing emptiness, is not that the self
empty, but rather that in certain ways the self behaves as
though it were the aggregation and at other times as though it
,were not. It is an expression of a designatory equivocation and
ambiguity rather than a signification of syntactical precison.
. On the SammitIya view, the self relates to the aggregation
,in much the same way that an employer is dependent on em-
:ployees yet still retains autonomy and manages them. Likewise,
the self, though dependent on the aggregation, powers and co-
ordinates it. Hence, this is like a sovereign self thesis, where the
self or agent directs and controls the mental and corporeal
'person.l
3
At issue in the MA is the subtlety of the Buddhist views-in
other words, whether they negate all wrong conceptions of the
person. The MA is especially concerned to negate that a person
'has a self-nature, and in so doing to establish the emptiness of
the person. From the MA's perspective, only the Madhyamika
refutes the self-existence of the person, and all others, Bud-
dhist and Hindu alike; either negate the self with insufficient
precision and subtlety, and hence fail to remove the conception
of self-existence; or, in the case of Hindu philosophies, estab-
lish (wrongly) that it has a self-nature.
III. Seven-sectioned analysis
All wrong conceptions of the person-coarse, subtle, Bud-
dhist and non-Buddhist-are claimed in the MA to be negated
by an analysis that comprises seven sections (rnam-pa-bdun). In
. refuting these false viewspoints, the analysis establishes the
emptiness or non-self of the person. Candraklrti's source for
12 JIABS VOL 6 NO.2
the analysis dates at least to Nagarjuna, for it is an extension of
a briefer analysis used in the MMKI4 and cited in the MABh.I5
Nagarjuna's analysis, in turn, is foreshadowed in the Pali suttas
and these may be his inspiration, for in the Sul;rllekha (bShes-pa
spring-yig) (vs. 49) he quotes a passage from the Samyutta-nikaya
which is a summary conclusion to his own analysis.
I6
The analysis is based on refuting seven relationships that
can be posited as relating the person and aggregation. Each
section of the analysis focuses on one relationship. The rela-
tionships refuted are summarized at verse 6.151. This verse
instantiates a carriage and its parts as relata-a substitution
Candraklrti makes for the person and aggregation part way
through the analysisP This substitution is said to facilitate the
exposition of the analyses. IS It is clearly cited as an example
(6.162) and it is understood that yo gins would in practice be
analyzing themselves. The verse reads:
A carriage is not considered ('dod) to be other than its own
parts (yan-lag). [Nor] is it not other. Also, it does not have
(ldan) [them] and it is not in (la) the parts, [nor] are the
parts in it. It is not the mere collection ('dus) of parts. It is
not the shape (dbyibs). Likewise [the self and aggregation is
not so related].19
For the relata intended, then, the seven relationships are these:
1. The self is not other (gzhan) than (i.e., different from) the
aggregation.
2. The self is not the same as the aggregation.
3. The self does not have (ldan) the aggregation.
4. The self is not in (la) the aggregation.
5. The aggregation is not in the self.
6. The self is not the collection ('dus or tshog, sangha) of the
aggregates.
7. The self is not the shape (dbyibs, samsthana) of the aggrega-
tion.
The cognate analyses in the MMK comprise five sections,
the first five cited above. The relations of "being the collection,"
and "having the same shape," are Candraklrti's own contribu-
tion.
ANALYSIS OF THE PERSON 13
Four (and perhaps five) of these wrongly-conceived rela-
tionships are mentioned (though not analytically refuted) in the
1.300 (and Sarhyutta-n'ikaya III. 114-115, as just
:i1oted). There the Buddha explains that those without any
'training in. the dhamma, view each of the aggregates, i.e., materi-
/al shape, feelings, consciousness, as the self, the self as having
these, these as in the self and self as in these. These, thus,
account for the two relations of containment, of identity, and
possession. A fifth is perhaps included, as the "self as form
(rupa)" may be the same as the self as the shape (sarhsthiina) of
the aggregation. It is through these misconceptions, the Bud-
'dha says, that one comes to have a wrong view about the body.
The first two relationships are generic, as they specify the
most fundamental ways in which the self and aggregation could
be related. The following five are each a species of relationship,
in that they isolate specific ways in which the self and aggrega-
tion may be related. They are thought to be the ways in which
ordinary people misconceive a relationship between the self
and aggregation.
, The MA refutes each of the seven relationships in turn.
I}These are introduced and essentially discussed serially, though
in an order that differs in three places from that summarized at
6.151. The order that can best be established from the karikils is,
',difference, sameness, collection, the two relations of contain-
ment, having, and shape. Often, one verse discusses more than
.' one relation, and Candraklrti also moves fairly freely among
the refutations relevant to each relationship. Here, though, for
',' the sake of clarification and structure, they are presented in a
more separate and serial order.
The section headings that follow state the relationships as
"what is being established" by Candraklrti's analyses. The
theses being refuted are thus the negations of what is estab-
lished, e.g., in the first case that "the self is different from the
aggregation. "
N. The self is not different from the aggregation.
Writing in refutation of transcendental conceptions of the
self, i.e., those which posit that the self is a completely different
entity from the aggregation, the MA (6.124) says:
14
JIABS VOL. 6 NO.2
Because grasping (,dzin) that [self] which is not included in
(gtogs) the aggregation is not established, therefore there is
no self other than the aggregation. [That self] is also not
considered as the basis (rten) of the worldl), self-cherishing
mind because seeing (lta-ba) [that] self is also not known.
The argument here is that if the self were not included within
the aggregation it would be quite unknown, for the self is al-
ways and necessarily established only on the basis of the aggre-
gation. For example, the knowledge of someperson is necessar-
ily made with reference to his or her aggregation, i.e., physical
appearance, affective traits, mental qualities, etc. Without such
a reference, the location of a person could never be made. This
is also the case in first person analyses, for all knowledge about
one's self is mediated by a consciousness of one's self, and con-
sCiousness (v&iiiina) is included within the aggregation. It is also
usually known with reference to the other aggregates, viz.,
one's body, feelings, discriminations, and impulses. As a knowl-
edge, and so location, of the self is mediated by and made with
reference to the set or a subset of elements of the aggregates,
.. the self cannot be independent of and completely other than
the aggregation.
20
Were it thus, it could be known indepen-
dently of the aggregates, and this is contingently and necessar-
ily impossible. It is necessarily impossible because, as we have
said, knowledge is a function of the aggregation. Hence the MA
concludes that, though a self-conception and grasping at it can
be produced, its basis or support cannot be a transcendent self,
for the existence of such is quite unascertainable.
21
Candraklrti supports his analysis with an example intend-
ed to establish the merely intellectual and speculative (kun-
btags) nature of transcendent conceptions of a self, and to show
why they cannot be the basis for an innate self-conception and
self-grasping. He writes (6.125) that: "Those who have become
stupefied (brgyal) as animals for many aeons also do not see this
unborn and permanent [self]. Yet in them also self-cherishing
is manifestly seen ('jug-mthong) and therefore there is no self
other than the aggregati6n."
The argument here is that an attitude of self-grasping
(such as is necessarily based on a self-conception) can be ob-
served in animals. They, though, are unable to conceive of tr: ~
permanent, independent, etc., transcendental self of the (Hin-
15
du)'philosophers, so that innate conception cannot be based in
or supported by the acquired view of a self.
Having refuted the ide.a that the self can be an entity utter-
ly different from the aggregation, Candraklrti turns his atten-
tion to the basis of innate conceptions of the self in which the
self is identified with rather than differentiated from the aggre-
gation.
V. The self is not the same as the aggregation
Candraklrti begins (6.126):
Because there is no self established as other than the aggre-
gation, the notion of a view of a self (bdag lta'i-dmigs-pa) is
solely the aggregation. Some consider that the aggregation
in [its] five parts also is the basis (rten) for a view of a self.
Some [others] consider it is only the mind (sems).
As seen from the foregoing, no proof can be made for a genu-
ine difference between the self and aggregation. Thus, certain
Buddhist philosophers, here the conclude that the
self must be merely the aggregation. According to Candraklrti,
some V considered that all five aggregates were the
self, whereas others considered only the consciouness aggre-
gate the self.
Several logical consequences issue from this identification
of the self with either all of the aggregates or consciousness
alone. The logical basis for these consequences is stated by
Leibniz's "principle of the identity of indiscernibles." It says
that "to suppose two things indiscernible is to suppose the same
thing under two names."22 In the case at hand then, one has
two things, self and aggregation, of which it is said they are the
same. Yet "to say of two things that they are identical is non-
sense."23 Hence, the wedge the Madhyamika drives in the posi-
tion of the (and all other opponents) exposes in this
case a stated unity of two things yet an instinctjve and sometimes
doctrinal separation of the two. The Madhyamika points to a
confounding of qualities in which one or other of two entities
1lilay be characterized by a set of qualities, but not both.
The refutation opens (6.127): "If the aggregation were the
self, then because they would be many there would be many
selves too. The self would be substantial (rdzas, dravya) , and
because that view (lta-ba, dr.'iti) is put ('jug) substantially [it]
would not be false (phyin-ci-log, viparyasa)."'Two separate conse-
quences are drawn here. The first is that if the self and aggre-
gation are really the same, then the unity of the self will be lost,
for the self must necessarily bifurcate into five selves, as this is
the n umber of aggregates. In fact, the self will multiply beyond
five for there will be as many selves as there are distinct parts of
the body, real aspects to feelings, etc. Moreover, even if the self
is asserted to be just the consciouness aggregate, its integrity is
lost, for there are visual, auditory, olfactory, etc., conscious-
nesses.
24
If, in the light of such consequences one were to main-
tain the oneness of the self, then the divisions between the
aggregates would collapse also. In other words, the unity of the
self can only be maintained at the expense of denying that
form, feelings, etc., are substantially different.
The second point to be made is that if the self and the
aggregation are the same, then just as the aggregation is (for
the substantially existent, then the self must be
also. This, though, contradicts the own philos-
ophy, which holds that the self is not substantial, but exists
dependent on a mental label (btags-yod, savikalpa). Further, if
the self is substantial, as can be concluded, then the self will be
free from error with respect to its cognition, and moreover, it
will then be quite unnecessary to give up attachment to the
aggregation for the purpose of achieving liberation.
Furthering his refutation, Candraklrti (6.128) writes:
"When nirvarw [was gained] the self would certainly be annihi-
lated (chad). In the moments before nirvarw [there would be]
birth (skye) and decay ('jig). Because there is no agent (byed-po,
karta) that [agent's karma would] have no result ('bras, phala).
Karma accumulated by someone would be consumed (za-ba) by
another."
There are several points in this verse. The first is directed
towards some philosophers who held that a contin-
uum of the self passed into nirvaI).a.) (dGe-'dun-grub
25
glosses
this as the nirvaI).a unaccompanied by the aggregates [lhag-med-
kyi-mya-ngan-las 'das-pa], i.e. the arhants pbst-mortem nirvaI).a.)
To these Candraklrti points out that what they say
is surely inconsistent, for if the self and aggregation are one,
17
then once the aggregation is destroyed, so is the self. (One
could add a general case, that if the self is the aggregation then
at the time when a person's body (rilPa) is being cremated or
buried so is his self, or at least some part of it.)
The second point is that if the self and aggregation are
one, then the self is subject to decay and birth the moment
before nirva.Q.a. The point is not elaborated by Candraklrti or
dGe-'dun-grub. The decay of the self makes sense, but one can
wonder what is born. I suspect that decay and birth are used
here as correlative concepts, much as jati-nirodha is used to de-
scribe any transitional or transformational process. (Any decay
involves a birth, even if it is a birth into non-existence.)
The third point is that the "agency," "action," and "results"
are mutually defining concepts, and so would lose their sense
and meaning. A later verse (6.137) states this more fully.
It is not correct that the acquirer upadatar) and its
acquisition (nyer-len, upadana) are one thing. If it were like
that, the actIOn (las, karma) and agent (byed-pa, karaka)
would be one. If it is [your] thought that there IS no agent
[but] there is action, [this] is not [right], for without an
agent there is no action.
26
The implications of this view are that action and the results
('bras-bu, phala) of action would be l.ntraced to an agent, for the
motivator and intender of an action would be no different from
the action itself. The notion of causal nexi would be meaning-
less for want of a basis for locating causal continua. Hence, in
Buddhism the concept of karma, in which agents reap results,
would be unfounded, for agents are indistinguishable from
results. As results can no more be ascribed to one agent than to
any other, this would give rise to the seeming possibility of the
karma accrued by one self being experienced by another.
27
The retorts (6.129a) that he has not forfeited
the concept of a continuum (rgyud, sarhtana); the Madhyamika
(6.129b-d) refers back to a refutation (6.61) proferred earlier in
the MA.28 The Madhyamika concludes, on a doctrinal note,
that the aggregation cannot be the self, for the form aggregate,
at least, has a beginning and so contradicts the Buddhist teach-
ings of beginningless existence, etc.
The Madhyamika continues (6.130-1):
As your yogins see there is no self, at that time surely [they
see also that] there are no things. If [you only] reject (spong)
a permanent (rtag, nitya) self then your mind or aggrega_
tion. will not be the self. Through, seeing nor:-self your
yogms would not understand (rtogs-pa) the realIty (de-nyid
tattva) of form, etc. Because [they] entertain the idea of
forms, attachment, etc., will be born, as they do not under-
stand their nature (ngo-bo).
The Madhyamika is saying that according to the
when yogins achieve an insight into the truth there is an ab-
sence of self consciousness. As things (chos, dharma) are identical
with the self, in virtue of their inclusion within the form (gzugs,
rupa) aggregate, when the self disappears at the moment of the
yogins' insight, so must conditioned things. The
then clarifies his position (MABh; 252) as asserting only that
the yogins abandon the view that the self is permanent. The
response of the Madhyamika is that if the construes
,the term "self' to mean a permanent (rtag-pa) self, then such an
apprehension of the self is unable to support the notion that
the aggregation or mind is the self. (Presumably, because at
times other than the time of insight, i.e, when the yogin is
perceiving the self, the aggregation and min.j are not perma-
nent.) The Madhyamika then attempts to rectify (6.131) the
apparently arbitrary application of the term "self'
to the aggregation or mind, by observing (6.131) that his con-
ception of non-self in no way ensures the abandonment of af-
fective concomitants (and hence gaining of liberation), for the
abandonment of attachment and aversion, etc., require insight
into emptiness. The insight merely into impermanence still
conceives that things have a self-nature (svabhiiva), and so con-
tinues to provide a basis for karma-creation, etc.
In some closing remarks (6.132-3) to the refutation of the
idea that the self and aggregation are the same, Candraklrti
interprets a sutric source that the had earlier used
to support his assertion of an identity between the two. On the
Madhyamika interpretation, a sutric statement that "the aggre-
gates are the self' was taught by the Bhagavan as an expedient
to root out a conception that the self is other than the aggrega-
tion. Evidence for such an interpretation is that yet another
sutra says that form is not the self. In other words, Candraklrti
19
is assigning an interpretative (neya) status to the Vaibha;;ika's
sutric source.
VI. Refutation of a substantial self
At this point, it seems sensible to move ahead some verses
to a set of four verses (6.146-9) that in a sense form an amal-
gam, if not a conjunction, of the two relations just discussed,
viz., difference and identity. These verses provide insights into
the relationship between description and ontology, and the log-
ic of Madhyamika refutation. They constitute an exposition
and refutation of the SammitIya doctrine that the person is
substantially existent (rdzas-su yod-pa; dravya-sat). Stating the
SammitIya theory, the MA (6.146) says: "Some consider the
person to be substantially existent [yet] inexpressible (brjod-med)
[as having] oneness (de-nyid) or otherness [with the aggrega-
tion], [or being] permanent (rtag) or impermanent, etc. [They]
consider it as an object of knowledge (shes-bya, jiieya) of the six
consciousnesses (rnam-shes, vijiiana) and also consider it as the
basis (bzhi) of self-cherishing."
According to this view, the person is not other than the
aggregation, because outside of the aggregation no grasping
Cdzin) or apprehension of a person can be ascertained. On the
other hand, the person does not have the nature (rang-bzhin) of
the aggregation, because it is beyond birth and destruction.
Therefore, the SarilmitIyas concluded that one cannot say
whether a person is identical with or different from the aggre-
gation, and likewise (MABh; 268) (by parity of reasoning) one
cannot say whether a person is permanent or impermanent.
Even so they theorized that a person is a substantial entity,
because it can be perceived by the mind and sensory conscious-
ness, in its functions as a worldly and spiritual agent (MABh;
268-9).
Arguing against the consistency of establishing, as substan-
tial, something that precludes relational designation, the MA
(6.147) says: "Because a mind (sems) , inexpressible (brjod-med)
[as one with or separate] from form is unknown (mi-rtogs) , so
[any] existing things (dngos-yod) [that are] inexpressible are not
known [either]. If any self is established as a [substantial] thing
20
JIABS VOL. 6 NO.2
(dngos-po) , then, just as the mind is established, so [other sub-
stantial] things will not be inexpressible."
The argument here is fortified by an example, the mind.
Candraklrti reasons that the mind whose identity with or dif-
ference from form is inexpressible, would be unknowable. Be-
ing unknowable it certainly could not be a substantially existing
thing. The unknowability entailed here is a necessary rather
than a merely contingent unknowability, for reasons adduced
earlier, namely-still with Candraklrti's example-that if one
could not look to forms or anything other than forms in an
effort to find the mind it would be in principle unknowable, for
"form" and "not form" are jointly exhaustive and mutually ex-
cluding categories of being. Likewise, all things which cannot
be predicated as different or not different from something else
are unknowable. Things exist in dependence upon the distinc-
tions that are made conceptually and in speech. If the means to
distinguish (bead-pa) things are not utilized, or things are genu-
inely indistinguishable, they go unlocated and so are unknown.
Conversely, Candraklrti concludes, whatever is established as
existing is not inexpressible, the mind being a case in point.
The assumption here on the part of the Madhyamika is
that the same self is being referred to by the SammitIya when
he ascribes contradictory properties, in which case one has a
genuine mutual exclusion, so such a self is unknown. Whether
the same self is in fact implicated in the SammitIya's contra-
diction is in a sense immaterial to the Madhyamika. From his
viewpoint, if it is the same self, then the analysis holds. If it is
not the same, then the self has been unwittingly bifurcated,
with the SammitIya giving the impression that the same self is
the subject of these two contradictory properties, when, in fact,
heis simply being loose with his thought.
Continuing his argument, Candraklrti (6.148) writes:
[For] you a vase is not established as a [substantial] thing
because it is inexpressible [that it is one with or separate]
from form, etc. The self, of which [its relationship as one
with or different] from the aggregates is inexpressible, is
not an object known as "estaOfished as existing by itself'
(rang-gyis yod-par grub-pay.
The verse reiterates the meaning of the prevIOUS one,
21
namely, that the existence of a designation (btags, prajiiapti) de-
pends on a support or base (rten) .on w h ~ c h t ~ e designation is
applied. On thIS count, non-referrIng desIgnatIOns are not des-
ignations. The point is that designations cannot be applied to
objects that are purported to be neither identical with nor dif-
ferent from other objects, for the reason that such things can-
not provide a basis or support within or on which distinctions
and hence object discernments can be made. In other words,
(MABh; 269) if objects' relations with other things-for exam-
ple, a vase to its form, and a self to its aggregation-cannot be
specified, those "objects" are merely "putative objects" for they
cannot establish either their existence or nature (chos, dharma).
It may seem as though the Madhyamika is placing himself
in a position diametrically opposed to his stated view that the
, expressibility of things is indicative of their being empty of self-
existence (svabhava). For the Madhyamika, self-existing things
could not be related to names. The implication (from 6.148cd)
would be that a self whose relationships can be known is an
object "established as existing by itself' (rang-gyis yod-par grub-
pa). The point, though, is that "inexpressible objects" are "un-
related objects" and objects unrelated to other things cannot be
established as having a nature they may be purported to have,
for the very discernment of their nature depends on their com-
parison with other objects. If those comparisons are not made,
then objects fail to establish their nature and hence themselves.
When comparisons are made, things are established not as pos-
. sessed of self-existence (svabhava), but as nominal bases suitable
for nominal designations.
Candraklrti concludes his refutation of the SammitIya's er-
rant view (6.149):
Your [view] does not consider whether consciousness IS
other than its own self. Having asserted that a thing is
other than form, etc., [you] would see those two aspects
(rnam-pa) in things. Therefore, there is no self, because it is
separate from the properties of things (dngos-chos).
The final argument is made first with the example of con-
sciousness (rnam-shes, vijiiana). If consciousness is not different
from its own self (rang-gi-bdag) (i.e., is the same as itself), then it
must be a different entity from what is not itself, e.g., form, etc.
In that case, the relations of identity and difference do apply,
and so consciousness is not substantially existing. Likewise, the
self, if it is substantial, cannot be other than its own self, in
which case it is different from that which it is not. Hence, it is
not inexpressible vis-a-vis the two aspects of identity and differ-
ence. Thus, on the SammitIya's own criterion, it cannot sub-
stantially exist. The final sentence of the verse just repeats the
earlier conclusion, that a self apart from the two aspects is a no
self, for want of a location for its properties.
There are two points worth making about these four
verses. The first is that the Madhyamika does not question the
analytical ascertainment of the self as neither one with or differ-
ent from the aggregation, for he establishes that conclusion
himself. It is the conclusions that follow from conjoining the
first two sections of the seven-sectioned analysis: viz., that self is
not different from the aggregation and that it is not the same,
either. The concern of the Madhyamika lies in an errant conclu-
sion drawn by the SarilmitIya: that a self so described does sub-
stantially exist. The second point is that in drawing the conse-
quences of the SarilmitIya's own conclusion, Candraklrti gives
an implicit recognition and utilization of the "three principles
of thought": viz., those of identity, the excluded middle, and
contradiction.
29
VII. The self is not the same as the collection
The remaining five sections of the seven-sectioned analysis
are, as we have said, aimed at refuting more specific relation-
ships that are commonly conceived to describe the relation be-
tween the self and aggregation. The first of the specific rela-
tionships considered is that of "being the collection." The MA,
speaking for the gives this definition (6.134ab):
"[When] we say 'aggregation' [we mean] the collection of the
aggregates (phung-rnams-kyi-tshogs-pa) not the entities (ngo-bo) of
the aggregation." The term "collection" is a translation of
"tshogs." Other equivalents are: set, group, class, composite, as-
semblage. The term, in this case, signifies the collection of parts
rather than the parts themselves.
3o
It is concerned not with the
arrangements of parts within some collection, but with the col-
ANALYSIS OF THE PERSON 23
lectlon itself. The concept of a set is, in fact, partiCularly appo-
site here, for the membership of sets is unordered. That is to
say, the arrangement or placement of elements within a set
does not affect the identity criteria for sets. Hence, different
orderings of the same membership constitute the same set.
Hence, here the collection which corresponds to the notion of a
set rather than its membership (i.e., the elements which make it
up), is distinguished from the concepts of "shape" or arrange-
ment (i.e., order of the parts), which is analyzed later.
The definition, then, is that the collection is the
aggregation as a unit rather than each aggregate individually.
The Madhyamika response is (6. 134cd) that the collection is not
the lord (mgon), discipliner (,dul-ba) or witness (dbang-po-nyid) ,
and as it is not these, the collection of them is also not the self.
The argument here (MABh; 256-57) is that the Buddha said
that the self is the lord, discipliner, etc., of the self, yet this
cannot be said of the collection of aggregates. In other words,
with respect to self, one can make sense of the notions that it
protects its interests, achieves its goals, witnesses its actions, etc.
Such sense cannot be made for the parts or constituents of the
self. Therefore, as they are not bearers of the seWs qualities,
they cannot be the self.
The Madhyamika continues (6.135):
A carriage and self are alike. At the time its parts (yan-lag)
collect in place [it] becomes a carriage per se (shing-rta-nyid).
A siitra says, "[It] is when dependent (brten) on the aggre-
gation." Therefore, the merely assembled ('dus) aggrega-
tion is not the self.
This verse introduces the substitution of a carriage and its
collected parts for the self and aggregation respectively. It is
said the carriage becomes a carriage when the parts of the
carriage collect in place. This does not imply a collection in
spatial terms, but is to say (MABh; 258) that the designation
(prajiiapti) "carriage" can only be made when the parts of the
carriage are considered as a collection. Prior to that one does not
have a "carriage," for the individual parts are uncollected 'and
so cannot be parts of the one carriage. That is to say, the sepa-
rate or diversified parts, e.g., wheels, etc., are not carriage
. parts, but, rather, just wheels, etc. Hence, the only suitable base
on which to designate "carriage" is the collection of carriage
parts. Likewise, the only suitable base for receiving the designa_
tion "self' is the collection of the aggregates, for prior to their
being collected one has form, feelings, 'etc., but not parts Or
aggregates suitable for the singular designation "self." That is
to say, as individual parts one could not unify them as all parts
of the one self, for to describe parts of one thing is to imply one
haver of the parts. But, the Madhyamika objects (MABh; 258-
9), if the designation is the collection, e.g., the carriage the
collection of carriage parts and the self the aggregation, then
the collections can have no parts, e.g., the carriage no wheels,
etc., and the self no form, feelings, etc., for the carriage and self
are unit concepts. That is to say, the composites, like the desig-
nations, would be singular notions and so not partake of divi-
sions. A consequence of this view is that each and every part of
the collection would be the collection. The wheels of a carriage
would each be the carriage and each of the aggregates would be
the self.31
Verse 6.136 refutes the idea that the self is the shape of the
aggregates.
32
Verse 6.137, which we have quoted earlier,33 is
introduced as a refutation of "the self as the same as a compos-
ite of the aggregations." It resolves the analysis into the earlier
one of simple identity between the self and aggregation, draw-
ing the conclusion that one has a dissolution of the concepts of
agency and action, etc.
Verse 6.152ac also considers singular designations as the
collection of their components. The verse reads: "If the collec-
tion were the carriage then the carriage would be in pieces
because the parts have no part possessor (yan-lag-can)."
This verse takes a different tack from the previous refuta-
tion.
34
Where the earlier refutation (6.136) resolves the notion
of "collection" into the "notion" of a unit concept, thus placing
it on a par with singular designations, this verse resolves the
term "collection" in the opposite direction. Where, in the earli-
er verse the concept of a "collection" was abandoned for want
of losing its membership, here the "collection" is construed as a
"collection of parts" on the grounds that without parts there is
no collection. As a collection of parts, a collection partakes of
the nature and properties of parts. That is, the properties of
parts are necessarily properties of a collection. As the notion
25
"parts" is necessarily a plural notion (to talk of one partimplies
there is at least one other) the collection also will be plural.
There will, in fact, be as many collections as there are parts and
so the term "collection" is abandoned again, this time for want
of a possessor or collector of the parts.
35
In summary, the analysis of the relationship of "being the
collection of aggregates" is accomplished through clarification
of the concept of a "collection." The concept is serially resolved
in favour of two possible interpretations, i.e., one in which the
characteristic of "being a collector" is prime, the other in which
the concept of "containing parts" is prime. In other words,
"collection" is reduced to its qualities as "designata" and "desig-
natum." The qualities inhering in these are mutually excluding,
e.g., one and many. Hence, a clarification in terms of either one
is at the expense of the qualities of the other. Consequently, the
three notions of a "designation," "collection" and "part" are
mutually incompatible. More precisely, "collection" is a mobile
term in this analysis, resolved into the mutually contradicting
notions of "singular designation" and "members or parts."
Hence, when "collection" is reduced to "designation" it is con-
sistent with "designation" and inconsistent with "members."
When it is reduced to "members," it is consistent with "mem-
bers" and inconsistent with "designation." Nor can it be a genu-
inely third term with a different meaning, for then it would
relate to neither "designation" nor "members."
The conclusion to this section of the analysis is that the self
cannot coherently be the collection of the aggregates.
VIII. The self is not in the aggregation and vice versa
The MA (8.142) says:
The self is not in the aggregation. Those aggregates are
also not in the self. Because this conception (rtog-pa) would
come [only] if otherness were here, [and] there IS no other-
ness, therefore this is a [wrong] conception.
The relationship in question in these two sections of the
analysis is one of containment, basis or support (rten). The Bha-
26
JIABS VOL. 6 NO.2
,rya (265) gives the example of curd in a plate. The refutation
refutes the containment of the self in the aggregation, and
aggregation in the self simultaneously. ~ h e analysis is straight_
forwardly reductive. Candraklrti (MABh;265) reasons that the
properties of containing (rten) and being a container (brten-pa)
are possible only where otherness or difference prevails be-
tween these two. As in the refutation of the relation of "other-
ness," all relata and relationships collapse, as do notions of the
selfs being based on or contained within the aggregation, and
vzce versa.
IX. The self does not have the aggregation
The sixth relationship refuted is that of having, or posses-
sion, and, in a stronger sense, ownership. The MA (6.143) says:
It is not considered ('dod) that the self has form (gzugs-ldan)
for the self does not exist. Therefore, the sense of "fi.aving"
(ldan-don) is inapplicable. If [it is said they are] other, [like]
having a cow, [or] not other, [like one's] having a form,
then, compared to the form, the self has no otherness [or]
identity.
In Tibetan, the relationship is given by the post-positive former
ldan, in Sanskrit the possessive s-qffixes vant and mant.
36
The
analysis here is reductive. The first point is that t h ~ self is a
mere designation and so cannot be said to have possessions,
such as form, etc. The second point is philological. Candraklrti
notes (MABh; 265-66) a dual usage of the term "having" (ldan,
vantlmant). On the one hand it is used in constructions such as
"Devadatta has a form (lhas-byin gzugs dang ldan)," which indi-
cate that Devadatta is a form or body. In other words, Deva-
datta is identified with his body. On the other hand, it is also
used in constructions like "X has a cow (ba-lang-dang ldan)," in
which a differentiation between possessor and possession is im-
plied. This dual usage indicates that the self is ambivalent vis-a-
vis form, and so cannot be said to possess form.
Though Candraklrti's analysis stops at this grammatical
analysis, the same conclusion can be drawn via a consequential
analysis, by noting that possession cannot obtain between things
27
that 'are inherently other. On the other hand, if the things are
the same, the notion of possession collapses, for there is no
possessor distinguished from a possession.
37
X. The self is not the shape of the aggregation
Finally, the MA considers a modal definition of the self,
namely that it is its shape (dbyibs, samsthana). The common-sense
meaning of the term, as the spatial displacement assumed by
material form, is analyzed as a suitable base for designations.
With respect to "parts," the shape is their arrangement. In the
case of the self and aggregation, the shape necessarily means
the form (rupa) aggregate, as all others are formless.
The first and obvious point that Candraklrti makes is that
if the self were the shape, then all aggregates other than form,
i.e., feelings, perceptions, etc., would not be the self. In re-
sponse to a V a i b h a ~ i k a suggestion that the self is nothing but
the shape, Candraklrti says (MA, 6.136 cd) straightforwardly
that "the collection of mind (sems) etc., cannot be the self (bdag-
nyid) because they do not have the shape."
The consequential analysis of "shape" is introduced at the
completion of verse 6.152. Candraklrti writes (6.152d-3):
Also, the mere shape (dbyibs) cannot be the carriage. [If]
you [consider that] the shape of each (re-re) part also be-
longs (gtogs) to the carriage in the same way prior [to ar-
rangement as after], [then] as [when] disjoined (bye-par) so
now also [when arranged] there is no carriage existing.
There are two ways in which the carriage may be the
shape. It may be the shape of the parts (yan-lag) or the shape of
the composite (tshogs) of the parts. This verse considers and
refutes the first alternative. The Madhyamika objection
(MABh;274) is that if the carriage is imputed to the disassem-
bled parts, these are not the carriage but just a wheel, etc., here
and there, so the assembled parts are not a carriage, either. The
basis of the objection is that when shape is the only criterion for
the determination of a carriage then the arrangement of the
parts is immaterial to their being a carriage. Hence, if one
. agrees that the unassembled parts are not a carriage, then nec-
essarily the assembled. are not a carriage, for assembly is an
immaterial factor.
Alternatively, one may regard the shape of the assembled
parts a carriage. That is, when the parts are arranged in the
shape of a carriage, they become a carriage. The Madhyamika
objects also to this view, stating (6.154) that: "If at the present
time of being a carriage, the wheels, etc., have a different
shape, this shape would be grasped [at the earlier time, when
unassembled], but it is not [grasped] as existing. Therefore, the
mere shape does not exist as a carriage."
The argument here (MAB;274) is that if the carriage is
viewed strictly in terms of its shape, without regard for the
collection or aggregation of parts, i.e., sub-shapes, then the
carriage shape will be perceivable independently of their being
collected or uncollected. In this case, the carriage, at the time of
its being assembled, is visually identical with its shape at an
earlier time, when it is unassembled. Hence, if the carriage is its
assembled shape, assembly drops out and the unassembled
shape is still the same shape as the assembled shape. The unas-
sembled parts of the carriage, therefore, assume the shape of
the carriage. This is not the case, though, so the carriage is not
the shape when collected.
Verse 6.155 makes the point that the collection as a suitable
basis for the identification of the "I" is already refuted, and so
"shape" must necessarily be understood here as having nothing
to do with the collection of members. But without a notion of
collection, the concept of shape is undetermined, and cannot by
itself provide a basis for the designation of a carriage or self in
the case of the aggregate(s') shape.
38
The assumption in these verses is that "shape" is a differ-
ent concept from "collection." Hence, matters of assemblage
are immaterial when considering whether things have the same
shape. The consequences accrue, because depending on where
one begins (with unassembled shapes that are not carriages or
assembled shapes that are), one can argue that redistributions
or rearrangements of the shapes makes no difference to their
status as carriages or non-carriages.
A series of closing verses (6.158-62) concludes the estab-
lishment of the non-self of the person via the refutations in
seven sections. These concluding verses reiterate a recurring
29
theme in the MA, that consequential analysis does not preclude
the nominal existence of entities and processes, and that selves,
carriages and other worldly conventions should not be aban-
doned.
XI. Conclusion
In concluding our own presentation of the seven-sectioned
analysis, we can note that all the specific relationships (i.e., the
last five) are species of the first two. Specifically, the theses that
the self is the "collection" and the "shape" of the aggregation
are both based on the premise that the self and aggregation are
identical, the "collection" and "shape" being the modality of the
aggregation wherein it is posited as being identical with the self.
On the other hand, the two theses based on the relation of
"containment" and the thesis based on "possession," presup-
pose a difference between the self and aggregation. Thus,
when the relationships of identity and difference are related,
ipso facto the following five are implicitly refuted also.
Hence, from a theoretical viewpoint, though not necessar-
ily from a practical one, the Madhyamika analysis of the self can
be completed, as the Prasannapada notes
39
within the first two
sections, for the theses of identity and difference (tattvanyatva-
p a ~ a ) subsume all possible relations.
It seems clear also that refutations of both identity and
difference are required in order to produce the Madhyamika's
conclUsion that things are empty of a self-nature, for together
they constitute what we may call the "two halves" of an ultimacy
analysis. Any analysis that failed to utilize both halves would
produce a conclusion that did not exclude all possible theses.
Hence, it would also fail to conclude that the self was empty. If,
for example, only the relation of identity between the self and
aggregation is refuted, then a transcendental self is implicitly
established. This, for example, is what the Hindu Advaita Ve-
danta does when analyzing the self (atma) within the formed
sheaths (mayakosa). The self is unfindable within the sheaths (an
analogue to the skandhas). It is not analyzed within the postulate
of being different from the sheaths, and so is thought to be
transcendental to the sheaths. Even so, it witnesses the sheaths
30
JIABS VOL. 6 NO.2
and holds them as an object, characteristics which, for the Mad-
hyamika analytically renders it non-transcendental with respect
to the sheaths.
40
If the difference between the two is analyzed in isolation
from refuting their identity, then a self is established as identi-
fied with the aggregation. In both cases, the establishments are
of appearances (i.e., a self as aggregation and transcendental
self) and not of emptiness.
This presumed necessity for conjoining the two analyses
may be thought to run against the Madhyamika's claim that
their negations are absolute (prasajya) in that they do not imply
or affirm a counter-thesis, as do implicative (paryudasa) nega-
tions. Hence, it could be thought that just one side or half of an
analysis is sufficient to prove that some phenomenon is empty.
Two replies can be made to this. Firstly, in the practice of
dialectics there may be a clear disparity between what the Mad-
hyamika intends by his negations and how they are actually
received and interpreted by his opponents. Hence, though the
Madhyamika may well intend that a negation directed to a phi-
losopher holding a view that the self is wholly other than the
aggregation, this in no way implies that the self is the aggrega-
tion, but in practice this may fail to preclude the possibility that
that philosopher does in fact slide to a view that affirms the
counter-thesis. In this case, both halves of an analysis, i.e., the
negations of difference and identity, may be directed to the one
person. In that case, the MA's instantiations of errant views as
belonging to the Samkhya, etc., are rightly inter-
preted as exemplifications of the wrong views, and perhaps as
emphasizing which half or component of analysis is used with
which philosophers. They need not, though, be taken as imply-
ing the exclusive pairing of each component of an analysis with
philosophers of opposed philosophical persuasions, vis-a-vis the
self and its relation to the aggregation.
Secondly, even if an opponent is not inclined to slide to an
opposing viewpoint, both halves of an analysis are implied, for
an opponent has presumably worked through one half of an
analysis by way of affirming his own. thesis prior to being en-
gaged in an analysis by a Madhyamika.
In conclusion, then, the emptiness or selflessness of the
person is shown by utilizing the two halves of the Madhyamika
----------- --------
31
analysis which, when their respective conclusions are con-
joined, serve to exclude any view about the self, and so establish
its emptiness. The syntax describing the analytical conclusion is
the bi-negative disjunction: the self is neither the same as nor
different from the aggregation. As a bi-negation, it also serves
to describe the emptiness of the self.
Notes
1. This paper could not have been completed without the help of a series
of lectures on this text that I was fortunate to receive from Ven. Geshe T.
Loden, and which were translated by Ven. Zasep Tulku.
2. References to the kilrikas are not paginated, as they are readily located
in Poussin's edition.
3. See, for example, Abhidharmakosa, 1.9, which says that rupa includes
external sense-objects (artha). ,
4. See P. J. Hopkins, Meditation on Emptiness (unpublished Ph.D. Diss,
University of Wisconsin, 1973), pp. 586-597 for the Tibetan dGe-Iugs discus-
sion of the pervasiveness of "mine."
5. Santideva refutes the Samkhya purus.a in the Bodhicaryilvatilra, 9.61-
68, in its characteristic Tole as an eternal consciousness that witnesses prakrti.
6. Cf. Bodhicaryilvatilra, 9.69ff. for Santideva's refutation of the
atman on the grounds that such a self would be non-conscious and unable to
perform its designated role.
7. The characteristics of pUT'lqa and the divisions of phenomena or na-
ture (Prakrti, rang-bzhin) are defined at length MABh; 235-239.
8. See Tsong kha pa's Drang-nges rnam-'byed legs-bshad snying-po, trans. by
Robert Thurman as Essence of the Eloquent (MS, 1977) p. 172.
9. Tsong kha pa, op. cit., p. 178, says that the eradication of the non-
Buddhist self does nothing to reduce the afflictions such as desire. Also, p.
171.
10. RSM, f.32b2 adds to this the view of the self as lacking its own power
(rang-dbang) and glosses that such selves provide a basis for fabricating the
innate (lhan-skyes) graspings at a self. The MABh does not ascribe this view to
anyone particular Buddhist school, though from the context it is presumably
meant to be the view of all or some
11. The Paficavimsatisilhasrika-prajfiilpilramitil-sutra (trans. by E. Conze,
The Large Sutra on Perfect Wisdom (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1975), p. 264) calls the doctrine of impermanence, (along with the teaching
that all is ill, not-self, and repulsive) a counterfeit perfection of insight. The
non-counterfeit perfection of insight does not describe forms, etc. as perma-
nent or impermanent.
12 . For a detailed account of the SammitIya's pudgala thesis see N. Dutt,
Buddhist Sects in India (Calcutta: Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 1970), pp. 194-
223.
13. The Abhidharmakosa-vyakhya, chapt. 9, uses a simile of the relation_
ship between fuel and fire in describing the pudgalavada view of the relation_
ship between the self and the aggregation.
14. See verses 10.14 and 22.1. _
15. The MABh; 267 quotes vs. 22.1 following 6.144.
16. See Leslie Kawamura, Golden Zephyr (trans. of Suhrllekha with a Tibet_
an Comm. by Mi-pham) (Emeryville, Calif.: Dharma Publishing, 1975), p. 46,
n.5S.
17. The MMK instantiates its analyses with fire and wood (chpt. 10) and
the Tathagata (chpt. 22). Like the MA, the MMK (10.15) indicates that substi-
tutions of the self (atma) and its acquiring (upadana-a functional equivalent
of the aggregation) are to be made for fire and wood. F. Streng, Emptiness: A
Study in Religious Meaning (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1967), 195-96.
IS. J. Hopkins writes that the analysis is "applied to an example ('chari-
ot') which is familiar in the world. For, a correct example is easier to under-
stand than the actual thesis. It is not that the emptiness of a chariot is to be
cognized before cognizing the emptiness of the person, but it is important
first to see how the mode of analysis works through an example which is
easier than the actual subject." Meditation on Emptiness, op. cit., pp. 560-61.
19. The MMK's analyses comprise five sections, the first five cited in this
verse. They exclude the relations of "being the collection" and "having the
same shape," which are Candraklrti's own contribution.
20. Cf. Ratnavalz, 1.33.
2l. Moreover, as Nagarjuna points out (MMK, 1S.lb), if the self is com-
pletely different from the aggregation, it would be impossible for the self to
have any of the characteristics of the aggregation. A person, for example,
could not be young, old, happy, sad, etc., because all physical and mental
attributes would apply only to the aggregates and never to the self.
22. H. G. Alexander (ed.), The Leibniz-Clark Correspondence (New York:
Manchester Univ. Press, 1956) (letter 4, para. 4), p. 37. Another statement is:
"There is no such thing as two individuals indiscernible from each" (Alex-
ander, p. 36); also see pp. 61-63. In The Monadology, the principle is stated
thus: "In nature there are never two beings which are perfectly alike and in
which it is not possible to find an internal difference, or at least a difference
founded upon an intrinsic quality (denomination)." In Leibniz, The Monado-
logy and Other Philosophical Writings, tr. with intro. and notes by Robert Latta
(London: Oxford University Press, 1925, 2nd ed.), p. 222.
23. L. Wittgenstein, Tmctatus Logico-Philosophicus (London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1961), p. 105.
24. The six consciousnesses asserted in the V a i b h a ~ i k a Abhidharma and
with which the Madhyamika agree are: eye (caks.ur), ear (srotm), nose (ghrar;a),
tongue (jihva), body (kaya), and mind (mano) consciousness (vijiiana). They
make up the consciousness aggregate (vijiiana-skandha). See Abhidharmakosa,
1.16-7.
25. RSM, f. 30a6. .
26. This verse in fact is stated as a consequence of the seWs being the
collection of aggregates. "If the self is but the collection (tshogs) of form etc., at
33
that time the agent and action would become one" (MABh p. 259). Can-
draklrti gives the example of a potter and pot becoming indistinguishable.
27. In the case of karmic continuity between lives, if the self and aggre-
gation are one, then aggregations alone would come into existence at birth
and cease at death. Though new aggregations would arise subsequent to the
destruction of old ones, there would be no means for locating ante- and post-
mortem aggregations as belonging to the same continuum, for want of having
something related to but different from the aggregations themselves, viz., a
self.
28. The brunt of that refutation is that continua do not exist intrinsically
(as both the and Viji'ianavada claim) and that were they to, causal
nexi would be completely reified, such that causal relationships between and
within continua would be impossible.
29. A third point that could be mentioned is the fact that these verses
make apparent a seeming inconsistency in the Madhyamika philosophy. The
inconsistency rises here because emptiness and self-existence, though oppo-
site, in fact purportedly mutually excluding, notions, are both finally beyond
designation. How, then, can they be different? The analytical solution, and
one to be expected just because these notions are mutually defining, is that
emptiness and self-existence are finally neither the same nor different; the
difference is nominal and not real. This mutual definition of mutually ex-
cluding terms is the basis for the construal elsewhere in the MA (Bhii.s.ya, p.
305-8) of svabhiiva as a synonym of filnyata. On this, see W. L. Ames, "The
Notion of Svabhava in the Thought of Candraklrti" (unpub., n.d.).
30. The refutation of the idea that the self is not the parts or aggregates
was made in the context of refuting the idea that the self and aggregates are
identical. The refutation in that case was that the self cannot be the individual
parts, i.e., the aggregates, for then there would be many selves.
31. At this point, the refutation of the idea that the self is not the collec-
tion of aggregates is recognizably reduced to the consequences inhering in
the earlier view that the self is the aggregation. If the aggregates and the self
are one, then, as the self is one, so is the aggregation; hence, it is not an
aggregation, for it cannot be divided into parts.
32. Here and 6.152 Candraklrti analyzes the relations of "shape" and
"collection" cross-referentially. Particularly, he draws on conclusions pro-
duced in the analysis of the collection when analyzing shape.
33. Supra, p. 17.
34. In an effort to separate this analysis from that of the subsequent
analysis of "shape," this commentary does not always follow Candraklrti.
35. In both analyses (at 6.135 and 6. 152a-c), the distinctions between
agents and action, etc., are analytically dissolved. In both cases one is left with
in vacuo concepts, in the first case of "designata" and in the second of "desig-
natum."
36. Cf. MMK's analyses of "having." The corresponding locutions are:
skandhavan" (22.1) and "nagnir indhanavan" (10.14). See K. Inada,
Nagarjuna: A Translation of his Millamadyamakakarika (Tokyo: the Hokuseido
Press, 1970), pp. 132 and 84.
37. In summarizing the conclusions of the last three sections, verse 6.144
expands these four misconceived relationships into "twenty [wrong] views of
the self." The twenty are arrived at by applying the four misconceived rela-
tionships to each of the five aggregates.
38. The establishment of a self as identified with shape and collection is
also subject to consequential analysis, and, like the analysis of "birth from
birth" would conjoin two analyses, one refuting the notion of shape as a basis
the other the collection. If the basis for identification were a mixture of two, ~
consequential analysis would resolve it into one or the other, or both.
39. See M. Sprung, Lucid Verses on the Middle Way (Boulder: Prajna Press
1979), p. 194. Also, p. 166, where self is analyzed for the sake of brevity i ~
terms only of identity and difference.
40. This applies also to atomistic or partitive analyses, which search the
aggregation for a self by dividing the constituents of the aggregation into
coarse and then finer parts. Such forms of analysis fail to exclude the possibil-
ity that the self is separate from the aggregation. They establish the non-
phenomenality of the self, but not its emptiness. See Bodhicaryavatara, 9.58 ff.
and Ratnavalr 2.2 for this sort of non-consequential investigation.
Abbreviations
MA Madhyamakavatara of Candraklrti (verses), Louis de la Vallee Poussin
(ed.) Madhyamakavatara Par Candrakfrti, Traduction Tibetaine. Osna-
bruck: Biblio Verlag (reprint), 1970.
MABh: Madhyamakavatara-Bhiisya ofCandraklrti, Poussin (ed.), Ibid.
MMK Millamadhyamakakarika of Nagarjuna.
RSM : dBu-ma-la 'jug-pai-bstan-bcos-kyi-dgongs-pa rab-tu gsal-ba'i-me-long of
dGe-'dun-grub, in The Collected Works (gSung-'bum) of dGe-'dun-grub-
pa. Sikkim, Gangtok: Dondrup Lama, Deorali Chorten, 1978.
Citiaprakrti and Ayonisomanaskara in the
Ratnagotravibhaga: A Precedent for the
Hsin-Nien Distinction of
The Awakening of Faith
by William Grosnick
The question of the authorship of the Ta-ch'eng chi-hsin lun (The
Awakening of Faith in Mahayana, tr. Paramartha, hereafter re-
ferred to as the AFM), has long been a lively subject of discus-
sion among scholars of Buddhism. Such eminent Buddholo-
gists as Demieville, Liebenthal, and Mochizuki (to name just a
few), have debated the authenticity of the two Chinese transla-
tions of the text and discussed the possibility that the original
text of the AFM might have been composed in China as part of
a controversy between two branches of the Ti-lun sect. I In re-
i cent editions of the Journal of the JABS the question of the
authorship of the AFM has been raised again. In a couple of
. intriguing essays, Professor Whalen Lai has presented some
new arguments in support of the Chinese authorship of the
text.
2
I do not intend here to try to resolve all of the many ques-
tions involved in determining the author of the AFM (such an
undertaking is well beyond the scope of a short paper), but I
would like to address an argument that Professor Lai raised in
the first of his articles-namely his contention that the AFM's
exposition of the relationship of hsin
a
(mind) and nien
b
(thought, thought-moment) bears such an "unmistakable sinitic
stamp" that it must have been authored in China.
3
I will try to
show that the AFM's central conception of an "unmoved," pure
mind (hsin) existing as the basis of the deluded movement of
thoughts (nien) has an important Indian precedent in the citta-
tPrakrti and ayonisomanaskara notions of the Ratnagotravibhaga- .
35
36
JIABS VOL. 6 NO.2
mahayanottaratantrasastra (hereafter referred to as the RGV), a
text with which the AFM's author may well have been familiar.
I do not intend this as a criticism of Professor Lai's research_
the parallels he finds between Chinese thought regarding hsin
and nien prior to the period bf the Six Dynasties and the eluci-
dation of these notions in the AFM deserve serious attention. I
simply would like to show that similar parallels-if not direct
textual influences-exist between the AFM and the Indian_
composed RGV, so that there is no compelling reason to con-
clude that the AFM theory of mind (hsin) and thoughts (nien)
demonstrates Chinese authorship.
I. The General Influence of the Tathagatagarbha Literature on The
Awakening of Faith
Before examining the connection between the theories of
mind and consciousness found in the RGV and AFM, it is
worth noting that the influence of the Indian tathagatagarbha
literature-of which the RGV is the primary treatise-can be
found throughout the AFM. It is well known that the AFM
incorporates the notion of the tathagatagarbha into its discus-
sion of "Mahayana" and the "birth and death of mind" (hsin
sheng-mieh
c
).4 What is not so well known is that the author of the
AFM knew not only of the tathagatagarbha notion itself, but
that he also was extremely well-versed in may of the other ideas
and doctrines expounded in the tathagatagarbha literature.
For example, the author of the AFM shows familiarity with the
idea of the identity of tathatii and the one dharmadhatu spoken
of in the Anunatvapurr;,atvanirde.sa, an early sutra on the tathaga-
tagarbha often quoted in the RGV.5 He also shows familiarity
with that sutra's central idea of the non-increase and non-de-
crease of the beings transmigrating through the triple world.
6
.
In several places he shows an awareness of the notion of the
non-emptiness of the innumerable virtues of the Buddha, dis-
cussed in the Srzmaladevzsutra and other tathagatagarbha texts'?
Elsewhere, he refers to the tathagatagarbha teaching of the
four gur;,aparamitas (eternality, bliss, true selfhood, and purity),8
and, as do tathagatagarbha texts, he characterizes the dharma-
bya using the four set expressions nitya (ch'angd) , dhruva
(keng-"), siva (ch'ing-liangf), sasvata (pu-pien
g
).
9
THE AWAKENING OF FAITH
37
Moreover, not only does the author of the AFM refer ex-
tensively to concepts found exclusively in the tathagatagarbha
literature; he also builds on these notions, explaining problems
left unresolved in earlier tathagatagarbha texts. A case in point
is the seeming contradiction between the idea that tathata is
markless and free from discrimination and the idea that it is
replete with innumerable discernible virtues. Authors of earlier
texts identified the tathagatagarbha as "samala tathata,"lO or
"thusness" hidden by defilements, and they emphasized that
tathata lay beyond the categories of conceptual thought. But, at
the same time, these authors identified the tathagatagarbha
. with the innumerable virtues and powers of the Buddha, ap-
parently without wondering whether these virtues and powers
might not be discernible only to a discriminating consciousness.
The author of the AFM, on the other hand, shows an aware-
ness of this apparent contradiction, and goes to great length to
explain that the essential nature of mind (which is identical with
tathata) , is really free from all distinctions, and it is only with
. reference to the discriminating, deluded mind, which is charac-
terized by innumerable illusions and defilements, that it is pos-
sible to speak of the innumerable virtues associated with the
tathagatagarbha. It is not that tathata is itself differentiated. II
All of this is highly sophisticated, if not abstruse, and shows
that the author of the AFM did not merely pull a few terms or
concepts at random out of Indian Buddhist texts and then use
them to expound a home-grown philosophy. He was, in fact, so
familiar with and involved in the tradition of tathagatagarbha
thought that he could address problems arising within the tra-
dition itself. It would not be surprising, therefore, if one found
that other ideas in the AFM, such as its theory of mind and
thought, showed the influence of the Indian tathagatagarbha
literature.
The question of precisely which sutras or commentarial
works expounding the tathagatagarbha were used by the au-
thor of the AFM is an open one, however. It is possible that the
author might have been familiar with one or more of a dozen
or so texts, including the Lankavatarasutra, Srfmaladevfsutra, An-
iinatvapurr]atvanirdefa, Anuttarasrayasutra, Fo-hsing lun
h
(*Budd-
hagotrasastra) , and the Ratnagotravibhaga, all of which seem to
have borrowed ideas, images, and terminology from one an-
other. But, it is worth noting that the RGV, besides being the
most central of all these texts, was also well known to Some of
the principal figures connected with the AFM. Jikido Takasaki
has shown that Paramartha, to whom tradition accords the first
translation of the AFM, was extremely well-versed in the
RGV-his interpolation of extended passages from the RGV
into his "translation" of the Mahayanasarrtgraha demonstrates
this rather convincingly. 12 And, for those who are inclined to
assign the authorship of the AFM to a master of the Ti-l
un
school, it is worth noting that Ratnamati, co-founder of that
school, was also the translator of the RGV into Chinese. With
the references to the tathagatagarbha teaching found in the
AFM itself, this shows that it was quite possible for the RGV to
have exerted a direct textual influence in the AFM.13
II. Parallels in the Exposition of Mind and Thought
in the Ratnagotravibhaga and The Awakening of Faith
At first glance, the general theory of mind and conscious-
ness of the AFM appears to be quite complex, since part of it
revolves around such unique theories as the five types of con-
sciousness.
14
But underlying this complexity is a basic structure
that is relatively simple. The central focus of the text is on the
actual minds of human beings, what it calls chung-sheng hsin,i or
sattvacitta.
15
Because the human mind is capable both of being
deluded and of attaining enlightenment, it can be analyzed
from two perspectives, and the AFM does this under the two
categories of "the mind as thusness" (tathata) (hsin chen-ju
men
j
),16 and "the mind as birth and death" (hsin sheng-mieh
men
k
) , 17 In Indian Mahayana texts the pure side of mind-the
capacity of the human mind for enlightenment- was a preoc-
cupation of the tathagatagarbha and Buddha-nature literature;
texts like the Ratnagotravibhaga spoke of the "pure element of
the mental nature" (cittaprakrtivaimalyadhatu), which is found in
all beings and which is responsible for their enlightenment.
The deluded mind, on the other hand, was a major preoccupa-
tion of the Vijfl.anavadins, and texts like Vasubandhu's Tri1!lsikii
analyzed those mental processes by which such illusions as the
mistaken cognition of subject-object duality arise. In its analysis
of the human mind as both pure and deluded, the AFM draws
THE AWAKENING OF FAITH 39
heavily on both of these Indian traditions. Indeed, it is entirely
possible t h ~ t one of the intentions ~ f ~ h e author of the text was
to harmonIze the apparently conflICtmg perspectives on mind
found in the tathagatagarbha and Vijnanavadin teachings.
To explain the paradoxical fact that the human mind can
be both pure and defiled, enlightened and deluded, the AFM
brings forward a rather simple and yet ingenious distinction.
The text distinguishes between the un evolved state of mind,
the state in which no thoughts have arisen, and the state of
mind that is bound up in the continuous production of a stream
of thoughts. "What is meant by enlightenment," the text reads,
"is that the mind itself (hsin t'i)! is free from thoughts (nien)."!S
Ordinary people "are said not to be enlightened because they
have a continuous stream of thoughts and have never been
freed from them; therefore they are said to be in beginningless
ignorance."!9 The "essential nature of the mind," according to
the text, "is neither born nor destroyed, things only come to be
differentiated because of deluded thoughts (wang-nien
m
)."20 If
human beings could only free themselves from the incessant
chain of thoughts that produces the illusion of "me" and
"mine," they would be liberated. But since they are ignorant
they do not distinguish the mind itself from its thoughts (they
"mistake thoughts for mind," says the text).2! As a result, they
are bound up in the continuous stream of their illusions.
This is not all the AFM has to say about human conscious-
ness, to be sure, but the distinction between mind (hsin) and
thoughts (nien) is a fundamental one and forms the basis of its
other discussion. One can perhaps see in the AFM image of a
pure mind disturbed by thoughts the basic image of the tatha-
gatagarbha itself-an innate pure nature that is hidden by de-
filements. Much more of the AFM discussion is taken up in
analyzing the nature of those defilements than one normally
finds in texts of the tathagatagarbha tradition, but this is pre-
cisely where the Vijnanavadin influence, with its minute analy-
sis of the incessant stream of thoughts (nien-nien hsiang-hsu
n
)
that constitutes sarp.sara, is most readily apparent. In any case,
one can probably discover the basic tathagatagarbha theme of a
pure mental nature hidden by illusion in the AFM image of the
innate pure mind that is hidden by its deluded thoughts.
Lai has argued that this central AFM distinction between
mind (hsin) and thoughts (nien) is evidence of Chinese ways of
thinking. 22 It may be true that this pattern of thought can be
found in Chinese Buddhist texts prior to the Six Dynasties
period, but it also seems that the author bf the AFM felt it was
found in Indian Buddhist texts as well. Notice the similarity
between the following two passages, one from the AFM and
one from the sarvatraga section of the RG V:
AFM: What is meant by enlightenment is that the essential
nature of mind (hsin-t'i)o is free from thoughts. This
aspect of being free from thoughts is like the ele-
ment of space: there is no place it does not per-
vade.
23
RGV: Just as space pervades all without discrimination
So the mind which is by nature free from
defilement
Pervades all without discrimination.
21
It appears that the author of the AFM took this particular
comparison directly from the RGV,25 apparently feeling that
"freedom from thoughts" was equivalent to being "without dis-
crimination." It is clear that he felt the analogy of mind to space
spoken of in the RGV was an expression of the freedom of
mind from thoughts. He apparently felt that the Indian text
gave direct expression of this; there is no evidence that he
thought he was presenting an alternative or variant interpreta-
tion. One might add in passing that he also apparently took this
particular analogy quite seriously, since he devoted an ex-
tended passage (one of the most profound and insightful of the .
text), to the elucidation of this comparison of mind and space.
26
If one reads further in the sarvatraga passage of the RGV,
one can perhaps see why the author of the AFM felt that the
analogy of mind to space expressed the mind's fundamental
freedom from thoughts. Karikas 15 to 20 of the RGV read:
The earth is supported by water
Water is supported by air (wind)
And air by space, and yet
S p a ~ e is not supported by any of the others.
SImIlarly the skandhas, ayatanas, and dhatus
Are founded on karma and kle.sas,
And kldas and karma
Are founded on irrational thoug-ht (ayonisomanaskiira) ,
And the activities of irrational thought
Are founded on pure mind.
But mind that is pure by nature
Is not founded on any of the others.
The skandhas, iiyatanas, and dhiitus are like the earth,
Karma and klesas are like water,
Irrational thought is like the wind,
And the element (dhiitu) of pure mind is like space.
On the basis of the mental nature
Irrational thought arises.
Thought gives rise to karma and kldas
And because of karma and klesas
There arise the skandhas, ayatanas, and dhiitus.'27
41
The AFM does not borrow the particular cosmology of the
elements found in this passage, but the relationship between
mind and thought that is expounded here is basically that of
the AFM. Pure mind, like space, is eternal and unchanging,
and yet provides the locus or basis (iisraya) of irrational thought.
Irrational thought, on the other hand, is changeable, like wind,
and is the basis of human attachments and deluded activities
(klesas and karma). As in the AFM, the nature of mind is seen to
be pure, while the activities of thought are seen to be the source
of human problems.
The term which has been translated "irrational thought"
(following Takasaki) is ayonisomanaskiira (or ayonisomanasikiira),
alternately translated pu-shan ssu-weip ("bad conception"), pu-
cheng ssu-wei'l ("incorrect conception"), pu-cheng nien
r
("incorrect
thought"), or hsieh nien ("perverted thought") in the Chinese,
and occasionally referred to simply with the single character
nien (as in the above line, "thought gives rise to karma and
klesas"). Ayoniso is derived from yoni, the female sex organ, and
seems to mean "without true origin" or "generated equivocal-
ly." Manaskiira comes from the noun manas (mind) and the
verbal root kr (to "do" or "perform") and means something like
"mental activity." So ayonifomanaskiira is perhaps best translated
"mental activity that has no genuine origin."28
Some of Ratnamati's Chinese translations of ayonifomanas-
kiira, especially hsieh-nien and pu-cheng nien, suggest a similarity
42
JIABS VOL. 6 NO.2
to the idea of wang-nien ("deluded thought") spoken of in the
AFM. Like wang-nien in the AFM, ayonisomanaskara, and not
pure mind itself, it is seen to be the direct source of the human
predicament. According to the above passage, ayonisomanaskara
is the basis of actions (karma) and emotional defilements (klesas)
and the various elements of phenomenal existence (skandhas,
etc.), but the pure mental nature, though always present, re-
mains unaffected by all of these. Interpreted in simpler terms,
the passage seems to say that it is out of mental activity that
illusions such as that of "self' are generated, and these in turn
are the source of those selfish emotional attachments and ego-
centered actions that lead to suffering. If one could still this
frenetic mental activity and return to one's original state, klesas
and karma would disappear as well. This seems to be consistent
with the perspective of the AFM.
Moreover, in the above passage, just as in the AFM,
thought (ayonisomanaskara) is characterized by movement, while
pure mind (since it is like all-pervading space), is seen to be
unmoving. The Chinese translation of the RGV speaks of the
"activities" (hsing)t of irrational thought, and likens manaskara to
wind, which is in constant motion. This calls to mind the other
famous metaphor of the AFM, possibly taken from karika 15 of
Vasubandhu's Trii(l,sika, which likens pure mind to the water of
the ocean and ignorance to the wind that caused waves to
arise.
29
Ayonisomanaskara is also spoken of in an earlier prose pas-
sage of the RGV:
I?}scrimination ('1!ikalpa) means irration!3-l. t h ~ : ) U g h t
(ayomsomanaskara), whICh IS the cause of the ongmatlOn of
karma and kleSas. By knowing that these are quiescent,
non-dual, and free from dualistic activity, one knows that
suffering is ultimately without origination. This is called
the trutli of the extinction of suffenng. It is not because of
the destruction of anything that it is called the truth of the
extinction of suffering. Therefore the sUtra
30
says: "0
MafljusrI: Whenever there is no activity of citta, manas, or
vijnana, there is no discrimination, and because there is no
dIscrimination no irrational thoughts arise. Because there
is rational thought (yonisomanaskara)31 one does not cause
ignorance to anse. Because ignorance does not arise, the
twelve nidanas do not arise. This is what is called non-
origination.
32
43
This passage gives expression to the important Mahayana no-
tion of non-origination,33 which here seems clearly to mean the
nonarising of discrimination (vikalpa) and irrational thought
(ayonisomanaskara) through the quieting of the activities of citta,
manas, and. vijnana. The human predicament, here expressed
in terms of the twelve nidanas, is again seen to arise out of
mental activity, and the Sanskrit verb, pravartante; meaning
"rolling onwards" or "set in motion" clearly conveys a sense of
the motion that is to be contrasted with the original quiescence
of the mental nature. It is not entirely clear whether vikalpa and
ayonisomanaskara are to be regarded as equivalent in the above
passage (the AFM is also not clear about this),34 but the point of
the passage is clearly that when these two do not arise, then
neither does ignorance or the rest of the twelvefold chain of
existence, with its attendant suffering.
This emphasis on nonorigination is also found in the AFM.
In speaking of the tathata aspect of mind, for example, the text
stresses that the essential nature of mind is "unoriginated and
undestroyed."35 In its discussion of the practice of upaya the
text says that a person should "meditate on the fact that all
things are by nature unoriginated, thereby divorcing himself
from deluded views so that he does not dwell in samsara.":l6
And, it is clear that at least part of what the AFM means by
nonorigination is the nonproduction of thoughts. This is evi-
dent from the following passage, which describes the perfect
understanding of bodhisattvas who have completed the stages.
They have realized the characteristics both of mind's in-
ceptIOn and birth and of mind without inception. They are
free from even the slightest thought and have realized the
mind's nature .... Furthermore, though we speak of
knowing the characteristics of inception, what we mean is
being WIthout thoughts.
37
Since both the RG V and the AFM make the nonorigination of
deluded thought the central characteristic of the pure mental
nature, it is difficult to find any significant difference between
the two texts' basic perspectives on mind and thoughts.
Lai has pointed out the difficulty translators and scholars
of the AFM have had in reconstructing a possible original San-
skrit term for nien, the Chinese term for "thought."38 Smrti,
with its positive connotations, and vikalpa, which is generally
translated fen-pieh,w a term already frequently occurring in the
AFM, clearly are not suitable, and this is one reason why Lai
suggests Chinese authorship of the text. 'But, the use of ayoniso_
manaskara in the RGV (and its frequent translation aspu-cheng
nien and hsieh-nien) seems to present another possible Sanskrit
alternative. As with wang-nien in the AFM, ayonisomanaskara is
more or less synonymous with vikalpa, though both texts still
use both terms. Ayoniso is sufficiently vague to be translated
wang,x and, as we have seen, the Ratnamati Chinese translation
occasionally leaves out this prefix altogether,39 which suggests a
possible precedent for the AFM use of nien without the prefix
wang.
40
There also remains the possibility that manaskara alone
might have been used in the original "Sanskrit manuscript" of
the AFM, but this is highly speculative, and the point is not so
much that the AFM is an actual translation from the Sanskrit as
that it faithfully reflects Indian Buddhist precedents. In either
case, the way the RGV uses the term ayonisomanaskara in con-
trast to cittaprakr:ti shows there was enough Indian precedent
for the AFM use of hsin and nien that is is not necessary to
assume Chinese authorship of the AFM.
In conclusion, I would like to repeat that I am not arguing
that the AFM was necessarily composed in Sanskrit. In fact,
there are some better reasons for concluding that the text was
composed in Chinese than the supposed sinitic character of its
theory of mind and thought. Among other things, one might
cite certain linguistic characteristics of the text. For example,
the explanation of chen-ju
Y
(the Chinese translation of tathata) in
terms of its component characters chen ("true") and ju
("thus"),4! is obviously something that could never have existed
in Sanskrit. And, there is another passage which seems to ex-
plain the tsang
z
("store") of ju-lai-tsang
ab
(the usual Chinese
translation of tathiigatagarbha), rather than the garbha of tathiiga-
tagarbha.
42
So there is textual evidence which argues that the
AFM might have been composed in Chinese. But this does not
mean that the ideas of the text depart from Indian Buddhist
precedents.
Nor does it even mean that the AFM was composed by a
native Chinese. The style of composition is typical of Buddhist
translations and (with the possible exception of the problemati-
45
cal triad of t'i,ac hsiang,ad and yung
ae
) ,43 typically Chinese concep-
tual categories like liaf and shihag or pen
ah
and mo
ai
simply do not
occur. There are no allusions to any Confucian or Taoist clas-
. sics and no highly literate rhetorical flourishes. This would
leave open the possibility that the text was composed in Chinese
by a foreign-born translator. This is pure speculation, of
course, but given Paramartha's great familiarity with the Ratna-
gotravibhaga and Vijiianavadin treatises, he clearly had the
background to undertake the project of synthesizing the two
traditions. He is said to have composed commentaries, though
unfortunately these are now lost.
44
More important, it has been
demonstrated that he was not particularly scrupulous in his
attributions, interpolating passages from the RGV right into
the middle of Vijiianavadin treatises and claiming that Vasu-
bandhu was the author of the Fo-hsing Lun, even though the
text is largely a rewriting of the RGV. Takasaki suggests he
even forged the Anuttarrurayasutra.
45
At least it would not have
been out of character for Paramartha to have composed the
AFM and attributed it to Asvaghosa.
NOTES
1. For a selected bibliography of articles on the authorship of the AFM
see Yoshito Hakeda, The Awakening of Faith Attributed to Asvaghosa (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1967), pp. 119-22.
2. Whalen W. Lai, "A Clue to the Authorship of the Awakening of Faith:
Redaction of the Word 'Nien,"'jIABS, 3, No.1 (1980), pp. 34-
53 and "Hu-Jan Nien-Ch'i (Suddenly a Thought Rose): Chinese Understand-
ing of Mind and Consciousness," jIABS, 3, No.2 (1980), pp. 42-59.
3. Cf. Lai, "Clue," p. 49.
4. T.32, p. 575c, 576b.
5. T.32, p. 576a (AFM). For quotations of the Anunatvapumatvanirdesa
(T.16, No. 669) in the RGV see Jikido Takasaki, A Study on the Ratnagotravi-
bhtiga (Rome: IsMEO, 1966), pp. 66-133.
6. T.32, p. 575c, 579a.
7. T.32, p. 576a, 579a (AFM). T.12, p. 221c (SMS). See also T.31, p.
840a (RGV).
8. T.32, p. 579a (AFM). See also T.12, p. 222a (SMS), T.31, p. 798b (Fo-
hsing Lun) , T.16, p. 471c (Anuttarasrayasutra), T.12, p. 617a, b (Nirvarw-sutra).
9. T.32, p. 579a (AFM). See also T.12, p. 221c (SMS), T.31, p. 824a
(RGV), and T.31, p. 801c, (Fo-hsing Lun).
10. Cf. T.31, p. 826c ff. (RGV), Takasaki, Study, p.187ff.
11. T.32, p. 579a, b.
12. Jikid6 Takasaki, "Shindai-yaku Shodaijoron-Seshin-shaku ni okeru Nyo-
raizosetsu," in Yuki-kyoju ShOju-kinen Bukkyoshi-shisoshi Ronshi't (Tokyo, 1964),
pp.241-64.
13. The AFM is not the only "translation" of ~ a r a m a r t h a that shows the
influence of the RGV. Scholars of the Fo-hsing Lun have long noted that text's
close similarity to the RGV, and it is possible that it was the Fo-hsing Lun
(which, like the AFM, also shows Vijnanavadin influence), and not the RGV
that directly contributed to the composition of the AFM. '
14. T.32, p. 576b.
15. T.32, p. 575c.
16. T.32, p. 576a.
17. T.32, p. 576b.
18. T.32, p. 576b.
19. T.32, p. 57Gb, c.
20. T.32, p. 576a.
21. T.32, p. 579c.
22. Cf. especially "Clue," pp. 34, 47, and 49.
23. T.32, p. 576b.
24. T.31, p. 832b.
25. This comparison is also found in the Anuttarasrayasutra (T.16, pp.
469c-470a) and the Fo-hsing Lun (T.31, p. 806b), though both of these speak
not of the cittaprakrtivaimalyadMtu but of the tathagatadMtu !ju-lai-chieh) per-
vading all.
26. T.32, pp. 579c-580a.
27. T.31, p. 832c.
28. The Waymans translate it "improper mental orientation." The Lion's
Roar of Queen Srfmala (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), p. 98.
29. T.32, p. 576c.
30. The siitra quoted is theJiianalokalankara, T.12, pp. 247a, 251b.
31. The Chinese translation of yonisomanaskara is cheng-nien, which, in-
terestingly enough, is also the usual translation of right mindfulness (samyak-
smrti).
32. T.31, p. 824a.
33. For a discussion of the important connection between nirvana and
non-origination see my short paper, "Nirva'(!a and Non-Origination in the
Early TatMgatagarbha Literature,"JIABS, 4, No.2 (1981).
34. The AFM uses bothfen-pieh and nien in a negative sense, but never
expressly equates or distinguishes the two.
35. T.32, p. 576a.
36. T.32, p. 580c.
37. T.32, p. 576a.
38. "Clue," pp. 35-36, 50.
39. Cf. T.31, pp. 824b, 832c.
40. Cf. Lai, "Clue," p. 36.
41. T.32, p. 576a.
42. T.32, p. 579b.
43. Walter Liebenthal has argued that the t'i-hsiang-yung ordering of the
text reflects a grafting of the neo-Taoist categories of t'i and yung onto the
"""
47
Indian svabhilva (t'i) and Zaks.a'IJa (hsiang) distinction ("New Light on the Ma-
Myana-sraddhotpada.fastra," T'oung Pao, 46 (1958), pp. 165-66. The problem
roay be more complex than that, however, and it should be noted that a
couple of the basic categories of analysis used in the RGV and many Vijnana-
vadin texts, karman and vr:tti, could conceivably be assimilated into yung, or
"function." This is a problem worthy of further investigation.
44. Cf. Paul Demieville, "Sur Z'Authenticite du Ta Tcheng K'i Sin Louen,"
Choix d'Etudes Bouddhiques (1929-1970), (Leyden: E. J. Brill, pp. 20-
21.
45. Takasaki, "Shindai-yaku," p. 253.
Glossary of Chinese Terms
GLOSSARY
a
ILi' r
b
s
c
IL., !i: ff
d 1t"
u
e 'rg v

f ffl
w ?} llU
"" g
x ":P::
h y

IL.,
z if.
j
IL., fto
ab
fto * if.
k
1L.,!i:
ac ft
IL., ft
ad t13
m
"" A,..
-t;r: Ia- ae
Jtj
n
af J!l!
0 IL., ft ag
..
p ah ::$:
q ai
)\<::
An Excursus on the Subtle Body in
Tantric Buddhism (Notes Contextualizing
the Kalacakra)l
by Geshe Lhundup S opa
There are two main schemes for classifying the tantras, a nine-
fold and a four-fold scheme.
2
Within the four-fold scheme,
which we are following, the highest or anuttara'l class is further
subdivided into father and mother tantra according to whether
the tantric method (upaya) or the tantric wisdom (prajfia) pre-
dominates in the tantra's course of practical development, I the
specifically tantric method being that of an illusory body, and
the specifically tantric wisdom being that of the knowledge of
emptiness inseparable from bliss. The Kalacakra-tantra then, is a
tantra of the anuttara class, and is usually subdivided as a moth-
er tantra."i However, among tantras of the anuttara class, wheth-
er father or mother, the Kalacakra has several unique features
which are not common to the other tantras. Among these fea-
tures, the most preeminent is the empty-form method of the
Kalacakra, in contradistinction to the illusory-body method of
the other anuttara tantras, like the Guhyasamaja. This brings us
to the main subject of our paper, the idea of subtle body, which,
in turn, brings us to the traditional idea of the superiority of the
tantric method.
When one speaks of the superiority of the tantric method,
one is following in the mainstream of later Indian Buddhism
and the form in which Buddhism entered and was preserved in
Tibet by such illustrious_-acaryas as Padmasarp-
bhava,(j Sa skya PaI.J-c;lifa, Ansa,7 Tsong kha pa, and others too
numerous to mention. Similarly, by "superiority" one means
the advantages which the tantras themselves claim for the tan-
tric method over the other path options offered by Buddhism.
48
TANTRIC BUDDHISM
49
In particular, the tantras, being a teaching of the Mahayana,
supplement the common
H
path of the Mahayana, i.e., the Para-
rnitayana, or path laid out in the Mahayana sutras, by the addi-
tion of a particular tantric method and wisdom. This is to say
that the tantric method is usually held to be in addition to rather
than in lieu of many of the common paths of the Mahayana
sutras. In the literature of the subject, the Paramita or sutra
paths are referred to as the vehicle of the cause, or causal
vehicle,D and the tantric paths as the vehicle of the effect, or
fruition vehicle, 10 and it is repeatedly said that the cultivation of
the causal vehicle precedes somewhat the attainment of the
fruition vehicle, or, in other words, that the development of the
Paramaitayana goes before Tantrayana, inasmuch as the Para-
rnitayana is the very matrix into which the special practices of
the Tantrayana are to be assimilated. Here, however, the
words, "cause" and "effect," refer simply to meditation on the
causes of enlightenment, in contradistinction to meditation on
the final result or effect, which is enlightenment itself from the
point of view of its qualities and realizations. Thus, the sutra
paths teach mainly the cultivation of the causes of enlighten-
ment, i.e., the virtues of the six (and ten) perfecteds (parami-
tas); charity (dana), a permissible conduct (szla) , tolerance
(kSanti) , and meditation (dhyana) count as method (upaya) , wis-
dom (prajfla) as wisdom (prajfla), II and manly effort (vfrya) as
common to the development of both wisdom and method.
12
These six staples of a Bodhisattva's conduct are the causes of
enlightenment according to the sutras, but thus broken down,
the practice of the method side is said to produce the corporeal
aggregate (rupakaya) of a Buddha, whereas the wisdom side is
said to produce the realization aggregate (dharmakaya) UI of a
Buddha at the time of achieving perfect enlightenment..
However, from the tantric point of view, the sutras do not
expose altogether adequately the causes of the form-body of a
Buddha, for although the virtues of those perfecteds (para-
mita) which constitute method may be the remote cause of a
Buddha's form-aggregate, the proximate cause of this form-
aggregate is a subtle body which needs to be first generated and
subsequently ripened by practices above and beyond the six (or
ten) paramitas. Thus, according to the tantras, just the sutra
method cannot lead beyond the ten Bodhisattva stages,11 and
50
JIABS VOL. 6 NO.2
the Bodhisattva who has obtained the tenth stage will still have
to practice the tantric method in order to progress from the
tenth stage to perfect enlightenment,15 which is to be under_
stood as the fulfillment not of a single but of a twofold objec_
tive, i.e., the assured well-being of oneself and of others
achieved through the attainment, respectively, of the realiza_
tion-body and the form-bodyl6 of a Buddha. Even more point-
edly, although the generation of a subtle body is the proximate
cause of the form-aggregate of perfect enlightenment, from
the meditator's point of view, the direct or immediate object of
its cultivation is the welfare of others.
Finally, according to the tantras, the wisdom achieved by
the Paramitayana is excelled by that realized through the tan-
tric method. Here, however, the excellence of wisdom is not
being measured from the point of view of the object realized,
which for both yanas is emptiness (sunyata), but rather from the
point of view of the qualities of the realizing mifiCl or mental
state, which is a particularly subtle and blissful consciousness
often referred to as the "clear light" (prabhiisvara). The actual
(tib. don gyi) clear light is uniquely the product of yoga, and this
clear light as the realizer of emptiness is simultaneously an
experiencer of great bliss,17 unlike the neutral consciousness
realizing emptiness at the culmination of the Paramitayana
paths, and therein lies the reason for the tantras' claim of bring-
ing about a "superior" wisdom. This realization of emptiness
inseparable from an experience of great bliss is often called
Mahiimudra. Although the actual clear light is solely the product
of yoga, it has its analogue in ordinary life in another extremely
subtle consciousness, which, together with its supporting mate-
rial element, the tantras hold to have a close relation with the
vital or biotic force itself. IH By way of analogy with the actual
clear light, it is named "the clear light of death," as this con-
sciousness is ordinarily dormant, or latent, or potential, appear-
ing as something only at the time of death. The tantric method
seeks by its peculiar yoga practices to arouse this clear light of
death, and once it is manifest, to transform it into a knower of
emptiness and so to produce the actual clear light.
Thus, the tantras profess not only to complete the paths of
the sutras by providing them with an adequate material cause,
but also by the same methods to expedite and greatly speed up
TANTRIC BUDDHISM 51
the attainment of the final goal of the Mahayana. As the vehicle
of the fruition, the tantric method of cultivation does not per se
focuS on the slow, patient accumulation of virtuous causes, but,
rather, focuses directly on the final result, the form and realiza-
tion aggregates, by emulating them here and now after the
fashion of a simulated 19 performance, or a dress rehearsal, or a
dry run, and by so meditating continuously, it seeks to move
more rapidly from mere simulation to the actual reality of its
accomplishment. Thus, what is first pretended for the purpose
of its being later obtained is divine mind-body, and the method
of its attainment is the deity yoga of the anuttara tantras, with
their two sets of steps or stages, i.e., the steps of generation and
the steps of completion.
20
The path system of the anuttara tan-
tras might profitably be called a Buddhist path of apotheosis,2l
of which the anuttara tantras offer two main types. The Guhya-
samaja and its cognate tantras, like Yamantaka, SrzcakrasaT(l,vara,
Vajrayoginz, etc., represent one such type and the Kalacakra the
other.
In the path of apotheosis of the Guhyasamaja type, the basis
to be purified is threefold: death, the intermediate state (anan-
tarabhava) , and birth; the path itself is the development of the
union of the illusory body (maya-deha) and clear light (prabha-
svara); and the final result is the three pure aggregates (tri-
kaya):22 the aggregate of realization (dharmakaya), the aggre-
gate of enjoyment (sambhogakaya), and the aggregate of
magical appearance (nirmal)akaya), or, in other words, realiza-
tion body, enjoyment body, and docetic
23
body. In this sense,
death is said to be purified by the attainment of the realization
body, the intermediate state by the attainment of the enjoyment
body, and birth by the attainment of the docetic body, and the
means of transition from birth, death, and the intermediate
state to the respective three pure aggregates is the path of
cultivating the union of the illusory body and the actual
21
clear
light. The preceding is in the overall or general sense, but in a
more specific sense, death may be said to be purified as the
actual clear light replaces the ordinary clear light of death,
which is to say, when the process and subtle mechanism of
ordinary death and dying serves as the locus for the deepest
realization of emptiness; and just as in the process of ordinary
death and dying, the kind of subtle body known as the interme-
52 JIABS VOL 6 NO.2
diate-state body (or bardo body) arises from the pneumatic ele-
ment of the clear light of death, the intermediate state becomes
eventually purified when in lieu of the subtle bardo bOdy an
illusory body (maya-deha) is produced from the material sub-
stance of the actual clear light. "Eventually purified" is said
because the illusory body first generated from an exemplary
clear light is initially impure, later purified, and at length per-
fected as a Buddha's enjoyment body. Finally, birth is said to be
purified when the emergence of the gross body, which is ordi-
narily brought about by the power of karma and klesa, gives way
to the special appearances of such a body produced for the sake
of others by the perfected union of the pure illusory body and
the immediate knowledge of emptiness inseparable from great
bliss, which constitutes the mind-body of an enlightened Buddha.
Thus, in the sequence of path stages (sa lam)26 of cultiva-
tion or yoga of the Guhyasamaja, the steps of mainly
ripen the meditator for the practice of the steps of completion,
which they anticipate
27
through the use of symbolism and
imagination, and they correspond roughly to the first, or path
of preparation (sarrzbhiira marga) subdivision in the fivefold divi-
sion
28
of the path of the Paramitayana. They commence with
the meditator's imagining himself arising from emptiness, pass-
ing through a set of transformations, and being generated as
the deity29 together with the deity's maI,l<;lala (symbolic of his
abode) and circle of attendant gods. Here the i.}tadevata, mal)-
<;lala, and entourage of gods represent the nirmaI,lakaya. The
steps of generation are said to be concluded when the medita-
tor can visualize lucidly, in every detail, and for as long as he
likes, the deity, maI,l<;lala, and circle of gods together in a space
the size of a mustard seed. From here begin the steps of com-
pletion
30
and the nonimaginary process of development lead-
ing to the abandonment of the passion and knowledge obscura-
tions (kleSa and fneya avara1J-a); in the tantras the knowledge
obscurations are understood to be the ordinary, everyday ap-
pearances of things, and the passion obscurations are under-
stood to be the apprehension of these ordinary appearances as
such.
The steps of completion are sometimes grouped into five,
sometimes into six steps. When grouped into six, the first three
are the three withdrawals or isolations, i.e., of the body, the
TANTRIC BUDDHISM
53
speech, and the mind, followed by the steps of illusory body,
clear light, and union.
3
! The three withdrawals of the body,
speech, and mind comprise a set of steps recapitulating the
stages of dying. Through the first, the pneumatic elements' or
winds which are the support or vehicle of consciousness are
successively withdrawn from their ordinary activities and made
to enter the median channel
32
(avadhilti), then to abide there
and finally to be dissolved there. Through the second, various
knots which constrict the movement of wind through the median
channel are loosened sufficiently to permit the winds to enter,
abide, and be dissolved in the heart area of the median channel.
By the third, the final knots are loosened, and the winds are
made to enter, abide, and be dissolved into a point, little larger
than a mustard seed, in the heart region, which is the seat of the
vital force itself. The dissolution of all the pneumatic elements
into this "indestructable drop"33 completes the recapitulation
of the act of dying, and there arises a manifestation of the clear
light, called the "exemplary clear light."34 This exemplary clear
light, having been produced by yoga, is more refined than the
ordinary clear light of death, but is not yet the actual clear light.
This corresponds roughly to the path of reaching (prayoga
marga) of the fivefold path system of the Paramitayana, wherein
an approximate but not a final direct understanding of empti-
ness is achieved. Here, the clear light of death has no under-
standing of emptiness, whereas the exemplary clear light close-
ly approaches but does not quite reach the final direct knowing
of emptiness. The production of this exemplary clear light
marks the climax of the three withdrawals and serves as the
material cause for the cultivation of the next step, the produc-
tion of the impure illusory body.
To summarize very briefly the remaining steps: before the
stage of union, the clear light and illusory body exist alternate-
ly, and not at the same time. Here, then, at the stage of union,
the meditator utilizes the impure illusory body as a basis for
bringing about a new manifestation of the clear light, this time
the actual clear light which directly perceives emptiness. This
production corresponds to the Paramitayana's path of seeing
(darsana marga) , on which those obscurations abandonable by
seeing reality are got rid of. Here, on the tantric path, all the
remaining obscurations are relinquished through the final
steps of the path, and again, these correspond to the Parami_
tayana's path of cultivation (bhavanii miirga), on which the mOst
subtle knowledge obscurations are got rid of. On the tantric
path, this is accomplished through still ariother production of
illusory body, this time the pure illusory body which stays con-
joined with the actual clear light, and this is the union (yuga-
naddha) of clear light and illusory body. Through the utiliza_
tion of this union, the final stages of purification of the
obscurations are accomplished, and these in turn are climaxed
by a path of no more training (asaikya miirga) , which is the
realization of enlightenment itself through the attainment of
the three bodies (trikiiya).
The above has necessarily been a highly abbreviated sketch
of the sequence of path stages of the Guhyasamiija, with minimal
elaboration and without discussion of the various meditation
techniques utilized in the development of a path of this sort, as
each of these topics is large in itself and all together quite volu-
minous, and this is to say nothing of the many specific philo-
sophical, scientific, etc., types of problems which a subject mat-
ter of this sort will pose for this or that particular reader. In
general, the anuttara tantras (with some exceptions on the side
of the Kalacakra) teach the development of a path system of the
above kind. Some, like Yamantaka, etc., give a greater emphasis
and expatiation to the generation and development of illusory
body; others, like the Cakrasa'Y[lvara, Vajrayoginz, etc., to the gen-
eration and development of clear light; and of course, there are
a great many specific differences in the details of the forms of
the yidam to be visualized, the particulars of the mal)qalas, and
numerous other such characteristics. However, the fundamen-
tal basis of purification (i.e., death, intermediate state, and
birth), the path (i.e., the cultivation of the union of illusory
body and clear light), and the final result (i.e., the three bodies),
remain a constant in the many anuttara tantras (excepting the
Kalacakra). Still another important feature shared by all of the
above (again excepting the Kalacakra) is the teaching that en-
lightenment is often achieved not in the current life but in the
intermediate state. Thus, without passing straight on to the
Kalacakra, the writer would like to digress for a moment to the
subject of the attainment of the final goal in the intermediate
state (Tib. bardo, Skt. antarabhava).
The notion of an intermediate state and its subtle bardo
T ANTRIC BUDDHISM 55
body is not peculiar to the tantras, but is common to all of
Buddhism,35 both the Hlnayana and Mahayana sutras and
their commentaries. Principal commentarial sources for the
Hlnayana may be found in Book III of Vasubandhu's
Abhidharmakosa, and like sources for the Mahayana are Asanga's
Abhidharmasamuccaya and the Bhumivastu section of his
Yogacaryabhumi. Similarly, the teaching that many who are pro-
ceeding on the path achieve the final goal in the bardo is shared
as well by the Hlnayana and the common Mahayana. For in-
stance, Vasubandhu says in Book VI of the Kosa, "non-returners,
by the exhaustion of these nine, are (obtainers of) nirval).a in
the intermediate (state, or the next) life, (and then) with diffi-
culty, or without difficulty."36 These two lines occur in a longer
passage discussing twenty Sanghas
37
(i.e., twenty kinds of aryan
individuals proceeding on the aryan paths
38
). The twenty is
from the point of view of two subdivisions (i.e., entry and abid-
ing) in the four fruitions (i.e., stream winner, once returner,
non-returner, and arhant), making eight, together with vari-
able subdivisions within this resultant eight. These two lines
state that some who have become non-returners on account of
their having exhausted nine klefas (passions) belonging to the
desire realm (kamadhiitu) achieve arhantship (1) either in the
intermediate state or (2) in the next life, and if the latter, either
(3) with difficulty, or (4) easily in that next life. The longer
passage continues that those who do not reali7;e nirval).a by one
of the above four proceed to yet another birth, but in a higher
region of the form realm (rupadhiitu), etc. Likewise, the Abhisa-
mayalar[lkara, touching on the topic of the same twenty Sanghas,
says in Book I, in similar language, "In the intermediate (state,
or the next) life, hard, (or) easily ..... "39 The Abhisamayalar[lkara,
being a Mahayana work and a commentary on the Prajnapara-
mita sutras, is referring the twenty Sanghas analogically to the
paths of Bodhisattvas also. Thus, for both the Hlnayana and
the common Mahayana, one of the modes of achieving the final
goal is in the intermediate state, just as for the uncommon
Mahayana (i.e., tantric). There is, however, this difference, that
for the Hlnayana and common Mahayana, the one attaining
the final goal in the intermediate state possesses a bardo body at
the time of his attainment, whereas for the tantric Mahayana,
such an attainer no longer is experiencing a bardo body, since
such a body has previously already given way to an illusory
56 JIABS VOL 6 NO.2
body, and it is through the illusory body that the final goal is
attained by the adept in tantra, whether in the bardo or in life.
Regarding the Kalacakra, then, one of the features of its
method which sharply distinguishes it from the other anuttara
tantras is the absence of bardo as one of the bases of purifica_
tion, and with the absence of bardo there is an absence of illu-
sory body in the above senseas well. Notwithstanding, the Kal
a
-
cakra does develop another kind of subtle body (Suk{ma-deha) ,
usually referred to as "empty form" (Tib. stong gzugs). Conse-
quently, in the Kalacakra the "immediate realization of empti-
ness inseparable from bliss" is held to have a sense slightly
different from its meaning in the other anuttara tantras.
40
In
the Kalacakra, the "empty" in emptiness refers to empty form,
and "bliss" to the experience of the mind directly knowing
emptiness.
41
The Kalacakra-tantra itself, together with its great commen-
tary, the Vimalaprabha,42 and subsequent commentarial litera-
ture, cover extensively and in detail a wide ranging subject
matter, all of which may be grouped under three topics: an
outer Kalacakra (or wheel of time), an inner Kalacakra, and an
alter-Kalacakra. The outer Kalacakra deals with the universe
conventionalized
43
into a system of cosmology, the inner Kala-
cakra with the structures and meta-structures and functions of
the human body (most notably the channels, winds, and semi-
nal drops), and the alter-Kalacakra with the path of the genera-
tion and completion stages and its final result.
In the path of the Kalacakra, just as in the path of the
Guhyasamaja type, the bases of purification are the same for
both the steps of generation and the steps of completion. Here,
however, the alter- Kalacakra takes as the bases of purification
the outer and inner wheels of time, that is the outer and inner
worlds as conventionalized and set forth in the Kalacakra tan-
tras. Among the various meta-structures of the inner Kalacakra,
four in particular serve as special bases for the path. These are
four seminal drops or germs which are identified as the "germs
of the four kinds of states," and are located in the head, throat,
heart, and navel regions of the medial channel. Together, they
are said to be the roots of all the obscurations.
44
Hence, by
purifying these, all the obscurations can be got rid of. The
above four states, of which these are the seed, are four states of
TANTRIC BUDDHISM 57
consciousness, namely the waking state, the dreaming state, the
deep sleep state, and the fourth state. In ordinary life, the first
of these functions to produce the appearances of the various
objects of the five senses and of the mental consciousness; the
second to produce syllables, terms, and language etc.; the third,
a diffuse and vague awareness; and the fourth, orgasm. When
completely purified, they result in four vajras
45
(or four sover-
eigns), namely, vajra-body, vajra-speech, vajra-mind, and vajra-
bliss, and as the path of purification, the first is the empty
forms which will ripen as vajra-body, the second the subtle
mantric sounds which will ripen as vajra-speech, the third the
nondiscursive wisdom of realization which will ripen as vajra-
mind, and the fourth the wisdom of great bliss which will ripen
as vajra-bliss. These four vajras may also be understood as coex-
tensive with the three bodies, vajra-body being the nirmal)a-
kaya, vajra-speech being the sambhogakaya,46 and vajra-mind
together with vajra-bliss being the dharmakaya.
47
As for the path of the steps of completion, these are co-
extensive with the famous six part yoga of the
Kalacakra, a set of six sequential stages. The six are: collection,
absorption, wind control, retention, mindfulness, and enrap-
ture.
48
For the purpose of understanding the path, these may
be arranged in three pairs, each pair laying the groundwork for
the attainment of one of the three bodies (trikaya). The former
of each pair is like an entry into a new phase or process and the
latter like its strengthening or confirmation. Thus, collection/
absorption are for realizing the nirmal).akaya, wind control/
retention for realizing the sambhogakaya, and mindfulness/en-
rapture for realizing the dharmakaya. Quite briefly, then, col-
lection/absorption gather together the winds and make them
manageable for use. Wind control/retention make them enter
into the medial channel and penetrate the "germs of the four
kinds of states." Mindfulness/enrapture bring about union
49
and through union the entry into and accomplishment of the
aryan path. Here, however, the majority of the salient features
of the steps of this path do not require mention in a paper
dealing mainly with the subject of subtle body, for, as said
above, the Kalacakra is a mother tantra, and consequently its
completion stages mainly emphasize the path of integration of
emptiness and great bliss. Thus, passing over these many, al-
though important, details, we may hasten to refer to the corpo_
real side of this path (i.e., the body of empty form).
Although the empty form of the Kalacakra deity is gener_
ated at the very beginning of the completion stages, 50 it remains
little more than an extension of the imaginary form produced
from the samadhi which seals the climax of the steps of genera-
tion,5l and it is not until the time of the union
52
which is
achieved by the practice of the limb of mindfulness (i.e., the
fifth part or limb of the six part yoga) that this empty form
comes into its own, for it is the union achieved by this practice
which becomes the proximate cause of the mind/body of per-
fect enlightenment. This union thus achieved, the entire re-
maining path may be quite rapidly obtained by the sixth or final
part, the limb of enrapture.
53
Through it all, the winds which
are the support of sarnsaric consciousness are checked. Accord-
ing to the Kalacakra there are 21,600 such karmic winds which
course through the body in a daily circuit. All these winds are to
be withdrawn and the circuit stopped. With the cessation of this
daily circuit, sarnsaric consciousness likewise ceases. Here, the
chief method of realizing this cessation is through the cultiva-
tion of a sufficiently powerful antidote. Such an antidote is the
yogic realization of emptiness inseparable from unchanging
bliss, and the production and fortification of a sufficiency of
such a realization is the function of the final limb or part of the
six-part yoga, called "enrapture."
Within this final part, the main procedure for effecting
this might be translated as "piling up" (brtsegs pa). Here, the
reader must backtrack for a moment. Through collection and
absorption, the winds are made more and more manageable.
Then, through wind control they are made to enter the medial
channel. Then, on account of their being held in the medial
channel through retention, a subtle psychic heat (gtum mo) is
generated in the lower region. Then, the union achieved
through mindfulness intensifies the psychic heat, making it
blaze upward through the medial channel, causing the bodhicitta
(or white thig le)54 in the head region of the medial channel to
melt. Finally, through enrapture, the molten seminal drops of
the white bodhicitta begin to pile up or become stacked from
the bottom
55
of the medial channel, and with each increase a
higher and higher level of yogic realization is attained, and with
these attainments there is a cutting off of an increasing number
T ANTRIC BUDDHISM 59
of karmic winds.
56
Thereby, the aryan path is entered upon
and completed.
In this final part of the six-part yoga, the path is divided
into twelve. The first section corresponds to the prayoga miirga;
the second to the first of the ten levels (dasabhumi) and is co-
extensive with the path of seeing (darsana miirga); the third
through the eleventh to the path of cultivation (bhavanii miirga)
and is coextensive with the second through the tenth of the ten
levels; and finally, the twelfth to the path of no further training
( a s a i ~ a miirga) or enlightenment itself. Thus, with the accumu-
lation of the white and red bodhicitta in each of the twelve
regions of the medial channel, a sufficiency of yogic realization
is generated to bring about a rapid traversal of the path to the
final goal of the attainment of the three perfect bodies of final
enlightenment. Here, the Kiilacakra teaches that with each pil-
ing up of the bodhicitta, the gross physical body is progressively
consumed leaving in the end the pure body of the Kalacakra
deity of empty form, like the elixir which dissolves iron, trans-
forming it into pure gold. With the disappearance of the gross
body, the piled up bodhicitta vanishes as well. Thus, the Kala-
cakra path becomes in the end like a kind of alchemy.
With this, we are brought back to the topic with which we
began this discussion, that the Kalacakra does not utilize the
bardo as a basis of purification. Relations between the gross and
subtle bodies being such as they are in the Kalacakra, the subtle
body of the bardo, or "illusory" type, cannot support the devel-
opment of the Kalacakra path, for only the gross physical body
is provided with the meta-structuring necessary to do this. This
difference, and others such as we have noted above, have given
. rise to a great deal of discussion, sometimes controversy, within
native Tibetan scholarship, discussions 57 which are way beyond
the scope of this paper.
Thus, we conclude by noting that the Kalacakra path does
not particularly lend itself to such brief treatment. The reason
for this has already been given previously, that the Kalacakra
path takes as its basis of purification the multifarious conven-
tions of the inner and outer Kalacakra, i.e., its intricate systems
of cosmology and meta-physiology. Notwithstanding these dif-
ficulties, we have tried somewhat to delineate the Kalacakra
path against the background of the other anuttara tantras, espe-
cially with respect to its treatment of subtle body.
Notes
l. This paper had its origin as a rather long footnote to a larger paper
"Some Notes Contextualizing the Kalacakra," which was prepared for
ery at the sixth lABS Conference in Tokyo, Japan, in September of 1983. I
would like to thank Elvin W. Jones for his editorial and literary assistance in
the preparation of this paper.
2. According to the ninefold classification: three Sutrayana, i.e., Sra-
vaka, Pratyekabuddha, and Bodhisattva; three outer Mantrayana, i.e., Kriycl,
Carya, and Yoga; and three inner unsurpassable, i.e., Mahclyoga, Anuyoga, and
Atiyoga. Vid. Nyingma section, page 7 ofThu'u khan chos kyi nyi rna's History
of the Tibetan Sects, Legs bshad shel gyi me long.
According to the fourfold classification: Kriya, Cwya, Yoga, and Annul-
lara, Kriya emphasizes mainly outer action, Carya half outer half inner action
Yoga ineer action, Annuttara highest inner action. '
3. anuttara = anuttarayoga
4. In addition to the subdivision of father and mother tantra, anuttara
tantras are often classified as nondual. Here, however, "nondual" does not
refer to the nonduality of method and wisdom, but to the nonduality of
emptiness and bliss. In this sense, all anutlara tantras are nondual. However, a
great deal of discussion on such points has arisen on account of such terms
and expressions, which are to be found in the tantras themselves.
5. The Kalacakra-lantm is frequently also called a nondual tantra. For the
sense of this, see note 4 above.
6. Tucci's speculation in Minor Buddhist Texts that history has perhaps
overestimated the concord between the followers of Santarak$ita and Padma-
sarnbhava is maybe too gratuitous. While pointing to no evidence in particular
it ignores the fact that aside from being the great systematizer of
the Yogacarasvatantrika-madhyamika, is often counted as one of the princi-
pal acaryas of Kriyalantm.
7. By the time of AtIsa's coming to Tibet in the eleventh century, Bud-
dhism in Tibet had become badly fragmented, due to gLang dar rna's perse-
cution of Buddhism and the disruption following his assassination and the
breakdown of the old kingship. Some, for example, following the Vinaya,
despised the tantras, and many following the tantras ignored and neglected
the Vinaya, etc. Consequently, a large part of Ansa's work in Tibet was the
reintegration of Buddhism. In this work of reintegration, Ansa taught the
superiority of the tantras, and in this he was followed later by Tsong kha pa.
8. The Mahayana, being both the vehicle of the sutras (Sutrayana ==
Paramitayana) and the vehiCle of the tantras (Tantrayana = Mantrayana), the
common path means the path common to or shared by both systems of the
Mahayana, for many principal .elements of the Mahayana qua Mahayana are
taught mainly in the sutras rather than in the tantras, elements like details of
the Bodhisattva vows, the practice of the paramitas, many of the salient fea-
tures of understanding emptiness, or of the development of bodhiciUa, etc.
Such features represent the common path, i.e., common to the paramita and
tantric paths.
TANTRIC BUDDHISM
61
9. rgyu'i theg pa
10. bras bu'i theg pa
11. "wisdom (prajiia) as wisdom (prajiia)," i.e., wisdom, or pmjiiilpilm-
mita, which constitutes one of the six pe'rfecteds, as the wisdom which is one of
the contrasting pair of wisdom and method (prajiia and upaya).
12. Meditation (samadhi) is sometimes counted together with wisdom
(prajiia) on the wisdom side.
13. Body (Kaya) does not mean "corporeity" but, rather, "an aggregate
of qualities." Consequently, as we are not translating, we will often refer to
kiiya by way of its paraphrase as "aggregate."
14. Sa bchu (dasabhilmi).
15. i.e., Buddhahood itself, the level immediately following the ten
stages and the fulfillment of the entire Mahayana path.
16. In the Mahayana, the form body (T'ilPakilya) may be subdivided into a
sambhogakaya and a nirmanakaya, the former being the natural or own form
(svarilpakaya) belonging to a Buddha, and the latter being any number of
corporeal manifestations presented by a Buddha to others for the purposes of
leading or instructing them. Other than to the Buddhas themselves, the
sambhogakaya is said to be visible only to Bodhisattvas of the ten stages.
'. 17. When one speaks of a realization of emptiness inseparable from
'bliss, one is referring to a cognitum-cognizer (v4aya-vi.'jayin) relation. This
ii'is to say that emptiness itself is the direct object, or cognitum, of a mind
),cognizing it, whereas bliss is a mental quality belonging to the cognizing mind

;-"
. 18. This biotic force is envisaged as the subtlest pneumatic element,
;("which is inseparable from the subtlest consciousness. According to the tan-
'tras, there is no moment of consciousness or mind which is not associated with
. some sort of corporeal element that serves as its vehicle. Thus, the tantras will
: not admit to a realm of disembodied consciousness such as the Hlnayana
"holds the formless realm (arilpaloka), with its four subdivisions, to be. Even
'here, the tantras maintain the existence of a kind of subtle form, for wherever
there is mind, they say there is also a corporeity on which, in a manner of
speaking, it may be said to ride. These mounts of the mind are held to be the
pneumatic element or winds (gzhon pa'i rlung) of the other elements. Of these
winds, the most subtle is the life force itself (srog rlung = gnyug ma'i rlung), the
, vehicle of the most subtle consciousness (gnyug ma'i sems). During life, this pair
of subtlest wind and consciousness are said to reside together in a point often
called the "indestructible drop" (mi shigs pa'i thig le) which persists through the
course of an entire life in the area of the heart. The consciousness associated
with this pair becomes apparent in death itself as a vacuous, contentless lucid-
ity, i.e., the clear light of death. Subsequently, the material side of this pair
serves as a seed for the generation of a subtle body form in the intermediate
state, a form called the "intermediate state body" (bar do'i lus). Similarly, it is
the same subtle wind which provides the base for the production of an illu-
sory body (rgyu ma'i lus) through the cultivation of anuttara yoga.
For further details concerning the ideas of death and dying to be found
in the anutarra tantras see Death, Intermediate State and RebiTth in Tibetan Bud-
dhism, by Lati Rinbochay and Jeffrey Hopkins, London, Rider and CO
mpa
1979.
19. superior qualities and behavior through a mode of
esotenc ImitatIOn or sImulatIOn (mam pa mthun par) IS one of the salient fea-
tures of tantric yoga.
20. utpattikrama & sarnpannakrama
21. i.e., apotheosis in its simple literal sense of transformation or meta_
morphosis from a human into a divine being. .
22. Re: three pure aggregates (trikaya), see notes 13 and 16 above.
23. In contradistinction to the Buddha's sambhogakaya, his actual or
own body apparent to himself, the apparitional or docetic body (nirmana_
kaya) is a Buddha's heuristic projection of a seeming;or appearance of bOdy to
another. Thus, by a kind of Mahayana docetism, Sakyamuni, the historical
founder of Buddhism, is just one such nirmapakaya, albeit a very special one
called paramanirmc"h.wkaya, the most excellent docetic body.
24. In the body of this paper, three things are being designated as "clear
light" and are distinguished as: clear light of death ('chi ba'i 'od gsal) , exempla_
ry clear light (dpe'i 'od gsal), and actual clear light (don gyi 'od gsal).
25. For explanation of this exemplary clear light, see page 53 in text.
26. There are numerous commentaries on the path stages of the Guhya-
samc"ija. Here, we are following mainly gSang chen rgyud sde bzhi'i sa lam !5Jli mam
gzhag rgyud gzhung gsal byed, by Ngag dbang dpal Idan, and dPal gsang ba 'dus
pa 'phags lugs dang mthun pa'i sngags kyi sa lam mam gzhag legs bshad skal bzang
'jug ngogs, by dByangs can dga' ba'i blo gros.
27. They anticipate inasmuch as the bases of purification, i.e., death, the
intermediate, and birth, are the same for both the stages of generation and of
completion, the former being mainly imaginary and the latter actual.
28. fivefold subdivision of the path ( = fivefold path) of the Parami-
tayana, i.e., sambhara marga, prayoga marga, darsana marga, bhavana marga, and
aiaiks.a marga, respectively the preparatory path, path of reaching, path of
seeing, path of cultivation, path of no further training. Here, the path of
seeing is coextensive with the first of the ten stages, and the path of cultivation
with the remaining nine of the ten stages, and the path of no further training
with enlightenment itself.
29. Deity = the yidam (Skt. The anuttara tantras center on
various such deities, and here in the Guhyasam(tja the deity, of course, is
Guh yasamaja himself.
30. Here, in his Sa lam (op. cit.) dByangs can dga' ba'i blo gros character-
izes the steps of completion as completing because they are steps of medita-
tion which do not have recourse to the imagination but rather target actual
loci of the human body, the channels, wind, and drops. "Bios btags pa la rna ltas
paT rang grub tsam nas rdzogs pa'i ills kyi Ttsa Tlung thig-le la gnad du bsnun nas
bsgom par bya ba'i Tim pa yin pas de ltaT bljod pa'! PhY!T."
31. When classified into five steps, the first two steps, i.e., body and
speech, of the sixfold classification are subsumed by a single withdrawal of
speech, the following four, withdrawal of mind to union, remaining the same.
The fivefold classification is particularly venerable as based on the system of
Nagarjuna.
TANTRIC BUDDHISM
63
32. In the metaphysiology of the tantras, there are three principal ele-
: Jllents which are objects of the meditation that aims at effecting the psycho-
;'physical achieved. on the tantric paths. Thes.e are the channels
veins (rtsa), wmd or pneumatic element (rlung), and semmal drops or germ
jthig le). These three elements for the most part occupy a level of subtlety
::intermediate between the gross body of flesh and bone and the finest corpo-
real essence represented by the "indestructible germ" which the tantras hold
ito be the root of sarpsara and nirvaI).a. Of these, the veins form a quasi-
'anatomical network of seventy-two thousand channels through which course
: the winds. This ramous structure branches off from a relatively few chief
channels, the principal of which are the medial channel and two
; channels to the right and left of it, respectively rkyang ma and ro ma, these
,three along with two others being the first to form in the ontogeny of the
individual. These three intertwine in numerous places, thereby creating stric-
'tures or knots which ordinarily prevent the movement of the winds through
the medial channel, whereas juncture points of other channels create various
.nexi often called "wheels" ot "cakra," which are of considerable importance in
" the process of yoga. In ordinary life, the winds do not deeply penetrate and
abide in the medial channel except through the action of death, and thus the
deep penetration of this channel and the loosening of the knots is one of the
: principal jobs of the initial stageS of the steps of completion. The winds have
been briefly discussed above in note 18, but while they have numerous other
functions in growth, bodily processes, etc., we have been able to mention only'
their importance for the tantras as vehicles of consciousness. Finally, the third
of the above elements, the drops or germ (thig le) are seminal somatic essences
both male and female, respectively white and red, which eventuate in multi-
form structures like flesh, blood, bone, etc.
Additional information may be found in Death, Intermediate State, and
Rebirth in Tibetan Buddhism (op. cit.).
33. "Indestructible germ" or "drop" has two referents, i.e.,. the insepara-
ble union of the subtlest mind/wind like kernel, and the red and white thig ie,
which, like the husk, encloses them in the region of the heart, the latter thig le
being indestructible only during the duration of a present lifetime.
34. i.e., dpe'i 'od gsal. See note 24.
35. i.e., Buddhism as it developed in India and wherever such develop-
ments are preserved elsewhere.
36. de dgu zad bas phyir mi'ong/ de ni bar skyes 'du byed dang/ 'du byed med
yongs my a ngan 'da'/
37. In the Vinaya, a Sangha will ordinarily consist minimally of four
fully ordained However, a who has obtained the aryan path
and thus become an aryan may perform all the functions of a Sangha in his
own person. Consequently, here, the twenty Sanghas refer to twenty kinds of
aryan individuals.
38. In the fivefold division of the path (See note 28 above) the first two
divisions are the path of ordinary individuals (prithagjana) , whereas the re-
maining three divisions are the path of the aryans or aryan individual. The
point of entry into the aryan path is the first moment of the darsana T/!ClTga, or
direct (i.e., nonconceptual, like sense perception) and unerroneous realiza-
64
JIABS VOL. 6 NO.2
tion of ultimate reality, for only with this kind of realization of truth does
every type of purification become attai:nable.
39 .... Bar skyes nas dang/ byed dang byed min . ...
40. sku dag pa sgyu rna'i sku dang thugs dag pa b ~ e stong db)lfr med kyi)le shes
gnyis gzung du 'jug pa. = gzung 'jug gi sku in Guhyasamiija.
sku dag pa stong gzugs phyag rgya chen 1)0 dang thugs dag pa 'gyur med kyi bde bet
chen po'i ye shes. = gzung 'jug gi sku in K(Uacakra.
41. Here a reader should not confuse "empty" in "empty form" and
"empty" in "emptiness." The former refers only to a special kind of subtle
body, and the latter refers to ultimate reality.
42. The Virnalaprabha consists of five books, respectively devoted to elu-
cidation of the topics of: Cosmology, Meta-physiology, Initiation, Sadhana
and Yogic realization Uflana). '
43. "Conventionalized into a system of cosmology .... " because com-
mentaries dealing with the subject of the Kalacakra, like Eu ston Rimpoche's
commentary on the Virnalaprabha, often state that its cosmology is not to be
taken as of direct meaning (nges don, Skt. nftal-tha), i.e., as literally true, but
rather that its cosmology represents an accommodation to the views of the
persons to whom the Buddha taught this particular path to enlightenment.
Buddhism in India had two principal systems of cosmology, that of the Abhi-
dharma and that of the Kalacakra, with many differences between them.
44. "Roots of all the obscurations," words which occur in the tantra itself,
is actually being said of the potencies of the mind/wind union which each of
these seminal drops incorporates. This is also a sharp contrast to the concen-
tration of the Guhyasamaja type yoga on the "indestructible drop" which it
utilizes as the psychic and material base for transformations into the perfect
mind/body of enlightenment.
45. Vajra is sometimes translated as "diamond," that is, the lord of stone
which can cut all other substances, and sometimes as "thunderbolt," referring
to the scepter of authority of Indra, the king of the gods. In either instance,
there is a strong sense of the sovereignty which rules over all others of its kind.
46. Not only for the Kalacakra, but for all the other anuttara-yoga tantras
as well, the special or uncommon (that is unshared by the Paramitayana)
attainment of the sambhogakaya is its aggregation of vocalizations. For the
tantras, the speech element predominates in the sambhogakaya, whereas the
form, or corporeal element, predominates in the nirmapakaya.
47. In the tantras, sometimes four bodies are counted. The four bodies
are just the three bodies (trikaya) plus a svabhiivakaya (ngo bo nyid sku). Here,
the svabhavaMya represents the cessations (nirodha) achieved by the Buddha
and also his realization of emptiness. As in the tantras, realization of empti-
ness is inseparable from the experience of great bliss; vajra-bliss assimilates to
the svabhavakaya in the four Mya system, and to the dbarmakaya in the three
kaya system.
48. 1. so sor bsdud pa, 2. bsam Ttan, 3. STag rlsol, 4. 'dzin pa, 5. Ijes dran, and
6. ling 'dzin.
49. i.e., union of the Kalacakra deity and his consort, each generated as a
body of empty form in the navel area. See note 52.
TANTRIC BUDDHISM 65
50. This empty form of the Kalacakra deity is produced from a sub-
stance (there is a great deal of controversy on this point) which appears at the
climax of a series of withdrawals and dissolutions of the consciousness-sup-
porting winds. In the Kalacakra, the series is tenfold: four appearances asso-
ciated with the four elements of earth, water, fire, and air, called night ap-
pearances; and six associated with particular forms of consciousness, called
day appearances. The day appearances are said to be much harder to realize.
The four night appearances are smoke, mirage, sparks, and flame of a butter
lamp followed by the six day appearances, i.e., sun (like at the end of a great
eon), moon, sun, Tahula (eclipse), lightning, and a blue tllig Ie. In the center of
this blue seminal drop is a speck of black substance in which appears the
Kalacakra deity. This substance is taken as a basis for the production of empty
form, and from it the body of the Kalacakra deity is generated. This leads us
to note similarities and differences to a like series of eight appearances uti-
lized in the Guhyasamaja when the consciousness-supporting winds are with-
drawn. This eightfold series ends in the appearance of the clear light. An
effort to elucidate this subject further would require the introduction of
several additional topics too large for this small paper.
51. As above, the steps of generation of the Kalacakra are said to end
when the meditator can visualize clearly, in every detail, and for as long as he
likes, the deity with his mar:rc).ala and entourage of gods in a space the size of a
mustard seed. This is a specifically tantric development of the meditative
fixation (Samatha) which is developed on all the Buddhist paths. The produc-
tion of the form of the Kalacakra deity at the earlier stages is little more than
an extension of this imaginative power of visualization.
52. In the initial stages of this union developed during the practice of
mindfulness, there is not yet a direct yogic realization of emptiness. At this
time, i.e., during the steps of mindfulness, one generates oneself as the Kala-
cakra deity and his consort as a body of empty form in union in the navel area
for the first time. Through this union great bliss is realized. Subsequently, this
realization of great bliss is made also to become a realizer of emptiness. This
full realization of emptiness arises later, during the early stages of the practice
of enrapture, specifically, with the "piling up" of the first 1800 seminal drops
in the medial channel, an action which immobilizes an equal number of the
21,600 karmic winds. This also brings about the completion of the path of
reaching (pmyoga mal'ga) and entry into the path of seeing (daTsana ma/ga), the
beginning of the aryan path.
53. One of the features of the 0arjangayoga worth noting is its enormous
preparation of a technical yogic kind, extending through all the first five of
the six parts, at length to be followed on the sixth by a rapid completion of the
entire Mahayana path, beginning from the upper level of the path of prep-
aration (sambMm mal'ga) all the way to the attainment of the final goal.
54. The uncommon bodhicitta of the tantras are the white and red thig Ie.
The white descending and the red ascending meet in the heart just before
death. Accordingly, death is considered complete when each exits from the
body at the opposite ends of the medial channel from which it began its
movement. These white and red seminal drops are also utilized in tantric
yoga for the production of subtle states of consciousness, and as the material
cause for subtle kinds of body.
55. With the piling up of the white bodhicitta from the bottom of the
medial channel, there is also an inverse and commensurate piing up of the
red bodhicitta from the top.
56. For the purposes of this yoga, the medial channel must be divided
into seven key points and their six interstices and twelve semi-interstices, and
the entire 21,600 karmic winds are grouped into twelve sets of 1800. Thus
with the accumulation of 1800 thig Ie in each of these twelve divisions of t h ~
medial channel (that is in the twelve semi-interstices), a sufficiency of yogic
realization is generated to annihilate a comparable area of karmic winds.
57. Here, for instance, the reader who can read Tibetan might refer to
the questions and answers concerning the Kalacakra to be found in dPal dus
kyi 'khor 10 i sa lam gyi gnos 'dzin rag rim 'phros dang bcas pa mkhas grub smra ba'i nyi
ma'i zhallung, by "Jam dbyangs dgyes pa'i bshes gnyen.
Socio-Cultural Aspects of
Theravada Buddhism in Nepal*
by Ramesh Chandra Tewari
I
Any observer of the contemporary Buddhist religious life in
the Kathmandu valley is bound to be impressed by the religious
fervour and activity of the Theravadin bhikkhus. One can see
them going from one vihar to another, holding Pali classes,
preaching religious sermons, and going around the city raising
donations for the construction of new vihars or for making
additions and alterations in the existing ones. When they are
not on the move they can be found busy in their vihars-rela-
tively small and unpretentious in appearance but invariably
clean and orderly-reciting siltras, performing pilja or: busy in
preparing booklets or editing magazines. In fact, at present
they constitute the most busy and active group of religious
people in Nepal. The prominent bhikkhus are endowed with
the qualities of religious leadership and instill confidence
among their followers. Many of them are learned and well
versed in Pali. It is a measure of their success and ability that
they command respect from both Buddhists and non-Bud-
dhists. Apart from the bhikkhus, there are anagarikas, the
Theravadin nuns, some of whom are as active as the bhikkhus.
The anagarikas work mostly among the womenfolk. The reli-
gious involvement and busy life of these people makes one
realise that the Theravada has found a foothold in Nepal and is
making its presence felt. It has all the traits of a religious move-
ment and is on its way to develop certain characteristics which
are not present in Theravada elsewhere.
By placing the Theravada movement in Nepal in a wider
67
perspective, this paper attempts to analyse its social and cultur_
al dimensions. In the process, some of the latent features of the
movement have also been highlighted. Obviously, the ideologi_
cal and organisational dimensions have not been touched. The
main thrust of the analysis relates to the sociological factors
crucial for the development of the movement. The movement
has also been seen as an expression of the cultural needs and
urges of the people. The paper is based on a first-hand study
made during visits to Nepal between 1978 and 1982. Much of
the study is based on observations made in the course of fairly
close and intimate association with Theravadin bhikkhus, ana-
garikas and the Buddhist laity. During the study contacts were
also established with some leading bajracharyas, shakyas and
other traditional Buddhists of the Kathmandu Valley.
II
We can discern two different patterns behind the emer-
gence, growth and establishment of any religious movement in
a society. According to the first pattern a religious movement
may germinate from within the society in which it later devel-
ops and flourishes. The interplay of various cultural and social
forces creates an historical situation that demands complete
overhauling or even outright rejection of the existing social,
cultural and religious arrangements and requires a new orien-
tation for the entire complex of values, norms and behaviour in
a given society. Under such a situation, various responses, cul-
tural and religious, spring forth from within the society. Histo-
ry is full of instances which follow this pattern. The rise of
Buddhism and J ainism in India or the emergence of Protes-
tantism in Europe provide examples of the religious move-
ments of endogenetic variety, generated from within the given
socio-cultural formation. Under the second pattern, social and
cultural influences external to the given society operate to give
rise to a religious movement. Although it is true that even in
this case it is necessary that the historical situation within the
society in question be receptive to such external influences, the
key is that the inspiration has its source outside the system. A
religion that expands beyond the confines of the country or the
THERAVADA BUDDHISM
69
society to which it owes its genesis and spreads to other lands
and cultures falls under the second pattern. The great religions
.. of the world-Buddhism, Christianity and Islam-owe their
. "greatness" to the fact that they followed this pattern when they
spread far and wide in different societies and cultures.
When we look at the Theravada movement from the point
of view of its genesis and emergence in Nepal, prima facie it
follows the second pattern, i.e., it is a religious movement that
owes its origin to extrasystemic, as againstmtrasystemic, influ-
ences. It did not spring from the Nepalese society; its inspira-
tion came from outside Nepal. The whole process began when,
about fifty years ago, a few highly religious and adventurous
Nepalese young men came in contact first with Burmese and
later with the Ceylonese Theravadin bhikkhus who were work-
ing for the revival of Buddhism in India. Since then, constant
and lively contacts with Theravada in Ceylon and Burma and,
of late, Thailand, have been crucial for the growth of the move-
ment in Nepal. At the same time, it would be entirely wrong to
conclude that the Nepalese Theravada movement has been re-
lying completely for its existence on extraneous inspiration and
support. In spite of the fact that it appears a novel phenom-
enon in Nepal, it is not striking roots and spreading in a society
in which Buddhism is unknown. It is entrenching itself in a
society where Buddhism has existed in some form or other for
many centuries, perhaps since the times of the Buddha. For
Theravada, the social and cultural climate is not wholly foreign
and uncongenial in Nepal. It has not to till fresh grounds and
break barren soil, but to recultivate the old soil. It strives to give
a new and radical orientation to the existing form of Buddhism
in that country.
What is remarkable about the movement is the fact that
Theravada has become a source of religious renewal or resur-
gence in a country that is the oldest seat ofliving Mahayana and
has served as the nursery of Tantric Mahayana, or Vajrayana,
which over the centuries spread in the entire trans-Himalayan
region and beyond.
At the very outset it should be made clear that Theravada
has not found its way into all the Buddhist communities in
Nepal. It is restricted primarily to the Buddhist Newars. The
Buddhist communities inhabiting the cis-Himalayan belt in Ne-
70 JIABS VOL 6 NO.2
pal and practising the older forms of Tibetan Buddhism have
so far remained unaffected by it.
The Theravada movement in Nepal offers a unique area
of study to students of Buddhism interested in its changing
aspects. Although it cannot be claimed that Theravada has en-
trenched itself deeply, there is no denying the fact that it has
come to stay and cannot be ignored in N epa!. Its growth has not
been spectacular, but slowly and steadily it is gaining ground,
attracting adherents and drawing wider support and admira-
tion. Its impact is felt by the entire Newar society, including the
Hindu Newars. Its presence has proved beneficial even to the
traditional Newar Buddhism, in the sense that some orthodox
Buddhists-who have no intention of turning to Theravada
and who do not want to see it replace Vajrayana-have been
forced to reflect on their own beliefs and practices.
With one or two exceptions, scholars have largely ignored
this movement.! The present paper tries to analyse some of the
important social and cultural factors that have provided anchor
to the movement in Nepal and have also been responsible for
improvising and innovating certain religious practices within
Theravada tradition.
Unlike in India, the Theravadin movement in Nepal is not
advancing through proselytisation. In India, following the in-
spiration and lead given byB. R. Ambedkar, most Theravadin
adherents are new converts drawn from the Hindu scheduled
castes, like Mahars in Maharashtra and Jatavas in Uttar Pra-
desh. But, as pointed out earlier, in Nepal Theravada is not
converting non-Buddhists. It is a movement which gets its
strength and support overwhelmingly from those who are al-
ready Buddhists by tradition. It has assumed the role of giving
novel and rational orientation to the established Buddhism. It
aims to promote a renewed religious consciousness in a tradi-
tional Buddhist community. Hence, the role of Theravada in
Nepal cannot be appreciated properly without having some
knowledge of the socio-cultural milieu in which it is embedded.
The Theravada movement in Nepal in its entirety is the
concern of Newars. It has been so right from its very inception.
All the bhikkhus, anagarikas and upasak-upasikas, whether in the
past or present, have been drawn from among the Newars. As
we shall later discuss in some detail the social composition of
THERA V ADA BUDDHISM
71
the Theravadins, it will suffice here to point out that it is pre-
dominantly a Newar phenomenon. Hence, it will not be out of
place to give a very brief account of the social and cultural
attributes of the Newars.
III
The Newars are one of the most important ethnic groups
in Nepal. They are the oldest inhabitants of the oval shaped
valley of Kathmandu, the heartland of Nepal. There are three
main towns in the valley, viz. Kathmandu, Patan and Bhaktpur.
The city of Kathmandu is not only the capital of the Himalayan
kingdom but is also the most important religious, cultural, edu-
cational and commercial centre of the country. The Newars
constitute the majority in the valley, and they dominate trade,
handicrafts, manufacture and agriculture there. They speak
Newari, a monosyllabic language belonging to the Tibeto-Bur-
man family. The Newars are a race of mixed Indo-Mongolian
ongm.
Religiously, the Newars are a unique comingling of Hindu-
ism and Buddhism. They are the earliest Buddhists of Nepal.
In ancient times they were predominently Buddhists. Later in
history, under the influence of the immigrants from India,
certain sections of the Newars were attracted. to. Hinduism.
Anyone visiting the Kathmandu valley is struck by the remark-
able tolerance and understanding between the Hindus and the
Buddhists. Religious syncretism has become so much a part of
the N ewar way of life that in many cases it is quite difficult to
distinguish between the followers of the two major religions.
They have existed side by side for ages and one can find few
instances of religious bigotry in the long history of their coexis-
tence. However, this does not mean that both religions enjoy
equal status and power in social and political spheres. For the
last several centuries, particularly since the 13th century,
Hinduism has been gaining ascendency through state patron-
age and Buddhism has been waning and losing its vigour. The
process of its decline started during the MalIa regime. Al-
though, unlike the later Gorkha rulers, MalIa kings were them-
selves N ewars they followed a systematic policy of Hinduisation
of the Newar society. This trend was most striking during the
regime of J ayasthiti Malla, who for the first time promulgated a
social code fixing the hierarchy of caste among the Newars on
the model of Manusmriti; it is significant tnat the king was assist-
ed by a group of Indian Brahmins in drafting the code. The
Hindu ascendency received a further fillip with the overthrow
of the Mallas and with the advent of the Shah dynasty in the
later half of the 18th century. The new dynasty was drawn
from the Gorkha stock as distinct from the Newar. Unlike the
heterodox Newars, the Gorkhas were exclusively Hindus. Nev-
ertheless, for about three quarters of a century after the estab-
lishment of their rule the powerful but prudent Shah rulers
followed a policy of accommodation and tolerance towards the
Buddhist Newars. However, this policy received ajolt with the
rise of the Ranas, a clan of warriors. The Ranas, who remained
the de facto rulers of Nepal for over a century, relentlessly pur-
sued a policy of vigorous Hinduisation. In order to promote
their political power they implemented a rigid code of caste
hierarchy.3 The social and political position of the Newars suf-
fered a grave setback under the partisan rule of the despotic
Ranas and it was only after the end of the Rana regime in 1951,
followed by the establishment of democracy in Nepal, that a
policy of liberalisation was instituted by the state and a more
favourable atmosphere created for the Buddhists.
Traditional Newar Buddhism has two distinct features
which set it apart from all other varieties of Buddhism. The
first is the complete absence of bhikkhus, or Buddhist monks.
Everywhere else, Buddhism is a religion pre-eminently associ-
ated with the bhikkhu Sangha, the monastic order. Normally,
Buddhism without monks is unthinkable, but the traditional
Buddhism of the Kathmandu Valley does not have ascetic
bhikkhus. Long ago, the institution of the homeless monk was
replaced by the institution of hereditary Buddhist priests,
known as Bajracharyas. The second distinguishing feature of
Newar Buddhism is its rigid caste structure. This caste rigidity
is, by and large, the r e ~ u l t of prolonged domination by a
Hinduism buttressed by the power of the state. As the social
base of the Theravada movement in Nepal is largely patterned
by the caste system, it is necessary to have some idea of Newar
caste structure.
73
. Newars have about twenty-six major castes, each of which
is further divided into sub-castes. Patterned on the lines of the
caste structure obtaining in the. Gangetic Plain of North India,
the Newar castes are ranked according to their place in the
ritual hierarchy, which is closely related to their position in the
hereditary occupational structure. Despite the fact that there
are certain Newar castes which are exclusively Hindu and oth-
ers which are exclusively Buddhist, all non-Newar groups gen-
erally consider the N ewars as belonging to a single ethnic
group. Also, in the case of some Newar castes, it is difficult to
make a clear distinction between Buddhists and Hindus. This
explains why anthropologists and sociologists classify all N ewar
castes under a single scheme.
4
One can distinguish between a
Buddhist and a Hindu caste among Newars by finding out
whether the particular caste traditionally utilises the services of
gubhajus or bajracaryas, the Buddhist priests, or of the dev bhajus,
the brahmin priests-although there are certain Newars who
get their domestic rites performed by gubhajus and dev bhajus
both. This again underscores the liberal and syncretic traits so
prominent among the Newars, who do not see any contradic-
tion in following a dual set of rituals or employing two types of
family priests.
Another important aspect of Newar social structure is the
division of castes into two blocks, the ju pi and ma ju pi. The ju pi
block consists of those castes from whom water can be taken by
all the Newars, where the ma ju pi block includes castes from
whom the ju pi block cannot accept water. The ju pi block in-
cludes more than ninety per cent of Newars. It is noteworthy
that the division of castes .into ju pi and ma ju pi groups applies
both to Buddhist Newars, known as Buddhamargis and the Hin-
du Newars, who are called Sivamargis. Normally, Buddhists will
neither uphold the distinctions of caste and birth nor discrimi-
nate among men on the basis of purity and inipurity, but such is
not the case with the Buddhistsof the Kathmandu Valley. The
Theravadins of Nepal do realise that if they are going to restore
the rationalism and humanism they believe essential to the
original Buddhist tradition, they will have to eradicate caste
distinctions and end the social injustice meted out to the un-
touchable and impure castes for centuries. Under the circum-
stances, this will be difficult, for caste distinctions and discrimi-
74
JIABS VOL 6 NO.2
nations are as real for the Buddhamargis as they are for the
Sivamargis.
Being primarily concerned with Buddhamargis, we need not
go into the details of the entire Newar caste structure. As noted,
although it is not easy to distinguish certain Buddhamargis from
Sivamargis, a broad distinction can be made according to reli-
gious affiliation of the priests who are called to perform domes_
tic rites. The Buddhamargi castes can be broadly divided into
four major groups-(l) the Gubhaju-Bare group, consisting of
two sub-groups, viz. the Gubhajus or Bajraclryas and Bares Or
Shakyas; (2) the Udas group, divided into seven main sub-
groups; (3) theJyapu group, consisting of eight or so sub-castes
and (4) the residual group, in which groups or sub-groups other
than those in the above three groups can be placed. Of these
four groups the first two-the Gubhaju-Bare group and the
Udas group-form the core of the Buddhamargi Newars and, as
we shall see later, it is from among these groups that most of
the Theravadin bhikkhus have been drawn.
The Bajracharyas, who belong to the first group, are
placed at the top of the intra-ethnic caste hierarchy among the
Buddhamargi Newars; they are the purohits or family priests.
Along with the Shakyas they have the right of hereditary mem-
bership of the bahas or vihars. The Shakyas, who are next to the
Bajracharyas in the caste hierarchy, can also be called vihar
priests. However, while the Bajracaryas' exclusive occupation is
priesthood, the Shakyas follow the hereditary occupation of
goldsmiths. The Udas group is composed of the castes of he-
reditary merchants and artisans. Some Udasas, like the Tulad-
hars, are among the most prosperous and wealthy people in
Nepal, and used to have property interests in places like Lhasa,
Darjeeling, Kalimpong and various other trade centres outside
Nepal. They carried trade between Nepal and Tibet and be-
tween Nepal and India. Their trade links with Tibet were ex-
tensive. Their occupational obligations brought them into close
contact with the people, religion and culture of Tibet. Being
traditional Buddhists, the Udas merchants could gauge the
depth and the hold of Tibetan Buddhism and could very well
assess comparatively the plight of their own Newar brand of
Buddhism. Therefore, it is not surprising that some of the
earliest adherents of Theravada came from the Udas ranks,
particularly from among the Tuladhars.
THERAV ADA BUDDHISM
75
The third group of Buddharnargi Newar castes is composed
of the different sub-groups of Jyapus, or agriculturists, and is
numerically the strongest. Although a section of the Jyapus
exclusively professes Hinduism, particularly in Bhaktpur
where they are in majority, most of them are Buddhists. How-
ever, many of them are truly heterodox, utilising the priestly
services of both the GubhaJus and dev bhaJus, visiting Buddhist
vihars and Hindu temples with same devotion and celebrating
both Buddhist and Hindu festivals with equal fervour. This
section of the J yapus is perhaps the best representative of reli-
gious syncretism in the Kathmandu Valley. Apart from the
above mentioned main caste clusters, there are a few others
who almost exclusively follow Buddhism. Among them, Ma-
nandhars are the most important. Other castes, like Chitrakars
and Putuwars, can also be included in this group. As compared
to the other three groups the numerical strength of this residu-
al group is not very significant.
IV
The leading groups active in the Theravada movement in
Nepal have been constituted by the Buddharnargi Newars. The
social origins of the bhikkhus, anagarikas and other active sec-
tion of the Theravadins unmistakably show that as compared to
others some particular groups have become more involved in
the movement. Firstly, let us take the bhikkhu Sangha. We find
that most of the bhikkhus have been drawn from those caste
groups of Buddharnargis who in the face of all odds have been
the bearers and upholders of Buddhist tradition and have been
able to preserve it, in whatever form, through the centuries. It
is significant that 38.4 per cent of the members of the Therava-
din bhikkhu Sangha have been recruited form the Shakya
ranks.
5
The next largest number of bhikkhus (22.7 percent)
have come from the Jyapu group. The third important caste
category, from which 14 per cent of bhikkhus have been re-
cruited, is the Udas group. The representation of the Bajra-
charya caste in the Bhikkhu Sangh is relatively low-only 7 per
cent of the monks are from this priestly caste. It is also notewor-
thy that 7 per cent of the bhikkhus have come from the
Shrestha caste, the most important and powerful caste of the
76
JIABS VOL. 6 NO.2
Sivamargi, or Hindu Newars.6 There are also bhikkhus drawn
from various other Buddhamargi castes, like the Manandhars
Naus and Kumas.
7
With certain minor variations, the social
composition of the anagarika group follows the same pattern.
As many as 42.6 per cent of the anagarikas have come from the
Shakya families and the percentages of nuns drawn from the
Udas, Jyapu,_Manadhar and Bajracharya castes are 14.2, 12.6,
10.6 and 7.1, respectively.s
The above description of the social origins of the bhikkhu
Sangha and of the anagarika order reveals that it is mainly from
the three castes of the Buddhamargi Newars-the Shakyas, the
Udas and the Jyapus-that most of the Buddhist monks and
nuns have been recruited. We have already noted that taken
together these three castes constitute the bulk of the population
of the Buddhamargi N ewars, their association with the Thera-
vada Buddhism shows that they perceive the potential of The-
ravada for restoring the lost elan of Buddhism in the Valley.
Nevertheless the differential participation of the three caste
groups requires further analysis. Let us take the Shakyas first.
There are some solid reasons behind the preponderance
of Shakyas in the Theravadin order. They occupy the place just
next to the Bajracharyas in the caste-hierarchy. Along with the
Bajracharyas, they have hereditary rights over the old vihars.
Although they are not family priests like the Bajracharyas, they
are the practitioners of Vajrayanic esoteric tantric rituals. It is
not without significance that Shakyas are also known as Sha-
kyabhikshus. This nomenclature indicates that in the Buddha-
margi tradition the Shakyas are accorded, at least symbolically,
the status of bhikkhus. Perhaps it would be more apt to call
them grihastha-bhikkhus. Moreover, the existence-of the Bud-
dhist initiation rite, bare chuyegu (which must be performed for
every boy from the Bajracharya and Shakya families) futher
confirms the close traditional affinity of the Shakyas with the
institution of the Buddhist ascetic order. The bare chuyegu rite
confers the status of a bhikkhu on a boy for four daysY It is also
to be noted that Shakyas, like the Bajracharyas, inhabit the
bahas, the Buddhist vihars. This provides further evidence of
the historical association of the Shakyas with the Sangha. It has
been found that the Bares, or the Shakyas, always want to be
identified as true Buddhists, and are proud of their ritualistic
THERAV ADA BUDDHISM
77
and symbolic status of a bhikkhu. In this context, It IS also
notable that even today, like bhikkhus, male Shakyas have their
heads completely shaven. With their high status in the Buddha-
rnargi caste hierarchy, and with their ritualistic affinity to the
Buddhist monk order, they are naturally the most suited to
become real bhikkhus. For this, the opportunity is offered by
the Theravada movement. When a Shakya dons yellow robes
and renounces the life of a householder he is readily given due
social recognition by all sections of Newar society. Bearing all
these facts in mind, it is no wonder that the Theravadin move-
ment has recruited the largest number of bhikkhus from the
Shakya ranks. By joining the Theravadin monastic order, the de
jure bhikkhus, the Shakyabhikshus, get an opportunity to attain
the status of virtuoso ascetics, the true bhikkhus.
Another caste closely associated with the Theravada move-
ment is that of the Udasas. It is believed that the term Udas has
been derived from the word upasaka, which denoted the Bud-
dhist laity. It is also said that Udas are the descendants of that
class of laity from which the Shakyabhikshus were recruited in
the past. There is no doubt that the Udas, along with the Bajra-
charyas and Shakyas, are exclusively Buddhamargins, and there
are reasons to believe that when the Shakyabhikshus were real
ascetics, the Udasas formed the elite among Buddhist house-
holders. 10 Being hereditary merchants, they were economically
well-off. The Udas, many of whom are wealthy are among the
best jajmans-the hereditary clients of the priests-of the gubha-
jus. Their generosity in spending large amounts for religious
ceremonies is well known. In the past, they virtually monopo-
lised the Tibet-Nepal trade. Their frequent visits and pro-
longed stays at Lhasa and other important trade centers in
Tibet, the citadel of Vajrayana, strengthened their devotion to
Buddhism. Several Udas traders were so enamoured of Tibet-
an Buddhism that they went to the extent of renouncing the
world and entering the Lamaist ordeL
II
Thus, it can be seen
that with better economic and occupational status, along with
their strong attachment to Buddhism, the Udasas occupy a key
position in the community of the Buddhamargis. Some of the
early leaders of the Theravada movement were drawn from
this group and, as already noted, we find that a good number
of the bhikkhus in present day Nepal are erstwhile Udasas.
78 jIABS VOL. 6 NO. "2
The main contribution of the Udasas to the cause of Ther-
avada in Nepal lies in the economic support they lend. There
are reasons to believe that withou.ci:heir timely and magnani_
mous support the movement would never have achieved much
success. 12 Every religious movement has its economic aspect,
and even Buddhism, known for its emphasis on asceticism and
non-attachment, needs economic support from the laity or the
masses for maintaining monks and nuns, for constructing vi-
haras and for propagation of religion. As a developing move-
ment, the Theravada in Nepal needed support, social as well as
economic, which was provided in full measure by the Udas
group. However, it is not being suggested that only the Udasas
provide economic support. All sections of the laity, even the
poorest, contribute their mite. On any full moon day in front of
the viharas in Kathmandu, Patan and elsewhere one can see
numerous poor Jyapu women in tattered clothes standing in
queues waiting for a chance to make their humble offerings of
coarse rice to the bhikkhus and anagarikas. As successful reli-
gious movement must have wide moral and material support
from the masses, but for its expansion, growth and sustenance,
it needs some substantial material support. For the Theravada
movement in Nepal, such material support has come to a large
extent from the highly religious and prosperous Udas families.
Another mainstay of the Theravada movement has been
the Jyapu group. The Jyapus, with their overwhelming nu-
merical preponderance in the Kathmandu valley, occupy a very
important place in Newar society. Theirs is a caste of peasants,
known for their hard work. They constitute the bulk of the
Newar masses. In the absence of their support, Theravada
would not have made any viable social impact. After all, every
movement needs people, and unless the bulk of the population
backs it directly or indirectly, it cannot make much headway.
Jyapus are very enthusiastic in performing rituals and attend-
ing festivals. They turn up in good numbers whenever pujas or
other religious ceremonies are held in the Theravadin vihars.
In several vihars, the overwhelming majority of the laity con-
sists of J yapus.
13
Without their involvement, the Theravadin
movement would have remained confined largely to urban
Buddhist elite groups.
There are some other Newar castes whose support has
79
been of considerable value for the progress of the movement.
Among them, Manandhars deserve mention. Although Man-
andhars are hereditary oil-pressers, by dint of their industri-
ousness and resourcefulness many of them have made a mark
in trade, and a few, after receiving higher education, have ob-
tained important positions in administration and in other
white-collar occupations. The Manandhar caste is known for its
powerful guthis, organisations that control and regulate the so-
cial and religious life of their members. This has helped the
members of this caste to acquire some sort of expertise in or-
ganisational affairs, and, compared to others, they seem better
able to manage the affairs of social organisations. The organisa-
tional talents of Manandhars have been put to good use in
running the various Theravadin religious and educational or-
ganisations, like Dayak Sabhas and \(ihar Guthis.
The foregoing analysis makes it"dt;ar:-that Theravada in
the present day Nepal has found its social base in the traditional
caste structure of the Buddhamargi Newars. As true Buddhists,
the bhikkhu leaders of the movement ideologically reject all
caste distinctions, and many among them are sincere in their
efforts to eradicate the evils of the caste system, which has
struck deep roots in Newar society. But, they cannot wish it
away. The very caste system they wish to abolish provides a
solid base for the Theravada, and that, too, without their ask-
ing. This may sound contradictory, but it cannot be helped.
After all, man's life and social existence are full of contradic-
tions, as Buddhists well know.
v
It is an important feature of Theravada in Nepal that de-
spite its declared rejection of the traditional Vajrayana Bud-
dhism of the Newars and despite its ultimate aim of completely
reorienting Buddhism in Nepal on the Theravada pattern ob-
taining in countries like Ceylon or Burma, it has never followed
a policy of confrontation with the established form of Bud-
dhism. The bhikkhus have carefully followed a positive policy
of introducing beliefs and practices associated with Theravada
without hurting the feelings of the traditional Bajracharyas and
Shakyas who, in spite of their weakening religious power and
authority, continue to have a hold over the deeply religious
BuddhamaTgis, and continue to practise their religious rituals
and carryon their priestly functions. 14 It is true that the bhik-
k?us lay emphasis on rational.elerr:ents in B ~ d d h i s m and tacitly
dIsapprove of the elaborate ntualIsm of VaJrayana. But, at the
same time, they know very well that any confrontation with the
Bajracharyas and Shakyas can prove counterproductive. Not
only do the Theravadins avoid such confrontation; but they are
prudent enough to make use of certain traits and practices
associated with the traditional Buddhism of the Newars. From
the orthodox Theravadin point of view, such compromises
would be considered unwarranted deviations from the time-
honoured pattern but, as the things stand in Nepal, they are
unavoidable. Let us take a few instances which show how some
of the practices and traits of traditional Buddhism have been
fruitfully utilised and wisely exploited-by the Theravadins.
As noted earlier, the Bajracharyas and Shakyas are re-
quired to be initiated into the Buddhist ascetic order for a brief
period. Their initiation rite, baTe chuyegu, confers the ritualistic
status of bhikkhu upon the initiate. Sensing the potential and
value of this ritual, the Theravadins took advantage of it by
starting the practice of giving ordination for a limited period.
Of course, this practice is not new to Theravada, being in vogue
elsewhere, particularly in Thailand, but what is significant in
the case of Nepal is the relative ease with which it has been
introduced. It is not seen as an alien practice by the Buddhist
public. However, to be fair to the Theravadins, the practice of
temporary ordination conforms entirely to the accepted ritual-
istic pattern of giving pmvajya. Moreover, they give such ordi-
nation to anyone who desires it, without distinction of caste and
status. This is quite at variance from the Newar Buddhist cus-
tom of limiting the right of symbolic ordination only to Bajra-
charyas and Shakyas, with the exclusion of all other Buddhist
castes. Further, according to the Theravadin practice, the mini-
mum period of ordination is seven days. This, if desired, may
be extended to several months, whereas the old Newar custom
limits the period to four days. Thus, the Theravadins have
patterned the practice of temporary ordination on different
lines. Nevertheless, what is significant is that the Theravadins
THERA. V ADA BUDDHISM
81
have succeeded in introducing their own pattern of temporary
ordination primarily because an earlier form of such practice
was already in existence in the Newar Buddhist tradition.
Another instance of use of the existing Buddhist tradition
by the Theravadins is in the establishment of their vihars. As
the rules of the Vinaya enjoin bhikkhus to reside in vihars, the
Theravadin bhikkhus needed vihars for themselves. Although
at present we find vihars being constructed with relative ease in
Nepal, in the early stages of the movement Theravadins faced
difficulties in founding them. 15 Before the early bhikkhus, the
pioneers of Theravada in Nepal, raised their own vihars thy
resided in an ancient vihara, known as Kindola Vihara, which
due to long neglect was in ramshackle condition. 16 Situated in
the vicinity of the great Swayambhu shrine, it was frequented
by all sorts of itenerant ascetics, ancI/particularly by Tibetan
lamas, who often would stay in for a fairly long
time. Later, the first Theravadin vihar was constructed on the
slopes of the Swayambhu HillY It has to be noted that al-
though the first vihara, Anand Kuti Vihar, was built anew in
the midst of woods, the choice of its location was largely influ-
enced by its proximity to Swayambhunath, the oldest and most
venerated Buddhist shrine in Nepal. Later, the bhikkhus
gradually established other vihars in Kathmandu, Patan and
elsewhere, and we find that a good numberofvihars have been
built either within the precincts of the ancient Vajrayap:l vihars
or are located so close to them that it is not easy to demarcate
their respective boundaries.
18
There are two main factors which have prompted the
bhikkhus to establish their vihars in the vicinity of the old ones.
Firstly, they were sure to attract the Buddhamargi laity who tra-
ditionally visit the old Vajrayaria vihars for worship. Had they
built their vihars far away from the old shrines, they might not
have succeeded in finding a following. This was more true in
the early stages of establishment of Theravada in Nepal. 19 Sec-
ondly, when the bhikkhus mooted the idea of establishing vi-
hars near the vicinity of old but almost neglected vihars they
received enthusiastic support from the Buddhamargi people.
The Buddhist public was very much pleased with the idea that
their dilapidated and decaying vihars and neglected shrines
were going to be resurrected and inhabited by the dedicated
82
JIABS VOL. 6 NO.2
bhikkhus. It is also possible that the conscious or unconscious
attachment of the bhikkhus to their ancient Buddhist tradition
and their longing to restore the glory of Buddhism may have
prompted them to choose the old sites for their new vihars.
However, the tendency to build their vihars in the vicinity of
old ones was more pronounced in the early days of Theravada
in Nepal. Of late, the bhikkhus have started constructing vihars
in new locations, away from the old vihars. This could happen
only after the Theravada gained a foothold in Nepal.
During the course of their work among the Buddhist
masses, the Theravadin bhikkhus found that certain old Newar
religious practices and customs could prove very helpful to
them and, consequently, they adopted them with slight modifi-
cations. One such customary practice is known as gunla dharma.
It is the name given to a complex of rituals, worship and cere-
monies held for one full month, sometimes during July-Au-
gust. Although gunla dharma is considered important by all
Newars, it has special significance for Buddhamargis like Sha-
kyas, Udas and Manandhars.20 For them, the period of gunla
dharma is the period of the general worship of shrines and
Buddhist deities. The most important part of the elaborate
rituals is the worship of caityas. Every day, devotees make a
large number of miniature clay caityas, and at the end of the
month the number of caityas made by a family may surpass a
hundred thousand. On the last day of the month, after the
performance of havan, all the miniature caityas are immersed in
the river. Throughout the month, Buddhist devotees visit vi-
hars, particularly the Swayambhunath shrine. Generous offer-
ings are made to Bajracharyas and Shakyas. The Theravadin
bhikkhus were well aware of the place and importance of gunla
dharma in Newar Buddhism. Assessing its potential, they wisely
adopted and moulded it according to their needs. They intro-
duced the convention of holding special sessions of preaching,
pujas and sutra recitations during the whole month of the gunla
dharma. Narrations of J ataka stories were also popularised. The
Newars were impressed by this new style of celebrating gun la,
and the bhikkhus, anagarikas and their vihars began receiving
liberal support, both moral and material, from the laity. Thus,
it can be seen how a customary religious practice of the Vaj-
rayana Buddhism in Nepal ha,s been adopted to their advan-
tage by the Theravadins.
83
The Theravadins have not considered it improper to take
advantage of the Nepalese love of music. Kirtans and bhajans,
religious group singing, are old traditions at the religious
shrines in Nepal. Even today, in the celebrated ancient vihars
and shrines of Kathmandu and Patan, the chacho songs-the
esoteric songs composed by the great Bauddha siddhiicaryas-
are regularly sung by the Bajracharyas and the Shakyas. One
can find a large number of kirtan and bhajan mandlees, groups of
amateur musicians, in the towns of the valley, holding regular
evening sessions of mass singing in the temples and vihars. In
the early stages of the Theravadin movement, when the bhik-
khus were struggling to find ways and means to gain public
support, they realised the importance of devotionar music and,
consequently, promoted their own musical groups, known as
jiianamala khals. The senior bhikkhus themselves composed
songs for mass singing, and their musical compositions quickly"
became popular.
21
It is worth recalling that the Theravada tra-
dition prescribes that entertainment and merriments like dance
and music are to be strictly avoided and discouraged but, in the
present case, we find the Theravadins themselves giving en-
couragement to music, of course of the devotional type, and
utilising it for the propagation of the Dharma. The bhikkhus
themselves admit that to promote music is a sort of deviation
from the established norms, but they point out that without
making such adjustments with the tradition it would have been
almost impossible to attain any degree of success in their mis-
SIOn.
As the Theravada movement in Nepal was faced with the
problem of entrenching itself in an environment entirely cre-
ated by the old Vajrayana tradition, it was natural that it adjust
itself to the requirements of the situation. In the process it
made some compromises which to the Theravadin orthodoxy
would appear as deviations from its own tradition. To take an
example, the bhikkhus started going to the old caityas for wor-
ship. Students of Vajrayana know that the old caityas of Nepal
contain the images of Paiicabuddhas, sometimes known as
Dhyanibuddhas: these are omnipresent in Kathmandu valley.
The concept of Paiicabuddhas is foreign to Theravada, yet the
worship of old caityas by the bhikkhus implied the worship of
the Paiicabuddhas. The situation posed a dilemma for them.
They neither wanted to give up the worship of the caityas be-
cause it paid dividends to them in the form of the growing
number of their followers, nor were they ready to admit that
they had compromised their position as Theravadins by wor-
shipping the Paiicabuddhas. But pragmatists that they are, the
Theravadins gave a ready and plausible explanation. They said
that they were not propitiating the Paiicabuddhas known in the
Mahayana tradition but were, as a matter of fact, worshipping
images of the historical Buddha in his different mudras, or
postures. Thus, according to their explanation, one
of the five Paiicabuddhas, was the Buddha in bhumisparsamudra.
Similarly, Amoghsiddhi was seen to represent the Buddha in abhaya-
mudra and Amitabha was none else than the Buddha in dhyanamudra,
and so on. The Theravadins claimed that they were not concerned with
the Mahayanist pantheon, but with the Buddha, his qualities and his
precepts. Notwithstanding these explanations, there is no denying the
fact that the bhikkhus found it convenient to worship Mahayanist cai-
I
Another such adjustment by the is to be
found in the existing arrangements relating\tC? the use of the
old Buddhist vihars-which, being neglected, fast turning
into historical ruins-renovated by the bhikkhus. As the tradi-
tion has it, the Bajracharyas and Shakyas have exclusive heredi-
tary right of ownership and possession of the old vihars, where
they are expected to perform their priestly and ritualistic func-
tions. The bhikkhus could not use even the forlorn or dilapi-
dated vihars without the consent of their rightful owners. The
Bajracharyas and Shakyas having rights over the vihars allowed
the bhikkhus to repair them for use on certain conditions.
Without foresaking their general rights over the vihars, they
reserved the right to worship in the old shrines-situated within
the vihars and, what is most important, retained exclusive
rights to receive the entire donations and offerings from the
laity at these shrines. The bhikkhus could worship at these
shrines, but could claim no right over the offerings. However,
all such offerings that were given directly to them or which
were not offered at the old shrines were to be taken by the
bhikkhus. In this way, workable agreements over the use of
some of the ancient vihars were forged between the bhikkhus
and the traditional Buddhist priests. There is no doubt that
such adjustments have not only proved beneficial to both par-
THERAVADA BUDDHISM
85
ties; but have also been highly appreciated by the Buddhist
laity, who find that such understanding promotes the cause of
Buddhism in genera1.
22
Perhaps no better proof of the co-exis-
tence of Theravada and Vajrayana in Nepal can be given. After
all, if Hinduism and Buddhism can exist in close cooperation
for centuries, why cannot two schools of Buddhism?
It is evident that in the process of development, the Thera-
vada movement in Nepal has striven to steer a course of its own.
It was incumbent upon the bhikkhus, the leaders and activists
of the movement, to judge the whole situation, thrash out their
own strategy and explore new methods and improvise the exist-
ing ones to achieve their central aim of establishing Theravada
in Nepal. As the followers of the Buddha, who was known for
his upaya-kausalya, or expedient skillfulness in the propagation
of Dharma, the Nepalese Theravadins have been pragmatic
enough to assess the situation and devise ways and means to
achieve their end. Being drawn from the traditional Buddhist
ranks they were well aware of the complexities of the situation.
They had to be prudent and cautious. They avoided confronta-
tion with the traditional Buddhists as also with the ruling elite
and the establishment. As true products of the Newar culture
they have always been accommodating, tolerant and resilient.
As the movement forges ahead in Nepal, it is possible that a
new version of Theravada may emerge in the Himalayan king-
dom, bearing a deep imprint of the rich Newar culture.
VI
Religious movements ongmate, develop and take shape
not in a vacuum but in a given social and cultural context. Every
movement must have the capacity to stir individuals and
groups, and to catch their imagination by answering their felt
needs and promising to fulfill their cultural aspirations. Unless
it comes to represent the aspirations of the people in a society
and unless it conjures a vision of a better alternative to the
existing situation, a religious movement cannot sustain itself
anywhere. It quite often offers the vision as well as the method
which enables a given social group to reinterpret and restruc-
ture its cultural identity. The Theravadin movement in Nepal
is no exception: it has arisen and developed in a given social
and cultural milieu, and this milieu provides not only the
ground where a movement germinates and strikes its roots but
also the framework within which it has to operate and grow.
Theravada in Nepal has to be seen in this perspective. In the
foregoing sections of this paper, we have already made an at-
tempt to delineate important linkages of the movement with
the N ewar social structure and also with traditional Vajrayana
Buddhism. But, the analysis of the social and cultural forces
shaping the movement will remain incomplete and inconclusive
unless we place it within the framework provided by the histori-
cal p"rocesses of social and cultural change.
The Theravada movement in Nepal can be viewed as a
product of a particular historical situation. Despite the fact that
it primarily involves the Newar people it has also to be seen in
the larger social and political context in which various ethnic
groups, including the Newars, have been mingling, interacting
and influencing each other for centuries. Let us sketch briefly
the historical and cultural situation which is relevant to the
present discussion.
The N ewar culture is known for its richness and refine-
ment. In the course of its known history of more than two
millennia, the Newar genius developed and nurtured a distinct
civilization. The earliest form of Newar civilization is said to
have existed around the 6th century B.C.23 Through the cen-
turies, this civilization acquired depth, variety, aesthetic ele-
gance and splendour, and in the process, the religions, Bud-
dhism and Hinduism both, provided the necessary impetus for
its achievement. The earlier inspiration was derived from Bud-
dhism. The Newars are perhaps the earliest Buddhists in Ne-
pal. Until the appearance of Hinduism, they were exclusively
Buddhists.24 Shifts in political power tilted the balance in fa-
vour of Hinduism, and evidently its ascendency did not prove
conducive even to the normal sustenance of Buddhism in its
older form.
With the passage of time, Newar society, ~ u ; l t u r e and reli-
gion underwent far-reaching changes, both in content and
form. A process of decline set in. Although Newar civilization
in general received a setback, it was the Newar variety of Bud-
dhism that faced the greatest difficulty. The ruling elite pur-
87
sued a policy aimed at the Integration of the Newar society,
along with the integration of other ethnic groups, into the larg-
er, homogeneously constituted Nepalese society. The model
for such.an integration was provided by the Brahmanical cul-
ture, and caste was its basic organising principle. But, one of
the most remarkable features of the policy of unification of
various ethnic and autochthonous groups has been its avoid-
ance of oppression. Integration was to be achieved not by op-
pression but by cultural subordination. 25 This policy of cultural
subordination was pursued with extreme vigour and almost
with vengeance during the regime of the Ranas. Under the
provisions of the Mulki Ain, the legal code, enacted by the
founder of the Rana regime, the conversion of Hindus to other
religions was prohibited but, to the great disadvantage of the
Buddhamargi Newars and other Buddhist groups, the conver-
sion of Buddhists to Hinduism was allowed. The Ranas, in the
relentless attempt to perpetuate their political power through
the policy of unification by subordination, went farther still,
and placed administrative restrictions on the cultivation of
Newar language and literature.
26
Thus, Newar culture and
Newar Buddhism both were being subjugated, gradually but
systematically.
No ethnic group or society likes cultural subjugation, the
less so in a community with a heritage as rich as the Newars',
During the oppressive Rana rule, the Newars became increas-
ingly conscious of their social and political subjugation and cul-
tural emaciation. There were ethnic groups other than the
Newars that were subjugated, but the odds were heavier against
the Newars, particularly against the Buddhists. However, un-
der the influence of rapid and far reaching social, political and
cultural changes taking place in India, signs of restiveness be-
gan to surface up in various sections of Nepalese society, in-
cluding the N ewars. As there was no freedom of association in
Nepal, any attempt to protest was curbed brutally. But, as often
happens under oppressive regimes, the voices of dissent nor-
mally appear not in political form, but in cultural or religious
spheres, and this happened in Nepal, also. During the last
phase of Rana rule, efforts were made to organise social and
religious reform movements, chiefly by caste Hindus belonging
to social groups other than the Newars.27 Though it was far
more difficult for the Buddhist Newars to organise such mOve_
ments, a few among them, particularly some Buddhist monks
were the first to give expression to their deep sense of
tion and frustration.
28
'
It is worth recalling that the first Buddhist monks of Nepal
to work openly for the renewal of Buddhism and to face exile at
the hands of the Ranas were not Theravadins but the Lamaist
monks who, after coming under the influence of Tibetan Bud-
dhism, had been ordained by ramas from Tibet, and who came
to Nepal and stayed for a considerable period. Later, some of
the exiled Nepalese Lamaist monks and a few other Newar
Buddhists came into contact with Burmese and Ceylonese
bhikkhus who were working for the revival of Buddhism in
India. It was this contact that ushered in the Theravada move-
ment in Nepal. With this, the initiative for inspiring and guid-
ing these young Newars-who for personal and social reasons
toyed with the idea of becoming Buddhist monks-came into
the hands of Theravadin bhikkhus living in India. Among
these bhikkhus the most outstanding was the famous Burmese
bhikkhu Chandramani Mahathero of Kushinagar who, almost
single-handedly, took upon himself the task of giving inspira-
tion, help and guidance to the young Theravada converts from
Nepal. Under his guidance, Nepalese bhikkhus went to Burma
and Ceylon for education and religious training. After the com-
pletion of their studies, they returned to Nepal and worked for
the propagation of Theravada.
In the initial stages, the people tended to ignore the new
yellow-robed bhik'khus, who faced various hardships, but car-
ried on their work undauntedly. While propagating Buddhism
in rational terms, something relatively new for the traditional
Buddhists, they also emphasized that Buddhism had lost its
elan and vitality in Nepal, and called upon the Buddhists to
restore its lost vitality. This evoked favourable response, and
gradually people began to shed their initial reluctance and
turned sympathetic towards the Theravadins. We find that the
bhikkhus partly adopted a cultural in promoting
Theravada. They pointed out that the decline of Buddhism has
proved detrimental to Newar culture, drawing people's atten-
tion to the fact that with the withering of Buddhism, the Newar
heritage, preserved in ancient vihars and contained in shrines
THERAV ADA BUDDHISM
89
scattered all over Kathmandu valley and elsewhere, was facing
extinction. They cogently argued that the decimation of Bud-
dhism and the neglect and impoverishment of the Newari lan-
guage and literature were different manifestations of the gen- .
eral decline of Newar culture. Such an approach was in accord
with the general sentiments of the Buddhamiirgi population.
As the Theravadin movement increasingly appeared to the
people as an expression of their cultural aspirations, they be-
came more inclined to support it. The Theravadins gradually
came to represent and lead the N ewar cultural resurgence.
This resurgence has its own distinctive features. It is marked by
unobstrusiveness and tolerance. Under the prevailing condi-
tions, the Theravadins were probably best suited to give it an
expression in their own way.
In this context perhaps one of the most important contri-
butions made by the Theravadins relates to Nepal Bhasha, the
Newari language.
29
From the very beginning, the Theravadins
used Newari as their chief medium of communication. There is
nothing surprising about this, because the bhikkhus and their
upasakas both were Newars. The importance lies in their exten-
sive use of Nepal Bhasha, or Newari, in the written or printed
form. Prior to their arrival, publication work in Newari was
very limited. Faced with the problem of introducing Theravada
Buddhism to people who were strangers to it, the bhikkhus
started publications in Newari. Almost every learned bhikkhu
published something in Nepal Bhasha. Their publications are
mostly translations of sutras and other canonical literature in
pali. The translations of J ataka stories also became popular. A
few novels and plays have also been written by them. The Ther-
avadins also started regular publication of periodicals and
newsletters. By the end of 1981 they had brought out more
than 400 publications, about ninety per cent in Nepal Bhasha.
30
Here, it must be noted that a fair number of publications in
Nepal Bhasha have been brought out by non-bhikkhus. The
modernistic trend of writing and publishing in the Bhasha was
pioneered by a few persons dedicated to the cause of the ad-
vancement of their language. The adoption of Devanagari
script and the use of printing facilities was started by them in
the early decades of this century. In this context, it is also sig-
nificant that almost all the pioneers of the modernistic trend in
90 JIABS VOL 6 NO.2
Newari were staunch Buddhists and some of them, in the Corn-
pany of the Buddhist monks, had faced the wrath of the
Ranas.
31
Nevertheless, the contribution of the Theravadins in
the field of Nepal Bhasha is most substantial and impressive, and
they can rightfully take credit for salvaging the language fro
rn
the morass in which it was placed.
Thus, it can be seen that the Theravada movement has
developed in an historical situation marked by t ~ e growing
awareness among Newars of the need for cultural rejuvenation,
if not renaissance, in their society. The movement has been
successful, in so far as it has activated languishing cultural
forces and given a expression to the religious urges of the
Newars. The movement has become an inseparable part of the
wider process of the Newar resurgence. There is no denying
the fact that though it is thoroughly religious in character, and
it has come to play an important role in the cultural life of
contemporary Nepal. With its deep anchorage in Newar cul-
ture and society, it is on its way to developing its own variety of
Theravada. One cannot predict the future, but present trends
clearly indicate that the Theravada movement will continue to
perform its function of channelising the religious and cultural
aspirations of Newars in general and the Buddhamargi Newars
in particular.
NOTES
*1 am greatly indebted to Professor Jagannath Upadhyaya, who inspired
and pursuaded me to undertake the present study. I was fortunate enough to
be benefited by his deep interest in Nepalese Budhism and by his personal
presence during my visits to Nepal. I must also record my gratitude to Prof.
Krishnanath for his insightful suggestions and constant encouragement. I am
also thankful to Dr. Baidyanath Saraswati and Shri Keshav Dev Sharma, both
of whom took pains to go through the manuscript.
This study would not have been possible without the generous and will-
ing help given by the venerable bhikkhus of Nepal. It is difficult to name all
the bhikkhus, anagarikas and upasak-upasikas of Kathmandu, Patan, Bhaktpur,
Kirtipur, Banepa and other places in the Kathmandu valley:-Nevertheless, I
must record my gratitude to Bhikkhu Amritanand Mahathera and Bhikkhu
Sumangala, for kindly allowing me to stay in their viharas during my visits. I
am also grateful to Sanghanayak Prajanand Mahathera, Ven. Aniruddha
Mahathera, Ven. Subodhanand Mahathera, Ven. Prajnarashmi Mahathera,
Ven. Mahanam Mahathera, Ven. Ashwaghosh Thera, Ven. Kumar Kashyap
THERAV ADA BUDDHISM
91
Thera, Ven. Bhikkhu Sudarshan and Anagarika Dhammawati. I must also
record my thanks to eminent scholars like Shri Hemraj Shakya and Shri
Dhanbajra Bajracharya and leading upasaks like Shri Tirthanarayan Manand-
har.
1. The most notable exception is the contribution of Ria Kloppenborg of
Utrecht, who has published a paper primarily relating to the historical devel-
opment of the movement. See, Ria Kloppenborg, "Theravada Buddhism in
Nepal," Kailash, Vol. V, No.4, Ratna Pustak Bhandar, Kathmandu, 1977.
2. Some important studies on Newars are: G.S. Nepali, The Newars, Unit-
ed Asia, Bombay, 1965; Colin Rosser, "Social Mobility in the Newar Caste
System," in Caste and Kin in Nepal, India and Ceylon, C. Von Furer-Haimien-
dorf, (Ed.), Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1966; S. Greenwold, "Monk-
hood vs. Priesthood in Newar Buddhism," in Contributions to the Anthropology of
Nepal, C. Von Furer-Haimendorf(ed.), Aris and Phillips, Warminister, 1974.
See also Himalayan Anthropology, edited by James F. Fisher, Mouton, The
Hague, 1978.
3. See Surendra Vikrama Shah Dev Ka Shashan Kalma Banayeko Mulki Ain,
Kanun Tatha Nyaya Mantralaya, Kathmandu, 1965.
4. See-Nepali, op.cit. p. 150. See also Rosser, op.cit.pp. 85-89.
5. The total strength of the Nepal Bhikkhu Sangh is about 60. The 82
year-old Bhikkhu Prajnanand Mahathera, who entered the Theravadin order
52 years back, is the present Sanghanayak. Other senior Mahasthavirs of the
Sangha are Bhikkhu Shakyanand, Bhikkhu Aniruddha, Bhikkhu Amritan-
and, Bhikkhu Subodhanand, Bhikhu Buddhaghosh, Bhikkhu Mahanam and
Bhikkhu Prajnarashmi.
6. It is worth recalling that the first Theravadin monk in Nepal was the
late Bhikkhu Mahaprajna Thera, who was a Hindu Newar by birth, belonging
to the Shreshtha caste.
7. There are two bhikkhus who are not Newars. OI1e of them was a
Brahmin prior to his ordination, and the other belongs to the Tamang tribe,
which follows Tibetan Buddhism.
8. There are about 65 anagarikas in Nepal. As noted in the case of the
bhikkhus, there are a few anagarikas from the Sivamiirgi section of Newars.
We find that 7.1 per cent of the anagarikas have come from Hindu Shreshtha
families. Further, as with the bhikkhu Sangha, there is also a nominal repre-
sentation of the Brahmin caste and the Tamang tribe in the anagarika order.
9. For details regarding the Bare Chuyegu rite, see, John K. Locke,
"Newar Buddhist Initiation Rites," Contributions to Nepalese Studies, Vol. 2, No.
2, June 1975. See also Stephen M. Greenwold, op.cit.
10. See, Nepali, op.cit., p. 162.
11. It may be recalled that the present head of the Nepal Bhikkhu
Sangh, Sanghanayak Bhikkhu Prajnanand Mahathera, was born in an Udas
family. Prior to his ordination as a Theravadin monk was a red-robed lama.
He had entered the Tibetan monastic order at Lhasa in 1928.
12. Senior bhikkhus of Nepal often recall the timely and substantial help
given by the Udas upasakas to them after their expulsion from the country by
the Rana rulers in the forties. Wealthy "Kothiwale Sahus" or "Lhasa Sahus"
92
JIABS VOL. 6 NO.2
like Bhaju Ratna Sahu or Mani HarshJyoti were always willing to help bhikk_
hus in distress. Also see Bhikkhu Dhammaloka Mahasthavir, Mahacheen Yatra
Dharmodaya Sabba, Lumbini, 1974, pp. 201-203. '
13. For instance, in Banepa, an important centre located fifty-two kilo-
meters from Kathmandu, more than ninety percent of upasakas and upasikas
in the Theravadin vihars are Jyapus. Incidentally, it is interesting that a large
number of them are traditional Hindus attracted to Buddhism.
14. It has been observed that the Theravadin bhikkhushave maintained
good relations with the traditional Bajracharyas and Shakyas, and that no
traces of rancour are noticeable between them. The Bajracharyas and the
Shakyas, on their part, pay due respect to the bhikkhus. Some of the most
orthodox Bajracharyas are known to have performed major bhikshu-dan on
certain occasions.
15. There are more than 40 Theravadin vihars in Nepal at present. Of
these, 27 are full fledged vihars. Apart from the viharas, there are no less
than a dozen nunneries of which two or three are very well established.
16. See, Bhikshu Dhammaloka Mahasthavira, op.cit., pp. 184-186 and
191-193. See also, R.B. Vandya, Sanghanayak Prajnand Mabasthavira, Pub-
lished by Chandradevi Ratnadevi Shakya, Pyukha, Kathmandu, 1978, p. 13
and pp. 23-27.
17. See, Bhikkhu Amritenand Thera, A Short History of Theravada Bud-
dhism in Nepal, Anandkuti Vihar Trust, Syambhu Hill, Kathmandu, 1982, pp.
7 and 8. See also, Dhammaloka Mahasthavira, op. cit., p. 192-199.
18. Such established and reputed Theravadin vihars, like the Gana Ma-
havihara, Shrigha Vihar and Dharmakirti Vihar in Kathmandu, the Suman-
gala Vihar and Manimandap Vihar in Patan or Samnkrit Vihar in Bhaktpur,
are all located in the compounds of old bahas or vihars.
19. For example, when Bhikshu Amritanand Mahathera, at present the
most important leader of Theravada movement and known for his scholar-
ship, foresight and demaneour, started his month long recitation of Vessan-
tara j ataka for the first time in Nepal, he located himself at a spot near the
Swayambhunath shrine, where Buddhist devotees used to come for worship
in large numbers during July-August. See Bhikkhu Dhammaloka Mahastha-
vira, op.cit., pp. 193 and 194.
20. See Nepali, op.cit., pp. 398-400.
21. The oldest devotional musical society formed under the patronage
of the bhikkhus is the Swayambhoo juanamala Khal, which for the last four
decades regularly has held its mass singing sessions in the compound of the
Swayambhu Shrine.
22. Instances of such arrangements can be seen in the case of vihars like
the Gana Mahavihar in Kathmandu, the Sumangal Vihar in Patan or the
Samkrit Vihar in Bhaktpur.
23. Dor Bahadur Fishta, The People of Nepal, Ratna Pustak Bhandar,
Kathmandu, 1972, p.17.
24. Dor Bahadur Bishta, Sabe jat Ko Phulwari, Sajha Prakashan, Kath-
mandu, 2nd Edition, 1976, p. 10.
25. Andras Hoffer, The Caste Hierarchy and the State in Nepal, Universi-
tatsverlag Wagner, Innsbruck, 1979, p. 208.
THERAV ADA BUDDHISM
93
26. Ibid.
27. Nepal Parichaya, Tribhuwan University Publication, Kirtipur, 1976,
pp. 230-232.
28. In this context, it is worth recording that one of the pioneers among
Buddhist Newars working for the cause of Buddhism was Dharmaditya Dhar-
rnacharya. Although he was not a Buddhist monk, he fully devoted his ener-
gies to the task of rejuvenating Buddhism in Nepal. He established a few
Buddhist organisations, the first as early as 1925.
29. As distinct from Nepali, Nepal Bhasha is the language of Newars.
Nepali is the national language of Nepal.
30. See Bhikshu Sudarshana, Buddha, Buddha Dharma Sambandhi Granth
Soochi, Gana Mshavihar, Kathmandu, 1975. A supplementary list was pre-
pared by the same author in 1981, but it has not been published.
31. Among such pioneers, the name of Dharmaditya Dharmacharya has
already been mentioned. In 1925, he launched the first journal in Nepal
Bhasha, known as Buddha Dharma Wa Nepal Bhasha. The contribution made
by the late Chittadhar "Hridaya" for the resurrection and development of
Nepal Bhasha is by far the most significant. He was not only the foremost poet
and literary figure of Newari, but also dedicated his entire life and property
to the cause of the language. It is notable that he was arrested along with
others in 1931 for actively helping the Buddhist monks.
The Yuktisastikakarika of N agarjuna
by Fernando Tala and Carmen Draganetti
I. authorship
In general terms, tradition considers that the was
written by Nagarjuna (IInd century A.D.), the founder of the
.\\1adhyamaka philosophical school of Mahayana Buddhism.
Candraklrti, Prasannapada, p. 3,1.15, ed. P.L. Vaidya (=p.
9, 1.4, ed. L. de la Vallee Poussin), expressly attributes to Na-
garjuna a pada that corresponds to a part of karika 19 of the
and in the same commentary, p. 3, 1.22, ed. P.L.
Vaidya (= p. 10, 1.4, ed. L. de la Vallee Poussin) he quotes
again the same pada, attributing it to the acarya, by which word
we must understand Nagarjuna.
In the 28, karika 19 of the is
quoted and expressly attributed to Nagarjuna.
The Madhyamakasastrastuti of Candraklrti, whose original
Sanskrit text was discovered by G. Tucci and published by J. W.
deJong in Oriens Extremus IX, pp. 47-56, includes the
tika among the eight works which it attributes to Nagarjuna ..
The Tibetan translation of the Madhyamakasastrastute was
known before Tucci's discovery. It is included at the end of the
Tibetan translation of Candraklrti's Prasannapada, but it is not
found in any of the Sanskrit manuscripts of this commentary.
Bu-ston, History of Buddhism 1. Part, pp. 50-51, considers
the Yukti:;rL5tika as one of the six principal treatises of Nagarjuna.
The colophons of the Tibetan translation of the Yukti$a$-
tika, in the Sde-dge and Peking editions, and the colophon of the
Chinese translation of this work, attribute it to Nagarjuna.
Modern authors generally attribute the Yukti$a$tika to Na-
garjuna: cf. A. Bareau, Die Religionen Indiens III, p. 136; T.R.V.
Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, pp. 88-89 (who fol-
lows Bu-ston's opinion); Phil. Schaffer, Yukti$a$tika, pp. 2-3;
94
YUKTI$A$TIKAKARIKA
95
p.L. Vaidya, Etudes sur Aryadeva, pp. 48-49; K.V. Ramanan,
Niigiirjuna's Philosophy, p. 35; A. K. Warder, Indian Buddhism, p.
375; M. Winternitz, A History of Indian Literature, Vol. II, p. 346;
D. Seyfort Ruegg, The Literature of the Madhyamaka School, pp.
19-20.
II. Editions and translations of the kiirikiis and commen-
tary
The has, as its name indicates, 60 kiirikiis. It was
commented upon by Nagarjuna himself and by Candrakirti,
Nagarjuna's great commentator.
The kiirikiis' text. The Sanskrit text has not been preserved.
Some Sanskrit kiirikiis from it have come to us,quoted in San-
skrit works like Candraklrti's Prasannapadii, Prajfiakaramati's
Panjikii, and the Subhii5itasarrtgraha.
We know this work thanks to its Tibetan and Chinese
translations.
Tibetan translation of the kiirikiis. Tohoku 3825 = Catalogue
5225. It was done by MutitasrI and Pa-tshab Ni-ma grags.
Chinese translation of the kiirikiis. Taisho 1575. Nanjio 1307. It
was done by Danapala (?).
The commentaries' text. Nagarjuna's commentary on the Yuk-
has been preserved neither in its Sanskirt origi-
nal text nor in any translation.
1
Candraklrti's commentary has
come to us only in its Tibetan translation: Tohoku 3864 = Cata-
logue 5265. This translation was made by Jinamitra, DanasIla;
Silendrabodhi and Ye-ses sde.
N ow we indicate some modern editions and translations:
German translation of the Chinese translation of the kiirikiis. Phil.
Schaffer, Die 60 Siitze des Negativismus,nach der
chinesischen Version ubersetzt, Heidelberg, 1923 (Materialien
zur Kunde des Buddhismus, 3.Heft), pp. 7-21. At the end of
his translation, Schaffer adds the text of the Tibetan (ed. Pe-
king) and of the Chinese (ed. Tokyo) translations.
Japanese translations of the Tibetan translation of the kiirikiis and
ofCandrakfrti's commentary. Susumu Yamaguchi, in Otani Gakuho
(Otani Bulletin), Vol. 7, No.3, Kyoto, 1925, pp. 66-119 and in
Chugan Bukkyo Ronko (Studies on Madhyamaka Buddhism) To-
kyo-Kyoto, 1944, reprin. Tokyo, 1965, pp. 29-109. In both
publications, Yamaguchi includes the text of the Tibetan trans_
lation of the karikas, the text of the Chinese translation, and the
Japanese translation of the Tibetan version.
Uriutsu Ryushin, in Daijo Butten (Literature of Mahayana
Buddhism) 14, Tokyo, 1974, pp. 5-SS. He presents the Japa-
nese translation of the karikas and commentary from the Tibet-
an verSIon.
The same U. Ryushin, in an article, "Nagarjuna Kenkyu
(1)" ("Studies on Nagarjuna,I"), published in MeijoDaigakuJim-
bun Kiyo (Bulletin of Humanities of Meijo College), No. 14,
1973, pp. 23-40, translates into Japanese the invocation and
karikas 1-3 and gives also a reconstruction into Sanskrit of these
four stanzas. His translation and reconstruction is from the
Tibetan version.
Finally, U. Ryushin, in his article "Nagarjuna Kenkyu (2),"
published in Kyoto Joshi Daigaku Jimbun Ronso (Collection of
Treatises on Humanities of the Women's University of Kyoto),
No. 23,1974, pp. 134-160, presentsaJapanese translation and
a Sanskrit reconstruction of karikas 4-12 from the Tibetan text.
III. Karikas quoted in other Sanskrit texts.
Karikas 19, 33, 34 and 39 of the have been
preserved in other Buddhist Sanskrit texts.
Karika 19: Candraklrti, Prasannapada ad I, 1, p. 3,1.16, ed.
P.L. Vaidya = p. 9, 1.5, ed. L. de la Vallee Poussin:
tat tat prapya yad utpanna'Y{l notpanna'Y{l /
Subha,yitasaJ!1graha 2S, p. 395, 11.19-20, ed. C. Bendall:
tat tat prapya yad utpannam notpannaJ!1 /
svabhavena yad utpannaJ!1 anutpannanama tat kathaJ!1 / /
Karika 33: Prajiiakaramati, PaiiJika ad IX, 7, p. lSI, 11.25-
26, ed. P. L. Vaidya = p. 37?, ed. L. de la Vallee Poussin:
mamety aham iti proktarfr yatha karyavasaj /
tatha karyavasat / /
YUKTISASTIKAKARIKA
97
Karika 34
2
: ]ftanasrlmitra, Sakarasa1[1.grahasiitra 3.27, p.
545, ed. A.nantalal Thakkur:
mahabhiitadi vijfiane prokta1[1. samavarudhyate I
tajjfiane vigama1[1. yati nanu mithya vikalpitam II
Karika 39
3
: Prajftakaramati, Pafijika ad IX, 85, p. 234,
11.20-21, ed. P. L. Vaidya = p. 500, ed. L. de la Vallee Pous-
sin:
hetuta/:L sa1[1.bhavo yasya sthitir na pratyayair vina I
vigama/:L pratyayabhavat so 'stity avagata/:L katham II
IV. Sanskrit reconstruction of some karikas
As we have said, Uriutsu Ryushin reconstructed the San-
skrit text of the Invocation and of the first twelve stanzas. It has
seemed interesting to us to reproduce in this artiCle his Sanskrit
reconstruction, considering the non-existence of the original
Sanskrit text. We reproduce Uriutso Ryushin's reconstruction
exactly as it was published in his two last quoted articles.
Invocation
yena hy utpadabhangabhyam ida1[1.kramer;,a1Jarjita/:L I
ta1[1. pratftyasamutpada/:L prokto vande mahamuni'Y{l II
1
buddhi atikranta bhavabhavad na t4thate I
gambhfra1[1. pratyayartha1[1. tai/:L nirarambha1[1. vibhavyate II
2
nastir nivarita I
yato yuktyastita1[1. capi varayeya1[1. me II
3
yadi satya1[1. bhaved bhava/:L yatha biilakalpita/:L I
tadabhavena kasmad hetor hi II
4
astitve na bhavad asmad nastitve na vimucyate I
bhavabhavaparijnanad mahatma tu vimucyate II
5
manyanastyeva nirvar:te loke I
na manyana tu nirvar:te loke 'pi II .
6
idarrt bhavas ca nirvar:tam ubhayarrt naiva vidyate I
bhava eva parijnato nirvar:tam iti kathyate II
7
na:;tasyotpannabhavasya nirodharrt kalpitarrt yatha I
tatha mayakrtarrt punar nirodham i:;yate II
8
vinasena nirodharrt na tu I
kasya pratyak:;am etat syad vinasajno 'tra kirrt bhavet II
9
yadi skandho na nasyeta k:;fr:takleso 'py I
yada hy atra syat tada mukto bhavi:;yati II
10
avidyapratyayotpanne samyagjnanad vilokite I
utpado va nirodho va na kascid upalabhyate II
11
dr:;tadharme hi nirvar:tarrt krtarrts ca krtyam eva tat I
dharmajnanat pascad yady atrasti vise:;ar:tarrt II
12
atyantasuk:;mabhave 'Pi yenotpado vikalpyate I
tena pratyayabhutartham avidvata na drsyate II
Let us indicate also that karikii 6 of the Pratftyasamutpadahr-
dayakarikii (in Tibetan Rten-cin-Mrel-bar-l;byun-bal;i snin-pol;i
tshig-lehur-byas-pa, in Chinese Yin yuan sin louen song) is identical
with karika 12 of the the only difference being
that in the second pada the Pratftyasamutpadahrdayakarika speaks
YUKTI$A$TIKAKARIKA
99
of cessation (chad-pa in Tibetan) while the re-
fers to birth (skye-ba in Tibetan).
V. V. Gokhale, in his article "Encore: The Prantyasamutpa-
dahrdayakarika of Nagarjuna," p. 67, gives the reconstruction
of karika 6 of the Pratftyasamutpadahrdayakiirika into Sanskrit
(from Tibetan), which reads as follows:
bhiivasya 'py yenocchedo vikalpital;, I
tena 'vipascita 'drJta pratyayotpattir arthatal;, II
V. Importance and contents of the
The is a small treatise of 60 karikas. In its beauti-
ful stanzas of succinct, clear and logical expression, being and
non-being, liberation, sarpsara, nirval}a, etc., are examined in
order to establish that silnyata, voidness, is their essence-a
central theme of Madhyamika thinkers, developed in so many
of their treatises. Because of these literary qualities and the
ample range of topics referred to in this small work, we are not
wrong, we think, to consider it as one of the most important
expositive treatises of Nagarjuna.
VI. The present article
We offer in this article the Tibetan text of the
karika and its English translation, with some simple notes. We
thank Professor Robert A. F. Thurman for havigg read our
article and having given us very valuable suggestions.
We have adopted the text of the Sde-dge edition of the Ti-
betan Buddhist Canon: Bstan-I;,gyur, Dbu-ma, Tsa. 20 b
l
-22 b
6
(Tohoku 3825), comparing it with the text as given in the Peking
edition: Bstan-I;,gyur Vol. 95, Mdo-I;,grel (Dbu-ma) XVII, 11-2-2
(22 b
2
-25 a
7
) (Catalogue 5225), and with the text of the
karikas included in Candraklrti's commentary, in its Sde-dge edi-
tion: Bstan-I;,gur, Dbu-ma, Ya. 1 b
L
30 b
6
(Tohoku 3864). In some
places, which we indicate in the notes, we have left aside the
reading of Sde-dge edition to adopt the reading of the Peking
edition of the karikiis and/or the reading of the Sde-dge edition of
the karikas included in the commentary of Candraklrti.
From karika 48, we have followed the verse distribution of
the Peking edition and of Candraklrti's commentary, because in
the Sde-dge there is an extra verse, which appears at the
beginning of kiirikii 48 and renders difficulrthe following distri-
bution of the kiirikiis.4
The Tibetan title of the work is Rigs-pa drug-cu-Pahi tshig_
lehur-byas-pa-shes-bya-ba, which corresponds to the Sanskrit
y
Tibetan text
Rigs-pa-drug-cu-pahi tshig-lehur-byas-pa
Invocation
gan gis5 skye dan b.jig pa dag I
tshul b.di yis ni spans gyur pa I
rten cin b.byun ba gsuns pa yi I
thub dban de la phyag b.tshallo II
1
gan dag gi bl0
6
yod med las I
mam par b.das is mi gnas pa I
de dag gis ni rkyen gyi don I
zab mo dmigs med rnam par rtogs II
2
re zig ftes kun b.byuil bab.i gnas I
med ftid rnam par bzlog zin gyis I
rigs pa
7
gail gis yod ftid yail
S
I
bzlog par b.gyur ba mftan par gyis II
3
ji ltar byis pas mam brtags Min I
dnos po gal te bden l)gyur na I
de dnos med pas rnam thar du I
gan gis mi l)dod rgyu ci zig II - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ ~
YUKTISASTIKAKARIKA
4
yod pas rnam par mi grol te I
med pas srid pa l;tdi las min I
dnos dan dnos med yons ses pas I
bdag nid chen po mam par grol II
5
de nid ma mthonl;tjig rten dan I
my a nan l;tdas par rlom sems te I
de nid gzigs mams l;tjig rten dan I
my a nan l;tdas par rlom sems med II
6
srid pa dan ni my a nan l;tdas I
gnis po l;tdi ni yod ma yin I
srid pa yons su ses pa nid I
my a nan l;tdas ses bya bar brjod II
7
dnos po byun ba zig pa la I
ji ltar l;tgog par brtags pa Min I
de Min dam pa rnams kyis kyan I
sgu ma byas pal;ti
9
l;tgog pa Med If
8
rnam par l;tjig pas l;tgog l;tgyur gyi I
l;tdus byas yons su ses pas min I
de ni su la mnon sum l;tgyur I
zig ses pa der ji ltar l;tgyur II
9
gal te ph un po ma l;tgags na I
non mons zad kyan l;tdas mi l;tgyur I
gan tshe l;tdir ni l;tgags gyur pa I
de yi tshe na grol bar l;tgyur II
10
ma rig rkyen gyis byun ba la I
yan dag ye ses kyis gzigs nas I
skye ba dan ni 1;lgags pa1;lan run I
1;lga1;l yan dmigs par mi 1;lgyur ro II
101
102
JIABS VOL. 6 NO.2
11
de nid mthon chos my a nan las
10
I
I)das sin bya ba by as pal)an yin I
gal te chos ses mjug thogs su I
I)di la bye brag yod na ni II
12
dnos po sin tu phra ba la I)an I
gan gis skye bar rnam brtags pa I
rnam par mi mkhas de yis 1 1 ni I
rkyen las byun bal)i don rna mthon II
13
non mons zad pal)i dge slon gi /
gal te l;tkhor ba rnam ldog na I
ci phyir rdsogs sans rgyas rnams kyis I
de yi rtsom pa rnam mi Mad II
14
rtsom pa yod na nes par yan I
Ita bar l;tgyur ba yons su I)dzin I
rten cin l;tbrel par l;tbyun ba gan I
de la snon das tha rna ci II
15
snon skyes pa ni ji ltar na I
phyi nas slar yan bzlog par I)gyur I
snon dan phyi mal;ti mthal;t bral ba I
l;tgro ba sgyu rna Min du snan II
16
gan tshe sgyu rna l;tbyun ze l;tam I
gan tshe l;tjig par l;tgyur snam du I
sgyu rna ses pa der mi rmons I
sgyu rna mi ses yons su sred II
17
srid pa smig rgyu sgyu l;tdra bar I
blo yis mthon bar gyur na ni 12 I
snon gyi mthal;t l;tam phyi mal)i mthal;t I
Ita bas yons su slad mi l;tgyur II
YUKTI$ASTIKAKARlKA
18
gail dag gis ni l).dus byas la I
skye dan l).jig pa mam brtags pa I
de dag rten l).byun l).khor 10 yis I
I).gro ba rnam par mi ses SOl3 II
19
de dan de brten gan l).byun de I
ran gi dnos por skyes rna yin I
ran gi dnos por gan rna skyes I
de ni skye zes ji Itar bya II
20
rgyu zad nid las zi ba nil
zad ces bya bar mnon pa 15 ste I
ran Min gyis ni gan rna zad I
de la zad ces ji ltar brjod II
21
de Itar ci yan skye ba med I
ci yan l).gag par mi l).gyur ro I
skye ba dan ni l).jig pal).i las I
dgos pal).i don du bstan pal).o II
22
skye ba ses pas l).jig pa ses I
l).jig pa ses pas mi rtag ses I
mi rtag nid la l).jug ses pas I
dam pal).i chos kyan rtogs par
l6
l).gyur II
23
gan dag rten cin l ) . b r ~ L l).byun ba I
skye dan l).jig pa rnam spans par I
ses par gyur pa de dag ni I
Ita gyur
l7
srid pal).i rgya mtsho brgal II
24
so sob.i skye bo dnos bdag can I
yod dan med par phyin ci log I
nes pas non mons db an gyur rnams I
ran gi sems kyis bslus par l).gyur II
103
104
JIABS VOL. 6 NO.2
25
dnos la rnkhas pa rnarns kyis ni I
dnos po rni rtag bslu baQi chos I
gsog dan ston pa bdag med pa I
mam par db en zes bya bar mthon II
26
gnas med dmigs pa yod ma yin I
rtsa ba med cin gnas pa med I
ma rig rgyu las sin tu byun I
thog ma dbus mthal:; mam par spans II
27
chu sin Min du sfiin po med I
dri zal:;i gron khyer l:;dra ba ste I
rmons pal:;i gron khyer mi bzad pal:;i I
l:;gro ba sgyu ma Min du snan II
28
tshans sogs Qjig rten Qdi la ni I
bden par rab tu gan snan ba I
de ni l:;phags la brdsun zes gsuns I
l:;di las gzan Ita ci zig Ius II
29
l:;jig rten rna rig ldons gyur pa I
sred pa rgyun gyi I H rjes Qbran dan I
mkhas pa sred pa dan bral ba I
dge ba rnarns Ita ga la mfiam II
30
de fiid tshol la thog mar ni I
thams cad yod ces brjod par bya I
don marns rtogs sin chags med la I
phyis ni mam par dben pal:;o 19 II
31
rnam par dben don mi ses la I
thos pa tsam la Qjug byed cin I
gan dag bsod nams mi byed pa I
skyes bu tha sal de dag brlag II
YUKTISASTIKAKARJKA
32
las mams l)bras bu bcas iiid dan I
l)gro ba dag kyan yan dag bsad I
de yi ran Min yons ses dan I
skye ba rned pa dag kyan bstan II
33
dgos pal)i dban gis rgyal ba marns I
na dan na yi zes gsuns ltar I
phun po kharns dan skye rnched marns I
de Min dgos patti db an gis gsuns II
34
l)byun ba che la sogs bSad pa I
marn par ses su yan dag l)du I
de ses pas ni hbral hgyur na I
log par rnarn brtags rna yin narn II
35
rnya nan hdas pa bden gcig pur I
rgyal ba marns kyis gan gsuns pa I
de tshe lhag rna log min zes I
rnkhas pa su zig rtog par byed II
36
ji srid yid kyi marn g-yo ba I
de srid bdud kyi spyod yul de I
de Ita yin na hdi la ni I
iies pa rned par cis rni hthad II
37
hjig rten rna rig rkyen can du I
gan phyir sans rgyas marns gsuns pa I
hdi yi phyir na l)jig rten l)di I
marn rtog yin zes cis rni l)thad II
38
rna rig I;1gags par gyur pa na I
gail zig I;1gag par hgyur ba de I
rni ses pa las kun brtags par I
ji Ita bur na gsal rni l)gyur II
105
106
JIABS VOL. 6 NO.2
39
rgyu yod pa las gait byun zin20 I
rkyen med par ni gnas pa med I
rkyen med phyir yan l)jig l)gyur ba I
de ni yod ces ji Itar rtogs II
40
gal te yod par smra ba rnams I
dnos la zen par21 gnas pa ni I
lam de fiid la gnas pa ste I
de la no mtshar cun zad med II
41
sans rgyas lam la brten nas ni I
kun la mi rtag smra ba rnams I
rtsod pa yis ni dnos po la
22
I
chags gnas
23
gan yin de smad do II
42
l)di l)am del)o z ~ s gail du I
rnam par dpyad nas mi dmigs na I
rtsod pa l)di l).am de bden zes I
mkhas pa su zig smra bar l).gyur II
43
gan dag gis24 Iii rna brten par I
bdag gam l)jig rten mnon zen pa I
de dag kye rna rtag mi rtag I
la sogs Ita bas l)phrogs pa yin II
44
gan dag brten nas dnos po mams I
de fiid du ni grub l)dod pa I
de dag la yan rtag
25
stsogs skyon I
de dag ji Itar l)byun mi l)gyur II
45
gail dag brten nas dilos po mams I
chu yi zla ba Ita bur ni I
yail dag rna yin log min par I
l).dod pa de dag Itas mi l).phrogs II
YUKTISASTIKAKARIKA
46
dnos por khas len yod na ni i
}:ldod chags ze sdan }:lbyun ba yin
26
I
Ita ba mi bzad rna runs }:lbyun I
de las byun ba}:li spyod par }:lgyur II
47
de ni Ita ba kun gyi rgyu I
de med non mons mi skye ste I
de phyir de ni yons ses na I
Ita dan non mons yons su }:lbyan II
48
27
gan gis de ses .bgyur ze na
28
I
brten nas }:lbyun ba mthon ba ste
29
I
brten nas skye ba rna skyes ses
30
I
de nid mkhyen pa mchog gis gsuns II
49
log pa}:li ses pas
3J
zil gnon pa I
bden pa min la bden }:ldsin pa}:li
32
I
yons su }:ldsin dan rtsod sags kyi I
rim pa chags las }:lbyun bar }:lgyur II
50
che ba}:li bdag nid can de dag I
mams la phyogs med rtsod pa med I
gail mams la ni phyogs med pa I
de la gzan phyogs ga la yod II
51
gan yan run ba}:li gnas rned nas I
non mons sbrul gdug gyo can gyis I
zin par }:lgyur te gan gi sems I
gnas med de dag zin mi }:lgyur II
52
gnas bcas sems dan ldan rnams la I
non mons dug chen cis mi }:lgyur I
gan tshe tha mal }:ldug pa yan
33
I
non mons sbrul gyis zin par }:lgyur II
107
53
byis pa bden par l)du ses pas I
gzugs brflan la ni chags pa biin I
de ltar l)jig rten rmons pal)i phyir I'
yul gyi gzeb la thogs par l)gyur II
54
bdag flid che mams dnos po dag I
gzugs brflan Ita bur ye ses kyi I
mig gis mthon nas yul zes ni I
bya bal)i l)dam la mi thogs so II
55
byis pa mams ni gzugs la chags I
bar rna dag ni chags bral l;lgyur I
gzugs kyi ran biin ses pa yi I
blo mchog ldan pa mam par grol II
56
sdug sflam pa las chags par l;lgyur /
de las bilog pas l;ldod chags bral I
sgyu mal)i skyes bu ltar dben par I
mthon nas my a nan l;ldal;l bar l;lgyur II
57
log pal)i ses pas mnon gdun bal;li I
flon mons skyon mams gan yin de I
dnos dan dnos med mam rtog pa I
don ses l;lgyur la mi l;lbyun no II
58
gnas yod na ni l)dod chags dan I
l;ldod chags bral bar l;lgyur zig na I
gnas med bdag flid chen po mams I
chags pa med cin chags bral min II
59
gail dag mam par dben snam du I
g-yo bal;li yid kyail mi g-yo ba I
non mons sbrul gyis dkrugs gyur pa I
mi zad srid pal)i rgya mtsho brgal II
YUKTJ$A$TIKAKARIKA
60
dge ba l).di yis skye bo kun I
bsod nams ye ses tshogs bsags te I
bsod nams ye ses las bymi ba.bi I
d,am pa gfiis ni thob par sog II
Translation
The Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning
Invocation
109
Homage to the Lord of munis, who taught Dependent Origina-
tion
34
and by whom, through this method,35 birth and destruc-
tion have been eliminated.
1
Those (men) whose minds, having gone beyond being and non-
being,36 do not cling (to anything),37 (those men) understand
the profound and imperceptible meaning of "condition."38
2
You, who have already completely eliminated non-being,39 the
source of all evils, should listen to the reasoning through which
being40 also will be eliminated.
3
If, as is thought by the ignorant, things are real, then what is
the reason why they do not admit liberation by means of non-
being?41
4
Through being there is no liberation, through non-being there
is no (liberation) from this existence; only through the full
knowledge of existence and non-existence are great beings (ma-
hiltman) liberated.
42
5
Those men who do not see the truth are infatuated with the
world and nirvaI).a;43 those who perceive the truth are not in-
fatuated with the world and nirvaI).a.
6
Sarp.sara and nirvaI).a-both do not (really) exist. It has been
taught that the perfect knowledge of sarp.sara is nirvaI).a.
44
7
In the same way as the superior men consider the cessation of a
thing that has been born (to be) when it is destroyed, in the
same way they consider the cessation of something created by
magic. 45
8
(If) cessation of sarp.skaras occurred through destruction and
not through their perfect knowledge, where would that (cessa-
tion) reveal itself? How could the notion (of) "destruction" oc-
cur there ?46
9
(The opponent asserts:)
If the skandhas do not cease, nirvaI).a is not produced even with
the destruction of the impurities.
47
In the moment in which
they (the skandhas) cease, in that moment liberation is pro-
duced.
48
10
(But we answer:)
When it is seen through correct knowledge that production is
by cause of ignorance, (then) neither birth nor cessation are
perceived at all. 49
11
This is nirvaI).a in this world; one has done what has to be
done.
50
-If, after knowing the Doctrine, (a person believed)
there were still here diversity.51
12,52
Such an extremely ignorant person, who imagines production
even in the most subtle things,53 that person does not perceive
the meaning of Dependent Origination. 54
YUKTISASTIKAKARlKA
III
13
If the sarp.sara of the monk, whose impurities have been de-
stroyed, comes to an end, why did the perfect Buddhas deny its
beginning?55
14
If there is a beginning (for sarp.sara), then definitely. one would
uphold the false view (of ahetuvada).56 But how can there be a
beginning and an end in something that is produced depend-
ing on causes?
15
How could something, which was formerly produced, cease
afterwards?57 The states of existence, devoid of the extremes of
beginning and end, appear as a magical illusion.
16
When a magical illusion arises or when it is destroyed, those
persons who know (what is) the magical illusion, are not de-
ceived with regard to it; those persons who do not know (what
is) the magical illusion, ardently desire it.58
17
When one perceives with his mind that sarp.sara is similar to a
mirage, to a magical illusion, one is not (any more) corrupted
by the extreme views of beginning or end. 59
18
Those persons who imagine that there is birth and destruction
in things that are composed, those persons do not know the
world as (what it really is:) the wheel of Dependent Origina-
tion.
60
19
61
What arises depending on this or that (cause)-that is not pro-
duced as a thing with an own being. Whatever is not produced
as a thing with an own being-how can it be called "produced"?
----------- ------------
112
JIABS VOL. 6 NO.2
20
It is evident that, in relation to somebody who has come to an
end through the cessation of the causes,52 it can be said "he
ceased."63 In relation to somebody who has 'not ceased in se et
per se, how can it be said "he ceased"?
21
Thus, nothing is produced, nothing ceases. (The Masters) have
spoken about the processes of production and destruction
(only) by reason of necessity. 54
22
Knowing production, destruction is known; knowing destruc-
tion, impermanence is known; through the knowledge which
penetrates into impermanence, the Supreme Truth is under-
stood.
23
Those persons who know that Dependent Origination is de-
prived of production and destruction, those persons have
crossed the ocean of existence, created by false views.
24
Common people, who believe that things possess substantiality,
who are mistaken about being and non-being, dominated (as
they are) by evil and impurities, are deceived by their own
minds.
25
Those persons who know reality perceive that things are imper-
manent, that their characteristic is fraud, that they are vain and
void, lacking of an own being.
26
(The world,) which is baseless, without objectivity, which has
not a root, which has no duration, which has come forth from
ignorance and is deprived of beginning, middle and end,
27
which has no core, like the plantain trunk, similar to the city of
the Gandharvas-the world, intolerable domain of error, ap-
pears as a magical illusion.
YUKTISASTIKAKARIKA
113
28
This world, including the Brahma realm, etc., which appears as
true, is declared to the Aryas (by the Buddha) to be false.
Which other thing remains there different from it?
29
Worldly people blinded by ignorance, persisting in the stream
of desire, and wise men, free from desire and virtuous, in what
respect are they indeed similar?
30
For the person who seeks the truth it is necessary to say, at the
beginning (of his search): "all things exist"; afterwards, when
he knows the (nature of) things and is liberated from desire,
(for him all things) are devoid of an own being.
31
Those persons who have not grasped the meaning of voidness,
who have come up to a mere hearing (of the Doctrine),65 and
do not accomplish meritorious deeds, those wicked persons are
defeated.
32
The concomitancy of actions and their "fruits" and also the
diverse states of existence have been correctly explained; the
knowledge of their true nature and also the non-existence of
their birth have been taught.
33
66
In the same way as the Victorious, by force of necessity, have
said "I" (and) "mine," in the same way also, by force of necessi-
ty, they have spoken of skandhas, dhiitus, ayatanas.
34
67
The so called Great Elements, etc., consist only of conscious-
ness; since, by knowing this, they are dissolved, are they (all)
not false mental creations?
35
If the Victorious Ones have said that is the only true
thing,68 then what wise men could think that the rest is not
false?
36
As long as there is agitation of the mind, (mind) is the domain
of Mara; if that is so, why not admit the flawlessness (of the
mind) in this (our teaching of emptiness)?69,
37
Since Buddhas have said that the world has ignorance as its
cause, then why not admit that this world is (only) a mental
creation?
38
How could a thing, which ceases when ignorance ceases, not
reveal itself as a mental creation (coming forth) from igno-
rance?
39
70
How it is possible to understand that a thing (really) exists,
which having come forth owing to a cause, does not endure
when its condition does not exist, and which disappears with
the non-existence of the condition?
40
If realists, (because of) dwelling in that very path (of realism),
persist in their attachment to objects, there is nothing surpris-
ing in it.71
41
Those persons, who, adhering to the Buddha's path, affirm
that all is impermanent and who nevertheless through their
discussions persist in their attachment to objects, those persons
really are blameworthy!7
2
.
42
What wise man will say, discussing, that "this" or "that" is true,
since, after investigation, he does not perceive anywhere either
a "this" or a "that"?
43
Those persons who intensely are attached to (the idea of) an
unconditioned self or world, those persons alas! are captivated
by the false theories of permanence and impermanence.
YUKTISASTIKAKARIKA
115
44
For those persons, who affirm that dependent things are estab-
lished really to exist, for those persons how can the evils of (the
belief in) permanence, etc., not be produced?
45
Those persons who affirm that dependent things, like the re-
flection of the moon in water, are neither real nor unreal, are
not captivated by wrong theories.
46
When there is acceptance of things (as really existing), attach-
ment and hatred are produced, intolerable and pernicious the-
ories are produced, and (evil) actions emerging from them take
place.
73
47
That (acceptance) is the cause of all (false) theories; when it is
absent, impurities are not produced; therefore, knowing them
(i.e., things) perfectly (as they really are), one purifies both
theories and impurities.
48
74
If it is asked how this is known, (we answer:) by seeing Depen-
dent Origination, the Supreme Knower of reality said: "What is
produced dependently, is not produced (in reality)."75
49
(In the man) overcome by erroneous knowledge, the (follow-
ing) series is produced from passion: perception of reality in
what is not real, possessiveness (about that false reality), contro-
versies, etc.
50
The great beings (mahatman) hold no thesis; they do not debate.
For those persons who hold no thesis, how can there be a con-
trary thesis?
51
When one assumes any support-point, one is captured by the
cunning poisonous serpent of the impurities. Those persons
whose mind lacks any support-point, are not captured.
52
How will not the great poison of impurities originate in those
persons who have a mind with support-point, since, living like
common people, they are (easily) captured by the serpent of
impurities?
53
In the same way as the ignorant man, believing that a reflected
image is (something) real, becomes passionately fond of it, in
the same way people, because of error, get imprisoned in the
net of the objects.
54
The great beings (mahatman), seeing with the eye of knowledge
that things are as a reflected image, are not captured in the
mud that are the objects.
55
Ignorant persons are attached to forms;76 mediocre persons
77
become detached; those who possess a lofty mind, who know
the true nature of forms, become liberated.
56
Through the idea that (something is) agreeable, (the ignorant)
become attached (to it); separating themselves from that (idea),
(the mediocre) are free from attachment; when (the lofty-
minded) see (that everything), as the man created by magic,
lacks an own being, they attain nirval)a.
57
Those faults, the impurities, which belong to persons afflicted
by erroneous knowledge, do not arise when being and non-
being are examined and the (true) meaning (of things) is
known.
58
If a support-point existed,78 passion would exist and so would
freedom from passion; but for the great beings (mahatman) who
have no support-point there is neither passion nor freedom
from passion.
79
YUKTI$A$TIKAKARlKA
59
117
Those persons whose minds, although unstable (by nature),
become stable as they consider that (everything) lacks an own
. being, those persons will cross the ocean of the intolerable exis-
tence, agitated by the serpent of the impurities.
60
Through the virtue (of this treatise), may all beings, having
accumulated the stores of merit and knowledge, obtain the two
excellences, which come forth from merit and knowledge.
Notes
1. P. L. Vaidya, Etudes sur Aryadeva, p. 49, affirms that Nagarjuna's com-
mentary has been preserved only in a Tibetan translation and gives as a
reference the Tibetan Canon Mdo XVII, 7, Cordier III, p. 292. Cf Lalou,
Repertoire, p. 122, where the title of this work is found: Rigs pa drugcu (ran
It is a mistake by Vaidya, since Nagarjuna's commentary to his own
treatise has not been preserved either in Sakskrit or in Tibetan. The work
mentioned by Vaidya has not been found, and its title has been reconstructed
with the help of the Index, where it is attributed to Nagarjuna, without any
indication of its translator, according to Catalogue of Kanjur and Tanjur, p. 350.
2. Cf D. S. Ruegg, The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in
India, p. 20 note 44. Ruegg changes yiiti into yadi.
3. The Sanskrit text of this kiirikii quoted by Candraklrti and Prajiiakara-
mati corresponds exactly to the Tibetan translation of kiirikii 4 of Lokiitftastava,
not to the Tibetan translation of kiirikii 39 of the Yuktis,iifi(ikii, although it
expresses a similar idea. Nevertheless, Vaidya and L. de la Vallee Poussin, in
their editions of the Paiijikii, consider that it is a quotation of the Yuktifiiifi(ikii.
4. See note 74.
5. gail gis: Peking. Sde-dge: gail gi.
6. gail dag gi blo: Peking. Sde-dge: gail gis blo gros.
7. rigs pa: Peking and Vrrtti. Sde-dge: rigs pal).i.
8. yan: Vrtti. Sde-dge: dan.
9. byas pal).i: Peking. Sde-dge: by as ltal).i.
10. my a nan las: Peking. Sde-dge: my a nan l).das.
11. de yis: Peking and Vrtti. Sde-dge: de yi.
12. gyur na ni: Vrtti. Sde-dge: gyur pa ni.
13. l).gro ba mam par mi ses so: Peking. Sde-dge: l).khorlol).i l).gro ba mam
mi rtog.
14. dlfOS por: Peking. Sde-dge: dlfOS po.
15. mlfon pa: Vrtti. Sde-dge: rtog pa.
16. rtogs par: Peking and Vrtti. Sde-dge: rtog par.
17. Ita gyur: Vrtti. Sde-dge: ltar gyur.
IS. rgyun gyi: Peking and Vrtti. Sde-dge: rgyun gyis.
19. dben pal:J.o: Peking. Sde-dge: dban pal:J.o.
20. rgyu yod pa las gan byun zin: Vrtti. Sde-dge: gan zig rgyu dan bcas
l:J.byun zin.
21. dnos la zen par: Vrtti. Sde-dge: dnos mchog zen nas.
22. rtsod pa yis ni dnos po la: Vrtti. Sde-dge: rtsod pas dnos rnams mchog
bzun bas.
23. chags gnas: Vrtti. Sde-dge: gnas pa.
24. gan dag gis: Vrtti. Sde-dge: de dag gis.
25. rtag: Vrtti. Sde-dge: rtags.
26. yin: Peking. Sde-dge: yi.
27. We suppress the line diws por khas len yod na ni, which appears in the
Sde-dge edition of the kiirikiis and does not appear either in the Peking edition
of the kiirikiis or in the Sde-dge edition of the Vrtti of Candraklrti, and which is
identical to the first line of kiirikii 46.
2S. ze na: Vrtti. Sde-dge: siiam na.
29. ste: Vrtti. Sde-dge: de.
30. ses: Vrtti. Sde-dge: pas.
31. ses pas: Vrtti. Sde-dge: ses pa.
32. l:J.dsin pal:J.i: Peking and Vrtti. Sde-dge: rdsun pal:J.i.
33. This line is not found in the Sde-dge edition. We take it from the Sde-
dge edition of Candraklrti's commentary.
34. In the Madhyamaka school, the word pratrtyasamutpiida (Tibetan:
rten cin l:J.byun ba) principally designates universal relativity and, as a conse-
quence, the non-substantiality of every thing. Cf. C. Dragonetti, Dhammapada,
pp. 76-79, Udiina, pp. 19-20 and 37-44; F. Tola and C. Dragonetti, "Nagar-
juna's conception of 'voidness' (Sunyatii)," and "Aniiditva or beginninglessness
in Indian philosophy," pp. S-9.
35. The method developed in this treatise, which is the analytical-aboli-
tive method of the Madhyamaka school. Cf. F. Tola and C. Dragonetti, "Na-
garjuna's conception of 'voidness' (sunyatii)."
36. That is to say: established in the Middle Way, which denies equally
existence and non-existence and affirms only "voidness," which is neither
something nor nothing.
37. Neither emotionally nor intellectually.
3S. We could translate the last two piidas as follows: "(those men) under-
stand, through profound non-perception, the meaning of 'condition.' " The profound
non-perception is non-perception of empirical reality. Through the abolitive
method of the Madhyamaka school, empirical reality disappears and, conse-
quently, cannot be an object of sensorial or intellectual perception.
39. To affirm not-being, that is to say: to deny reincarnation and the
retribution of acts and, consequently, the moral order founded in them,
induces man to adopt an amoralist position, (as that of materialists), which
causes also the performance of actions that chain one to reincarnation. See C.
Dragonetti, "Los seis maestros del error," in Yoga y Mistica de la India.
40. To affirm being means to believe in an eternal, inalterable soul, which
constitutes a heresy according to Buddhism, and which is the origin of actions
YUKTI$A$ TIKAKARIKA
119
which chain us to reincarnation. Cf. F. Tola and C. Dragonetti, "La doctrina
de los dharmas en el Budismo."
41, If sarpsara had real existence, the only way to become free from it
would be to annihilate it. But since sarpsara has only illusory existence, pro-
duced by an erroneous act of our mind, the only way to end it is correct
knowledge of true reality, which eliminates erroneous conceptions.
42. Only knowledge of the true nature of things allows man to adopt a
behaviour that does not provoke actions which enchain one to -sarpsara and
that permits liberation.
43. The world and nirval!a are unreal: the wise man, who has reached to
the knowledge that all is void, unreal, has no more erroneous ideas regarding
the nature of the world and of nirval!a.
44. Knowledge of universal unreality constitutes true liberation, nirva-
I!a. Nirval!a is the annihilation of empirical reality, the end of the reincarna-
tion series. About nirvana, see F. Tola and C. Dragonetti, "Sarpsara, anaditva
y nirval!a."
45. The destruction of the things that came forth in some moment
(things unreal moreover) is not different from the destruction of something
created by magic, and, consequently, it is inexistent. In one case as in the
other, birth and destruction are illusory.
46. The conglomerates are illusory, inexistent, because the only things
(relatively) real are the parts (cf. F. Tola and C. Dragonetti, Alambanapariks,il,
p. 103, note 20). The conglomerate ceases when, through a correct act of
knowledge, one can perceive its true nature as a mere mental creation, a mere
illusion. We cannot affirm that the conglomerate ceases with its destruction,
because there cannot be destruction of something illusory, because it is impos-
sible that something inexistent be destroyed; consequently the notion of "de-
struction" is out of place, because there is nothing corresponding to it.
47. The kleias, impurities, depravities, afflictions, are simple adherences
to that psycho-physic unity, constituted by the skandhas, that is man; they are
adventitious and secondary; their destruction does not ~ 'oduce the skandhas'
destruction.
48. The opini0n expressed in this kiirikii is that of a person who believes
in the real existence of the skandhas. The true doctrine is expounded in
karikii 10.
49. When it is said that the skandhas, the impurities, or sarpsara (kiirika
13) are produced, cease or are destroyed, we must understand that there is
not a true production, cessation or destruction, that there is only the appear-
ance or disappearance of the illusory creations that constitute the skandhas,
the impurities, and sarpsara. The knowledge of their true nature, i.e., that
they are only illusions, produced by the abolitive analysis that is a characteris-
tic feature of the Madhyamaka school, eliminates the illusions, the illusory
mental creation of "birth" and "destruction."
50. After realizing that there is neither production nor destruction, one
obtains nirval!a, and nothing else remains for him to be done in this world.
51. From the point of view of "relative truth" (i.e., before one knows the
Doctrine) it is possible to speak about "obtaining nirval!a" in this world, etc.,
but it is not so from the point of view of the "absolute truth" (i.e., after one
120
JIABS VOL. 6 NO.2
knows the Doctrine and realizes its profound meaning: that there is neither
birth nor destruction). Then, one cannot speak any more about "entering
nirvaI).a," about "having done what has to be done," since with the true wis-
dom, diversity disappears and there is no difference between saJTlsara and
nirvaI).a (doctrine of samata, see karika 6): both are equally "void," lacking an
own-being, unreal. To say that one "goes out" from saJTlsara to "enter into"
nirvaI).a is an approximate, methaphorical, conventional way of expression,
imposed by the empirical reality to which we and our language belong.
52. Cf. Pratnyasamutpadahrdayakarika, attributed to Nagar:juna, karika 6,
whose reconstruction into Sanskrit by Gokhale has been given in the Intro-
duction of the present article. The fact that this karika 12 appears in the
Pratftyasamutpadahrdayakarika 6, complete and independent, leads us to be-
lieve that this karika 12 has in itself its own complete meaning and that there is
no need to unite to it the two last padas of karika II, as is usually done.
53. We think that the expression "the most subtle things" designates the
atoms.
54. The principle of relativity and conditionality, expressed by the term
"Dependent Origination," has a universal application, and does not admit an
exception.
55. SaJTlsara does not really exist; it is a mere mental creation, produced
by ignorance. Therefore it cannot have either a real beginning or a real end.
When the Buddhas said that saJTlsara has no beginning, implicitly they were
denying that it has an end, since how can a thing cease that did not begin?
SaJTlsara; as something illusory, ceases only through knowledge of its true
nature.
56. The meaning is that, if a beginning is accepted for saJTlsara, then
nothing can be admitted before that beginning and, consequently, such a
beginning has to be causeless. This is a wrong view, the ahetuvada, opposed to
the Buddhist conception of causality.
57. If something did come forth with an own being, it could not lose it
and, therefore, it could not end. See Candraklrti, Prasannapada ad XXI, 17;
Nagarjuna, Madhyamakasastra XXIII, 24 and commentary of Candraklrti,
58. Persons who do not know what magic is desire the woman magically
created, enjoy seeing her, and suffer when the magical creation comes to an
end. In the same way, those who do not know the true nature of empirical
reality can love the beings and things that belong to it and can suffer with
their destruction. It does not happen thus with persons who know that every-
thing is unreal, illusory.
59. One does not fall any more into either the affirmation of being
(eternalism) or the affirmation of not-being (destructionism). See karika 2.
60. They do not perceive that the world is only a process, an eternal
chain of causes and effects.
61. See III. Karikas quoted in other Sanskrit texts. The last two padas of the
Sanskrit quotation of the express an idea different from
that of the Tibetan version.
62. The causes, whose cessation produces nirvaI).a, liberation, are igno-
rance of the true nature of oneself and of the world, the affection for beings
and things, and actions inspired by that ignorance.
YUKTI$A$TIKAKARIKA 121
63. He obtained nirvar;ta, was liberated.
64. To be able to communicate with other beings.
65. The idea is that they have not gone beyond the "letter" of the Doc-
trine, they have only "heard" the words, but they did not grasp its meaning or
act according to its precepts.
66. See III. Kiirikas quoted in other Sanskrit texts.
67. See III. Kiirikiis quoted in other Sanskrit texts. The second line could be
translated: "they are entirely contained in consciousness." Ruegg, The Litera-
ture of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India, p. 20 note 44, adopts the
meaning of "to contain" for !;,du.
68. Everything is unreal and, consequently, deceptive and illusory. Nir-
var;ta is the supreme reality (voidness) and, as such, the only thing that in our
language can be called trtie. Cf. Candraklrti, Prasannapadii ad XIII, 1.
69. If, according to the Madhyamaka central teaching of emptiness,
mind is not really produced, it cannot be the domain of Mara, and cannot be
afflicted by faults.
70. See III. Kiirikiis quoted in other Sanskrit texts.
71. One must not be surprised when one sees that realists feel affection
for themselves and for the other beings and things, because for them every-
thing has real existence. They act logically.
72. Because there is a contradiction between what they sustain (the unre-
ality of all) and their behaviour and their discussions, which keep them at-
tached to things as if they did r e ~ l l y exist.
73. When one attributes reality to beings and things, then feelings of
attachment and aversion arise, the theories of eternalism and destructionism
are developed and one acts according to those feelings and theories.
74. As we have said in note 27, we suppress the first line of this karika,
which appears in the Sde-dge edition. We add as a fourth line of this kiirikii the
fourth line that appears in Peking edition (de iiid mkhyen pa mchog gis gsuils).
75. One knows that things do not really exist by seeing that they are
produced in dependence, as the Buddhas have taught. When there is the
acceptance of things as really existing, all evils, indicated in previous kiirikas,
arise.
76. "Form" (Tibetan gzugs, Sanskrit rupa) indicates visible form, the ob-
ject of sight, but the other sense objects in general are also understood.
77. Those that have gone half the way of spiritual progress.
78. In the present case, the "support point" is the person or thing that is
the object of our passion.
79. They cannot be liberated from something that does not exist.
Bibliographical Abbreviations
A. Bareau, W. Schubring, Chr. von Fiirer-Haimendorf, Die Religionen Indiens
III, BuddkismusJinismus-Primitivvolker. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag,
1964.
Bu-ston, History of Buddhism (Chos-hbyun) I Part, The Jewelry of Scripture, trans-
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JIABS VOL. 6 NO.2
lated from Tibetan by E. Obermiller. Heidelberg: O. Harrassowitz, 1931
(Materialien zur Kunde des Buddhismus, 18. Heft).
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stuti de Candraklrti," in Oriens Extremus, Jahrgang 9, Februar 1962, Heft 1,
pp.47-56.
Candraklrti, Prasannapada, in Madhyamakasastra of Nagarjuna, with the Com-
mentary: Prasannapada by Candrakrrti, edited by P. L. Vaidya. Darbhanga:
The Mithila Institute, 1960 (Buddhist Sanskrit Texts-No. 10) and in Mad-
hyamakaV1:ttil}, Miilamadhyamakakiirikiis (Madhyamikasiitras) de Nagarjuna, avec
la Prasannapada, Commentaire de Candrakfrti, publiee par L. de la Vallee
Poussin. Osnabruck; Biblio Verlag, 1970 (Neudruck der Ausgabe 1903-
1913).
Catalogue: The Tibetan Tripitaka. Peking Edition, edited by D. T. Suzuki, Cata-
logue & Index. Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation, 1962.
Catalogue of Indian (Buddhist) Texts in Tibetan translation, Kanjur & Tanjur (al-
phabetically rearranged) Vol. I Texts (Indian titles) in Tanjur, A. Chattopad-
hyaya in collaboration with M. Gangopadhyaya, D. Chattopadhyaya. Cal-
cutta: Indo-Tibetan Studies, 1972.
C. Dragonetti, Dhammapada, El camino del dharma. Buenos Aires: Sudameri-
cana, 1967.
C. Dragonetti, Udana, La palabra de Buda. Barcelona: Barral Editores, 1972.
Ed. Sde-dge (of the Tibetan Buddhist Canon, Tanjur): Sde dge Tibetan Tripi(aka
Bstan flgyur-preserved at the Faculty of Letters of To kyo--To kyo , 1977-.
Ed. Peking: D. T. Suzuki and S. Yamaguchi, Eiin Pekinban Chibetto Daizokyo
(The Tibetan Tripi(aka), Peking edition reprinted under the Supervision of
the Otani University. Tokyo: Tibetan T r i p i ~ a k a Research Institute, 1955-
1961.
V. V. Gokhale, "Encore: the PratItyasamutpadahrdayakarika of Nagarjuna"
See: Pratityasamutpadahrdayakarikii.
Jiianasrlmitra, Sakiirasa1}'!grahasiitra, in jiianasrzmitranibandhiivalz, edited by
Anantalal Thakkur. Patna: Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, 1959.
M. Lalou, Repertoire du Tanjur d'apres le Catalogue de P. Cordier. Paris: Biblio-
theque Nationale, 1933.
E. Lamotte, Le Traite de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse de Nagarjuna (Mahiiprajiia-
paramitasastra) avec une nouvelle Introduction, Tome III, Chapitres
XXXI-XLII. Louvain: Institut Orientaliste-Universite de Louvain, 1970.
T.R.V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism. A Study of the Madhyamika
System. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1960.
B. Nanjio, A Catalogue of the Chinese Translation of the Buddhist Tripitaka, The
Sacred Canon of the Buddhists in China and japan. San Francisco: Chinese
Materials Center, Inc., 1975 (Reimpression of the Oxford edition, 1983).
Prajiiakaramati, Paiijikii, in Bodhicaryavatara of Shiintideva, with the Commentary
Paiijikii of Prajiiakaramati, edited by P. L. Vaidya. Darbhanga: The Mithila
Institute, 1960 (Buddhist Sanskrit Texts No. 12) and in Bibliotheca Indica
150, Calcutta, 1901-1914, edited by L. de la Vallee Poussin.
Pratztyasamutpadahrdayakiirikii, in "Encore: The PratItyasamutpadahrdayakar-
ika of Nagarjuna" by V. V. Gokhale in collaboration with M. G. Dadphale,
in V. S. Apte Commemoration Volume, edited by Dr. M. G. Dadphale. Poona:
D. E. Society, Fergusson College, 1978.
YUKTISASTIKAKARIKA
123
K. V. Ramanan, Nagarjuna's Philosophy, As presented in the Mahaprajnaparamita-
Sastra. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1975.
D. S. Ruegg, The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India.
Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1981 (A History of Indian Literature, Edited
by Jan Gonda, Volume VII, Fasc. 1).
An anthology of extracts from Buddhist works compiled by an
unknown author, to illustrate the doctrines of Scholastic and of Mystic (Tantrik)
Buddhism, edited by C. Bendall, Le Museon N.S. IV, 1903, pp .. 375-402, V,
1904, pp. 5-46 and 245-274.
Taisho: Taisho Shinshu Daizokyo (The Tripitaka in Chinese). Revised, collated,
added and rearranged, Together with the original Treatises by Chinese,
Korean and Japanese Authors, Edited by J. Takakusu, K. Watanabe, First
edition 1925, Reprinted: Tokyo, The Taisho Shinshu Daizokyo Kanko Kai,
1960.
Tohoku: A Complete Catalogue of the Tibetan Buddhist Canons (Bkal}-I}gyur and
Bstan-I}gyur), edited by H. Ui, M. Suzuki, Y. Kanakura, T. Tada. Sendai,
Japan: Toho'ku Imperial University-Saito Gratitude Foundation, 1934.
F. Tola y C. Dragonetti, "La doctrina de los dharmas en el Budismo," en Boletin
de la Asociaci6n Espanola de Orientalistas, Ano XIII. Madrid, 1977, pp. 105-
132.
F. Tola y C. Dragonetti, "Nagarjuna's conception of 'voidness' (Sunyata)," in
Journal of Indian Philosophy, Volume 9, No.3, September, 1981, Dordrechtl
Boston, pp. 273-282.
F. Tola y C. Dragonetti, "Anaditva or beginninglessness in Indian Philos-
ophy," in Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute Vol. LXI, Parts
I-IV, Poona, 1981, pp. 1-20.
F. Tola y C. Dragonetti, Yoga y Mistica de la India, Buenos Aires: Editorial
Kier, 1978.
F. Tola y C. Dragonetti, "SaIjlsara, anaditva y nirvaf.la," in Boletin de la Asocia-
ci6n Espanola de Orientalistas Ano XV, Madrid, 1979, pp. 95-114.
P. L. Vaidya, Etudes sur Aryadeva et son Catul;Sataka, Chapitres VIII-XVI. Paris:
L.O.P. Geuthner, 1923.
Vrtti = Candraklrti, Rigs pa drug cu pal;i l;grel pa in Sde-dge
edition: Tibetan Tripi(aka, Bstan 1jgyur, (Dbu Ma) 8 (Ya). Tokyo, 1978, No.
3864, (Ya. I b
l
-30b
6
) and in Peking edition: Vol. 98, No. 5265, pp. 169-
183.
A. K. Warder, Indian Buddhism. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1970.
M. Winternitz, A History of Indian Litemture II, Buddhist Literature and Jaina
Literature. Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, 1972.
The "Suicide" Problem
in the Pali Canon
by Martin C. Wiltshire
This paper is addressed to the subject of "suicide" within the
Pali Canon. The topic of suicide has been chosen not only for
its intrinsic factual and historical interest but because it spot-
lights certain key issues in the field of Buddhist ethics and
doctrine. In particular, our investigations into this phenom-
enon may be seen to have a bearing on the doctrinal issue of the
individual's relationship to his own "body" in Buddhism and on
the ethical matter of the relationship between the individual
and society as a whole. We should, perhaps, point out that
suicide first presented itself to us as an intriguing subject of
inquiry when we discovered that it appeared to be regarded
equivocally within the Canon, that it was both censored and
condoned. It was the attempt to explain and resolve this appar-
ent anomaly which resulted in this paper.
One cannot say that the theme of suicide forms a major
item of interest or dogmatic concern in the Canon, but it does
occur sufficiently for us to arrive at some definitive statement
on the subject and its ramifications. Material relating to it we
have divided into three basic categories: i) regulations on the
subject contained within the Vinaya Pi(aka. These purportedly
arise out of an incident of "mass" or multiple suicide within the
ranks of the sangha; ii) a short disquisition occurring within the
Payasi Sutta of the Digha Nikiiya and commenting on the "mor-
al" side of the issue; and iii) anecdotal passages of which a
handful are scattered throughout the remaining Nikayas; these
describe cases of individual suicide and the circumstances of
their occurrence. We shall, therefore, examine the material in
the order we have listed it. But, before we do this, we wish to set
the context with a few words about the concept of "suicide" in
124
SUICIDE PROBLEM
125
terms of the religion and culture of the Indian sub-continent
generally.
Quite evidently suicide takes on an altogether different
complexion in India than the West-let us say, the Semitic and
secular traditions-if only because they possess contrasting con-
ceptions of post-mortem existence. In the West each person is
allotted only one existence or life-chance, and this either ends
in total annihilation (according to "secularism") or, alternative-
ly, determines our fate for the remainder of eternity. In India,
on the other hand, the ending of a person's life is merely the
preview to entry upon another, itself subject to much the same
kind of rules and conditions, and so on ad infinitum. We are not
as concerned with the accuracy of these generalisations, how-
ever, as with the differing impacts these conceptions have on
the religious outlooks of the people concerned. Stated simply,
these are as follows: religious transcendence in the one case is
conceived in terms of revivification or resurrection of the indi-
vidual with a transformed body and in a transformed world
where existence is thought of as a kind of indefinite finitude. In
India, on the other hand, since Vedic times the belief in trans-
migration has meant that we are already part of the indefinite
finitude continuum and, as a result, "transcendence" comes to
represent the very contrary of that notion: the "ultimate" salvif-
ic goal is therefore depicted as the dissolution of individuality
and as an absorption to the principle of absolute stillness or
quiescence. The Indian standpoint, then, could be said to start
precisely where the Western leaves off, and the overlooking of
this basic difference in premises has unfortunately led to many
misunderstandings when making cross-cultural comparisons
and evaluations. In practical terms, the Indian system means
that our "individuality" is not just an obstacle or impediment to
religious consummation but the essential barrier, whilst the con-
ception of "individuality" itself is basically defined in terms of
"bodily existence and its parameters. Therefore Indian reli-
gious paths (marga)-viz., jfiana, bhakti, karma-are devised
specifically for the shedding of individuality, and this involves
the formulation of theoretical and practical manuals and tech-
niques (yoga) directed at the "body" as a corporate entity.
Underlying the denial of individuality is, of course, the
principle and practice of asceticism and ascetic behaviour. The
126
JIABS VOL. 6 NO.2
many VarietIes and modes of asceticism found in India are
themselves a reflection of the divergent interpretations placed
upon this basic religious premise regarding the individual and
his body. To mention just a few: J ainism, for instance, repre-
sents the most extreme interpretation, where individuality is
seen as literally syno'nymous with corporeal existence and,
therefore, the body has to be physically subdued and quelled in
its functions right up to and including the moment of death.
J ainism prescribes "slow suicide" as part of its higher level of
teaching and is operating perfectly consistently with its basic
premises in so doing.! For death is as much a property of the
body as any of those properties we normally identify with it,
such as mobility and the sense operations; therefore, it too must
be admitted and faced. Here, we may mention a distinction
which is relevant to our discussion of Buddhism at a later point:
to kill oneself by a direct, singular act-sudden suicide-inter-
rupts the natural sequence of bodily processes and is therefore
construed as a deed of hirhsii against one's own person; this is
outlawed by Jainism, which seeks to interfere as little as possible
in the natural processes. On the other hand, to allow oneself to
die slowly, by fasting over a period of years in accordance with
carefully laid-out ordinances, is to create the opportunity to
watch and monitor one's own death and thereby master and
transcend it.
Buddhism's ascetic stance represents a subtle variation of
J ainism, mirroring the fact that historically it is probably its
younger cousin. Here also the body is the prime "enemy," as it
were, but the concept "body"2 receives a less literal and materi-
alistic denotation: though having form (niima-rupa), it is essen-
tially a creation and outgrowth of the mind (viiiiiii1J,a).3 Conse-
quently, the clue to its dissolution as a vehicle of individuality
lies with the mind (manas) ridding itself first of the conception
of individuality (re. anattii: no self). More will be said about this
later.
For a third illustration we might choose the Samkhya-Yoga
system, as exemplified within the philosophy of the Bhagavad
Gfta. Although this scripture is syncretist in its aims, and allows
for a range of salvific paths (marga), one of its main pro-
nouncements is that individual interests should be subordinat-
ed to higher "dharmic" duty, and that if such duty requires one
SUICIDE PROBLEM
127
to take others' lives or forfeit one's own life in the attempt, as it
does in Arjuna's case, then one should do so readily. In this
philosophy we see once again that the transcendence of the
individual and his body is the governing principle, yet this time
it is expressed in terms of a subduing and subordination at a
social level primarily, not by regimenting the body conceived as
a physiological or as a psychological mechanism, as. in J ainism
and Buddhism respectively. The Bhagavad Cfta's ethical philos-
ophy, of course, derives its inspiration from the Samkhya meta-
physic of the absolute distinction between body (Sarira) and soul
(atmanZjZva)4: because it is infinite the soul remains unaffected
by the destruction and destructability of the body - it cannot
die
5
. Although there is no reference to suicide in the Bhagavad
Cfta, so far as 'Ye can tell, it is not difficult to work out a view on
that particular issue (as on many issues) consistent with its over-
all philosophy. Firstly, suicide would be regarded as socially
irresponsible unless it were laid down as one's dharmic duty
(there are circumstances in which this might be conceivable,
e.g., as part of a mass protest) and, secondly, it would be consid-
ered vacuous, because taking one's own life is simply a matter
of taking it up again in another existence, owing to the continu-
ity of the soul-a futile gesture.
This brings us to consider what Hindu dharma actually is
on the subject. As in all social communities, suicide seems to
receive official disapproval for the simple reason that any inci-
dence of the phenomenon signifies that there is something seri-
ously wrong with the social fabric. But we must be careful to
observe the distinction, already alluded to, between sudden and
slow suicide. The first is socially disruptive, since its very sud-
denness creates a "surprise" effect on society. The second kind
comprises a specialized form of longer term behaviour which
can, for this very reason, be tolerated by a society. This latter
can in due course be accommodated by society by being dubbed
"religious austerities" and made subject to certain hierarchical
stipulations. This, in fact, is the way orthodox Brahmanism
handles the problem of the potentially socially disruptive force
of religious renunciation. By the time of sastra compilation
(circa 2nd cent. B.C.
6
), Brahmanism had succeeded in rationa-
lizing renunciation within its own religious system and thereby
alleviated any threat it posed to its hold on social power. Re-
nunciation was essentially emasculated, by virtue of being con-
fined to the "twice-born," and reserved for the third and fourth
stages (iiSramas) of life, when a person's economic value in soci-
ety had considerably dwindled. "Religious," or slow suicide, as
an aspect of ascetic austerities, formed a component of renunci-
ation, and was therefore subject to the same restrictions. Ac-
cordingly, Manu permits this course of action for the twice-
born vanaprastha: "Let him walk, fully determined and going
straight on, in a north-easterly direction, subsisting on water
and air, until his body sinks to rest" (VI. 31).7 Still, evidence
suggests that suicide in its conventional social form was severely
stigmatised.
8
It is difficult to avoid seeing a close connection between the
phenomenon of renunciation, which is a principle hallmark of
Indian religion in post-Vedic times, and the relatively wide-
spread practice of religious suicide. In short, the principle of
renunciation begins with disaffiliation with social phenom-
ena-attributable in Indian history, perhaps, to the alienation
experienced by the indigenous people on being subjugated by
the Aryans in the early part of the first millenium B.C.-and,
carried through to its logical conclusion, culminates with disaf-
filiation from all phenomena, including one's individual self
and its corporeal form.
So, having attempted to show how religious suicide can
form part of the logic of Indian religion, we shall now see how
it relates to the specific tradition of Buddhism.
Before we can consider the actual texts, we should first
draw attention to the all-important question of motivation: one
can take one's own life for selfish or self-centered reasons, or
one can voluntarily surrender one's life in an act of self-sacri-
fice for the welfare of others. The former might be described as
tantamount to suicide proper and the latter as martyrdom, ex-
cept that by martyrdom is not always meant a voluntary act, and
it usually revolves as well around confessional disputes. The
distinction between self-centered and altruistic motives be-
comes an increasingly key factor in determining the direction
in which Buddhism was to develop after its initial establish-
ment. We can trace an evolving pattern away from one and
towards the other: the oldest form of the tradition comprised
the paccekabuddhas, forerunners of the Buddha, who epito-
SUICIDE PROBLEM
129
mised the self-interested ascetic
9
; then, in the story of the Bud-
dha's initial hesitation to teach 10, the break with the pacceka-
buddha tradition is symbolised; and towards the end of his life
he postpones his parinibbiina until he has fulfilled all his teach-
ing responsibilities!!; next, we have the emergence of Jataka
legends illustrating altruistic virtues-the most precious and
cherished of which is the tale of Prince Vessantara, who relin-
quishes his own wife and children!2; finally, the supreme act of
self-sacrifice becomes part of Buddhism's ethical values-the
proto-Mahayana legend from thejatakamala and elsewhere,13
in which the bodhisattva gives his own body as provender to
save a tigress and her cubs from starvation. This particular
literary episode, perhaps, marks the point where voluntary,
altruistically-motivated suicide is given an official stamp of ap-
proval within Buddhism, for subsequently a strong tradition of
this practice has existed, right up to and including the self-
immolations of the recent Vietnam war.!4
Thus, we see that "voluntary" suicide does not rank as any
kind of issue for early Buddhism since it has not yet entered
into its field of vision. This leaves us with the matter of purely
self-interested motives.
In the Pali Canon, there is mention of just one crisis relat-
ing to the practice of suicide within the sangha, a sufficient
crisis to warrant a Vinaya regulation on the matter. The par-
ticular incident in question is both mentioned by hearsay
(M.III.269; S.IV.62) and narrated in some detail (S.V. 320ff;
Vin.III.68ff). It is said that a number of bhikkhus developed
the "meditation on the unlovely" (asubha-bhavana) in accor-
dance with the Buddha's instructions and became so disgusted
with their own bodies (kaya) in the process that they all commit-
ted suicide. When the Buddha discovered what had happened
he framed an alternative strategy and recommended to other
bhikkhus the meditatin on breathing (anapanasati samadhi). It is
left somewhat unclear as to whether the latter meditation was
intended by the Buddha altogether to replace the former or
whether it was just to act as an antidote. From its description as
conducing to peace (santam) and a sense of well-being (sukho
viharo) the latter at least seems to have been intended.
15
The
Vinaya then proceeds to condemn, not suicide per se, but any
act or form of conduct which may be construed as inciting or
130
JIABS VOL. 6 NO.2
assisting another to commit suicide (op cit. III.71,73) and pre-
scribes expulsion from the Order (parajika) as punishment for
the offence. The reason why suicide itself is not pronounced
upon concerns, we think, a. technical point:- suicide cannot be
adjudged an offense by the sangha because the person is no
longer living and so cannot come under its jurisdiction. Quite
what ordinance would apply to a case of a failed-suicide mem-
ber of the sangha, we don't know; but perhaps this actual cir-
cumstance was not envisaged, since the Buddha had, after all,
taken precautionary measures to discourage attempts at sui-
cide, by readjusting his teaching, while a bhikkhu had readily
available the means to dispatch his own life should he be suffi-
ciently determined to do so. The Canon mentions poisoning,
hanging (Vin. III. 72), cutting one's throat (the bhikkhu's few
possessions included a razor [khura] or scissor implement [satth-
aka]) and throwing oneself off a high place as the most conven-
tional methods of suicide. 16 The case of the monks who medi-
tated on unloveliness is illuminating because it illustrates that
the roots of Buddhism still lay within the religious austerities
practiced by the Sramal)a tradition and that, from time to time,
there were lapses or retreats into ascetic behaviour, going
counter to the spirit of the middle way.
The Vinaya proscriptions against inciting others to suicide
are principally directed at a practice, which seemed to have
arisen among some bhikkhus, of encouraging buddhist laymen
(upasakas) to commit suicide on the grounds that they would the
sooner enjoy the pleasures of heaven earned by their good
kamma. This particular offense was known as to "praise the
beauty of death" (mara1Javary:r;,q,rrt sarrtva1J1Jeti) or "to speak praise
of death" (mara1Je va1J1Jarrt bha1Jati-V.III.73). Considerable
gravity attached to itbecause it concerned relations between the
sangha and the laity.
We now come to consider the passage in the Payasi Sutta
(D.II.330-32). This is the only passage in the Sutta Pitaka in
which the subject of suicide is considered in the abstract, and
even then obliquely, as part of a wider argument aimed at
refuting a heretical opinion about life after death. The sutta is
about a dialogue between a certain chieftain called Payasi and
the Buddha's disciple Maha-Kassapa. Payasi expresses the view
that there is no after-life and hence that deeds performed in
SUICIDE PROBLEM
131
this life can have no consequences beyond death. Otherwise, he
maintains in defense of his belief, good people would seek pre-
mature death by suicide in order to reap the benefit of their
good deeds immediately. Evidently, he was unaware that this
did sometimes happen, as we have just seen, if we can safely
rely on the Vinaya testimony. Maha-Kassapa attempts to de-
molish Payasi's argument by resort to the following illustration:
an expectant mother is anxious to discover the gender of the
child in her womb because it bears upon her own rights to
inheritance; in her desperation to know, she cuts open the
womb, inadvertently killing herself and the child. The point of
this illustration ostensibly is to show that prudentially-motivat-
ed suicide proves entirely counter-productive and stems from a
basic misunderstanding about the real nature of the facts.
Maha-Kassapa expands his point by comparing spirituality to a
ripening fruit: if it is plucked before its time then it will simply
die and not mature at all. But Maha-Kassapa adds a further
reason why seeking premature death should be considered
wrong. He maintains that the object of living is not just to
promote one's own spiritual welfare but others' as well; one has
an obligation to others to remain in this body. This last asser-
tion of Maha-Kassapa's is quite resounding, for it is one of the
few occasions in the Canon where lip-service is expressly paid
to altruistic action.
The main interest of this paper, however, focuses upon the
anecdotal cases of individuals, which we shall now examine.
They stand out from the other material because they represent
instances of suicide which, if not condoned, are certainly exon-
erated. We aim to find out exactly why this should be so. We
have located three stories which are indubitable suicide cases.
They concern the bhikkhus named Vakkali (S.II1.119; cf. also
Thag.350-4; Dh.A.IV.1l7; Visin.129), Godhika (S.1.120) and
ChaI).I).a (M.II1.263; S.IV.55), each of whom takes his own life
with a knife. There are other stories as well, which share the
same basic theme and structural pattern, but which do not
make it entirely explicit at the end whether the protagonist puts
an end to his own life or dies of natural causes. Owing to their
fundamental resemblance to the indubitable suicide stories, we
shall treat these as relevant to the issue. The problem of deci-
pherment is partly created by the Pali locution katakiila (lit.,
"making an end") which is used both for death by natural
causes and for suicide; unless the context makes an explicit
reference to "using the knife" (sattharrt iiharatilsatthiiharakarrt) or
some equivalent expression,!7 then the precise manner of
death is left unclear. The stories which belong in this category
are those of the bhikkhuAssaji (S.IILI24) - this story succeeds
Vakkali's in the Sarrtyutta text and shares the same format, apart
from not mentioning his death; it was probably thought super-
fluous to mention this, as the primary object of these suttas is to
convey doctrine on the khandhas (see fn.19) - and of the two
upiisakas AnathapiI)Q.ika (M.IIL258; S.V.380) and Dlghavu
(S.V.344).
Apart from representing putative cases of suicide, these
stories share one further overriding theme (with one possible
exception we shall consider in a moment): each of the protago-
nists is suffering from a serious degenerative illness. Conse-
quently, they seek the respite of death as a way of release from
their acute sufferings. In this respect, their motivation and the
circumstances of their demise differs from those of the bhik-
khus whom we have seen commit suicide as a form of emotional
revulsion against living, or those motivated by desire for quick
access to heavenly delights, or the J ains, with their long-term,
studied suicide. In fact, they are cases which might be catego-
rized as examples of self-administered euthanasia. So, when we
try to understand why they are exonerated, it is initially neces-
sary to appreciate that their act is not gratuitously performed,
but constrained by force of circumstance.
Since all these suicides are prima facie examples of persons
seeking alleviation of pain of physical illness, it is important to
understand that canonical Buddhism did acknowledge the exis-
tence and legitimacy of certain standard traditional remedial
treatments for illness. In other words, it is made quite plain, in
the context of the stories, that recognized conventional treat-
ments had been and were being used to alleviate the ailment,
but that they had a limited value in these particular instances. If
this were not made plain, then exonerating these suicides might
have the effect of opening the floodgates for people to take
their own lives on the pretext of slighter complaints. We shall,
therefore, examine for a moment those treatments which the
Canon recognizes as counteracting physical illness and its re-
sulting pain.
SUICIDE PROBLEM 133
Firstly, there is the conventional treatment using medicines
and nursing care.
IS
This has the capacity to arrest, allay and
possibly cure the illness. But it should be stressed that it is not a
complete panacea, because it cannot alter the fundamental law
of impermanence (anicca), which inheres in all things. There is
in the Pali Canon the recognition that man has no control over
events in the external world per se, because they are without
self (anatta), and this includes his own body (kaya) as composed
of the khandhas (e.g. S.III.3f et seq). What he does have control
over, however, is his own attitude towards these external (and
internal) phenomena.
19
This brings us to the two remaining methods of treatment,
which are specifically Buddhistic. Through the activity of sa-
madhi one can for a time withdraw from sense-objects, the
senses and their operations (the 18 dhatu) and so experience
temporary respite by attenuating or eliminating sensation (ve-
dana). But this is not a method of cure. In this respect, it may be
compared, perhaps, with drug-therapy, without the detrimen-
tal side-effects drugs so often have. Failure to achieve samadhi
and allay pain forms the theme of the story of bhikkhu Assaji.
His illness has debilitated him so much that he can no longer
summon the energy to achieve samadhi. He is consoled by the
Buddha, who teaches him of the impermanence of all sensa-
tions, mental and physical, painful and pleasurable (S.IILI26).
Having gone beyond the stage where the pain can be arrested,
Assaji is left with the one remaining consolation: the knowledge
of spiritual truth. A similar case but at a more developed stage
is that of Godhika, who is a savaka-bhikkhu (S.LI21).20 He finds
it impossible to sustain "mind-release through samadhi" (cetovi-
mutti'f(l samadhika'f(l): he is reported to have attained it and fallen
away six times. His plight leads him to commit suicide, yet he is
posthumously declared an arahant by the Buddha. Of all the
suicide cases we are examining, this one is the most problemat-
ic, for there is no mention in the text of what precise external
phenomenon prevented him from sustaining his mind-release,
and there is no other case in the Canon of this type of com-
plaint with which we could compare it. The Corny maintains
that it was a physical sickness that affected him and adds that he
attained arahantship after cutting his throat (S.A.LI44). We
may infer from this that the actual dying process had the effect
of removing the particular feature inhibiting his release (vi-
134
JIABS VOL. 6 NO. '2
mutti). It so happens that in the other bhikkhu suicide cases,
those of ChaI)l)a and Vakkali, it is also made quite clear that
they too were not arahants until the event of their death, after
which the Buddha pronounces them parinibbuta. This, we
think, goes to show that Buddhism by no means constitutes a
simple dualist philosophy between "matter" and "spirit." It
seems to demonstrate that there are circumstances in which
material conditions can intrude upon "spiritual" factors, on the
one hand and, on the other hand, that spiritual development
can only sometimes take place when external constraints or
inhibitors are first removed. Similarly, there are occasions
when "spiritual" forces can have a causal effect on the external
world, as we shall see shortly in the case of AnathapiD<;lika. To
return to the story of Godhika. His is the most amusing of the
cases-if we can talk about amusement in this context-since
the main purpose of the story is to illustrate the ousting of
Mara. Mara gets very excited at the prospect that Godhika will
commit suicide. He thinks that, as Godhika is only a sekha
(trainee), he will acrue bad kamma (papa) from his act and fall
into Mara's hands (literally qua death and metaphorically qua
apotheosis of evil). Convinced that the Buddha can do nothing
to save Godhika, Mara, with his tongue in cheek, taunts the
Buddha and urges him to "dissuade" (nisedha-S.1.121) his disci-
ple from committing the fatal act. But the Buddha already
knows that Godhika is about to become an arahant. After God-
hika's expiry, Mara searches for his vinna1J,a-a sure sign that
one is still within the wheel of rebirth. But he is unable to trace
it, because Godhika is parinibbuta; so Mara slinks sulkily away.
The whole episode would seem to indicate that suicide is salvifi-
cally fatal in most cases, but not for the arahant, since he cannot
be motivated by tanhii (S.1.121). This is a clear sign that acts are
evaluated on their determining motives and not on their sur-
face appearance.
The third method of combatting physical pain, according
to the Canon, is to reflect upon (samanupassati) the Buddha's
teaching (dhamma). Presumably, this takes away the mental
anguish associated with physical pain, as this is the purpose of
his teaching. In the case of the layman, Anathapil)<;lika, howev-
er, it also relieves the physical pain21: his reflection upon right
knowledge (samma-na1J,a) and right release (samma-vimutti) re-
SUICIDE PROBLEM
135
suits' in immediate (thiir;,a) subsidence (patipassambhati) of his
pain. This account would at the same time seem to be describ-
ing his transition to sotapanna status, since he is classified by the
_ Buddha as such after his death.-
In each of these suicide cases (with the exception of God-
hika, who is a siivaka already) the person anticipating his own
death receives systematic instruction on dhamma, either from
the Buddha or one of his disciples, such as Sariputta. We sug-
gest that such instruction takes place for the following reasons:
Firstly, to serve as an antidote to their suffering, as we have just
seen. Secondly, in order to ensure that they have a proper
-grasp of doctrine respective to each individual's own level of
spiritual development. It is noteworthy that instruction follows
a catechising procedure: a series of questions intended to elicit
the right answers. The content of the teaching invariably con-
cerns the doctrines of impermanence (anicca) or no-self (anattii)
or both. Why these particular doctrines? Not only do they rep-
resent the consummation of the Buddha's teaching but they -
also have a special relevance to the person about to encounter
his own death. The precise relevance can be gleaned from a
passage occurring in the ChaI)I)a story, in which the Buddha
states that "whoever lays down this body (kiiya) and grasps -after
(upiidiyati) another body, is to be blamed (sa-upavajja)."
(M.III.266; S.IV.59), which means that his (suicidal) act carries
bad kammic consequences. Therefore, we can surmise that the
instruction that the body qua the khandhas is impermanent and
without self helps to counteract any tendency'to grasp after a
new body. The concept of body (kiiya), here means not just the
idea of taking up a new corporeal form but all the attendant
features of its senses and the hold they exert over the individ-
ual. Since the suicide act is technically the last deed an agent
performs, the spirit in which it is performed is absolutely cru-
cial. Already, within the Canon itself, the last mental image
before death is said to play a critical part in determining the
nature of rebirth for those who are reborn (cf.M.III.I03).
Death itself is always a key event in the round of rebirth, as
it is the point of transition from one body to another. Neverthe-
less, death in itself is not a deed, and can carry no kammic
consequence of itself; it is simply the turn-style or customs area
through which the traveller passes on his journey from one
136
JIABS VOL. 6 NO.2
existence to another. This point is made clear in a sutta from
the Sar(iyutta Nikaya (S.V.369-70): A devoted lay-disciple, Ma-
hanama, asks the Buddha what would happen to him if he met
an untimely death, like a sudden accident of'being run-over or
crushed during a procession (this illustration has an uncanny
resemblance to our contemporary car accident). Would it make
any difference to his posthumous destiny? The Buddha assures
him that he has nothing to fear in such an eventuality, provided
that his mind (citta) is practiced in the dhamma, since the body's
(rupa-kaya) very nature is mortality but the mind (citta) is quite
distinct and separate. To illustrate his point, the Buddha com-
pares the mind and body to a clay pot and the oil in it: when
cast into a deep pool of water, the pot breaks up and disap-
pears, but the oil rises up to the surface.
Thus, death as a physical event has no special significance
of its own. It merely provides corroboration of the empirical
truth that all created things must come to an end. Establishing
this point helps us to appreciate why it is that suicide per se
need not be a blameworthy act. The body is merely the recepta-
cle or bearer of the citta, and is composed of disposable materi-
al, with its own form of built-in obsolescence. This does not
mean to say that one should dispose of it before its time, for
that is to betray a misunderstanding of its proper purpose,
which is to allow for one's own spiritual development and to
assist others-as the Payasi Sutta avers. But, should the body
reach that condition or point at which it can no longer perform
these functions-as in the case of an incurable malady or ill-
ness-then death becomes little more than de jure confirmation
of a de facto situation. The key issue is not the dying but the
motivation accompanying the dying.
Finding out whether a person whose death is imminent is
fitted for the event comprises the third reason for instruction
. being given. Here, instruction provides an opportunity to find
out whether the person has any negative kammic residue (apa-
pika)which can be absolved by confession. There is a set proce-
dure followed in these stories: the Buddha questions the per-
son with the words: "have you any anxiety (kukkuccar(i) or
remorse (vippa(isara)?" and "have you anything to blame (upa-
vadati) yourself with in regard to morals (sUa)?" The bhikkhu
ChaI)I)a, for one, has no confession to make, claiming that he
SUICIDE PROBLEM
137
has nothing to reproach himself for, since when he was healthy
he had always served the Buddha eagerly (manapena-
M.III.264). In his service of the Buddha, he therefore seems to
have fulfilled the requirement, of assisting others, laid down in
the Payasi Sutta. Vakkali, on the other hand" does have some-
thing to confess. He tells the Buddha that one remaining "anxi-
ety" and "remorse" dominated him before the Buddha came to
visit him: a longing to see the Buddha face to face. In the
context of his reply, the Buddha is supposed to have made one
of his most famous utterances: "He who sees the dhamma sees
me, and he who sees me sees the dhainma" (S.III.120). A third
example is the bhikkhu Assaji, who confesses that his own fail-
ure to realize samadhi has become to him a source of personal
anxiety (S.III.124). The terms "anxiety" (kukkuccarp,), "remorse"
(vippatisara) , and "moral blame" (upavajja) together represent
the notion of a "bad conscience," and to die with a bad con-
science is kammically lethal. But the individuals, in these cases
we have cited, either have been or are absolved of any traces of
bad conscience or unfulfilled opportunities, and can therefore
confront the experience of death unafraid (abhaya). We notice
that they are vindicated: firstly, by the verbal confirmation of
the Buddha, who pronounces them "blameless" (anupavaJja);
and secondly by the manner of their destiny: the three bhikk-
hus become parinibbuta, and the upasakas, Anathapil).<;iika and
Dlghavu, become, respectively, a deva in the Tusita heaven (qua
sotapanna) and an opapatika (qua anagamin).
Let us briefly summarise the main findings of this paper.
Suicide need not necessarily be regarded as wrongful in Bud-
dhism, since the body is prospectively dead anyway. We have
seen that this was over-literally interpreted by certain zealous
monks, however, who took their own lives as a result of dwell-
ing too much on the principle of unloveliness (asubba); unwit-
tingly they transgressed against the spirit of the middle way.
The wrongfulness or not of the matter turns-as ever in Bud-
dhism-on the question of motivation and circumstance: if the
motivation is grasping (upadana) or craving (tanha) after a new
milieu of existence, as in the case of the Buddhist laymen who
longed for an early realisation of heavenly delights, then the act
proves counter-productive. But if this body has lost its essential
usefulness-and Buddhism seems to recognise that such cir-
138
JIABS VOL. 6 NO.2
cumstances do sometimes exist-then the body' can be relin-
quished; provided, that is, it is understood that all bodies are
intrinsically impermanent and bankrupt of self and that,conse_
quently, no body one may inhabit will be implicitly different
from the present one. Buddhism therefore is not coterminous
with stoical behavior, but recognises that there are conditions
and situations too oppressive to be endured.
We should like to close on two features which have, for us
proved the most fruitful and thought-provoking results of
enquiry. Firstly, the canonical material provides evidence that
there existed in early Buddhism a rudimentary form of cate-
chism and confessional procedure for those, as it were, on their
death-beds. This anticipates the later pre-mortem rites that
have become such a pronounced feature of Buddhist belief and
practice. Secondly, we may remind ourselves that one of the
arguments invoked against suicide is the "altruistic" case: exis-
tence within the body is for the welfare of others as well as for
oneself. Let us make a note of the fact that this outward-looking
value judgment occurs within the setting of Pali Buddhism.
NOTES
1. The doctrine of suicide in J ainism is treated in the Ayara-anga and the
second (Aurapachchakkhiina) and fourth (Samthara) Painna. The legends of
slow-suicides by Jain tIrthaIpkaras and others are related in the Kappa SuUa
(Parsva & the Bhagavata Sutta (Khandaga the monk) and the
Ovavaiya SuUa (Ambada the layman). An analysis of the texts has recently
been performed by Colette Caillat, "Fasting unto Death according to the J aina
Tradition," Acta Orientalia, vol. XXXIII, 1977. pp. 43-66.
2. Kaya is the Pali word for "body" in its most general and fundamental
sense. It is a term of central soteriological importance in the sense that it is the
name for the five khandhas or constituents of individuality taken collectively.
All khandhas are subject to the "three marks" (ti-lakkhana) of existence and this
explains why the body (kaya) is viewed as inherently bereft or bankrupt, aswe
try to show in this paper. Other Pali words sometimes translated "body" are:
rapa, denoting the physical, corporeal body as distinct from the mental (nama)
factors also included in the concept of kaya; hence we have rapa-kaya. Sarira is
the word for body mainly in the context of corpses and of relic-worship. Deha
is a term with an allied meaning to sarira, but used less in Pali than Sanskrit.
3. The relationship of nama-rilpa and viii:fia1Ja is discussed comprehen-
sively in The Dynamic Psychology of Early Buddhism, R. Johansson (Scandinavian
Institute of Asian Studies Monograph Series No. 37, 1979). He states: "Vifi-
SUICIDE PROBLEM 139
iia1'}a may become conscious of body through stimulation but it also creates
body through mano or saiiiia .... These viiiiia(w-processes create a new mate-
rial person. This is possible, because conscious processes and corresponding
material processes are only different aspects of the same reality" (p. 33). In
further support of Johansson's point we may cite S.III.152: "the uninstructed
person creates and continues to create the body" (assutava pu-
thujjano rilpaiiiieva abhinibbattento abhinibbbatteti).
4. See, for instance, Bhg. G. XIII.31, XV.7.
5. "It is not killed when the body is killed" (na hanyate han yamane sarfre)-
op.cit. II. 20; "this embodied being is in anyone's body beyond killing" (dehf
nit yam avadhyo 'yam dehe sarvasya)-IL30.
6. P. Kane A History of DharmaSastra, vol. 1 p. 8.
7. S.B.E. vol. xxv. p. 204. This particular ascetic rite, known as mahii-
prasthiina (the great departure), is also alluded to in theJabala Up. (5) and the
Apastamba (11.9.23). Maybe S.V.361 is a reference to it as well.
Cite H. Cakraborti, Asceticism in Ancient India, Calcutta, 1973. p. 77.
8. The earliest-known interdiction against suicide occurs in the f{g Veda:
"One desiring heaven should not die before the appointed span of life is at its
end" (na purayus.ah svaJ;kiimi preyaditi)-. A verse from the White Yajurveda
(Vajasaneyi Sar.nhita, 40.3) which refers to those who "kill the self' is, I think,
erroneously construed by Cakraborti (op. cit., p. 77) to mean straightforward
suicide. It is plain from the context that "self' is here referring to "Atman,"
the soteriological objective (cf. also LB. Horner's comment, Book of Discipline
pt. 1, p. 117, fn. 3). Traditionally, in Hindu culture, a person's suicide has a
polluting effect on relatives and other householders, rendering them impure
(Gautama, XIV.12); at the same time self-inflicted death is recognised as a
legitimate kind of punishment for certain crimes (see Apastamba Dharma,
S.L9.25). The one renowned exception to the interdiction placed on suicide
in Indian culture is, of course, the custom of satT (widow-burning). This cus-
tom appears to have a very specific socio-economic purpose, relating pre-
dominantly to the in the Hindu community. It ensured, for exam-
ple, that others could not usurp the rights to property and inheritance by
marrying the widows of powerful men. See A.L. Basham, The Wonder that was
India, Fontana edit. 1971, pp. 188-190.
9. For the theory of paccekabuddhas as forerunners of Buddhism, see my
Doctoral Thesis, "The Origins of the Paccekabuddha Concept," University of
Lancaster, 1980.
10. The principal version of the Buddha's hesitation to teach occurs at
Vin.I.5ff. See also D.IL36-9, M.I.l67-9, S.I.l36-38.
11. D.II.l12f.
12. J.VI.479ff. See The Perfect Generosity of Prince Vessantara, M. Cone
and R. Gombrich, Oxford, 1977, for an up-to-date translation of this Jataka.
13. Jatakamala, ch.I. See also Suvararp,bhiisottamasiltra (trns!. R. Emmer-
ick, Luzac, 1970) ch.XVIII; Saddharmapur;4arika stitra (trns!. H. Kern, S.B.E.
vo!' XXI.) ch.XXII.
14. cf. "La mort volontaire par Ie feu et la tradition Bouddhique In-
dienne," J. Filliozat,Journal Asiatique 1963.
IS. We read elsewhere (A.V.I0Sf) that the Buddha teaches combining'
the practice of asubha-bhiiviina and iiniipiinasati samiidhi, together with other
practices, as a form of curative treatment for illness. It is to be noticed that
nine out of the ten components of this treatment (see l:]elow, n. 20)represent
facets of asceticism or world rejection, iiniipiinasati, situated at the end of the
list, comprises the exception. We are therefore prompted to view iiniipiinasati
as the countervailing, balancing factor, judiciously placed alongside the oth-
ers to inhibit their possible morbidity-promoting effects.
15. Black Rock (Kii(asilii), an aspect of Mount Isigili, Rajagaha, was a
place associated with ascetics and ascetical suicide according to the Buddhist
scriptures. A special feature of Black Rock was a precipice which formed an
ideal place for suicide by casting oneself over. See D.II.l15, M.I.92, S.1.120,
III.l20, Vin.II.75.
17. viz. attiina'f!l jZvitii voropenti (they deprive themselves of life)-
Vin.III.5S.
IS. Regulations and practices regarding medicine and medical care are
the subject of the sixth section of the Mahiivagga (Vin.I.I99-252).
19. According to the Khandhavagga of the Sa'f!lyutta (III. I-ISS), suffer-
ing (dukkha) arises because a person identifies or equates his self with the
khandhas. This identification is described as a process of clinging (upiidana)
and attachment (riiga). Emancipation (vimutti) begins when a sense of disgust
(nibbinda) at the body (i.e., khandhas) causes the attachment to break down.
20. Another version of the Godhika story appears in the Dhammapada
Corny. (I.43lf).
21. See also A. V.lOSff., where the Buddha is said to claim that the monk
Girimananda's sickness (unstated) will immediately be cured by hearing teach-
ing on the ten ideas (dasasaiiiiii) of impermanence (anicca), no-self (anattii), the
unlovely (asubha), the wretched (iidfna), abandonment (pahiina), absence of
attachment (viriiga), cessation (nirodha), rejection of worldly-pleasure (sabba-
loke anabhirata), the impermanenece of all constructs (sabba-saizkhiiresu anicca)
and meditation on breathing (iiniipiinasati). Elsewhere (S.V.79), Mahakassapa
experiences instant recovery from an illness when he hears teaching on the
seven "limbs of enlightenment" (bojjhaTJgii).
II. BOOK REVIEWS
Buddhist and Western Philosophy, edited by Nathan Katz. Atlantic
Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1981.
As the title indicates, most of the essays in this volume at-
tempt one or another variety of an enormously difficult task. As
comparison of various books on Buddhism makes abundantly
clear, even if one limits one's attention to good books on Bud-
dhism, the task of making clear what a particular school or text
teaches is not an easy matter. Not every good book on the subject
can have gotten everything right, or there would not be so many
divergent interpretations. Similarly, it is not a piece of cake to
get, say, Wittgenstein or Heidegger, or Aristotle or Frege, right.
Most of the essays in this book are attempts to correctly exegete,
and comparatively comment on, one or more Buddhist texts,
themes, or concerns, and a somehow comparable (by similarity,
or by contrast) non-Buddhist text, theme, or concern. Conse-
quently, each such author has three chances to go astray: in
interpreting a Buddhist view, in interpreting a non-Buddhist
view, and in comparing the one to the other. On the other hand,
however difficult it is to make apt comparisons and contrasts,
such comparisons and contrasts, when they are well made, are
enormously helpful to one who wishes to understand how rather
different views are related; if the explanations are especially
clear, one need not even already have one of the terms of the
comparison or contrast firmly in mind from the outset. One can
be instructed as to the content of both terms (both the Buddhist,
and the non-Buddhist, views) by an apt and articulate discussion
of them together.
There are twenty essays. Not all of them are explicitly com-
parative. One, by Alex Wayman, discusses the "Four Alterna-
tives." Another, by D. Seyfort Ruegg, discusses briefly the ques-
tion as to whether Buddhism is a religion (concluding that it is)
and asking about the role of any concept of the "supermun-
dane" or "divine" in Buddhism. Ninian Smart's brief essay asks
about the applicability of such terms as "polytheism" and
"monotheism" to Buddhism and concludes that "if one must
categorize it by relation to the traditional concerns of such classi-
fictions, it is a trans-polytheistic, non-theistic religion of contem-
plation." Braj M. Sinha considers temporality and consciousness
141
142
JIABS VOL. 6 NO.2
in Abhidharmika Buddhism by using "a phenomenological ap-
proach"; what this means in the context, apparently, is that it is
assumed that "temporality is a feature of existence as a structure
of world involvement" (i.e., roughly, if no minds; then no time)
and the question remains as to the proper account of temporal-
ity, construed as subjective. This does not strike me as an actual
use of phenomenological method (nor does what follows in the
essay, namely an abstract account of various analyses of subjec-
tive temporality, and a discussion of various Buddhist views on
this topic), but the essay is nonetheless highly interesting. Rich-
ard J. Demartino's essay on "The Zen Understanding of the
Initial Nature" is more comparative than its title suggests, for it
compares Zen Buddhist views with non-Zen Buddhist. There is
also a comparative component (particularly with process
thought) in Kenneth K. Inada's "Problematics of the Buddhist
Nature of Self."
The other essays are explicitly comparative, in title and con-
tent, and in a brief review one cannot do more than note their
comprehensive scope. Besides the topics or philosophers men-
tioned already, Nagarjuna, Buber, Cusanus, Nietzsche, tautol-
ogy, formal logic, the nature of thought, analytic philosophy,
existentialism, Marxism, nirval).a, nothingness, oriental reli-
gions, Logical Positivism, verification, the self, and nihilism
come up for discussion. Not surprisingly, some essays are stron-
ger, and some essays are weaker, but it would be unfair to try to
identify which are which without a detail of argument incom-
patible with a review.
The editor, in a short Preface, considers four objections to
the sort of comparative enterprise the book involves: that there
is no Buddhist philosophy, that the linguistic and cultural tasks
involved in gaining an understanding of one tradition require a
lifetime and so are incompatible with trying to understand a
second tradition, that non-Buddhist (at least, Western non-Bud-
dhist) philosophy is too materialistic to be worth worrying about,
and that comparative philosophy is all eisegesis and no exegesis.
Without denying that behind each overemphasis lies a defensi-
ble concern, Katz nicely defends the legitimacy of his enterprise.
Both the letter and the spirit of this Preface serve the book, and
comparative studies, well.
The Introduction to the volume, by John Blofeld, serves the
book, and the area, rather less well. If various earlier efforts
compare Buddhism and Christianity to the former's disadvan-
tage, Blofeld seems determined to balance the scale by reversing
the direction of what one might politely call "aspersive dis-
BOOK REVIEWS 143
course." While the Introduction contains more examples of this
than one might have thought possible within its scope (pages xix
through xxviii), a couple of examples will sufficiently illustrate
both tone and type of content: "Whereas a Christian philos-
opher cannot (unless at the cost of ceasing to be accepted as a
Christian) argue from premises that do not accord with the no-
tion of a creator God as the First Cause, and must reject-as he
will very likely do with horror-conclusions that tend to impugn
the validity of that notion, a Buddhist thinker is tied by no such
restrictions, since the Buddha himself encouraged his followers
to test his teachings in the light of their own experience and not
to accept them on account of unwavering faith in the Teacher
they venerated so highly" (p. xx). A later sentence refers to
"certain ancient cosmological beliefs (perhaps of pre-Buddhist
origin) such as the notion that the universe consists of an incal-
culably tall mountain, surrounded by four continents, the south-
ernmost of which contains our own world system-a belief
which has more in common with the speculations of the author
of Genesis than with those of philosophers whose works com-
mand respect in this scientific age" (pp. xx,xxi). Then we are
treated to a commendation of transmigration, even though it
would seem a poor candidate for belief if we are to take our
norms from "philosophers whose works command respect in
this scientific age," one feature of which is the suggestion that
transmigration seems implausible only because of the influence
of Christianity.
It seems to me that this is exactly the sort of thing that the
editor's Preface so nicely avoids. Such paragraphs as Blofeld's
are easy to produce. Consider what a Christian, or a materialist,
writing at about the same level of fairness as Blofeld, might
write. "Whereas a Buddhist philosopher, cannot (unless at the
cost of ceasing to be accepted as a Buddhist) argue from p r e m ~
ises that do not accord with the notion of reincarnation and
karma, the desirability of escape from the Wheel, and the goal of
attaining nirviiI)a, and must reject-as he will do very likely with
horror-the notion of a Creator and Lord whose grace is neces-
sary for salvation, or any other notions which tend to impugn
the validity of his basic Buddhist notions, a Christian is tied to no
such restrictions, since Christians are exhorted to "test the spir-
its" and "give no heed to fables" and "love God with their minds"
rather than to have unwavering faith in the sayings of some
alleged Guru or in abstruse meditations which are judged reli-
able only if they yield the predetermined results." Or: "Whereas
a Buddhist philosopher cannot (unless, etc.) argue from prem-
ises that do not accord with there being nothing but physical
particles, and their properties and relations, and must reject-as
he will very likely do with horror-conclusions that reject the
notion of reincarnation and nirvana as either abs-urdly false or
else totally meaningless, the materialist is tied by no such restric-
tions, since the scientific method frees one from appealing to the
teachings of supposed Holy Men."
These hypothetical comments play about as fairly with Bud-
dhism as do Blofeld's with Christianity (and, by implication, any
monotheistic tradition). In fact, within Christendom (as within
"Buddhadom," if one may use this term to refer to that rich
mixture of cultures and traditions in which Buddhist thought
plays a significant role) one can find various degrees of sensitiv-
ity to evidence, willingness to listen to alternatives and to weigh
arguments, and the like. Christianity, Buddhism, and indeed
any tradition, includes beliefs; not all such beliefs can be true.
The Preface favors one perspective toward this fact; the Intro-
duction illustrates another. The Preface, I hope, resembles the
future; the Introduction, I fear, resembles the past (and that
part of the past which this sort of book is an effort to overcome).
Keith E. Yandell
A Meditator's Diary, by Jane Hamilton-Merritt. Harmondsworth:
Penguin Books Ltd., 1979. pp. 156 Price: 1.00 (U.K.)
Contemplative habits and mental discipline are valued in all
schools of Buddhism. Yet the stress laid on them is strongest in
. the Theravada form of this religion; for here, the supreme goal
of emancipation itself is represented as a prize to be won
through a process of self-culture which entails in a central way
the disciplining of one's faculties. Buddhist works of Theravada
inspiration therefore contain some of the best theoretical elabo-
rations on meditation. And, equally significant, monastic com-
munities that belong to this tradition have tended to preserve
among themselves the esoteric techniques that relate to tire actu-
al practice of meditation. Jane Hamilton-Merritt's A Meditator's
Diary offers an intimate and eminently readable account of an
encounter with meditation in one such Theravada environment,
namely, the wats of Thailand. Through an autobiographically
oriented presentation, the author reaches a number of conclu-
BOOK REVIEWS
145
. sions: meditative practices rooted in Theravada Buddhism are
uniquely fulfilling, useful in everyday living, and, most impor-
tant, cultivable.
However, it was only through arduous effort (and expert
instruction from monks) that Hamilton-Merritt came to recog-
nize these things. Being not only a Westerner, but also a woman,
she had difficulty gaining access to the world of Theravada
meditation. Yet she overcame the obstacles in her way: living as
an acolyte in the spare cell of a Thai teaching wat she learns
about the intricacies of mind control by personal experience.
Though the outer circumstances of her quest have an element of
adventure (and are often sensitively narrated), the most absorb-
ing parts of the book are those in which the meditative process
itself-its initiation, accompaniments and effects-are detailed.
In addition to their evident religious value, Hamilton-Merritt
says much about the meditations that has a distinct phenomeno-
logical significance. Indeed, she provides the reader with first
hand descriptions of a very rare kind-and in everyday lan-
guage-about the state of the experient who is disengaged from the
world and is absorbed instead in the deeper forms of meditative
activity.
Concentration is the key to meditation; hence the author's
initial efforts are directed towards the practice of mindful
breathing (iinapiiniisati). On acquiring an adeptness in this an-
cient technique she is transported, as it were, into a supernormal
realm of visual images, shapes and symbols. Pulsating lights,
kaleidoscopic colour displays and the silhouette of a Buddha are
among the "sights" recorded. The fruits of concentration, how-
ever, are not these but, rather, the calm and tranquil states of
mind which supervene. The further refinement of these very
qualities takes place in the course of the author's subsequent
initiation into the more advanced insight (vipassana) meditation.
The focus of attention here is on the stomach's rising and falling
as one breathes. And the practice of this type of concentration is
in turn accompanied by subjective experiences of an extraordi-
nary order (cf. pp. 106-108). But, it is emphasized again that
the real compensations for the efforts are to be found else-
where-in the ineffable sense of inner peace that comes to be
felt.
Not surprisingly, Hamilton-Merritt views meditation as a
mind expanding procedure which enables one-without,signifi-
cantly, the use of harmful drugs-to go beyond what is tradi-
tionally considered to be reality. Though her own introduction
to the practice of meditation took place in a Buddhist setting
146
JIABS VOL. 6 NO.2
amidst a fairly clear recognition of the principal emphases of
Buddhist philosophy, she has no doubt as to the possibility of
cultivating mental concentration in other, different circum-
stances. "One can watch the breath at any time," she says, add-
ing: "being mindful can be done while waking, riding the train
to work, doing routine work like raking leaves, pulling weeds,
washing dishes, scrubbing floors." (p. 140) The resultant bene-
fits, it is observed lastly, are considerable. For a controlled mind,
among other things, conserves its energies and is thus better
placed to produce "more acute realizations." (p. 142)
A Meditator's Diary deserves notice because it succeeds in
showing in a striking way that Theravada Buddhist meditation is
indeed a teachable, experiential discipline. But, it would be well
to observe that the conception of the uses of meditation that is
projected here might not meet with full acceptance everywhere:
there is room to argue that it is perhaps somewhat overly secu-
larized. In any event, one must not forget that though even the
orthodox Theravada believer might recognize mundane uses
for meditation, he or she would no doubt value it finally because
it is an indispensable aid in the quest for salvation.
Vijitha Rajapakse
The Roof Tile of Tempyo by Yasushi Inoue, translated by James T.
Araki. University of Tokyo Press: Tokyo, 1982, pp. xvii + 140.
This book is a narrative account of the perilous journey to
Tang China of four Japanese Buddhist monks who go to that
country to study and who subsequently convince prominent Chi-
nese monks to come to Japan to establish there the proper ordi-
nation procedures for Buddhist priests. The book is broadly
based upon historical fact, but the narrative fleshes out the bare
bones of history and presents an engaging and readable story.
Araki's translation is excellent, for at no point is one made aware
that the original is not English.
In his preface Araki notes that, although this book was the
recipient of the Japanese Ministry of Education Prize in 1958, it
has been considered until now to be too "Japanese" for success-
ful introduction to a Western audience (p. xiii). Araki highlights
a few of the aspects that characterize its uniquely Japanese cul-
tural heritage. However, it would seem that the main difficulty
BOOK REVIEWS 147
in reading The Roof Tile of Tempyo lies less in comprehending its
unique cultural background than in understanding just what
Inoue is doing here. The work is not an historical novel in the
sense that unreal, fictional characters are set against a "real"
historical background. Rather it is an attempt to recapture, to
recreate, narrative innocence. This fact, I think, may be the
source of difficulty in appreciating the novel.
By narrative innocence is meant narrative not yet grasped
by the spirit of critical history, but which sets forth its story by
weaving events and interpretation into a single whole. Before
the dawning of historical criticism such interpretive narrative
did not question whether an event had actually occurred in fact.
Rather, the dynamic meaning of the events described was em-
bodied in evaluative story telling. Inoue's book is an attempt to
recapture such narrative innocence by interpreting the bare
bones of history through the "fictionalized" experiences of four
Japanese monks. Such an endeavor obviously does not negate
the validity of critical history, but it does imply that The Roof Tile
of Tempyo, or any pre-critical narrative, must be read not as bas-
tardized history, but as narrative.
The notion that symbolic, narrative story telling is charac-
teristic only of primitive mentalities, such as has been presented
by the psychologist Piaget, is itself a biased view and often misses
the import of what was in fact going forward in and through
historical events. Any doubt on this point would soon be dis-
pelled by reading this book and comparing it with the historical
record. History is not the mere reporting of facts, but overall
insight into what actually was transpiring in the COurse of such
factual events. Although the four Japanese monks of this book
are literary inventions of Inoue, they do indeed embody the
movement of an actual history.
However, even if the reader takes exception to this assess-
ment of narrative innocence, The Roof Tile of Tempyo can be
recommended as an engaging and at times gripping novel.
John P. Keenan
Les royaumes de I'Himalaya, histoire et civilisation: Ie Ladakh, Ie Bhou-
tan, Ie Sikkim, Ie Nepal, under the direction of Alexander W.
Macdonald. Paris: Collection orientale, Imprimerie nationale,
1982,250 pages, 209 coloured or black and white photographic
illustrations, 7 coloured maps, index, bibliography.
148
JIABS VOL. 6 NO.2
This beautiful book, large-sized (33 x 25 cm), contammg
numerous and fine or interesting illustrations, is a good descrip-
tion of the four Himalayan "kingdoms," especially of their histo-
ry and their civilisation. It is the collective work of three research
workers of the French Centre National de la Recherche Scienti-
fique, Alexander W. Macdonald, maitre de recherche, Philippe
Sagant, charge de recherche, and Anne Vergati, attachee de
recherche, and also of Chantal Massonaud, chargee de mission
in the Musee Guimet (Paris). It is a serious work, written by good
ethnologists, who have a direct knowledge of the Himalayan
countries. However, it is intended for cultured but not special-
ized readers, though Orientalists can find various and interest-
ing pieces of information in it. A. W. Macdonald wrote the intro-
duction (pp. 5-25) and the chapter on Ladakh (pp. 27-65), Ch.
Massonaud these about Bhutan (pp. 67-115) and Sikkim (pp.
117-163), A. Vergati the one on Nepal (pp. 165-208) and Ph.
Sagant the long appendix dealing with the Hinduisation of the
Limbu, a people living in the eastern part of Nepal (pp. 209-
239). At the end, we find a very complete double index, analytic
and thematic, and an index of the illustrations. The bibliograph-
ical indications, carefully chosen and sufficiently numerous, are
set at the end of each chapter.
In the introduction, A. W. Macdonald outlines the peoples
dwelling in these Himalayan countries, the basis of their social
and political institutions, the Indian and Chinese influences
these peoples have received during their history, and the for-
eign religions, Hinduism and Buddhism, they were converted
to. Each chapter begins with a description of the country and the
way of life of its inhabitants. Then, it deals with the history, the
social organisation, ethnography, languages, religions, festivals,
arts and literature.
Much of the book concerns, directly or not, the religions of
these four Himalayan kingdoms. It is an interesting subject, be-
cause these countries are in part the mountainous refuge of
peoples who are faithful to very archaic religious forms, assimi-
lated to animism and shamanism, but who came under the
strong influence of Indian, Tibetan and Chinese religions. By
reading this book, we can follow the penetration of these various
foreign religions, and their extension, which was quick or slow,
domineering or patient according the different circumstances.
We learn of the original inhabitants, resistance to these foreign
beliefs and rites, and their eventual acceptance of them. Of
course, these phenomena varied by epoch, the country, the pop-
BOOK REVIEWS
149
. ulation and so on, in such a way that the present religious situa-
tions in these four kingdoms are also various. In Bhutan and
Ladakh, the Tibetan forms of Buddhism are largely dominant,
whereas Hinduism is the principal religion of Nepal and Sikkim,
but several groups of animists are found here and there, in the
highest parts of the Himalayan valleys. Besides, we can note
Hinduism's evident and numerous influences on Buddhism,
and vice versa, in all these countries. Often, the zealous propaga-
tion of a religion was intimately tied with a political aim. It was
especially the case with the Hinduisation of Nepal, as A. Vergati
and Ph. Sagant explain clearly and in detail, giving numerous
illustrative anecdotes. Moreover, we find described in this book
the history of the various Buddhist sects that came from Tibet to
Ladakh, the way of life in Buddhist monasteries in Bhutan and
Sikkim, the beliefs and rites of the animists of Sikkim, the Hindu
and Buddhist pantheon of Nepal, the various religious festivals
in these four kingdoms, and their art, architecture, sculpture,
and painting-all of thein essentially religious.
The book reads easily and the numerous illustrations in-
crease one's pleasure in it. Therefore, we can thank its authors
for having given to us this fine work on the history and the
civilisation of the four principal Himalayan kingdoms-a work
in which a prominent place is given to their religions, especially
to Buddhism.
Andre Bareau
Wings of the White Crane: Poems of Tshangs dbyangs rgya mtsho
(1683-1706), translated by G.W. Houston. Historical Introduc-
tion by Helmut Hoffmann. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1982.
xxi + 53 p. Rs. 50.
The Rain of Wisdom, translated by the Nalanda Translation Com-
mittee under the Direction of Chogyam Trungpa. Boulder:
Shambhala, 1980. xxiii + 384 p. $9.95.
Songs of Spiritual Change, by the Seventh Dalai Lama, Gyalwa
. Kalzang Gyatso. Translated by Glenn H. Mullin, in accordance
with instruction received from Geshe Lozang Tenpa and L.N.
150
JIABS VOL. 6 NO.2
Tsonawa. Illustrated by Kevin Rigby. Ithaca, NY: Gabriel/Snow
Lion, 1982. 205 p. $9.95.
Tibetan poetry has received little sustained attention from
Westerners, either scholars or poets. What attention there has
been has come chiefly from scholars: R.A. Stein's fine work with
the Gesar epic and the songs of 'Brug pa kun legs; Garma e.C.
Chang's translation of the Mi la mgur 'bum. These scholarly
translations mayor may not be accurate; seldom are they poetic.
Tibetan poetry has yet to attract a Western poet capable of trans-
lating it-either directly or with a collaborator-in the same en-
gaging way that Kenneth Rexroth has translated from Japanese,
Ezra Pound and Gary Snyder from Chinese, and Robert Ely and
W.S. Merwin from lndic languages.
There are a number of reasons for the relative neglect of
the Tibetan poetic tradition. First, Tibetan has been studied for
a relatively short time by very few. Thus, the bulk of the tradi-
tion simply has not been exposed. Second, its singsong rhythm
and consistent metrical patterns make its formal transposition
into Western poetical modes a daunting task, for reproduction
of the original style will sound alien, while a rendition in contem-
porary poetic idioms will stray dangerously far from the origi-
nal: traduttore, tradittore.
Third-and, I think, most significant-the content of Tibet-
an poetry is almost invariably religious and philosophical, and
this sophisticated content is tremendously compressed within
the relatively simple poetic forms that contain it. Take two typi-
cal lines (admittedly, liturgical): sdo sngags chos gzung nyes spyod
tha dag sdom / dge chos kun sdus spyin bzhis 'gro don byed. These are
rhythmically pleasing and conceptually comprehensible to any
educated Tibetan. Unpacked and translated literally into En-
glish, however, they read: "Adhering to the Dharmas of sutra
and tantra, I vow (to refrain from) all faulty activities; / collecting
all virtuous dharmas, I will act for the sake of transmigrating
beings through the four (types of) giving." How is such content
to be made understandable, let alone poetically pleasing, to a
Western reader? Philosophical poetry (Eliot and Stevens not-
withstanding) has long been out of vogue in the West. The
reigning style (at least in America) derives from the broadly
"imagistic" tradition of Pound and Williams. This style, in turn,
has helped dictate the sorts of foreign poetry that have proven
attractive: haiku, Chinese "landscape" poetry and many of the
Indian lyrics translated emphasize mood and image at the ex-
pense of specific philosophical or religious content. This, pre-
BOOK REVIEWS
151
. sumably, makes their appeal more "universal." Tibetan poetry
hardly lacks mood or imagery. By and large, however, its moods
and images are so closely intertwined with specifically Buddhist
themes that it cannot be translated without reference to those
themes. This makes it less attractive to a potential translator in
the first place, and tremendously difficult for someone who does
attempt a poetic translation-for he has few Western models on
which to draw in giving a specifically poetic shape to such com-
plex material.
A further point must quickly be added, however: it is open
to question whether "poetic" translations of much of Tibetan
poetry really are desirable. Much that is in "verse" is explicitly
liturgical or didactic in function, its "poetic" form chiefly a mne-
monic expedient. Still, even when we have eliminated the great
body of "verse" literature that may not constitute "poetry," there
still remain a considerable number of works whose personal
point of view and manipulation of mood, image and symbol
more closely approximate what we in the West do consider poet-
ry. They are "worth" translating poetically, but they are idiosyn-
cratically Tibetan and Buddhist, so the problems cited above
must still be confronted. Three recent translations of Tibetan
poetry illustrate varying attempts at solutions to the problems.
If any Tibetan poet should be accessible to Westerners, it is
Tshangs dbyangs rgya mtsho, the Sixth Dalai Lama, who had a
short, unhappy life, and wrote of it in poems that are at once the
most explicitly confessional in Tibetan literature and the least
explicitly intertwined with Buddhist religious and philosophical
concerns (their alleged "tantric" content seems to me in most
cases problematic). G.W. Houston has provided us with a com-
plete edition of the Sixth Dalai Lama's poems-53 in all-in
Tibetan script, Roman transliteration, and English translation.
It is an admirable work, though it contains some disappoint-
ments. In the first place, the Tibetan-script version (whose cal-
ligraphy is poor) sometimes varies from the Romanized version,
usually by the inclusion of readings found in Das' edition. Pre-
sumably, the Tibetan-script version is the preferred one, but Dr.
Houston has included no explanatory material to this effect, nor
has he always chosen best: in no. 17, for example, Das' reading
for the second line (yid La 'char rgyu mi 'dug) seems, better than
Dr. Houston's choice (yid La yang yang shar byung), to convey the
irony that when meditating the author cannot clearly visualize
his guru-while when he is not meditating he is obsessed by the
image of his be1oved. Similarly, in no. 16, the Romanized 'khrid is
preferable to the Tibetan-script 'khid.
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JIABS VOL. 6 NO.2
,In translating, Dr. Houston has opted for a concise, direct
style, often employing rhyming quatrains. This captures rather
well the rhythmic feel of the poems (most of whose lines are
hexasyllabic), and often stands as fine poetry on its own, e.g., no.
1, "Behind peaks of eastern mountains / The shining white
moon appears, / And one girl's face / Turns round in my mind";
and no. 52 (from which the book derives its title), "If only white
cranes / Do grant me wings, / I shall not go far; / Only to Lithang,
then home."
There are other instances, however, in which the results are
less felicitous, particularly when Dr. Houston resorts to rhyme.
No. 17 (bsgoms pa'i bla ma'i zhal ras / yid la 'char rgyu mi 'dug / ma
sgom byams pa'i zhal ras / yid la wa le wa le = "When I meditate, the
face of my guru / will not arise in my mind; / When I don't
meditate, the face of my beloved / is clear, so clear, in my mind"),
for instance, undergoes a number of contortions to reach a
rhymed form: "When meditating, I cannot retain / My guru's
face to see; / Not meditating, I cannot restrain / My loved one's
face in me." Similarly, no. 51 (ga ler phebs shig byasbas / ga ler
bzhugs shig gsung gi / thugs sems skyo yong byas pas / mgyogs po 'phrad
yong gsungs byung = "I bade her farewell; / 'Stay well,' she said. /
This saddened her heart, / So I said, 'We will meet again.' ") loses
itselegaic quality and approaches doggerel when translated as:
"I said goodbye to her. / She replied: 'Goodbye.' / Because this
made her cry, / I said: 'Soon again we say hi!' "
Also, alas, there are a number of instances in which Dr.
Houston either misses or obscures meanings contained in the
original Tibetan. In no. 6, for example, nyin mo lag tu ma lon
seems to mean not "Daily affairs have no end," but something
more like "I cannot handle the everyday." Describing the ferry
in no. 10 as "senseless" (sems pa med) makes it sound purposeless,
given current usage of "senseless"; "insentient" might be prefer-
able. In no. 16, sems pa 'gor kyang mi thub / byams pa'i phyogs la shor
song is less accurately translated as "My mind always fought /
Slipping home to you" than as something like "My mind was
unable to stay, / and fled toward my beloved."
There are relatively few typographical errors. The only one
of any significance occurs in no. 48, where the translation has
"Rinchen" for the Tibetan rigs 'dzin. Helmut Hoffmann's intro-
duction is an interesting study of the Sixth Dalai Lama's possible
relation to "heretical" religious sects. Desirable, too, would have
been a more general introduction to the Sixth Dalai Lama's life,
and some remarks by Dr. Houston on his method of translating.
Dr. Houston's work, then, is not without its drawbacks, both
in edition and translation, but it is an admirable attempt to come
BOOK REVIEWS 153
to grips poetically with a Tibetan work, and I hope that it will
stimulate reflection and further efforts from those who are in-
terested both in poetry and things Tibetan.
The Rain of Wisdom is a translation of the text generally
known as the bKa' brgyud mgur mtsho (The Ocean of Songs of the
bKa' brgyud pas), a collection of the vajra doMs sung by masters
of the bKa' rgyud lineage, from Tilopa and Naropa, through
Marpa, Mi la ras pa and sGam po pa to the various red hat and
black hat hierarchs. In addition, a number of poems by Cho-
gyam Trungpa, who oversaw the translation, are included.
Trungpa warns in his foreword that "These songs should not be
regarded as ordinary poetry, as a purely literary endeavor"
(xiii). They are, rather, didactic, instructing the reader on var-
ious aspects of Buddhist practice, both Slltrayana and Tan-
trayana. Most importantly, the songs "are the life examples of
our forefathers to inspire devotion" (ibid.), personal accounts of
frailty, doubt, faith, struggle and, ultimately, spiritual triumph.
Like the doMs of the Indian maMsiddhas, the songs of the bKa'
brgyud masters celebrate spiritual attainment, and are explicitly
inspirational in intent: to this day, "Students are ... advised to
read this book for instructions when their life is filled with dis-
ruption and uncertainty and neurosis" (ibid.).
Recognizing that their material does not represent a "purely
literary endeavor," the Nalanda committee has produced a care-
ful, rather literal translation. The rhythms of the original thus
are sacrificed, and the translation preserves (usually in their
Sanskrit forms) a number of Buddhist technical terms that hard-
ly can be considered "poetic," but what is lost stylistically is more
than adequately recovered by the overall accuracy and compre-
hensibility of the translations.
A number of poets stand out by virtue of their mastery of
structure, particularly their effective use of parallel construc-
tions: Choying Dorje, Lodo Dorje, Ngotrup Gyaltsen, Rinchen
Pal and, of course, Milarepa (the translators maintain phonetic
spellings throughout). Most poems are too long to reproduce
here; this passage from the song of Ngotrup Gyaltsen may serve
as a brief example: .
When I dwell in places of solitude,
These apparent objects of the six senses
Are like the spreading of a forest fire.
How joyful, all these arising as companions!
Ah la la, how wondrous is the Accomplished One of
Nyemo!
Ah la la, what joy in the snow and slate mountains!
154
JIABS VOL. 6 NO. '2
The mind is the essence of emptiness.
Uncorrupted by words,
It is like the moon reflected in water, unattached to
appearance or emptiness.
How joyful, this freedom from confusion arising as
luminosity!
Ah la la, how wondrous is the Accomplished One of
Nyemo! .
Ah la la, what jo}' in the snow and slate mountains! .
Ah la la, what delight of this little child in the snow
mountains!
The translation is only rarely cluttered by suchphrases as "dual-
istic fixation," and although it might be argued that such terms
as "prajiia," "upaya" and "klesa" could easily have been given
English equivalents, one's gratitude for the reliability of the
translation far outweighs the stylistic inconvenience entailed by
the inclusion of Sanskrit terms.
These terms, and a number of others, are explained in
some detail in a glossary near the end of the book. The glossary
is generally careful and helpful, but some of its definitions are
problematic. The "two accumulations" (of merit and wisdom),
are made to sound as if they are simply cause and effect; tradi-
tionally, their practice is parallel and mutually reinforcing. Al-
though "arya" is "an epithet of the enlightened ones: arhats,
bodhisattvas and buddhas," it more specifically connotes one
who has attained the path of seeing (not all bodhisattvas are
aryas). The "three families" refer most often not to adherents of
Hinayana, Mahayana and Vajrayana, but to practitioners of the
Sravakayana, Pratyekabuddhayana and Bodhisattvayana. "Mai-
tri," which, as one of the four immeasureables, is usually direct-
ed to others, is idiosyncratically regarded as "friendliness to one-
self." "Sampannakrama" is somewhat misleadingly described as
formless meditation (a definition that hardly covers the complex
manipulation of the subtle body that is entailed by so many
completion stage practices), and is incorrectly said to give rise to
the utpattikrama (it is the other way around).
The translators have provided a lengthy Afterword, which
discusses the bKa' brgyud lineage and its teachings, the text, and
the lives of the masters represented in the collection. My only
reservation here-a mild one-is with the discussion of bKa'
brgyud teachings, which seems weighted toward the occasionally
idiosyncratic interpretations of Chogyam Trungpa. Vipasyana,
for instance, is the development of "a field of nowness" (296),
Vajrayana is said to center on an appreciation for the "sacred-
ness of the world" (298) and mahamudra is "the realization that
BOOK REVIEWS
155
the most fundamental and sacred truths of all are expressed in
the simple, unadorned reality of everyday life" (293). These
definitions may be defensible, but they are not comprehensive,
and betray a distinct "psychological" bias .
. Certain terminological problems (all in the Afterword and
Glossary) notwithstanding, The Rain of Wisdom is a fine work of
translation. Though it is written more with the Buddhist than the
Buddhologist in mind-it has little footnote apparatus-it none-
theless displays careful scholarship, and bodes well for future
undertakings by the Nalanda Translation Committee.
Comparable in both approach and quality in Songs of Spiritu-
al Change, Glenn H. Mullin's translation of a number of poems by
the Seventh Dalai Lama, Kalzang Gyatso (bsKal bzang rgya
mtsho, 1708-1757). Though all dealing with Buddhism and the
author's relation to it, the poems display a wonderful variety of
style and approach, from conventional didactic summaries ofthe
path, to Buddhist transpositions of folk songs, to "alphabetical
songs" in which each verse must begin with a letter of the Tibetan
alphabet, to skillfully rhetorical "question" songs, to intensely
personal confessions of doubt and weakness. An instance of the
latter, and perhaps the most beautiful poetry in the book, is this
excerpt from "An Autumn Day" (128):
The sky of unstained space,
I thought to blend my mind with it;
The center of fresh, hanging clouds,
I thought to touch their softness.
Like mist in the wind,
This mind yearns to drift;
Before the sun turns red and sets,
I would leave behind all squalor.
In this and many other passages, Mr. Mullin displays a fine
balance between fidelity to the author's intention and a sensitivity
to the sounds of poetic English. His ear betrays him only occa-
sionally, as when, in "A Song in Couplets" (129-30), he achieves
rhyme at the price of contorted syntax; or in the occasional use of
a clearly Western term like "spiritual evolution" or "neurotic."
Songs of Spiritual Change also contains an excellent historical
and doctrinal introduction, a translation of a biography of the
Seventh Dalai Lama, and a Glossary. The Glossary is useful and
careful, being marred only by wrong or inconsistent spellings of a
number of the parenthetical Tibetan terms (e.g., rSangs rgyas for
sangs rgyas and kun rDob bDen pa for kun rdzob bden pa). As with The
156
JIABS VOL. 6 NO.2
Rain of Wisdom, however, there is little basis for complaint: Songs
of Spiritual Change is a sound and mellifluous translation, as good
a rendition of Tibetan poetry as has appeared in English, and
Mr. Mullin is to be commended for it.
Roger Jackson
Where West Meets East
e
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paper reporting on the growth and ferment in the
* contemporary Buddhist world, both in the West and
in Asia. Regular features include a Buddhist News
Summary, interviews with leading tliachers and
scholars, profiles of artists and writers, book reviews,
up-to-date coverage of the arts, psychology, science, health, and the on-
going dialogue between the East and West. Plus current news of the
Vajradhatu Sangha.
For one year subscription (6 issues): please enclose$15 for USA; $18 outside USA
(in US currency). Vajradhatu Sun, Dept. 10C 1345 Spruce Street, Boulder,
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Published by Vajradhatu, an international association of Buddhist meditation and study centers;
and Nalanda Foundation, a nonprofit educational corporation.
III. NOTES AND NEWS
A Report on the International Seminar:
Aspects of Indian Thought
On the occasion of the 250th anniversary of the founda-
tion of the Oriental Institute (University) of Naples, in May-
June, 1983, the School of Superior Studies in Naples in collabo-
ration with the said Institute held an international seminar on
Aspects of Indian Thought, with four sessions daily: two on Bud-
dhism delivered by Professors Andre Bareau (College de
France, Paris), and Amalia Pezzali (University of Bologna, Ita-
ly), and two on Vedana delivered by Professors Karl H. Potter
(University of Washington, USA) and Mario Piantelli (Universi-
ty of Torino, Italy).
The last session was held as a round table discussion: A
Confrontation Between Buddhism and Vedana, Two Moments of Gno-
sis, presided over by the Chancellor of the Oriental Institute
(University) of Naples, Professor Maurizio Taddei, and with
the participation of the following professors: A. Bareau, P. Fi-
lippani Ronconi, S.M. Panday, C. Pensa, A. Pezzali, M. Piantelli,
and K.H. Potter.
Amalia Pezzali
157
CONTRIBUTORS
Prof. Andre Bareau
(Chaire d'Etude du Bouddhisme,
College de France)
15 Boulevard Colbert
92330 Sceaux
France
Prof. Carmen Dragonetti
Centro de Investigaciones
Filosoficas
Seminario de Indologia
Miiiones 2073
1428 Buenos Aires
Argentina
Dr. Peter Fenner
50 Chiswick Road
Bardon, Queensland
Australia 4065
Prof. William Grosnick
Department of Religion
La Salle College
Philadelphia, P A 19141
Prof. Roger Jackson
Department of Religion
Carleton College
Northfield, MN 55057
Dr. John Keenan
222 Park Avenue
Beaver Dam, WI 53916
Dr. Vijitha Rajapakse
35950 Timberlane Drive
Solon, OH 44139
Geshe Lhundup Sopa
Dept. of South Asian Studies
1250 Van Hise Hall
University of W i s c o ~ s i n
Madison, WI 53706
Prof. Ramesh Chandra Tewari
Department of Sociology
Kashi Vidyapeeth
Varanasi
U.P.
India
Prof. Fernando Tola
Centro de Investigaciones
Filosoficas
Seminario de Indologia
Miiiones 2073
1428 Buenos Aires
Argentina
Prof. Martin G. Wiltshire
Department of Religious Studies
City of Liverpool College
of Higher Education
Liverpool Road
Prescot, Merseyside L34 1 NP
England
Prof. Keith Yandell
Department of Philosophy
Helen C. White Hall
University of Wisconsin
Madison, WI 53706
158
BOOKS ON SOUTH ASIAN STUDIES
ASPECTS OF HINDI PHONOLOGY
BY M. OHALA pp. xvii + 193 $35.00
[ISBN 0 89581 670 9]
. The Language whose phon.ologyis described in this work is standard Hindi spoken
m day-to-day workmg which IS different from Sanskritised Hindi.
BUDDHIST COSMOLOGY $22.50
BY R. KLOETZLI
[ISBN 0 89581 955 4]
In this interpretation .o.f the major phases of .Buddhist cosmological speculation two
major cosmologICal traditions emerge: those whICh rely on metaphors of time and those
which rely on metaphors of sIJace. The former are associated with the Hinayana and
the latter with the Mahayana forms of Buddhism.
A HISTORY OF EARLY VEDANTA PHILOSOPHY
BY N. NAKAMURA pp. xxxvi+532 $35.00
[ISBN 0 89581 9562]
In this Imperial Prize winning book the author presents the details of the pre San-
kara Vedanta Philosophy, utilismg not only Sanskrit material but also Pali, Prakrit,
Tibetan and Chinese sources.
JAINA YOGA
BY R. WILLIAM pp. xxx + 296 $30.00
[ISBN 0 89581 967 8]
This book describes what the Jains considered to be the way of life proper to a
layman and examines the contents of the principal Jaina Sravakacaras.
HERMENEUTICS AND LANGUAGE IN PURVAMIMAMSA
BY O. GACHTER pp. x + 154 $27.50
[ISBN 0 89581 636 9]
In this critical investigation in Sabara's realism truth is shown as the real coincidence
between reality and language. According to this approach Language by its nature does
neither objectify nor subjectify the status of reahty, but presents through Sabda what
really 'is.'
KALIDASA
BY. K. KRISHNAMOORTHY p. 155 $18.00
[ISBN 0 89581 9635]
This book aims at presenting a clear and complete picture of the plays and poems of
the celebrated Sanskrit poet, Kalidasa and also gives a brief account of the age and life
of the poet.
AGNI: THE VEDIC RITUAL OF THE FIRE ALTAR
BY FRITS STAAL pp. xxxviii + 1548 $300
[ISBN 0 89581 450 I] 133 plates, 160 illus.
2 Vols:, 2 cassettes
A remarkably detailed and readable study of one of the world's most ancient rituals
- the Atiratra-Agnicayana of the Nambudiri brahmin community. AGNI also points to
new ways of lookmg at the Veda, its ritual and its transmission over the centuries.
THE SARVADURGATIPARISODHANA TANTRA
BY T. SKRORUPSKI pp. xxix+385 $50.00
[ISBN 0 89581 572 9]
This book consists of an edition of the Sanskrit manuscripts and the Tibetan transla-
tions of Sarvadurgatiparisodhana Tantm (Elimination of all Evil Destinies), a Buddhist
literary work belongmg to the Yoga-Tantm class. A complete English translation is also
given of the later of the two versIOns in which the work is available.
SELECT INSCRIPTIONS VOL. II
BY D.C. SIRCAR pp. xxviii + 787 $65.00
[ISBN 0 89581 1065]
This Volume includes inscriptions bearing on the Indian History and Civilisation
from the sixth to eighteenth century A.D. 'containing some of the most important
epigraphic and numismatic records of the period. '
Exclusive North American Distributors
ASIAN HUMANITIES PRESS
P.o. Box 3056, Berkeley, CA 94703, USA
Complete Catalogue will be sent on request
MOTILAL BANARSIDASS
Indological Publishers & Booksellers,
Bungalow Road, Delhi-ll0 007 (India)
(Issued by Capaxil)

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