Jiabs 30.1-2

JIABS
Journal of the International

Association of Buddhist Studies
Volume 30 Number 12 2007 (2009)
The Journal of the International
Association of Buddhist Studies (ISSN
0193-600XX) is the organ of the
International Association of Buddhist
Studies, Inc. As a peer-reviewed journal,
it welcomes scholarly contributions
pertaining to all facets of Buddhist
Studies.
JIABS is published twice yearly.
Manuscripts should preferably be sub-
mitted as e-mail attachments to:
editors@iabsinfo.net as one single le,
complete with footnotes and references,
in two dierent formats: in PDF-format,
and in Rich-Text-Format (RTF) or Open-
Document-Format (created e.g. by Open
O ce).
Address books for review to:
JIABS Editors, Institut fr Kultur- und
Geistesgeschichte Asiens, Prinz-Eugen-
Strasse 8-10, A-1040 Wien, AUSTRIA
Address subscription orders and dues,
changes of address, and business corre-
spondence (including advertising orders)
to:
Dr Jrme Ducor, IABS Treasurer
Dept of Oriental Languages and Cultures
Anthropole
University of Lausanne
CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland
email: iabs.treasurer@unil.ch
Web: http://www.iabsinfo.net
Fax: +41 21 692 29 35
Subscriptions to JIABS are USD 40 per
year for individuals and USD 70 per year
for libraries and other institutions. For
informations on membership in IABS, see
back cover.
Cover: Cristina Scherrer-Schaub
Font: Gandhari Unicode designed by
Andrew Glass (http://andrewglass.org/
fonts.php)
Copyright 2009 by the International
Association of Buddhist Studies, Inc.
Print: Ferdinand Berger & Shne
GesmbH, A-3580 Horn
EDITORIAL BOARD
KELLNER Birgit
KRASSER Helmut
Joint Editors
BUSWELL Robert
CHEN Jinhua
COLLINS Steven
COX Collet
GMEZ Luis O.
HARRISON Paul
VON HINBER Oskar
JACKSON Roger
JAINI Padmanabh S.
KATSURA Shry
KUO Li-ying
LOPEZ, Jr. Donald S.
MACDONALD Alexander
SCHERRER-SCHAUB Cristina
SEYFORT RUEGG David
SHARF Robert
STEINKELLNER Ernst
TILLEMANS Tom
JIABS
Volume 30 Number 12 2007 (2009)
Obituaries
Georges-Jean PINAULT
In memoriam, Colette Caillat (15 Jan. 1921 15 Jan. 2007) . . . . . . 3
Hubert DURT
In memoriam, Nino Forte (6 Aug. 1940 22 July 2006) . . . . . . . . . . 13
Erika FORTE
Antonino Forte List of publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Articles
Tao JIN
The formulation of introductory topics and the writing of
exegesis in Chinese Buddhism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Ryan Bongseok JOO
The ritual of arhat invitation during the Song Dynasty: Why
did Mahynists venerate the arhat? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Chen-Kuo LIN
Object of cognition in Digngas lambanaparkvtti: On
the controversial passages in Paramrthas and Xuanzangs
translations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
Eviatar SHULMAN
Creative ignorance: Ngrjuna on the ontological signi-
cance of consciousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
Sam VAN SCHAIK and Lewis DONEY
The prayer, the priest and the Tsenpo: An early Buddhist
narrative from Dunhuang . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
CONTENTS 2
Joseph WALSER
The origin of the term Mahyna (The Great Vehicle) and
its relationship to the gamas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
Buddhist Studies in North America
Contributions to a panel at the XVth Congress of the International
Association of Buddhist Studies, Atlanta, 2328 June 2008
Guest editor: Charles S. Prebish
Charles S. PREBISH
North American Buddhist Studies: A current survey of the eld . . 253
Jos Ignacio CABEZN
The changing eld of Buddhist Studies in North America . . . . . . . . 283
Oliver FREIBERGER
The disciplines of Buddhist Studies Notes on religious
commitment as boundary-marker. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
Luis O. GMEZ
Studying Buddhism as if it were not one more among the
religions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319
Notes on contributors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345

In memoriam
COLETTE CAILLAT
(15 Jan. 1921 - 15 Jan. 2007)
GEORGES-JEAN PINAULT
International Indology has suffered a great loss by the demise of
Prof. Dr. Colette Caillat, precisely on her eighty-sixth birthday,
15 January 2007. She had contacts and friendly relationships with
scholars of Indian studies allover the world, especially in her field
of expertise: Jaina and Buddhist studies and Middle Indo-Aryan
linguistics, not excluding other topics, as classical Sanskrit litera-
ture and Indian culture in general. 1 may refer to obituaries that
have been already published for full information about her career
and publications.! I would like to stress shortly some important
facts. On one hand, the education of Colette Caillat is deeply root-
ed in the French humanist tradition, which is based on the study of
classical languages (Latin and Greek), and masterworks of French
and world literature: her interest for Sanskrit was initially con-
nected with comparative Indo-European linguistics, but the French
lndology of the 1930s and 1940s had developed a keen interest for
the study of Indian languages and literature in the larger context
of India and South Asia, that is in their native milieu. Her teach-
ers, whose merits she was never reluctant to recognize, were Louis
1 See Indo-Iranian Journal 50, 2007, pp. 1-4 (by Minoru Rara); Bulletin
d'Etudes Indiennes 22-23, 2004-2005 [published in June 2007], pp. 23-70
(by Nalini Balbir, with full bibliography, including the reviews); The Jour-
nal of Jaina Studies (Japan), Vol. 13, September 2007, pp. 77-90 (by Nalini
Balbir, with list of papers related specifically to Jaina studies); Indologica
Taurinensia, VoL XXXIII, 2007, pp. 167-182 (by Nalini Balbir, with list of
books and articles published between 1988 and 2007); Journal Asiatique
295.1,2007, pp. 1-7 (by Nalini Balbir).
Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies
Volume 30 Number 1-2 2007 (2009) pp. 3-11
4
Renou (1896-1966), who had the deepest knowledge of the Vedas,
of Pat;lini and of the literary genres of classical Sanskrit, and Jules
Bloch (1880-1953), who drew the attention of his audience to the
whole history of Indo-Aryan, with Pali and Prakrits as intermedi-
ates, and to all aspects of Indian material and non-material cul-
ture. This latter influence explains why Colette Caillat learned, iii.
addition to Sanskrit and Middle Indo-Aryan languages, Hindi at
the School of Oriental Languages ("Langues Orientales") in Paris.
On the other hand, Colette Caillat has been from the beginnings
of her research on Jaina literature at the level of international re-
search in Indology, through the decisive collaboration with Walther
Schubring (1881-1969) in Hamburg, to Whom she was addressed
by Louis Renou, because nobody in France was proficient in the
texts of the Jaina tradition. Later, again under the recommendation
of Schubring, she became a collaborator of the Critical PaIi Dic-
tionary, an international venture based on the highest philological c
standards, the publication of which started in 1924. One should add
that she visited India for the first time in 1963, and that she worked
regularly there over the years, especially in Mysore and Ahmeda-
bad, being in friendly contacts with Jaina scholars. Therefore,
Colette Caillat has been able to combine her European scholarly
education with open-mindedness for the Indian culture, including
its contemporary aspects, but she never forgot the rational and his-
torical approach, that is based ultimately on the influential doctrine
Meillet (1866-1936), linking linguistics with social and
cultural history.
All works of Colette Caillat are characterized by great accuracy
in philological matters, lucidity of exposition, and high sensibility
to the texts. One should add Common sense, which is not the qual-
ity that is most frequently met among great Indologists. Accord-
ingly, her researches on the vocabulary and on minute details of
grammar were conceived as tools for understanding with the best
exactness the way of thinking of Indian authors of the past. This
method is certainly welcome for the understanding of literatures
that play consciously with the potentialities of the language itself.
COLETTE CAILLAT (15 Jan. 1921 - 15 Jan. 2007)
5
Colette Caillat has made a great contribution to a wider knowledge
of the Jaina religion and literature. As a matter of fact, she has
also emphasized the links between Jaina and Buddhist traditions,
despite their independence, on the linguistic as well as on the doc-
trinal side. Her doctoral thesis about the Atonements in the Ancient
Ritual of the Jaina Monks (1965)2 remains a masterpiece, since she
was able in a luminous style to disentangle a complicated doctrine
from the texts themselves and to explain it in a wider context, that
makes the difficult matter understandable for every humanist.
The bibliography of Colette Caillat is quite impressive: nine
personal books, mostly on Jaina texts, direction of eight books,3
around 90 articles and 190 reviews in various journals. I can testify
that Colette Caillat, since the beginning of her career, has read in
depth and annotated many works of Indologists of present and past
time. Therefore, every statement from her pen is based on long-
time thinking, pondering and immense learning. I remember that
she has followed with passion all advances about the interpretation
of the edicts of Asoka that remain a turning point of Indian lin-
guistic and cultural history. She said also that she never hesitated to
immerse herself in the monumental edition of the Gandhari Dhar-
mapada by John Brough (1962). It is no surprise that she has been
much interested in the past years in the publication of manuscripts
from several collections that emerged from the Gandhara region.
In some sense, her teaching and original contributions helped to
fully appreciate under the best angle the relevance of these doc-
uments for the history of Buddhism, which, in addition to their
intrinsic linguistic import, committed to oblivion some rash ear-
2 Date of the original publication in French; English translation published
in Ahmedabad, 1975.
3 Some of them are proceedings of conferences; others are editions of the
works of her teachers: Jules Bloch, Application de la cartographie a l' histoire
de l'indo-aryen, in collaboration with Pierre Meile, specialist of Dravidian
(Paris, 1963); Recueil d' articles de Jules Bloch 1906-1955 (Paris, 1985);
Louis Renou, Etudes vediques et palJineennes, t. XVII (Paris, 1969).
6
GEORGES-JEAN PINAUL T
lier generalizations based on less material. As an appendix to this
present memorial, I give a list of her articles devoted to Buddhist
studies and Middle Indo-Aryan linguistics, but I would insist on
the importance of her reviews, from which one can glean many im-
portant insights. To this list should be added the booklet Pour une
nouvelle grammaire du PaZi, Turin, 1970, based on a lecture given
at the Istituto di Indologia dell'Universita di Torino. This modest
publication (around 30 pages) actually paved the way to the ~ i n g u i s
tic interpretation of facts in a larger spectrum, including morphol-
ogy, syntax, derivation, thus replacing the innovations and stylistic
choices ofthe PaIi language into history.4 One of her last works was
the direction of a collective dossier about ancient Buddhism: "Le
bouddhisme ancien sur Ie chemin de l'Eveil. Les vies du Bouddha,
Nobles Verites et Octuple sentier. Philosophie ou religion?" for the
journal Religions & Histoire, Nr. 8, May-June 2006, pp. 12-75. It
testifies to her pedagogical talent in introducing the fundamentals
of the Buddhist way of thinking.
Colette Caillat was quite engaged in the teaching of Indology at
the University: having started her career in Lyon (1960-1965), she
succeeded Louis Renou at the Sorbonne in 1966, and she taught
there until her retirement in 1989. She was convinced that Indian
studies are as demanding as studies of classical languages: they
are worth of a complete course at the university. Her direct pupils
have much benefited from her teaching that was quite stimulating
because of her wide knowledge of all aspects of Indian culture and
of Indology. She was able to share with the audience her curios-
ity and even her love for everything Indian. As a former student,
I will always remember her unique way of pronouncing Pali and
ArdhamagadhI, which helped to communicate the feeling of living
and real languages. She has encouraged young researchers that had
different interests in the large field of Indology. One may say that
4 It has been openly taken into account in the handbook of Middle Indian
published by Prof. Dr. Oskar von Hiniiber, Das altere Mittelindisch im Uber-
blick, Vienna, 1
st
edition 1986, 2
nd
revised edition 2001.
7
several (French and non-French) Indologists, while having their
own intellectual aims, owe their degree to her benevolence and her
capacity to form a decent committee for a thesis; she had the abil-
ity to highlight the strong points of a student, while indicating the
weak points if needed. Her influence spread to scholars of other
countries, especially from Japan, where she had many friends,
some of them being former pupils, starting with Prof. Katsumi Mi-
maki (Kyoto). One may recall that the latter colleague gave the
name Kaya ("perfume" in Japanese) to his daughter, born 1977,
as a reminder of his Parisian teacher. While having strong convic-
tions, and being quite sympathetic towards modern trends, Colette
Caillat was both fair and friendly, and she never compromised firm
ethical principles. These personal features explain her wide influ-
ence and her role in several academic institutions, learned journals
and international committees; she served as treasurer of the In-
ternational Association for Sanskrit Studies (1977-2000), and she
was elected to the Presidency of the International Association of
Buddhist Studies (1999-2002). She conceived indological research
on an international basis, and was opposed to every form of nation-
alism, which turns often to chauvinism or sectarianism. She was
open to all sound advances in Indology; one could also say that she
could express a typical French irony against fuss and overstate-
ment, which belong to the usual pathology of scholarship. She was
very demanding of herself, and she was devoted to the transmis-
sion of the knowledge that she had received from her teachers and
friends, because it remains the basis of every future progress in the
understanding of the contribution of India to the universal culture.
8
Articles by Colette Caillat on Middle Indo-Aryan and Buddhist stud-
iess
Deux etudes de moyen-indien (1. A propos de pali philsuvihilra, ardhama-
gadhi phasuya-esalJ-ijja ; 2. Sur l' origine de gOlJ-a) , Journal Asiatique 248,
1960, pp. 41-64.
Nouvelles remarques sur les adjectifs moyen-indiens philsu, philsuya ,
Journal Asiatique 249, 1961, pp. 497-502.
Les derives moyen-indiens du type kilrima , Journal Asiatique 253, 1965,
pp. 289-308.
La sequence SHYTY dans les inscriptions indo-arameennes d' Asoka , Jour-
nal Asiatique 255, 1966, pp. 466-470. Following Emile Benveniste & Andre
Dupont-Sommer, Dne inscription indo-arameenne d'Asoka provenant de
Kandahar (Afghanistan) , ibid., pp. 437-465.
La finale -ima dans les adjectifs moyen- et neo-indiens de sens spatial ,
in : Melanges d'indianisme a la memoire de Louis Renou, Paris, De Boc-
card, 1968 (Publications de 1'Institut de Civilisation Indienne, n 28), pp.
187-204.
Isipatana migadaya , Journal Asiatique 256, 1968, pp. 177-183.
Pali ibbha, Vedic {bhya- , in : Lance Cousins et al. (eds.), Buddhist Studies
in honour of I.B. Horner, Dordrecht, D. Reidel, 1974, pp. 41-49.
A propos de sanskrit candrimil- 'clair de lune' , in : Melanges
ques offerts a Emile Benveniste, Paris (Collection Iinguistique pubIiee par la
Societe de Linguistique de Paris, t. 70), 1975, pp. 65-74.
Forms of the Future in the Gilndhilrf Dharmapada , in : Annals of the
Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1977-1978 (Diamond Jubi-
lee Volume), pp. 101-106.
Pronoms et adjectifs de similarite en moyen indo-aryen , in: Indianisme
et Bouddhisme. Melanges offerts a Mgr. Etienne Lamotte, Louvain-Ia-Neuve,
1980 (Publications de 1'Institut orientaliste de Louvain, n 23), pp. 33-40.
La langue primitive du bouddhisme , in : Heinz Bechert (ed.), The Lan-
guage of the Earliest Buddhist Tradition, Gottingen (Abhandlungen der Aka-
demie der Wissenschaften in Gottingen. Phil.-hist. Kl., 3. FoIge, Nr. 117),
1980, pp. 43-60.
5 A volume of selected papers on this topic is currently in preparation for
publication by the Pali Text Society.
COLETTE CAILLAT (15 Jan. 1921-15 Jan. 2007)
9
Etat des recherches sur les inscriptions d' Asoka , Bulletin d' Etudes In-
diennes 1, 1983, pp. 51-57.
Pali (langue; litterature) , in : Encyclopaedia Universalis, Paris, 1985,
Corpus, t. 13, pp. 986-988.
Prohibited speech and subhasita in the Buddhist Theravada tradition , In-
dologica Taurinensia 12, 1984, pp. 61-73 (Proceedings of the Scandinavian
Conference-Seminar ofIndological Studies, Stockholm, June 1''-5
t
\ 1982).
Notes bibliographiques : quelques publications recentes consacrees aux tra-
ditions manus crites du bouddhisme indien et aux conclusions generales qui
decoulent de leur etude , Bulletin d'Etudes Indiennes 2, 1984, pp. 61-69.
The Condemnation of False - Wrong Speech (musavada) in the Pali Scrip-
tures , in : Tatsuro Yamamoto (ed.), Proceedings of the 31
st
International
Congress of Human Sciences in Asia and North-Africa, Tokyo-Kyoto (31
st
August-7th September 1983), Tokyo, 1984, Vol. 1, pp. 201-202 (resume).
Grammatical Incorrections, Stylistic Choices, Linguistic trends (with ref-
erence to Middle Indo-Aryan) , in: Wolfgang Morgenroth (ed.), Sanskrit
and World Culture. Proceedings of the 4th World Sanskrit Conference (Wei-
mar, 1979), Berlin, Akademie Verlag, 1986 (Schriften zur Geschichte und
Kultur des Alten Orients, Nr. 18), pp. 367-373.
Sur l'authenticite linguistique des edits d' Asoka , in: Colette Caillat (ed.),
Dialectes et formes dialectales dans les litteratures indo-aryennes. Actes du
colloque international, Paris, De Boccard, 1986 (Publications de l'Institut de
Civilisation Indienne, nO 55), pp. 413-432.
The constructions mama krtam and mayii krtam in Asoka's edicts , in:
Albrecht Wezler & Ernst Hammerschmidt (eds.), Proceedings of the XXXII
International Congress of Asian and North African Studies (Hamburg, 25
th
-30
th
August 1986), Stuttgart, Franz Steiner Verlag, (ZDMG, Supplement
IX), 1992, p. 489.
Some idiosyncrasies oflanguage and style in Asoka's Rock Edicts at Gir-
nar , in: Harry Falk (ed.), Hinduismus und Buddhismus. Festschriftfur Ul-
rich Schneider, Freiburg, 1987, pp. 87-100.
Vedic ghraf!!sa- 'heat' of the sun, ArdhamagadhI ghif!!sU 'burning heat',
Jaina M a h a r a ~ t r I ghif!!_o 'hot season', in: Annals of the Bhandarkar Ori-
ental Research Institute 68 [Ramakrishna Gopal Bhandarkar 150th Birth-
Anniversary Volume], 1987, pp. 551-557.
Aspects de 1'epigraphie dans l' Asie du Sud et du Sud-Est , Comptes ren-
dus de I'Academie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, 1988, 4
e
fascicule, pp.
10
GEORGES-JEAN PINAUL T
1-12 (communication prononcee dans la seance publique annuelle du 18 no-
vembre 1988).
Notes grammaticales sur les documents de Niya , in : Akira
Haneda (ed.), Documents et archives provenant de I'Asie centrale. Actes du
colloque franco-japonais (Kyoto, 4-8 octobre 1988), Kyoto, Societe Franco-
Japonaise des Etudes Orientales, 1990, pp. 9-24.
Asoka et les gens de la brousse (XIII M-N) "qu'ils se repentent et cessent
de tuer", Bulletin d'Etudes Indiennes 9, 1991, pp. 9-13.
The 'double optative suffix' in Prakrit Asoka XIII (N) na hartmesu/na
haiiiieyasu , in: Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute
[Amrtamahotsava Volume] 72-73 (1991-1992), 1993, pp. 637-645.
Connections between Asokan (Shahbazgarhi) and Niya Prakrit? , Indo-
Iranian Journal 35, 1992, p. 109-119.
Deux notes de moyen indo-aryen. I. Les quatre themes de present de HAN-
en pali. II. 'Double optatif' en jaina ? , Bulletin d' Etudes Indien-
nes 10, 1992, pp. 97-111.
Doublets desinentiels en moyen indo-aryen , in : Reinhard Sternemann
(ed.), Bopp-Symposium 1992 der Humboldt-Universitiit zu Berlin (Akten der
Konferenz vom 24.3.-26.3.1992), Heidelberg, Universitatsverlag Carl Win-
ter, 1994, pp. 35-52.
Vedic and Early Middle Indo-Aryan , in : Michael Witzel (ed.), Inside the
texts, beyond the texts. New approaches to the study of the Vedas. Proceed-
ings of the International Vedic Workshop (Harvard University, June 1989),
Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard Oriental Series (Opera Minora, Vol. 2), 1997,
pp.15-32.
L'appel de la Loi ou l'age transcende , in : Christine Chojnacki (ed.), Les
ages de la vie dans Ie monde indien. Actes des journees d'etude de Lyon
(22-23 juin 2000), Lyon, 2001 (Collection du Centre d'Etudes et de Recher-
ches sur l'Occident Romain. Nouvelle serie, nO 24), pp. 325-332.
Gleanings from a Comparative Reading of Early Canonical Buddhist and
Jaina Texts , Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies
26/1,2003, pp. 25-50.
Manuscrits bouddhiques du Gandhara , Comptes rendus de l'Academie
des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, janvier-mars 2003, pp. 453-460.
L'epoque du Bouddha et la diffusion du bouddhisme , La doctrine des
Anciens (Thera-vada) , in : Religions & Histoire, n08, mai-juin 2006, pp.
14-17,36-42.
11
Articles in the Critical Piili Dictionary (CPD), Copenhagen, in Volume
II, from fascicle 7 (1971) to fascicle 15 (1990) : is-issayitatta, uddha-unnltaka,
upatapeti-upananda-sakyaputta, ekato-ekavasa, etadI-etava(ta), ettaka-ettavata,
edI-edisaka.
Reviews of fascicles of the CPD : Indogermanische Forschungen 71, 1966,
pp. 306-309 ; 74, 1969, pp. 223-225 ; 75, 1970, pp. 299-303 ; 78, 1973, pp.
247-249 ; 79, 1974, pp. 250-255 ; 81, 1976, pp. 327-329 ; 88, 1983, pp. 312-318 ;
Bulletin de la Societe de Linguistique de Paris 66/2, 1971, pp. 66-67 ; Comptes
rendus de l'Academie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres 1992, pp. 689-691.
In memoriam
NINO FORTE
(6 Aug. 1940 - 22 July 2006)
HUBERT DURT
Antonino Forte, who passed away in his beloved Kyoto during the rainy
season of 2006, was a pioneer in a new approach to Buddhist studies.
This approach cannot be separated from the Sicilian background of this
Sinologist and Historian born in Cefalu. Sicilian writers, and especially
the novelist Leonardo Sciascia who in his essays tried to define the spirit
of the island, were obsessed with the weight of the power of institutions,
or pseudo-institutions, hanging over the shoulders of a population com-
posed much more of country people than of seafarers. In the rather indo-
lent world of studies on Chinese Buddhism the title of the first book of A.
Forte, and in its revised version his last, Political Propaganda and Ideol-
ogy in China at the End of the Seventh Century, sounded like a gun shot.
"Propaganda" is a despised term, and so also, in a somewhat reduced
measure, is the term "ideology."
Opening the book, the reader is faced with a survey made with intense
scrupulousness, but also with much clarity, which unravels a double mach-
ination whose effects have persisted for almost thirteen centuries. The
first machination consisted in offering, by a group of eminent representa-
tives of the Buddhist clergy at the end of the first Tang age, of a pseudo
commentary on the well-known Great-Cloud Sutra (Mahiimeghasutra,
Dayunjing). This Indian Mahayanic sutra contains several prophetic ele-
ments, and the pseudo-commentary, found in the early twentieth century
among Dunhuang manuscripts, was intended to support the founding of
the Zhou dynasty (690-705) by Empress Wu. The commentary then dis-
appeared with the collapse of the ephemeral Zhou era.
Forte's outstanding annotated translation of the commentary forms
the second part of the book. But there was a second machination. After
the Zhou dynasty was abolished, the official (and sometimes Buddhist)
historiography of the second Tang age and following periods darkened
the memory of Empress Wu. This resulted in numerous misunderstand-
ings which were renewed when modern historians, mostly Chinese and
Volume 30 Number 1-22007 (2009) pp. 13-15
14
HUBERTDURT
Japanese, attempted a new evaluation of the troubled, but for many rea-
sons brilliant, reign of Empress Wu.
Much of the scholarly production of Forte was devoted to that short
but extremely important period of Chinese history, where we see a reign-
ing woman topple several taboos and initiate what could be considered
a Chinese enlightened policy. Forte's choice to concentrate on Chinese
Buddhist "ecclesiastical" documents, and especially on epigraphy, has
made his work extremely original and creative.
Following his seminal Political Propaganda, first published ip Naples
in 1976 and completely revised in the new edition of the Kyoto Italian
School of East Asian Studies, another major contribution on the Empress
Wu period was Forte's Mingtang and Buddhist Utopias in the History of
the Astronomical Clock. The Tower, Statue and Armillary Sphere Con-
structed by Empress Wu, jointly published by the EFEO of Paris and by
the IsMEO of Rome in 1988. In connection with these works, several of
Forte's articles deal with religious figures contemporary to Empress Wu:
Buddhist (including a monograph on Fazang's letter to Uisang) or non-
Buddhist as the Persian Aluohan (616-710).
Another book, which was also co-produced, this time by the Italian
School of East Asian Studies in Kyoto and the College de France in Paris,
was the edition of an unfinished study of Paul Pelliot, L'inscription ne-
storie nne de Si-ngan-fou in 1996. With the help of his indefatigable wife
Lilla, Forte not only edited and completed Pelliot's work, but he also
contributed no less than five appendices (pp. 349-495), which mark his
foray into the post-Wu period of the Tang dynasty. Furthermore, he un-
dertook some investigations on the Persian and Manichean relations of
the Tang empire, some of which have deep roots in the past, as shown by
his. everlasting interest in the archaic translator An Shigao (fl. ca. A.D.
148-170).
The magisterial and very homogenous scholarly written heritage left
by Antonino Forte is far from representative of the totality of his ac-
tivities. His various undertakings at his Alma Mater, the Istituto Uni-
versitario Orientale of Naples, currently called Universita degli Studi di
Napoli "L'Orientale," and at the Institut du H6b6girin of Kyoto, where
he was sent by the leader and inspirer of the H6b6girin Dictionary, Paul
Demieville, were the platform from which he later launched his major
projects, when he started the Italian School of East Asian Studies in
Kyoto, as its first and long-time director. His activities took, amongst oth-
ers, three special directions: the study of Chinese religious epigraphy,
the Italo-Chinese collaboration for the study of Longmen, and the Italo-
NINO FORTE (6 Aug. 1940 - 22 July 2006)
15
Japanese collaboration for the study of the Buddhist Canon kept at the
Nanatsuderain Nagoya.
Having known Nino Forte since 1964 (in Bordeaux), I keep the fond
memory of a friend with a warm smile, whose passion for research im-
mediately attracted to him the support of a plead of eminent Masters:
the already mentioned Paul Demieville, Giuseppe Tucci, Tsukamoto
Zenryu, and Makita Tairyo. Later (1976-1984), we became colleagues at
the Ecole d'Extreme-Orient in Kyoto. I benefited from his his-
toricallucidity and also from his expertise in computers when this new
technology was introduced into our studies. In the years that followed, I
saw for myself the inspiration he gave to his own students in Naples and
in Kyoto, where he spent close to twenty years, I witnessed his generosity
to students of every nationality engaged in East Asian studies. It would
be difficult not to find warm acknowledgment expressed to Nino Forte in
any work prepared in the stimulating atmosphere of the Italian School of
East Asian Studies during his directorship.
After having studiously spent every summer in Kyoto since his return
to Italy after his first directorship, Nino Forte had just begun a second
period as director in the Spring of 2006, when he sadly was defeated by
cancer. It is Silvio Vita, his able predecessor, who will once again take up
the direction of the School.
Although ultra-specialized in his field, Antonino Forte was not a man
secluded from his time: he was deeply active in the struggle for the pro-
tection of Old Kyoto from financial conspiracies, megalomaniac tenden-
cies, and the lack of consciousness accompanied by irreverence for the
past. He was, moreover, engaged in activities to prevent war in Iraq. In
him, in his wife Lilla, and in their daughter Erika, an archaeologist in the
field of Chinese and Central Asian Studies, I could always see the sacred
fire of devotion to Asia and to world peace.
Books
ANTONINO FORTE - LIST OF PUBLICATIONS
(Compiled by the late Prof. Antonino Forte
and amended by Erika Forte.)
1. Political Propaganda and Ideology in China at the End of the Seventh Cen-
tury. Inquiry into the Nature, Authors and Functions of the Tunhuang Docu-
ment S. 6502, Followed by an Annotated Translation. Istituto Universitario
Orientale, Napoli 1976.
2. Index des caracteres chinois dans les Fascicules I-V du Hobogirin. Mai-
sonneuve, Paris, Maison Franco-Japonaise, Tokyo 1984.
3. Mingtang and Buddhist Utopias in the History of the Astronomical Clock.
The Tower, Statue andArmillary Sphere Constructed by Empress Wu. Istituto
per il Medio edEstremo Oriente (Serie Orientale Roma, vol. LIX), Ecole
Fran9aise d'Extreme-Orient (vol. CXLV), Rome and Paris 1988.
4. The Hostage An Shigao and his Offspring. An Iranian Family in China.
Italian School of East Asian Studies (Occasional Papers 6), Kyoto 1995.
5. A Jewel in Indra's Net. The Letter Sent by Fazang in China to Uisang in
Korea. Italian School of East Asian Studies (Occasional Papers 8), Kyoto
2000.
6. Political Propaganda and Ideology in China at the End of the Seventh
Century. Inquiry into the Nature, Authors and Functions of the Tunhuang
Document S. 6502, Followed by an Annotated Translation (Second Edition).
Italian School of East Asian Studies (Monographs 1), Kyoto 2005.
Edited books
1. Gururajamaiijarika. Studi in onore di Giuseppe Tucci, 2 vols. Istituto Uni-
versitario Orientale, Napoli 1974. (Co-editor with Maurizio Taddei and Luigi
Polese Remaggi.)
2. Tang China and Beyond. Studies on East Asia from the Seventh to the
Tenth Century. Italian School of East Asian Studies (Essays 1), Kyoto 1988.
Volume 30 Number 1-2 2007 (2009) pp. 17-31
18
ANTONINO FORTE (1940-2006)
3. Maurizio Riotto, The Bronze Age in Korea. A Historical Archaeological
Outline. Italian School of East Asian Studies (Occasional Papers 1), Kyoto
1989.
4. Giuliano Bertuccioli, Travels to Real and Imaginary Lands. Two Lectures
on East Asia. With an Appendix: Francesco Carletti on Slavery and Oppres-
sion, by Antonino Forte. Italian School of East Asian Studies (Occasional
Papers 2), Kyoto 1990.
5. Tonami Mamoru, The Shaolin Monastery Stele on Mount Song. Italian
School of East Asian Studies (Epigraphical Series 1), Kyoto 1990. .
6. Hubert Durt, Problems of Chronology and Eschatology. Four Lectures on
the Essay on Buddhism by Tominaga Nakamoto (1715-1746). Italian School
of East Asian Studies (Occasional Papers 4), Kyoto 1994.
7. Claudio Zanier, Where the Roads met. East and West in the Silk Production
Processes (l7th to 19th Centuries). Italian School of East Asian Studies (Oc-
casional Papers 5), Kyoto 1994.
8. Paul Pelliot, L'inscription nestorienne de Si-ngan-fou. Italian School of
East Asian Studies (Epigraphical Series 2) and College de France, Kyoto and
Paris 1996.
9. Giorgio Amitrano, The New Japanese Novel. Popular Culture and Literary
Tradition in the Work of Murakami Haruki and Yoshimoto Banana. Italian
School of East Asian Studies (Occasional Papers 7), Kyoto 1996.
10. A Life Journey to the East. Sinological Studies in Memory of Giuliano
Bertuccioli (1923-2001). Italian School of East Asian Studies (Essays 2),
Kyoto 2002. (Co-edited with Federico Masini.)
Articles and reviews
1968
1. "An Shih-kao: biografia e note critiche." Annali dell'Istituto Orientale di
Napoli, 28 (1968), pp. 151-194.
1970
2. "La prima opera buddhista delle fonti giapponesi." Il Giappone, X (1970),
pp.43-52.
LIST OF PUBLICATIONS
19
3. Review: Fujishima Tateki "Gench6 K6hi no bukky6 shink6" :7G
IBK 16, 2. pp. 309-313. Revue Bihliographique de Si-
nologie, (1968-1970), p. 311.
1971
4. "11 P'u-sa cheng-chai ching e l'origine dei tre mesi di digiuno prolungato."
T'oung Pao, LVII (1971), pp. 103-134.
5. "The Ching-tu san-mei ching and the Tun-huang Manuscripts" by Tairy6
Makita. East and West, 21.3-4 (September-December 1971), pp. 351-361.
(Annotated translation from Japanese).
1973
6. "11 'Monastero dei grandi Chou' a Lo-yang." Annali dell'Istituto Orientale
di Napoli, 33 (1973), pp. 417-429.
7. "Deux etudes sur Ie manicMisme chinois: 1. Une poesie attribue a Po Chil-
i; II. Le manicMisme dans la region de Wen-chou en 1120." T'oung Pao,
LIX.l-5 (1973), pp. 220-253.
1974
8. "Divakara (613-688), un monaco indiano nella Cina dei T'ang." Annali
della Facolta di lingue e letterature straniere di Ca' Foscari, Ser. Or. 5, XIII
(1974), pp. 135-164.
9. "Un pensatore Vijfianavadin del VII secolo: Hsiian-fan." In Gururiijamaii-
jarikii. Studi in onore di Giuseppe Tucci, edited by Maurizio Taddei, Antoni-
no Forte and Luigi Polese Remaggi, Istituto Universitario Orientale, Napoli
1974, vol. II, pp. 559-570.
1979
10. "Ch6sai *'J1!f" (Prolonged Fast). In Hobogirin Dictionnaire
encyclopedique du Bouddhisme d'apres les sources chinoises et Japonaises,
V (1979), pp. 135-164 (with collaboration of Jacques May).
11. "Le moine Khotanais Devendraprajfia." Bulletin de l'Ecole Franraise
d'Extreme-Orient, LXVI (1979), pp. 289-298.
20
ANTONlNO FORTE (1940-2006)
1980
12. "Additions and Corrections to my Political Propaganda and Ideology in
China at the End of the Seventh Century." Annali dell'Istituto Orientale di
Napoli, 40 (1980), pp. 163-175.
1983
13. "Daiji (Chine)" (Great Monasteries in China). In HabiJgirin rt;)t
Dictionnaire encyclopedique du Bouddhisme d'apres les sources chi-
noises et Japonaises, VI (1983), pp. 682-704.
1984
14. "The Activities in China of the Tantric Master Manicintana (Pao-ssu-wei
?-721) from Kashmir and of his Northern Indian Collaborators." East and
West, 34.1-3 (September 1984), pp. 301-345.
15. "II persiano A1uohan (616-710) nella capita1e cinese Luoyang, sede del
Cakravartin." In Incontro di religioni in Asia tra il III e il X secolo d. c.,
edited by Lionello Lanciotti. Olschki, Firenze 1984, pp. 169-198.
16. "Daiungyasho 0 megutte" (About the Commentary
on the Great-cloud Satra). In Tonka to Chiigoku bukkya q:tOOfJ,.Wc
(Dunhuang and Chinese Buddhism), edited by Makita Tairyo and
Fukui Fumimasa Vol. no. 7 of the series Koza Tonko
DaitO shuppansha Tokyo 1984, pp. 173-206.
1985'
17. "Hui-chih (fl. 676-703 A.D.), a Brahmin Born in China." Annali
dell'Istituto Orientale di Napoli, 45 (1985), pp. 105-134.
18. "Brevi note suI testo kashmiro del Dhiirar;f-satra di AvalokiteSvara
dall'infallibile laccio introdotto in Cina da Manicintana." In Orientalia Iose-
phi Tucci memoriae dicata, edited by Gherardo Gno1i and Lionello Lanciotti,
Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente (Serie Orientale Roma, vol.
LVI, 1), Roma 1985, pp. 371-393.
19. "La Secte des Trois stades et l'heresie de Devadatta. Yabuki Keiki corrige
par Tang Yongtong." Bulletin de ecole Franraise d'Extreme-Orient, LXXIV
(1985), pp. 469-476.
20. "Itaria Tohogaku kenkyujo no sosetsu" ..{ y
(The foundation of the School of East Asian Studies in Kyoto). Tah6gaku *
(Eastern Studies), 69 (January 1985), pp. 163-167.
21
21. "The School of East Asian Studies (Tohogaku Kenkyujo) in Kyoto." An-
naZi dell'Istituto Orientale di Napoli, 45 (1985), pp. 357-365.
1986
22. "Scienza e tecnica." In Cina a Venezia. Dalla dinastia Han a Marco Polo.
Electa, Milano 1986, pp. 36-49.
23. "Science and Techniques." In China in Venice. From the Han Dynasty
to Marco Polo. Electa, Milano 1986, pp. 36-49. (English translation of no.
22.)
24. "II buddhismo e Ie altre religioni straniere." In Cina a Venezia. Dalla
dinastia Han a Marco Polo. Electa, Milano 1986, pp. 58-7l.
25. "Buddhism and the Other Foreign Religions." In China in Venice. From
the Han Dynasty to Marco Polo. Electa, Milano 1986, pp. 58-71. (English
translation of no. 24.)
26. Review: Recherches sur les chnfftiens d'Asie Centrale et d'Extreme-
Orient. II, I: La stele de Si-ngandou. Oeuvres Posthumes de Paul Pelliot.
Editions de la Fondation Singer-Polignac, Paris 1984. East and West, 36.1-3
(September 1986), pp. 313-315.
27. "The School of East Asian Studies (Tohogaku Kenkyujo) in Kyoto."
Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali, XXXIII, 5
(maggio 1986), p. 516.
1987
28. Review: Horward J. Wechsler, Offerings of Jade and Silk. Ritual and
Symbol in the Legitimation of the T'ang Dynasty. Yale University Press, New
Haven and London 1985. T'oung Pao, LXXIII.4-5 (1987), pp. 327-340.
1988
29. "Un gioiello della rete di Indra. La lettera che dalla Cina Fazang invio
a Uisang in Corea." In Tang China and Beyond. Studies on East Asia from
the Seventh to the Tenth Century, edited by Antonino Forte, Italian School of
East Asian Studies (Essays 1), Kyoto 1988, pp. 35-83.
1989
30. "Yutian seng Tiyunpanruo" (The Khotanese Monk De-
vendraprajiia). In Xu Zhangzhen (translator), Xiyu yu fojiao wenshi
lunji (A Collection of Literary and Historical Essays
22
Concerning the Western Regions and Buddhism), Xuesheng shuju Jj!1:..fili,
Taipei 1989, pp. 233-246. (Chinese version of no. 11; revised in 1988.)
31. Review: Stanley Weinstein, Buddhism under the T'ang. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge 1987. T'oung Pao, LXXVA-5 (1989), pp. 317-324.
32. Comment (in Japanese) to Nakanishi "Higashi Ajia ni
okeru Nihon Bunka. Hohoron 0 motomeru tame no joshQ"
S*xf[:; - (Japanese Culture in East Asia. In-
troductory Chapter in Search of a Methodology). In Sekai no naka no Nihon
l. Nihon kenkyu no paradaimu: Nihongaku to Nihon kenkyu. s*
I. A - (Japan in the World l. The Para-
digm of Japanese Studies: Japanology and Japanese Studies), Kokusai Ni-
hon Bunka Kenkyii senta (International Research
Center for Japanese Studies), Kyoto 1989, pp. 197-198.
1990
32. Foreword and editorial note to Tonami Mamoru, The Shaolin Monastery
Stele on Mount Song, edited by Antonino Forte, Italian School of East Asian
Studies (Epigraphical Series 1), Kyoto 1990.
33. "The Relativity of the Concept of Orthodoxy in Chinese Buddhism:
Chih-sheng's Indictment of Shih-Ii and the Proscription of the Dharma Mir-
ror Sutra." In Chinese Buddhist Apocrypha, edited by Robert E. Buswell, Jr.,
University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu 1990, pp. 239-249.
34. "Francesco Carletti on Slavery and Oppression." In Giuliano Bertuccioli,
Travels to Real and Imaginary Lands. Two Lectures on East Asia, edited by
Antonino Forte, Italian School of East Asian Studies (Occasional Papers 2),
Kyoto 1990, pp. 59-80.
"On Carletti's Book with Particular Reference to his Chapter Conc!rning
Japan." In Giuliano Bertuccioli, Travels to Real and Imaginary Lands. Two
Lectures on East Asia, edited by Antonino Forte, Italian School of East Asian
Studies (Occasional Papers 2), Kyoto 1990, pp. 81-85.
36. "ltaria no futatsu no tOyo kenkyii kikan"
(Two Italian Research Institutions for Oriental Studies) . .{?T Y (Itali-
ana), 1990.1, pp. 29-36.
37. "Studying at the Jinbun-ken." Kyoto daigaku tsiishin .... (Kyo-
to University Newsletter), 11 (November 1990).
23
1991
38. Foreword and Presentation to Ochiai Toshinori, The Manuscripts of
Nanatsu-dera. A Recently Discovered Treasure-House in Downtown Nagoya,
edited by Silvio Vita, Italian School of East Asian Studies (Occasional Pa-
pers 3), Kyoto 1991, pp. vii-ix, 1-3.
39. "My First Visit to Nanatsu-dera. Impromptu Notes and Impressions." In
Ochiai Toshinori, The Manuscripts of Nanatsu-dera. A Recently Discovered
Treasure-House in Downtown Nagoya, edited by Silvio Vita, Italian School
of East Asian Studies (Occasional Papers 3), Kyoto 1991, pp. 55-77.
1992
40. "Chinese State Monasteries in the Seventh and Eighth Centuries." In
Echo 6 Go-Tenjikkoku den kenkYLl (Huichao's Wang
Wu-Tianzhuguo zhuan Record of Travels in Five Indic Regions), edited by
Kuwayama ShOshin ,*=WJjE:i:f!, Kyoto daigaku Iinbun kagaku kenkyujo H:tIl
::k':A::x:f4,:1i3fJ'Em (Institute for Research in Humanities, Kyoto Universi-
ty), Kyoto 1992, pp. 213-258. (For a partial version in Japanese, see no. 54.)
41. "An Shigao and his Descendants." Bukkyo shigaku kenkYLl {?lJWl5t'.
(The Journal of the History of Buddhism), XXXV.l (July 1992), pp.
1-35.
42. "On the Subject of the Mingtang." Monumenta Serica, 40 (1992), pp. 387-
396. (Reflections on 1. Gernet's review of Mingtang and Buddhist Utopias in
the History of the Astronomical Clock, published in Toung Pao LXXVL4-5,
1990, pp. 337-340.)
43. "About Carletti's Attitude towards Slavery." East and West, 42.2-4 (De-
cember 1992), pp. 511-513.
44. Review: Nahal Tajadod, Mani Ie Bouddha de Lumiere. Catechisme mani-
chien chinois. Les editions du cerf, Paris 1990. Asian Folklore Studies, LI,2
(1992), pp. 367-369.
45. "Itaria TohOgaku kenkyujo" -{ l7 Y 7Jlt:1j':1i3fJ'Em (The Italian School of
East Asian Studies in Kyoto). TSLlshin (Circulaire de la Societe franco-
japonaise des etudes orientales), 14,15 (1992), pp. 26-27.
1993
46. "Again on the Subject of the Mingtang of the Empress Wu." Studies in
Central and East Asian Religions, 5/6 (1992-93), pp. 144-154.
24
47. Entries "An Shigao (fl. 148-170 circa)," "Bodhidharma (?-532?)," "Bud-
dha (566-486)," "Buddhismo," "Buddhismo cinese," "Buddhismo giap-
ponese," "Fazang (643-712)," "Nalanda," "Xuanzang (602?-664)," "Zen." In
Dizionario di storia e storiograjia, Edizioni .scolastiche Bruno Mondadori,
Milano 1993.
48. "A New Study on Manichaeism in Central Asia." Orientalistische Litera-
tur Zeitung 88.2 (Miirz/April1993), Nr. 1089, col. 117-124.
Review article of Moriyasu Takao Uiguru manikyo-shi no kenkya
':7-1 (A Study on the History of Uighur Manichaeism:
Research on Some Manichaean Materials and their Historical Background),
Osaka daigaku Bungaku-bu kiyo (Memoirs of the Fa-
culty of Letters Osaka University), Vols. XXXI and XXXII, August, 1991.
iii + 2 + 248 pages, 34 plates (of which the first 22 in colour), 23 figures, two
maps.
49. The Journal of Asian Studies, 52,1 (February 1993), pp. 107-'-108 (a com-
munication to the editor concerning the book Mingtang and Buddhist Uto-
pias in the History of the Astronomical Clock. The Tower, Statue and Armil-
lary Sphere Constructed by Empress Wu).
1994
50. "An Ancient Chinese Monastery Excavated in Kirgiziya." Central Asi-
atic Journal, 38.1 (1994), pp. 41-57.
51. (The Title of Grand Master in China and Japan). In
Hobogirin Dictionnaire encyclopedique du Bouddhisme d'apres
les sources chinoises et Japonaises, VII (1994), 1019-1034.
52. "Marginalia on the First International Symposium on Longmen Studies."
!$tudies in Central and East Asian Religions, 7 (1994), pp. 71-82.
53. "A Symposium on Longmen Studies, Luoyang, 1993." East and West,
44.2-4 (December 1994), pp. 507-516.
1995
54. "Shichi hachi seiki ni okeru Chugoku no kanji" 7 8i1!:{f,2.\;:;jOft0"POOO)
("Chinese State Monasteries in the Seventh and Eighth Centuries"), Ko-
dai bunka tl1-1(;:)(11::: (Cultura Antiqua), 47.7 (July 1995), pp. 380-390 (Eng-
lish summary, pp. 423-424). (A partial version in Japanese of no. 40.)
55. "Nanatsu-dera z6 Daijo Bishamon kudoku kyo 'ZenshO-bon' dai ni (hon-
koku)" (wtU) (,The Sujata Chapter,'
Second juan of the Satra of the Merits of of the Great Vehicle
25
in the Nanatsu-dera [reproduced]). Setsuwa bungaku kenkya
(Studies on Legendary Literature), 30 (1995), pp. 121-131. In collaboration
with Toshinori. Ochiai and Silvio Vita.
56. Foreword to Inventaire sommaire des manuscrits et imp rimes ehinois de
la Bibliotheque Vatieane. A posthumous work by Paul Peliiot, edited by Taka-
ta Tokio, Italian School of East Asian Studies, Kyoto 1995, pp. VII-IX.
1996
57. Foreword to Paul Pelliot, L'inseription nestorienne de Si-ngan-j'ou, edited
with supplements by Antonino Forte, Italian School of East Asian Studies
(Epigraphical Series 2) and College de France, Kyoto and Paris 1996, pp.
vii-xii.
58. Avant-propos to Paul Pelliot, L'inseription nestorienne de Si-ngan-jou,
edited with supplements by Antonino Forte, Italian School of East Asian
Studies (Epigraphical Series 2) and College de France, Kyoto and Paris 1996,
pp. xiii-xix.
59. "The Edict of 638 Allowing the Diffusion of Christianity in China." In
Paul Pelliot, L'inscription nestorienne de Si-ngan-jou, edited with supple-
ments by Antonino Forte, Italian School of East Asian Studies (Epigraphical
Series 2) and College de France, Kyoto and Paris 1996, pp. 349-373.
60. "On the So-called Abraham from Persia. A Case of Mistaken Identity."
In Paul Pelliot, L'inseription nestorienne de Si-ngan-jou, edited with supple-
ments by Antonino Forte, Italian School of East Asian Studies (Epigraphical
Series 2) and College deFrance, Kyoto and Paris 1996, pp. 375-428.
61. "The Chongfu-si in Chang'an. A Neglected Buddhist Monastery
and Nestorianism." In Paul Pelliot, L'inscription nestorienne de Si-ngan-jou,
edited with supplemerits by Antonino Forte, Italian School of East Asian
Studies (Epigraphical Series 2) and College de France, Kyoto and Paris 1996,
pp. 429-472.
62. "A Literary Model for Adam. The Dhfita Monastery Inscription." In Paul
Pelliot, L'inscription nestorienne de Si-ngan-jou, edited with supplements by
Antonino Forte, Italian School of East Asian Studies (Epigraphical Series 2)
and College de France, Kyoto and Paris 1996, pp. 473-487.
63. "Additional Remarks" to Paul Pelliot, L'inscription nestorienne de Si-
ngan-j'ou, edited with supplements by Antonino Forte, Italian School of East
Asian Studies (Epigraphical Series 2) and College de France, Kyoto and
Paris 1996, pp. 489-495.
26
64. "Kuwabara's misleading thesis on Bukhara and the family name An "ii."
Journal of the American Oriental Society, 116.4 (1996), pp: 645-652.
65. "On the Identity of Aluohan (616-710), a Persian Aristocrat at the Chi-
nese Court." In La Persia e l'Asia Centrale. Da Alessandro al X secolo, Ac-
cademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Roma 1996, pp. 187-197.
66. "The Origins and Role of the Great Fengxian Monastery at
Longmen." Annali dell'Istituto Orientale di Napoli, 56.3 (1996), pp. 365-
387.
1997
67. "Longmen Da Fengxian si de qiyuan ji diwei"
ill ("On the Beginning and Status of Big Fengxian Temple at the Longmen
Grotto"), Zhongyuan wenwu rpJJl'i:JtIfto (Cultural Relics of Central China),
1997.2, pp. 83-92. (A Chinese translation [unchecked by the author] of a
preliminary version of no. 66. Published under the author's Chinese name
Fu Andun
68. "Fazang's Letter to Uisang. Critical Edition and Annotated Translation."
In Kegongaku ronshu (Collected Essays on Avatal1lsaka Stud-
ies), edited by the Kamata Shigeo hakushi koki kinenkai
Daizo shupp an Tokyo 1997, pp.109-129.
1998
67. "Some Considerations on the Historical Value of the Great Zhou Cata-
logue." In Chiigoku Nihon kyoten shOsho mokuroku rpOO
(Catalogues of Scriptures and their Commentaries in China and Japan), 6th
volume of the Nanatsudera koitsu kyoten kenkyii sosho
(The Long Hidden Scriptures of Nanatsu-dera, Research Series), edited by
Makita Tairyo and Ochiai Toshinori Daito shuppansha
*J![tI:lJjR1lf, Tokyo 1998, pp. 21-34 of the German and English part of the
book.
68. "Da Shu kantei shukyo mokuroku juichi" (The
Eleven Fascicle of the Da Zhou kanding mulu). In Chugoku Nihon kyoten
shOsho mokuroku rpOO of Scriptures and
their Commentaries in China and Japan), 6th volume of the Nanatsudera
koitsu kyoten kenkyu sosho (The Long Hidden Scrip-
tures of Nanatsu-dera, Research Series), edited by Makita Tairyo
and Ochiai Toshinori Daito shuppansha **tI:lJjR1lf, Tokyo 1998,
pp.3-58.
27
69. "The Maitreyist Hl1aiyi (d. 695) and Taoism." Tang yanjiu (Jour-
nal o/Tang Studies), IV (1998), pp. 15-29.
70. "Wu Zhao de mingtang yu (The
Mingtang of Wu Zhao and the Astronomical Clock). In Wu Zetian yanjiu
lunwenji (Collected Research Papers on Wu Zetian), ed-
ited by Zhao Wenrun Li Yuming Shanxi guji chubanshe
Taiyuan 1998, pp. 140-147. (A Chinese translation [un-
checked by the author] of the concluding part (pp. 253-260) of Mintang and
Buddhist Utopias in the History o/the Astronomical Clock (see Books, no. 3).
Published under the author's Chinese name Fu Andun
71. Review: Silvio A. Bedini, The trail 0/ time. Time measurement with in-
cense in East Asia. Shih-chien ti tsu-chi, Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, 1994. xvii + 342 pp. Archives Internationales d'Histoire des Sciences,
vol. 48 no. 140 (1998), pp. 225-226.
1999
72. "The Sabao iiiJf Question." The Silk Roads Nara International Sympo-
sium '97. Vol. 4: The Silk Road of Sanzo-Hoshi Xuanzhuang: The Climate
and His Foot-Steps. Research Center for Silk Roadology, Nara, March 1999,
pp.80-106.
73. "Sappo mondai" (The Sabao Question). Shirukurodo Nara
kokusai shinpojiumu kirokushu Vol. 4: Sanzo hoshi Genjo no Shirukurodo:
Fudo to ashiato p- 4:
p- Silk Roads Nara International Sympo-
sium Vol. 4: The Silk Road of Trepitaka Master of the Law Xuanzang: Natu-
ral Features and [Xuanzang's] Footsteps). Shirukurodogaku kenkyu sentli
)v::7 p- (Research Center for Silk Roadology), Nara 1999,
pp. 102-124. (Japanese version of no. 72.)
74. "Francesco Carletti sulla schiavitu e l'oppressione." Strumenti critici
XVI.2 (maggio 1999), pp. 1-21. (Italian revised version of the article "Fran-
cesco Carletti on Slavery and Oppression" published in 1990).
75. "The Maitreyist Huaiyi (d. 695) and Taoism. Additions and Corrections."
Tang yanjiu (Journal o/Tang Studies), V (1999), pp. 35-38. (A Chi-
nese summary of no. 69, as augmented and emended in no. 75, is on pp.
38-40 of the same journal: "Milejiao zhe Huaiyi [695 nian zu] yu daojiao
[tiyao]"
76. "The Clock and the Perfect Society." Kyoto Journal, 42 (1999), pp. 28-
31.
28
ANTONINO FORTE (1940--'2006)
2000
77. "Iranians in China. Buddhism, Zoroastrianism, and Bureaus of Com-
merce." Cahiers 11 (1999-2000), pp. 277-290. (English ver-
sion of no. 78.)
78. "Iraniens en Chine. Bouddhisme, mazdeisme, bureaux de commerce."
In La Serinde, terre d'echanges. Art, religion, commerce, du Ier au Xe siecle.
Actes du colloque international Galeries nationales du Grand Palais 13-14-
15 fevrier 1996, edited by Jean-Pierre Drege, La Documentation fran<;:aise,
Paris 2000, pp. 181-190.
79. ''Additions and Corrections to A Jewel in Indra's Net." Cahiers d'Extreme-
Asie, 11 (1999-2000), pp. 345-348.
2001
80. "The Five Kings of India and the King of Kucha who According to the
Chinese Sources Went to Luoyang in 692." In Le parole e i marmi. Studi in
onore di Raniero Gnoli nel suo 70 compleanno, edited by Raffaele Torella,
Serie Orientale Roma XCII, Istituo Italiano per l'Africa e l'Oriente, Roma
2001, pp. 261-283.
81. "Fazang e Sakyamitra (fl. 664-670), un medico singalese del settirno
secolo alIa corte cinese." In Filosofia, storiografia, letteratura. Studi in onore
di Mario Agrimi, edited by Bernardo Razzotti, Editrice Itinerari, Lanciano,
2001, pp. 925-962. (Italian version of no. 82.)
2002
82. "Fazang and Sakyamitra, a Seventh-century Singhalese Alchemist at the
Chinese Court." In Zhong shiji yiqian de diyu wenhua, zongjiao yu yishu
(Regional Culture, Religion, and Arts
before the Seventh Century). Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Disanjie guoji hanxue
huiyi lunwenji, lishi (Pa-
pers from the Third International Conference on Sino logy, History Section),
edited by I-tien Hsing (Xing Yitian) Zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi
yuyan yanjiusuo (Institute of History and Phi-
lology, Academia Sinica), Taipei 2002, pp. 369-419.
83. "The South Indian Monk Bodhiruci (d. 727). Biographical Evidence." In
A Life Journey to the East. Sinological Studies in Memory of Giuliano Ber-
tuccioli (1923-2001), edited by Antonino Forte and Federico Masini, Scuola
Itahana di Studi sull'Asia Orientale (Essays 2), Kyoto 2002, pp. 77-116.
29
84. "The Chinese Title of the Manichaean Treatise from Dunhuang." An-
nali dell'Universita degli studi di Napoli "L'Orientale", 62.1-4 (2002), pp.
229-243. (English modified version of no. 87.)
2003
85. "Daisojo ::k{)!fj]E" (Grand Rector of the Sa:rp.gha). Hobi5girin
Dictionnaire encyclopedique du Bouddhisme d'apres les sources chinoises et
Japonaises, VIII (2003), pp. 1043-1070.
86. "Daitoku ::k1ffJJ" (The Title of Great-Virtue). Hobi5girin Dic-
tionnaire encyclopedique du Bouddhisme d'apres les sources chinoises et
Japonaises, VIII (2003), pp. 1071-1085.
87. "II titolo cinese del Traite manicheen." In Turcica et Islamica. Studi in
memoria di Aldo Gallotta (Series Minor 64), edited by Ugo Marazzi, Univer-
sita degli Studi di Napoli "L'Orientale," Napoli, vol. I, pp. 215-243.
88. "Suowei Bosi 'Yabolahan.' Yili cuowu de biding." -
("On the So-called Abraham from Persia. A Case of Mis-
taken Identity"). In Tangdai jingjiao zai yanjiu (New Re-
flections on Nestorianism of the Tang Dynasty), edited by Lin Wushu
:7,*, Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe r:p (China Academy
of Science Press), Beijing 2003, pp. 231-267. (An abridged Chinese transla-
tion [unchecked by the author] by Huang Lanlan of no. 60, published
under the author's Chinese name Fu Andun
89. "La Scuola di Studi sull'Asia Orientale di Kyoto. Note sparse." In Italia-
Giappone 450 anni, edited by Adolfo Tamburello, Istituto Italiano per l'Africa
e l'Oriente, Roma, and Universita degli Studi di Napoli "L'Orientale," Napoli
2003,pp.712-723.
90. "On the Origin of the Purple in China." In Buddhist Asia 1.
Papers from the First Conference of Buddhist Studies Held in Naples in May
2001, edited by Giovanni Verardi and Silvio Vita, Italian School of East
Asian Studies, Kyoto 2003, pp. 145-166.
91. "L'intervista a Buddhapalita nel 677 0 all'inizio del 678." In Studi in on-
ore di Umberto Scerrato per il suo settantacinquesimo compleanno, edited
by Maria Vittoria Fontana and Bruno Genito, Universita degli studi di Napoli
"L'Orientale" and Istituto Italiano per l'Africa e l'Oriente, Napoli 2003, pp.
369-384.
92. Review: Maurizio Scarpari, Ancient China: Chinese Civilization from ist
Origins to the Tang Dynasty. Barnes and Noble Books, 2000. Journal of the
American Oriental Society, 123.4 (2003), pp. 851-860.
30
2004
93. "Remarks on Chinese Sources on Diva:kara (613-688)." In Chugoku
shukyo bunken kenkyu kokusai shinpojiumu hokokusho
(Report of the International Symposium: Researches
on Religions in Chinese Script), Kyoto daigaku Jinbun kagaku kerikyiijo *
(Institute for Research in Humanities, Kyoto Univer-
sity), Kyoto, December 2004, pp. 75-82.
2005
94. "Cenni storici e re1azioni estere, religioni straniere, scienze." In Tang.
Arte e cultura in Cina prima dell'anno Mille, edited by Lucia Caterina and
Giovanni Verardi, Electa, Napoli 2005, pp. 25-37.
95. "II monaco indiano Bodhiruci (m. in Cina nel 727). Note biografiche." In
Studi in onore di Luigi Po lese Remaggi, edited by Giorgio Amitrano, Lucia
Caterina, Giuseppe De Marco, Universita degli Studi di Napoli "L'Orientale"
(Series Minor LXIX), Napoli 2005, pp. 199-242.
2006
96. "Buddhismus und Politik - Die Kaiserin Wu Zetian und der Famen-Tem-
pel." In Xi'an. Kaiserliche Macht im Jenseits. Grabfunde und Tempelschiitze
aus Chinas alter Hauptstadt (Catalogue of the exhibition held at the Kunst-
und Ausstellungshalle der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in Bonn, April 21
- July 23, 2006), Philipp von Zabern, Mainz 2006,pp. 109-119.
97. "Brief Notes on the Kashmiri Text of the Dhiirm;! Sutra of AvalokiteSvara
of the Unfailing Rope Introduced to China by Manicintana (d. 721)." In Tang-
dai fojiao yu fojiao yishu (Tang Buddhism and Bud-
dhist Art) edited by Kathy Cheng-mei Ku (Gu Zhengmei) Chuefeng
fojiao yishu jijinhui (Chuefeng Buddhist Art and Culture
Foundation), Taiwan 2006, pp. 13-28. (A revised version of no. 18.)
2007
98. "Jibakara ni kan suru kango shiryo" (Re-
marks on Chinese Sources on Diva:kara). In Chugoku shukyo bunken kenkyu
(Researches on Religions in Chinese Script), edited by
Kyoto daigaku Jinbun kagaku kenkyiijo (Institute
for Research in Humanities, Kyoto University), Rinsen shoten I:lii;) 11:J:J;5,
Kyoto 2007, pp. 109-117.
31
Listed as "forthcoming articles" in 2006
i. Entries "Daiunky5 "Daiunji and "An Seik5 in
Chilgoku bunkashi daijiten r:pOOJt1t:.se:kI'i"fA (provisional title), to be pub-
lished by Taishukan, Tokyo.
2. "The So-called Buddhapalita Chinese Version of the vi-
jaya dhiiralJfsiltra and its preface." In Kuo Liying (ed.), volume in honour of
Makita Tairy5.
3. "Scrittura e ideologia in Cina. Note sui caratteri particolari del periodo
689-705." A paper presented at the .conference "II testo, il supporto e la fun-
zione." Cortona and Viterbo, 13-15 Novembre 2003.
4. "On the Origins of the Great Fuxian Monastery in Luoyang."
Rome, July 24, 2009
THE FORMULATION OF INTRODUCTORY TOPICS AND
THE WRITING OF EXEGESIS IN CHINESE BUDDHISM
1
TAOJIN
As a guide to the interpretation of sutras, introductions in Chinese
Buddhist commentaries almost always present a wide range of top-
ics that allow commentators to survey the texts they comment upon
from various different perspectives. The formulation of these intro-
ductory topics varies with commentators and, in many cases, also
with commentaries of the same commentator. While, for example,
Zhiyi (538-597) adheres steadfastly to his famous model of "five
aspects of profound meaning" (wuchong xuanyi), regarding the
"title" (ming) of the work, the "essence" (ti), "central tenet" (zong)
and "function" (yang) of the religious truth taught in it, and the
"characteristics" (xiang) that set one sutra apart from another on
the basis of these four aspects,2 his slightly younger contemporary
1 This paper is adapted from a chapter of my 2008 dissertation, "Through
the Lens of Interpreters: the Awakening of Faith in Mahayana in Its Classi-
cal Re-presentations;" an earlier version of this chapter was presented in the
2005 Annual Meeting of American Academy of Religion. I want to thank the
anonymous reviewer of the JIABS for his or her careful and insightful com-
ments and suggestions.
2 For a discussion of the structural relationship of these "five aspects," see
below, section three: Elaboration of teaching: from essence to its manifesta-
tions. The topic of "characteristics" is designed to differentiate a particular
sutra from others, or to determine its position in a tradition by comparing
its "characteristics" with those of others. A commentary of the Sutra of the
benevolent kings (Renwanghuguoboruojing shu) thus spells out this sense of
"differentiation" as follows: '''Teaching' (jiao) refers to the words with which
sages edify the people, and 'characteristics' differentiate similarities from
differences (in various such teachings)" (T33n1705p255b9). It is perhaps for
this sense of "differentiation" that the topic of "characteristics" is often used
Volume 30 Number 1-2 2007 (2009) pp. 33-79
34
TAOJIN
Jizang (549-623) appears to be much less focused and organized
in his exegetical attention - indeed, he has never really settled on
any set of introductory topics, sometimes even allowing the list of
his inquiries to be rampantly open,3 and occasionally also find-
ing it convenient to borrow Zhiyi's "five aspects.'>! Such examples
abound in Chinese Buddhist commentaries and, together, they am-
ply demonstrate the variation in the formulation of introductory
topics in the writing of exegesis in Chinese Buddhism.
This variation draws our attention to the breadth and depth of
commentators' introductory surveys, for it asks us to think about
what questions different commentators raise in their introductions,
and how they in their respective ways understand, organize and
present these questions - with the former reflecting the breadth of a
survey and the latter, the depth. Put in other words, such a variation
directs our attention, not to what is said in commentaries, but to
how it is said, or, using the words of this article, not to the content
of exegesis, but to the writing of exegesis.
This attention to the writing of exegesis is, apparently, not
something new. In his magnum opus on the history of Chinese
Buddhism, Tang Yongtong touches upon the issues of origination
and methods of the Chinese Buddhist exegesis;5 Mou Runsun ex-
plores the relationship between siitra lectures and commentaries in
his 1959 comparative study of the Confucian and Buddhist exege-
, ~ i s from, particularly, the perspective of rituals performed during
to discuss the practice of doctrinal classification (panjiao).
3 For example, he has ten topics in Milejing youyi (T38n1771), and these
ten still do not seem to have exhausted all that he wants to ask about that sutra,
because his tenth topic "clarification of miscellaneous issues" (zaliaojian) is
made, apparently, to include more or "miscellaneous issues."
4 See, for example, the introduction of his Renwangboruojing shu,
T33n1707.
5 Tang, Hanwei liangjin nanbeichao fojiaoshi, pp. 114-20 & 546-52.
INTRODUCTORY TOPICS AND EXEGESIS IN CHINESE BUDDHISM 35
those lectures;6 OchO Enichi's 1979. "Shakuky6shik6" presents a
comprehensive inquiry into the evolution of the Chinese Buddhist
exegesis;7 the conference on and the subsequent publication of Bud-
dhist Hermenutics in 1988 look at the "principles for the retrieval of
meaning," an indispensable element in the interpretation of sutras;8
and, in his 1999 study of Chinese prajiiii interpretation, Alexander
Mayer assigns three levels of significance to Buddhist interpreta-
tion, namely, exposition, exegesis, and hermeneutics.
9
This list has
been continuously growing in recent decades.lO
While scholars have approached the writing of exegesis from all
these various perspectives, the formulation of introductory topics
has remained largely an unexplored subject. This subject entails
such questions as: What questions are generally asked to introduce
a sutra? How are these questions related to each other or, in other
words, how do commentators categorize their inquiries in different
ways? And, more importantly, how do the asking and re-asking
of these questions expand and deepen the exegetical inquiry into
sutras and, in that sense, contribute to the development in the writ-
ing of exegesis in Chinese Buddhism? This article thus aims to ad-
dress these previously unanswered questions by focusing its atten-
tion on the formulation of introductory topics in Chinese Buddhist
commentaries.
6 Mou, "Lun rushi liangjia zhijiangjing yu yishu," pp. 353-415.
7 OchO, "Shakukyoshiko," pp. 165-206.
8 Lopez, ed., Buddhist Hermeneutics, p. 1.
9 Mayer, "The Vajracchedika-sutra and the Chinese Prajfiil Interpreta-
tion."
10 Continuously broadened and deepened in recent years, the scholarly at-
tention to the writing of exegesis has been mostly focused on a number of ma-
jor topics, such as the practice of "matching of meaning" (geyi) in the initial
stage of Buddhism's introduction into China, satra lectures, sutra transla-
tion, relationship among Confucian, Daoist and Buddhist exegesis, and re-
lationship between Buddhist exegesis and popular literature, and between
Buddhist exegesis and literary theory.
36
TAOJIN
While it is difficult to give a conclusive list of all introductory
topics actually used in Chinese Buddhist commentaries, several
themes in the introductory inquiries appear to be more recurrent
than others. Even it is difficult to reproduce the exact course in
which these themes evolved, such a course can be seen roughly
as characterized by a movement of commentators' attention from
brief thematic discussions, which rely heavily on the explanation of
title, to elaborations of the introductory survey from v ~ r i o u s per-
spectives. Hence the following list of seven themes, on the basis of
which the formulation of introductory topics is to be treated below
in seven sections:
ll
1. title
2. introductory summary
3. elaboration of teaching
4. arising of teaching
5. central tenet
6. medium of truth
7. classification of teachings
The first two revolve around title and its role in the writing of an
introduction, and the remaining five elaborate upon the process of
introductory survey, with the third as a general discussion and the
last four as discussions of a few specific themes frequently exam-
ined in that elaboration. As a general pattern of discussion, each
of the seven sections is engaged primarily with two tasks, i.e., a
,:general overview of a particular theme and a look at the introduc-
II Well-known as they may be, these seven themes have apparently not
exhausted all questions commentators have asked of their siitras. They also
look, for example, at the audience of teaching, among many others, and this
theme gives rise to such introductory topics as Jizang's "number of people at-
tending (Buddha'S) assembly (of Dharma)" (huiren duoshao, T38nl771) and
"believers and followers" (tuzhong, T35n1731 and T38n1780), Won'chuk's
"sentient beings (for whom) the teaching is intended" (suowei youqing,
T33n1708), Wonhyo's "categorization of people" (juren fenbie, T37n1747),
Kuiji's "clarification of the time (in which) and the faculties (for which) the
teaching (is given)" (bianjiao shiji, T43n1830), and many of Fazang's "facul-
ties (for which) the teaching is intended" (jiaosuo beiji).
tory topics formulated on that basis, though not necessarily always
distinctly in such an order.
1. Explanation of work title
To most Chinese Buddhist exegetes, explanation of title is perhaps
the most natural and most logical first step in the writing of intro-
duction. Located in the beginning of a text, title is naturally the
first thing that catches a commentator's attention, and, perceived
as embodying the central tenet of a sutra,12 it is treated, logically,
as the most ideal platform for a thematic survey of that sutra. It is
probably for this reason that the Chinese Buddhist exegetes always
start their exegesis with an effort to kai-ti, or to "layout the subject
matter (through the explanation of title),"13 and it is for this same
reason that almost all commentaries contain a section on title and,
in many cases, such a section begins a commentary. In fact, the
12 For example, in his Wuliangshoujing yishu, Huiyuan lists ten types of
title, five of which, i.e., 1", 7th, 8
th
, 9
t
h, and 10
th
, are represented as embody-
ing central tenet, either completely or partially
Even when it does not fall into one of these five categories, commentators
still tend to use title to discuss central tenet in their introductions. For an
example see Wonhyo's "main ideas" (dayi) in his
Mileshangshengjing zongyao, where the "main ideas" of teaching are sum-
marized through a discussion of the future Buddha Maitreya (i.e., "Mile" in
Chinese), after whom the satra is named.
13 The word ti in kai-ti refers to "subject matter" instead of its more obvi-
ous meaning of "title," although the word itself can be understood in both
ways. Thus, to kai (i.e., open) ti is to "layout the subject matter." However,
if we take a look at the content of kai-ti-xu, (i.e., introduction laying out the
subject matter), such as those in Jizang (ex., T34nl722p633b12) and Kuiji
(ex., T33n1695p26a19), it is quite clear that the laying out of ti as subject mat-
ter relies heavily on the explanation of ti as title. In that sense, it would be not
unreasonable to suggest that, in the context of Chinese Buddhist exegesis,
when a commentator sets out to kai-ti, he thinks not only of the "subject mat-
ter," but also of the "title" that embodies such a "subject matter."
38
TAOJIN
introductory sections in many early are devoted al-
most entirely to the explanation of title.
14
The interest in title is expressed in two different perceptions
about its role in the writing of commentaries. On the one hand,
believed to embody central tenet, title is sometimes treated as a
means of exegesis, i.e., title is sometimes used to summarize and
bring out the central tenet of a sutra as a way to begin a com-
mentary.lS On the other hand, however, the increasing attention to
title itself also allows it to be treated as an end of exegesis, i.e., an
introductory topic in its own right, which can be examined for its
various aspects, such as those philological, textual, biographical,16
typological and etc. A typological analysis of title by Huiyuan is
given below as an illustration:
The title of a sutra (is formed) differently, and (its formation) contains
many varieties. Some (are formed to) reflect the Dharma (ofthe sutra);
some (are formed) from the perspective of the person (who teaches the
Dharma); some, in accordance with the event (in which the Dharma is
taught); some, to follow the metaphor (of the Dharma); some, to dwell
upon the person and the Dharma; some, on (both) the Dharma and the
metaphor; some, on (both) the event and the Dharma. Such examples
are simply innumerableP
14 See, for example, the introductions in Dao'an's Renbenyushengjing zhu
(T33n1693), Sengzhao's Zhu weimojiejing (T38nl775), and the ten commen-
taries compiled in the Dapanniepanjing jijie (The Collected explanations of
the NirvalJasatra, T37n1763; hereafter referred to as the "Collected explana-
tions" for the sake of convenience).
15 This role will be discussed further in section two: Summary of teaching
as pre-introduction.
16 Because the discussion of title sometimes includes a discussion of au-
thor; see also the discussion of the close association between "intention,"
"author" and "title" (as well as the notes thereof) in section four: Accounting
for the arising of teaching: intention, conditions and transmission.
17 T37n1764p613b15-b17.
The interest in title finds its most sophisticated expression in Zhiyi's
commentaries, where the two perceptions of its role fuse and the
examination Of title becomes extremely complex. On the one hand,
Zhiyi sometimes devotes an entire commentary to the expJ.anation
of title, making title ostensibly the only task and therefore the end
of his exegesis; but on the other hand, he subsumes various issues
surrounding a sutra under the framework of the explanation of title,
clearly treating title as a means to his exegesis. Take, for example,
his multi-level discussion of the title Vimalakfrtinirddasutra:
18
At the first level, he divides the title into Vimalakfrtinirdda and
sutra:
19
This explanation of title can be divided into two sections: Section one
explains the specific name (i.e., Vimalakfrtinirdesa), and section two
explains the general name (Le., satra).
By thus making the first section "specific," and the latter "general,"
the commentator presents and contrasts these two aspects of sig-
nificance and, in doing so, links this specific work to a larger con-
text of similar sutras. At the second level, the commentator further
divides the "specific" name of Vimalakfrtinirdda into Vimalaklrti
and nirdda:
This explanation of specific name can be divided into two sections:
Section one explains Vimalaklrti, and section two explains nirdea.
20
In doing so, the commentator separates issues related to the person
who speaks the Dharma and issues about the Dharma spoken by
that person. At the third level, he specifies the issues related to the
person, listing them as translation, practice, classification of teach-
ings, and a basis-ramification (ben-ji) relationship, i.e.,
First, the explanation of Vimalaklrti is divided into four sections: 1.
Translation of the name and explanation of its meanings; 2. Explana-
tion (of the name from the perspective of) three contemplations; 3.
18 See his Weimojing xuanshu, T38nl777p524b05-554b18.
19 T38n1777p524b6.
20 T38n1777p524b18-b19.
40
TAOJIN
(Explanation of the name from the perspective of) the four-teaching
classification; 4. (Explanation of the name from the perspective of)
the basis and the ramifications of Vimalakirti.
21
Each of these four perspectives receives still further divisions, and
such a bifurcation continues for several more levels, exploring is-
sues related to the title in further and greater details, an act that
reinforces the impression of the complexity and therefore maturity
in the treatment of title.
The importance oftitle, however, diminishes in the eyes of com-
mentators over the time, a situation characterized not only by the
disappearance of the kind of exegesis devoted exclusively to the
discussion of title after Zhiyi and his disciple Guanding, but also
by a steady movement of the title section away from the beginning
or the most prominent position in introduction and, consequently,
its relegation to the status of a regular introductory topic. In works
by Dao'an (312-385) and Sengzhao (384-414), and in the Collect-
ed explanations (before or early 6
th
century),22 explanation of title
alone constitutes introduction; in Zhiyi (538-597), title is always
the first of his "five aspects of profound meaning;" in Jizang (549-
623), title is not always in the first place; in Zhiyan (602-668), title
is the fourth in the list; in Wonhyo (617-?), title is either third or
fourth; in Fazang (643-712), title is generally always in the seventh
place. These examples are by no means comprehensive and such
a trait of change must not necessarily be representative, but the
diminishing of exegetical attention to title is simply unmistakable,
a situation that indicates a general tendency to look beyond title for
more specified inquiries into siitras.
The introductory topics derived from the theme of title are gen-
erally formulated on the basis of two words, namely, ti (title) and
21 T38n1777p524b24-b26.
22 While serious doubts have been raised about the attribution of the Col-
lected explanations to Baoliang, the time placement of the work has not been
questioned. See, for example, Och6, pp. 182-186, for a discussion of its au-
thorship.
INTRODUCTORY TOPICS AND EXEGESIS IN CIllNESE BUDDIDSM 41
ming (name), with the latter genera,1ly referring only to the key
words of a title, rather than its entirety.23 Chief among all title-
related introductory topics are shi-ti, shi-ti-mu, shi-ming, shi-ming-
ti, shi-ti-ming and their derivatives, and all can be as
"explanation of title."
2. Summary of teaching as pre-introduction
With the development in the writing of exegesis, introductions to
commentaries gradually attain a relative independence from the in-
terlinear textual expositions (suiwen jieshi), and this independence
culminates in the appearance of such exegetical works as Zhiyi's
"profound meaning" (xuanyi) and "profound commentary" (xuan-
shu), Jizang's "wandering thoughts" (youyi) and "profound trea-
tise" (xuanlun), Wonhyo's "doctrinal essentials" (zongyao),24 etc.
23 See the "Explanation of title" (shiming) section in the Collected expla-
nations in T37nI763p380b2-b29, where the compiler put together only the
explanations of nirvli1J,a, the key word in the title Mahaparinirva1}-asatra.
24 This type of exegetical works, though generally treated as an indepen-
dent commentary (see OcM's discussion of the gendan jidai, pp, 193-200),
is by nature and origin only a very special type of introduction in commen-
tary.
In the sense that the size of such a work is disproportionately bigger than
is commonly expected of a regular introduction and that it usually appears
as an independent work, it is treated as a commentary in its own right, as is
evidenced by its inclusion in Ui'chon's Sinp'yon chejong kyojang ch'ongnok
(T55n2184), a catalogue of Buddhist commentaries,
However, such a work is first and foremost an introduction by nature, for, like
other introductions, it approaches a sutra by presenting a set of general and
mostly thematic questions without getting into detailed interlinear textual ex-
position. In explaining the function of his "profound meaning," Zhiyi is very
clear about such a feature: "The teaching in this sutra is deep and far-reach-
ing, and the purport of its words is unfathomably abstruse. If (we) explain (the
sutra), relying only on its writing (i.e., its words and sentences, and therefore
its interlinear textual exposition), (what is clarified) is only its individual is-
sues, while its Ultimate tenet can never be brought out clearly. (What we are
obliged to do, however) is also to briefly reflect upon (its) abstruse and subtle
42
TAOJIN
(meanings) in order to uncover its central tenet of the 'inconceivable' (truth).
(For this reason, we) present, here, the five aspects of profound meaning
before the text (i.e., the interlinear textual exposition)" (T38n1777p519a6-
a9). That is, a "profound meaning" is an introduction to the interlinear tex-
tual exposition, which he sees as the main text of a commentary. In fact,
when Zhiyi (or Guanding, as the editor of Zhiyi's lectures) introduces his
completely interlinear textual exposition of the Sqddharmapur:uf.arfkasutra,
namely, the Words and sentences of the Saddharmapu1Jq.arfkasutra (Miao-
falianhuajing wenju, T34nl718), he indicates that a Profound meaning afthe
Saddharmapu1Jq.arfkasutra (Miaofalianhuajing xuanyi, T33nl716) precedes
and thus prepares for this Words and sentences, saying: "A careful and com-
prehensive explanation of the subject matter of the sutra has been made in a
prior (work)" (T34nl718plb23). This "prior (work)" is his Profound meaning.
Put in other words, the thematic survey of the Profound meaning is by nature
and origin the introduction to the interlinear textual exposition of the Words
and sentences.
Jizang's "wandering thoughts" and "profound treatise" and Wonhyo's "doc-
trinal essentials" are apparently alternate forms of Zhiyi's Profound mean-
ing. The concluding sentence in Wonhyo's "doctrinal essentials" on the
Mahiiprajfitiptiramittisutra (Dahuidujing zongyao) is more telling about the
nature of such a work: "The fifth subject, the classification of teachings, hav-
ing been thus discussed, the sixth subject, the interlinear exposition of text
is to explain the sutra in an extensive manner. Here ends the Doctrinal es-
sentials on the Mahiiprajfitiptiramittisutra" (T33n1697p74a2-a4). The first
five subjects introduce and prepare for the sixth subject, i.e., the interlinear
textual exposition, which Wonhyo chooses not to include in the Doctrinal
,:,essentials. The very fact, however, that he attaches the name of the sixth sub-
ject to the Doctrinal essentials suggests that Wonhyo sees a regular and full
commentary as composed of both a "doctrinal essentials" and an interlinear
textual exposition and, in that sense, he sees the Doctrinal essentials as the
introduction to the latter.
Such a perception underlies the "wandering thoughts" and "profound trea-
tise," too, although no specific remarks to that effect have been found. In fact,
the standard ten-section format in Fazang's commentaries, which includes
nine introductory sections and a section for interlinear textual exposition as
the tenth, incorporates both a general introductory overview and an interlin-
ear textual exposition in one work, a practice apparently derived from this
same perception - it is only that Fazang's introductory section is so much
reduced in size, in comparison with those of Zhiyi, Jizang and Wonhyo and
1NTRODUCTORY TOPICS AND EXEGESIS IN CHINESE BUDDIDSM 43
For that reason, it is quite natural that an introduction should de-
'Velop its own introduction, which, for the lack of better words and
also for the purpose of distinction, is provisionally called in this
paper a "pre-introduction." Like an introduction, a pre-introduction
also gives a thematic survey of sutra, although only on the scale of
a miniature,25 and, in that sense, it is at once a summary of teaching
and an introduction.
While there are different ways in the writing of a pre-introduc-
tion, it generally settles on a two-part format. The first part sum-
marizes the central tenet, sometimes represented by the key words
of title, such as nirviilJ-a, "inconceivable" (busiyi, or bukesiyi), and
prajfiii in the titles NirviilJ-asutra, Vimalaklrtinirdeiasutra
26
and the
titles of prajfiii sutras, respectively; the second part takes a brief
excursion into the entire title, both as a conclusion to that summary
and as an introduction to the main body of the introductory sec-
tion. An example of such a format is given below in an abridged
pre-introduction:
1. The Dao (of the sutra) is abstruse, subtle, deep, far-reaching and
unfathomable ... For this reason, the laying out of the satra's central
tenet in the beginning abides in the Dharma of non-abiding, and the
elucidation of its purport in the end is attained through (the notion of)
non-attainment ...
2. (The title) Mahaprajiitiptiramittisutra .. , the term mahti means ... ;
the term prajiiti means ... ; the term ptiramitti means ... ; the term sutra
means ... 27
with his own interlinear textual exposition, that the two can be placed side by
side in a perfect proportional relationship in the same commentary.
25 The full thematic survey of sutra in introduction is discussed in section
five: Explanation of central tenet: zong, zong-qu, and other zong-related top-
ics.
26 Another of its Chinese name is Bukesiyi-jietuo jing (The Sutra of incon-
ceivable liberation), hence the key phrase bukesiyi or, simply, busiyi (incon-
ceivable).
27 Jizang, Dapinjing youyi, T33n1696p63a27-b9.
44
TAOJIN
It opens with a brief thematic survey through the explanation of
prajfia, the key words in the title Mahaprajfiaparamitasutra. The
term prajfia itself is not mentioned, but is identified as the "Dao"
and assigned the attributes of "non-abiding" and "non-attainment."
The pre-introduction then concludes with a brief explanation of the
title in its separate components, i.e., maha, prajfia, paramita and
sutra.
The earliest instance of such a format can be found in Sengzhao's
introduction to his commentary on the Vimalakfrtinirdeiasutra.
28
After Sengzhao, especially after Zhiyi and Jizang, such a format
seem to have become and remained a general, although not neces-
sarily universal, standard for the writing of pre-introduction.
Most pre-introductions are untitled. Occasionally, however, a
rubric is assigned surrounding the word xu (introduction), such as
the aforementioned kai-ti-xu (introduction laying out subject mat-
ter) in Jizang,29 and xu-wang (literally, "introduction king," i.e., in-
troduction that captures the essence of teaching) in Jizang
30
and
Guanding (561-632).31 As discussed earlier, to kai-ti is to layout
subject matter (ti) through the explanation of title (ti). A xuwang
performs the same task. As Guanding explains:
A xuwang expounds the abstruse intentionion, which explains the
heart of a text, which does not lie beyond the ramifications (ji) and
28 See his Zhu Weimojiejing in T38nl775p327a14-p328a9, where he dis-
cusses "inconceivable" (busiyi) in the first part and the entire title in the
second part. This introduction is not as concise as later introductions of the
same format and contains, between the two parts, a discussion of issues re-
lated to the translation of the slUra, but the two-part format itself is quite
clear.
29 See his Fahua youyi at T34nl722p633b09.
30 See his Guanwuliangshoujing yishu at T37n1752p233c13.
31 See his introduction to his transcription of Zhiyi's lecture on the Sad-
dharmapUlJlJarfkasatra at T33nl716p681a25 and T33n1716p681b25.
INTRODUCTORY TOPICS AND EXEGESIS IN CHINESE BUDDIDSM 45
the basis (ben). A look at this purport (represented by the xuwang thus
allows) all meanings to fall orderly into place.
32
A pre-introduction occasionally also appears under the name of
dayi (main idea).33 Fayun (467-529) assigns such a rubric, ret-
rospectively, to the pre-introduction in his commentary to the
Saddharmapwujarfkasutra,34 but Wonhyo uses the term most reg-
ularly - all his commentaries collected in the Taish6, except for the
revised version of his Qixinlun commentary, begin with a dayi.
3. Elaboration of teaching: from its essence to its manifesta-
tions
Generally speaking, the development in the writing of introduc-
tion is accompanied by the elaboration of teaching from a general
interest in central tenet to increasingly more specific discussions of
various issues that are either based on, derived from, or related to
central tenet Analogically, the process of such an exegetical elabo-
ration, from the general to the specific, can be described with the
terms of a philosophical one that "elaborates" the absolute into the
phenomenal, or "essence" (ti) into its "manifestations" (de).35
32 T33nl716p681b19-b20.
33 Dayi was also used for other, but related, purposes, such as the discussion
of subject matter (see Jizang, Niepanjing youyi between T38n1768p230blO-
p232b6) or the search for the intention of teaching (see Jizang, Fahua xuan-
[un between T34nl720p365a25-p371c9).
34 See Fahuajing yiji at T33n1715p573a16.
35 See, for example, a formulation of the philosophical "elaboration" of "es-
sence" into its "manifestations" in the Collected explanations, with nirvQ1}a
as the "essence" and "dharma body, true wisdom and ultimate liberation"
as its "manifestations": "Therefore, (the author) places it (i.e., nirvQ1}a) in
the beginning of the sutra as (its) title, for it is (at once) the name of the es-
sence (ti) and its manifestations (de). The name names the essence, and the
essence naturally entails manifestations. The 'essence' is the root of sublime
perfection and wondrous existence, and 'manifestations' refers to wisdom
(prajfiii), liberation (nirvii1}a), etc. The 'manifestation' is multifarious, but
46
TAOJIN
Commentators usually do not agree on their choice of "manifesta-
tions," or on the selection of perspectives for the elaboration of "es-
sence." In his commentary to the Mahaprajfiiipiiramitasutra,36 for
example, Jizang summarizes, before giving his own, two schemes
of elaboration in the explanation of maha, a summary ilhistrating
the diversity in the perception of "manifestations":
In the elucidation of this maha there are two schools. Recounting (the
master of Zhuangyan Monastery),37 the Nirva1!asutra master of the
Zhaoti Monastery says: Maha has ten meanings; (it means the "great-
ness," i.e., maha, of) first, object; second, person; third, essence;
fourth, function; fifth, cause; sixth, effect; seventh, guidance; eighth,
benefit; ninth, cessation; and tenth, the removal of sins ... Drawing on
(the master of) the Kaishan Monastery,38 Longguang observes: Maha
has six meanings; (it means the "greatness" of) person, object, es-
sence, function, cause and effect. Thefour remaining ones, i.e., "guid-
ance," "removal of sins," etc, are included in the greatness of"func-
tion" ... The application, here, (of these two schemes) includes (the
meaning of) "greatness" in only essence and function. Why? Because
(none of these) meanings lie beyond the frameworks of the middle and
the provisional, and the ten meanings and six meanings explained by
the two previous schools all belong to (the category of) "function."39
The second school narrows down the first school's ten aspects to its
six by incorporating the latter's last four into its "function" (yong)
aspect, and Jizang makes a much more drastic move to reduce all
these aspects to only two, namely, the aspect of "function" when
their distinctions are allowed "provisional" Uia) significance, and
the aspect of the philosophical "essence" when these distinctions
the 'essence' is (marked by) oneness. (Put in other words,) names (ming, i.e.,
manifestations) may be various, but substance (shi, i.e., essence) remains in-
variable." (T37n1763p379a17-a19)
36 Dapinjing youyi, T33n1696.
37 I.e., Sengmin.
38 I.e., Zhizang.
39 T33n1696p63b17-c13; italicization mine.
are viewed as ultimately non-existent from the perspective of the
"middle" (zhong). Put in other words, mahii is the "essence," and
the ten, six and finally the two specific topics are its "manifesta-
tions" - this example shows that the effort to elaborate teaching
has been under constant negotiation among various commentators,
who expand or narrow down the scope of topics in accordance with
their respective understandings about the "essence" and, in doing
so, create the diversity in the perception of "manifestations."
Despite this apparent diversity, commentators share a number
of common focuses in their elaboration of teaching, such as the
philosophical "essence," "characteristics," "function," "wisdom,"
"practice," and "teaching," and this elaboration of "essence" into
its "manifestations" provides the basis for the formulation of in-
troductory topics, for, when the "focuses" on these specific "mani-
festations" grow with the development in the writing of exegesis,
these "manifestations" tend to take on definitive forms and thus be-
come independent topics themselves. In other words, the erstwhile
"focuses" become separate topics in the elaborated introductory
surveys, a tendency to be illustrated below with two examples.
The first example is the eight-topic introduction of the Collected
explanations, where the elaboration of "essence" allows its various
"manifestations" to take on the forms of such independent topics as
the philosophical "essence," "root and being" (ben-you) and "cessa-
tion of names." The full titles ofthe eight topics are as follows:
1. explanation of title (shiming)
2. elucidation of essence (bianti)
3. discourse on root and being (xubenyou)
4. discussion of cessation of names (tanjueming)
5. explanation of the word mahii (shidazi)
6. explanation of the word sutra (jiejingzi)
7. clarification of the intention of teaching (hejiaoyi)
8. structural classification of text (pankeduan)
48
TAOJIN
Except for the last two topics, the first six were devoted to the ex-
planation of the title, Mahiiparinirvii1}asutra, with the first four
to the key words (pari)nirvii1}a, and the fifth and sixth to mahii
and sutra, respectively.40 The discussion of (pari)nirvii1}a in the
first four sections can be further divided into a general explanation
of the "essence" in the first section, and specific analysis of the
"manifestations" in the second, third, and fourth, a relationship il-
lustrated in the table below:
I. "essence"
1. explanation of title
II. "manifestations"
2. elucidation of essence
3. discourse on root and being
4. discussion of cessation of names
The central tenet (i.e., the "essence") is treated generally in the ex-
planation of the title (pari)nirvii1}a, and is also treated specifically
in the three following topics (i.e., in its three "manifestations").
In these three specific treatments of the central tenet, section two
looks at nirvii1}a from, self-evidently, the perspective of the philo-
sophical "essence;''41 section three deals with the dynamic relation-
40 To Och6, the discussion of the title takes place in 1
st
, 5
t
h, and 6
th
sections
~ apparently, he has not noticed that the 2
nd
, 3
rd
and 4th are also part of the
discussion of title, although they are not as explicitly so identified. Cf. OcM,
p.185.
41 The content of this section, built upon citations from several authors of
the Collected explanations, which deal with not only dharmakiiya (i.e., es-
sence), but also prajfiii (i.e., wisdom) and nirviiIJa (i.e., practice), gives the ap-
pearance that the compiler of the Collected explanations is not only treating
the issue of "essence" in this section, but also the other two aspects. However,
given the fact that he unmistakably identifies this section with the rubric of
"essence," that he deals with the other two in the two following sections, and
that his task of compiling passages from others restrains him from fully fo-
cusing on "essence," it would not be unreasonable to suggest that this section
is intended primarily to discuss the issue of "essence."
ship between "root" (ben) and "being" (yoU)42 and, in that sense,
looks at nirviilJa from the perspective of its "function;" section four
touches upon the provisional nature of words in the expression of
truth and; in that sense, looks at nirviilJa from the perspective of
"teaching." Thus, in the sense that the 2
nd
, 3
rd
and 4
th
sections each
reveals one specific aspect of the central tenet, which is represented
by (pari)nirviilJa, or that the three manifestations each reveal one
aspect of the central tenet, this table presents a first-hand example
of how the elaboration of teaching results in the formulation of
independent introductory topics.
Zhiyi's scheme of "five aspects of profound meaning" presents a
more developed example of the formulation of introductory topics
based on the elaboration of teaching. Of his "five aspects,"
title, essence, central tenet, function, characteristics
the rubrics bring out the nature of their respective topics more ac-
curately than do those in the Collected explanations, for the top-
ics of "root and being" and "cessation of names" in the Collected
explanations have not spoken directly and explicitly about what
precisely these two topics are meant to discuss; also, Zhiyi more
consciously draws upon the "essence vs. manifestations" relation-
ship when he explicitly applies such a relationship to "title" and
"essence (philosophical), central tenet, and function" in his analy-
sis ofthe five aspects. A section in the introduction to his Profound
commentary to the Vimalaklrtinirddasutra (Weimojing xuanshu)
provides just such an example:
42 That is, between the absolute and the phenomenal. Such a ben-you re-
lationship describes, apparently, the relationship between Daosheng's "root"
(ben) and its "activation" (shiqi), Sengliang's "unconditioned" (wuyin) and
"conditioned" (yin), Baoliang's "true" Czhen) and the "conventional" (su), Fa-
zhi's "originally existent" (benyou) and "newly created" (shizao), and Fayao's
nirvalJa and sal!lSara. In the sense that this ben-you relationship looks at two
different aspects, Fazhi's benyou corresponds only to its ben or the absolute
aspect. See T37n1763p381a7-a24.
50
TAOJ1N
Section four, "the clarification of the general and the specific," (re)
organizes the previous fives aspects into three. The first, highlighting
only the person and Dharma, constitutes the general discussion;43 the
second, elaborating (teaching) into essence, central tenet and func-
tion, constitutes the specific discussion; the third, clarifying the char-
acteristics of teachings, encompasses in its content both the general
and specific discussions.
44
The reason for such (a reorganization) is:
Since the first dwells upon the name of the person (i.e., Vimalakfrti),
which encompasses the three aspects (i.e., essence, central tenet, and
function), it is thus called "general (discussion)."
Since now (the second) is to differentiate between the aspects of
teaching, it should differentiate between the essence, central tenet,
and function, and is therefore called "specific (discussion)."
(The discussion from the perspective of) person is the general (discus-
sion) of the specific (issues), and (the discussion from the perspectives
of) the three aspects is the specific (discussions) of the general issue
- thus, the general generalizes the specific, and the specific specifies
the general.
The reason (why the second is a specific discussion) is: Since the name
of the person is Iing-wugou-cheng (i.e., Vimalaklrti),jing (vimala, i.e.,
clean) describes the true nature, which, being pure and clean, stands
for the essence; wugou (vimala, i.e., immaculate) describes the true
wisdom, and (the practice as a) cause guided by and (the salvation as
an) effect ascertained through (this) true wisdom constitute the cen-
tral tenet of the sutra; cheng (kfrti, i.e., name), being the expedient or
43 This section presents a general discussion of teaching through the dis-
cussion of the key words of the title, i.e., Vimalaklrti, from the perspective of
person, and nirde.sa, from the perspective of Dharma.
44 This section compares the Vimalakfrtinirde.sasiitra and other teachings,
i.e., it presents a classification of teachings, with the Vimalakfrtinirde.sasiitra
as the central object of this comparison or classification, on the basis of their
respective "characteristics." Being a comparison with other teachings, it
repeats the general and separate discussions undertaken previously for the
Vimalakfrtinirdesasiitra.
skillful (means of naming the unnamable), stands for the function of
truth. (In short, this second) extends and elaborates (the first) and, for
this reason, is called a "specific (discussion)."
Since (the third, i.e.,) "the characteristics of teachings," compares the
similarity and difference between various slUras, it, in its content, en-
compasses both the general and specific (discussions).45
In short, the section on "title" summarizes the teaching of the text
and is thus general in nature; the sections on "essence, central te-
net, and function" each provide a specific perspective in the elabo-
ration of this central tenet, and are thus specific in nature; and the
section on "characteristics" encompasses at once the general and
the specific. This relationship is better illustrated in the following
rearrangement of the five aspects in this passage:
1. characteristics
2. (title, essence, central tenet, function)
a. ("essence"): title
b. ("manifestations"): essence, central tenet, function
As the table shows, the first level of the hierarchy, numbered with
Arabic numerals, contrasts "characteristics" with the remaining
four of the five aspects, and, in doing so, shows that the ultimate
objective of Zhiyi's five-aspect scheme is not set on the interpreta-
tion of one particular siitra, but on all siitras. Put in other words,
this level shows that Zhiyi intends to establish a universal model for
the writing of exegesis, an ambition explicitly stated in his reply to
an imaginary query:
(One) asks: Is this five-aspect (scheme) designed for (the interpreta-
tion of) this satra alone, or (is it applicable) also to other satras? (I)
answer: (Since) in the establishing of meaning various schools have
placed their intention at various places (I) am creating here the five-as-
pect (scheme) as a general paradigm of interpretation for all satras.
46
45 T38nl777p519b13-cl.
46 Le., although expressions may vary, this universal model can be used to
adequately decipher the teachings in all satras; T38nl777p519cOl-03.
52
TAOJIN
It is for this reason that he divides the five aspects into "character-
istics" and the remaining four - to discuss one particular text with
these four subjects should ultimately lead to a comparison with all
other sutras, which can all be approached from these four perspec-
tives! The second level of the hierarchy, alphabetically ordered,
dwells upon one particular text, the Vimalaklrtinirdeiasutra in this
case, by looking at its teaching from both a general perspective,
i.e., the perspective of "title," and specific perspectives, i.e., the per-
spectives of the philosophical "essence," "central tenet" and "func-
tion" - clearly, the general perspective is that of the "essence," and
the specific perspectives are those of the "manifestations."
As we can see from this analysis, the core of Zhiyi's interpreta-
tion lies in the specific discussions of the philosophical "essence,"
"central tenet" and "function." It substantiates the general discus-
sion of title and, together with it, prepares for a comparison with
other sutras from these same perspectives, thus creating what Zhiyi
would believe to be the universal model of exegesis. For our present
purpose, such a model (particularly the general topic of "title" and
the specific topics of "essence, central tenet and function") clearly
brings out the "essence vs. manifestations" relationship, and, in do-
ing so, illustrates how central tenet is elaborated into specific issues
and, on that basis, how introductory topics are formulated.
Having thus examined the elaboration of teaching and its role
in the formulation of introductory topics, the rest of this paper will
dwell upon a small selection of the "manifestations," which have
appeared more frequently than others in the Chinese Buddhist ex-
egesis and are thus, in that sense, the more representative. These
include the introductory topics derived from the themes about the
arising of teaching, central tenet, medium of truth, and classifica-
tion of teachings.
4. Accounting for the arising of teaching: intention, conditions
and transmission
In their effort to account for the arising of teaching, commentators
look primarily at the intention in the giving of teaching, the condi-
tions through which a teaching arises, and the history of a teach-
ing's transmission.
The exegetical attention to "intention" is generally expressed in
the introductory topics surrounding the word "intention" (yi) itself,
most notably the "intention of sutra" (jing-yi),47 "intention of teach-
ing" (jiao-yi),48 "intention of the coming (of the teaching)"(lai-yi),49
"intention in the writing of the treatise" (zaolun-yi)50 and etc. In
some cases, the discussion of intention is closely associated with the
discussion of author,S! for, after all, the "intention" must be the au-
47 See, for example, Jizang: xushuo jingyi in T33n1699; Won'chuk:
shuojingzhiyi in T33n1708; Kuiji:jingqizhiyi in T34nl723.
48 See, for example, xu jiaoxing yi, Daoxun, T40n1804.
49 See, for example, laiyimen, Jizang, T34nl722.
50 See, for example, zaolunyi in Jizang, T42n1825 and T42n1827.
51 This close association between the issues of "intention" and "author"
reminds us of the close association between the issues of "title" and "author"
(sometimes also translator) in commentators' categorization of introductory
topics. Huiyuan must have implied such a perception when he places his
discussion of immediately after the discussion of the title of the
satra, and this implication is explicated in Fazang's commentary to the same
siitra, when the commentator includes the discussion of author as an integral
part of the discussion of title. In fact, Fazang appears to have always con-
sciously grouped the issues of "title," "writing" and "translation" together.
As Zixuan has noted, Zongmi divides Fazang's nine introductory topics into
two categories of the first six and the last three, with the latter including
title, time of writing, and year of translation (See Zixuan, Qixinlun bixiaoji
in T44n1848p0303a9-a28). Such a differentiation is probably not arbitrary,
for the 6-3 division appears to be the standard format in most of Fazang's
commentaries, though not without some slight differences in selection and
organization of these topics.
54
TAOJIN
thor's intention, and a look at the person responsible for the spread-
ing of teaching is a good place to discuss the intention of doing so.
Thus, for example, as soon as the name of the purported author
is mentioned in the Qixinlun commentary attributed to
Huiyuan, the attention is immediately directed to pur-
pose or "intention" in writing the treatise,
To say "written by Bodhisattva is to present the name of
the author of the treatise ... The reasons why the Bodhisattva wrote
this treatise are ... 52
and the section on author concludes with a reiteration of his inten-
tion:
Such is the intention for the writing (of this treatise).53
The exegetical attention to "conditions" is generally expressed in
the introductory topics surrounding the words "cause" (yin) and
"by way of" (yoU),54 and gives rise to such topics as "that which to
rely on" (suo-yin),55 "direct cause and indirect cause" (yin-yuan),56
"causes for arising" (yin-qi),57 and "by the means of which" (suo-
yoU).58 Such an attention to conditions sometimes finds itself ex-
pressed as the indispensable qualities required of someone who
gives the teaching. Zhiyan's (602-668) topic of "admirations for
the sage's response to the individual circumstances and (for) the
basis of (his) meritorious deeds (i.e., the giving of teaching)" (tan-
52 T44n1843p175c12-c13.
53 T44n1843p176all.
54 Meaning "by way of," you thus refers by extension to "means" or "ba-
sis."
55 See, for example, Kuiji: T38n1782, T43n1829 and T44n1840.
56 Here it means only "cause," without the distinction between direct
and indirect causes. See, for example, yinyuan in Wonhyo's T38n1769 and
T33n1697, where yinyuan is also called yuanqi.
57 See, for example, yi zhang yinqi in see Kuiji, T33n1700p125a18.
58 See, for example, Kuiji: zaolun suoyou in T43n1834p979b18-c12.
shenglinji, deliang youzhi),59 for example, singles out the under-
standing of "non-abiding" (wuzhu) and the aspiration for bodhi as
the necessary spiritual preparation for Buddha's giving of teach-
ing.
The exegetical attention to the "history of transmission" is some-
times expressed as the topic of "origination" (yuanqi), which, pri-
marily translating "dependent origination" (pratftyasamutpiida), is
here simply referring to "historical development." Jizang relates as
a yuanqi, for example, Zhu Shixing's adventure in Khotan to bring
the Mahiiprajfiiipiiramitiisutra back to China.
60
While commentators account for the arising of teaching from
the three perspectives of "intention," "conditions," and "transmis-
sion," the first two are apparently more closely related to each other
than to the third. The yin in Pazang's accounting for the arising of
teaching refers not only to "intention," but also to "conditions," as
can be illustrated in the "ten yins" section in his Qixinlun com-
mentary. It contains two major parts. Part 1, including yins 1 to 6,
explains the following six conditions: 1
st
, insight of the teacher; 2
nd
,
specific forms of the teaching; 3
rd
, pedagogical means; 4
th
, peda-
gogical tools; 5
th
, doctrinal basis; and 6
th
, powers to invoke for the
giving of teaching. Part 2, including yins 7 to 10, explains the in-
tention as the following four reasons: 7
th
, obligation to Buddha; 8
th
and 9
th
, compassion of the author; 10
th
, benefits anticipated in the
giving of teaching.
61
The distinction between the intention, conditions and transmis-
sion is not always very clear. Thus, yuanqi is about the "transmis-
sion" of sutra in one place,62 but explains "reasons" in another,63
59 T35n1732p13c8.
60 See Jizang, T33n1696p68a24-b4.
61 T44n1846p241a18-b24
62 See Jizang, T33n1696p68a24-b4.
63 See Jizang, Shengman baoku in T37n1744p4b26-5b12.
56
TAOJIN
and is interchangeable with yinyuan in a third.
64
Similarly, Zhiyan
dwells on you to discuss the attributes of teacher 'in one commen-
tary, but with the same word explains "reasons" in a second.
65
5. Explanation of central tenet: zong, zong-qu, and other zong-
related topics
The explanation of central tenet is undoubtedly the most important
step in the elaboration of introductory survey. While the' aforemen-
tioned pre-introduction certainly touches upon central tenet with
its reliance on the explanation of title, it offers only a summary of
that central tenet and serves, as is obvious in its name, primarily
as an introduction. It is only zong and its related topics that are
designed primarily for the explanation of central tenet; indeed, it
is probably for this reason that all Chinese Buddhist schools call
themselves a certain zong - the identity of a certain school depends
largely on its adherence to a particular type of teaching.66
Zong often appears in the forms of zong-zhi, zong-yao, zong-ti,
zong-qu, etc. Since zhi stands for "purport," yao for "essentials,"
and ti for "essence," the suffixation of the first three words to zong
simply produces varied forms for the topic of zong; another word
represented by zhi means "to arrive at" or, in Wonhyo's words,
"the intended destination of central tenet" (yi-zhi),67 and in that
., 64 See Wonhyo, Dahuidujing zongyao in T33n1697p68b23 and T33n-
. 1697p72a19-p73a20.
65 See jiaoxing suoyou (that through which the teaching arises) in Jingang-
boruoboluomijing lueshu, T33n1704p239a11.
66 According to Yan Shangwen, the meaning or use of zong in the Bud-
dhist context develops from "to revere," to "central tenet" (i.e., that which
is revered), and finally to "school" that "reveres" a particular tenet. See his
Suitang jojiao zongpai yanjiu, pp. 1-16.
67 This translation is meant to bring out its main idea. Translated liter-
ally, it means "the (destination which the teaching) is intended to arrive at."
See his discussion of zongzhi in, for example, his Liangjuan wuliangshou
jing zongyao: "Section two, i.e., the clarification of zongzhi, (argues that)
sense this different zong-zhi represents a similar though more em-
phatic expression of zong, pointing to, in a sense, the culmination
of central tenet. Zong-qu is a similar reformulation of zong, for
the word qu, meaning "to approach," is essentially not different
from the second zhi in highlighting the "destination" of central te-
net.
68
In some cases, commentators simply use zong-qu and zong
interchangeably, apparently seeing no difference at all between the
twO.
69
Zong-qu, however, was transformed into the most unique of all
zong-related topics at the hands of Huayan scholars, i.e., it was re-
conceptualized in such a way that the separate attention to and the
combined use of these two words zong and qu produces a complex
set of perspectives for the examination of central tenet.
The re-conceptualization of zong-qu can be observed in two
related aspects. The first aspect is the conscious differentiation
of zong and quo While, in Huiyuan and Kuiji's treatment, the two
words have their respective emphasis, (i.e., zong for central tenet
and qu for its destination,) the difference between the two is meant,
as mentioned earlier, only to give an emphatic expression for the in-
terest in central tenet and, in that sense, the differentiation between
this sutra takes the cause and effect of the Pure Land as its central tenet,
and the rebirth of sentient beings (in Pure Land) as its intended destination"
(T37n1747p125c28-c29).
68 Kimura's suggestion that zong and qu point, respectively, to the philo-
sophical and aspirational aspect ofa sutra probably better explains the zong-
qu and also the zong-zhi relationship. See his "Kegonkyo shiishuron no reki-
shi to yimi," p. 255.
69 See, for example, Huiyuan, "section four, i.e., the discussion of zong-
qu, (argues that) the zong of this sutra is the meritorious deeds of giving
that bring about good fortune" (T39n1793p512c15); for another example, see
Kuiji: "Section six asks: How many versions are there for this sutra and what
zong-qu does each of these versions clarify? (The commentator answers:) An
exhaustive search for the versions of this sutra comes up with four. (In the
sense that) all explain the Pure Land, (this sutra in its four versions) takes
Pure Land as its zong" (T37n1757p313a15-a16).
58
TAOnN
the two is not significant. This difference is, however, highlighted
and capitalized upon in Zhiyan's use, for the entire section of his
zong-qu relies on the elaboration of both the zong and the qu of
central tenet. The second aspect is the abstractification ofzong, ex-
pressed in the replacement of its meaning "central tenet" with the
meaning "to revere" or, more precisely, "that which is revered."70
The former is derived from the latter, for "central tenet" must be
something "revered" in a siitra, and this replacement s t r ~ p s zong of
its specific reference to "central tenet" and thus turns it into a more
widely applicable term.
This new perception of zong-qu allows Zhiyan to present a more
complex and subtle examination of central tenet or the religious
truth of a sutra.
To Zhiyan, religious truth can be approached from the perspec-
tives of principle, practice, and teaching:
Section one explains the zong-qu from a general (perspective). This
siitra adopts (i.e., teaches as its zong-qu) three types of prajiiii: first,
the prajiiii of reality (i.e., principle); second, the prajiiii of contem-
plation (i.e., practice); and third, the prajiiii of words (i.e., teaching).
This is known because the sutra below elucidates all three aspects of
principle, practice, and teaching.71
By making no distinction whatsoever between zong and qu from
this "general perspective," Zhiyan presents truth as comprising at
. once principle, practice, and teaching which, in Zhiyan's primary
. choice of expressions, are reality, contemplation and words, or, as
in a unity of these three aspects - principle results from practice
70 Fazang thus explains the nature of zong: "That which is revered in a text
is called zong" (T44n1846p245b04). Zhiyan has not made a statement as ex-
plicit as this, but the way he treats zong and qu, as analyzed shortly, indicates
that he also sees zong as generally "that which is revered" rather than the
specific "central tenet," i.e., he also abstractifies the use of zong. For a discus-
sion of zong's various meanings, see Yan, Sui tang fojiao zongpai yanjiu, pp.
1-16.
7] T33n1704p239b17-b19.
INTRODUCTORY TOPICS AND EXEGESIS IN CHINESE BUDDlllSM 59
and is conveyed in teaching, practice is guided by principle that is
conveyed in teaching, and teaching conveys principle that results
from practice.
This unity, however, is brought out more vividly when Zhiyan
applies his new scheme of zong-qu, in which, with the separation of
zong and qu and the abstractification of zong, he allows each of the
three aspects to be both the zong, i.e., the "revered" or simply the
"means," and the qu, i.e., the "destination" or the "end." In other
words, such a scheme allows the examination of truth to start any-
where from these three perspectives (or, by an extended application
of this scheme, from perspectives not listed by Zhiyan) and still ar-
rive at its destination. A rearrangement of principle, practice, and
teaching in different zong-qu relationships produces five pairs of
correspondence, and thus five perspectives for an elaborate exami-
nation of truth in its unity of the three aspects. Below is such an
example in Zhiyan's separate discussion of zong-qu:
Section two explains long and qu separately from five perspectives:
The first (perspective) is the correspondence between teaching and
(its) purport, i.e., (one) takes teaching as long and (its) purport as qu;
the second is the correspondence between the cause (of practice) and
the effect (of realization), i.e., one takes cause as long and (its) effect
as qu ... ;
the third is the correspondence between person and Dharma, i.e., (one)
takes Dharma as long and person (i.e., Buddha-hood) as qu ... ;72
the fourth is the correspondence between principle and phenomena,
i.e., (one) takes principle as long and phenomena as qu;
the fifth is the correspondence between the object of perception (i.e.,
teaching)?3 and practice, i.e., (one) takes the object of perception as
72 "Because (one) relies on Dharma to become the Buddha" (T33n1704
p239b24).
73 "Because teaching, comprising objects of perception, is established to
facilitate the practice" (T33n1704p239b26).
60
TAOJIN
zong and practice as qu ... 74
The first pair of the zong-qu correspondence, i.e., of teaching and
its purport, indicates that "teaching," as zong, conveys "principle"
in its "purport" as qu; the second pair, of cause and effect, indicates
that "practice" of cause, as zong, leads to the "effect" of realizing
truth as qu, for the "effect" marks the realization of "principle;" the
third pair, of "person" and "Dharma," indicates that "principle"
(i.e., Dharma), as zong, results in "practice" as qu, for the attain-
ment of Buddhahood is the culmination of practice; the fourth pair,
of principle and phenomena, indicates that the teaching of "princi-
ple," as lOng, gives rise to "practice" as qu, for the shift of attention
from the absolute principle to phenomena is designed ultimately for
the purpose of realizing principle, i.e., practicing it, in the phenom-
enal world; the fifth pair, of the object of perception and practice,
indicates that "teaching," as zong, provides guidance to "practice"
as qu, the "object of perception" being the teaching itself.
Put in other words, the five pairs of zong-qu rearrange the three
aspects of principle, practice, and teaching and present their uni-
ty from five different perspectives. Thus, the first pair states that
teaching leads to principle; the second pair, practice to principle;
the third and fourth pairs, principle to practice, although one fo-
cuses on "Dharma" and "person" and the other on "principle" and
"phenomena;" and the fifth pair, teaching to practice. Despite this
apparent diversity of perspectives, the ultimate purpose is to unfold
the originally unified truth into its various aspects with what Zhi-
yan would believe to be the greater precision and subtlety.
Zhiyan's re-conceptualization of zong-qu is further developed in
Fazang's explanation of central tenet. This development lies in two
aspects. For one, he theorizes a perception which underlies Zhi-
yan's treatment of zong-qu, but which has never been brought out
explicitly; for the other, he further develops the separate perspec-
tives, from which Zhiyan approaches the central tenet, by organiz-
74 T33n1704p239b20-b26.
INTRODUCTORY TOPICS AND EXEGESIS IN ClllNESE BUDDHISM 61
ing them into a unified and systematic relationship of a successively
related and increasingly deepened progression of inquiries.
As discussed earlier, Zhiyan re-conceptualizes zong-qu by first
separating zong and qu and then stripping them of their specific ref-
erence. In doing so, Zhiyan makes zong represent that which is to
be relied on, i.e., a means, and qu as its objective, i.e., an end. Such
a re-conceptualization allows one to approach the central tenet of a
sutra from a number of different perspectives. However, although
this new perception of zong-qu underlies Zhiyan's discussion of
central tenet, he has never spelled out this understanding explicitly,
i.e., he has never moved his attention from the content of zong-qu
to the nature of zong-qu. It is Fazang who consciously takes up the
task of theorizing this previously unspoken perception:
That which the sutra reveres is called zong, and the destination to
which this zong leads is called qU.
75
By not limiting the significance of zong to "central tenet," although
"central tenet" is "that which the sutra reveres," the new percep-
tion makes it possible to read different meanings into zong and, by
extension, also qu, in the examination of central tenet.
76
75 T44n1846p245b04.
76 In most of his other commentaries, Fazang has a slightly different the-
orization of zong-qu, i.e., "what the words express is called zong, and the
destination to which this zong leads is called qu" (See, for example, T35n-
1733p120a7). "What the words express" is apparently a mere different formu-
lation of "that which the satra reveres." A similar statement Fazang makes
in his other commentaries reinforces the same perception by rejecting any
sense of distinction between zong and qu: "In the general discussion, zong is
in itself qu." (See, for example, T35n1734p495b6). Such theoretical assertions
about zong-qu are manifested in his treatment of the subject, particularly in
his formulaic expression in the separate discussions of zong-qu: "(The satra)
takes ... as zong and ... as qu; or, the reverse (is also true)" (See, for example,
T35n1734p495b4-b13). By emphasizing that zong and qu are interchange-
able, Fazang gives the two a general applicability, i.e., he preserves only the
sense of correspondence between the means and its end, but not their specific
references.
62
TAOJIN
While Zhiyan's zong-qu opens up the central tenet and presents
a number of different perspectives for its understanding, he seems
to have never paid attention to the relationship between these dif-
ferent perspectives. Fazang, however, takes it as his task to build a
coherent relationship between them. He thus discusses the zong-qu
of QixinZun:
Section two shows long and qu separately from, briefly speaking, five
(perspectives). The first (perspective) is the correspondence between
teaching and (its) purport, i.e., (one) takes teaching as long and (its)
purport as qu ... ; the second is the correspondence between principle
and phenomena, i.e., (one) takes the sampling of phenomena as long,
and the revelation of principle (therein) as qu ... ; the third is the corre-
spondence between the objects (of perception) and practice, i.e., (one)
takes objects (of perception, both) ultimate and conventional, as long,
and the practice of mind contemplation as qu; the fourth is the cor-
respondence between realization and faith, i.e., (one) takes non-retro-
gression of faith upon its formation as long, and the ascendance onto
bhamis and the entry into realization as qu; the fifth is the correspon-
dence between the cause (of practice) and the effect (of realization),
i.e., (one) takes cause as long and the accomplishment of effect as
quo Of these five (perspectives), subsequent ones arise from preceding
ones in a successive and causal (progression), (a situation) understood
when the explanation (i.e., the commentary) is referred to.
77
Such a "successive and causal" relationship is more clearly outlined
jn Zixuan's explanation, where he supplies certain connections not
apparent in Fazang's own discussion:
By "successive and causal (progression)," (Fazang means:) First, from
teaching, its purport is obtained; second, from phenomena (presented
as examples) of the purport, principle is revealed; third, by taking phe-
nomena and principle as the object (of perception), one accomplishes
the practice of calming and contemplation (samatha and vipasyana);
fourth, with (the practice of) calming and contemplation, (one) enters
77 T44n1846p245b5-b12. The translation of the last sentence is taken from
Dirck Vorenkamp's translation of this commentary. See his English transla-
tion, p. 53.
into the stages of realization (bhiimis); fifth, with such an entry, (one)
attains the fruit (or effect of realization). Thus, taking turns to supply
a basis for one another and delving from surface (levels) to deeper
(levels), (the five steps) transmit the central tenet of the treatise.
78
This relationship can be further elucidated in the following sim-
plified rearrangement of the five perspectives, constructed on the
basis of both Fazang and Zixuan's explanations. Extra words are
added in brackets to bring out the connections between concepts
at different levels, and the indentations in subsequent levels are de-
signed to highlight Fazang's perception that "subsequent ones arise
from preceding ones in a successive and causal (progression)":
l't: teaching vs. purport
2
nd
: phenomena (i.e., which manifests the purport) vs. principle (i.e.,
which is the purport revealed through phenomena)
3
rd
: object of perception (which is at once phenomena and Prin-
ciple, or the provisional and the ultimate, and which, in the
unity of the two, is also the purport) vs. practice (which con-
tains calming and contemplation)
4th: faith (i.e., the initial stage of practice) vs. realization (i.e.,
the culmination of practice)
5
th
: cause (which includes practices from faith to realization)
vs. effect (which is realization)
From the first and the most general perspective, one relies on Bud-
dha's words (i.e., teaching as zong) to obtain the intended purport
(i.e., purport as qu). The purport of this teaching is, however, mani-
fested only in things to which sentient beings have access through
their sense faculties (i.e., phenomena), and it is in these things (i.e.,
phenomena as zong) that one retrieves the principle intended by
Buddha in his teaching (i.e., principle as qu), hence the second per-
spective. The teaching (i.e., the object of perception, which is also
purport) that unites both phenomena and principle (also identified
as the "the provisional" and "the ultimate" by Fazang himself),
78 Qixinlunshu bixiaoji, T44n1848p312c26-c29.
64
TAOnN
however, is not sufficient in accomplishing the realization; thus,
from a third perspective, one has to resort to practice (i.e., practice
as qu) after retrieving the teaching (i.e., purport or object of per-
ception as zong). Zixuan identifies the two major forms of practice
as "calming and contemplation" (samatha and vipasyanii), but as
Fazang has it, the two ends of the spectrum in the practice are faith
at the beginning and realization at its conclusion, thus the fourth
perspective, with "faith" as zong and "realization" as quo :rhe fifth
perspective summarizes various forms of practice (from faith to
realization) as the cause and its ultimate destination as the effect,
hence "cause" as zong and "effect" as quo In short, "teaching" leads
to "purport," which in turn leads to "principle," which in another
turn calls for "practice," which in still another turn necessitates a
progression of practices from lower stages to higher stages, which,
as an inseparable whole, eventually leads to the ultimate realiza-
tion. Such a system of five perspectives thus organizes them, as said
earlier, into a unified and systematic relationship of a successively
related and increasingly deepened progression of inquiries.
6. The medium of truth: neng vs. suo
Another subject in the elaboration of teaching is the means for the
transmission of teaching or, in other words, the medium of truth.
Tci Buddhists, the medium of truth is not only that which teaches
truth, such as words and writings, but ultimately also that which
is taught, i.e., truth itself. Put in Chinese Buddhist terminology,
the medium of truth includes not only the neng aspect (that which
teaches), but ultimately also the suo aspect (that which is taught).
Such a perception is often reflected in the debates among Bud-
dhist scholars in their effort to determine what comprise(s) the me-
dium of truth. Jizang records such a debate in his commentary on
the Mahiiprajiiiipiiramitiisutra:
In the explanation of medium (ti),79 there are a total of four schools
of views:
the first school argues that principle is the sutra itself ... For, as Long-
guang asserts, principle is that which imprints, and the writings are
its imprints ... ;
the second, i.e., the Dharma master Shi of the Lingmei Monastery,
argues that ... the writings and principle, mutually expressing (each
other), constitute the sutra in their unity - neither of the two alone is
the sutra ... ;
the third, i.e., the Dharma master Sheng of the Lingyao Monastery, .
argues that writings constitute the satra (from the perspective of)
writings, and principle constitutes the sutra (from the perspective of)
principle - writings and principle is each in itself a sutra ... ;
the fourth, i.e., the Dharma master Zong of the Taichuang Monas-
tery and the Dharma master Yaofa of the Baima monastery, consider
teaching (i.e., writings) as the sutra.
SO
The four schools have four different views about what comprise(s)
the medium of truth. The first school sees truth itself (suo) as the
medium; the second, a combination of both truth (suo) and writ-
ings (neng); the third, either truth (suo) or writings (neng); and the
fourth, writings (neng) alone. While the four schools cannot agree
exactly what the medium is, at least three of them accept that suo
itself could be the medium, either in part or in full; also, the very
fact that a choice has to be made between neng and suo suggests
that both were perceived as potential but legitimate candidates for
the medium of truth.
79 Often referring to "essence" or "base," ti in this case refers by an exten-
sion of meaning to "vehicle" or "means" through which Buddhist teachings
are transmitted, hence the translation of "medium." In this particular pas-
sage, the commentator uses "medium" interchangeably with sutra for the
apparent reason that a sutra is one form of such media. For a discussion of
another meaning of the same ti or "essence," see section three: Elaboration
of teaching: from essence to its manifestations.
so T33n1696p65b15-b26.
66
TAOJIN
The inclusion of suo as the medium reflects the Buddhist per-
ception of truth in its active aspect. While truth remains inacces-
sible to intellectmi1ization in its quiescent and thus absolute state, it
also actively manifests itself in the myriad of phenomena, i.e., phe-
nomena constitute the media of truth. As Jizang concludes in his
summary of these four schools, "each of the ten thousand dharmas
is without exception a sutra (i.e., medium of truth)."81 In that sense,
truth teaches itself, or truth is its own medium. This is e ~ a c t 1 y the
argument made by the first school, which draws on Longguang to
support its claim that truth or suo is the medium:
The principle is that which imprints, and the writings are its imprints.
What we have in the fonn of writings or neng is simply given to us by
principle or suo itself. Using the metaphor in this remark, that which
teaches (neng) is the "imprints" imprinted by that which is taught
(suo), and writing is one fonn of such "imprints."
A tension, however, exists between neng and suo in commenta-
tors' minds, for they constantly attempt to accommodate these two
perspectives in their discussion regarding the medium of truth, and
this effort in turn suggests a tendency to separ<;tte suo from neng
and, ultimately, to deny suo the role as medium of truth.
An obvious problem that arises regarding this issue is: If both
neng and suo can serve as the medium of truth, why then is there
this difference between the neng and suo? Or, simply, how shall the
;;'(tifference be accounted for? Some commentators attempted to rec-
oncile this difference by interpreting neng and suo with the help of
the two truths theory, arguing that the two are different from each
other from the perspective of provisional truth, but are ultimately
the same from the perspective of ultimate truth. In the discussion
of the medium of truth in his Vimalakfrtinirde.fasutra commentary,
Kuiji makes just such an attempt by drawing on Bhavaviveka and
Dharmapala. Below is an outline of this section:
82
81 T33n1696p65c3.
82 T38n1782plOOOb22-plOOlc19
The medium of teaching has two aspects: The first is the writings that
explain (truth), and the second is the purport that is explained (in the
writings) ..
1. Bhavaviveka
a. From the perspective of provisional truth
1) From the perspective of suo: All dharmas, conditioned or
unconditioned, empty or existent, constitute the medium of
truth;
2) From the perspective of neng: The medium includes name,83
sentence, paragraph, and treatise.
b. From the perspective of ultimate truth: Both the neng and the
suo are empty of self-nature ... (In the sense that the nature of)
all dharmas is empty of self-nature, what (is there to be called)
the teaching (i.e., neng) or principle (i.e., suo)?
2. Dharmapala
a. From the perspective of provisional truth
1) From the perspective of suo: All dharmas, conditioned or
unconditioned, empty or existent, constitute the medium of
truth;
2) From the perspective of neng: The medium includes voice,
name, sentence and treatise.
b. From the perspective of ultimate truth
1) The medium that incorporates the characteristics into the
tathata
2) The medium that incorporates all others into the mind
3) The medium that incorporates the provisional into the sub
c
stantial
4) The medium that separates the provisional from the substantial
According to Kuiji, Bhavaviveka and Dharmapala each see the rela-
tive roles of neng and suo in conveying the truth from the provision-
al perspective and the ultimate perspective. From the provisional
83 "(It or ju) is the same as the 'name' in Dharmapala's discussion"
(T38n1782plOOOb29).
68
TAOJlN
perspective, neng and suo are different from each o t ~ e r , with name,
sentence, paragraph and treatise in Bhavaviveka, or voice, name,
sentence and treatise in Dharmapala as neng, and all dharmas as
suo. From the ultimate perspective, however, this distinction, simply
disappears. As Bhavaviveka explains, that which teaches and that
which is taught are both void of self-nature and, in that sense, neng
is not different from suo, or, "what (is there to be called) the teach-
ing (i.e., neng) or principle (i.e., suo)?" Dharmapala explains the
same idea with different words: That is, from the ultimate perspec-
tive, the medium can be identified with either xing (tathatii) which
encompasses all "characteristics," or "mind" (shi) that gives rise to
and thus also encompasses phenomena, or "substance" (shi) that
constitutes the basis for the "provisional." While the discussion of
the fourth type of medium appears to separate the provisional from
the ultimate, Dharmapala sees the provisional as eventually derived
from the ultimate, thus also integrating the neng and the SUO.
84
The significance in accommodating the neng-suo relationship
in this provisional-ultimate framework lies in the fact that it rep-
resents a conscious effort to understand the relative roles of neng
and suo, and that it suggests an increasingly stronger intentionion
to distinguish the two as different topics. This can be illustrated in
the following examples:
Jizang: Section two, explanation of the central tenet and the medium
(zong-ti):
Sub-section one, explanation of medium;
Sub-section two, explanation of central tenet.
85
Zhiyan: Section three,
the central tenet being taught,
and the medium that teaches.
86
84 I.e., "of all provisional dharmas, none has a separate essence, i.e., (each
arises) on the basis of its respective source, and takes the substantial dharma
as its nature" (T38n1782plOOla28-a29).
85 T33n1696p65b13.
86 T35n1732p13c07.
INIRODUCTORY TOPICS AND EXEGESIS IN CHINESE BUDDIDSM 69
Won'chuk: Section two,
elucidation of the central tenet being taught,
and the medium that teaches.
87
Wonhyo:
Next, explanation of central tenet;
Section three, explanation of the medium of teaching.88
Kuiji:
Section five, discussion of the medium;
Section six, discussion of versions of the sutra and (their respec-
tive) central tenets.
89
Fazang:
Section five, the medium that teaches;
section six, the central tenet that is taught.
90
What these examples show first is a clear and increasing tendency
to distinguish between neng and suo. Neng, i.e., medium of teach-
ing, and suo, i.e., truth being taught, are expressed in different top-
ics, and, in most cases, the words neng and suo are assigned to de-
fine the two different topics. What's more, the two topics are orga-
nized such that the connection between them becomes increasingly
weakened. As we can see in these examples: Jizang includes neng
and suo as two different parts of the same topic of "central tenet
and medium;" Zhiyan andWon'chuk still see them as belonging to
the same category, but equate and, in that sense, differentiate the
two by making both rubrics parts of the title; Wonhyo, Kuiji, and
Fazang simply treat them as two separate and independent topics.
What these examples also show, however, is a clear perception of
the mutual dependence of the two, for, in all these cases, the topics
of neng and suo are always placed side by side. This suggests that,
even when these commentators do not agree with the claim that
87 T33n1708p359a24.
88 T38n1769p239b19.
89 T37n1757p31Oc29
90 T44n1846p241a15-16
70
TAOJIN
suo is in itself the neng, this view has apparently i1;s hold on their
understanding of the relationship between neng and suo.
7. Classification of teachings: textual and doctrinal orientations,
and the bu-, zang- and jiao-classification
Still another subject in the elaboration of teaching is the categori-
zation or classification of various specific teachings. Th? primary
purpose for the classification of teachings is to determine the posi-
tion of a particular teaching in a certain part or the entire body of
Buddhist teachings. As we can see in all examples of such a prac-
tice, commentators always begin with a classification of various
teachings, and always conclude with the identification or location
of a particular sutra in that classificatory scheme.
Generally speaking, classification of teachings is oriented ei-
ther textually, or doctrinally, or both. A textual classification deter-
mines the position of a particular teaching from the perspectives of
version and content, i.e., it asks to which of its many versions a par-
ticular text belongs, or into which of the three canonical categories,
sutra, vinaya, abhidharma, a text falls. A doctrinal classification
determines the position of a particular teaching with the identifica-
tion of the level of its doctrinal value, or in comparison with those
of all other teachings.
> ~ ; These two types of classification appear, generally, in the forms of
three types of topics, namely, bu (version), zang (pitaka or collection)
andjiao (teaching). While all three of them constitute a response to
the increasing diversity of Buddhist teachings and subsequently the
need to sort them out for the purpose of determining the position
of a particular teaching, each has its specific way of classification.
The bu-classification is textually oriented, for it is a response to
the diversity of texts, particularly the different versions, or some-
times different translations, of a sutra in its transmission in China.
As we can see in the relevant sections in Zhiyi's commentary on V
ajracchedikaprajfiiipiiramitiisutra and Jizang's commentary on the
ThlRODUCTORY TOPICS AND EXEGESIS IN CIDNESE BUDDHISM 71
Mahiiprajiiiipiiramitiisutra, the purpose of both commentators is to
locate their respective texts in the series, or various versions, of the
Prajiiiipiiramitiisutra. Zhiyi lists eight versions, and identifies his
text as the eighth;91 Jizang outlines four classificatory schemes, each
proposing a list of its various versions, and locates his text in each
of these schemes.92 The bu-classification in Jizang's commentary
on the SaddharmapulJarfkasutra simply identifies his text as one
of the translations of the sutra.
93
This classification usually appears
in the forms of bu-lei (versions and categories), bu-dang (or bu-
tang, i.e., versions and kinds), and bu-zhou (versions and scrolls).94
The zang-classification is oriented both textually and doctrin-
ally. Oriented textually, the zang-classification differentiates sutras
from the perspectives of subject matter and authorship, an act that
results in the classification of sutra, vinaya, abhidharma collections
(i.e., the Tripitaka); oriented doctrinally, the zang-classification
looks at the level of doctrinal sophistication and gives rise to the
classification into Bodhisattva collection (pusazang) and Sriivaka
collection (shengwenzang) (i.e., the Dvipitaka) .. This two-fold clas-
sification generally appears as the topic of zang-she (i.e., inclusion
in a certain collection), but occasionally also takes the forms of ji-
aojenqi (differentiation of teachings)95 and jiaodaxiao (i.e., whether
91 See lingang bonta jing shu, T33n1698p76a2- a7.
92 See Dapin jing youyi, T33n1696p67c20-p68a23.
93 See Jizang, Fahua youyi, in T34nl722p649cU-p650a03.
94 See, for example, bulei in Jizang (T34nl721), Zhiyan (T33n1704) and
Kuiji (T37n1757), budang in Jizang (T33n1696, T33n1699, T34nl722), and
buzhou in Zhiyi (T33n1698), etc.
95 See T37n1745, T37n1764 and T38nl776. These formulations of the sub-
ject are given only at the end of the section and the beginning of the next. In
T37n1745, Huiyuan only uses fen (differentiation), apparently an abbreviated
form of jiao zhi fenqi of the other two.
72
TAOJIN
the teaching in question belongs to the Great V e h i ~ l e or the Small
Vehicle).96
The most prevalent form of classification, jiao-classification, is
doctrinally oriented. With the development of the Chinese under-
standing of Buddhism, the textual classification, in its differentia-
tion of versions and of the collections of sutra, vinaya and abhid-
harma, becomes increasingly inadequate in determining the posi-
tion of a particular teaching in tradition; so it is the case with the
doctrinal classification in the Bodhisattva and Sravaka collections,
for the mere distinction between the two is simply incapable of
explaining the complex relationship between, and thus the relative
positions of, a vast array of teachings. The jiao-classification goes
beyond, not only the textual classification, but also the relatively
formulaic classification of the two collections, and allows commen-
tators greater freedom in the classification of teachings, thus push-
ing the practice to a new level of sophistication. Its topics mostly
carry the term "teaching" (jiao), hence "characteristics of teach-
ings" (jiaoxiang),97 "classification of teachings" (panjiao), "differ-
entiation of teachings" (jiaofenqi), "differences in teachings" (jiao
butong), and "distinctinctions between teachings" (jiaoyi chabie).98
The origination of the jiao-classification, however, deserves
some more attention. It probably begins as an effort to explain the
intention of teaching. Almost all the authors of the Collected expla-
; 'nations make comparisons between earlier teachings and the teach-
96 See, for example, Huiyuan, T37n1749 and T39n1793; Shandao,
T37n1753.
97 See the discussion of the "characteristics" as one of Zhiyi's "five aspects
of profound meaning" in section three: Elaboration of teaching: from essence
to its manifestations.
98 Given Zhiyi's introductory topic of panjing jiaoxiang (differentiation
of the characteristics of a sutra, i.e., from those of other sutras), panjiao is
probably just a different formulation of jiaoxiang. The rest of them, with their
unanimous emphasis on differentiation, are apparently other reformulations
of the same topic.
ing to be commented upon in their commentaries, and all identify
the earlier teachings as provisional and theirs as ultimate.
99
In that
sense, the differentiation of teachings was aimed to explain the in-
tention of teaching with a view to reaffirm the importance of their
exegetical projects - this text, the Mahtiparinirvii1:zasutra, gives the
highest teaching and thus requires further explication. It is prob-
~ b l y for this reason that the compiler sets aside a separate section
for these differentiations of teachings, and defines it as an effort to
"clarify the intention of teaching." While the "intention of teach-
ing" only implies a comparison or differentiation of teachings, this
secondary objective gradually comes to the fore and occupies the
center stage. That is, commentators gradually move away from the
interest in justifying their exegetical projects, and begin instead to
set their attention squarely on a comparison regarding the degrees
of doctrinal sophistication, thus producing various forms of jiao-
classification.
Conclusion
The foregoing seven sections have examined the seven most recur-
rent themes that commentators in Chinese Buddhist history used in
surveying sutras in the introductions of their commentaries - most
introductory topics in Chinese Buddhist exegesis were derived
from or formulated on the basis of these themes. In these seven
sections, this article has demonstrated the variation in the breadth
and depth of introductory inquiry in commentaries. While the vari-
ation in breadth is reflected in the diversity of the themes and their
derivative introductory topics, the variation in depth is expressed
in the extended examination of and sometimes fluid perception of
a subject - in the latter the variation unfolds a subject into its sev-
99 See the formulaic expressions of "formerly ... , but now ... ," as illustrat-
ed in the example of the compiler's statement: "Therefore (the Buddha) first
(i.e., formerly) presents the teaching of expedience, which is to lay the basis
for the perfect and permanent teaching here (in the Mahiiparinirviil}aSLltra)"
(T37n1763p381c15).
74
TAOJIN
eral aspects, as shown in the elaboration of essence its various
manifestations; it expands the use of a certain topic, as illustrated
in the re-conceptualization of zong-qu at the hands of the Huayan
scholars; and, last but not the least, it extends and shifts the central
focus of a certain subject, as seen in the transition from the "inten-
tion of teaching" to the "classification of teachings." Such a varia-
tion both in breadth and depth, allows us to observe the ways in
which commentators select, organize and present ques-
tions in an introduction, and, in that sense, illustrates the extent of
sophistication and complexity of the development in the writing of
exegesis in Chinese Buddhist history.
Bibliography
Citations from the TaishO shinshU daizokyo are
identified in conformity with the conventions employed in its elec-
tronic version, i.e., the Chinese Buddhist Electronic Text Associa-
tion (CBETA). Thus, the first line of Fazang's commentary on Qixin-
[un, for example, is identified as T44n1846p240c19 (slightly modified
from the original T44n1846p0240c19[00]), i.e., TaishO volume num-
ber 44, serial number 1846, page 240, line 19 of the lower (i.e., c) sec-
tion (as opposed to the upper [a] and middle [b] sections of that page).
Primary sources
Amituojing shu by Kuiji mt1i. T37n1757.
Bailun shu by Jizang T42n1827.
Chengweishilun shuji by Kuiji mt1i. T43n1830.
Daboruoboluomiduojing boruoliqufen shuzan
:51llim, by Kuiji mt1i. T33n1695.
Dafangguangfohuayanjing souxuanfenqi tongzhifanggui
by Zhiyan 9'ii. T35n1732.
Dahuidujing by Wonhyo T33n1697.
Dapanniepanjing jijie attributed to Baoliang W:;!':..
T37n1763.
INTRODUCTORY TOPICS AND EXEGESIS IN CHINESE BUDDillSM 75
Dapanniepanjing yiji by.Huiyuan T37n1764.
Dapinjing youyi by Jizang T33n1696.
Dashengqixinlun yiji by Fazang T44n1846.
Dashengqixinlun yishu by Huiyuan T44n1843.
Fahuajing yiji by Fayun T33n1715.
Fahua xuanlun by Jizang T34nl720.
Fahua yishu by Jizang T34nl721.
Fahua youyi 5**Jaifi!, by Jizang T34nl722.
Guanwuliangshoufojing shu by Shandao T37n1753.
Guanwuliangshoujing yishu by Huiyuan T37n1749.
Guanwuliangshoujing yishu by Jizang T37n1752.
Huayanjing tanxuanji by Fazang T35n1733.
Huayanjing wenyigangmu by Fazang T35n1734.
Huayan youyi *iM'Jaifi!, by Jizang T35n1731.
lingangboruoboluomijing lueshu by Zhiyan
T33n1704.
lingangboruojing shu attributed to Zhiyi T33n1698.
lingangboruojing zanshu by Kuiji T33n1700.
lingangboruo shu by Jizang T33n1699.
lingming xuanlun by Jizang T38n1780.
Liangjuanwuliangshoujing zongyao by Wonhyo
T37n1747.
Miaofalianhuajing wenju attributed to Zhiyi T34
nl718.
Miaofalianhuajing xuanyi attributed to Zhiyi T33
nl716.
Miaofalianhuajing xuanzan by Kuiji T34nl723.
Milejing youyi by Jizang T38nl771.
Mileshangshengjing zongyao by Wonhyo T38nl773.
Niepanjing youyi by Jizang T38n1768.
Niepan zongyao by Wonhyo nUJil. T38n1769.
76
. TAOJIN
Qixinlunshu bixiaoji by Zixuan rff. T44n)848.
Renbenyushengjing zhu by Dao'an T33n1693.
Renwangboruojing shu by Jizang T33n1707.
Renwanghuguoboruojing shu attributed to Zhiyi
T33n1705.
Renwangjing shu by Won'chuk T33n1708.
Shengman baoku )ljjJ(lf@, by Jizang T37n1744
Shiermenlun shu by Jizang T42n1825.
Shuowugouchengjing shu by Kuiji T38n1782.
Sifenlushanfanbuque xingshichao by Daoxuan mW.
T40n1804.
Sinp'yon chejong kyojang ch'ongnok by Ui'chon
T55n2184.
Weimojing xuanshu by Zhiyi T38n1777.
Weimo yiji by Huiyuan T38n1776.
Weishiershilun shuji by Kuiji T43n1834.
Wenshijing yiji by Huiyuan T39n1793.
Wuliangshoujing by Huiyuan T37n1745.
Yinmingruzhenglilun shu [ZSJ13I3.A1Hll[rufUifJit, by Kuiji T44n1840.
Yuqieshidilun luezuan by Kuiji T43n1829.
Zhu Weimojiejing by Sengzhao {IW T38nl775.
Secondary sources
Kimura, Kiyotaka *f1m;1:: "Kegonky5 shiishuron no rekishi to yimi" .
(The History and Meaning of the Zongqu Theory
about the Avatarrzsakasutra). IBK 37 (19-1) 1970, pp.
255-61.
. Lopez, Donald S., Jr., ed. Buddhist Hermeneutics. Honolulu: University of
Hawaii Press 1988.
Mayer, Alexander. Das Vajracchedika-sutra und die chinesische Auslegung
der prajiiii. Ein Beitrag zur Expositorik. Exegese und Hermeneutik im
sino-buddhistischen Kommentar (The Vajracchedika-siitra and the Chi-
nese Prajiiii Interpretation: A Contribution to the Exposition. Exegesis.
and Hermeneutics of the Sino-Buddhist Commentary). Habilitation,
Heidelberg University 1999. .
Mou, Runsun $5f.lEf*. "Lun rushi liangjia zhi jiangjing yu yishu" 'Alilflm
(On Scripture Lecture and Commentary in Both Con-
fucianism and Buddhism). Xinya xuebao vA n.2 (Feb. 1959),
pp.353-415.
OchO, Enichi tJ\ttHI,JB"Shakuky6shiko" (A Study in the History of
the Interpretation of Scriptures), Chugoku bukkyo no kenkya
vol. 3. Kyoto: Hozokan 1979.
Tang, Yongtong 5fflfjg. Hanwei liangjin nanbeichao fojiaoshi
(A History of Buddhism in the Han, Wei, Two Jin, and Southern
and Northern Dynasties) Xiandai foxue daxi 27 27. Taibei:
Mile chubanshe 1982.
Vorenkamp, Dirck. An English Translation of Fa-tsang's Commentary on the
Awakening of Faith. Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press 2004.
Yan, Shangwen Sui tangfojiao zongpai yanjiu (A
Study of Buddhist Schools during the Sui and Tang). Taibei: Xinwenfeng
chubangongsi 1980.
Glossary

Avataf!lsakasutra
Baoliang JtJL.
ben 2js:
benyou
bhami :f:tt
Bhlivaviveka, or Bhavya
bianjiao shiji
bianti
bie XlV
bodhi:gill!:
bu'liB
budang 'liB:i:
Bukesiyijietuo jing
bulei 'liB;!iffi[
busiyi
butang 'liB,.
buzhou 'liB,m
da*

dayi*1t.
dharmakaya
Dharmapiila
dvipitaka
Fa'an
Fayao

Fazang
Fazhi
gendan
geyi
Guanding 51m
78
TAOJIN
hejiaoyi
huiren duoshao Wr A37Y

jiaobutong
jiaodaxiao
jiaofenqi
jiaoqi
jiaoshe
jiaosuo beiji
jiaoxiang
jiaoxing
jiaoxing suoyou

jiaoyi chabie
jiao zhi fenqi
jiejingzi
jietuo
jingqizhiyi

Jizang
ju {J]
jueming
jurenfenbie $A:5t3U
kaiti Ifflm!
kaitixu Ifflm!ff

laiyi
laiyimen
Li Tongxuan '*WE:

Mahiiprajiitiptiramittisatra:

mahiiytina **
ming;g
mingquan
Mou Runsun
neng
nirvtiIJa
OeM Eniehi
panjiao
panjing jiaoxiang
pankeduan !#Uf4tli '
parinirvtiIJa
pitaka lJi
prajiiti Bt
pratftya-samutptida
pusazang ifililJi
Qixinlun
quan
SaddharmapuIJarfkasatra fr'Y5tJi

samatha l1:
sa1J1stira1=.YE
stistra
Sengliang

Sengzhao
Sengzong
Shandao
shengsi1=.YE
shengwenzang liQlJi
shidazi
shiming
shimingti
shiqi frEriffi
shiti
shitiming
shitimu
shixiang Jft
shizao
shizhi
shuojingzhiyi
su 1:fr
suiwen jieshi
suopJT
suowei youqing
S[ttra
Taishi5 shinsha daizokyo

Takakusu
Tang Yongtong
Tanji
tanjueming
Tanyan .
Tanzhun
tathatii
ti 1m
tiR
o Tripitaka=-ii.
tuzhong

Vajracchedikaprajiiiipiiramitiisutra

Vimalakfrtinirddasutra

vinayaf=it
vipasyanii W
wenju )(1:i]
Won'chuk
Wonhyo
wuchong xuanyi

xiang;f
xiao IJ\
xuff

xuanlun

xubenyou*JI::2fs:ff
xu jiaoxing yi
xushuo jingyi
xuwang ffx.
yan1
Yan

yig
yin Jz:;j
yinqi Jz:;jJre
yinyuan
yi zhang yinqi
yizhi giR
yong.F
you E8

yuanqi
zaliaojian
zang ii.
zangshe ii.m
zaolun suoyou
zaolunyi

zhi 13
zhiW
Zhili 9altl
ZhixiuW3'
ZhiyanWfli

Zhizang Wii.
Zixuan rl?f
zong*

zongti*R

zongzhi *13
zongzhi *iX
THE RITUAL OF ARHAT INVITATION
DURING THE SONG DYNASTY:
WHY DID MAHAYANISTS VENERATE THE ARHAT?'
RYAN BONGSEOK JOO
Introduction
At first glance, it seems odd that Chinese Buddhists have vener-
ated arhats. Given that the Mahayana doctrine vehemently rejects
the arhat ideal in favor of the bodhisattva path, it appears contra-
dictory that Chinese who follow the teachings of Mahayana Bud-
dhism have worshipped arhats.2 The painting
3
[Fig. 1] shows an
I An early version of this essay was presented at the Five College Bud-
dhist Studies Faculty Seminar in Smith College, Apri13
rd
, 2008. I would like
to thank Peter Gregory, Jamie Hubbard, Jay Garfield, Marilyn Rhie, Young
Rhie, Susanne Mrozikand Maria Heim for their helpful comments.
2 For instance, the Lotus Satra, one of the best-known Mahayana Bud-.
dhist scriptures in China, claims that the arhat is no longer an arhat un-
less he heeds to the teaching that the arhat is on his way to becoming the
bodhisattva. Chapter two of the Lotus Satra states, "Sariputra, if any of my
disciples should claim to be an arhat or a pratyekabuddha and yet does not
heed or understand that the Buddhas, the Thus Come Ones, simply teach
and convert the bodhisattvas, then he is no disciple of mine, he is no arhat
or pratyekabuddha. Again, Sariputra, if there should be monks or nuns who
claim that they have already attained the status of arhat, that this is their
last incarnation, that they have reached the final nirvi'ilJa, and that therefore
they have no further intention of seeking anuttarasamyaksambodhi, then you
should understand that such these are all persons of overbearing arrogance."
See Burton Watson, The Lotus Satra (New York: Columbia University Press
1993), p. 33.
3 I would like to express my gratitude to Gregory P.A. Levine and Uni-
versity of Washington Press for granting me permission to use this image.
Volume 30 Number 1-2 2007 (2009) pp. 81-116
82
RYAN BONGSEOK JOO
example for such arhat worship, portraying what appears to be a
scene of what I will refer to as, in a generic term, "the ritual of
arhat invitation.''4
The painting depicts a Buddhist monk standing in front of an
altar with a portable incense burner in his hands and gazing at the
descent of arhats in clouds. Two literati, probably brothers and the
sponsors of the ritual, are bowing down behind the monk while
their wives are folding their hands respectfully, joining the rite of
veneration.
5
Meanwhile, four servants in the back are busy setting
up food offerings in front of arhat portraits hung on the wall. This
scene of arhat invitation appears to be a private family function
carried out inside the pavilion of a donor's home adjacent to his
garden. The painting is part of the Five Hundred Arhat paintings
from Daitokuji in Kyoto, which were originally produced in
China during the Southern Song Dynasty (1127-1279).6
Readers familiar with eady Indian Buddhist doctrine may be
perplexed at seeing that people have ritually invited arhats for
worship, who, by definition, have attained nirvalJa and, therefore,
would not return to the world of sa1!lsara. However, this practice
has a canonical basis, offering a rather reasonable explanation for
engaging in such a seemingly counter-intuitive practice. Accord-
ing to A Record of the Perpetuity of the Dharma, Narrated by the
Great Arhat Nandimitra, the Buddha, upon entering parinirval}a,
yntrusted his Dharma to the Sixteen Great Arhat disciples and their
See Gregory P.A. Levine, Daitokuji: the Visual Cultures of a Zen Monastery
(Seattle: University of Washington 2005), p. 294.
4 The ritual was known by several Chinese names, including Luohan qing
(Invitation of Arhats), Luohan zhai *-i5lJ,llf (Feast of Arhats) and Luo-
han gong *-i5l{;!:!: (Offering to Arhats). For my purposes, I will refer to all
these forms with the generic term, "ritual of arhat invitation."
5 The lady on the right is looking at her baby held by her baby-sitter.
6 For the study of the Daitokuji set from an art historian's perspective,
see Wen Fang, Five Hundred Lohans at the Daitokuji (Princeton University,
Ph.D. diss. 1956).
[Fig. 1] Zhou Jichang, Li Tinggui. One scroll from the Five Hundred
Arhats, Southern Song Dynasty, ca. 1178. Hanging scroll. Ink and color
on silk. Daitokuji.
84
RY BONGSEOK JOO
retinues and ordered them to prolong their lifespan and stay in the
world of sa1J1siira through their supramundane As a result,
the Sixteen Arhats and their retinues became deputies during the
Buddha's absence, undertaking the duties of protecting the Dharma
and becoming the field of merit for a donor.
8
This legend of the living Sixteen Arhats and their retinues was
transmitted to China in the seventh century when the famous pil-
grim Xuanzang (600-664) translated this scripture in. the cap-
ital, Chang'an -f.f:'tt.9 However, the actual cultic movement based on
the Sixteen Arhats started later, in the tenth century, when
7 See A Record of the Perpetuity of the Dharma, Narrated by the Great
Arhat Nandimitra (Skt. Nandimitravadana; Ch. Da aluohan Nantimiduoluo
suoshuo fazhu ji, trans.
(600-664), T. no. 2030, 49: 12c-14c.
8 For the study of A Record of the Perpetuity of the Dharma, see Jen
Lang Shih, The Perpetuity of the Dharma (University of California, Berke-
ley, Ph.D. diss. 2002); Sylvain Levi, and Edouard Chavannes. "Les seize ar-
hat protecteurs de la Loi," Journal Asiatique 8 (1916) 206-224; John Strong
"The Legend of the Lion-Roarer: A Study of the Buddhist Arhat PiI:H;iola
Bharadvaja," Numen 26 (1979), pp. 51-55; Bong Seok Ioo, The Arhat Cult in
China from the Seventh through Thirteenth Centuries: Narrative, Art, Space
and Ritual (Princeton University, Princeton, Ph.D. diss. 2007), pp. 49-63.
9 Some doubts have arisen as to whether A Record of the Perpetuity of
the Dharma was actually translated by Xuanzang since there is no extant
Sanskrit original text. However, Xuanzang is consistently listed as the author
of A Record of the Perpetuity of the Dharma in early Chinese catalogs of the
Buddhist canon such as Da Tang neidian lu and Kaiyuan shijiao
lu Given that Da Tang neidian lu was compiled in 664 by Xu-
anzang's contemporary Daoxuan, and the alleged year of translation of the
text was only ten years earlier than the compliment of Da Tang neidian lu, I
think this is strong evidence that it was most likely translated by Xuanzang.
In addition, there are also Tibetan and Khotanese versions of the A Record
of the Perpetuity of the Dharma, which suggest that the text was probably
authored outside China. See Da Tang neidian lu Daoxuan m''
(596-667), T. no. 2149, 55: 325c; Kaiyuan shijiao lu Zhisheng
f. (fl. 730), T. no. 2154, 55: 557b. John Strong also discusses this issue in his
article. See Strong, "The Legend of the Lion-Roarer" (cf. n. 8), p. 53.
85
the arhat motif image and arhat hall were established and widely
accepted as independent genres in Chinese Buddhist art and temple
architecture.
lO
'As for the ritual of arhat invitation, it was only in the
Song Dynasty (960-1279) that the ritual became known throughout
China and gained popularity among lay followersY
In this essay, I am interested in exploring the following questions
regarding the ritual of arhat invitation and veneration practices in
China. First, how were the Song Dynasty Chinese able to over-
come, reconcile or ignore the negative portrayal of the arhat de-
picted in Mahayana polemical texts while venerating the arhat in
the ritual? In other words, who was the arhat for Chinese Buddhists
vis-a-vis the canonical definitions of the arhat? Second, how was
the ritual of arhat invitation carried out? Who participated in the
ritual, and how long did it last? What kind of images, material of-
ferings and ritual instruments were involved? What was the atmo-
sphere like? Third, which individuals and groups sponsored the
ritual, and why? Did Chinese Buddhist ever imagine that the arhat
10 See Bong Seok Joo, The Arhat Cult (cf. n. 8), pp. 67-110, 231-290.
11 There is one exception to this claim. Although it was limited mostly
to the monastic community in China, the cult of PiI).<.iola as an independent
tradition was already developed as early as the fourth century. According
to the hagiography of Dao'an llio/ (312-385), the ritual of inviting the holy
monks to bathe was taught to Dao'an by a strange-looking monastic guest
who visited Dao'an's monastery in the year 385. After finding that this monk
had the supramundane ability to pass in and out of the hall through a small
hole in a window, Dao'an asked why he came to see him. The monk's answer
was that he came to accompany Dao'an to Heaven where Maitreya Bo-
dhisattva resides. However, in order to be reborn in Heaven, the monk
mentioned one condition: Dao'an must invite the holy monks to bathe. Fol-
lowing the guest monk's instruction, Dao'an performed this ritual of inviting
the holy monks and saw the appearance of an unusual child (jeichang xiao'er
and his company entering into the bath. In the same hagiography,
there is also an episode about the appearance of PiI).<.iola in Dao'an's dream.
Dao'an saw PiI).<.iola in his dream, who asked Dao'an to offer foods for him. In
exchange, PiI).<.iola promised to help Dao'an spread the Dharma. See Gaoseng
zhuan Huijiao (497-554), T. no. 2059, 50: 353b17-c9.
86
RYAN BONGSEOK JOO
is specialized in solving certain kinds of human nredicament or
suffering? Fourth, in light of recent scholarship on Buddhist ritual
by Robert Sharf - particularly his idea of ritual as "adult play" and
"Buddhist darsan" - what does the ritual of arhat invitation teU us
about Mahayana Buddhist ritual in general?12
Apart from the visual material, there are largely three types of
literary sources available for the study of the arhat invitation ritual
in China: an indigenous liturgical text by a scholar-officer, Huang
Shang (1044-1130), an eye-witnessed account of the ritual
performance recorded in the diary of Japanese monastic pilgrim
Jojin (1011-1081), and several short Song Dynasty literati
writings on the ritual of arhat invitation including a letter of a fa-
mous scholar-officer and writer, Su Shi (1037-1101). I will
examine these sources one by one while providing a translation of
these texts.
The Eulogy of Inviting Arhats
The Eulogy of Inviting Arhats (Qing Luohan zanwen
is a rare extra-canonical liturgical text composed specifically for
the ritual of arhat invitation in China. The text is valuable since it
is the earliest extant liturgical text of its kind.13 The author of The
Eulogy of Inviting Arhats was Huang Shang (1044-1130), a
high-ranking official from the present-day city of Nanping 1.i.lJZ in
'Pujian province.
14
After passing the highest imperial exami-
12 See Robert Sharf, "Ritual" in Critical Terms for the Study of Buddhism, ed.
Donald S. Lopez Jr. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2005), pp. 245-270.
13 There is a fifth century canonical text called The Method of Inviting
Pil:u!ola (Ch. Qing Bintoulu fa, IDBlMmt5t), translated by Huijian (fl.
457). However, this text concerns only PiI},c,lola and not the entire Sixteen Ar-
hats and their retinues. In addition, the language in the text is narrative, not
liturgical. For the translation of The Method of Inviting Pir.u!ola, see Bong
Seok Joo, The Arhat Cult (cf. n. 8), pp. 294-300.
14 In the biography of Huang Shang, his place of origin is listed as Yanping
which is the old name of the city of Nanping. It also says that Huang
THE RlTUAL OF ARHAT INVITATION
87
nation (jinshi in the year 1082, Huang Shang served for much
of his career in the Department of Rites (Libu His work at
the court was later recognized by the emperor, who granted Huang
Shang the honorable title of Shaofu yff upon his death.15 He also
left many poems and essays, which were compiled together in sixty
volumes titled The Collection ofYanshan (Ch. Yanshanji
The subject of our study, The Eulogy of Inviting Arhats, is also in-
cluded in this book.
Given that the eulogy is too lengthy to include the entire text
here, I will limit my translation to the parts that are most relevant
to the discussion that follows. The text states:
Kings, ministers, elders and lay Buddhists should set up a joyful rit-
ual offering and arouse their utmost sincere heart. Then, the honor-
able ones along with their retinues will take part in the seats of the
five offerings (wushi EDtE)P This [holy] crowd will surreptitiously
exercise the virtue of the six supramundane powers (liutong 7\W)
simultaneously,18 receive offerings from all fields and reveal their
Shang liked Daoist (Ch. Daojia m*) and mysterious (Ch. Xuanmi t:fJ})
books. See Bide Chang et al., ed., Songren zhuanji ziliao suoyin 5R.A
I (Taibei: Dingwen shuju 1974-6), vol. 4, pp. 2866-2867.
15 The title Shaofu ytt is one of the Sangu =W titles, which include
Shaoshi ygijJ and Shaobao Y{:if;. The Sangu titles were considered one step
below the Sangong =.0 titles consisting of Taishi ;t:gijJ, Taifu and Tai-
bao;t:{:if;.
16 See Huang Shang (1044-1130), Yanshanji 1-60, Siku
quanshu, Wenyuange Sikuquanshu dianziban (Hong Kong: Zhongwen Dax-
ue Chubanshe Dizhi 1998). For the collection of Huang Shang's writings in
modern editions, see Chen Huifen ed., Huang Shang sanwen xuanji
(Tianjin: Baihua wenyi chubanshe 1997); Jiang Deming
f!)j, ed., Huang Shang shu hua (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe 1996).
17 The five offerings consist of unguent, chaplet, incense, food, and lamp.
18 The six supramundane powers (liutong t\:w) refer to the powers of di-
vine vision, divine hearing, knowing people's mind, remembering people's
previous lives, unimpeded bodily action and the extinction of all defilements.
See Mochizuki Shink6, Mochizuki bukkyo daijiten, (Tokyo: Sekai Seiten
88
RYAN BONGSEOK JOO
form again and again. How could such results not be obtained [if there
is] utmost sincerity? .
Therefore, the magnificent offerings [for arhats] were prepared in the
JambUdvipa, the great Song (*), the great China (mohezhinaguo r,JgOj
in such and such (mou ;Jt)20 province (zhou j'f'/) of such and
such (mou ;Jt) village (fang :Ij]) [by] such and such (mou ;Jt) disciple.
Arhats enter into sal!lsiira and work inside the burning. house. It is
never the case that their power of liberation Uietuoli iWij)tfJ) is insuf-
ficient in aiding sentient beings in the ocean of suffering. Nor is it the
case that arhats are deficient in benevolence to guide sentient beings
away from the path of confusion. [Therefore,] I now set up the seat of
the bountiful Dharma assembly and respectfully uphold the order of
the Buddha. For the last forty-nine years, the samiidhi was difficult to
pursue. [However,] the Sixteen Arhats have constantly existed. Great
sincerity will surely bring a response (zhicheng kegan just
like the sound of an echo within a deep valley. The response of the
virtuous one is like having the image of the moon on a clear river.
[We] wish that [the arhats] have pity on us and hope to have their hon-
orable visitation. [Now,] the great assembly chants in one voice and
respectfully carries out the rite of invitation.
With one heart (yixin -{,\), [we] reverently invite (fengqing the
first great arhat, Pil).c;iolabharadvaja, from the Aparagodanlya continent
in the west, and his one thousand arhat retinues. [We] wholeheartedly
wish to receive their boundless [holy] assembly. Have pity on sentient
beings and come to this Dharma hall. In the Aparagodanlya continent
in the west, the self-awakened ones already set themselves free from
all outflows (wulou In the Central Land (zhongtu cp),21 even
more karmic affinity (with the arhats) has been established as we wel-
come them. Who gets to be the foremost in spiritual cultivation and
Kank5 Ky5kai 1955-63), p. 5060.
19 Zhina was the ancient name of China used by people in India and
Central Asia.
20 On the meaning of the character ;lj!;, see below p. 93.
21 The Central Land (zhongtu r:p) refers to China.
89
benefit this world? Among the sixteen of honorary rank, [PiI.1qola]
should be the first.
... With one heart, [we] reverently invite the fourth great arhat, Subinda,
from the Uttarkuru continent in the north, and his one thousand arhat
retinues. [We] wholeheartedly wish to receive their boundless [holy]
assembly. Have pity on sentient beings and come to this Dharma hall.
In a trance-like state, [Subinda] suddenly hears the sound of calling
from the Central Land. Being leisurely and carefree, [Subinda] peace-
fully stays in the cloud of the northern continent. Flowers and flags
are waving inside the spacious Dharma hall. [One] should believe that
in the midst of ordinary people, there are holy ones.
The honorable ones rest their bodies in the tenth bhumi (shidi +:ttt)22
and their virtue appears in three luminous lights. Some [of them] hide
their light when encountering sentient beings. Some reveal their form
in empty space. Some breathe wind and cloud in and out [while] some
ride on dragons and tigers. [As they] respond with the eight methods
of liberation (bajie ten thousand spirits (wanting ;lit.) look
at them with awe.
22 The tenth bhumi (shiti +:ttt) refers to the last stage in the development
of a bodhisattva into a Buddha. There are several ways to define the ten stag-
es including the ten stages of Mahayana bodhisattva development (Dash eng
pusa shidi the ten sriivaka stages (Shengwensheng shidi
*+:ttt) and the ten stages of the pratyekabuddha (Yuanjuesheng shidi
+:ttt). The most well-known ten stages development in China was that of the
Mahayana bodhisattva, originating from the Flower Garland Sutra (Huayan
jing Skt. Avatar!ISakasatra). The tenth bhami in the development of
a bodhisattva into a Buddha is named "the stage of Dharma Cloud" (Skt.
Dharmamegha, Ch.fayun di The person in this last stage is equipped
with countless merits and wisdom and can "rain" the Buddha's Dharma to
all sentient beings. For more information on the tenth bhami, see Mochizuki
Shink5, Mochizuki bukkyi5 daijiten (cf. n. 18), pp. 2297-2303.
23 The eight methods of liberation (bajie consist of (1) liberation
through the realization of filthiness in objects as desire arises within, (2) lib-
eration through meditating on filthiness in objects when no desire arises, (3)
liberation through the realization of a permanent state of freedom from all
desire, (4) liberation through the realization of the infinity of space, (5) lib-
eration through the realization of infinite knowledge, (6) liberation through
90
RYAN BONGSEOK JOO
... With one heart, [we] reverently invite the seventh great arhat, Kalika,
from the Sarrghatadvlpa continent, and his one thousand arhat reti-
nues. [We] wholeheartedly wish to receive their boundless [holy] as-
sembly. Have pity on sentient beings and come to this Dharma hall.
Would the arhat respond only to affairs leading up to the achievement
of Buddhahood? [He] still composes poetry together with [Daoist]
immortals and has patience not to pass into nirvtiIJa. [Kalika] rushes
into the ocean of suffering only because of sentient beings.
Honorable ones! Some [of you] have serene and exotic appearances
while some have extraordinary and wonderful characters. Some [of
you] enjoy drifting and floating in the air while some [of you] are
wholly engrossed in [the act of] contemplation. Your mind (xin
has both fullness and emptiness, and your nature (xing t1.) does not
have inner and outer differentiation. [You] ride on clouds and cranes
and leave the otherworldly home of tranquility. [You] cross over moon
and cloud to receive the magnificent offerings from this world. Hon-
orable ones, please let [your] vessel of Dharma (faqi accept
these offerings and let the light of [your] mind enlighten us. If there
is sincerity, there must be resonance. If there was no seeking, neither
would there be any response. Please withdraw from [your] samtidhi
temporarily and grant [us] swiftly the dignified vision [of yourself]!
Please come to [this place of] twinkling lights soon and become the
merit field of sentient beings. It is all because the arhats are compas-
sionate and sympathetic. Indeed, it is because they are compassionate
and sympathetic .
. .. [Our] admiration to the honorable Sixteen Ones, their retinues and
others! Those [of you] who reside in different continents (zhou y'I'!)
have the view of water and moon. Those [of you] who are entrusted
with mountains (shan llD have the comfort of spring water and rock.
the realization of nothingness or nowhereness, (7) liberation through having
neither thought nor absence of thought, (8) liberation through attaining the
state of nirviiIJa. See Mochizuki Shinko, Mochizuki bukkyo daijiten (cf. n.
18), pp. 4206-7; Charles Muller, ed., Digital Dictionary of Buddhism, (http://
www.buddhism-dict.net/ddb/ accessed April 28, 2006).
24 In this context, I think the vessel of Dharma (faqi is a metaphoric
way of denoting the arhat's body.
91
Those living in the country (guo become fellow friends with hu-
man beings [while] those living in heaven (tian *) become partners
with the immortals (xian 1l1J). Although their names are different, they
are equal in regards to [having] the [same] virtue (de qf!(). Although
their abodes are varying, they are united with the [same] heart. There-
fore, they abide by the Tathagata's entrustment and disseminate [his
Dharma] throughout the world. Their cultivation of the Way is all for
the purpose of clarifying the view of the unborn (wusheng rid-
ing on the wheel of the non-returner (butui being awakened
suddenly to the three levels of emptiness (sankong .=:@),25 quickly
moving beyond the tenth bhami (shidi +:f:ili), opening the latch of the
door to emptiness and freeing the block on the road to awakening.
Their acceptance of our offerings is all for the purpose of unlocking
the door of expedient means (fangbian jJ{f), establishing the hall
of compassion, providing the essence of one hundred Dharma (baifa
s5*), guiding their sentient beings and creating the karmic affinity
[lasting] three periods (sanshi =f!:t).26 [We] beseech you to descend
to this world. Today is even more special, [given that we have] pre-
pared a dignified assembly and conveyed our reverent sincerity. The
[ritual] implements and material [donations] compete in color while
incense and flowers vie for their scent. We beseech the honorable ones
along with all Buddhas, bodhisattva-mahasattvas, and others in the
universe to visit us. [Please] come neither too quickly nor too slowly.
Regardless of distance or nearness, once the six bands of the staff have
made their sound, [the arhats] leave the pavilions in the mountains
and oceans. With one breath, [the arhats make] clouds and depart the
grotto palaces (dongfu 515liff) under cliffs. [We] dutifully welcome you
25 The three levels of emptiness (sankong imply emptiness of oneself
(wogong emptiness of dharma (fakong and emptiness of empti-
ness (kongkong The last, emptiness of emptiness, is sometimes re-
placed by emptiness of all phenomena (jukong See Mochizuki Shinko,
Mochizuki bukkyo daijiten (cf. n. 18), p. 1486.
26 The three periods (sanshi =f!:t; Skt. traiyadhvika) refer to past, present
and future. See Mochizuki Shinko, Mochizuki bukkyo daijiten (cf. n. 18), pp.
1592-4.
92
RYAN BONGSEOK JOO
all without making distinction. [Please] have pity on sentient beings,
come to this Dharma hall and receive these offerings.27
The Eulogy of Inviting Arhats reveals that the author, Huang Shang,
was an erudite scholar-officer who had great interest in the Bud-
dhist tradition. He had obviously read A Record of the Perpetuity of
the Dharma, having matched all Sixteen Arhats' names in Chinese
characters and sharing a similar narrative about how the Sixteen
Arhats became the field of merit during the Buddha's absence.
28
In
addition, the text shows that Huang Shang understood much tech-
nical Buddhist terminology such as the tenth bhiimi (shidi +:l:tt),
the eight methods of liberation (bajie AM), the six supramundane
powers (liutong :t\W) and the five offerings (wushi .litif[). On the
other hand, although it was not unusual for Buddhist clergy to ask
prominent literati to write commemorative writings for Buddhist
architecture during the Song Dynasty, it is noteworthy that the task
of writing a liturgical text was also taken up by a literatus instead
of a Buddhist priest. 29 I suspect that this might have had more to do
with the fact that Huang Shang worked for the Department of Rites
(Libu ffrl=&B). Although the text does not mention why Huang Shang
composed this eulogy, it nevertheless reveals that this text was not
composed just for the ritual performance of his family. Instead, it
was intended for much wider usage. For example, in the introduc-
> 27 See Huang Shang (1044-1130), Yanshan jijuan j. 36,
pp. 1a-8b, Siku quanshu, Wenyuange Sikuquanshu dianziban (Hong Kong:
Zhongwen Daxue Chubanshe Dizhi 1998).
28 The Eulogy of Inviting Arhats also mentions the Chinese title of A Re-
cord of the Perpetuity of the Dharma with a slight variation, as The Satra of
the Perpetuity of the Dharma (fazhu jing >t{U!rD. A Record of the Perpetuity
of the Dharma is the only Buddhist scripture in Chinese recording the names
of the Sixteen Arhats and their residences.
29 For an examination ofthe Song Dynasty literati's commemorative writ-
ings on Buddhist architectures, see Mark Halperin, Out of the Cloister: Lite-
rati Perspectives on Buddhism in Sung China, 960-1279 (Cambridge: Har-
vard University Press 2006).
93
tory part, the character mou * meaning "such and such" appears
three times .
.. . the magnificent offerings (for arhats) were set up in the Jambudvipa,
the great Song (*), the great China (mohezhinaguo in
such and such (mou province (zhou )'1'[) of such and such (moLt
village (fang:9]) [by] such and such (moLt disciple.
The character mou * is supposed to be replaced by the names
of the province, village and person specific to each ritual perfor-
mance. This suggests that the author intended that this text be used
by many different people carrying out the ritual of arhat invitation.
Unfortunately, since there is no independent Song Dynasty record
of this text, it is almost impossible to know how widely The Eulogy
of Inviting Arhats was circulated and used for actual ritual service.
The language in this text is descriptive and beseeching, all at
the same time. The descriptive part reveals that the identity and
behavior patterns of the arhat are quite similar to those of the bo-
dhisattva and the Daoist immortal (xian {W). According to Huang
Shang, the Sixteen Arhats and their retinues are "compassionate
and sympathetic" beings who can unlock "the door of expedient
means" to aid "sentient beings in the ocean of suffering." Like the
bodhisattvas, they respond to many people's requests simultane-
ously while remaining in "the tenth bhiimi." These descriptions
suggest that Huang Shang saw virtually no difference between the
arhat and the bodhisattva.
Similarly, arhats are also depicted not only as friends of Daoist
immortals but also as sharing some of their characteristics. For
instance, some arhats and their retinues are described as "partners
with immortals" while engaging in leisurely activity of "composing
poetry" together. Like Daoist immortals, arhats can ride on clouds
and cranes and know how to control dragons. Some arhats live in
"a grotto heaven," which is also one of the places of residence for
immortals.
3D
Notably, many of these descriptions of the arhat are
30 For a study of Daoist grotto heavens, see Franciscus Verellen,"The Be-
94
RYAN BONGSEOK 100
consistent with Song Dynasty arhat images.
31
suggests that
Huang Shang's vision of the arhats was not unique but shared by
many of his contemporary Chinese.
Another characteristic of the language is its beseeching tone.
Sometimes, the text is addressed directly to the arhats, proving for
certain that the text was written for the ritual performance. For ex-
ample, the following paragraph was quoted sixteen times whenever
a new arhat was introduced and called upon.
With one heart (yixin [we] reverently invite (jengqing the
first great arhat, Pir:u;iolabharadvaja from the Aparagodanlya conti-
nent in west, and his one thousand arhat retinues. [We] wholeheart-
edly wish to receive their boundless [holy] assembly. Have pity on
sentient beings and come to this Dharma hall.
What is interesting about this way of addressing the arhat is that
behind the highly reverential language, the author is also asking
the arhat to behave in a certain way. Another example is:
Honorable ones! Some [of you] have serene and exotic appearances
while some have extraordinary and wonderful characters. Some [of
you] enjoy drifting and floating in the air while some [of you] are
wholly engrossed in observation; ... Please refrain from [your]
samadhi temporarily and grant [us] swiftly the dignified appearance
[of yourself]! Please come to [this place of] twinkling lights soon and
become the merit field of sentient beings.
Here, the author first praises the appearance and ability of the arhat.
Then, the tone of its voice shifts and the author asks the arhats
directly but politely to leave their meditation temporarily to act as
the field of merit, as they have promised to the Buddha.
In his study of early Japanese death ritual poetry, Gary L. Ebersole
also notices the power of ritual language and quotes a section from
yond Within: Grotto-heavens (dongtian ;1EJ7::) in Taoist Ritual and Cosmol-
ogy," Cahiers d'Extreme-Asie 8 (1995), pp. 265-290.
31 The arhat images were represented to resemble Chan masters, immortals,
literati and recluses. See Bong Seok Joo, The Arhat Cult (cf. n. 8), pp. 136-158.
95
the Japanese preface to the Kokinshu: "it is poetry which, without
effort, moves heaven and earth, stirs the feelings of the invisible gods
and spirits, smoothes the relations of men and women, and calms
the hearts of fierce warriors."32 Ebersole then adds that the ritual
poem frequently acts as "a linguistic means of manipulating religio-
political power in the human sphere as well as of manipulating the
spiritual powers including the kami and the spirits of the dead."33
In my analysis, the polite and reverential language in The Eulogy of
Inviting Arhats ultimately serves similar functions. The language
was meant to "stir the feelings of the invisible" arhats and to
manipulate their "spiritual powers." For example, by repeatedly
calling them "compassionate" and "sympathetic," Huang Shang, or
anyone who recites this text aloud in a ritual setting, is, in a way,
compelling arhats to show their compassion and sympathy_ In other
words, the ritual language in The Eulogy of Inviting Arhats is not
merely describing who the arhats are. Rather, it is a tool used by the
author to orchestrate the entire ritual process.
The text gives only a general description of the ritual performance.
In its closing words, it briefly mentions the presence of ritual
implements, incense and flowers inside the hall where the ritual is
carried out. However, it repeatedly emphasizes one prerequisite for
the ritual performance: in order to succeed in inviting the Sixteen
Arhats, participants must be very sincere. Huang Shang wrote,
"Great sincerity will surely bring a response (zhicheng kegan .
~ P J ~ ) , just like the sound of an echo within a deep valley." This
belief about great sincerity bringing a response or resonance is a
fundamental belief underlying The Eulogy of Inviting Arhats. If the
result of the ritual were successful, the author would say that it was
because the arhats responded to people's sincerity.
Interestingly, this particular language of sincerity and resonance
originated from an indigenous tradition dating back to the time of
32 See Gary Ebersole, Ritual Poetry and the Politics of Death in Early
Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1989), p. 19.
33 Ibid., p. 19.
96
RYAN BONGSEOKJOO
the Han Dynasty (206 BCE-220 CE).34 According to The Book
of Documents (Shu jing "great sincerity move gods"
(zhicheng ganshen In the "Great Treatise" chapter of
The Book of Changes (Yi jing it also says, "when stimulated
(gan it penetrates (tong W)."36 However, this does not mean
that Buddhist tradition did not value sincerity when evoking deity's
presence. In fact, according to A Record of the Perpetuity of the
Dharma, before setting up offerings for the monks of direc-
tions, one's "sincere and pure mind" has to be present first.37 An-
other scripturual text called, Tlie Method of Inviting Pi1:uj.ola also
mentions that if one wants to obtain the presence of PiI).Q.ola, one
should prepare various offerings and "believe with great sincerity"
that PiI).Q.ola will come to the offering.
38
What this exemplifies is a
case of pre-Buddhist Chinese ideology conforming well to Indian
inheritance, or vice versa.
34 Another similar expression in Chinese is ganyin translated as
"sympathetic resonance." For a more extensive discussion of ganyin, see
Robert Sharf, Coming to Terms with Chinese Buddhism (Honolulu: Univer-
sity of Hawaii Press 2002), pp. 82-88.
35 See in Shisanjing zhusu (Beijing: Zhonghua
shuju 1979), vol. 4, p. 25b.
';" 36 For the complete translation and study of the Great Treatise chapter (Da
zhuan or Xi cizhuan) see Gerald Swanson, "The Great Treatise: Commentary
Tradition of the Book of Change" (University of Washington, Ph.D. diss.
1974). Also see John Kieschnick, The Eminent Monk, (Honolulu: University
of Hawaii 1997) p. 101; ehlin-Fang Yli, Kuan-yin: the Chinese transforma-
tion of AvalokiteSvara, (New York: Columbia University Press 2001) p. 157.
37 See A Record of the Perpetuity of the Dharma, Narrated by the Great
Arhat Nandimitra (Skt. Nandimitrtivadiina; Ch. Da aluohan Nantimiduoluo
suoshuo fazhu ji, trans. Xuanzang
(600-664), T. no. 2030, 49:13b. Also see Jen Lang Shih's translation The
Perpetuity of the Dharma (cf. n. 8), p. 213.
38 Qing bintoulu fa, trans. Huijian (fl.457), T. no. 1689,
32: 784c.
97
The ritual of arhat invitation in the diary of Jojin
After visiting. the Tiantai Mountains (Tiantaishan :7(EnlJ) , the
Japanese monastic pilgrim Jojin (1011-1081) headed out to
Kaifeng Iffl!t. the capital ofthe Northern Song Dynasty, in the year
1072. According to his diary, Jojin had an opportunity to witness
the ritual of arhat invitation offering in one of the major temples
in Kaifeng, Dapingxingguo monastery (Dapingxingguosi *.:ifJ!!
It is noteworthy that the ritual was performed in the capi-
tal city, evidence of the growing popularity of this ritual beyond
Zhejiang and nearby provinces where the cult of arhats had been
most popular in the previous century. The ritual service was per-
formed at the beginning of winter, the thirtieth day of the tenth
lunar month. Jojin's diary record states:
On the thirtieth day, the weather was clear; ... Around noon (Jp. uma-
doki, Ch. wushi [the ritual of] arhat offering (Jp. Rakan kyo,
Ch. Luohan gong [began]. The lecture hall was decorated,
with spread canopy and hanging needle-sewn images (Jp. nuimono,
Ch. fengwu of the Sixteen Arhats and one image of Sizhou )[9
jl[I[ master.
39
Each one was about two chi R wide and four chi tall.
4o
In front of the seats [of the images], there were offerings made of gold
and silver, flowers, etc. In front of those [offerings], the sweet body of
golden dancing (Jp. Gigaku, Ch. lile bodhisattvas stood.
41
Their
height was about two chi. In front of those [bodhisattvas], there was the
food offering of one hundred different flavors followed by the offering
of burning incense. Cymbals (Jp. batsu, Ch. bo were struck four
39 Sizhou 5[9)+[ master refers to the eminent Buddhist monk named Sengjia
(fl. 1016) who was known as one of the Five Hundred Arhats. Sizhou
refers to the area in Anhui !ft':m& province where Sengjia master used to stay.
40 One chi R. is about 33 centimeters. Thus, two chi is about 66 centime-
ters long while four chi is about 132 centimeters long.
41 It is not clear what the sweet body of golden dancing (Jp. Gigaku Ch. lile
bodhisattvas is. Given that it is only 66 centimeters tall, it cannot be
real people dressed like bodhisattvas. My educated guess would be that it is
the image of a dancer or musician made of either gold-colored paper or sweet
material such as sugar.
98
RYAN BONGSEOK JOO
times, a small drum (Jp. ko, Ch. gu once and a hand bell (Jp. nyo,
Ch. nao once and a wooden percussion (Jp. Mfa'n, Ch. fadan 5*
once. The sound of praise filled the entire room. Next, incense was
lighted in all halls [within the monastery] and [people] chanted praise.
Next, [the assembly of the ritual participants] moved toward the living
quarters while holding the Buddha image (Jp. jibutzu, Ch. chifo
[The assembly] first went to the associate abbot's room (Jp. Shokei bo,
Ch. Shaoqing fang [He] donated one roll of silk to the Bud-
dha. Next, from the [master] Tripitaka's (Jp. sanzo, Ch. sanzang
room, one string of coins was donated. Next, [the assembly] paid their
respect to the Earth Guardian Protector of the Dharma (Jp. iishugoho,
Ch. Tizhuhufa Next, [they] moved toward master Chong-
fan's ,*JI: room. [He] donated one roll of silk. Next was master
Guangzhi's!J['W room. [He] donated one roll of silk. Next was master
Zhaoda's room. [He] donated one roll of silk. The next quarter
was locked. [The assembly] pressed down the lock, shouted a number
of times, and [then] moved on [to the next]. The next was J6jin's room.
[I] donated two rolls of silk. The associate abbot, Tripitaka [master],
and others returned one roll [to me]. Next was master Wenhui's
room. [He] donated one roll of silk. Next was master Ciji's 1i1f.m room.
[He] donated one roll of silk. Next, [the assembly] returned to the
original hall [where the ritual was performed]. Around two o'clock
(Jp. hitsujidoki, Ch. weishi Tripitaka master sent three items: a
head scarf (Jp. zukin, Ch. toujin \mrtJ), four liang of Longnao
incense, and Rukou silk. Then Wenhui master came and brought
one jin fT44 of tea. He wrote [his words] and said, "[this tea] is the
finest tea of Lu Mountain JlILlJ. [Please] take this to Japan and offer it
to eminent monks. The interpreter bhik/ju Zhipu 'Wllff sealed [the tea
bag], which won the honor of being bound together with [the statue of]
42 Earth Guardian, Protector of the Dharma (Jp. jishugoho Ch. Tizhu hufa
tfu.:tiil5*) was probably the local earth god who became incorporated into
the Buddhist pantheon. Another possibility is that this refers to a wealthy
layman who supports the temple.
43 One liang m is about 37 grams. Thus, the four liang are about 148
grams.
44 One jin IT is a little more than 500 grams.
99
MafijusrI bodhisattva. Around eight o'clock [at night] (Jp. inudoki, Ch .
. xushi from the quarters of Tripi!aka master, eight kinds of pre-
cious fruit and one bottle of wine were sent. This morning, all monks
[in the monastery] received eight kinds of soups and precious foods.
Tonight, it was to be repeated just as before. This [announcement]
was repeated. In a couple of hours, the associate abbot and Tripitaka
master invited [me] to come to the arhat offering and have tea, snacks
and more. All day and night, the instrumental music and the songs
of praise [were performed], and [the participants] ate porridge and
fruits. Although there were frequent requests to come out and join [the
ritual], I could not find free time and [thus could] not go. [It was] very
regrettable. Around two o'clock [at night] (Jp. ushidoki, ch. choushi
[the monk,] Kedao PJlli [who is] the facilitator of the hall (Jp.
tenjo, Ch. dianzuo came and brought nine hundred coins [that
he] put aside. Two hundred coins were given to the old monk
45
and one
hundred each were given to seven monks. [These were] the leftover
offerings after the chanting (Jp. nenbutsu, Ch. nianfo The old
monk recited the blessing and accepted it. The Dharma activity was
[finally] over at that time.
46
The ritual of arhat invitation that Jojin witnessed was a grand ser-
vice involving virtually everyone and every hall in the monastery.
The decorations and offerings prepared for the ritual were elab-
orate. Canopies were hung and the Sixteen Arhat images, which
were not painted but sewn on fabric, were installed. In addition to
45 I think the old monk refers to Jojin himself.
46 For the annotated reprint of Jojin's San Tendai Godaisan ki fi.7'ef:iE
Ei'uJiic, see Hirabayashi Fumio :iJZ#::x:tt, San Tendai Godaisanki Kohon
narabini Kenkya (Tokyo: Kazamashobo
1978) pp. 140-1. There are extensive scholarly works on Jojin's text
available. See Fujiyosi Masumi San Tendai Godaisanki no Kenkya
(Osaka: Kansai Daigaku Tozai Gakujutsu Kenkyiijo
2006); 0 Reihei Sodai no Chanichi Koryashi Kenkya *{-1(;CVCPB
(Tokyo: Benseisha 2002); Nakajima Ryoichi CP':;u-, "San
Tendai Godaisanki no Mondaiten Indogaku
Bukkyogaku Kenkya 27 (December, 1978): 250-253. For more works on
Jojin's text, see Hirabayashi Fumio's book, pp. 441-3.
100
RYAN BONGSEOK JOO
the Sixteen Arhats, the image of the eminent Chinese monk Sizhou
5e.rJj'f'[, who was regarded as a reincarnated arhat, was added. Several
rows of offerings were placed in front of the arhats, beginning with
flowers and followed by images of dancing (Jp. Gigaku, Ch. Jiyue
1 5 t ~ ) bodhisattvas. Most importantly, many different kinds of food
offerings were prepared before the images.
The actual ritual procedure seems to have been relatively un-
complicated, but very long. Starting by burning incense .and play-
ing different instruments, the assembly inside the hall then chanted
the hymn (zan iiJ) of the Sixteen Arhats. Jojin did not describe
what exactly they were chanting. It is possible that they used a
ritual text similar to The Eulogy of Inviting Arhats. 47 Next, the as-
sembly dispersed and went to different halls within the monastery.
They burnt incense and chanted in all halls of the monastery at the
same time. Since other deities were enshrined in other parts of the
temple, this act probably signifies the invitation of all other Bud-
dhist deities besides arhats. Then, the assembly joined again and
held a procession to the living quarters of the monks, while holding
the Buddha's image. When the assembly arrived, each monk had to
donate either a roll of silk or a string of coins. Jojin was also vis-
ited by the assembly. He donated two rolls of silk, but one roll was
returned to him. It is not clear why this part was incorporated into
the ritual of arhat invitation. It might have served as an occasion
for monks to make merit or pay their respect to their arhat ances-
tors and other Buddhist deities. Afterward, the assembly returned
to the ritual hall, and different offerings and foods were sent out to
all monks in the living quarters.
Surprisingly, the ritual continued all night long. The assembly
kept on chanting praise and playing instruments periodically. There
was enough tea, snacks and food to go around for everyone. This
suggests that the mood of the ritual was festive. It was time to share
47 Since Huang Shang passed his imperial examination in the year 1082, it
is most likely that The Eulogy of Inviting Arhats was written after J6jin's visit
to the capital city.
101
foods, gifts and money among all monks. Jojin was no exception
to this rule. Although he was just a visiting monk from Japan and
did not actively participate in the ritual, he and his entourage were
given fruit, wine, food, tea, silk, headscarves and even money. Un-
fortunately, Jojin did not record who sponsored this ritual and why
s/he did it. Given the size of the ritual, the donor must have been
quite wealthy. To find out the possibly diverse motivations behind
sponsoring the rituals, we need to examine the Song Dynasty lite-
rati records on the ritual of arhat invitation.
Literati writings on the ritual of arhat invitation
Compared to Jojin's diary, many Song Dynasty records concerning
the ritual of arhat invitation are less descriptive and more poetic, as
they were written mostly by literati. They are usually brief and eu-
logistic, and the number of extant records is limited. Nonetheless,
they survive in sufficient numbers to help us examine the reasons
for sponsoring the arhat ritual. From these writings, we see not
only why the medieval Chinese performed the ritual but also what
sort of abilities they imagined the arhat to possess.
In gratitude for passing the examinations
The first record is written by a literatus named Shi Tianzhi 9:7(1)t.
We know almost nothing about the author other than that he was a
Song Dynasty literatus.
48
However, from the record we can imagine
what kind of life he led. The title reveals quite a bit about the con-
tent that follows; it is "The Memorial of Gratitude for Passing [the
Imperial Examinations] and Setting Up of the Arhat Ritual (Xie-
dengdi sheluohanzhai shu The text states:
48 Shi Tianzhi's name is not listed in the Songren zhuanji ziliao suoyin.
However, the Siku quanshu (Wenyuange edition) contains eight essays by Shi
Tianzhi. They are all within the book series titled Wubaijia bofang daquan-
wencui. See Wei Qixian ed., Wubaijia bofang daquan wencui llEHR
14,15,17,37,79,81, Sikuquanshu, WenyuangeSikuquan-
shu dianziban (Hong Kong: Zhongwen Daxue Chubanshe Dizhi 1998).
102
RYAN BONGSEOK JOO
Although the Way of Heaven (tiandao 5ICm) is distan!, it listens [even]
to the lowly beings. Gods (shen reside in all directions, and [thus]
if there is a request, surely there will be a response. I often prepare
offerings of fruits and vegetables and respectfully convey my sincere
heart. [I] lay down and thought [to myself] that I was unfortunate,
living alone even in these late years. Since I had to pass the imperial
examinations at the county, regional and provincial levels, even more
worries were added to [my] anxious mind. I was afraid of not having
[my] name on the list [of those who had passed the examination]. Even
in dreams, I saw the absence of my name. Suddenly, looking at the
face of-my [present] life, [I realize that] I made the poverty of earlier
days disappear and attained the governmental position in the south
which I had wanted earlier. As I have pursued prosperity and happi-
ness, they [seem to] have come from the help of the unseen world. On
the morning of Insect Awakening Day Uingzhe of the second
spring month (zhongchun it is also befitting for the day of the
true governors (zhenzai descending. I eagerly spread out the
pure offerings and welcome the wind of immortals (xian flLr). I humbly
beseech the great gentlemen (dashi *) to examine [this place] and
the true [governors] to bestow protection. [Please] remove the signs
of a lifetime's bad luck and open up the road of ten thousand li ahead
[of me]. [Please] make my vocational path smooth and let my life span
be long.
51
Shi Tianzhi's motivation for sponsoring the ritual of arhat invita-
tion was very personal, originating in a specific situation in his life.
the title indicates, the author set up the ritual in gratitude for
having passed the imperial examinations and obtaining the official
position that he had previously wanted. Before taking the examina-
tions, he often made offerings and prayed to the arhats and gods.
49 Insect Awakening Day Uingzhe is one of the 24 seasonal divisions
based on the length of the day and the sun's shadow at noon. It is usually
around March 5
th
or 6
th
on the solar calendar.
50 The "true governor" here implies the arhat.
51 See Wei Qixian ed., Wubaijia bofang daquan wencui (cf. n. 48),
j. 81, pp. 18a-18b.
103
He believed that the gods would listen and respond to his prayer
even if he was just a "lowly being" without a wife or career. Af-
ter successfully passing the examinations, he still remembered the
help from the "unseen world" that he might have received. Thus, he
sponsored the ritual in the early spring, on the morning of Insect
Awakening Day Uingzhe Formally inviting the arhats, he
requested that they descend to the ritual space where he prepared
"pure offerings." This portion of the memorial sounds somewhat
similar to Huang Shang's The Eulogy of Inviting Arhats. This sug-
gests that Shi Tianzhi's memorial could have been recited at that
time of ritual service.
Shi Tianzhi designated arhats with different names. Arhats were
referred to with the titles of "the true governor" (zhenzai "the
immortal" (xian111J) and "the great gentleman" (dashi *), as if
they were local gods, immortals and bodhisattvas.
52
The last part
of the memorial specifies the kind of help the author would like to
receive from the arhats in the future. More than anything else, Shi
Tianzhi desired the aid of the arhats in his burgeoning career. He
believed that the arhats could help him clear away any unforeseen
obstacles to the advancement of his career in office. In addition, he
asked thearhats to help him live a long life.
For my deceased mother
In contrast to Shi Tianzhi, Li Qubing *"*Wg sponsored the ritual
of arhat invitation not for himself but for his deceased mother. 53
The text is short, providing only limited information about the au-
thor's (and his mother's) specific situation. However, the title is long
and informative: "The Memorial on Setting Up the Arhat Ritual on
52 Guanyin bodhisattva was often called "dashi." See Chiin-Fang Yii,
Kuan-yin (cf. n. 36), p. 345, 357, 373 and 417.
53 There is not much information on Li Qubing. Songren zhuanji ziliao
suoyin only mentions his style name, Zhonghuo {rpm and his place of origin,
Mincheng See Bide Chang et al. ed., Songren zhuanji ziliao
suoyin (cf. n. 14), vol. 2, p. 964.
104
RYAN BONGSEOK JOO
Behalf of [Deceased] Mother (Jianmu sheluohanzhai shu
Let us read the text and find out why he sponsored the
ritual. It states:
[Since the arhats] have not forgotten the entrustment [of the Buddha],
[the sentient beings can] have this wonderful karmic affinity [with
them]. (As the arhats] possess the six supramundane powers (liu-
tongzhishen 7'\WZ1$), (they] know everything and see everything.
(Please] withdraw from the samadhi, come this way and arrive here!
[Please] become my mother's spiritual guide (daoshi take the
place of all Buddhas and send down [your blessing] to my family.
That will correspond exactly to our sincere wishes. 55
The overall structure of this text is similar to the previous one by
Shi Tianzhi. The text has three parts. The first part gives a general
background about arhats, such as the Buddha's entrusting of the
Dharma to the arhats and a mention of their supramundane powers.
The second part describes calling the arhats and inviting them to
the ritual space. After extending the invitation, the author moves
on to the third part, expressing his wishes to the arhats. From this
last part, we can know more about Li Qubing's reasons for sponsor-
ing the ritual. He first asks the arhats to become his mother's spiri-
tual guide (daoshi Given that his mother has already passed
away, the author is probably requesting that the arhats guide his
mother to a better rebirth, perhaps in the Pure Land. The second
wish concerns his living family. Li Qubing beseeches the arhats to
54 The first character in the title, jian li, implies that the author's mother
was deceased at the time this text was written. In classical Chinese,jian usu-
ally means, "to make an offering"(jinxian or xiangji in a ritual
setting. In Buddhist context, jian is used together with the character zhui
lli in zhuijian lilli. It means, "To make offerings on behalf of a deceased
person and his or her well being." See Chen Fuhua et al. ed., Gudai
Hanyu cidian (Nanjing: Shangwu yinshuguan 1998), p. 752;
Charles Muller, ed., Digital Dictionary of Buddhism, (cf. n. 23, accessed July
1,2006).
j. 82, p. 9b.
105
take the place of the Buddha, who is not present in this universe,
and bless his family. All of his wishes are family-centered and, in
contrast to the first text, not at all related to the author's career or
long life.
For the health and prosperity of my family
A third account also concerns family, although, unlike the second
one, here the ritual is not dedicated to a specific member of the au-
thor's family. The author is Han Iu (?-1135), a Song Dynasty
literatus from Xianjing 1w# in Sichuan IZ:QJ r 1.56 He was the student
of Su Zhe (1039-1112), a younger brother of Su Shi and a
well-known poet and scholar-officialY The title, "Setting Up the
Arhat Offering and Praying for Well-Being (Sheluahangang qi'an
reveals that Han Iu prays to the arhats for the gen-
eral well-being of his family. The text states:
The bodhisattva responds to the calls of his karmic affinity and [there-
by] has become the king of longevity. The srtivaka (shengwen !fi:p,j;j)58
benefits the world greatly and [thus has become] no different than the
arhat. The assembly of Chan (Chanzhong which respectfully
relies on [the arhats], venerates [them] and cultivates the truth. [I hum-
bly] bow down and wish that my family be healthy and untroubled
while my posterity (zisun -=t-I*) prosper. [May my family remain]
56 Xianjing is modern day Iingyan #liff city in Sichuan. For the biography
of Han Iu, see Bide Chang et al. ed., Songren zhuanji ziliao suoyin (cf.
n. 14), vol. 5, pp. 4151-2.
57 The styled name (zi of Han Iu was Han Zicang and
sometimes his poems are under his styled name. His poems became well
known because they resembled the poems of famous Tang Dynasty writer,
Chu Guangxi fi.Ji1G (fl. 706-763). His writings were compiled under the
title Lingyang ji in four volumes. See Han Iu Lingyang ji
j. 1-4, Siku quanshu, Wenyuange Sikuquanshu dianziban (Hong Kong:
Zhongwen Daxue Chubanshe Dizhi 1998).
58 The srtivakas (shengwen JiM) are personal disciples of the Buddha.
They are also known as the "voice-hearers." The term often designates the
early arhat disciples.
106
RYAN BONGSEOK JOO
pure and have few worries. [May we] always live in the village where
there is fortune and virtue. [May I] live long in peace and joy. May I
again see the world that gradually [becomes] more peaceful!59
The first half of the text eulogizes arhats while contrasting them
with bodhisattvas and the assembly of Chan (Chanzhong
The second half contains the author's prayer to the arhat. This in-
cludes petitions for the health and prosperity of Han Ju's family, as
well as for peace and happiness in his life and in the village where
he lived. The author also includes prayers for a worry-free life. The
characteristics of these wishes are decisively worldly and yet very
general. This suggests that the author might not have had any spe-
cific occasion in his life to perform the ritual, such as the death of
his mother, or passing the imperial examination. Nevertheless, Han
Ju may have still wanted to perform the ritual because it helped to
reaffirm the peace and happiness of his family.
Village people praying for rain
I have so far discussed sources that indicate personal reasons for
performing the arhat ritual. However, there were also rituals in-
volving arhats carried out by the public. This arhat ritual was per-
formed by a group of villagers who hoped for rainfall. the text is
written as a poem by Fan Chengda YBRX.* (1126-1193). The author
was a Southern Song Dynasty scholar-officer and poet from Wux-
ian Jiangsu aiJ province. After passing the highest imperial
examination in the year 1154, Fan Chengda served initially at the
Department of Rites (Libu ffiJHl$) and then as the Great Scholar at
Zizheng hall 60 Like the poems discussed above, this poem
also bears a long and descriptive title: "In the Year of Draught, Vil-
lagers Prayed to the Fifth Arhat and Received Rain. [This Poem is]
j. 81, p. 17a.
60 For the biography of Fan Chengda, see Bide Chang et al. ed.,
Songren zhuanji ziliao suoyin (cf. n. 14), vol. 2, pp. 1655-8.
107
in Response to the Poem of Mr. Le (Suihan yiren dao diwu luohan
deyu Le xiansheng youshi ciyun
Fan Chengda wrote the poem to commemorate the
successful outcome of the arhat offering and prayer. After receiv-
ing Mr. Le's poetry, Fan Chengda composed the following poem:
In the pool of ocean and mountain is the palace of a dragon.
At the bottom of a splashing waterfall, a jade-striking sound reso-
nates.
The great gentleman of azure colored eyes!61 Whom do you reign
over?
[Because you] love the silky waterfall, [you] fly up from the misty
bottom.
You sit in meditation for a hundred thousand kalpas (jie MJ) by
chance.
You are equipped with boundless supramundane power and compas-
sionate vows.
Until now, blazing clouds have been holding the sun under their arm.
Sands are frying and the sun rots a thousand mountains after anoth-
er.
Mingling with heat, the wind from Luhun blows high.
The lush grass of lingchuan ):!lfJ 1[63 waits for the work of rain.
The mouths of ten thousand [people] are crying out for the gentleman
(shi )!
Even before the incense burner spits out, [our] sincerity has reached
[him] first.
The dust of the sunset swirls around the land, making the sound of a
whirlwind.
The morning glow hangs over the sky, reddening the [shape] of a fish-
tail cloud.
The shangyang [I;f:. bird
64
rubs the sky and a hawk flies up and dances.
61 "The great gentleman of azure colored eyes" refers to the arhat who has
the face (and thus the eyes) of a non-Chinese foreigner.
62 Luhun is the name of a town in Henan )ilJlj province.
63 lingchuan ):!lfJ r [ is in Gansu i:tffi province.
64 The shangyang p.;:j;f:. bird refers to a legendary bird that flies right before
108
RYAN BONGSEOK JOO
Suddenly, timely rain falls and [people] sing [the song of] this year's
good harvest.
65
Fan Chengda's poem is rhythmic, picturesque and dramatic. His
language invokes various moving images and sounds of rapidity.
Unlike the previous texts, his poem does not directly address or
make a request to the arhats. Instead, it describes the miraculous
event from a third person perspective, starting from the time of
drought to the moment of falling rain. This suggests that the au-
thor might not have personally attended the ritual. Nevertheless,
the poem still describes a type of arhat-centered ritual practice at
a local level, and shows how Fan Chengda perceives the arhat. He
first presents the arhat as a king who reigns over the dragon and
its palace underneath the waterfall. In medieval Chinese society,
the dragon represents the divine animal responsible for rainmak-
ing. Thus, reigning over the dragon implies having control over
the weather. As the poem continues, the author further reveals his
perception of the arhat's . preternatural ability and character; the
arhat can remain in meditation for a long time, and has boundless
supramundane power and compassion. Next, the poem shifts to a
scene of scorching weather before the rainfall, followed by the ritu-
al scene in which people burn incense and pray for rain. The poem
ends with the arhat's miraculous response to the people's sincerity
(cheng showering timely rainfall.
For the accumulation of merit
The next record to examine is a letter penned by the famous scholar-
officer Su Shi (1037-1101). While Su Shi was exiled in Hainan
the rain falls. See Chen Fuhua et al. ed., Gudai Hanyu cidian (cf. n.
54), p. 1368.
65 See Fan Chengda 5BfflGje (1126-1193), Shihu shiji 4, p. 1b-
2a, Siku quanshu, Wenyuange Sikuquanshu dianziban (Hong Kong: Zhong-
wen Daxue Chubanshe Dizhi 1998).
109
;ijJj, he was able to acquire a set ofthe Eighteen Arhat paintings.
66
The following letter was enclosed together with the arhat paintings
and sent to his younger brother, Ziyou rrn.67 The letter states:
After the Buddha's nirviilJa, the sentient beings in lambudvfpr;t became
rigid, hateful and self-centered. Faith did not easily enter [into their
mind]. Therefore, all holy beings hide and do not manifest themselves.
Only their images and transmitted words can lead the unenlightened.
However, the magical transformations of light are still appearing in
Emei ilJft) [mountains], Wutai Ii=- [mountains], Lu [mountains]68
and Tiantai 7C1S' [mountains]. [These phenomena] allow people to de-
tect their presence and see them. My house had Sixteen Arhat images.
Whenever a tea offering was made [to the arhats], a transformation oc-
curred, which turned the tea into milky floats. Sometimes, [it] became
congealed in [the shape of] white flower, peach, plum or herbaceous
peony and so on. Some say that the compassion of arhats is profoundly
deep, and they quickly help sentient beings. Therefore, many magi-
cal transformations were manifested. Is this not the case? Today, I
obtained the Eighteen Arhat images in Hainan and I am send-
ing [them] to Ziyou rEB, my younger brother. [People] should pay
respect to [the arhat images] at the right time. If it happens to be the
birthday of one of the members of the couple, then set up [food] offer-
ings (shegong and pray for the accumulation of merit (jifu
for that year. I am sending these images along with the poems that [I]
have previously composed. Ziyou's birthday is the twentieth day of the
second [lunar] month and his wife, the lady of the Deyangjun
66 For Su Shi's biography, see Bide Chang et al. ed., Songren
zhuanji ziliao suoyin (cf. n. 14), vol. 5, pp. 4312-4324. For the study of Su
Shi's life and writings, see Ronald C. Egan, Word, image, and deed in the life
of Su Shi (Cambridge: Harvard University 1994). For Su Shi and Buddhism,
see Beata Gran, Mount Lu Revisited: Buddhism in the Life and Writings of Su
Shih (Honolulu, University of Hawaii 1994); Ronald C. Egan, ibid.
67. Ziyou is a style name. He is better known as Su Zhe iflJ: (1039-1112).
68 Mount Lu ELl! is the place where later Buddhists believed that the fa-
mous monk Huiyuan (334-416) expounded the teachings of Pure Land
Buddhism.
110
RYAN BONGSEOK JOO
Ms. Shi's (Shishi is the seventeenth day of the eleventh [lunar]
month. On the day of Zhongyuan ,*51:,69 [I have written] this.?o
Su Shi's letter is elegant and easy to follow. He begins by explain-
ing why the arhat was no longer seen in the world. It was because
people had become hateful and self-centered after the Buddha's
nirvii;(La. However, the arhat still manifests himself through the
magical appearance of various lights in Chinese holy mountains.
Su Shi then records the arhat's magical manifestation he often
witnessed while growing up. After making a tea offering to the Six-
teen Arhat images at his home, he saw the appearance of milk-like
liquid floats, which turned into different flower and fruit shapes. Su
Shi interpreted these as the compassionate work of arhats, . letting
their worshippers know of their presence through signs.
Next, Su Shi mentions the Eighteen Arhat paintings that he ac-
quired in Hainan and gives instructions on how to venerate the
images at home. He first asks his brother's family to venerate them
according to a time schedule. This probably meant that they should
burn incense in front of the arhat images and pray on a regular
basis. On a birthday, however, he instructed them to make special
offerings to the Arhat images "for the accumulation of merit (jifu
for that year." In other words, Su Shi's reason for setting up
the arhat ritual was to accrue enough merit for the year to come, in
order to prevent troubles and bring good luck.
Praying for having sons
The last record describes the miraculous tale of Huang Kuo ;;:J3.
Unlike the previous five records, the story of Huang Kuo was writ-
ten not by the subject himself but by Hong Mai (1123 - 1203)
in The Record of the Listener (Yijianzhi Compared to the
69 Zhongyuan is the fifteenth day of the seventh month.
70 See Su Shi (1037-1101), Dongpu chuanji 98, p. 15a-
15b, Siku quanshu, Wenyuange Sikuquanshu dianziban (Hong Kong: Zhon-
gwen Daxue Chubanshe Dizhi 1998).
111
previous five records, it is less poetic and more descriptive. The
title is also informative: "Mr. Huang, the Story Teller, Prays for a
Son (Huang'Jiangshu daozi The text states:
Huang Kuo ;':m, the story teller (jiangshuzhe was originally
from Xinghua J!1c?! His horne was in Xinzhou and he did not
have any sons. Once he took his wife, Ms. Shi JjiE, and his concubine
to a Buddhist temple in order to pray inside the arhat hall. That night,
the wife and concubine both dreamed of several honorable arhats.
The arhats looked at each other and laughed. [Then,] all of sudden,
they looked at [the wife and concubine] and started to say "before
and after three years each (qianhou gesannian iWtrt-&=:q::.)." When
[they] awoke, they could remember the dream clearly. The wife and
concubine had had the dream at the same time. However, no one knew
what the phrase meant. [Later] they both got pregnant three years
apart from each other. Afterward, they both had sons in the same
year. After the death of Mr. Huang, Ms. Shi diligently taught [her son]
how to read. The concubine's son was named Tao and Ms. Shi's
son was named Jie In the Jiachen EtfItZ year of Chunxi reign
era (1184), Jie passed [the imperial examination] and three years later
(1187), Tao [also] passed it succeeding Jie. Now, [everyone] knows the
meaning of "before and after three years each." [Huang] Kuo also had
four other sons and Tao was the oldest.
73
Huang Kuo's reason for going to the arhat hall with his wife and
concubine was to pray for a son. At that time, Huang Kuo was
without a son, and he thought that the arhat could help him. The
record does not give any detailed information about what Huang
Kuo did inside the arhat hall. It is likely that before praying to the.
arhat, he made some offerings to the arhats perhaps with the help of
a Buddhist priest. The text explains how his wishes came true after
praying inside the arhat hall. At night, a number of arhats appeared
71 Xinghua is located in Jiangsu province.
72 Xinzhou is located in Jiangxi 5Iffi province.
73 See Hong Mai (1123-1203), Yijianzhi j. 10, pp. 4b-5a,
Siku quanshu, Wenyuange Sikuquanshu dianziban (Hong Kong: Zhongwen
Daxue Chubanshe Dizhi 1998).
112
.RY AN BONGSEOK JOO
magically in the dreams of Huang Kuo's wife and concubine. The
arhats uttered the mysterious phrase, "before and after three years
each," which became comprehensible only after the wife and con-
cubine gave birth to two sons three years apart. Later the two boys
passed the imperial examinations, again three years apart.
Conclusion
In this part, let us revisit the four questions raised in the beginning.
First, for the Song Dynasty Chinese, the arhat was essentially not
different from the bodhisattva. The liturgical text written by Huang
Shang states that, just like the bodhisattva, the Sixteen Arhats and
their retinues willfully remain in the tenth bhami and extend their
help to sentient beings out of their compassion. They often hide
themselves in the midst of ordinary people and surreptitiously use
their supramundane powers to grant people's wishes and protect
the Dharma. Their powers include a variety of different preternatu-
ral abilities: granting a male child, bringing down rain, protecting
the health and prosperity of a family, guiding a deceased parent to
a better rebirth, and aiding in career advancement and long life.
This shows that there was no set pattern to the arhat miracle tales -
that the arhat was regarded as granting all and any kinds of wishes.
This positive portrayal is obviously different from the image of
"overbearing" or selfish arhats whose only concerns lay in the at-
tainment of their own nirvQl}a in Mahayana polemical texts. This
shows that for most Song Dynasty Chinese Buddhists - whether
they were monastics or lay followers - the canonical definitions of
the arhat were irrelevant. They neither stopped a highly educated
scholar-officer like Huang Shang from creatively redefining the ar-
hat's identity nor prevented village people from making offerings
to the arhat and praying for rain. In other words, Chinese people
venerated the arhat not because the arhat is on his way to becoming
the bodhisattva on the path to Buddhahood, but because in their
minds, arhats are disguised bodhisattvas.
113
Second, thanks to Jojin's diary, we are able to reconstruct a scene
of arhat invitation during the Northern Song Dynasty. The ritual
was performed in Dapingxingguo monastery located in the capital
city of Kaifeng. It was a long, elaborate and community-wide event,
involving many priests in the monastery. The Sixteen Arhat images
were made of needle-sewn fabrics while the offerings of "one hun-
dred different flavors" of food, flowers and incense were presented
in front of those images. When the assembly chanted the praise of
arhats, cymbals, drums, bells and wooden percussion instruments
were played repeatedly. Curiously, a part of the ritual procedure
included solicitation of donations from monks. They used a roll of
silk as their donation to the assembly. Other material objects were
exchanged between Jojin and other resident monks of the monas-
tery including a head scarf, incense, tea and coins, as well as many
different kinds of food and wine. The ritual lasted all day and night,
and the atmosphere was highly festive.
Third, the Song Dynasty literary and visual sources attest that
the Song literati played a significant role in the development and
sustainment of the arhat cult. Huang Shang, a high ranking schol-
ar-officer, composed a liturgical text for the ritual of arhat invita-
tion for wide public usage. Other high-profile literati such as Su
Shi, Han Ju and Fan Chengda participated in the arhat veneration
practices by commissioning arhat paintings, sponsoring the ritual
for family, and composing a commemorative poem about the mi-
raculous rainfall after a performance of the ritual at the village.
Lesser known literati Shi Tianzhi and Li Qubing also left a record
of the ritual service, professing personal gratitude to the arhat and
eulogizing the arhat's power and benevolence. Although the Song
Dynasty literati engaged in the ritual for a variety of different rea-
sons, the overall tone of their voices was uniform, displaying awe,
reverence and devotion to the arhat. This devotion, however, is dif-
ferent from what Mark Halperin called "worldly devotion," denot-
ing highly nuanced, multi-faceted and socially engaged views of
Buddhism by the Song Dynasty literati. Rather, it is closer to the
114
RYAN BONGSEOK JOO
language of less "savvy" and more pious laymen of T ~ n g Dynasty?4
In addition, this also stands in sharp contrast to Jacques Gernet's
claim about the literati and Buddhism. He states:
Those raised in the classical tradition could not be fervent Buddhists.
Their rationalism restrained them from adopting common beliefs
and superstitions. Noble women, by contrast, female members of the
great families, self-made men, and commoners had no such protection
against religious faith. There were more receptive to Buddh,ism. The
literati, moreover, had an austerity of principle, an inclination to tem-
perance and thrift, that disapproved of extravagant expenditures?5
All of the evidence in this study proves that it was not just women,
commoners and self-made men who engaged in the "superstitious"
practices of arhat veneration. Contrary to Gernet's assertion, the
literati group participated in the arhat cult just as much, if not more.
The old and tired assumption that only the uneducated masses par-
ticipated in "superstitious" cultic practices should finally be laid to
rest.
Fourth, Robert Sharf recently published an excellent theoretical
essay on ritual, proposing the idea of Buddhist ritual as "adult play"
and "Buddhist darsan." In his analysis, the performative approach
to ritual advocated by contemporary scholars ended up reinforcing
to the very dichotomies - thought and action, the subjective and the
objective, inner and outer, etc. - that they have tried to avoid. To
overcome this problem of "moieties," he turns to the realm of "play"
where children first learned to detach a signifier from the signified
and place the signifier onto some other object. This "transfer of
74 Mark Halperin's recent work was very helpful for this article. I am not
suggesting that Halperin's analysis is incorrect. My point is that if we were
to look outside the genre of commemorative writings on Buddhist temple, we
can also discover more uniform and devotional voices of the Song literati.
See Mark Halperin, Out of the Cloister (cf. n. 29), pp. 4, 27-61, 233-237.
75 See Jacques Gernet, Buddhism in Chinese Society: An Economic His-
tory from the Fifth to the Tenth Century, trans., Franciscus Verellen (New
York: Columbia University Press 1995), p. 299.
115
meanings" implies that "For a child, the word 'horse' applied to the
stick means .'there is a horse,' because mentally he sees the object
standing behind the word."76 Like a child who uses a stick as the
pivot of detaching meaning/signifier and yet still sees a horse in the
new object of the stick, an adult participates in ritual in a similar
manner, taking, for instance, "the wafer as if it were the flesh of
Christ" and worshipping "the stone icon as if it were the body of a
god."77 In other words, a ritual recreates an "as-if world" like that
of young children, where a conceptual displacement is encouraged,
and a signifier and a signified are fused.
Sharf also points out how the practice of Buddhist ritual resem-
bles, more so than Buddhists often admit, those of Hindu darsan
and Vedic sacrifice. The practice of darsan involves consecrated
images which are treated "not merely as a representation of the
deity but as its animate corporeal embodiment (murti)."78 Suppli-
cants in Vedic sacrifice invoke the deity's presence and make of-
ferings along with ritualized gestures and utterances in exchange
for a preternatural boon. However, according to Sharf, Mahayana
Buddhist rituals differ from Hindu sacrifice in that the Buddhist
deity invoked is none other than the Mahayanist truth of emptiness
(sunyatii), and the ultimate purpose of any Mahayana Buddhist rit-
ual is to "elicit precisely the understanding that all form is empty."
He further elaborates that "recognition of this 'truth' - namely, that
all truth is relative - is precisely the boon bestowed by the bud-
dhas" while "Mahayana rituals both affirm and confute ... the real-
ity of the deities that take center stage in the practice."79
Extending Sharf's theory to the ritual of arhat invitation pro-
vides some new insights. Generally speaking, the ritual of arhat
76 These are the words of Vygotsky that Sharf is quoting in his essay. See
Sharf, "Ritual" (cf. n. 12), p. 255.
77 Ibid., pp. 256-257.
78 Ibid., p. 257.
79 Ibid., p. 258.
116
RYAN BONGSEOK JOO
invitation fits quite well with the model of Buddhist darsan and
sacrifice. According to Jojin's diary, the needle-sewn images of the
arhat take the center stage and are treated as if they were "real
things" by adding metalinguistic cues such as chanting, bowing,
playing instruments, and making offerings to the images. As the
literati's writings reveal, those offerings were made with the expec-
tation of receiving various preternatural boons from the arhat.
On the other hand, there is near silence on the subject of in-
terpreting a preternatural boon as doctrinally sound epistemologi-
cal knowledge. For the most Song Dynasty Chinese Buddhists, the
boon that they sought in return for offerings to the arhat was onto-
logical transformation in their everyday lives - becoming pregnant
with a male child, bringing down rain, living a healthy and pros-
perous life, guiding a deceased parent to a better rebirth, etc. - and
had little to do with knowledge. To borrow Sharf's own words in
critiquing performative approach, this habit of reducing a "non-
Western ontology to an epistemology" is one of the signature char- '
acteristics of "the modernist project" valorizing "the parochialisms
and limitations of Western enlightenment."8o
Lastly, let us revisit the Song Dynasty arhat painting Wig. 1] that
we viewed at the beginning of this essay. Interestingly, although
there are arhat images hung in the back where food offerings are
made, the main supplicants in this painting are not having eye-
to-eye Buddhist darsan experience with the arhat images. Instead,
they are facing the sky above the garden. This turning away from
the image to face the "real things" descending from the sky sug-
gests that adults do not always participate in children's "play." Rit-
ual participants can and often do remain aware that a signifier is
just a signifier, never a "real thing," in spite of what Catholic theo-
logians or traditional Buddhist exegesis advocates. If Zhou Jichang
and Li Tinggui, the artists of our painting [Fig. 1] were still alive
today, they would proclaim that "map" is just "map" and "terri-
tory" is in the sky.
80 Ibid., p. 252.
OBJECT OF COGNITION IN DIGNAGA'S
ON THE CONTROVERSIAL PASSAGES IN PARAMARTHA'S.
AND XUANZANG'S TRANSLATIONS*
CHEN-KUO LIN
1. Introduction
There are four Chinese translations
vrtti. The earliest translation, Wuxiang sic hen lun, by Paramartha,
is dated between 557 and 569 C.E. The second one, Guan suoyu-
anyuan lun, by Xuanzang, was done in 657. The third one, com-
pleted in 710, was included in Yijing's translation of Dharmapala's
Commentary, Guan suoyuan lunshi. The last version, by Lti Cheng,
was translated from the Tibetan in 1928.
1
In Lti's work, all four
versions are arranged in parallel form for convenience of compari-
son. Lti concluded that, as far as the original text was concerned,
Paramartha's version and the Tibetan version were very similar,
while Xuanzang's version was rather close to Yijing's.2 A similar
comparison by Vi Hakuju was conducted in 1958 partially on the
basis of Lti's contribution.
3
* Acknowledgements: This article is indebted to Professor Shoryu Kat-
sura's invaluable instruction in several occasions of discussion. It is also ben-
efited from Professor Chien-hsing Ho's comments and Carlo Harris' edito-
rial assistance.
1 Lii & Yincang 1928.
2 Lii 1928: 34.
3 Di 1958: 13-14. Yamaguchi Susumu also acknowledged his indebted-
ness to Lii's exegetical reading of Dharmapi'ila's text. See Yamaguchi & No-
zawa 1965: 413-414.
Volume 29 Number 22006 (2008) pp. 117-138
118
CHEN-KUOLIN
Regarding the content, however, it is quite obviqus that Xuan-
zang followed Dharmapala's Commentary, claiming that the object
of cognition in Dignaga's critique of realism referred to the five
kinds of sensory objects. By contrast, in Paramartha's translation
the object of cognition is said to consist in the six kinds of objects,
including the object of mental consciousness (manovijiiana).4 Al-
though Dignaga's original Sanskrit text was no longer extant, we
are quite sure that, as agreed in both the Tibetan and Yijing's trans-
lations, Dignaga did not specify the scope of the cognitive objects
in his critique of realism.
Here arises the question: Is the textual discrepancy between the
two translations a minor issue? Or is it rather a critical sign of an
interpretative difference in Paramartha's and Xuanzang's concep-
tion of Dignaga's epistemology? I shall argue in this article that
the discrepancy cannot be overlooked, for both Paramartha's and
Xuanzang's translations are quite consistent in themselves with re-
gard to whether five kinds or six kinds of the object of cognition
should be subject to investigation. It is obvious that these differ-
ences were deliberately maintained in both translations. Now, how
do we explain this interpretative difference? The key to answer this
question is to explain how the ontological status of the object of
mental consciousness was conceived differently in Buddhist episte-
mology during the fifth and sixth centuries, especially in the debate
between the Sarvastivada and Sautrantika schools. If the object of
mental consciousness is regarded as externally real, it should be
subject to the same criticism that Dignaga had launched against re-
alists. On the other hand, if it is not externally real, there is no need
to include it as the target of investigation. In other words, we should
4 In Paramartha's translation, the treatise is directed to "those who claim
that the six kinds of consciousness, such as visual consciousness, etc., are
caused by the external objects" while in Xu-
anzang's translation the treatise is rather directed to "those who would re-
gard external matter (riipa) as the known object (alambana) and the cause
(pratyaya) of the five kinds of consciousness, such as visual consciousness,
etc." See T.31.1619.882c; 888b.
OBJECT OF COGNITION
119
be more concerned with the epistemological arguments about the
ontological status of the object of mental consciousness than with
the differences between the various translations of Dignaga's text.
There are two approaches that may be employed to solve the
foregoing problem. The first is to look into Dignaga's other works,
especially Nyiiyamukha and PramiilJasamuccaya, with the hope
that we may find an explanation in some doctrinal clues. The sec-
ond approach is to contextualize the whole issue within the Indian
Buddhist scholastic debate, mainly between Sarvastivada and Sau-
trantika, about the ontological status of the cognitive object. Hypo-
thetically, I believe that Dignaga, just like his Yogacara predeces-
sors, conducted his epistemological analysis by engaging with both
contemporary Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophers. That this
approach is a better choice can be confirmed through Dignaga's
PramiilJasamuccaya, where he vigorously responded to the chal-
lenges from Nyaya, Sailkhya, and MlmaIp.sa.
5
In the
however, Dignaga took Buddhist realists as
the main antagonists, arguing that the Buddhist realist atomic the-
ory fails to explain the object of cognition. This way of reading is
. also confirmed in Chinese Yogadira literature, especially in Kuiji's
Weishi ershilun shuji and Chengweishilun shujii, Taixian's Cheng-
weishilun xueji (and Huizhao's Chengweishilun liaoyideng).6
The elaboration of these issues in the discussion that follows
is divided into three parts: (1) Firstly, I provide a brief account
of the main thesis in Dignaga's (2) Then
I use Dharmapala's Commentary to explain the rationale for Xu-
anzang's exclusion of the cognitive object of mental consciousness
in Dignaga's argument. (3) Thirdly, I explore the doctrinal debate
about the ontological status of the cognitive object in Buddhist di-
rect realism (Sarvastivada), indirect realism (Sautrantika) and epis-
temological idealism (Yogacara). In the last section I look for some
5 For a comprehensive view of Dignaga's philosophical enterprise within
the Indian philosophical and religious context, see Dan Arnold, 2005.
6 See Lii 1928: 39.
120
CHEN-KUO LIN
doctrinal clues to explain the raison d'etre for inclu-
sion of the cognitive object of mental consciousness.
2. Main theses in Dignaga's
What is the object of cognition (alambana)? This is the question
addressed in Dignaga's a small treatise
that contains 900 words in Xuanzang's translation. Before giving
Dignaga's answer, let us check the Abhidharma literature first. Ac-
cording to Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakosa, the object of cognition
(alambana) is differentiated from the object of senses The
latter refers to that which is acted upon (i.e., perceived) by the sens-
es, whereas the former refers to the object of consciousness, i.e., the
object of mind (citta) and mental associates (caittas). This defini-
tion is clearly stated in I.19:
What is the distinction between the 'object-realm' (vioJaya) and the
'object of cognition' (alambana)? VioJaya refers to that which is acted
upon by the senses, whereas iilambana refers to that which is grasped
(grhyate) by the mind and its mental associates for their arising.
7
As to the relationship between the object-realm and the object of
cognition, however, Sarvastivada contended that they are not on-
tologically differentiated. What is directly perceived by the six
senses must be the same as what is known in cognition. According
tp the Sarvastivada theory of simultaneous causation, an object is
said to be cognized in the mind/consciousness when this object is
directly perceived by a sense faculty. A cognized object must be
an object perceived by a sense faculty too. As for the Sautrantika,
who held the theory of successive causation, only if the object of
sense has been perceived by the sense faculty first is it possible for
the perception of the same object to arise at the next moment. In
7 Vasubandhu, AKBh, T.29.1558.7a: plT*t, 11'f{OjJ3U?;finNEl;i;;, Jf:t
:JJj]ijg, 0 {I" )L"plT;i;;ttli'ElffiJJre, For
the Sanskrit text, see Ejima 1989: 30: kaJ:! punar vi.JayiiZambanayor viie.JaJ:! /
yasmin yasya ktiritraf!! sa tasya vi.JayaJ:! / yac cittacaittair grhyate tad
iilambanam /. Cf. also Dhammajoti 2004: 5-6.
OBJECT OF COGNITION
121
each successive moment of perception, the object of sense during
the first moment first ceases to be, and then there arises the object
of cognition of the following moment. The object one knows is no
longer the object perceived by the six sense faculties. They occur at
different moments in the same process of perception.
8
As for the Sarvastivada, the object of mind must be the same real
object of the sense faculties. It is not possible for one to perceive
something not existent. On the contrary, the Sautrantika claimed
that one is able to perceive both existence (bhiiva) and non-exis-
tence (abhiiva), including objects in both the past and the future.
9
Confronted with the distinction between the object of the sense
faculties and the object of cognition, Dignaga did not agree with
the ontology of either direct realism or indirect realism, both of
which assumed the existence of the external object as the condition
of cognition to begin with. However, Dignaga did not question the
Buddhist causal theory of knowledge. That is, knowledge should
be explained in terms of causality. Only when the sense and the
object are given as the causal conditions, there arises perception,
no matter simultaneously or successively. Conversely, if the object
of sense is absent, at least for the Sarvastivadins, there arises no
perception.
lO
Accordingly, since we all experience perception, we
are thus able to infer that there must exist an object of sense. As for
Dignaga, however, to prove that the object of sense exists is not the
same as to prove that the object of sense exists externally.
Dignaga's argument starts from redefining the premises that the
object of cognition needs to fulfill. The two conditions are (1) the
object of cognition must be a substance (ti mI I shiti .m1, dravyal
8 For Buddhist causal theories of knowledge in the Sarvastivada and the
Sautrantika, see Dhammajoti 2004: 69, 81.
9 Vasubandhu, AKBh, T.29.l558.05c:
10 Vasubandhu, AKBh, T.29.l558.104b: 0
0 iIIUW::f"..
122
CHEN-KUO LIN
svabhava)ll as the support for the arising of cognition and (2) cog-
nition arises with the mental representation (akara) of the objectP
The first premise excludes the realist metaphysical assumption of
the existence of external world in the epistemological analysis. For
Dignaga, whether or not the external world exists is precisely the
subject matter an epistemologist needs to investigate. It can be de-
termined only after the investigation has been soundly conducted.
Like Descartes, we are justified only in starting from the. investi-
gation of cognition.13 Due to the fact that cognition is not able to
arise without any "support," no matter what kind of "support" that
may be, internal or external, there must be "substance" to serve as
the substratum which grounds the properties or attributes of the
object. Here we see that although Dignaga avoids the metaphysi-
cal assumption of external world, he inevitably employs another
metaphysical distinction between substance and attribute in the
definition of the object of cognition. Only after the first premise is
granted are we able to explain why it was necessary for Dignaga
to adopt the standpoint of sakaravijfianavada, claiming that all we
know are nothing but the representations of object that appear in
consciousness. This theoretic stance follows as a direct result of the
substance/attribute distinction made in the first premise- along with
II The Sanskrit equivalent of ti S / shiti 'JfS could be dravya or svabhava,
which is confirmed by Tibetan rendering rali gi lio boo See Tola & Dragonetti
1982: 108, 129, note 3. This reading is also confirmed in Yijing's translation
of Dharmapala's Commentary: "As to 'self-nature' (svabhiiva), it refers to the
'particular' and the 'universal' As to 'mak-
ing known' (vijfiiipyate), it means 'determination.' How is it characterized as
'making known'? It is because [cognition] arises in accord with that form."
Cf. T.31.1625.889c: JElli,

12 See Xuanzang's translation, T.31.1624.888b:

13 In this respect, the first condition of the cognitive object reminds us of
the Husserlian method of epoche employed to suspend our natural attitude
towards the external world. See Zahavi 2003: 46.
OBJECT OF COGNITION
123
the use of the notion of akara to explain that what one perceives
is only an attribute (since the substance itself cannot be known di-
rectly). This is the second premise, which is also shared by indirect
realism, i.e., Sautrantika.
The above exegetical analysis is based on our reading of Xuan-
zang's text. When we come to Paramartha's translation, some slight
differences should be noted. The same passage on the definition of
alambana is translated by Paramartha as follows:
What are the characteristics of the object of cognition? The object
of cognition is thus named insofar as its form of substance is made
known in the consciousness, and the consciousness arises in accord
with the form of substance.
14
Unlike Xuanzang's interpretation, substance and form are not
separately treated in Paramartha's definition. According to the lat-
ter, the form of substance serves as the condition of the object of
cognition. According to Xuanzang, however, there are clearly two
aspects of cognition: form as the object of cognition and substance
as the support (substratum) of cognition, each of which must be
analyzed separately.
After the definition has been given, Dignaga proceeds to argue
that the realist theories of external object are not justifiable, for they
are not able to meet both conditions of cognition. The four realist
theories are stated as follows: (1) Perception can only be caused by
single atoms (paramalJu) because nothing else is real except for
atoms. (2) The synthesis (*saiicitakara) of atoms can serve as the
14 Cf. Paramartha's translation, T.31.1619.882c:
tEl, Here I follow Ui Hakuju's Japanese trans-
lation , see Ui 1958: 30, 31, 36. In the beginning, I tried to render H:tEl as
dvandva, meaning "substance and form". Thanks to the comments by Chien-
hsing Ho and an anonymous reviewer, I agree that Ui's interpretation is more
acceptable. However, this rendering does change the difference between
Paramartha's and Xuangzang's interpretations. Cf. also Frauwallner 1930:
180: "Objekt (vi.yaya) sein das eigene Wesen (svan7pa) wird durch die
Erkenntnis (jfiana) (avadharyate), indem sie in seiner Gestalt (akara)
entsteht."
124
CHEN-KUO LIN
object of perception too. (3) Some maintain that the conglomera-
tion (*saficita) of atoms, such as solidness and wetness, is qualified
as the object of perception because it is capable of creating its own
image in consciousness.l
5
(4) The various forms of object deter-
mined by the conglomeration of atoms are objective real, because
they are evident in perception.
Responding to the above realist theories, Dignaga argues that
(1) even if a single atom could be recognized as a substance, it
still does not have a perceivable form (visual, tactile, etc.). As a
substance, an atom is said to be able to serve as the cause of cogni-
tion. However, since it lacks form, it is not able to be represented
in cognition. Hence, an atom cannot be the object of cognition be-
cause it fails to meet the second condition. (2) As for the synthesis
of atoms, although it has a form to be represented in cognition, it
is not qualified to be the object of cognition because, just like the
double-moon illusion caused by the disease of the eye, there is no
substance which acts as the cause of the cognition. In other words,
it does not meet the requirement of the first condition. (3) Regard-
ing the theory of conglomeration, Dignaga argues that although the
conglomeration of atoms is able to meet the first condition, it does
not fulfill the second requirement, i.e., producing the representation
in cognition. For example, solidity in the conglomeration of atoms
cannot be perceived in the visual consciousness. (4) As to the last
theory, Dignaga argues that the form of a thing, e.g., a jar, is not an
ultimate existence (paramarthasat), but a conventional existence
(saJ!lVrtisat). Why? Consider that there are two same-size jars with
15 In addition to reconstructing the Sanskrit origin of ;rD* by *saiicita (or
*sanghata) and ;fOE;- by *saiicitttkttra (or *sanghtitttkttra), Kata Junsha also
proposed to reconstruct these two terms by *saiicita and *saiicaya respec-
tively. See Kata 1989: 176-180. According to Sanghabhadra, the conglom-
eration (saiicita) of atoms can serve as the object of five sensations, because
it is the collection of real atoms, whereas the synthetic form (*saiicitttkttra)
cannot be taken as the object of sensations, because it is the object of concep-
tual discrimination (T.29.1562.350c). For analysis in detail, see Dhammajoti
2004: 75-78.
OBJECT OF COGNITION
125
different shapes. The different shape of a jar cannot be explained
by the same amount of atoms in two jars of the same size.
When all alternatives of realist theory have been refuted,
Dignaga continues to argue for his own thesis, namely that the
external object does not exist at all, whereas what truly exists as
the object of cognition is nothing but the internal object appearing
like an external object.
16
For Dignaga, there is only one theoretic
alternative left when the existence of external world has been re-
futed. That is, what truly exists is the internal object that arises as
a part of cognition itself. Within the domain of cognition, there
arises simultaneously something as an "object" dualistically stand-
ing opposite to cognition itself as "subject."
At this point, the ontological problem of the internal object
needs to be pressed further. What is this internal object? How does
it arise? Dignaga answers as follows:
The external objects do not exist at all. Due to the mental construction
of the sentient being's deluded mind, the construction of the six [ex-
ternal] objects arises in the consciousness. The mental construction
[of external object] appears in such way that it looks external [to the
consciousness]. Thus it is named aZambanapratyaya (Paramartha's
translation)P
For Dignaga, the object of cognition is mental construction only,
which serves as the cause of cognition. Between the object and
16 Cf. Paramartha's translation, T.31.1619.883a: ;Em,
fPJ5t1;Jm? 31D:9H!(,ffJt Xuanzang's translation, T.31.
1624.888c: The thesis (1) that the
object of cognition is merely an internal object does not necessarily imply
another thesis (2) that external object does not exist. Although Dignaga ex-
plicitly argues for thesis (2), his argument for such an ontological claim needs
further explication. This ambiguity is also the reason why Dignaga has been
identified as a Yogacara idealist by some and as a Sautrantika by others.
17 Cf. Paramartha's translation, T.31.1619.883a: 0
0 0 31DlIUlfifJ1.,

126
CHEN-KUOLIN
cognition, there is simultaneous mutual causation. As to the sub-
jective aspect of cognition, Dignaga employs a Yogacara notion of
"potential force" (akti),18 the synonym of "seed" (blja), to re-inter-
pret the meaning of "sense faculty." The so-called "sense faculty"
is thus nothing but the potential force (to cause the arising of cog-
nition) embedded in the consciousness. Even though he appealed
to the Yogacara interpretation, it must be noted that Dignaga did
not mention the iiZayavijfiiina as the matrix of where
"potential force" is supposed to reside. On the contrary, Xuanzang
deliberately inserts the notion of iiZayavijfiiina (root-consciousness)
into the text to make Dignaga's theory fall in line with Yogacara
position, even if it might not be faithful to Dignaga's original in-
tent.
19
Dignaga concludes that it is the internal object which meets
both conditions of the object of cognition. First, the internal object
appears as the object of cognition. The appearance of the internal
object meets the premise that cognition arises with the representa-
tion of the object. Second, the mutual causation between the inter-
nal object and its respective perception, for instance, visual object
and visual perception, meets the premise that the object of cogni-
tion must be a substance to act as the support/cause for cognition
to arise. Although the internal object is the result of mental con-
struction, it does not mean that mental construction does not have
causal force. A well-known example is that of the "wet dream." For
Yogacara, the object of cognition is defined in terms of causal ef-
ficacy, but not by the exteriority or physicality of object.
18 For the Sanskrit restoration, cf. Yamaguchi 1938: 11 (Verse 7b). Cf. also
Sastri 1942: 5l.
19 Cf. Xuanzang's translation, T.31.1624.889a: lft1.:r;fj
0 English translation:
"The existence of sense faculty is inferentially justified by the potential force
sakti) for producing perception. However, the potential force is not
derived from outside. It is not unjustifiable to claim that five senses, includ-
ing eye, etc., are named after the various kinds of potential force in the root-
consciousness by which five sensory objects are perceived."
OBJECT OF COGNITION
127
3. Tracing Xuanzang's interpretation in Dharmapala's Commen-
tary
It is also worthy of note that, according to Paramartha, the inter-
nal objects of the six cognitions are merely mental constructions.
According to Xuanzang, however, only the five internal sensory
objects are included in Dignaga's critique of realism, whereas the
object of mental consciousness is left unexamined. The difference
between the two translations is mainly marked by their different
interpretations of the ontological status of the object of mental
consciousness. In order to solve this problem, we will focus on
Dharmapala's Commentary first and take it as our primary clue
in exploring the rationale and assumptions underlying Xuanzang's
translation.
Dharmapala's interpretation can be summarized as follows:
(1) The Buddhist realist holds that, according to the theory of
existence, ultimate existence (paramiirthasat) consists of the ob-
jects of five sensory perceptions, whereas conventional existence
(sal!lvrtisat), such as the existence of a "cart," is the object of men-
tal consciousness only. Ultimate existence is truly real (dravyataJ:z
sat) in the sense of existing independently from conditions other
than itself. It exists in itself (svo bhiivaf:z). On the contrary, con-
ventional existence, which is also called "verbal-conceptual exis-
tence" (prajfiaptisat), depends upon other conditions, which can
be reduced to more fundamental factors.
2o
Strategically speaking,
as far as the realist theory is concerned, there is no need to refute
conventional existence (which serves as the object of mental con-
sciousness), because conventional existence is ontologically based
on ultimate existence. And to the extent that ultimate existence is
refuted, conventional existence likewise becomes untenable.
(2) Here arises another question: In addition to taking the
conventional existence for its object, does the mental conscious-
20 For a brief Abhidharma distinction of paramarthasat and saY(lvrtisat, cf.
Hirakawa 1990: 143-144.
128
. CHEN-KUO LIN
ness also take five sensorial objects for its object? The
Sarvastivada's answer is that it doesn't. They argue that the mental
consciousness and the five sensory perceptions are not directed at
the same object at the same moment. Historically, this question has
been subject to dispute among Abhidharma schools. Some held that
mental consciousness is able to perceive both the sensory object
and its concept. If the mental consciousness is capable of perceiv:-
ing the sensory object, that is tantamount to saying that the mental
consciousness has the function of perception If that is
the case, Paramartha's translation is justifiable, because the mental
consciousness is said to be capable of perceiving the external ob-
ject. This is the problem of mental perception
which will be discussed below.
According to Buddhist realism, whenever there is sensory per-
ception, there must be a sensory object. Sensory perception and
its object are not separated from each other in the experience
of cognition. This is the fundamental principle upon which the
Sarvastivadins argue for the existence of external objects. How-
ever, this principle does not fully apply to the mental consciousness
which also perceives non-sensory objects, such as the objects in
dream, the past or the future. Therefore, according to Dharmapala,
even if mental perception is granted, it occurs only on the basis of
the five sensory perceptions. Thus, this argument is sufficient for
. Dignaga's critique of realism insofar as the existence of the five
> sensory objects have been refuted.
(3) For some Buddhist realists, who contend that the physical
object perceived by the mental consciousness in the state of medi-
tation is not the object of reasoning (tarka), but an object which
has to be based on the real factors of existence,21 Dharmapala re-
plies that in his treatise Dignaga does not deal with extraordinary
experiences such as the state of concentration. The experience of
cognition Dignaga attempts to analyze in that treatise belongs to
21 For Sarvastivada's view on the object of meditation, see *Abhidharma-
nyayanusarasastra, T.29.1562.622a-623b.
OBJECT OF COGNITION
129
the ordinary spheres of learning and tbinking only, but not of med-
itation. Even if in the state of deep concentration a practitioner is
able to perceive the object as real through yogi-perception (yogi-
which is accepted as one of the four perceptions in the
Pramal}asamuccaya, such direct perception is still different from
ordinary sensory perception. Precisely for these reasons, there is
no need for Dignaga to include the object of mental consciousness
in examination.
22
(4) Some argue that the mental consciousness is able to directly
perceive the external object. Therefore, the object of mental con-
sciousness should be included in Dignaga's anti-realist analysis.
Dharmapala replies that if so, then deaf and blind people would not
exist, for they are supposed to be capable of perceiving the external
object through the mental consciousness only. And this contradicts
our everyday experience.
The issue that whether or not the mental consciousness directly
perceives the external object was widely contested among Abhi-
dharma schools. The Sarvastivada contends that the mental con-
sciousness does not arise with sensory perception simultaneously
and that it perceives objects in the past and the future, but not the
object in the present. The object of the present is perceived by sen-
sory perception. For example, the green color of a table is perceived
by visual perception first. At the next moment it is perceived as
"square" or "round" by the mental consciousness, which needs to
be based on the visual perception of the preceding moment. While
sensory perception is primary in the process of cognition, the men-
. tal consciousness is derivative and secondary only.
(5) Some argue that the mental consciousness is capable of per-
ceiving "unmanifested matter"(avijfiaptirupa), the physical aspect
of "unmanifested karma" (avijfiaptikarman), which is character-
22 Dharmap1l1a, T.3l.1625.889a-b:
0 0

130
CHEN-KUO LIN
ized by the Sarvastivada as a sort of physical existence.
23
The fact
that aVijfiaptirapa exists indicates that the mental consciousness is
capable of perceiving the physical object (rapa). As to this objec-
tion, Dharmapala replies that since avijfiaptikarma exists in itself
as substance only without appearance, it cannot be taken as the ob-
ject of the mental consciousness, for any object of cognition needs
to have two aspects: substance and attribute.
24
To sum up Dharmapala's commentary, the central argument of
Dignaga's is said to be a refutation of the
realist thesis that all sensory objects of cognition are external ob-
jects. The thesis is theoretically involved with Buddhist scholastic
debates on other issues such as and avijfiaptirapa.
Dharmapala concludes that, as the main target of Dignaga's cri-
tique, the Sarvastivada's direct realism denies mental perception
claiming that there is no way for the mental
consciousness to perceive the external object directly. Hence there
is no need to examine the problem of the object of mental con-
sciousness in Dignaga's treatise.
4. Reconstructing the reasons for Paramlirtha's translation
What would be Paramartha's response to the same problem? By
reference to his translation only, we cannot find any textual evi-
dence to explain why he deliberately includes the object of mental
consciousness as the target of Dignaga's criticism. A possible alter-
native explanation is to contextualize the complexity of the issue
within the Buddhist scholastic debate. For Paramartha, Dignaga
clearly stands for Yogacara idealism in the
by claiming that "the external object does not exist" though whether
or not this ontological claim can be necessarily deduced from the
epistemological proposition, i.e., "cognition takes the internal ob-
23 Hirakawa 1990: 144-145.
24 Dharmapala, T.31.1625.889b:
1'Ftt
OBJECT OF COGNITION
131
ject as its object," is subject to further investigation. If SO, according
to Paramartha, what would be Dignaga's response to Sarvastivada
and Sautrantika with regard to the object of mental consciousness?
Did both Sarvastivada and Sautrantika contend that the mental
consciousness is capable of cognizing the external object?
Let us take a look at Dignaga's answer in PS I.6ab first where he
claims that in addition to sensory perception, there is mental per-
ception which non-conceptually apprehends
the external object, such as nlpa, for its object.
25
Most of pramii1}a
scholars take this statement as evidence to label Dignaga as be-
longing to the lineage of Sautrantika, for he claims that external
objects can be perceived by the mental consciousness. However,
as Nagatomi argues, such a way of reading would be incompat-
ible with Dignaga's theory of self-cognition (svasafJlvedana) which
posits that cognition occurs within a twofold structure: the appear-
ance of the object (arthiibhiisa) and the appearance of cognition
itself (sviibhiisa). Mental perception is no exception as it takes
the appearance of the object as the object of cognition, which can
only be interpreted as an internal object. 26 And in regards to the
the external object is clearly not accessible
to mental perception. That is, Dignaga does not take the Sautrantika
position in that treatise.
25 Hattori 1968: 27: "There is also mental [perception, which is of two
kinds:] awareness of an [external] object and self-awareness of [such sub-
ordinate mental activities as] desire and the like, [both of which are] free
from conceptual construction. The mental [perception] which takes a thing
of color, etc., for its object, occurs in the form of immediate experience (anu-
bhava) is also free from conceptual construction. The self-awareness (sva-
sal'[lvedana) of desire, anger, ignorance, pleasure, pain, etc., is [also recog-
nized as] mental perception because it is not dependent on any sense-organ."
For the reconstruction of the Sanskrit text, see Steinkellner 2005: miinasal'[l
ciirthariigiidisvasal'[lvittir akalpikii / miinasam api
avikalpakam anubhaviikiirapravrttal'[l ca svasal'[lvedanam indri-
miinasal'[l
26 Nagatomi 1979: 254-255.
132
CHEN-KUO LIN
According to the Sautrantika, cognition needs to be explained
under two theoretic premises: (1) the theory of successive causation
and (2) the theory of momentariness. As seen in the record of the
debate between the Sautrantika (Sriiata) and the Sarvastivada (Sati-
ghabhadra) in the *Abhidharmanyiiyiinusiirasiistra, the Sautran-
tika holds the doctrine that all six kinds of perception arise in the
following successive process. (1) At the first moment, the external
object and the sense faculty arise simultaneously. what
is perceived is not the external object itself, but the representation
(iiMra) of it, which we name "object x." (2) At the second moment,
the "object x" serves as the object of cognition for the sensory
perception. (3) The same "object x" preserved and passed down
through anudhiitu, the field of object-continuum, becomes "object
x-2," which in turn becomes the object of cognition for mental
perception at the third moment. (4) The "object x-3" of the third
moment becomes the object of cognition for mental construction
which occurs at the fourth momentY In this successive process
of cognition, both objects of cognition for sensory perception and
mental perception are not the external object itself which appeared
only at the first moment.
The above theory held by the Sautrantika is inherited in the
except that Dignaga does not assume the
existence of external objects. For and Sautrantika, all
. objects of cognition for six kinds of perception are not external
objects. They are the representation of objects appearing to be the
objective pole of cognition. Since the Sautrantika holds that the
object of cognition for the mental consciousness (mental percep-
tion and mental construction) is not the external object, this theory
could not be the reason why Paramartha argues that the object of
cognition for the mental consciousness must be included in the list
of Dignaga's refutations.
There is one final alternative explanation for Paramartha's
translation which we find in Sarvastivada's ontology, which claims
27 Nagatomi 1979: 256; Dhammajoti 2004: 59, 92.
OBJECT OF COGNITION
133
that all existents in the three time-periods are real. According to
this realist ontology, the five sensory perceptions take the external
object of the present as the object of cognition, whereas the mental
consciousness is capable of taking all objects of the three time-
periods as its object of cognition. This theory is seen in the *Ahhi-
dharmanyiiyiinusiirasiistra:
The group of five [sensory] perceptions grasps the object of the pres-
ent moment only. There are no perceptions of two moments sharing
the same object of cognition. There is also no object of cognition for
the preceding moment of perception, which has already vanished,
to be grasped again by the perception of the second moment as the
cause for its arising. Mental consciousness is capable of cognizing
the object of the three time-periods. [That is,] even if the existents [in
the past] have ceased, they are still taken as the object [of the mental,
consciousness].28
According to Sarvastivadin ontology, mental consciousness is not
merely capable of perceiving conventional existence, i.e., verbal-
conceptual existence, it is also capable of perceiving the real exis-
tent of all three time-periods, including those in the past and the fu-
ture. The only difference between the existence of the present and
the existence of the past and the future is that the former is capable
of function, whereas the latter are not. 29 However, since the objects
of all three time-periods exist in the form of substance (svabhiiva),
they are considered real existents, including those in the past and
the future which are the objects for the mental consciousness.
Another critical question also arises in this context: Is the men-
tal consciousness capable of directly perceiving the external object,
if, as the Sarvastivada claims, it is capable of cognizing all objects
of the three time-periods? There is no problem for the five sen-
28 *Abhidharmanyiiyiinusiirasiistra, T.29.1562.349a:

3'f-, Cf. also Dhammajoti 2004: 63.
29 *Abhidharmanyiiyiinusiirasiistra, T.29.1562.409b:
lRlll1'fJm '
134
. CHEN-KUO LIN
sory perceptions to cognize the external object. the same
epistemic function cannot be ascribed to the mental consciousness
as it is commonly assumed that mental perception was accepted in
the systems of the Sautrantika, Dignaga, and DharmakIrti, but not
the
Here I shall argue that this assumption might need to be modi-
fied. As Dhammajoti points out, the Sarvastivada distinguishes
three types of immediate perception (1) sensory
perception i.e., that which
is dependent on the five sense faculties, (2) perception of [men-
tal] experience i.e., the imme-
diate experience of mental activities, such as feeling (*vedana)
and conception (*safijfia) and (3) perception of understanding
i.e., the sensory comprehension of
the particular and the intellectual comprehension
of the universal Although the terminologies
are different, Dhammajoti considers the third type of perception
to be the same as mental perception because "it is a clear, vivid
perception directly induced by the immediately preceding sensory
perception."32 In other words, the Sarvastivada holds the same view
that the mental consciousness is also capable of perceiving two as-
pects of the external object: its particular and. universal character.
If this view is accepted, it seems reasonable for Paramartha to list
objects of the six consciousnesses as the target of Dignaga's
criticism. \
Here I would like to add one more consideration for the possible
acceptance of mental perception in the Sarvastivada. As generally
30 Cf. Nagatomi 1979, Yao 2004, Nagatomo 1993.
31 *Abhidharmanyiiyiinusiirasiistra, T.29.1562.736a: ffl.:JU!*-i=:ft, {:&
. m, 0 0
0 Cf. also
Dhammajoti 2004: 71.
32 Dhammajoti 2004: 71.
OBJECT OF COGNITION
135
assumed, the five sensory perceptions are characterized as "non-
discriminative" and mental consciousness is characterized as "dis-
criminative" (vikalpaka). According to the Sarvastivada, the notion
ofvikalpa is divided into three types: (1) svabhiivavikalpa, i.e., rea-
soning (vitarka) and investigation (viciira) as the essence of discrim-
ination. (2) anusmaralJ-avikalpa, discrimination through the men-
tal contribution of recollection (smrti). (3) abhinirupalJ-avikalpa,
i.e., discrimination through the mental contribution of intellection
(prajfiii). It is due to the strong activity of recollection and intel-
lection, which can be appeased in the meditative state, that mental
consciousness possesses the function of conceptual discrimina-
tion.
33
However, mental consciousness is capable of retaining the
pure function of mental perception as intellectual intuition when
the discriminative function of recollection and intellection has been
appeased, or even eliminated in the meditative state. This explains
why mental consciousness is capable of cognizing the universal
character of the object through intellectual intuition whereas the
five sensory consciousnesses are capable of cognizing only the par-
ticular character of the object through sensory intuition. In short,
it seems likely that the Sarvastivada maintained the realist thesis
that mental perception also takes the external object as its object
of cognition.
5. Concluding remarks
Demonstrating true philosophical genius, Dignaga aptly refuted
the Buddhist realists' theory of iilambana in one short philosophi-
cal treatise. Although he gave his own interpretation in prose, there
are still some puzzles left for further pondering. In this article I
have simply chosen one of these puzzles, that of the ontological
status of the object of mental consciousness to serve as an entry
point into the ocean of Buddhist scholastic epistemology. Now it
becomes clear that Buddhist philosophers in fifth and sixth century
33 Dhammajoti 2004: 61-63.
136
, CHEN-KUOLIN
India and China, including the Madhyamika and !he Yogacara in
particular, could not construct their philosophies without reference
to the whole net of concepts weaved in the Abhidharma literatures,
which indeed forms the matrix of all Buddhist philosophical sys-
tems. This applies to our proposal for solving the interpretative
conflicts in Paramartha's and Xuanzang's translations of Dignaga's
A.Zambanaparzk$iivrtti, which were based on differing interpre-
tations that can be traced back to the scholastic engaged
by various Buddhist schools, especially the Sarvastivada and the
Sautrantika.
As far as the is concerned, there is no
doubt that, for both Paramartha and Xuanzang, the main target of
Dignaga's criticism is Sarvastivada's direct realism. Dignaga did not
consider the Sautrantika as the main target because they shared the
same assumptions regarding iilambana. Both belonged to siikiira-
vijfiiinaviida. However, Paramartha and Xuanzang were not in con-
sensus with regard to Sarvastivada's theory of the object of mental
consciousness. Following Dharmapala's' Commentary, Xuanzang
did not count the object of mental consciousness as that which re-
quired refutation in Dignaga's critique because Xuanzang assumed
that mental perception was not accepted in the Sarvastivada. On
the contrary, Paramartha might have held a different opinion of
Sarvastivada with regard to the same issue when the latter con-:-
,tends that all existents of the three time-periods are real in the
form of substance and also knowable to the mental consciousness.
Moreover, as recorded in the *Abhidharmanyiiyiinusiirasiistra, the
mental consciousness is said to be capable of perceiving both the
individual and the universal, through "perception of understand-
ing," which can be interpreted as the same function of mental per-
ception. Accordingly, for Paramartha, all six objects of cognition,
including the object of mental consciousness, need to be refuted in
Dignaga's critique of realism.
OBJECT OF COGNITION
137
References
Primary Sources
Dharmaplila, Guan suoyuan lunshi trans. by Yijing, T.31, No.
1625.
Dignaga, Guan soyuanyuan lun trans. by Xuanzang, T.31, No.
1624.
Dignaga, Wuxiang sichen lun trans. by Paramartha, T.31, No.
1619.
Sanghabhadra, *Abhidharmanyayanusarasastra trans.
by Xuanzang, T.29, No. 1562.
Vasubandhu, Abhidharmakosabhli.yya trans. by Xuanzang,
T.29, No. 1558.
Secondary sources
Arnold, Dan. 2005. Buddhists, Brahmins, and Belief" Epistemology in South
Asian Philosophy of Religion. York: Columbia University Press.
Dhammajoti, Bhikkhu K. L. 2004. Abhidharma Doctrine and Controversy
on Perception. Sri Lanka: Center for Buddhist Studies.
Ejima, Yasunori. 1989. Abhidharmakosabhli.yya of Vasubandhu, Chapter I:
Dhlitunirdeia. Tokyo: The Sankibo Press.
Frauwa1lner, Erich. 1930. "Dignagas A.lambanaparTIqa. Text, Ubersetzung
und Erlauterungen," Wiener Zeitschriftfiir die Kunde des Morgenlandes
37,174-194.
Frauwallner, Erich. 1959. "Dignaga, Sein Werk und Seine Entwicklung,"
Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Sud- und Ostasiens 3, 83-164.
Kato, Iunsho. 1989. Kyoryobu no kenkyii Tokyo: ShunjUsha.
Hattori, Masaaki. 1968. Dignaga, On Perception. Cambridge, Massachu-
setts: Harvard University Press.
Hirakawa, Akira. 1990. trans. by Paul Groner. A History of Indian Bud-
dhism: From Sakyamuni to Early Mahayana. Honolulu: University of
Hawaii Press.
LU, Cheng. 1928. "Fulun zangyiben zhi tezheng" Neixue
pg 4/3, 34-42.
138
CHEN-KUO LIN
Lti, Cheng & Shi Yincang, 1928. "Guan souyuan shilun huiyi"
lWfl', Neixue 4/3, 1-33. '
Nagatomi, Masatoshi. A Conundrum in the Bud-
dhist Pramii/!-a System," in M. Nagatomi, B. K. Matilal, J. M. Masson
and E. Dimock (eds.), Sanskrit and Indian Studies. Dordrecht: D. Reidel
Publishing Co, 243-260.
Nagatomo, Taijun. 1993. "I ni okeru chikaku ni tsuite"
'"(, in Tsukamoto Keish6 Ky6ju Kanreki Kinen RonbushU Kank6kai ( :f:W
(ed.): Chi no kaiko: Bukkyo to ka-
Tokyo: Kose Shuppansha, 389-404.
Sastri, N. Aiyaswami. 1942. and Vrtti by Difmiiga with the
Commentary of Dharmapiila. Adyar, Chennai: The Adyar Library.
Steinkellner, Ernst. 2005. Digniiga's Pramii/!-asamuccaya, Chapter 1, online
version at http://www.oeaw.ac.at/ias/Mat/dignaga_PS_l.pdf (lasted ac-
cessed on 8.8.2009)
Tola, Fernando & Carmen Dragonetti. 1982. "Dignaga's
vrtti," Journal of Indian Philosophy 10, 105-134.
Ui, Hakuju. 1958. Jinna Chosaku no Kenkya Tokyo: Iwa-
nami.
Warder, A. K. 1975. "Objects," Journal of Indian Philosophy 3, 355-361.
Woo, Jeson. 2003. "Dharmaklrti and His Commentators on
Journal of Indian Philosophy 31, 439-448.
Yamaguchi, Susumu & Nozawa Josho. 1939. Sesshin Yuishiki no Genten
Kaimei Kyoto: H6z6kan .
. Yao, Zhihua. 2004. "Dignaga and the Four Types of Perception," Journal of
Indian Philosophy 32, 57-79.
Zahavi, Dan. 2003. Husserl's Phenomenology. Stanford, CA: Stanford Uni-
versity Press.
CREATIVE IGNORANCE: NAGARJUNA ON THE ONTOLOGICAL
SIGNIFICANCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS!
EVIATAR SHULMAN
It is generally accepted that N1igiirjuna's dialectic is aimed at ex-
posing, or proving, the lack of self-nature
2
(svabhava) of all phe-
nomena, all things whatsoever. The fact that this paper, for exam-
p,le, is dependent on the material conditions for its production (my
computer, electricity, paper, my fingers, etc.), on my intention to
write it, on its audience and/or readers, and so forth, suggests it has
no true nature of its own. What the refutation o'f svabhava actually
means, both philosophically and experientially, is hotly debated;
numerous views haven been suggested. Some believe the lack of
svabhava implies Nihilism,3 others see it as pointing to the decep-
1 This paper is an elaborated version of the one I read at the XVth lABS
conference, held in Atlanta, June 2008. I wish to thank Akira Saito and Ernst
Steinkellner for their valuable comments following my presentation. I also
wish to thank Jonathan Silk and Paul Harrison for their remarks on an earlier
version of this paper.
2 I will hereby be translating svabhiiva, most literally "self-existence,"
"existence of /by/in/for/ as itself," or "own being," and commonly translated
as "intrinsic nature" or "inherent existence," as "self-nature." Svabhliva
most simply means "nature," and Nagarjuna at times will use the term in
such a non-technical sense as well (e.g. 55). Specifically, svabhliva refers
to a quality of being attributed to something that has it own private nature
that it possesses of itself. MMK 15.2cd is commonly viewed as a defini-
tion of svabhiiva (see for example Saito [2007: 157]): akrtrimaJ.t svabhiivo
hi paratra ca (Self-nature is unmade and does not depend on
another).
3 Recent examples are Wood (1994), Tola & Dragonetti (1995) and Burton
(1999: ch. 4).
Volume 30 Number 1-22007 (2009) pp. 139-173
140
EVIATAR SHULMAN
tive nature of language, or even to a fundamental errpr which char-
acterizes any form of knowledge.
4
Still others view the refutation
of svabhava as being conducted from the point of view of ultimate
reality, and thus as directing the mind toward the realization of an
absolute truth.
5
There are still more who doubt that Nagarjuna had
any positive philosophical message.
6
Finally, there are those who
believe the realization of the lack of self-nature to be an end in
itself?
Although these positions can be elaborated, and many others
could be listed, I believe the views just mentioned are the major
readings Nagarjuna has received in modern scholarship. They are
4 This is possibly the most widely accepted view of Nagarjuna today, and
it consists of a number of separate but nonetheless related positions. Sprung
(1977) and Ganeri (2001) are among the scholars who define Nagiirjuna as a
skeptic. Siderits (1988) believes him to be arguing against the c,?rrespondence
theory of knowledge. The view of Nagarjuna and the Madhyamaka as dis-
cussing the nature of language, often inspired by Wittgenstein, has achieved
great popularity, and is advocated in such works as Thurman (1980), Hun-
tington (1983, 1989, 2007) and Loizzo (2001).
5 A clear definition of the "absolutistic" reading of Nagarjuna is given by
de Jong (1972: 5):
"There is no doubt that paramiirtha, being the 'supreme goal' of the be-
liever, may be called 'the absolute.' But this absolute by its very nature
ji is inaccessible to philosophical thought. One might try to approach it by
indirect means, but all one could say or think about it would of neces-
sity be false. It cannot be thought of as being or as nothingness. For the
Miidhyamikas it is 'the silence of the saints'."
More than vestiges of this position can be identified in many works on Nagar-
juna and the Madhyamaka, such as Gomez (1976), Seyfort Ruegg (1977: 6,
12, 1981: 34-41), Harris (1994) and Lindtner (1997).
6 Schroeder (2000, 2001) is a prominent example, and he represents a
common Zen-Buddhist approach to Emptiness.
7 The classic case in this regard is the understanding of the M a d h y a m a ~
ka developed in the Tibetan dGe-Iugs-pa sect, which has influenced a great
number of modem discussions on the subject. For prominent examples see
Napper (1989) and Williams (1989: ch. 3).
CREATIVE IGNORANCE
141
all rooted in understandings of Nagarjuna's thought which were
developed in the different Buddhist philosophical traditions.
8
But
although all of these various teachings of emptiness do relate to
certain aspects of Nagarjuna's writings, I will argue that they also
suffer from fundamental errors, in regard both to what the texts
reliably attributed to Nagarjuna actually say, and to philosophical
consistency. Not only do these readings misrepresent Nagarjuna's
original message; they also fail to come to terms with the full im-
plications of his thought. In fact, all these presentations of Madhya-
maka ignore a central aspect of Nagarjuna's insight which concerns
his understanding of the relation between consciousness and reality.
I. Genre sensitivity
In this paper I will attempt a faithful reconstruction of Nagarjuna's
teaching, based on a careful reading of his Mulamadhyamakakiirikii
("The Core Verses of the Middle Path," MMK)9 in light of his
("Sixty Verses of Reasoning," Y$)lO and Sun-
yatiisaptati ("Seventy Verses of Emptiness," SS)P Naturally, my
8 Some of these views are characteristic of non-Buddhist Indian traditions'
take of Nagarjuna as well. In the VV Nagarjuna argues against a rival who
is understood to represent the Nyaya school and who accuses Nagarjuna of
Nihilism. The "absolutistic" reading of Nagarjuna was developed in the Hin-
du Advaita-Vedanta school, most explicitly by Gauc;lapada. On Gauc;lapada's
adoption of Nagarjuna's rhetoric see Radhakrishnan (1956: 456), Whaling
(1979), Darling (1987: I.G) and King (1989).
9 For the text of the MMK I am relying on the edition of de Jong (1977
[1958]), together with the emendations made by MacDonald (2007).
10 For the text of the Y$ I am relying on the excellent critical edition pre-
pared by Scherrer-Schaub (1991).
11 The text of the 5S presents many philological and interpretive problems,
the greatest of which are the significant divergences which exist between the
version of the karikiis alone and the version accompanied by a svavrtti at-
tributed to Nagarjuna. For the text of the 5S itself I prefer the version of the
kiirikiis over the one embedded in the svavrtti. The verses quoted here are
based on an edition of the text I have prepared, which I hope to publish in the
142
EVIATAR SHULMAN
methodological position determines much of the reading of Nagar-
juna I will suggest. I argue that in order to achieve 'a clear picture
of Nagarjuna's understanding of emptiness we must regard his four
extant analytical treatises - the MMK, y ~ , SS, and his Vigraha-
Vyiivartanf ("A Refutation of Objections," VV)l2 - as an integral
unit of meaning. When Nagarjuna is read in light of the MMK and
VV alone, as commonly happens, a limited picture of his thought
emerges. The MMK's power lies in its unrelenting critical force,
which precludes the possibility of offering a positive description
of existence. The VV is a polemical, one could say a defensive
treatise, in which, in a "user-friendly" fashion, Nagarjuna attempts
to blur the severe consequences of his theory and method. Alter-
natively, if the MMK and VV are read in light of texts belonging
to distinct literary genres, such as the Ratntivalf ("The Precious
Garland"), the picture becomes rather hazy,13 since Nagarjuna's
four analytical texts do not discuss the more practical aspects of
the Mahayana Buddhist path, such as compassion and the path of
the Bodhisattva.
14
If we wish to reach a reliable understanding of
what sunyatii ("emptiness") meant to Nagarjuna, we must first de-
fine the message expressed in the texts he devoted to 'this subject it-
near future. There I will also elaborate on my preference for the ktirikil ver-
sion of the text. My edition is based on the one presented by Lindtner (1986),
who relied on the Narthang and Peking canons, which I compared to the
Verge edition. I have also compared these versions of the text to those found
in the svavftti, as well as to those found in Parahita and Candraklrti's com-
mentaries. For Candraklrti's commentary, Erb (1997) has prepared a critical
edition of his discussion of verses 1-14. For a discussion of the different ver-
sions of the SS see Komito (1987: section 3).
12 For the text of the VV I am using the edition found in Bhattacarya,
Johnston and Kunst (1978).
13 Examples of such a presentation which views Nagarjuna as a traditional
Mahayana teacher are Lindtner (1982, 1986), and Williams (1984).
14 A rare exception to this rule would be MMK 24.32 which speaks of
"the practice of the Bodhisattva" (bodhisattvacaryil). See also the conclud-
ing verses of the MMK and the Y ~ .
CREATIVE IGNORANCE
143
self. We should better first achieve a clear definition of Nagarjuna's
philosophical message, before we ask how emptiness relates to Bo-
dhisattvas, their vehicles and the like.
It should be emphasized that the four texts I wish to examine are
regarded as authentic to Nagarjuna by nearly all the knowledge-
able authorities both among modern scholars and within the Bud-
dhist tradition. IS Regarding all other texts attributed to Nagarjuna
in the Chinese and the Tibetan traditions, serious doubts have been
raised regarding their authorship. Moreover, the Tibetan tradition
has grouped these four texts as a distinct genre within Nagarjuna's
writings, that is his "analytical corpus" (rigs tshogS).16 Although
IS The most important discussions of Nagarjuna's ~ o r p u s have appeared in
the following sources: Seyfort Ruegg (1981), Lindtner (1982, 1986) and Wil-
liams (1984) mainly discuss Tibetan views on the subject. Ramanan (2002
[1966]) and Robinson (1967) discuss Chinese positions. Further important
studies of specific works by Nagarjuna are Dragonetti (1978, 1986), Vetter
(1992), Huntington (1995), Tola & Dragonetti (1995, 1995a, 1998) and Ja-
mieson (2000).
Tola & Dragonetti (1998) have argued against the authenticity of the VV, in
a manner I find unconvincing. They raise the plausible suggestion that the
first 20 verses of the text, which express the position of a purvapak.#n, were
originally an independent text. Aside from this argument, the authors offer
no claims that should seriously cause us to doubt the traditional attribution
of the VV to Nagarjuna, as the majority of their arguments are answered by
taking into consideration the different perspectives from which Nagarjuna
may have written different statements.
In Tola & Dragonetti (1995: 54-57) the same authors have suggested that
a number of verses from the SS may not be authentic, since the title of the
text speaks of 70 verses while the text actually includes 73. Again, I do not
believe such a technical argument to be persuasive, especially since such dis-
crepancies are common to the genre (e.g. Vasubandhu's Virrtsatikli). In this
respect, see the comments made by Prebish (1974: 176).
Regarding the SS, the Chinese tradition seems to be unfamiliar with the text,
although the Dvadasamukhasiistra, a central text of the Chinese Madhya-
maka, quotes SS 8 and 19.
16 The common Tibetan classifications of the rigs tshags normally include
144
EVIATAR SHULMAN
this category is clearly a retrospective classification" it is not with-
out its merits. We can safely assume that Nagarjuna was aware of
the differences which exist between writing a philosophical text
and composing a devotional hymn or a "frienqly letter." In, short,
based on these four texts we can hope to achieve a clear definition
of emptiness, or this is at least where we should begin.
The Y.$ and the SS expand on the analysis conducted in the
MMK, and allow a fuller understanding of Nagarjuna's philosophi-
cal thought. They demonstrate that the MMK has a special place in
the Nagarjunian corpus, but that Nagarjuna's philosophical insight
is not exhausted by the text. An attentive reading of the and
the SS will lead us not only to a better understanding of the way
Nagarjuna viewed the world, but to a fuller comprehension of the
MMK's thought as well. 17
n. The object of refutation
What is Nagarjuna actually refuting? A quick but bold look at the
texts tells us that Nagarjuna was troubled not by "self-existence"
- svabhava - but by existence in general - bhava, or astitvam.
Nagarjuna attempted to pave the middle path between existence
5 or 6 texts. The additional texts included are the (1) Vyavahiirasiddhi, no
longer extant (the first 6 verses are quoted in Lindtner [1982: 96-99, 1986:
120-123], identified by Lindtner in MadhymakiilaY[lkiiravrtti).
(2) VaidalyaprakaralJa, a polemical text dedicated to a refutation of the 16
basic categories of Nyaya thought. Serious doubt regarding the text's authen-
ticity have been raised by Tola & Dragonetti (1995a) and Pind (2001). (3)
Ratniivalf, at times listed in the rigs tshags, but generally assigned to the
gtam tshags ("The religious narrative corpus"), where it does in fact belong.
The major bulk of this text is actually about Buddhist practice and belief, and
discusses Buddhist concerns on a much wider scale. For a discussion of the
Tibetan classification of Nagarjuna's works see Seyfort Ruegg (1981: 7-9)
and Williams (1984).
17 The Y-5 and the SS offer rich insight in regard to Nagarjuna's soteriolog-
ical views as well. This issue will not be discussed in the present context.
CREATIVE IGNORANCE
145
and non-existence: he believed all notions of existence to be rooted
in ignorance. As he states in MMK 15.10:
"Exists" is a grasping at eternalism. "Does not exist" is a view of
annihilation. Therefore the wise should not base themselves on exis-
tence or non-existence.
astfti stisvatagrtiho ntistfty ucchedadarsanam I
tasmtid astitvantistitve ntisriyeta vichak:jafwJ:t I
This verse supplies an important definition of the middle path
which avoids both existence and non-existence.I
8
Nagarjuna is here
extending the meaning of the traditional Buddhist definition of the
middle as the path that avoids etemalism and annihilation (iiSvata
and uccheda). These terms, which originally referred primarily to
the nature of the self,19 now make an ontological statement about
the nature of reality. A similar position is expressed in MMK 5.8:
The slow-witted who see existence and non-existence of things do not
see the auspicious quieting of objects.
astitval!l ye tu pasyanti ntistitval!l calpabuddhayaJ:t I
bhtivtintim te na pasyanti dra:jtavyopasamal!l sivam II
Again Nagarjuna makes it more than clear that he believes any
view, any actual seeing of existence or non-existence, to be mistak-
en. These verses alone should rule out the interpretations of Nagar-
]8 A similar statement is given in SS 21:
yod pa nyid na rtag nyid dang limed na nges par chad nyid yin II
dngos po yod na de gnyis 'gyur II de phyir dngos po khas blang min II
If there is existence there is eternalism, and if there is non-existence
there is surely annihilation. When there are existent things, both occur,
and therefore one should not accept existent things.
]9 See my discussion of this issue in Shulman (2008: section III). In this
context, it is of primary importance to notice that the terms used by the
Kacciinagottasutta (SN II. 16-17) for the extremes, attitha and natthita, do
not relate to abstract notions of existence but to particular ways of under-
standing the nature of the Self. In fact, for the Kacciinagottasutta, attitha
and natthita represent sassata and uccheda (eternalism and annihilation).
See also note 31 in the same article.
146
EVIATAR SHULMAN
juna's thought delineated at the outset of our Nagarjuna
denies non-existence and therefore cannot be a nihilist.
20
He must
not be expounding a vision of an absolute truth, since such a truth
must exist. 21 He is also making a definite philosophical statement
regarding the nature of reality, which must not exist as it appears,
and therefore his verses cannot be only of pragmatic ("upayic")
value. Finally, the focus of the discussion must not be only lan-
guage or knowledge, since that would imply an existent rea)ity mis-
represented by thought. If words or concepts are invalidated, surely
the objects they refer to are unreal as well.
22
In order for these
verses to mean anything, they must be a description of reality itself,
which is characterized as neither existent nor non-existent, neither
absolutely true nor wholly false.
Both of the verses quoted deny astitvam and nastitvam, exis-
tence and non-existence, or better "is-ness" and "non-ness." In
other places Nagarjuna prefers to target a more general notion of
existence - bhava. A most important example is the opening verse
of the MMK (Ll):
20 Burton (1999: 90) has argued that Nagarjuna's thought is nihilistic even
though Nagarjuna did not believe so himself. See note 54 below for my re-
sponse to such a position.
'21 The discussion of Nagarjuna's view of absolute truth, or "the absolute,"
cannot be fully developed in this paper. Clearly there are verses which sug-
gest that Nagarjuna accepted an ultimate and unconditioned reality, such as
MMK 18.9 and 25.9. But the maligalaslokas of the MMK, as well verses
such as MMK 7.32, 18.10, 25.19, 20, 5-6, and SS 30-32, strongly sug-
gest that Nagarjuna did not believe in ultimate truth in any absolute sense.
These verses imply that Nagarjuna used "absolutistic" terms such as tattva,
dharmatii, and nirvii1}a, not as a description of an actual state, but rather as
a poetic description of a truth that exists only in the realms of the imagina-
tion.
22 See also MMK 12.10, which explicitly states that the impossibility of
suffering arising from itself, from another, from both or without a cause, is
true also in regard to external things (biihyiiniim bhiiviiniim).
CREATIVE IGNORANCE
147
Not from themselves, not from another, not from both or without a
cause, are arisen entities ever found, anywhere.
na svato niipi parato na dViibhyii1!l niipy ahetutaJ:z I
utpannii jiitu vidyante bhiiviiJ:z kva cana ke cana II
Here Niigiirjuna argues against the truth of bhava/:t in the plural,
and hence we must translate "entities" or "things." Such a trans-
lation could lead us to believe that Niigarjuna is arguing against
"thingness," against the differentiation of entities into distinct phe-
nomena with clear-cut boundaries.
23
Obviously, "thingness" is part
of what Niigiirjuna is targeting here, but it cannot contain all of his
purpose. If things do not have any true boundary, any well-defined
state of existence, any bhava, they can not really be understood to
exist. This point is expressed more clearly when Niigiirjuna refutes
bhiiva in the singular, as in 46:
When one accepts existence, there are the arising of passion and ha-
tred, the holding of bad and violent views, and the strife which comes
from them.
dngos por khas len yod na ni II 'dod chags zhe sdang 'byung ba yi II
Ita ba mi bzad ma rungs 'dzin II de las byung ba'i rtsod par 'gyur II
I
viviidiis tatsamutthiis ca bhiiviibhyupagame sati If4
The continues to discuss the great misfortunes caused by be-
lieving existence to be true. This verse tells us that the refutation of
"things" in the plural, is related to the refutation of "existence" in
the singular.
25
In fact, the Sanskrit allows a meaning unavailable in
23 Such a reading of Niigiirjuna, based on the MMK and the VV, was ar-
ticulated by Streng (1967).
24 In quoting from the I will provide the Tibetan text, accompanied
by the Sanskrit verse in the few cases in which it has been identified in later
sources.
25 The compound bhiiviibhyupagame could obviously be read as referring
to bhiiva in the plural (probably bhiiviiniim abhyupagame), and thus the verse
would relate to "things" and not to "existence." MMK 21.14-15 tells us what
Niigiirjuna probably means by this phrase, speaking of bhiival'{t abhyupapan-
148
EVIATAR SHULMAN
English - "existences," that is bhiivii/:l in the plural. We should note
that Nagarjuna's argument against "things" is better'understood to
be a refutation of "states of existence." Nagarjuna denies the real-
ity normally attributed to all that is, saying it does not existin any
true fashion.
Some readers may have noticed that the lack of self-nature has
yet to appear in any of the verses I have quoted thus far.26 There
is no need to amend the message of these verses so as to deliver a
meaning not theirs - they are denying existence, not self-nature.
27
nasya in the singular.
26 It is true that following MMK 15.10, MMK 15.11 explains the relation
between astitva/niistitva and siiSvata/uccheda in terms of existence by way
of svabhiiva. But 15.11 should not cause us to read 15.10 as denying exis-
tence/non-existence only by way of svabhiiva. Rather, Nagarjuna is explain-
ing that in order for something to exist, it would have to have svabhiiva, and
thus it would be "eternal."
27 There are a number of additional considerations that should cause us to
doubt whether svabhiiva is so central a concept for the thought of the MMK.
First, it should be noted that svabhiiva is a rather rare concept in the MMK,
especially if we do not over-emphasize the importance of chapters 17 and
24. In these two chapters, Nagarjuna uses the notion of svabhiiva in order
to defend himself against his I suggest that these two chap-
ters, much like the VV, should not be understood as a positive articulation of
Nagarjuna's position, but rather as a defensive strategy in which Nagarjuna
exposes the problems that arise once one accepts svabhiiva. Aside from
chapters 17 and 24, and chapter 15 which is an analysis of svabhiiva, the term
svabhiiva appears only in verses 1.3, 7.16, 13.3-4, 20.21, 21.17, 22.2-4, 9,
14, 16 and 23.2,6,24-25. This means that the term svabhiiva is absent from
17 of the MMK's 27 chapters (which amounts to no less than 63%)! Clearly,
the notion of svabhiiva is central to the MMK's thought, but this observation
alone should cast a doubt on the idea that the MMK as a whole is a refutation
of svabhiiva. Furthermore, if the text's main objective was a refutation of
svabhiiva, surely the term should appear in its concluding chapter. But MMK
27 makes no mention of svabhiiva. Also, the fact that Nagarjuna devotes a
separate chapter to svabhiiva, just as he does to the skandhas and iiyatanas or
the terms saT{lskrta and kiila, implies that svabhiiva is part of what the MMK
is analyzing, rather than being the focus of the discussion.
CREATNE IGNORANCE
149
In fact, the y ~ makes it clear that the refutation of svabhiiva is not
an end in itself (contra dGe-lugs-pa exegesis), but rather the means
by which existence is refuted. Once things are proven to lack a true
nature of their own, there is nothing left to lack self-nature. What
can be said to lack self-nature? When self-nature is refuted, noth-
ing is left. As Nagarjuna states in y ~ 19:
What appears dependent on this and that does not arise by way of
self-nature. What does not arise by way of self-nature - how can it be
called 'arisen'?
de dang de brten gang byung de II rang gi dngos por skyes ma yin II
rang gi dngos por gang ma skyes II de ni skyes zhes ji itar bya II
tat tat priipya yad utpannarrt notpannarrt tat svabhiivataJ:t I
svabhiivena yan notpannam utpannarrt niima tat katham II
The fact that things arise in dependence proves they do not arise
"svabhiivically." But if they have not really arisen in any true way,
how can they be said to have arisen? If there is no svabhiivic arising
there is, in fact, no arising at alp8 And again, more bluntly:
What appears together with causes does not abide without conditions,
and is destroyed as a result of their absence - how can it be understood
that 'it exists'?
gang zhig rgyu dang bcas 'byung zhing II rkyen med par ni gnas pa med II
rkyen med phyir yang 'jig 'gyur ba II de ni yod ces ji Itar rtogs II
hetutaJ:t sarrtbhavo yasya sthitir na pratyayair vinii I
vigamaJ:t pratyayiibhaviit so 'strty avagataJ:t katham II y ~ 39
Verse 39 re-states what verse 19 said about arising in terms of
existence. What exists in dependence cannot existl In this verse
28 y ~ 19 is followed by a verse that makes a similar statement regarding
extinction, a verse that hints at the implausibility of understanding nirviil}a
as "cessation."
rgyu zad nyid las zhi ba ni II zad ces bya bar rtogs pa ste II
rang bzhin gyis ni gang ma zad II de la zad ces ji ltar brjod II y ~ 20
The calm (which results) from an extinction of a cause is understood as
'extinction.' What (exists) by way of self-nature does not become extinct.
How can it be understood to be extinct?
150
EVJATAR SHULMAN
Nagarjuna skips defining the dependent as lacking and
proceeds to state with confidence that dependence implies non-
existence.
Another important example of the principle that there can be no
existence without svabhiiva is MMK 13.3:
29
There is no self-nature of things, since change is perceived. The emp-
tiness of things (is understood) from the fact that there are no things
devoid of self-nature.
bhiiviiniilJ1- niJ:tsvabhiivatvam anyathiibhiivadarsaniit J
asvabhiivo bhiivo niisti bhiiviiniilTL siinyatii yataf:z Jfo
What changes has no svabhiiva. What has no svabhiiva is empty, it
does not exist. There is no such a thing that lacks svabhiiva. This
verse summarizes the stages we have seen so far by which Nagar-
juna's dialectic proceeds: Because of (1) change (or dependence),
are understood to have (2) no self-nature. But nothing can
exist without a true nature, and hence (3) things are empty, they do
29 Both Candraklrti and Bhaviveka understand MMK 13.3 (and 13.4ab) to
be voiced by a (see Nietupski [1994]). It is obviously not easy
to argue against such authorities. Candraklrti's and Bhaviveka's reading is
adopted also by Streng (1967) and Inada (1993). For Buddhapalita as well,
the verse articulates the position of a Buddhist who equates emptiness with
impermanence (Derge, dBu rna, vol. 1, 3842, 217.2-218.2). It is obviously
not easy to argue against such authorities. Nevertheless, in light of the many
other places in which Nagarjuna makes arguments similar to the ones I am
outlining here, such as the ones I have quoted and the ones I will quote below
(most importantly MMK 13.7 which appears in the same chapter), I believe
my reading is more than plausible. Even if this may not be "what Nagarjuna
intended" by the verse, it is fully consistent with his overall system. In any
case, the third piida of the verse - asvabhiivo bhiivo niisti ("There is no thing
devoid of self-nature") - emphasizes the point I am making regarding the
meaning of svabhiiva even if it is understood as a claim: Once
there is no self-nature, no existent thing remains.
30 Another translation that could be offered here (substituting the referent
of yataJ:t) is "there is no thing lacking self-nature, because of the emptiness
of things." This translation would not change the meaning of the lack of self-
nature I am discussing here.
CREATIVE IGNORANCE
151
not exist. We see in this verse that there is a qualitative difference
between lacking self-nature and being empty. Because things lack
self-nature, they are empty.31 This same point is made in the Vrtti
to VV 1:
Since there is no self-nature anywhere (in any of its conditions), the
sprout lacks self-nature. Because it lacks it is void.
yasmiid atra sarvatra svabhiivo niisti tasmiin ni/:tsvabhiivo 'ftkura/:t /
yasmiin niF:zsvabhiivas tasmiic chilnya/:t /
If emptiness is equal to the lack of self-nature, the second sentence
of this passage would be both tautological and meaningless. We
see that emptiness results from the lack of self-nature, a statement
quite distinct from the one which says that emptiness is emptiness
of self-nature.
32
This same point is made again in the commentary
to VV 57, where Nagarjuna adds that if something is empty, in this
case a name, it is unreal:
33
And also, because of the non-existence of the self-nature of things, the
name lacks self-nature. Therefore it is empty. Because of its emptiness
it is unreal.
tad api hi bhiivasvabhiivasyiibhiiviin niima ni/:tsvabhiivaJ?'! tasmiic
chilnyaJ?'! silnyatviid asadbhiltam /
31 See also Nagao (1991: p. 191). Nagao believes that the formulation "be-
cause it is devoid of self-being it is empty" was produced by Nagiirjuna's In-
dian commentators in order to explain why the dependently originated is said
to be empty and non-existent. As we see here, this formulation had already
been introduced by Nagiirjuna himself.
32 There are clearly many places where Nagiirjuna speaks of emptiness of
self-nature, such as SS 67. This is also the general drift of MMK 24. None-
theless, the existence of such passages does not mean that lack of svabhiiva
is the sole meaning of emptiness. The refutation of svabhiiva is, in fact, the
main avenue by which the fuller meaning of emptiness is reached, and thus
it comes as no surprise that Nagarjuna speaks of the emptiness of self-nature
as well.
33 The statement that what lacks svabhiiva is unreal (asadbhiUa) is made
not only in the commentary but in the verse as well.
152
EVIATAR SHULMAN
Again - what can lack svabhiiva? Once there is no self-nature,
there is nothing left to lack its own nature, an insight Nagarjuna
expresses in what may .be the acme of the MMK:
If there were anything non-empty, there could be something empty
too. And there is no non-empty thing - how will there be something
empty?
yady asunyarrz bhavet kirrz cit syiic chanyam api kirrz cana I
na kirrz cid asty asunyarrz ca kutaJ:z sunyarrz II MMK 13.7
This verse is followed by the famous denial of the possibility of tak-
ing emptiness itself as a true view of reality (13.8). MMK 13.7 tells
us that once the thing is empty, there is nothing left that is empty.
No existence remains after the Madhyamaka dialectic penetrates
its object of scrutiny. Not only does the object lack self-nature, it is
unreal and has no true existence.
This is probably the right moment to re-affirm that I do not
believe that Nagarjuna was a nihilist, intentionally or by default.
Nagarjuna denied the validity of notions of non-existence,34 and
found non-existence to be morally dangerous.
35
But before we ask
ourselves how Nagarjuna escapes nihilism, and before I present a
positive definition of Nagarjuna's vision of the middle, I would like
to push my point a little further and discuss two common intuitions
about Nagarjuna which I believe are rooted in error. I am refer-
ring to the role the traditional Buddhist insights of impermanence
;and dependence, as well as the notion of the two truths, play in
Nagarjuna's thought.
34 MMK 5.6: When there is no existence, whose non-existence will there
be? (avidyamiine bhiive ca kasyiibhiivo See also MMK 15.5 and
25.7.
35 Y$ 2ab: First refute non-existence, the source of all faults. (re zhig nye
kun 'byung ba'i gnas II med nyid rnam par bzlog zin gyis I)
CREATIVE IGNORANCE
153
III. Nagarjuna's innovations
36
In modern interpretations of Nagarjuna, one often encounters the
idea that Nagarjuna attempted to retrieve the Buddha's original
message in response to dogmatic tendencies which prevailed in the
Buddhism of his day, primarily in Abhidharma traditions. Such a
position generally argues that for Nagarjuna, emptiness is a differ-
ent way of saying impermanence and/or dependence.
37
There are many problems with such an interpretation, among
them the fact that the Buddha did not characterize all things as
dependent,38 and that Nagarjuna has much in common with Abhi-
dharma traditions.
39
In the present context I wish to concentrate
36 It is clear that Nagarjuna is not responsible on his own for the ideational
developments I will discuss in this section. Many Mahayanasiltras (e.g. the
SiiralJ1gamasamlidhin7tra and the siitras of the Prajiiliparamitli genre) ex-
press these same doctrinal shifts. Nonetheless, Nagarjuna is a clear exponent
of these new Mahayana visions, and he offers a full logical exposition of
them. In this sense he is an emblematic figure who represents the innovations
produced by thinkers and meditators in the earlier stages of the Mahayana.
37 The classic proponent of such a thesis may be Kalupahana (1986), al-
though this view of Nagarjuna is endorsed by many scholars, such as Gom-
brich (1996: 32) and Ronkin (2005: 200). Understanding emptiness as a syn-
onym of dependence and or impermanence is also deeply rooted in the Zen
reading of Nagarjuna, and is central to dGe-Iug-pa presentations of Madhya-
maka as well (e.g. Garfield [1994, 1995]).
38 See my discussion of this issue in Shulman (2008). See also in Cox
(1993).
39 Nagarjuna shares with the Abhidharmikas the conviction that a thor-
ough and detailed analytic inquiry into the nature of reality can bring one
to a vivid vision of truth. Moreover, I suggest that Nagarjuna accepted tra-
ditional Abhidharma insight and method, but wished to specify how this
tradition's basic concepts should be understood. I believe this is a better op-
tion than saying Nagarjuna rejected Abhidharma thought and viewed it as a
corruption of the Buddha's message.
These remarks are clearly not intended as a final statement on the matter,
and serve only as initial observations to be explored in the future. See also
154
EVIATAR SHULMAN
only on the fact that Nagarjuna directly refuted both itp.permanence
and dependence, since both imply existence.
4o
When all existence
is empty, there is nothing there to be impermanent, as he says in
MMK 25.22-23:
All phenomena being empty - what is endless, what has an end? What
has and doesn't have an end? What does not have nor not have an
end?
What is the same? What different? What eternal? What ephemeral?
What both eternal and ephemeral? What neither?
kim anantaY(! kim antavat I
kim anantam antavac ca niinanta'!z niintavac ca kiY(! II MMK 25.22
kiY(! tad eva kim anyat kiY(! sasvataY(! kiY(! asasvataYfl I
asasvataY(! siisvatay(! ca kiY(! vii nobhayam apy ataJ:t II MMK 25.23
Or again, more cogently:
If everything is impermanent, and impermanence is also not perma-
nent, how will there be permanent or impermanent things?
thams cad mi rtag yang na ni II mi rtag pa yang rtag pa med II
dngos po rtag dang mi rtag nyid II 'gyur na de Ita ga la yod II SS 58
The same problem that Nagarjuna identifies in regard to the lack of
svabhiiva, applies to impermanence as well: Just as there must be
something existent to be characterized as devoid of self-nature, there
must be something permanent to be characterized as impermanent,
{)r something independent to be characterized as dependent. This
point is made explicit in the in regard to dependence:
Those who are attached to the self and the world (and see them as)
non-dependent - Oh! They are confused by views of permanence and
impermanence.
Saito's (2007: 158) reference to Nagarjuna as "the founder or originator of
the Mahayana-Abhidharma movement," as well as the discussion in Wil-
liams (1988: 8), Hayes (1994: 361) and Walser (2005: chapters 6 and 7).
40 For a fuller discussion of this issue see Shulman (2008a).
CREATIVE IGNORANCE
155
Those who accept that being dependent, things are established in re-
ality - how will the faults of permanence and the like not appear for
them as well?!
Those who accept that being dependent, things are like the moon on
the water, neither true nor false, are not confused by views.
gang dag gis ni ma brten par II bdag gam 'jig rten mngon zhen pa II
de dag kye ma rtag mi rtag II la sogs lta bas 'phrogs pa yin II Y ~ 43
gang dag brten nas dngos po rnams II de nyid du ni grub 'dod pa II
de dag la yang rtag sogs skyon II de dag ji ltar 'byung mi 'gyur II Y ~ 44
gang dag brten nas dngos po rnams II chu yi zla ba lta bur ni II
yang dag ma yin log min par II 'dod pa de dag ltas mi 'phrogs II Y ~ 45
Verse 43 attacks the non-Buddhist position which denies that all
exists in dependence. The key verse is the following one (44),
which attacks Buddhists who believe dependent things really to ex-
ist. Prior to these three verses, a similar claim was made regarding
impermanence, where Nagarjuna again attacks Buddhists who do
not realize that impermanence denies the possibility of existence.
41
Later on he again says that:
What is born in dependence is unborn, said the best among knowers
of reality.
brten nas skye ba ma skyes par II de nyid mkhyen pa mchog gis gsungs II
pratftya jatarrz cajiltam aha tattvavidarrz varaJ:t II Y ~ 48cd
Many more examples can be supplied in order to further substan-
tiate the position that Nagarjuna believed that emptiness empties
41 gal te yod par smra ba rnams II dngos mchog zhen nas gnas pa ni II
lam de nyid la gnas pa ste II de la ngO mtshar CUng zad med II Y.$ 40
sangs rgyas lam la brten nas ni II kun la mi rtag smra ba rnams II
rtsodpasdngosrnamsmchogbzungbasllgnaspagangyindermaddolIY.$41
It is not at all surprising that those who speak of existence (astitvavadin)
abide grasping at things as they abide on their path.
But it is quite amazing that those who rely on the path of the Buddha, who
speak of impermanence with regard to everything, abide as they grasp at
things through strife.
156
EVMTAR SHULMAN
impermanence and dependence, which both can only be viewed
from the extreme of existence.
42
'
The fact that there is 'nothing there to be impermanent or de-
pendent should cause us to be very cautious with regard to the way
we understand Nagarjuna's use of the theory of the two truths.
Most often, this theory is used in order to re-affirm the validity
of the phenomenal world, in an attempt to balance the intensity
of Nagarjuna's dialectic of emptiness. It seems that such a read-
ing of Nagarjuna may be no more than .a futile effort to avoid the
deep and thorough refutation of existence he conducts. We may
be convinced by now that according to Nagarjuna there really are
no true phenomena that exist "conventionally" and are "ultimately
empty." The concept of the two truths is valuable as a reminder that
Nagarjuna is not affirming non-existence, but should not be seen as
a positive description of reality. Rather, what MMK 24.8-10, the
locus classicus for the discussion of the two truths, actually say is
that the Buddha's teachings are useful in order to facilitate realiza-
tion.43 This statement is corroborated by y ~ 21-22 and 30-33, that
explain that basic Buddhist concepts amount to useful fictions.44
42 Regarding impermanence, see, for example, the discussion in chap-
ters 7, 11 and 21 of the MMK, where Nagarjuna makes it fully clear that he
finds the ideas of origination and cessation, and thus of impermanence, to
Qy unreasonable. The same idea is central to the y ~ (See, for example, the
maligalasloka and verse 18). I believe we should read these statements as they
were phrased, rather than forcing them to say something else ("ultimately" or
"conventionally"). I devote fuller attention to this issue in Shulman (2008a).
Regarding dependence, see MMK 10.8-11, where Nagarjuna clearly states
that in order for the dependent to exist, it would have to be established prior
to its dependence. Once two things depend on each other, neither of them is
established.
43 A similar claim has been made by Wood (1994: ch. 5).
44 In y ~ 21-22 Nagarjuna states that since there exist no arising or ceas-
ing, the concept of impermanence was taught only for the practical purpose
(kliryavaslit, dgospa'i don) of facilitating realization. y ~ 33 states again that
the concepts of "I and mine" and of the skandhas, dhlitus and liyatanas were
CREATIVE IGNORANCE
157
For brevity's sake, I will quote only two verses from the SS.
First, the opening verse of the text:
Abiding, arising and ceasing, existence and non-existence, low, middle
and superior - the Buddha spoke of these under the power of worldly
convention, not under the power of truth.
gnas pa'am skye 'jig yod med dam II
dman pa'am mnyam pa'am khyad par can II
sangs rgyas 'jig rten snyad dbang gis II
gsung gis yang dag dbang gis min II SS 1
The basic concepts we employ in describing existence should not
be understood to reflect the truth, but only conventional agreement.
Such conventions cannot be real, since we would need to specify an
existent phenomenon that could be defined as empty.45 This would
contradict the major thrust of Nagarjuna's argument and the ex-
plicit statements of all the verses we have examined.
Near the end of the text, Nagarjuna summarizes his discussion
and defines his position regarding the two truths:
The worldly principle "this arises in dependence on that" is not de-
nied. (But) also - What is dependent has no self-nature, and hence -
how could it exist? Understand this correctly!
'di la brten nas 'di 'byung zhes II 'jig rten tshul 'di mi 'gog cing II
gang brten rang bzhin med pas de II ji ltar yod 'gyur de nyid nges II SS 71
There is truth in the way people see the world; thought is not to-
tally mistaken in its analysis of experience. But once dependence is
recognized, it should lead to the conclusion that nothing can exist.
Again we encounter the three step procedure of Nagarjuna's dia-
lectic: because of dependence, there is no svabhiiva, and therefore
there is no existence.
also taughtfor such practical purposes.
45 . See in this regard SS 2ab:
bdag med bdag med min bdag dang II bdag med min pas brjod 'ga' 'ang med I
There is no self, no non-self, no self and non-self. Therefore there is noth-
ing which can be expressed.
158
EVIATAR SHULMAN
We must now ask ourselves what this severe deconstruction of
existence, that I awkwardly insist does not lead to non-existence,
actually means.
IV. Creative ignorance
46
We have now reached the heart of our discussion, the attempt to
come to terms with Nagarjuna's deep and total denial of existence.
There is, according to this vision, nothing truly out there in the
world. Nonetheless, we are not in a non-existent void but can actu-
ally discuss the meaning and value of our experience. How can a
world that is not existent or non-existent (or both or neither) be de-
scribed? In other words, how is it that a non-existent reality comes
into being?
Surprisingly enough, the Y$ and SS supply a rather straightfor-
ward answer to these questions, explaining that the world is created
out of ignorance, as a result of processes of conceptualization. The
clearest statement in this regard is Y$ 37:
Since the buddhas have said that the world
47
has ignorance for its con-
dition, does it not follow that this world is a mental construction?
46 Initial articulations ofthe reading of Nagarjuna presented in this section
have previously appeared in de la Santina (1987: 174) and Tola & Dragonetti
(1995: xxix), and more importantly in Scherrer-Schaub (1991: 252-259, n.
492). Regrettably, none of these sources developed these points much beyond
the level of preliminary observations. Siderits (2004) has provided some of
the logical basis for the reading of Nagarjuna suggested here, although he
bases his discussion on MMK 1 alone. Burton (1999: ch. 4) defined certain
elements of Nagarjuna's thought in a similar way to my treatment of them,
although I believe he has misunderstood Nagarjuna's basic position (see note
54 below).
47 Candraklrti explains "the world" to be equal to "the five aggregates of
clinging" ('jig rten ni nye bar len pa'i phung po'i nga rnams so, Scherrer-
Schaub [1991:77]). The same definition is given also in chapter 12 of the A ~ r a
(see Conze [2006 (1973: 173)]). Although this statement seems to suggest that
only the world of subjective experience is conditioned by vikalpa, we must
note that there is, for Nagarjuna, no "world" which exists beyond the five ag-
CREATrvEIGNORANCE
159
'jig rten ma rig rkyen can du II gang phyir sangs rgyas rnams gsungs pa II
de yi phyir Tla 'jig rten 'di II rnam rtog yin zhes cis mi 'thad II y ~ 37
The world is a mental construction, an act of creative imagination,
a vikalpa propelled by ignorance. The following verse strongly sug-
gests that everything depends on ignorance:
That which ceases when ignorance ceases, how can it not be clear that
is an imagination constructed out of mis-knowledge?
ma rig 'gags par gyur pa na II gang zhig 'gog par 'gyur ba de II
mi shes pa las kun brtags par II ji Ita bu na gsal mi 'gyur II y ~ 38
When ignorance will cease to be, it seems that the world will not
be there either. What appears to exist is constructed by our own
imagination, out of ignorance. Nagarjuna, if I understand him cor-
rectly, is asking why we believe, given that our perception of the
world is colored by ignorance, that the world is true? How is it that
our very knowledge of the world's existence is not created by igno- .
rance? Moreover, when we realize that the world is conditioned by
ignorance, why is it that we don't realize it to be an act of creative,
ignorant imagination? What this means is not that our perception
or ideation of things mistakenly constructs a mental image it re-
places for a true object. Rather, the object itself is constructed by
ignorance, since there is nothing objectively there independent of
ignorant perception. Earlier in the Y$ Nagarjuna has stated twice
that the true vision of reality means seeing that things are born of
ignorance. The first instance is Y$ 10:
When true knowledge sees the appearance conditioned by ignorance,
no arising or ceasing is perceived.
ma rig rkyen gyis byung ba la II yang dag ye shes kyis gzigs na II
gregates. More importantly, the riipa aggregate traditionally includes all that
is material, and specifically the 6 perceptual objects. One would probably
not want to argue that there is no relation between the "real" physical object
and its representation in perception. Examples of the emphasis on the physi-
cal aspect of the riipa aggregate can be found in Majjhima Nikaya i185-190,
i88-90, i421-423. See also Gethin's (1986) treatment of the five aggregates
in the nikayas and early Abhidhamma.
160
EVIATAR SillJLMAN
skye ba dang ni 'gags pa'ang rung II 'ga' yang dmigs par mi 'gyur ro II
Nagarjuna goes on to state that "this is nirvG1J.a and the seeing of
reality in this very life, what is to be done has been done" (Y$ llab:
de nyid mthong chos my a ngan las / 'das shing bya ba byas pa'ang
yin) .
. Y$ 10 is based on a delicate play of meaning. In traditional Bud-
dhist exegesis "appearance conditioned by ignorance" refers to the
12 links of conditioned arising, the descriptions of the process by
which sarp.saric transmigration proceeds. The causational principle
underlying this process is based on each link conditioning the aris-
ing of the following one, or, when it is absent, conditioning its ceas-
ing.
48
But Nagarjuna envisions a very different picture: When one
rightly observes the conditioning of ignorance - he sees no arising
and ceasing! This is because he understands that what seems to be
real is actually not much more than a fantasy, and therefore that
it does not truly arise or cease. Nagarjuna is hereby articulating a
fully new import for "appearance conditioned by ignorance." No-
thing whatsoever undergoes arising and ceasing, because all such
things are not really there, they are fictions produced by ignorance.
Nagarjuna will make this point again in verse 26 where- he asserts
that "the knowers of things" (dngos po la mkhas pa rnams gyis,
verse 25) know them to "appear caused by ignorance" (ma rig rgyu
las shin tu byung).
It is tempting to try to read these verses as describing the na-
ture of experience, rather than characterizing existence in general.
But in Y$ 34 Nagarjuna declares he believes the physical-material-
objective reality to be dependent on consciousness:
Things spoken of, the great elements and so forth,49 are enclosed in
consciousness. When this is understood, they dissolve. Indeed, they
are a mistaken construction.
48 For an exceptionally strong statement of this principle see SN iil05.
49 For an explanation of mahtibhatadi Cbyung ba che la sogs pa), see
Scherrer-Schaub (1991: n. 492, p. 256).
CREATIVE IGNORANCE
161
'byung ba ehe la sags bshad pa II mam par shes su yang dag 'du II
. de shes pasni 'bral 'gyur na II log pas mam brtags ma yin nam II
mahabhatiidi vijfiane proktaf!l samavarudhyate I
tajjfiane vigamaf!l yati nanu mithyii vikalpitaf!l II Y$ 34
The elements are "checked by" or "enclosed in consciousness" (vi-
jnane samavarudhyate, mam par shes su yang dag 'dU).50 They can
be dissolved when this is understood, and hence are not objectively
real but depend on consciousness for their being. They are further
defined as a mistaken mental construction (mithya vikalpitam, log
pas mam brtags).
When we realize that Nagarjuna understood things to rise out
of ignorance, we can better understand his intention in describ-
ing them as being similar to illusions, dreams, phantoms, cities of
gandharvas, and the like. This is a central feature of Nagarjuna's
thought, which he expresses in different verses and contexts.
51
A
good example is SS 66:
Conditioned things52 are like a city of gandharvas, an illusion, a phan-
tom, hairs (seen by a person suffering from a cataract), a bubble in the
stream, a magical display, a dream and a whirling fire-brand .
. 50 The meaning of samavarudhyate is not fully clear. In this context the
verb could imply either that the elements etc. are made of consciousness, or,
more probably, that they depend on consciousness in order to be. Numer-
ous translations for samavarudhyate have been presented, such as Lindtner
(1986: 83): "made to cohere in consciousness," Ichigo (1989: 155) and Loizzo
(2001: 506) "reduced to consciousness," Scherrer-Schaub (1991: 252) and
Tola & Dragonetti (1995: 38): "contained in consciousness," and Iinpa: "ab-
sorbed in consciousness." See further Scherrer-Schaub (1991: 254-255).
What is important to note about samavarudhyate in Y ~ 34 is that it probably
does not make the strong idealistic claim that reality consists only of mind.
51 See MMK 7.34, 17.31-33, 23.8; 5S 14, 36, 40-42, 66; VV 65-67; y ~
15-17, 27, 56.
52 This verse speaks of 'du byed (saf!lskara) in the sense of 'dus byas (saTfl-
skrta), a use familiar from different Buddhist contexts (see, for instance,
Boisvert [1995: 93-95]). One should note that the technical and generally
subconscious meaning of saTflskara makes little sense in this verse. It should
162
EVrATAR SHULMAN
'du byed dri za'i grong khyerdang II sgyu ma smig rgyu skra shad dang II
dbu ba chu bur sprul pa dang II rmi lam mgal me'i 'khar lo mtshungs II
A similar idea is expressed in y ~ 17 as well:
When one understands that existence
53
is like a mirage and an illu-
sion, one is not polluted by views of the extremes of a beginning or
an end.
srid pa smig rgyu sgyu 'dra bar II blo yis mthong bar gyur pa ni II
sngon gyi mtha' 'am phyi ma'i mtha' II lta bas yongs su slad mi 'gyur II
Things are unreal, but nonetheless appear. This appearance does in
fact occur, but has no substantial reality to it. Moreover, as we have
learned, the appearance is conditioned by ignorance and caused by
conceptualization. This is why it is similar to an illusion, a dream
or a mirage, phenomena which are created mentally without hav-
ing any true objective support. This is, in fact, Nagarjuna's vision
of the middle way, in which appearance is neither truly existent nor
fully denied.
54
be clear as well that this verse is not intended as an affirmation of an uncon-
ditioned (asaY[lskrta) truth, argued against earlier in verses 30-32 of the same
text (SS 32): .
'dus byas dang ni 'dus ma byas II du ma ma yin gcig ma yin II
yod min med min yod med min 1/ mtshams 'dir sna tshogs thams cad 'dus //
Conditioned and unconditioned are neither one nor many. They do not
exist, not-exist or (both) exist and not-exist. The whole variety (of things)
is included in these boundaries.
53 In this verse, "existence" translates the more particular srid pa (bhava),
rather than the more abstract bhiiva (yod pa or dngos po).
54 This formulation of the middle way also answers Burton's (1999: ch. 4)
claim that the fact that Nagarjuna believes reality to be a mental construction
leads his view to Nihilism. I would argue the opposite view to Burton's: the fact
that Nagarjuna understands reality to be conditioned by subjectivity demands
a great degree of moral responsibility of people, since man naturally condi-
tions and creates his own reality. According to this view, morality is not only
validated, but enforced. The argument could be made that only in an empty
world is morality understood to be not only a necessary, but even a constitu-
tional force. On an ontological level, there is obviously a difference between
CREATrvEIGNORANCE
163
Thus far I have been quoting mainly from the y ~ . The SS dis-
cusses the creative capacity of the mind somewhat differently. First,
it connects illusory existence to karma.
55
Verses 33-43 are devoted
to a discussion of karma, in which Nagarjuna shows thatkarma
lacks svabhiiva. Of primary importance for our discussion are the
conclusions the SS draws from showing karma to lack svabhiiva.
Just as the victorious Tathagata creates a magical manifestation by
way of his magical power, and that same magical manifestation in
turn creates another magical manifestation,
In such a case, the manifestation (created by) the Tathagata is empty,
and what need we say about the manifestation (created) by the man-
ifestation? Both exist only as names,56 and are wholly conception-
only.
In just the same way the agent is like the manifestation, and his act
like the manifestation created by the manifestation. What is empty of
self-nature in every bit, is conception-only.
ji ltar bcom ldan de bzhin gshegs II rdzu 'phrul gyis ni sprul pa sprul II
sprul pa de yis slar yang ni II sprul pa gzhan zhig sprul gyur pa II 5S 40
de la de bzhin gshegs sprul stong II sprul pas sprul pa smos ci dgos II
gnyis po ming tsam yod pa yang II ci yang rung ste rtog pa tsam II 5S 41
de bzhin byed po sprul dang mtshungs II las ni sprul pas sprul dang
mtshungs II
rang bzhin gyis stong gang cung zad II yod pa de dag rtog pa tsam II 5S 42
non-existence and the statement that what exists is constructed by the mind.
55 las ni rkyen skyes yod min zhing II rkyen min las skyes cung zad med II
'du byed rnams ni sgyu ma dang II dri za'i grong khyer smig rgyu
mtshungs II 5S 36
Karma does not arise from conditions, and it does not arise at all from
non-conditions. Conditioned things are like illusions, a city of gandhar-
vas, and mirages.
56 The characterization of things as "only names" (ming tsam) is absent
from the svavrtti version of the text.
164
EVJATAR SHULMAN
Karma is similar to a magical manifestation. 57 Anything that ap-
pears due to karmic conditioning is "conception-only," merely a
name. The rationale of this insight is defined in verse 42: "What
is empty of self-nature in every bit, is conception-only." This is, in
fact, exactly what I have been arguing that the lack of self-nature
means - when there is no true existence of itself, reality proves to
be a conceptualization. The SS informs us that this conceptualiza-
tion is caused not only by ignorance, but also by karma. .
The discussion of karma in the SS concludes with a statement
regarding the enigmatic nature of existence (verse 44), following
an elaborate discussion of the problems Nagarjuna identifies in de-
fining the perceptual process (verses 45-57). The argument is too
complex to be treated fairly in this context, since it rests on a very
challenging and counter-intuitive assumption: Nagarjuna seems to
believe that if we cannot supply a coherent definition for the way
perception functions, every experience, every act of knowledge and
every object are proven to be unrea1.
58
I hope to give the intricate
arguments of the SS fuller attention in another context. For now
it will suffice if we note the intimate relation Nagarjuna intuits
between definition and reality. Of even greater importance in the
present context are the formulations he provides at the end of this
discussion, in which he defines the creative power of conceptual-
ization. First he states that the kleSas lack self-nature, since they are
;.Conditioned by pleasant and unpleasant sensation.
59
Next he states:
57 The discussion of karma in chapter 17 of the MMK reaches the same
conclusion. In 17.31-33, Nagarjuna uses the same image as in SS 40-42 in
order to define karma as being similar to an illusion.
58 The most significant verse in this regard is SS 51:
mig blo mig la yod min te II gzugs la yod min par na med II
gzugs dang mig la brten nas de II yongs su rtog pa log pa yin II
Eye-consciousness is not in the eye, in the object or between the two.
What depends on the form and the eye is a mistaken conception.
I 59 SS 59: sdug dang mi sdug phyin ci log II rkyen las chags sdang gti mug
dngos II
CREATIVE'IGNORANCE
165
Because desire, anger and ignorance are directed toward one and the
, same thing, they create it through conceptuality. That conception, too,
is unreal. 60
The conceived object does not exist, and without it - how will there
be conception? Therefore the conceived and the conception, because
they arise from conditions, are truly empty. 61
gang phyir de nyid la chags shing II de fa zhe sdang de la rmongs II
de phyir rnam par rtog pas bskyed II rtog de'ang yang dag nyid du
medii SS 60
brtag bya gang de yod ma yin II brtag bya med rtog ga la yod II
de phyir brtag bya rtog pa dag II rkyen las skyes phyir stong pa nyid II
SS 61
Nagarjuna understands the functioning of conceptuality in a sur-
prising manner. Rather than conceptuality being an attempt to de-
fine and understand reality, Nagarjuna sees conceptuality as re-
sponsible for the creation of reality. Things are not objectively "out
there," but are brought into being by ideation.
'byung phyir chags sdang gti mug dang II rang bzhin gyis ni yod ma yin II
The phenomena of desire, anger and ignorance arise conditioned by the
mistaken perceptions of pleasant and unpleasant. Therefore desire, anger
and ignorance do not exist by way of self-nature.
60 This verse could be read as a statement that conception creates the klefas
rather than the kleas creating the object. The reason I believe my translation
- which stresses that the ktefas create the object - to be more convincing,
is that the next verse begins with the statement "The conceived does not ex-
ist ... " (brtag bya gang de yod ma yin), a fact which must have been r e f e r ~ e d
to in the previous verse. Also, in a Nagarjunian world, the fact that something
is experienced through the distorting lenses of the klesas clearly implies that
it is unreal. I wish to thank Prof. Ernst Steinkellner and Prof. Akira Saito for
carefully reading this important verse, as well as the following verse, with
me.
61 We could translate "emptiness itself" (stong pa nyid), but following the
svavrtti I translate "are empty" (stong pa yin). The nyid which ends the verse
appears to be a translation of eva. It is difficult to decide whether the original
Sanskrit reads sanyatii-eva or sanya/e/ii-eva.
166
EYJATAR SHULMAN
. What leads Nagarjuna to conclude in these -yerses that ob-
jects are created in the manner they are envisioned by the mind?
Nagarjuna's analysis leads him to the conviction that there is no
true existence; the object is not real. Observing that experience is
manifold, as objects take different forms (in this case they are ex-
perienced through the threefold division of the klesas), Nagarjuna
realizes that it is ideation which creates the object. There exists no
unitary reality which conditions experience, and hence tl,le objects
of experience, which appear to be unitary, are created as part of
the way they are envisioned by consciousness. They are not ac-
tually perceived, but rather, are projected as part of the "percep-
tual" process. For Nagarjuna, it is not the object which conditions
experience, but experience which conditions the object. The logic
Nagarjuna is employing in this case rests on the well-known "one
or many" argument: The object cannot have a unitary or a manifold
nature. Once it appears in different ways, the Madhyamika views it
as a result of the way it has been conceived.
62
Moreover, once things are proven to be brought into being by
the power of ideation, that ideation itself is realized to be unreal
as-well, since it perceives objects which are not really there. Emp-
tiness is said to be the play of unreal conceptualization perceiving
unreal objects.
The description of reality as "conception-only" in the 5S is
;.highly significant. It may remind us of Vasubandhu's statement at
the opening of his Vif!tsatika: "In the Mahayana these three worlds
are established as being mere figments of consciousness" (mahii-
yane traidhiitukaf!t vijfiaptimatraf!t vyavasthapyate). 5S 61 is also
remarkably similar to Madhyantavibhaga 1.3 and 1.6, and to Tri-
svabhavanirde1a 36.
63
Some readers will possibly be worried that
Nagarjuna has turned into a Yogacarin.
62 The non-unitary nature of the object, which serves as a proof of its
logical and ontological impossibility, is central to the logic employed by
Nagarjuna in the SS. See verses 46 and 50 for examples of this principle.
63 I quote here only the last of these 3 verses, TrisvabhavanirdeSa 36:
CREATIYEIGNORANCE
167
I believe that to a great extent suchan understanding is true.64 In
a future publication I wish to provide a complementary discussion,
which will shOw that Vasubandhu was a sort of a Madhyamika. In
my mind, in the earlier stages of their evolution the Madhyamaka
and Yogacara shared a very similar intuition about reality, under-
standing it to be an empty presentation determined by conscious
and unconscious processes of conceptualization.
65
cittamatropalambhena syac jfieyarthanupalambhata I
jfieyarthanupalambhena syac cittanupaZambhata II
From the perception of mind-only, there should be the non-perception
of knowable things. From the non-perception of knowable things, there
should be the non-perception of mind.
See also SS 57 for another remarkably similar statement by Nagarjuna.
64 For further discussion of the intimate relations between Madhyamaka
and Ybgacara thought, albeit in a different context than the one developed
here, see Nagao (1991: ch. 13) and King (1994). It is also interesting to note
in this regard the way Saito (2007) refers to Nagarjuna as " ... the founder
or originator of the Mahayana-Abhidarma movement, that was later devel-
oped by the so-called Yogacaras and Madhyamikas" (p. 158). Saito refers
also to the commentaries written by early Yogacara masters on the MMK.
His words suggest the possibility that there was a viable Yogacara reading
of Nagarjuna, now forgotten due to the immense influence thinkers such as
Buddhapalita, Candraklrti and Tsong-kha-pa exert on our understanding of
Madhyamaka. The possible, or even natural synthesis of Madhyamaka and
Yogacara is also attested by so-called Yogacara-Madhyamaka
school. This school was particularly dominant during the early stages of Ti-
betan Madhyamaka (see Seyfort Ruegg [2000: section one]).
65 It is most important to note that when Nagarjuna or Vasubandhu iden-
tify the creative role of mental forces, this should not be meant to imply they
believed people can control the processes of creation propelled by their own
minds. Karma, ignorance and mistaken forms of imagination and conceptu-
ality (vikalpa, vijfiapti, abhiUaparikalpa) are clearly not willful, and are to
a large extent unconscious. This explains not only why we cannot create at
will, but also why we make perceptual and ideational mistakes.
168
EVIATAR SHULMAN
V. Conclusion
The basic argument developed in this paper was that for Nagarjuna,
the fact that phenomena lack svabhiiva implies that they are created
by ignorance through processes of conceptualization. When noth-
ing exists, as it has no true nature, it cannot be independent of the
way it is known or perceived. The dialectic of Emptiness shows
things to be a sort of a "real illusion." Phenomena are not really
there in any objective or substantive sense. Nonetheless, they do
appear, and hence are understood to be "like an illusion, like a
dream, like a city of gandharvas."66
Abbreviations
JAOS
JIP
MMK
PEW
SS
VV
WZKS
References
Journal of the American Oriental Society
Journal of Indian Philosophy
Millamadhyamakaklirikli - cf. n. 9
Philosophy East and West
Silnyatlisaptati - cf. n. 11
Vigrahavylivartanf"- s. Bhattacharya et. al1978
Wiener ZeitschriJt fur die Kunde Sudasiens und Archiv fur
indische Philosophie
Yukti:ja:j!ikliklirikli - s. Scherrer-Schaub (1991)
Bhattacarya, K., Johnston, E. R., and Kunst, A. (1978). The Dialectical Meth-
od of Nliglirjuna: Vigrahavylivartanf. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Boisvert, M. (1997). The Five Aggregates: Understanding Theravlida Psy-
chology and Soteriology. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications.
66 MMK 7.34ab: yathli mliyli yathli svapno gandharvanagararrz yathli.
CREATTVEIGNORANCE
169
Burton, D. F. (1999). Emptiness Appraised: A Critical Study of Nilgilrjuna's
Philosophy. Great Britain: Curzon.
Conze, E. (tr.) (2006 [1973]). The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand
Lines & its Verse Summary. San Francisco: City Lights.
Cox, C. (1993). "Dependent Origination: Its Elaboration in Early Sarvastivadin
Abhidharma Texts." In: Sharma, R. K. (ed.). Researches in Indian and
Buddhist Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Professor Alex Wayman. Del-
hi: Motiial Banarsidass: 119-142.
Darling, G. J. (1987). An Evaluation of the Vedilntic Critique of Buddhism.
Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
de Jong, J. W. (1977 [1958]). MiZlamadhyamakakilrikil ofNilgilrjuna. Madras:
Adyar Learning and Research Center.
de Jong, J. W. (1972). "The Problem of the Absolute in the Madhyamaka
School." lIP 2: 1-6.
de la Santina, P. (1987). "The Madhyamaka Philosophy." lIP 15: 173-185.
Dragonetti, C. (1978). "The PratItyasamutpadahrdayakarika and the PratItya-
samutpadahrdayavyakhyana of Suddhamati." WZKS 22: 87-93.
Dragonetti, C. (1986). "On Suddhamati's PratItyasamutpadahrdayakarika
and on Bodhicittavivaral).a." WZKS 30: 109-122.
Erb, F. (1997). Siinyatilsaptativrtti: Candrakfrtis Kommentar zu den "Sieb-
zig Versen iiber die Leerheit" des Nilgilrjuna (Kilrikils 1-14): Einleitung,
Ubersetzung, textkritische Ausgabe des Tibetischen und Indizes, Tibetan
and Indo-Tibetan Studies 6. Franz Steiner Verlag Stuttgart.
Ganeri, J. (2001). Philosophy in Classical India: The Proper Work of Reason.
London and New York: Routledge.
Garfield, J. L. (1994). "Dependent Arising and the Emptiness of Emptiness:
Why did Nagarjuna Start with Causation?" PEW 44/2: 219-250.
Garfield, J. L. (1995). The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nilgilr-
juna's MiZlamadhyamakakilrikil. New York and Oxford: Oxford Univ.
Press.
Gethin, R. (1986). "The Five Khandas: Their Treatment in the Nikayas and
Early Abhidhamma." lIP 14: 35-53.
Gombrich, R. (1996). How Buddhism Began. London & Atlantic highlands,
N. J.: Athlone.
Gomez, L. (1976). "Proto-Madhyamika in the Pali canon." PEW 26/2: 137-
165.
170
EVIATAR SHULMAN
Harris, I. C. (1994). The Continuity of Madhyamaka and Yogliclira in Indian
Mahliylina Buddhism. Leiden, New York, K!1lbenhavn, KOln: E. J. Brill.
Hayes, R. F. (1994). "Nagarjuna's Appeal." lIP 22: 299-378.
Huntington Jr., C. W. (1983). "The System of the Two Truths in the Prasan-
napadli and the Madhyamaklivatlira: A Study in Madhyamika Soteriol-
ogy." lIP 11: 77-106.
Huntington Jr., Ch. W. (1989). The Emptiness of Emptiness. Honolulu: Uni-
versity of Hawaii Press.
Huntington Jr., C., W. (1995). "A Lost Text of Early Indian Madhyamaka."
Asiatische Studien 49: 693-768.
Huntington Jr., C., W. (2007). "The Nature of the Madhyamika Trick." lIP
35: 103-131.
Ichigo, M. (1989). MadhyamaklilaY(!klira." In: Gomez, Luis
0, and Silk, Jonathan A. (eds.). The Great Vehicle: Three Mahliylina Bud-
dhist Texts. Ann Arbor: Collegiate: 141-240.
Inada, K: K. (1993). Nliglirjuna, a Translation of his Mulamadhyamakaklirikli
with an Introductory Essay. Delhi: Sri Satguru.
Jamiesori, R. C. (2000). Nliglirjuna's Verses on the Great Vehicle and the
Heart of Dependent Origination. New Delhi: D.K Printworld.
Jinpa, Th., "Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning." http://www.tibetancIassics.org/
pdfs/SixtyStanzas.pdf (last accessed: 14.07.2009)
Kalupahana, D. J. (1986). Nliglirjuna: The Philosophy of the Middle Way.
New York: SUNY.
King, R. (1989). "Sunyatli and Ajliti: Absolutism and the Philosophies of
; Nagarjuna and Gaugapada." lIP 17: 385-405.
King, R. (1994). "Early Yogacara and its Relationship with the Madhyamaka
School." PEW 44/4: 659-684.
Komito, D. R. (1987). Nliglirjuna's "Seventy Stanzas." A Buddhist Psychol-
ogy of Emptiness. Ithaca: Snow Lion.
Lindtner, Ch. (1982). Nliglirjuniana: Studies in the Writings and Philosophy
of Nliglirjuna. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Lindtner, Ch. (1986). Master of Wisdom: Writings of the Buddhist Master
Nligllrjuna. Oakland: Dharma Press.
Lindtner, Ch. (1997). "The Problem of Precanonical Buddhism." Buddhist
Studies Review 14/2: 109-139.
CREATIVE IGNORANCE
171
Loizzo, J. J. (2001). Candraklrti and the Moon-flower of Nalanda: Objec-
tivity and Self-Correction in India's Central Therapeutic Philosophy of
Language. PhD Dissertation, Columbia University.
MacDonald, A. (2007). "Revisiting the Millamadhyamakakarika: Text-Crit-
ical Proposals and Problems." Indo Tetsugaku Bukkyogaku KenkyL7 14/3:
25-55.
Nagao, G. (1991). tldhyamika and Yogtlctlra. New York: SUNY.
Napper, E. (1989). Dependent Arising and Emptiness. Boston, London, Syd-
ney: Wisdom Publications. . {t
Nietupski, P. (1994). "The Examination of Conditioned Entities and the Ex-
amination of Reality: Nagarjuna's Prajiitlntlma Malamadhyamakaktlriktl
XIII, Bhavaviveka's Prajiitlpradfpa XIII, and Candraklrti's Prasannapadtl
XIII." JIP 22: 103-143.
Pind, O. H. (2001). "Why the Vaidalyaprakara1).a cannot be an Authentic
Work of Nagarjuna." WZKS 45: 149-172.
Prebish, C. S. (1974). "The Puzzle: Fact versus Fantasy." JAOS
94/2: 168-176.
Radhakrishnan, S. (1956). Indian Philosophy, vol. II. New York: Mac-
millan.
Ronkin, N. (2005). Early Buddhist Metaphysics: The Making of a Philosophi-
cal Tradition. London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon.
Saito, A. (2007). "Is Nagarjuna a Madhyamika?" In: K. Mochi-
zuki (ed.). Hokekyo to Daijokyoten no KenkyL7 (Studies in the
SaddharmapwJc!arfkasL7tra and Mahaytlna Scriptures). Sankibo Press:
153-164.
Scherrer-Schaub, C. A. (1991). Yukti,Ja,Jtikiivrtti: Commentaire it la Soixan-
taine sur Ie Raisonment au Du Vrai Enseignment de la Causatite par Ie
maitre Candraklrti. Bruxelles: Institut BeIge des Hautes Etudes Chinois-
es (Melanges Chinois et Bouddhiques).
Schroeder, J. (2000). "Nagarjuna and the Doctrine of 'Skillful Means'." PEW
50/4: 559-583.
Schroeder, J. W. (2001). Skillful Means: The Heart of Buddhist Compassion.
Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
Seyfort Ruegg, D. (1977). "The Uses of the Four Positions of the Catu,Jkoti
and the Problem of the Description of Reality in Mahayana Buddhism."
lIP 5: 1-71.
172
EVIATAR SHULMAN
Seyfort Ruegg, D. (1981). The Literature of the Madhyamaka School ofPhi-
losophy in India. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz. .
Seyfort Ruegg, D. (2000). Three Studies in the History of Indian and Tibetan
Madhyamka Philosophy:' Studies in Indian and Tibetan Madhyamaka
Thought Part I. Vienna: Arbeitskreis fiir Tibetische und Buddhlstische
Studien.
Shulman, E. (2008). "Early Meanings of Dependent-origination." lIP 36:
297-317.
Shulman, E. (2008a). "Nagarjuna on Impermanence, the Buddha on Illu-
sion." In: Shulman, D. and Weil, Sh. (eds.). Karmic Passages: Israeli
Scholarship on India. Delhi: Oxford University Press: 168-187.
Siderits, M. (1988). "Nagarjuna as Anti-Realist." lIP 16: 311-325.
Siderits, M. (2004). "Causation and Emptiness in Early Madhyamaka." lIP
32: 393-419.
Sprung, M. (1977). "Nietzsche and Nagarjuna: The Origins and Issue of
Skepticism." In: Coward, H., and Silvaraman, K. (eds.). Revelation in
Indian Thought: A Festschrift in Honor of Professor T. R. V. Murti. Em-
eryville, California: Dharma Publishing: 159-169.
Streng, F. J (1967). Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning. Nashville and
New York: Abingdon Press.
Thurman, R. (1980). "Philosophical Nonegocentrism in Wittgenstein and
CandrakIrti in their Treatment of the Private Language Problem." PEW
30/3: 321-337.
Tola, F. & Dragonetti, C. (1995). On Voidness: A Study in Buddhist Nihilism.
; Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Tola, F. & Dragonetti, C. (1995a). Niigiirjuna's Refutation of Logic (Nyiiyii),
Vaidalyaprakara1J.a, Zib Mo Rnam Par J:zthag Pa Zes Bya BaJ:zi Rab Tu
Byed Pa: Edition of the Tibetan Text, English Translation and Commen-
tary, with Introduction and Notes. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Tola, F. & Dragonetti, C. (1998). "Against the Attribution of the Vigrahavya-
vartanlto Nagarjuna." WZKS 42: 151-166.
Vetter, T. (1992). "On the Authenticity of the Ratniivalf." Asiatische Studien
46: 492-506.
Walser, J. (2005). Nagarjuna in Context: Mahiiyana Buddhism and Earlier
Indian Culture. New York: Columbia University Press.
Whaling, F. (1979). "Sarikara and Buddhism." lIP 7: 1-42
CREATIVE IGNORANCE
173
Williams, P. (1984). "Review Article." JIP 12: 73-104.
Williams, P. (1988). The Reflexive Nature of Awareness: A Tibetan Madhya-
maka Defence. Richmond, Surrey: Curzon.
Williams, P. (1989). Mahayana Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations. New
Yark: Routledge.
Wood, Th. E. (1994). Nagarjunian Disputations: A Philosophical Journey
through an Indian Looking-Glass. Honolulu: University of Hawaii press.
Volume 30 Number 12 2007 (2009) pp. 175217
THE PRAYER, THE PRIEST AND THE TSENPO:
AN EARLY BUDDHIST NARRATIVE FROM DUNHUANG
SAM VAN SCHAIK AND LEWIS DONEY
1. Introduction
1
Historical writing in Tibet has been, by and large, a religious tra-
dition. Tibetan histories have focused on the transmission of reli-
gious practices ever since the anonymous treasure histories began
to circulate in the eleventh and twelfth centuries.
2
These wove to-
gether Buddhist cosmology, the history of Buddhism in India, and
semi-legendary accounts of Tibets imperial past, creating a grand
narrative that established Tibet at the centre of Buddhist history.
The major works of Tibetan religious historians from the twelfth
century onwards, while perhaps more recognisable as histories,
were also religious accounts of the arising of the dharma (chos
byung).
3
The authors of these works tended to begin their histories

1
The authors would like to thank Brandon Dotson, Kazushi Iwao, Birgit
Kellner and Helmut Krasser for their comments on aspects of this article,
and the support of the Arts and Humanities Research Council (UK).

2
These gter ma or treasure histories, the Bka chems ka khol ma and
the Ma i bka bum, claim to have been written and buried in the seventh
century by the dharma-king Srong brtsan Sgam po; on these texts see Dan
Martins major bibliography (1997), entries no. 4 and 16 respectively.

3
As Leonard van der Kuijp (1996: 46) points out, the rst chos byung
still extant today was the Chos la jugs pai sgo, completed in 1167/8 by Bsod
nams rtse mo. This narrative history, which charts the rise of dharma from
the time of the Buddha to the twelfth century, lingers the longest over the re-
ligions founder. Later that century, Nyang ral Nyi ma od zer wrote the very
dierent Chos byung me tog snying po sbrang rtsii bcud. It is much longer
than the Chos la jugs pai sgo, and devotes more time to the Tibetan imperial
176
with what they knew of Buddhism in India, followed by the narra-
tive of Tibets conversion to Buddhism during its imperial period
of the seventh to ninth centuries. These narratives end with a brief
account of the dark period, or time of fragmentation (sil bui dus),
which lasted from the mid ninth to late tenth century, and an ac-
count of the Buddhist renaissance, the so-called later diusion
(phyi dar), that followed.
In constructing their narratives, Tibets religious historians had
to rely on a variety of sources, but they tended not to make these
explicit. Thus the sources of Tibets religious narratives are not at
all clear to us. On the one hand, we have the Dba bzhed, an ac-
count of the establishment of Buddhism in Tibet during the reign of
the eighth-century imperial king, or tsenpo (btsan po), Khri Srong
lde brtsan. Quite how old this source may be is a matter of debate,
but it certainly contains parts that go back to the ninth or tenth
centuries, as a recent discovery of related Dunhuang fragments has
shown.
4
However, since the Dba bzhed focuses on the reign of Khri
Srong lde brtsan, it can only have been one source among many.
period than any other. Nyang rals chos byung contains a short transmission
history, apparently based on a chos byung by the eleventh-century Rnying
ma pa Rong zom Chos kyi bzang po (see Germano 2002). Rong zoms history
is no longer extant, but apparently only describes the transmission of old
tantras into Tibet in imperial and early post-imperial times (Martin 1997:
25). Other twelfth-century chos byung include Sheu Lo tsa bas transmis-
sion history for the Lam bras teachings of the Sa skya pas, as well as those
written by the Bka gdams pa master Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge and his dis-
ciple Gtsang nag pa Brtson grus seng ge (Martin 1997: 29). From then on
chos byung proliferated in Tibet, continuing the dierent trajectories begun
by these twelfth-century exemplars.

4
The two Dunhuang fragments contain the story of the abbot ntarakitas
arrival at the court of Khri Srong lde brtsan, displaying a clear textual rela-
tionship to the Dba bzhed version of the story (see van Schaik and Iwao
2008). The dating of the Dba bzhed and the other versions of the same nar-
rative, such as the Sba bzhed, is discussed in Pasang and Diemberger 2000:
xiv-xv, 1114.
THE PRAYER, THE PRIEST AND THE TSENPO
177
On the other hand we have the many manuscripts drawn from
the so-called library cave in Dunhuang. These manuscripts date
from the Tibetan occupation of Dunhuang (in the late eighth cen-
tury) through to the closing of the cave at the beginning of the elev-
enth century. Foremost among this group are the year-by-year royal
records known as the Old Tibetan Annals and the poetic account of
imperial Tibet known as the Old Tibetan Chronicle.
5
While these
texts, or others like them, were clearly important for the narrative
of the imperial period in the later chos byung genre they are not
primarily Buddhist works. We must assume, then, that a variety of
sources used by the early Buddhist historians are no longer avail-
able to us.
The manuscript presented in this article, PT 149, contains a
brief historical narrative that illustrates the change from imperial
to religious history in Tibet. As we shall see in the next section, the
text probably dates from sometime between the late ninth and late
tenth centuries, within Tibets time of fragmentation. This period
is often depicted in traditional and modern scholarship as a dark
age; indeed, owing to the paucity of historical literature from the
period, it has been di cult to identify the sources for the early chos
byung accounts. Thus the narrative in PT 149 might be helpful in
this regard; though it cannot be identied as a direct source for any
of the extant Buddhist histories, it may be considered the kind of
source that historians of the eleventh century onward would have
utilized. PT 149 is actually the narrative setting for a single Bud-
dhist text, a prayer known as the ryabhadracarypraidhna.
6

5
On the Tibetan historical sources from Dunhuang, see Uray 1979. The
Old Tibetan Annals are found in the following manuscripts: PT 1288, IOL
Tib J 750 and Or.8212/187. The Old Tibetan Chronicle is found in PT 1287,
with associated fragments in PT 1144 and IOL Tib J 1375, and a related ge-
nealogy in PT 1286. Images of most of these manuscripts can be found on
the IDP website (http://idp.bl.uk) and transcriptions are available from the
OTDO website (http://otdo.aa.tufs.ac.jp).

6
This translates roughly as the aspirational prayer of the practice of [Sa-
manta]bhadra, to which is sometimes appended rja, so as to read: the king
178
This narrative, like the later Tibetan Buddhist histories, begins
in India, and continues through to the imperial period in Tibet, spe-
cically the period of the reign of Tsenpo Khri Srong lde brtsan (r.
c.754797?). Also in line with most of the later histories, but unlike
the Old Tibetan Annals or Old Tibetan Chronicle, PT 149s narra-
tive focuses on religious lineage rather than royal succession.
The manuscript contains the story of Sudhanas
7
quest for the
rya bhadracarypraidhna, which leads him to the bodhi sattvas
Majur and Samantabhadra. Obtaining the prayer from the lat-
ter, he is able to reach the spiritual level (bhmi) of utter joy. The
scene of the narrative then shifts to Tibet, where the prayer is trans-
lated into Tibetan as part of the great translation project undertak-
en during the reign of Tsenpo Khri Srong lde brtsan. The tsenpos
priest, Dba Dpal byams, has a dream, which the Indian abbot Bo-
dhisattva (known in other historical sources as ntarakita) inter-
prets. The dream indicates that Dba Dpal byams must recite the
ryabhadracary pra i dhna for three days and nights. Dba Dpal
byams fails to uphold this commitment, and so asks Khri Srong lde
brtsan if he can go to a more spiritually conducive place. With the
tsenpos blessing he travels towards the caves of Ching pu, where
he meets two Tibetan monks who have experienced omens indi-
cating that they should meet up with Dba Dpal byams. The three
travel together and, reciting the prayer, ascend to the pure land of
Sukhvati.
of aspirational prayers, that of the practice of [Samanta]bhadra In PT 149
the prayer is rst referred to as the king of aspirational prayers (recto l.
1), but then three times as the aspirational prayer (recto ll. 1, 5 and 8). We
have chosen the latter title for use here, since it is shorter and more often at-
tested in our text. The text is found in the Derge and Peking editions of the
Bka gyur (P 716, 1038 and D 1095). An English translation by Jesse Fenton
(2002) based on the Tibetan is available.

7
Not to be confused with the hero of the romantic Sudhana (Manohar)
Jtaka (Jaini 1966), which also proved popular in Tibet (see Stein 1972: 276
278).
179
2. The Manuscript
PT 149 is a single folio in the pecha format, measuring 47 cm width
by 8.6 cm height.
8
The page has red margins, and no pagination,
suggesting that is was originally a singular item as we have it, rath-
er than part of a manuscript text collection. The scribe has written
rather densely, tting eight lines on the recto side and six on the
verso. This little manuscript is in good condition and gives a pleas-
ing general impression, as Marcelle Lalou noted in her catalogue:
Beau papier et jolie criture.
9
The scribe
The scribe who wrote PT 149 has characteristic handwriting that
can be identied in a number of other manuscripts. This identica-
tion is based on a method of forensic handwriting analysis adapted
to the conventions of Tibetan manuscripts, which has been dis-
cussed elsewhere.
10
In brief, the method involves breaking down
the handwritings into units of individual graphs (the written letters
that appear on the page) and identifying su cient similarities at the
graph level to produce a convincing identication. The identica-
tion of such similarities is experience-based, in that the examiner
must know which graphic forms are likely to be idiographic, and
which allographic. While allographic forms are learnt variations
in writing styles, idiographic forms are those that are specic to a
given writer, and not under his or her conscious control. A series of

8
The pecha (dpe cha) format is orignally derived from the Indian palm
leaf folio, which is much longer than high. This format, which was associ-
ated with sacred Buddhist scriptures, was transferred to paper manuscripts
in Central Asian states like Khotan, with little change except that larger
pages could be made using paper instead of palm leaves. This Central Asian
style was then adopted in Tibet during the imperial period. The form is often
known by the Hindi word pothi, derived from Sanskrit pustaka.

9
Lalou 1939: 49.

10
See Dalton, Davis and van Schaik 2007.
180
benchmarks may then be established as a basis for comparing one
example of handwriting with another.
The handwriting of PT 149s scribe can be recognised by cer-
tain general features, the letter-forms being (i) compact, (ii) round-
ed, (iii) somewhat clotted with ink at the points where the pen
has come down or changed direction. More specic benchmarks
include: (i) a very small, almost vestigal ra btags, (ii) a tha with a
tiny, circular lower half, (iii) a cha which has lost not only the head
but also the vertical line connecting the lower part to the head.
Such features, while none of them unique, when found together are
persuasive evidence of the same hand.
In addition, there are a number of other features that may not
be specic to this scribe, but are found in most manuscripts with
this handwriting and therefore are part of the family resemblance
within this manuscript group. These include (i) the use of double
circles and shad to ll space left by incomplete lines of text at the
end of a manuscript, (ii) an opening curl (mgo yig) followed by a
shad, two dots and another shad, (iii) a recognisable mise en page
comprising red margins, no obvious guidelines, and an unusually
dense 78 lines per page.
With these criteria in mind, we can identify a group of manuscripts
written in the same handwriting as PT 149, which includes:
PT 89: two texts from the Ratnaka, mainly dealing with
Buddhist cosmology.
PT 322: a prayer to the magical net tantras in general, and
the Guhyagarbhatantra in particular, that emphasises the
Great Perfection (rdzogs chen).
PT 808: a Chan treatise on the three jewels.
PT 958: an extract attributed to the Abhidharma stra, again
on Buddhist cosmology.
IOL Tib J 597: a history of the Central Asian state of Khotan
known as The Prophecy of the Khotanese Arhat(s) (li yul gyi
dgra bcom pas lung bstan pa). This text seems to have been
181
quite popular around Dunhuang. IOL Tib J 597 is actually a
copy from another manuscript version of the same text (IOL
Tib J 598), which may well date back to the mid ninth centu-
ry.
11
PT 322 and 808 belong to a wider group of manuscripts on Chan,
tantric Buddhism, and a combination of the two, which have been
discussed by Sam van Schaik and Jacob Dalton.
12
The other three
manuscripts are thematically more closely related to our PT 149.
The emphasis in PT 89 and 958 on Mahynastras bears compari-
son with the role of PT 149 as a narrative setting (gleng gzhi) for
the ryabhadracarypraidhna from the Gaavyhastra.
The Prophecy of the Khotanese Arhat(s) in IOL Tib J 547, though
framed as the speech of the Buddha with its contemporary subject-
matter presented as prophecy, touches on Tibetan history in its ac-
count of how the monks of Khotan were given refuge by the Tibetan
king. There is common ground here with the religio-historical nar-
rative contained in PT 149, which extends from the journey of Sud-
hana in India (the narrative framework of the Gaavyhastra) to
the activities of the Tibetan tsenpo and his preceptor.

11
This text, one of ve related prophetic scriptures concerning Khotan,
also exists in another manuscript version, IOL Tib J 601, which is closer to
the versions preserved in four dierent editions of the Tibetan Bka gyur
(Personal communication from Tsuguhito Takeuchi). Furthermore, Pelliot
chinois 2139 contains a Chinese translation of the text by the Dunhuang-
based translator Go Chos grub; this may have been based on IOL Tib J 598.
Gza Uray gives the dates of Chos grub as 770c.858, and states that the text
cannot date to later than 858 (Uray 1979: 289). There is a translation of this
text in Thomas 1935: 3 87 (where he confusingly refers to it as The Proph-
ecy of the Li Country, which is actually the title of another of the Khotanese
prophecies). See also Emmerick 1967.

12
See van Schaik and Dalton 2004.
182
Dating the manuscript
The handwriting in the manuscript does not correspond to any of
the styles known to have been used in the period of the Tibetan
occupation of Dunhuang, which ended in the middle of the ninth
century. Instead, its general stylistic features correspond to cur-
sive writing found in many of the tenth-century Dunhuang manu-
scripts.
13
So we can tentatively date the manuscript to the tenth
century. This still leaves the question of the date of the text itself.
One of the other manuscripts in this handwriting group contains
The Prophecy of the Khotanese Arhat(s). As we mentioned above,
this is a copy of an earlier manuscript, which we also have in the
Dunhuang collections. The earlier manuscript probably dates from
the mid ninth century, and The Prophecy of the Khotanese Arhat(s)
is therefore at least that old, and possibly older. Unfortunately the
text found in PT 149 exists only in this single manuscript version.
However, there are some indications that it may be a copy of an
earlier text. These are archaic features in the text itself.
In terms of orthography, the strong da (da drag) and support-
ing a (a rten) appear frequently. These features are traditionally
held to have been removed from the o cial script in the second
revision of Tibetan orthography, which was probably enforced in
812.
14
Though they are found in manuscripts and inscriptions after

13
Many Dunhuang manuscripts that can be proved to post-date the Tibet-
an occupation are discussed in Takeuchi 1990 and 2004. For a preliminary
study of the dierences between imperial and post-imperial writing styles in
Dunhuang, see van Schaik forthcoming.

14
See Li shii gur khang, pp. 23. Note that the author also considers the
ya superscribed to ma to have been removed at this time, a feature that is nev-
ertheless consistently present throughout the Dunhuang manuscripts. The
standardization of 812 is traditionally said to be the second of three revisions
of the Tibetan written language, and the one that resulted in a detailed royal
edict, the Sgra byor bam po gnyis pa, which has been preserved intact. There
is some disagreement between the traditional histories on whether this sec-
ond standardization occurred in the reign of Khri Lde srong brtsan (r.799
183
this date, they are less common, and are usually absent in tenth-
century manuscripts that are not copies of earlier texts. In terms
of language, the text contains a number of formulations that are
characteristic of the documents originating in the Tibetan imperial
period, such as btsan poi snyan du gsol for a petition to the tsenpo.
The phrase snyan du gsol is found in several Old Tibetan texts,
and the specic phrase btsan poi snyan du gsol appears in the Old
Tibetan Chronicle.
15

The orthography of the title tsenpo (btsan po) and the name Khri
Srong lde brtsan in PT 149 follow the conventions of documents
from the imperial period. These conventions, strictly adhered to
at the time, necessitate that the name element is spelled brtsan,
and the role btsan p(h)o. The spelling brtsan po is only seen in
imperial-period sources in the specic phrase dbu rmog brtsan po
or variants based thereon.
16
The orthography btsan p(h) o, on the
other hand, is seen repeated hundreds of times in these sources.
Conversely, we nd the name element spelled brtsan in the vast
815) or Khri Gtsug lde brtsan (r.815841). Most of the later sources place it
in the latters reign; however, the earliest source to give a date, Bsod nam rtse
mos Chos la jug pai sgo (p. 343-2-6), places it in the reign of the earlier
tsenpo, and Mkhas pai dga ston of Dpa bo Gtsug lag phreng ba places
it more specically in a dragon year in the reign of Khri Lde srong brtsan
(also known as Sad na legs), which can only be 812 (see Srensen 1994: 412
n. 1431). This date accords nicely with the orthographic dierences between
the two inscriptions at the Zhwai lha khang, dated to 805/6 and 812. Recent
scholarship dates the compilation of the full Sgra byor bam po gnyis pa to
814, a few years after this reform, though earlier versions are found in the
Tabo manuscripts (see the excellent survey in Scherrer-Schaub 2002). On the
orthographic features of early Tibetan manuscripts in general, see Scherrer-
Schaub and Bonani 2002.

15
PT 1287: l. 323 and IOL Tib J 1375: r.2.

16
PT 1287: ll. 332, 387 (dbu rmog brtsan po); IOL Tib J 751: 38r.23 (dbu
bang rmog brtsan po, dmag mang poi mthu brtsan po); Phyong rgyas bridge
inscription, ll. 3, 12 and 19 (dbu rmong brtsan po) and the east face of the
Lhasa Treaty Pillar, ll. 16 and 49 (dbu rmog brtsan po, dmag brtsan po).
184
majority of cases in manuscripts and inscriptions from the imperial
period.
Of course, in PT 149 these could all be conscious archaisms ad-
opted to give the text an authentic avour, and we cannot use them
to denitively place the text in the imperial period. Yet there is no
doubt that it belongs to the earliest stratum of Tibetan religious his-
tory, when the events of the imperial period, especially those from
Khri Srong lde brtsans reign, were being reformulated as a speci-
cally Buddhist narrative.
The king of aspirational prayers
The title of the text is The Narrative Setting of the First Teaching
of this ryabhadracarypraidhnarja. The designation of the
prayer as this suggests that the narrative setting was originally
included as an introduction to the prayer. Importantly though, our
manuscript seems to stand alone. It is a single folio with no pagina-
tion, and though the text does not ll the verso folio, leaving some
blank lines, the prayer does not follow it. Therefore it is possible
that our scribe copied the narrative from a manuscript in which it
preceded the prayer itself.
In later Tibetan Buddhism the ryabhadracarypraidhna is
one of the most widely known and most frequently recited prayers,
whether in monastic or lay contexts.
17
It was already one of the
more popular Buddhist texts in Tibetan by the ninth century, when
several works related to it were included in the catalogue of the li-

17
Stephan Beyer stressed the importance of the prayer in Tibetan culture
and wrote that a copy of the prayer has adorned the house altar of every
family in the Tibetan-speaking world. (1973: 188). Matthew Kapstein is also
of the opinion that it is perhaps the most widely known prayer in Tibet.
(Kapstein 2000: 97). David Gellner and Mark Tatz have mentioned the use of
the prayer in funerary contexts in Newar and Tibetan Buddhism (see Gellner
1992: 107 and Tatz 1977: 156). There is also a version of the ryabhadra-
cary praidhna in the Bon po canon named G.yung drung bzang por (sic)
spyod pai smon lam gyi rgyal po (see Karmay and Nagano 2001: no. 285.7).
185
brary of Lhan kar monastery.
18
Among the Dunhuang manuscripts
there are over forty copies of the ryabhadracarypraidhna in
Tibetan: either on their own or in collections of several texts.
19
It
is likely that these collections were assembled for group recitation
and ritual practice. These collections strongly suggest a ritual func-
tion for the prayer, as they often contain ritual dhra texts like
the Pj me gha dhra. There are also Tibetan translations of Indic
commentaries on the prayer, including one by Bhadrapaa that was
translated by Jnagarbha and Dpal brtsegs.
20
The latter translator
is also mentioned in our manuscript.
An indication of the importance of the ryabhadracary pra i-
dh na for the cult of the tsenpos is found in PT 134, a prayer on the
accession to the throne of Ui dum brtan (better known as Glang dar
ma). This prayer is based on the seven-branch structure that derives

18
The prayer is listed as Bzang po spyod pai smon lam kyi rgyal po in
the various aspirational prayers section of the Lhan kar ma, where it is no.
470. The commentaries listed in this catalogue are a Bzang po spyod pai
rgya cher grel pa, attributed to the crya akya gshes gnyen (no. 559), a
Bzang po spyod pai grel pa, attributed to the crya Yon tan od (no. 560),
a Bzang po spyod pai grel pa, attributed to the crya Phyogs kyi glang
po (no. 561), a Bzang po spyod pai grel pa, attributed to the crya Rgyan
bzang po (no. 562), and a mnemonic (brjed byang) on the Bzang po spyod pai
grel pa drawn from four dierent commentaries by Ye shes sde (no. 563).
See Lalou 1953 for a brief record, and Herrmann-Pfandt 2008 for full details
and references to the canonical versions. For a discussion of the name of the
monastery, see Herrmann-Pfandt 2008: xvi, n. 28. Here we have opted for
the version of the name found in PT 1085: Lhan kar.

19
There are also several copies in Chinese. The rst complete Chinese
translations of the ryabhadracarypraidhna were made by Amoghavajra
(Bu kong jin gang ) and Praj (Ban ruo ) in the eighth century.
See Dessein 2003 for a survery of the literary history of the ryabhadracary-
pra idhna in China. Given the importance of Chinese culture in Dunhuang,
we should not ignore the possibility of a Chinese inuence on the popularity
of the Tibetan version.

20
IOL Tib J 146. This commentary is also found in the Bstan gyur (P
5515), where the text is attributed to the same author and translators.
186
from the ryabhadracarypraidhna, which is also mentioned
here by name.
21
Another early example of the use of the prayer is
the bell at Yer pa, just outside Lhasa, dating to the rst half of the
ninth century.
22
In addition, certain early histories, including the
Bka chems ka khol ma, mention an inscription of part of the prayer
that was made at Ldan ma brag, along with an image of Maitreya,
when the Chinese princess was being escorted to Lhasa to marry
Srong brtsan Sgam po (618649).
23
However, Per Srensen is of the
opinion that the ryabhadracarypraidhna would not have been
known to the Tibetans during the reign of Srong brtsan Sgam po.
Another early history, the Me tog snying po of Nyang ral nyi ma od
zer, states that the prayer was translated a century later, to increase
the lifespan of Tsenpo Khri Srong lde brtsan (742c.800).
24
This
latter testimony resonates with the use of the prayer in PT 134 as
part of the cult of the tsenpos.

21
PT 134: l. 19. See the study of this manuscript in Scherrer-Schaub 2000.
The prayer is also discussed in Yamaguchi 1996.

22
Richardson 1985: 144145.

23
Bka chems ka khol ma: 185.18186.1: khams su ldan mai brag sngon
rtsi dkar can la rgyas pai dbu dum dang / bzang po spyod pai smon lam bur
du btod pa brkos nas bris /
The same account appears in other early histories; see Srensen 1994: 240
241 for a discussion. A rock carving and inscription at Ldan ma brag were
discovered in 1983, and are discussed in Heller 1985. As Heller and Srensen
point out, these are not to be identied with the ones mentioned in the histo-
ries, as the carved deity is Vairocana, not Maitreya, and the inscription is not
the ryabhadracarypraidhna. Moreover the rediscovered carving and
inscription probably date to the reign of Khri Srong lde brtsan.

24
Chos byung me tog snying po: 336.17. Later the Chos byung me tog
snying po identies a version of the prayer, written in gold, held in the Dge
(rgyas) bye ma gling temple built in the reign of Khri Srong lde brtsan
(417.14).
187
3. The story
Though PT 149 is not to be regarded as a credible source for the life
or times of Khri Srong lde brtsan, it is an invaluable example of how
his image began to be used in post-imperial times. It is also the sole
known extant version of a unique historical contextualisation of the
ryabhadracarypraidhna.
25
Unlike PT 134, this narrative does
not emphasise the power of the prayer to give long life to its royal
patron. Instead it stresses the thematic unity between the Indian
and Tibetan stages of the prayers transmission. Both parts of the
transmission reference the social hierarchy of spiritual friends, in
India and Tibet respectively. This was perhaps in order to raise the
status of the ryabhadracarypraidhna in a post-imperial Tibet,
where Buddhism had survived the fall of its dynastic patrons.
The Indian narrative
The rst third of the text is a condensed version of the Gaavyha-
stra narrative, describing how 102 spiritual friends (dge bai bshes
gnyen) aid Sudhana (nor bzangs) on his search for the rya bha dra-
carypraidhna. None of the available Sanskrit, Chinese or Ti-
betan versions describe this many spiritual friends, the traditional
number being 53.
26
The Sba bzhed mentions a wall frieze of the
Sudhana story, including 102 spiritual friends, in the great court-
yard (khor sa chen mo) at the Bsam yas monastery built by Khri

25
We have so far only found gleng gzhi in a minority of later commentar-
ies on the ryabhadracarypraidhna: for example the eighteenth-century
rnam shes of Ye shes bstan pai sgron me (Chandra 1963) or the twentieth-
century bzang spyod bru grel of A dzom rgyal sras rig dzin gyur med rdo
rje. These gleng gzhi only give the Indian narrative, and their descriptions
dier from our narrative in following the traditional list of 53, not 102, spir-
itual friends (dge bai bshes gnyen).

26
See Osto 2004: 2933 for reference to the Chinese, Tibetan and Indian
versions, and his Appendices for lists of the 53 spiritual friends in Sanskrit
and Tibetan. Fontein (1967: 1 and passim) also lists 53 spiritual friends in
iconographical representations around Buddhist Asia.
188
Srong lde brtsan.
27
We have, as yet, been unable to verify whether
such a frieze existed or still exists in some form; but it seems that
what we have in PT 149 is a version of that variant of the popular
Sudhana story.
Other variants exist, including an early Tibetan versied retell-
ing from Dunhuang called The History of the Cycle of Birth and
Death (Skye shi khor loi lo rgyus). The Cycle of Birth and Death
describes 27 spiritual friends, who dier in name and order from
Indian tradition. The Cycle of Birth and Death is apparently based
on older textual sources, which suggests that this narrative was al-
ready widely known in post-imperial Tibet.
28
The popularity of the
Sudhana narrative was not conned to the Dunhuang area either;
the narrative is well-represented in both textual and visual culture
from the imperial and post-imperial periods. As we saw, there may
at one time have been frescos at Bsam yas depicting Sudhanas
visits to 102 spiritual friends. Still surviving today are a series of
wooden panels at the Jo khang temple, carved in the Nepalese Lic-
chavi style and possibly dating to as early as the seventh century.
These panels, though incomplete, appear to depict Sudhanas audi-

27
Sba bzhed 4546: de nas khor sa chen mo bskor te rnam par snang
mdzad ngan song sbyong bai dkyil khor du bzhengs so / [46] mda yab kyi
ngos gsum na rnam par snang mdzad la sogs pa rigs lngai lder tsho zhal
phyir lta ba / nang du mdo sdong po brgyan pai rgyud ris dang / tshong dpon
gyi bu bzang pos dge bai bshes gnyen brgya rtsa gnyis bsten pa bris so /

28
The nine Dunhuang fragments, discovered and pieced together by Yo-
shiro Imaeda, are: PT 218; 219; 220; 366; 367; IOL Tib J 99; 345; and vol.
69 fol. 17 (=IOL Tib J 1302) (Imaeda 2007: 114). Steinkellner concludes, fol-
lowing de Jongs discovery of sources for some of the quotes found in these
fragments, that a merely oral knowledge of the Gaavyhastra can be
ruled out because [the Cycle of Birth and Death] copies words and phrases of
a clearly textual kind (Steinkellner 1995: 1819). The list of spiritual friends
(Steinkellner 1995: 128) includes neither Majur nor Samantabhadra, but
does include a nal scene set in Magadha, and the lauding of a text (the
Uavijaydhra) that is missing from the end of the narrative (Imaeda
2007: 13233) two features also present in PT 149.
189
ences with several teachers, among other subjects.
29
From the post-
imperial period, the Tibetan Tabo inscriptions present a version of
the story which seems to have the traditional 53 spiritual friends,
despite a gap in the extant panels from the 34
th
to the 39
th
spiritual
friend (inclusive).
30
It is likely that PT 149 represents a similar Ti-
betan reformulation of the Gaavyhastra narrative. We must
also consider that it may have been inuenced by popular Chinese
narratives of Sudhana (Ch. Shancai ) or other Central Asian
sources.
31
Bearing in mind that the scribe of our manuscript also
copied The Prophecy of the Khotanese Arhat(s) we should also con-
sider the possibility of inuence from a lost Khotanese version of
the story.
Where it does go into detail, the PT 149 narrative displays a mix
of elements from the traditional story and the Cycle of Birth and
Death reworking, with its own unique take on the spiritual friends
speeches. Traditionally, Sudhana is searching for Samantabhadras
code of conduct (samantabhadracar). He visits many teachers, each
of whom bestows a valuable teaching. His search ends after he is
taken home to Dhanykara by Majur, questions Samantabhadra
and gains enlightenment. In the Cycle of Birth and Death, the
protagonist, here named Rin chen, tries to gain peace and happiness
(bde zhing skyid pa) for his dead father. All of the teachers he visits
are unable to help him, until the last, Rgya mtsho rgyal mtshan,
instructs him to travel to Magadha, where kyamuni praises the
Uavijaydhra as the path to enlightenment.

29
See Heller 2004.

30
The Tabo inscriptions, studied by Ernst Steinkellner, may well be the
earliest example extant of a local Kanjur text (Steinkellner 1995: 7), dif-
fering from extant Bka gyur versions. Steinkellner believes the inscriptions
are nevertheless based on an older text, retaining Old Tibetan orthographic
features (Steinkellner 1995: 1417 and Appendix 1, 108111).

31
On the history of the translation and circulation of the prayer in China,
see Dessein 2003.
190
PT 149 follows the traditional Gaavyha narrative in naming
its protagonist Sudhana (nor bzangs), but his quest is specically
the ryabhadracarypraidhna, rather than the more abstract
concept of the conduct of Samantabhadra. Unlike the Gaavyha,
but similarly to the Cycle of Birth and Death, none of the teachers
he visits is able to help him, except for the very last. Our text is also
similar to the Cycle of Birth and Death in that the last scene is in
Magadha, and ends with an exhortation to the recitation of a text
(the praidhna) that is then (surprisingly) not included after the
narrative.
Lastly, PT 149 contains certain elements not, to our knowledge,
seen anywhere else. For example, we have not found the phrase I
dont know [the ryabhadracarypraidhna], and since I dont,
you cannot be destined to be my student used in any other versions
of the spiritual friends speeches. The mixture of elements in this
part of PT 149 suggests that this narrative is either a prcis of a no
longer extant early Tibetan version of the Gaavyhastra, or is
inuenced by popular versions of the Sudhana narrative circulation
in the ninth to tenth century not only in the Tibetan language, but
also in Chinese and perhaps Khotanese as well.
Dba Dpal byams
The remaining two thirds of PT 149 tell the story of how Dba Dpal
byams, the commitment holder (thugs dam pa) to Tsenpo Khri
Srong lde brtsan, received and passed on the transmission of the
ryabhadracarypraidhna in Tibet. This is evidently the same
gure as the Dba Dpal dbyangs to whom the Dba bzhed accords
an eminent role in the establishment of monastic Buddhism in Ti-
bet. There, Dba Dpal dbyangs is the rst Tibetan to be ordained
as a monk (his previous, non-Buddhist name is given as Dba Lha
btsan), is given high o ce (ring lugs) by the tsenpo, and plays a
191
central role as an exponent of the gradual path in the Bsam yas
debate.
32

The o cial title of Dba Dpal byams in our manuscript, com-
mitment holder (thugs dam pa), is not found in other sources. It
may be related to the particular focus in our manuscript on the
religious commitment (thugs dam) to the recitation of the rya-
bha dra carypraidhna. It is this commitment that is passed on
from ntarakita to Dba Dpal byams and from Dba Dpal byams
to his two Tibetan disciples. The transmission of the dharma in
early Tibet is described elsewhere in the Dunhuang manuscripts in
terms of commitments; for example, in The Dharma that Fell from
Heaven, the kings Srong brtsan Sgam po and Khri Srong lde brtsan
are said to have taken up the commitments (thugs dam bzhes)
and spread them among the people of Tibet (see the full quotation
below). Further examples from the same period of the use of thugs
dam to signify religious commitment are found in a collection of
letters of passage, which make a request to Buddhist priests of lo-
cal monasteries to look after a Chinese pilgrim monk. The phrase
please consider your commitments (thugs dam la dgongs par
gsol) there appears in three separate letters.
33
The name of Dba Dpal dbyangs is also found in the lineage of
spiritual friends (dge bai bshes gnyen) teaching at the Bsam yas
and Phrul snang temples, as listed in the manuscript IOL Tib J
689/2.
34
Interestingly, there is also an overlap between other gures
in the lineage of the ryabhadracarypraidhna in PT 149, and

32
See Pasang and Diemberger 2000. The relevant pages of the text are
14b, 18b, 20a and 22b respectively. There is another example of the cor-
respondence of the name elements byams and dbyangs in IOL Tib J 470, a
version of the Rdo rje sems dpai zhus lan, in which the authors name, which
is given as Gnyan Dpal dbyangs in other sources, appears in the colophon as
Slobs dpon Dpal byams.

33
IOL Tib J 754, letters 1, 3 and 5.

34
IOL Tib J 689/2 fol. 16b. See Karmay 1988:7880 for a translation and
transliteration, and see Uebach 1990 for further discussion.
192
the list of spiritual friends in IOL Tib J 689/2, as illustrated in the
following table:
35
Abbatial succession in IOL
Tib J 689/2
Lineage in PT 149
Mkhan po Bo de sva dva Mkhan po Bo de sva dva
Dba btsun pa Yes she (sic)
dbang po
Dba Dpal dbyangs Dba Dpal byams
Ngan lam Rgyal ba mchog
dbyangs
35
Ngan lam Rgyal mchog skyong
As

with the abbatial succession, the narrative subtext of PT 149
gives the Indian abbot the most authority, both in the interpre-
tation of dreams and the recommendation to recite the rya-
bhadracarypraidhna. The narrative suggests the place of Dba
Dpal byams in the middle of this succession, since his practice,
at the abbot Bodhisattvas behest, is of benet to Ngan lam Rgyal
mchog, who seems to be unaware of the prayer beforehand. Unlike
the Indian abbot (and the tsenpo), Dba Dpal byams is presented as
a fallible gure in PT 149. He is unable to interpret the signicance
of his own dream, and fails at rst to uphold the commitments that
the dream entails. Yet Dba Dpal byams is also the central gure
who holds the narrative together, and the way the text relates the
dreams, spiritual welfare and journey of Dba Dpal byams may be
seen as a forerunner of the conventions of later biographical litera-
ture in Tibet.
36
Structurally, the text makes Dba Dpal byams equivalent to Sud-
hana himself. By placing the Indian and Tibetan narratives next

35
The nal syllable diers between the two manuscripts: dbyangs in IOL
Tib J 689/2 and skyong in PT 149.

36
Though there is at this time no general study of the role of biography or
hagiography in Tibetan culture, see Robinson 1996 and the essays in Penny
2002. On the conventions of autobiography in Tibet, see Gyatso 1998.
193
to each other in chronological order, PT 149 becomes a history
of the transmission of ryabhadracarypraidhna from India to
Tibet. However, the story does not establish an unbroken lineage
between India and Tibet, which is one of the functions of many
later lineage histories. It seems rather to legitimise the Tibetan lin-
eage by a kind of mimesis with the more well-known Indian story
of the prayers transmission to Sudhana. This is most explicit in the
phrase a half-days journey for a horseman, a whole days journey
on foot, which is applied to the journeys of Sudhana and Dba
Dpal byams.
37
As well as having a journey as the principle narra-
tive structure, the two stories are also characterized by the appear-
ance of prophecies (lung bstan), and signs (ltas) and the reception
of the ryabhadracarypraidhna as a commitment (thugs dam).
Finally, where the journey of Sudhana ends with his seeing the rst
bhmi, utter joy (rab tu dga ba), Dba Dpal byams journey ends
with his ascension to the realm of bliss (bde ba can).
Khri Srong lde brtsan
If we are to read PT 149 as a validation of the rya bha dra cary-
pra idhna, we should also consider how the text associates the
prayer with imperial patronage. Dba Dpal byams is bound by
his religious commitments (thugs dam) to Tsenpo Khri Srong lde
brtsan, seeks his interpretation of dreams and begs him for leave
to go on retreat. After the fall of the Tibetan Empire in the mid
ninth century, the period of Khri Srong lde brtsans reign became
a seductive source of narrative for Tibetan histories. Already in
the Dunhuang manuscripts we see Tsenpo Khri Srong lde brtsan
becoming a semi-mythological Buddhist king.
The most important of the Dunhuang texts that reference
Khri Srong lde brtsan are the Old Tibetan Annals and Old Tibet-
an Chronicle. The former is a yearly account of the Yar (k)lung
Dynasty; the latter a verse and prose narrative of the imperial pe-

37
r.2: rta pai gdugs lam rkang thang gi zhag lam tsam, repeated on v.2.
194
riod. In the rst of these, which may date to the imperial period,
Prince Srong lde brtsan is said to have been born at Brag mar in
the horse year, 742 C.E.,
38
and given the title Khri, marking his
enthronement, in the Ape year 756 C.E.
39
The dates of his rule and
death are still uncertain, since the extant Old Tibetan Annals do not
continue past the rst few years of his reign, but it is possible that
he ruled Tibet twice in his lifetime.
40
Under his leadership Tibet
reached the heights of its military strength, capturing the Chinese
capital Changan briey in 763 and threatening the Caliph Harun
Al-Rashid in the west.
41
In the Old Tibetan Chronicle, the tsenpo is
described as the just ruler of an expanding empire.
42
The Chronicle
rst mentions Buddhism (sangs rgyas kyi chos) while describing
his reign. It focuses especially on the monasteries he built around
Tibet, as well as the compassion and freedom from birth and death
that the Dharma brought to all his people.
43
It then goes on to list
the tsenpos military victories.
44

38
PT 252, 93; transliterated and translated in Bacot et al. 1940: 26 and
51 respectively.

39
Or. 8212.187, l. 17.

40
The eleventh-century Dba bzhed puts his death at 802 C.E. (Pasang and
Diemberger 2000: 92). However Brandon Dotson believes it to be mistaken
here (Dotson 2006: 13 n. 48). Based on early ninth-century inscriptional evi-
dence, Dotson argues that Khri Srong lde brtsan probably died in 800 C.E, at
the age of 59, after taking up the reigns of o ce a second time (Dotson 2006:
1415).

41
See Stein 1972: 6667; Beckwith 1987: 146152.

42
PT 1287, ll. 366397; translated into French by Bacot et. al (1940: 114
117).

43
PT 1287: ll. 374376: sangs rgyas kyI chos bla na myed pa brnyeste
mdzad nas // dbus mtha kun du gtsug lag khang brtsigs te / chos btsugs nas /
thams shad (sic) kyang snying rje la bzhugs shIng dran bas skye shi las bsgral
to /

44
PT 1287: ll. 376397. Line 98 begins an interpolated section from the
reign of Srong brtsan Sgam po, caused by a misplaced folio (see Uray 1968).
195
Other Dunhuang documents tend to portray Khri Srong lde
brtsan primarily as a religious king, and emphasise his religious
works over his military achievements. There are three other signi-
cant descriptions of this tsenpo in the Dunhuang manuscripts and
we will look at each of them briey here:
45
(i) IOL Tib J 466/3 is a prayer paying homage to Khri Srong lde
brtsan along with teachers and deities of India and Tibet.
46
It has
not previously been studied and is an interesting addition to the
evidence for the portrayal of this tsenpo as a Buddhist king soon
after the imperial period. The invocation of the tsenpo occurs in
the middle of a long prayer of oering to all the deities, monks and
patrons of the dharma. Some of the language here is archaic, and it
may be that the prayer is the earliest of our three descriptions here,
perhaps just post-dating the Tibetan empire itself.
I make oerings to the spiritual teachers of our own Tibet, the great
dharma kings such as the great king Khri Srong lde brtsan. I respect-
fully make the oering of homage to all those teachers who have gone
to nirva [after] propagating the teachings the magically emanated
lord Khri Srong lde brtsan, who has mastered the royal methods of
fortune (phywa) and [rules] the kingdom with the sword of the sky-
gods, and Dharma-Aoka, Kanik, (Hara) lditya and so on.
47

45
In addition to the examples below, we may add IOL Tib J 709/9 and IOL
Tib J 667, which together make up a treatise on Chan said to have been au-
thorised under the seal of Khri Srong lde brtsan. Although this is not a depic-
tion of Khri Srong lde brtsan as such, it does allude to his activity as patron
of the dharma interestingly in this case, from China rather than India.

46
This prayer is among a series of texts written on a scroll. Unlike the
two previous scrolls, this is not a re-used Chinese stra, but a scroll dedi-
cated to these Tibetan texts alone. Another dierence is that the Tibetan
texts are written with the scroll in the horizontal, rather than vertical ori-
entation, in two columns per panel. This is the same method found in the
Aparimityurnmastra scrolls, which are also written on the same paper as
these texts. The other texts are a number of prayers and dhra, apparently
gathered together here for the purpose of recitation.

47
IOL Tib J 466/3: 5r.912: bdag cag bod khams kyI dge baI bshes gnyen //
196
The prayer is written on the same paper, and in the same handwrit-
ing style, as the many copies of the Aparamityurnmastra that
were written in the 840s, during or soon after the last years of the
Tibetan occupation of Dunhuang. The awareness of a tradition relat-
ing to the Indian kings who patronized Buddhism, Aoka, Kanika
and Hara is unusual in a prayer like this. The prayer also contains
several interesting elements in its description of the tsenpo. We
have the di cult concept of phywa in other early sources a class
of gods or an ancient clan.
48
We also nd the tsenpo described as
holding the sword of the gods of the sky (gnam gyI lde), a reference
to the legends of the tsenpos ancestral lineage of divine beings.
(ii) IOL Tib J 370/6 is an account of the ourishing of Buddhism
in Tibet, attributed to the will of the tsenpos Srong brtsan Sgam
po and Khri Srong lde brtsan.
49
This text, titled The Dharma that
Fell from Heaven, is a brief celebration of the early transmission of
Buddhism to Tibet. Like the text above, it begins with an account
of how the kings introduced the dharma to the Tibetan people:
The protectors of men, divine sons, supreme kings,
The magically manifested king Srong brtsan
rgyal po chen po khri srong lde brtsan lastsogs pa // chos kyI rgyal po chen
po rnams la mchod pa // phywai rgyal thabs mnga brnyes shing // chab srId
gnam gyI lde mtshon can // phrul rje khrI srong lde brtsan dang // dar ma
sho ka / ka ni sk / shI la a tI da ya lastsogs // ston pa mya ngan das phyIn //
bstan pa rgyas mdzad thams cad la // phyag tshal bsnyen bkur mchod pa
dbul //

48
See Stein 1961: 6064 and Karmay 1998: 2856.

49
See Richardson 1998: 7576. Richardson counted this as the fth text
on the scroll. However, in this numbering he ignored the rst, fragmentary
text on the scroll. The number here corresponds with Dalton and van Schaik
2006. As with PT 840, this is a re-used Chinese stra scroll. In this case, it
is a Vajracchedikastra. All of the Tibetan texts are written on the verso of
this scroll; they include a short treatise, some brief stras and a prayer to
Majur. Several handwritings are represented, and the text in question here
is in a hand not seen elsewhere on the scroll. This hand in particular contains
characteristic features of late ninth- and tenth-century writing styles.
197
And the tsenpo Khri Srong lde brtsan
Learned the teaching of Gautama kya
Which brought benet to all beings
In Jambudvpa, the world of men, Tibet
In accord with it, they took up the commitments
And spread them far and wide among beings.
As a record to maintain this, on a stone pillar
It was written as an edict of the lord and his subjects.
50
Here the main focus of the prayer is less on the special features
of the tsenpos, and very much on their activities of spreading the
dharma.
(iii) PT 840/3 celebrates Khri Srong lde brtsans invitation of
Buddhist masters from India.
51

There is a king called Tsa,
Born into a divine family in the lineage of the bodhisattvas:
The divine son Khri Srong lde brtsan.
He [introduced] the sublime dharma and invited masters from India.
Like a lamp held aloft in the midst of darkness
He allowed [the dharma] to be practised throughout the kingdom,
Placing [the kingdom] on the path of supreme enlightenment.

50
IOL Tib J 370/6, ll. 17: / gnam babs kyi dar ma bam po gcig go // // myi
mgon lha sras rgyal mchog ste // phrul gyi rgyal po srong brtsan dang / btsan
po khri srong lde brtsan gnyis // dzam gling myi yul bod khams su // gro ba
kun la phan mdzad pai // u dum ba ra i men tog ltar // shin tu bzang dkon
sman gi mchog // dus bde gshegs yul gyur pa // shes rab pha rol phyin pai
chos // de bzhin nyid la mnyam ba ste // yod dang myed pai phyogs jig pai //
bla myed theg chen rab sgrags pa // geu tam shag kyai bstan pa bslabs //
dang du blangs nas thugs dam bzhes // gro ba kun +la+ rgyas par spel //
brtan bai gzungs su rdo rings la // rje bangs rnams kyi gtsigs su bris //

51
See Karmay 1998: 7693. The text is written on a re-used Chinese stra
scroll, containing part of the Avatasakastra. A long Mahyoga sdhana
(PT 840/1) is written on the verso where also, in another hand, two Tibetan
texts are written in between the Chinese characters. The rst (PT 840/2) is
on the view of yoga and the second (PT 840/3) is the text described here.
The handwriting style of these texts is a form not seen in the Tibetan imperial
period, and probably dates to the tenth century.
198
How great was the divine kindness of this divine son!
52
Here the text equates the tsenpo with the legendary King Tsa (or
Dza in other sources), associated with tantric Buddhism.
53
As with
text (ii), there is only minimal reference to the tsenpos divine at-
tributes, and the emphasis is rmly on his Buddhist activities.
In a similar vein, PT 149 depicts Khri Srong lde brtsan in terms
drawn almost entirely from the Buddhist tradition. More than any
of the above manuscripts, this text also helps us to sketch in more
detail the post-imperial view of the people and places under his
rule. The depiction of the tsenpo here references the three princi-
pal achievements that characterize his reign in the later historical
tradition: overseeing the translation of Buddhist texts, building the
Bsam yas temple, and patronising monastic Buddhism.
First, the tsenpos extensive translation project, which encom-
passed works like the Gaavyhastra,
54
is alluded to in PT 149
with the names of three translators working during his reign: Ska
ba Dpal rtsags, Cog ro Klui rgyal mtshan and Rma Rad na ya
kra. The rst two translators are well known, and their numerous
works well attested in the Tibetan canons. The last translator does
not play a prominent role in traditional histories, and has tended to
be conated with Dpal dbyangs from the Sba bzhed onwards.
55
The
earlier, eleventh-century Dba bzhed depicts him as a distinct per-
son: Dba Rad na, the rst Tibetan monk and the son of Dba Rma

52
PT 840/3, ll. 23: rgyal <ka> po tsa zhes bya ba de // lhai rigs la byang
chub sems dpai rgyu // lha sras khri srong lde brtsan gyis//dam chos slobs
dpon rgya gar yul nas spyan drangs te // mun nag dkyil du sgron bzhin // rgyal
khams phyogs kyang stsod par gnang // byang cub mchog gi lam la bkod //
lha sras lhai drin re che //

53
Karmay discusses King Tsa / Dza and his relationship to the tantric king
Indrabhti in his study of this text (Karmay 1988).

54
Steinkellner 1995: 1517.

55
See Pasang and Diemberger 2000: n. 263 and n. 30.
199
gzigs.
56
In PT 149 the translator appears with the clan name of Rma
rather than Dba.
57
Coupling this fact with the Tibetan translation
of ratna, rin chen, we could tentatively identify Rma Rad na (ya
kra) with Rma rin chen (mchog).
58

This would, of course, be only a literary identication, not an
historical one, since neither person is found in imperial sources.
The Dba bzhed makes no mention of Rma rin chen mchog, but he
plays a more important role in later histories. Nyang ral Nyi ma od
zer, for instance, makes him part of the very same trio (with Ska
ba Dpal rtsegs and Cog ro Klui rgyal mtshan), this time travelling
to India to invite Vimalamitra to Tibet.
59
The same tradition, plac-
ing these three translators together, may be behind both PT 149
and this part of Nyang rals history. In any case, PT 149 adds extra
weight to the Dba bzheds depiction of Dba Rad na and Dba Dpal
dbyangs as dierent people, strongly suggesting that the earliest
Tibetan literary tradition distinguished these two Buddhists.
Khri Srong lde brtsans second great religious achievement was
the building of the great Bsam yas monastery, mentioned in our
manuscript as the site of relations between the tsenpo and Dba
Dpal byams.
60
The longer Bsam yas edict, contained in Dpa bo
Gtsug lag phreng bas Chos byung mkhas pai dga ston (but prob-
ably dating to the eighth century), mentions that the minister Stag
sgra klu gong was among those who swore that the practice of the

56
Pasang and Diemberger 2000: 70, 79.

57
It is possible that the rst part of the name Dba Rma gzigs was added
by the redactors of the Dba bzhed.

58
The translators of the Dba bzhed also suggest that Dba Rad nas name
had other synonyms, giving Dba rin po che (another word for ratna, jewel)
as one of his aliases (Pasang and Diemberger 2000: 73).

59
Zangs gling ma: 47b6.; Chos byung me tog snying po: 338.19.

60
For a translation of Khri Srong lde brtsans Bsam yas edicts, see Rich-
ardson 1985: 2631 and 1998: 9198.
200
Buddhas religious law would never be abandoned or destroyed.
61

PT 149 mentions Ngan lam Stag sgra klu gong only as the elder
brother of Ngan lam Rgyal mchog skyong, who plays a part in the
narrative.
The high status of Ngan lam Stag sgra klu gong is conrmed by
the inscription on the north side of the Zhol pillar in Lhasa, which
records an oath taken by Khri Srong lde brtsan to conrm the en-
noblement (dku rgyal) of Stag sgra klu khong and his descendents
in the Ngan lam clan.
62
In contrast to the Bsam yas edict, later
Buddhist and Bon historical traditions identify Stag sgra klu gong
as a Bon po.
63
Our text makes no specic reference to his religious
persuasion, but it seems unlikely that the text would mention this
gure in an introduction to a great spiritual practice if he was con-
sidered an enemy of Buddhism at the time when it was written. In
any case, PT 149 appears to be the only source to provide a specic
familial relationship between Stag sgra klu gong and Rgyal mchog
skyong/dbyangs, two important early gures from the Ngan lam
clan.
Thirdly, in PT 149, the tsenpo is shown to privilege his monks
spiritual practices over their court duties, allowing Dba Dpal by-
ams to go into retreat at, or near, Ching pu. It is evident that even at
this stage the Ching pu caves were becoming important Buddhist
sites in Tibetan literature. The earliest important reference to this
site is the early ninth-century Skar cung inscription, which states
that a temple was built at Mching phu during the reign of Khri Lde

61

62

63
For early indications of this traditional Tibetan depiction, see Pasang
and Diemberger 2000: 61 and n. 194; Grags pa gling grags 36a3. Christopher
Beckwith has discussed the role of Klu khong in the turmoil preceding Khri
Srong lde brtsans enthronement in Beckwith 1983: 12.
201
gtsug brtsan (704?754).
64
The Dba bzhed seems to agree with
this in its statement about a temple built, and a bell buried, at Ch-
ing phu during the middle of the eighth century.
65
The specic cave
known in PT 149 as Ching pu brag rgyeu, has been linked with
Padmasambhavas religious practices ever since Nyang rals hagi-
ography had him going into retreat there.
66
Although the temporal power of the tsenpo is not emphasized in
PT 149, his spiritual authority over Dba Dpal byams is made quite
clear. Dba Dpal byams petitions the tsenpo to interpret his dream,
and it is the tsenpo who approaches the Indian abbot Bodhisattva to
enquire about the dream. In conversation with the Indian abbot, the
tsenpo calls Dba Dpal byams my student, a monk.
67
However,
the text also describes a respectful and even intimate relationship
between the tsenpo and his priest. The tsenpo accompanies Dba
Dpal byams on the rst day of his journey, a gesture of great re-
spect. Finally, before they part, Khri Srong lde brtsan and Dba
Dpal byams stand facing each other, each with a hand on the oth-
ers heart, reciting the ryabhadracarypraidhna. This striking
image carries the implication that outside of the imperial court, and
in the purely religious context of prayer, the two gures are equal.

64
The reference appears on l. 11 of the inscription. See Richardson 1985:
7475.

65
Pasang and Diemberger 2000: 34 and 37, spelled Ching bu both times.
Two other early religious histories mention a temple at Ching phu/bu in the
list of temples established during the reign of Khri Gtsug lde brtsan. See
Uebach 1990: 396397. These sources strongly suggest that Ching pu/phu/
bu is an older spelling than Chims phu.

66
See Nyang ral Nyi ma od zers Zangs gling ma: 58b24; though it now
reads chims phu bre gu dgeu (Zangs gling ma: 58b4), this is probably a
result of the rnam thars long recensional history. The site, now known as
brag dmar keu tshang (the red rock treasury), is described in Dowman 1998:
230.

67
bdag gi slob ma dge sbyong zhig (PT 149 r.8).
202
Other elements in the story
The last master mentioned in PT 149, Sgro snya Ye shes byang
chub, is unknown to us. He is obviously outside the tradition of
abbatial succession represented by IOL Tib J 689/2. He may have
been an important gure in the original authors lineage, but to
our knowledge he is not listed anywhere besides PT 149.
68
He is
said to have lived in Sho ma la, which is probably the Sho ma ra
of Skyi mentioned in the Old Tibetan Annals as the site of three
winter councils, held in 729, 731 and 744 C.E.
69
Sho ma ra was also
the administrative seat of the minister Mgar Stong brtsan and the
site of the rst writing-down of the Tibetan law codes in 655. As
Srenson has noted, Sho ma ra seems to have been a key site for
administration during the whole of the Tibetan imperial period.
70

Later accounts show that a Great Dharma College of the Glorious
Sho ma ra (Dpal sho ma rai chos grva chen po) was an important
centre for the Bka gdams pa school from the eleventh century. In
the twelfth century Sho ma ra was the site of the ordination of Stag
lung Thang pa.
71
Certain geographical elements of the narrative in PT 149 remain
problematic. The tsenpo travels with Dba Dpal byams for the rst
day of his journey, parting at a place called Spa dro. This name is

68
Note that a Mngan lang Gro snya brtsan khong lod appears in the Old
Tibetan Annals (IOL Tib J 750: ll. 227228).

69
See IOL Tib J 750: ll. 254, 260 and 298; Bacot et al. 1940: 48, 49 and
52.

70
Srenson 1994: 184.

71
According to Srenson and Hazod (2005: 47 n. 37 and 237 n. 44), Sho
ma ra is located in the Dbu ru lung district, on the upper course of the Skyid
chu. The location of Sho ma ra and its occurance in the early literature is
explored more fully in Hazod forthcoming. He points out that while the Blue
Annals appears to speak of a Sho ma ra in Stod lungs (Roerich 1988: 728
729), this should be read as two separate toponyms. He accepts a location for
Sho ma ra in the lower Skyid chu region, downwards from Klung shod or
northern Mal gro.
203
close to Spa gro, the valley of that name in western Bhutan that was
part of the territory granted to Gos Khri bzang by the tsenpo Khri
Gtsug lde brtsan in the ninth century, and was thereafter known as
Gos yul.
72
In the eleventh century Spa gro came under the control
of the Nyos clan, thanks to the activites of Nyos Lo tsa ba (born
c.973) and Lha nang pa (11641224).
73
Another early source men-
tions the same place in the context of Gaydharas rst trip to Tibet
in the mid eleventh century.
74
Obviously Spa gro in Bhutan does
not match the location of PT 149s, between Lha sa/Bsam yas and
Ching pu. There is a distant possibility that Spa dro may be a mis-
spelling of Ma(r) dro, where Srong brtsan Sgam po was born (ac-
cording to some traditions) and founded a temple.
75
This is a more
tting place for a tsenpo and his commitment-holder to say their
farewells, yet it is still not en route between Lha sa/Bsam yas and
Ching pu.
4. Conclusion
PT 149 is a remarkable example of the kinds of materials that must
have been available to the early Buddhist historians. Later writers
gathered together such sources to form a coherent Buddhist nar-
rative of the imperial period. Indeed, such a collation may have
already been taking place at Dunhuang. As mentioned earlier, the
other manuscripts in the same hand as PT 149 include another Bud-
dhist narrative connected with the imperial period in Tibet, The

72
See Srenson and Hazod 2005, II.382383, n. 35.

73
See Srenson and Hazod 2005, II.441443.

74
See Stearns 2001: 91 and 214 n. 40.

75
In PT 149 the spa and ma share a similar orthography. In the earliest
source for this toponym, the Old Tibetan Annals (Or. 8212.187) we nd two
spellings, mal tro (l. 42) and mar dro (l. 70), referring to the same place (Ba-
cot et al. 1940: 53, 58 and 65). On the birthplace of Srong brtsan Sgam po, see
Srenson and Hazod 2000: 3637 n. 92. On the founding of the temple and
other religious activities at this site, see Srenson and Hazod 2005: 5051 n.
49, passim.
204
Prophecy of the Khotanese Arhat(s), as well as two Buddhist cos-
mological texts. There is an intriguing suggestion here of a tenth-
century inhabitant of Dunhuang collecting materials for a narrative
placing Tibet in the Buddhist cosmological and historical tradition.
It is just such a narrative, combining cosmology and Tibetan impe-
rial history, that we nd from the eleventh century onward, both in
the early historical treasure literature of the Bka chems ka khol
ma and the Ma i bka bum and in the rst historical accounts of
the arising of the dharma (chos byung).
We hope to have showed the importance of PT 149 for the miss-
ing period of Tibetan historiography in Tibets time of fragmenta-
tion. This manuscript suggests a steady movement, not a sudden
jump, from royal to religious history in Tibet. The Old Tibetan An-
nals and eighth-century edicts may be a rmer base from which to
investigate contemporary imperial hierarchy. However, in this text
we see the emphasis on spiritual lineage and hierarchy gradually
taking shape out of the ashes of the empire as Buddhisms embers
continued to smoulder.
Appendix:
Translation and annotated transcription
Translation
The narrative of the rst teaching of this ryabhadra cary pra i-
dh narja:
There was the son of a rehin called Sudhana. Because his in-
tellect became supremely sharp, he learned by heart an inconceiv-
able amount of the concise and extensive [teachings of] the sublime
dharma. After that, his faith became supremely great. Since he had
not yet received the ryabhadracarypraidhna, he went to see
205
101 spiritual friends. All of them said, I dont know [it], and since
I dont, you are not destined to be my disciple. The distance be-
tween [each of] these spiritual friends was a half-days journey for
a horseman, a whole days journey on foot.
[Sudhana] met 100 teachers, and [then] saw the face of Majur.
He requested [the prayer] from Majur, who said: I dont know
[it], and since I dont, you are not destined to be my disciple. In
India, in Mahbodhidvpa, lives Samantabhadra. Make a request
to rya Samantabhadra. This was his prophecy.
Then the son of a rehin called Sudhana [went and] made the
request to rya Samantabhadra in Mahabodhidvpa. rya Saman-
ta bhadra said: It is contained in the rya Gaavyha, also
known as the Buddhvatasaka, the Mang po dus pa, the Rdza
plags pa, the Snyan gi gong rgyan and the Rma ga chad. And he
taught it. Afterwards the son of a rehin called Sudhana received
[the prayer] as a commitment and practised it ardently. As a result
he saw the rst bhmi, utter joy. In the same way, others in India
took the rya bhadracarypraidhna as a commitment and con-
sequently achieved the siddhi of Samantabhadra.
Subsequent to that, [the ryabhadracarypraidhna] was
translated by Ska ba Dpal rtsags, Cog ro Klui rgyal mtshan and
Rma Rad na ya kra, among others. In the lifetime of tsenpo Khri
Srong lde brtsan, the tsenpos commitment-holder, a certain Dba
Dpal byams, received [the ryabhadracarypraidhna] as a
commitment, and afterwards, one night in a dream, saw crowds
of people in a series of seven golden courtyards. When [Dba Dpal
byams] petitioned the tsenpo, the tsenpo could not interpret [the
dream]. Not far away there was an Indian abbot called Bodhisattva,
and the tsenpo asked him, If someone dreams a dream like this,
what does it mean?
The Indian abbot asked the tsenpo, Who was it [that had the
dream]?
He is a student of mine, a monk. replied [the tsenpo].
206
[The abbot] then commanded He should recite rya bha dra-
cary praidhna and thereby gain the siddhi of rya Samanta-
bhadra. Then the tsenpo repeated this to Master Dpal byams, and
the abbot explained extensively that [Dba Dpal byams] should
chant for more than three days and three nights.
Not long afterwards, [Dba Dpal byams] made a request to the
tsenpo: Since I am emaciated and my aggregates have deteriorated,
I have not been properly upholding my commitment to the tsenpo.
Therefore may I have permission to travel to a holy place? Straight
away [the tsenpo and Dba Dpal byams] left Lha sa [and] Bsam yas
[respectively] and travelled a half-days journey for a horseman, a
whole days journey on foot. At Spa dro temple [Dba Dpal byams]
was encouraged by the tsenpo again. They each placed a hand on
the others heart and recited the prayer. Then [the tsenpo] left.
Not much later, at a nearby place called Ching pu brag rgyeu,
lived Ngan lam Rgyal mchog, the younger brother of Ngan lam
Stag sgra klu gong. At Sho ma la lived the Master Sgro snya ye
shes byang chub. [One day] these two had certain omens that they
couldnt understand, such as a rainbows appearing in the sky. Then
they heard the words Go and meet Master Dpal byams! So they
left.
When these two met [Dba Dpal byams] on the path, they paid
their respects and exchanged news, and then they asked each other
Where are you going? [Dba Dpal byams] said, Three nights
ago, I had a dream prophecy like this Since this was concordant
with the omens [experienced by] the two masters, they went as es-
corts. Master Dpal byams recited his commitments.
When the time of my death comes
When he recited this, [they all] spoke in one voice.
Then by purifying all my delements
As they recited this, they ascended [into the sky].
When I directly perceive Amitbha
207
As they recited this, accomplishments such as rainbows arose, just
like the signs that had [previously] arisen for the two masters, and
they cast o the shackles of the body.
May I go to the land of Sukhvati
Having arrived there, they recited these prayers and departed.
76
The above is the narrative setting.
Annotated transcription
[recto, l. 1] phags pa bzang po spyod pai smon lam gyi rgyal po
di dang por bshad pai gleng gzhi ni / tshong dpon gi bu nor bzangs
zhes bya bas / shes rab rno bai mchog du phyin pa s ni dam pai
chos mdo dang rgyas pa bsam gis myi khyab pa zhig thugs su chud
nas / dad pa che bai mchog du phyin pas ni / phags pa bzang po
spyod pai smon [l. 2] lam di ma gsan pai slad bzhin du / dge bai
bshes gnyen brgya rtsa gcig zhal mthong ba las / kun gi zhal nas
ngas myi shes pa ni ma yin na / nga i dul skal du khyod ma gyur
ro // gsungs pas ma gsan nas / dge bai bshes gnyen de rnams kyi
bar thag ni rta pai gdugs tsam / rkang thang gi zhag lam tsam zhig
mchis so
77
// [l. 3] dge bai bshes gnyen brgya tham ba la thug pa
dang / phags pa jam dpal gi zhal mthong nas / phags pa jam
dpal la zhus pa las / ngas myi shes pa ni ma yin na ngai dul skal
du ma bab pas / rgya gar gi yul byang chub chen po ma ha bo dei
gling na phags pa kun tu bzang po bzhugs pas / phags pa kun tu
[l. 4] bzang po la zhu zhig par lung bstan to // de nas tshong dpon
gi bu nor bzangs gyis ma ha bo de byang chub chen poi gling
78

du phags pa kun tu bzang po la zhus pas / phags pa kun tu bzang
pos / phags pa stug po bkod pa zhes kyang bya / sangs rgyas phal

76
The lines in italics are equivalent to verse 57, towards the end of the
prayer.

77
This phrase is repeated below with a minor variation at v.2.

78
Here the name of the Mahbodhi temple appears in both transliterated
and translated forms.
208
po che zhes kyang bya / mang po dus pa zhes kyang bya / rdza
plags pa zhes kyang bya / [l. 5] snyan gi gong rgyan zhes kyang
bya / rma ga chad zhes kyang bya ba dei nang nas bsus te bshad
nas / tshong dpon gi bu nor bzangs kyi thugs dam du bzhes pas /
mos par spyod pa las sa dang po rab du dga bai bden ba mthong /
de dang mtshungs par rgya gar gi yul du yang phags pa bzang
po spyod pai smon lam thugs dam du bzhes pas / [l. 6] mang pos
phags pa kun tu bzang po i dngos grub brnyes so // dei og tu ska
ba dpal rtsags dang cog ro klui rgyal mtshan dang / rma rad na ya
kra las bsogs pas bsgyur nas / btsan po khri srong lde brtsan gi sku
ring la / btsan po thugs dam ba dba dpal byams zhes bya ba zhig
gis thugs dam du bzhes nas / nub gcig gi [l. 7] myi lam na / gser gi
sko ra bdun dbu la breng dug par rmangs pa las / btsan po i snyan
du gsol
79
nas / btsan pos dpyod ma mkhyen nas / khad myi ring ba
zhig na rgya gar gi mkhan po bo de sat tva zhes bya ba bzhugs pa
de la btsan pos g.yar lam
80
di lta bu zhig rmyis na / di ci lags zhes
zhus pa dang / rgya gar gi mkhan pos de su lags [l. 8] zhes btsan
po la zhus pa dang / bdag gi slob ma dge sbyong zhig lags so zhes
gsol pa dang / di ni phags pa bzang po spyod pai smon lam don
pas / phags pa kun tu bzang po i dngos grub thob pa zhig ces bka
rtsal pa dang / btsan pos slobs dpon dpal byams la bzlas pa dang /
mkhan pos lhag par yang spro ba bskyed nas /
[verso, l. 1] nyin lan gsum mtshan lan gsum bas kyang lhag par
zhal [s]ton du mdzad do // de nas ring ma lon ba dang / btsan po la
zhus pa / bdag ni rad pa
81
phung po yang dgud
82
pas / btsan po i

79
The phrase snyan du gsol is found in several Old Tibetan texts, and the
specic phrase btsan poi snyan du gsol appears in part of the Old Tibetan
Chronicle (IOL Tib J 1375: r.2) See also Thomas 1951: 5355.

80
g.yar lam is an alternative, more archaic word for dream, but can also
mean in the presence of. In view of the syntax of this sentence, it seems that
the former meaning is intended here.

81
Read rid pa for rad pa.

82
Read gud for dgud.
209
thugs dam dngo
83
myi thog pas / bdag ni dgon gnas gcig du mchi
bar ci gnang zhes zhus pa dang / de tsam na ni lha sa bsam yas
84

na bzhugs pa [l. 2] las / de nas rta pai gdugs lam rkang thang gi
zhag lam tsam na / spa dro dgon pa na zhes bya ba der btsan pos
kyang bskul nas / gcig gi thugs kar gcig gi phyag bzhag nas / sa
sar
85
smon lam btab nas gshegs so // de nas ring zhig ma lon ba
tsam na / khad kyis myi ring ba zhig na / ching pu brag rgyeu
zhes bya ba de na / [l. 3] ngan lam stag sgra klu gong gi gcung po /
ngan lam rgyal mchog skyong bzhugs / sho ma la la ni slob dpon
sgro snya ye shes byang chub bzhugs pa las / gnyis gi sku ltas
86

sam rtogs pa la nam ka las gzha tshon las bsogs pa byung nas /
slobs dpon dpal byams bsur gro o zhes thos pa las / gnyis ka slobs
dpon la zlor [l. 4] gshegs pa las lam du gnyis ka mjal nas / zhe sa
bgyis nas bka mchid
87
bgyis nas / gar gshegs so sor zhus pa dang /
mdang gsum g.yar ltas
88
di lta bu zhig byung ngo zhes gsol ba
las / slobs dpon gnyis ka sku ltas mthun nas / zlor gshegs pa dang /
slobs dpon dpal byams thugs dam don pa las / bdag ni chi bai [l.

83
Read dngos for dngo.

84
This seems more likely to refer to Lha sa and Bsam yas as two separate
places than to one confused location in the mind of the original author.

85
Read so sor for sa sar.

86
We have not found the phrase sku ltas elsewhere. To judge from the
context, it indicates a kind of sign or omen.

87
bka mchid is used in a dierent context here to either the authorita-
tive account in Khri Srong lde brtsans eighth-century edict (Richardson
1998: 9293) or the Dba bzheds formal discourse by a king (Pasang and
Diemberger 2000: 9 and 23 n. 1). However, unlike PT 149, the edict and Dba
bzhed use bka mchid in a nearly identical phrase: sangs rgyas kyi chos bod
yul du / snga phyir [Dba bzhed: bod khams su] ji ltar byung bai bka mchid
kyi yi ge. It is seems that, outside of this rare but apparently stock phrase, the
honoric term bka mchid (bgyis) might have carried the more general mean-
ing of (to give ones) news.

88
We have not found the term g.yar ltas elsewhere. It seems to be an ar-
chaic term for an omen received in a dream, to be distinguished from sku
ltas, an omen received while awake.
210
5] bai dus byed gyur pa na /
89
gsung tsam na gsung lan gcig chad /
de nas sgrib pa thams cad ni phyir bsal te /
90
gsung tsam na / gcung
tsam yang phags / mngon gsum snang ba mtha yas de mthong na
gsung tsam na /
91
slob dpon gnyis kyi sku ltas la byung ba bzhin du
gzha tshon la bsogs pa dngos grub byung nas / lus gdos pa can [l.
6] bor nas / bde ba can gyi zhing der rab du gro /
92
der song nas ni
smon lam di dag kyang / zhes zlos shing gshegs so / de yan cad ni
son gi gleng gzhi o // //
General Abbreviations
D Text in the Derge Bka gyur, quoted according to Ui Hakuju et
al., Chibetto Daizky Smokuroku / A Complete Catalogue of the
Tibetan Canons (Bka-gyur and Bstan-gyur). Sendai: Tohoku
Teikoku Daigaku Hobun Gakubu 1934.
IOL India O ce Library collection (now British Library)
Or. Oriental collections of the British Library
P Text in the Peking Bka gyur, quoted according to Suzuki, Daisetz
T. (ed.), The Tibetan Tripitaka: Peking edition. Reprinted under the
supervision of the Otani University, Kyoto. Tokyo; Kyoto: Tibetan
Tripitaka Research Institute 19551961.
PT Pelliot tibtain (Bibliothque nationale de France)
Bibliography
Dunhuang manuscripts
Many of these manuscripts are now available in transcription on the Old
Tibetan Documents Online website (http://otdo.aa.tufs.ac.jp), and images

89
Received version: bdag ni chi bai dus byed gyur pa na /

90
Received version: sgrib pa thams cad dag ni phyir bsal te /

91
Received version: mngon sum snang ba mtha yas de mthong nas /

92
Received version: bde ba can gyi zhing der rab tu gro/
211
can be found at the International Dunhuang Project website (http://idp.
bl.uk).
IOL Tib J 370/6: The Dharma that Fell from Heaven: an account of the our-
ishing of Buddhism in Tibet.
IOL Tib J 466/3: A prayer paying homage to Khri Srong lde brtsan.
IOL Tib J 689/2: A list of spiritual friends and the Bsam yas and Lha sa
Phrul snang temples.
PT 149: The narrative of the rst teaching of the ryabhadracary pra-
idhnarja.
PT 840/3: On the ourishing and decline of Buddhism in Tibet.
Old Tibetan Annals
Version 1: PT 1288 (lines 153), IOL Tib J 750 (lines 54307)
Version 2: Or.8212/187
Old Tibetan Chronicle
PT 1287, with related manuscripts PT 1286, PT 1144, IOL Tib J 1375 (vol.
70, f. 15)
Tibetan texts
Bka chems ka khol ma = Smon lam Rgya mtsho. Bka chems ka khol ma.
Lanzhou: Kan sui mi rigs dpe skrun khang 1989.
Grags pa gling grags = Dran pa Nam mkha (attributed). G.yung bon gyi sgra
sgrags pa rin po chei gling grags bzhugs so. In: Ben Jiao Dan zhu erh
da zang jing [= Bon po bstan gyur] vol. 74. Lhasa: Bod ljongs mi dmangs
dpe skrun khang 1998, 1110.
Chos byung me tog snying po = Nyang ral Nyi ma od zer. Chos byung me
tog snying po sbrang rtsii bcud. Lhasa: Bod ljongs mi dmangs dpe skrun
khang 1988.
Chos la jug pai sgo = Bsod nams rtse mo. Chos la jug pai sgo zhes bya bai
bstan bcos. In: The Complete Works of the Great Masters of the Sa skya
Sect of the Tibetan Buddhism [Sa skya bka bum] vol. 2: 318-3-1345-3-
6. Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko 1968.
212
Phags pa bzang po spyod pai smon lam gyi rgyal po = ryabha dra cary-
pra idhnarja. Three versions: P 716; P 1038; D 1095.
P 716 contained in the Peking Bka gyur volume ya 268a271b4 [vol. 11,
285-3-2286-5-4].
P 1038 contained in the Peking Bka gyur volume phe 296b199a7 [vol.
45, 236-5-137-5-7].
D 1095 contained in the Derge Bka gyur volume a 262b566a3.
Zangs gling ma = Ngodrup and Sherab Drimay. Slob dpon padma byung
gnas kyi skyes rabs chos byung nor bui phreng ba zhes bya ba bzhugs so
rnam thar zangs gling mao. In: Ngodrup and Sherab Drimay (eds), Rin
chen gter mdzod chen mo : a reproduction of the Stod-lun Mtshur-phu re-
daction of Jam-mgon Kong-spruls great work on the unity of the gter-ma
traditions of Tibet, with supplemental texts from the Dpal-spuns redac-
tion and other manuscripts. Paro: Ugyen Tempai Gyaltsen 1976.
Li shii gur khang = Ka rma lo ts ba Rin chen bkra shis. Dag yig li shii gur
khang. In: Tibeto-Sanskrit Lexicographical Materials, ed. Sonam Angdu.
Leh: Basgo Tongspon Publications 1973.
Secondary Sources
Bacot, Jaques et al. 1940. Documents de Touen-houang relatifs lhistoire du
Tibet. Paris: P. Guethner.
Beckwith, Christopher. 1983. The Revolt of 755 in Tibet. In: Ernst Stein-
kellner and Helmut Tauscher (eds.), Contributions on Tibetan Language,
History and Culture: Proceedings of the Csoma de Kors Symposium
Held at Velm-Vienna, Austria, 1319 September 1981. Vol. I. Vienna:
Universitt Wien, 116.
1987. The Tibetan Empire in Central Asia: A History of the Struggle for
Great Power among Tibetans, Turks, Arabs, and Chinese during the Early
Middle Ages. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Beyer, Stephan. 1973. The Cult of Tr: Magic and Ritual in Tibet. Los An-
geles: University of California Press.
Chandra, Lokesh. 1963. Lcng-skya Khutukhtu Lalitavajras Commentary
on the Samantabhadracarypraidhnarja. Gangtok: Namgyal Insti-
tute of Tibetology.
Dalton, Jacob, Tom Davis, and Sam van Schaik. 2007. Beyond Anonym-
ity: Paleographic Analyses of the Dunhuang Manuscripts. Journal of the
213
International Association of Tibetan Studies 3, 123. (http://www.thdl.
org?id=T3106)
Dalton, Jacob and Sam van Schaik. 2006. Tibetan Tantric Manuscripts from
Dunhuang: A Descriptive Catalogue of the Stein Collection at the British
Library. Leiden: EJ Brill.
Dessein, Bart. 2003. The Glow of the Vow of the Teacher Samantabhadra
Puxian Pusa Xing Yuan Zan (T.297) *Samantabhadrcryaprai dh-
na rja. Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientarum Hungaricae 56/24,
317338.
Dotson, Brandon. 2007. Emperor Mu rug btsan and the Phang thang ma
Catalogue. Journal of the International Association of Tibetan Studies
3, 125.
Dowman, Keith. 1988. The Power-Places of Central Tibet: The Pilgrims
Guide. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Emmerick, Ronald E. 1967. Tibetan Texts Concerning Khotan, London: Ox-
ford University Press.
Fenton, Jesse. 2002. The King of Prayers: The Extraordinary Aspiration of
the Practice of Samantabhadra. Seattle: Foundation for the Preservation
of the Mahayana Tradition Educational Services.
Gellner, David. 1992. Monk, Householder, and Tantric Priest. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Germano, David. 2002. The Seven Descents and the Early History of rNy-
ing ma Transmissions. In: H. Eimer and D. Germano (eds), The Many
Canons of Tibetan Buddhism: PIATS 2000: Proceedings of the Ninth
Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, Leiden
2000. Leiden: Brill, 225267.
Gyatso, Janet. 1998. Apparitions of the Self. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni-
versity Press.
Hazod, Guntram. Forthcoming. King Mer khe: A brief historical note on
the legend of origin of the Byang Stag lung pa protector Rgyal po Mer
khe. In: Charles Ramble (ed.) Proceedings of the Tenth Seminar of the
IATS 2003.
Heller, Amy. 1995. Ninth Century Buddhist Images Carved at Ldan ma brag
to Commemorate Tibeto-Chinese Negotiations. In: Per Kvaerne (ed.),
Tibetan Studies: Proceedings of the 6th Seminar of the International As-
sociation for Tibetan Studies, Fagernes 1992. Vol I. Oslo: The Institute for
Comparative Research in Human Culture, 335349 and Appendix, 1219.
214
2004. The Lhasa gtsug lag khang: Observations on the Ancient Wood
Carvings. Tibet Journal 29/3, 324. (http://www.asianart.com/articles/
heller2/ last accessed at 21.07.2009)
Herrmann-Pfandt, Adelheid. 2008. Die lHan kar ma: Ein frher Katalog
der ins Tibetische bersetzten buddhistischen Texte. Vienna: Verlag der
sterreichischn Akademie der Wissenschaften.
Imaeda. Yoshiro. 2007. The History of the Cycle of Birth and Death: A Tibet-
an Narrative from Dunhuang. In: M. Kapstein and B. Dotson (eds), Con-
tributions to the Cultural History of Early Tibet. Leiden: Brill, 105181.
Jaini, P.S. 1966. The Story of Sudhana and Manohar. The Bulletin of the
School of Oriental and African Studies 3, 533558.
Kapstein, Matthew. 2000. The Tibetan Assimilation of Buddhism: Conver-
sion, Contestation and Memory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Karmay, Samten. 1988. The Great Perfection. Leiden: Brill.
1998. The Arrow and the Spindle: Studies in History, Myths, Rituals and
Beliefs in Tibet. Kathmandu: Mandala Book Point.
Karmay, Samten and Yasuhiko Nagano. 2001. A Catalogue of the New Col-
lection of Bonpo Katen Texts. Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology.
van der Kuijp, Leonard. 1996. Tibetan Historiography. In: Jos Cabezn
and Roger Jackson (eds), Tibetan Literature: Studies in Genre. Ithaca:
Snow Lion, 3956.
Lalou, Marcelle. 1939. Inventaire des manuscrits tibtains de Touen-houang
conservs la Bibliothque nationale (Fonds Pelliot-tibtain, nos 1849).
Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve.
1953 Contribution la bibliographie du Kanjur et du Tanjur. Les textes
bouddhiques au temps du roi Khri-sro-lde-bcan. Journal Asiatique
1953: 313354.
Martin, Dan. 1997. Tibetan Histories: A Bibliography of Tibetan-language
Historical Works. London: Serindia publications.
Osto, Douglas Edward. 2004. The Gaavyha-stra: a Study of Wealth,
Gender and Power in an Indian Buddhist Narrative. Ph.D Thesis for the
School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.
Pasang Wangdu and Hildegard Diemberger. 2000. dBa bzhed: The Royal
Narrative Concerning the Bringing of the Buddhas Doctrine to Tibet.
Wien: Verlag der sterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.
215
Penny, Benjamin (ed). 2002. Religion and Biography in China and Tibet.
Richmond, Surrey: Curzon.
Richardson, Hugh Edward. 1985. A Corpus of Early Tibetan Inscriptions.
London: Royal Asiatic Society.
1998. High Peaks, Pure Earth: Collected Writings on Tibetan History and
Culture. Edited with an Introduction by Michael Aris. London: Serindia.
Robinson, James B. 1996. The Lives of Indian Buddhist Saints: Biography,
Hagiography and Myth. In: Jos Ignacio Cabezn and Roger R. Jackson
(eds), Tibetan Literature: Studies in Genre. Ithaca: New York: Snow Lion,
5769.
Roerich, George N. 1988. The Blue Annals. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
van Schaik, Sam. Forthcoming. Towards a Tibetan Paleography: A Prelimi-
nary Typology of Writing Styles in Early Tibet. In: Michael Friedrich,
Jrg Quenzer, Matthew Driscoll and Jan-Ulrich Sobisch (eds), Manu-
script Cultures in Asia and Africa, Vol.I. Berlin: de Gruyter.
van Schaik, Sam and Jacob Dalton. 2004. Where Chan and Tantra Meet:
Buddhist Syncretism in Dunhuang. In: Susan Whiteld (ed.), The Silk
Road: Trade, Travel, War and Faith. London: British Library Press, 6171.
van Schaik, Sam and Kazushi Iwao. 2008. Fragments of the Testament of Ba
in the Dunhuang Collections. Journal of the American Oriental Society
128/1, 477487.
Scherrer-Schaub, Cristina A. 2000. Prires pour un apostat: fragments
dhistoire Tibtaine. Cahiers dExtrme-Asie 11, 217246.
2002. Enacting Words: A Diplomatic Analysis of the Imperial Decrees
(bkas bcad) and Their Application in the sGra sbyor bam po gnyis pa
Tradition. Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies
25/12, 263340.
Scherrer-Schaub, Cristina A. and G. Bonani. 2002. Establishing a Typology
of the Old Tibetan Manuscripts: A Multidisciplinary Approach. In: Su-
san Whiteld (ed.), Dunhuang Manuscript Forgeries. London: The Brit-
ish Library, 184215.
Schopen, Gregory. 1989. A Verse from the Bhadracarpraidhna in a 10
th

century Inscription found at Nland. Journal of the International As-
sociation of Buddhist Studies 12/1, 14957.
Srensen, Per K. 1994. Tibetan Buddhist Historiography: The Mirror Illu-
minating the Royal Genealogies. An Annotated Translation of the XIVth
216
Century Tibetan Chronicle: rGyal-rabs gsal-bai me-long. Wiesbaden:
Harrossowitz Verlag.
Srenson, Per, Guntram Hazod and Tsering Gyalpo. 2000. Civilization at
the Foot of Mount Sham-po. The Royal House of lHa Bug-pa-can and
the History of g.Ya-bzang. Historical Texts from the Monastery of g.Ya-
Bzang in Yar-Stod (Central Tibet). Vienna: Verlag der sterreichischen
Akademie der Wissenschaften.
2005. Thundering Falcon: An Inquiry into the History and Cult of Khra-
brug, Tibets First Buddhist Temple. Vienna: Verlag der sterreichischen
Akademie der Wissenschaften.
2007. Rulers of the Celestial Plain: Ecclesiastic and Secular Hegemony in
Medieval Tibet. A Study of Tshal Gung-Thang. 2 vols. Vienna: Verlag der
sterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.
Stearns, Cyrus. 2001. Luminous Lives: The Story of the Early Masters of the
Lam bras Tradition in Tibet. Boston: Wisdom.
Stein, R. A. 1961. Les tribus anciennes des marches Sino-Tibtaines. Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France.
1972. Tibetan Civilization. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Steinkellner, Ernst. 1995. Sudhanas Miraculous Journey in the Temple of Ta
pho: The Inscriptional Text of the Gaavyhastra Edited with Intro-
ductory Remarks. Roma: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Ori-
ente.
Takeuchi, Tsuguhito. 1990. A Group of Old Tibetan Letters Written Under
Kuei-I-Chn: A Preliminary Study for the Classication of Old Tibetan
Letters. Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 44/12,
175190.
2004. Sociolinguistic Implications of the Use of Tibetan in East Turkestan
from the End of Tibetan Domination through the Tangut Period (9
th
12
th

c.). In: Desmond Durkin-Meisterernst et al. (eds), Turfan Revisted The
First Century of Research into the Arts and Cultures of the Silk Road.
Berlin: Dietrich Reimer Verlag, 341348.
Tatz, Mark. M. 1977. The Vow of Benevolent Conduct (introduction, trans-
lation and commentary). In: Lokesh Chandra and Perala Ratnam (eds),
Studies in Indo-Asian Art and Culture. Vol. 5. New Delhi: atapiaka
Series no. 238, 153176.
Thomas, F.W. 1935. Tibetan Literary Texts and Documents from Chinese
Turkestan, Part I: Literary Texts. London: Royal Asiatic Society.
217
Uebach, Helga. 1990. On Dharma-Colleges and their Teachers in the Ninth-
Century Tibetan Empire. In: P. Da na (ed.), Indo-sino-Tibetica: Studi
in Onore di Lucian Petech. Rome: Bardi Editore. 393418.
Uray, Gza. 1968. A Chronological Problem in the Old Tibetan Chronicle.
Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarium Hungaricae 11, 268269.
1979. The Old Tibetan Sources for the History of Central Asia up to
751 A.D.: a Survey. In: J. Harmatta (ed.), Prolegomena to the Sources
on the History of Pre-Islamic Central Asia. Budapest: Akadmiai Kiad,
275306.
Yamaguchi, Zuih. 1996. The Fiction of King Dar-mas Persecution of Bud-
dhism. In: Jean-Pierre Drge (ed.), Du Dunhuang au Japon: tudes chi-
noises et bouddhiques oertes Michel Soymi. Geneva: Droz, 231258.
THE ORIGIN OF THE TERM 'MAHAYANA' (THE GREAT
VEHICLE) AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE AGAMAS*
JOSEPH WALSER
Though a considerable amount of work has been done on early
Mahayana, one of the questions that has received relatively less at-
tention in Western language sources is why Mahayanists chose the
word mahiiyiina' to begin with. While there is a growing consensus
that the term "Mahayana" did not refer to a single set of doctrines,
practices or propositions, the fact remains that at a certain point
in history a set of authors gravitated toward the term "Mahayana"
(trailing a penumbra of affiliated terms such as bodhi-
sattvayiina, tathiigatayiina, agrayiina, ekayiina, etc.) as a kind of
brand name for their project. Presumably there was a reason for the
choice - or at least some reason why this moniker stuck and oth-
ers did not. What did the term mean to those who first used it? We
have become so accustomed to hearing about the "Great Vehicle,"
that few have stopped to consider that there may be something odd
about identifying a religion with what is essentially a carriage. In
this paper I argue that early Mahayanists may well have adopted the
term from a non-technical usage found in passages from the JiiY}us-
sOy}isiitra of the Sa1?1yuktiigama and the MahiiparinirviiY}asiitra of
the Dfrghiigama. In these contexts, we find the term enmeshed in a
* An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the lABS Conference
in Atlanta, GA. in June of 2008. I would like to thank the numerous schol-
ars who gave me extensive feedback on various drafts, especially Jim Egge,
Richard Gombrich, Ronald Davidson, Daniel Boucher, Sing-chen Lydia
Chiang, Jan Nattier and Birgit Kellner.
1 In the following I will capitalize Mahayana when referring to the reli-
gious movement. I will use the lower case italic mahayana when I am simply
referring to the word in a non-technical sense.
Volume 30 Number 1-2 2007 (2009) pp. 219-250
220
JOSEPH WALSER
complex metaphorical nexus spanning Buddhist and, non-Buddhist
literature. This nexus blurs together the concept of the
"path leading to the gods" with the Vedic metaphor of the sacrifice
as chariot and then infuses the whole with some pan-Indic ideas
of a great vimiina chariot as a post-mortem reward for meritorious
behavior. While these three ideas - the devayiina patha, the yajiiii
as ratha and the vimiina - may appear to have no obvious connec-
tion, I will argue that there was a precedent within non-M.ahayana
Buddhist literature connecting these ideas and that all three are
specifically referenced in early Prajiiiipiiramitii literature.
The term mahilyilna in Mahayana literature
The place to begin our discussion of the term mahiiyiina should be
with the Mahayanasfltras themselves. While the term may not have
been as important at the beginning of the movement as it would
become later, and not all texts that we would consider Mahayanist
even use the term,2 the fact remains that the term is there, scat-
tered among our earliest translations of Mahayana texts, its mean-
ing largely taken for granted. Indeed, somewhat surprisingly, there
are no Mahayana texts that introduce the term as if its audience
had never heard it before. In every case, our texts assume that the
audience is already familiar with the term and its positive connota-
tions. Since the term would take on great significance later on, it
is worthwhile inquiring into its origins and early connotations to
ask what early audiences heard in the word mahiiyiina. For this we
need to look at a relatively early Mahayana text that discusses the
term itself at some length.
I would like to begin by looking at what has been argued
3
to be
the earliest extended discussion of the term mahiiyiina, and if not
2 The term is, for example, notably missing from every Indic manuscript
of the Vajracchediktisatra.
3 See Edward Conze, The Prajfitiptiramitti Literature, 2
nd
edition, (Tokyo:
The Reiyukai 1978), 9; and "The Development of Prajfitiptiramitti Thought."
THE ORIGIN OF THE TERM 'MAHAYANA'
221
the earliest at least the earliest discussion in Prajfiiipiiramitii litera-
ture - namely the excursus on the subject found in the first chapter
of the Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines. Though this
may not be the earliest Mahayana text,4 it is nevertheless one of
the earliest to provide us with an etymology (if not an etiology) of
the term itself. If we look at the earliest Chinese translation of the
first chapter, we find the Venerable Piirl!a asking, "What is the rea-
son for saying that bodhisattvas are mahii-sarrmiiha-sa1?1naddha
(armed with the great armor) and are mahiiyiina-sa1?1prasthita (set
out for the Mahayana)?"5 After a discussion of what it means to don
the great armor, Subhiiti asks the following:
SubhUti said to the Buddha, "For what reason does one set out in the
Mahayana? What is the Mahayana? Where should one abide in the
yana? From where should one depart in the yana? Who will perfect
this yana?
The Buddha said to Subhuti, "[To say] 'Mahayana, Mahayana' is not
correct. It cannot be delimited."
. [428a] Subhuti asked the Buddha, "I wish to know where the yana
comes from. From the triple world ... it goes forth. It spontaneously
abides in omniscience, and nothing comes forth from it. Nothing will
come forth in the future. Why, Deva of Devas?
The Buddha said, "If there are two dharmas of that which actually
arises and that which will arise in the future, then both cannot be ap-
prehended. If dharmas are not apprehended then from what dharmas
do they come forth?"
In Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies (Oxford: Bruno Cassirer 1968), 124.
4 Indeed, Tilmann Vetter has argued that the A ~ r a was not originally af-
filiated with the Mahayana at all. See esp. his "Once Again on the Origin of
Mahayana Buddhism," Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Siidasiens 45 (2001)
59-90.
5 The translation here and in the following section is from Egil Fronsdal,
The Dawn of the Bodhisattva Path: Studies in a Religious Ideal of Ancient
Indian Buddhists with a particular Emphasis on the Earliest Extant Perfec-
tion of Wisdom Sutra (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University 1998),44.
222
JOSEPH WALSER
Subhuti said to the Buddha, "The Mahayana is unsurpassed and with-
out equal among the heavenly beings and among the beings below
heaven. This yana is equal to the sky. As the sky covers countless peo-
ple, so the Mahayana covers countless beings. This is why it is called
the Mahayana. And one cannot see when the Mahayana comes, or
when it goes, or see its dwelling place. Nor can its center or edges be
seen. Nor can it be seen or heard in this [discourse]. It cannot be seen
anywhere and it cannot be seen in the triple world. Deva of Devas, this
is why it has the name Mahayana."
The Buddha said, "Well done, Subhuti! That is why it is called the
Mahayana."6
Parallel to this passage we find the following two verses from the
Ratnagu1J.asaYJ1cayagatha:
Great as a giver, as a thinker, as a power, He mounts upon a vessel
(yana) of the Supreme Jinas. Armed with the great armour he'll sub-
due Mara the artful. These are the reasons why 'Great Beings' are so
called ...
What then again is said to be 'the vehicle of awakening' [bodhiyana]?
Having mounted it one guides to NirvaIfa all beings. This vehicle
[yana] is a Great Chariot [mahii-vimana] like space. Those who attain
safety, delight and ease are the most excellent of beings?
6 Ibid., 46-7. I have chosen to use T. 224 here, but the same points can be
made with any of the extant versions of the A ~ t a . The last paragraph quoted
here became the standard formula for Mahayana in Prajiiaparamita litera-
ture. It is quoted with some minor variations (and usually introduced with the
phrase, "mahayanal'{t mahayanarrt itrdarrt bhagavann ucyate," in all versions
of the 8000 P.P., as well as all versions of the 25,000 P.P., the 18,000 P.P. and
the 100,000 P.P.
7 Edward Conze, The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines &
its Verse Summary (Dehli: Sri Satguru Publications 1994), 11; Sanskrit: E.
Obermiller, Prajiia Paramita-Ratna-Gul!-a-Sarrtcaya-Gatha (Sri Satguru
Publications, reprint 1992), 13-14.
223
Yiina as path/yiina as vehicle
Since my interest in the bulk of this paper lies in the origins and
significance of the trope of the spiritual vehicle in Indic thought,
I need to digress briefly to address arguments stating that it never
was a vehicle in the first place. From the context of the and the
Ratnagur:wsaf!lciiyagathii, it makes sense to translate mahii-yiina
as the "Great (mahii) Vehicle (yiina)." However, Tilmann Vetter,S
has argued for interpreting the second member of the compound,
yiina as a "path" or an "approach" rather than a vehicle - an al-
ternative that can be found in every Sanskrit dictionary.9 In this
case, yiina would be a synonym for miirga and mahiiyiina would
mean something like "the great path." To support his claim that
the was not originally affiliated with the Mahayana, he points
to the fact that renders the term as moheyan
and continues to represent the word yiina by the phonemic :j>f yan
rather than translating it. The one time does appear to
translate the term (at the beginning of T. 418) he translates it as 7\.
m "great way" instead of "great vehicle."l0 Vetter also points to
the same rendering in other early Chinese translations such as the
anonymous Han dynasty translator of the Kiisyapaparivarta,u All
of this leads Vetter to the conclusion that and other ear-
8 See Vetter, esp. pp. 62-70.
9 See, for example, Monier Williams who cites a few examples of this
usage from the Monier-Williams, A Sanskrit-English Dictionary,
s.v.
10 For what its worth, the translation ::k:ili appears quite a number of times
in the verse portion ofT. 418, which was probably completed by
school in 208 CE. [See Paul Harrison, The Pratyutpanna Samildhi Sutra
Translated by (Berkeley: The Numata Center for Buddhist Trans-
lation and Research, 1998), 8 and also Jan Nattier, A Guide to the Earliest
Chinese Buddhist Translations: Texts from the Eastern Han *5l and Three
Kingdoms =l@ Periods (Tokyo: Soka University, The International Research
Institute for Advanced Buddhology 2008),81-83].
11 Vetter, 62-63.
224
JOSEPH WALSER
ly Chinese translators understood mahayana to be a "great way"
and not a "great vehicle." ,
Vetter may be correct about understanding of the
term in T. 418, but it is not clear to me that we can generalize from
this one instance. Transliterating the term in his translation of the
A.na did not allow to avoid interpreting it. In the un-
derlined passage of the translation above, made a
clear choice to interpret the mahayana as a vehicle. This is because
the Sanskrit itself forces the vehicle imagery. The Sanskrit reads
as follows:
anena bhagavan paryayelJa mahayanam idal!l bodhisattvanal!l maha-
sattvanam 1 naivasyagamo drsyate, naivasya nirgamo drsyate, napy
asya sthanal!l sal!lvidyate 112
In such a manneris the mahayana of the bodhisattvas, the mahasattvas.
Its coming isn't seen, nor is its going seen, nor is its abiding perceived.
To understand the yana here as a path is untenable, since vehicles
come and go while paths do not. The vehicle nature of the yana
becomes even clearer in Chinese:
... 13
Here, the repetition of the character adds a temporal dimension
to the sentence, ("it is not seen when it comes, it is not seen when
it departs ... ") that would simply not make sense if he understood
the mahayana to be a path. Thus, we can infer that at least in this
translation, understood mahayana as a vehicle and not
as a path.
Vetter is, of course correct that there were translators in
school who rendered mahayana as ::k:ti[t but if so,
they were followed not long after by Kang Senghui and ZhI Qian in
12 P.L. Vaidya, Prajiiiipiiramita (Darbhanga: Mithila Insti-
tute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning, 1960), 12,
lines 18-19.
13 T. 224, p. 428a9-1O. All references to the TaishO Tripitaka throughout
this paper are from the CBETA version.
225
the first half of the third century who habitually render it with **,
"great chariot." If anything, I prefer to interpret con-
sistent transliteration as Eric Frondsal does, as simply an indication
that understood his audience to be already familiar not
only with the foreign term mahayana as a compound
l4
but also
with the foreign term yana as a well established technical term.
In the end, it is difficult to know what to make out of the Chi-
nese translators' choices. On the one hand, it should be remem-
bered that the term Great Dao (*m) was certainly a religiously
weighted term in Chinese culture at the time these translators were
working and may have been chosen for reasons other than techni-
cal precision. Finally, some translators are inconsistent in how they
translate yana. Kumarajlva's Lotus siitra translation, for example,
may render Buddha-yana as while still rendering mahayana
itself either as *:ijf16 (Great Cart) or as ** (Great Chariot). In-
deed, he makes a clear distinction between yana and path in his
translation of the Dazhfdulun (T. 1509) when he translates an un-
named source as saying, "The Buddha's omniscience serves as a
great vehicle (travelling) the Noble Eightfold Path that leads into
nirvat;la."17
14 See Fronsdal, 48.
IS Seishi Karashima, The textual study of the Chinese versions of the
Saddharmapw:u!arzkasutra in the light of the Sanskrit and Tibetan versions
(Tokyo: Sankibo Press 1992),31.
16 Ibid, 69.
17 T. 1509, p.72aI4: Another theory
has been proposed by Karashima Seishi, who argues that we frequently find
the word jiiana in Central Asian manuscripts of the Lotus sutra ih places
where much later Nepalese Sanskrit manuscripts have the word yana. He
argues that the word mahayana may be an incorrect back-formation result-
ing from an attempt to Sanskritize a Prakrit form of "maha-jiiana" (Great
Knowledge). [See Karashima, Seishi, "Hokekyo ni okeru jo (yana) to chie
(jiiana) - daijo bukkyo ni okeru yana no gainen no kigen ni tsuite." In: Taga
Ryugen (ed.), Hokekyo no juyo to tenkai (Kyoto: 1993): 137-97.] Karashima's
argument delves into considerable detail regarding the manuscripts of the
226
JOSEPH WALSER
Nevertheless, if we look at non-technical uses of the word yana
in Pali and in the Sanskrit Epics, the meaning of '''vehicle'' is by
far the most common. Thus, while the term yana may admit some
ambiguity such that it may have even been possible for some native
speakers to be confused as to its intended connotation depending
on context, there are specific contexts in Mahayana literature that
force us to understand the yana as a vehicle not as a path. The
mahayana of the bodhisattva in the A ~ t a is that which will depart
(niryasyati) from the triple world - niryasyati here functioning as
an etymological play on words with yana.
18
Though it is of an un-
certain date, this vehicular nature of the Mahayana is even further
Lotus siUra and this is not the place for a full critique of his argument. As
much as his hypothesis may apply to the Lotus slUra, however, I have three
main concerns as to whether his hypothesis applies to Mahayanasrrtras more
broadly:
1) Since, presumably, the earliest Mahayanists aspired to become Buddhas,
we would expect to find the Buddha lauded as one with Great Knowledge
in some authoritative non-Mahayana text. Mahayanists could then tap into
the legitimacy of the already established text through the adoption of the
term. I have not been able to find the term mahiijiiiina applied to the Bud-
dha in early biographies, though it does appear in later sources.
2) Barring (1), we should at least expect to find the Buddha's enlightenment
experience to be described as a special kind of jiiiina, preferably a mahii-
jiiiina, in some other authoritative non-Mahayana text (preferably in an
abhidharma treatise if not in one of the biographies of the Buddha). Again,
this appears to be the case only in much later texts.
3) Finally, in the absence of (1) and (2), at the very least we should expect to
find some Mahayana text to make a big deal aboutjiiiina, preferably about
mahiijiiiina. If the term had been so foundational to the early Mahayana
movement, we should expect to find residual evidence of this fact in exist-
ing Mahayana texts. Though the term mahiijiiiina does appear in some
early Mahayana texts its significance is certainly eclipsed by other terms
like prajiiiipiiramitii.
18 Vaidya, A ~ t a . 12, line Sff.
227
amplified in the RatnagulJasayt2caya Giitha, which associates the
yiina with the term vimiina.
19
Mahayana as vehicle
What kind of vehicle is it? Like many Mahayana texts, the
describes the bodhisattva mahiisattva as one who is armed in the
great armor and set out on the great vehicle. The juxtaposition of
these two ideas, whether intentional or not, gives the overall impres-
sion of going into battle. The martial imagery also becomes ampli-
fied in the RatnagulJasayt2cayagiithii, which states that the one so
mounted and armed will subdue Mara, and that the Mahii-yiina is a
mahii-vimiina. It adds that this war chariot belongs to the "Supreme
jinas," meaning of course the Buddhas, but amid the extended war
metaphor, we might be forgiven for translating Jina as "conqueror"
here. In this regard, it is perhaps not insignificant that, outside of
the Buddhist context, the word mahiisattva is often used to refer to
the heroes in the Mahiibhiirata, who do battle mounted on yiinas of
their own. On the other hand, when the RatnagulJasayt2cayagiithii
presents the Great Vehicle as a "great vimiina," it is alluding to the
celestial mansions that took the shape of vehicles driven by gods
19 The term vimiina can, of course, mean quite a few things. It can be an
estate or a palace, but the more common meaning is as a kind of flying vehicle
(such as Raval).a's But to say, as the RatnagulJasal'{tcayagiithii
does, that the mahiiyiina is a mahiivimiina constrains the semantic possibili-
ties of both words to mean "vehicle."
228
JOSEPH WALSER
and siddhas in Buddhist,20 Jain
21
and BrahmanicaP
2
literature. This
would explain its size and why in both texts the yaria is a great one
that is vast like space.
What are the origins of vehicles as a spiritual metaphor in the
South Asian context? Such a metaphoric use of the word yana is
rare in the Vedas,23 and non-existent in the and the Ep-
ics. Similarly, there are no such references in Abhidharma texts
prior to the (which for its part seems to take the idea
of "the three vehicles" for granted).24 Where did the 'vehicle' rheto-
20 The Pali canon devotes an entire work to vimanas, namely the Vimana-
vatthu [see Peter Masefield, Vim ana Stories (London: Wisdom Publications
1989)]. Though a similar collection does not appear to have been employed
by other sects, there are enough references to vimanas in avadana literature
to suggest that the idea of vimanas was probably fairly widespread at the
beginning of the Common Era.
21 Umasvati's Tattvarthasutra, 4.16 (SS 4.17) mentions that the fourth class
of gods (the vaimanika gods) ride vimanas, though they are not the only ones
to do so. Umasvati, Tattvartha Satra: That Which Is, Nathmal Tatia, trans.
(San Francisco: Harper Collins 1994), 104.
22 See MBh 13.110 (= section 107 in Ganguli's translation).
23 I have only been able to locate two instances in the Vedas where the
yana in devayana could be read as "vehicle." At f!.gveda 10.51.2, Agni's fire
sticks are said to be devayanfin which Mitra and Varul).a reside. Again, at
f!.gveda 10.181.3 the Yajus is said to be the first devayana to have fallen. In
both cases, reading yana as "path" is also possible, but reading it in the sense
of "leading to" is a bit more awkward. There may be other examples, but in
the vast majority of cases (and always in the Spaniards) devayana modifies
some other word, usually patha, pantha or adhvan.
24 See, e.g., T. 1547, p. 445cllff. and T. 1545, 735b-c. The latter is trans-
lated by Fa Qing in her dissertation: The Development of Prajiia in Buddhism
from Early Buddhism to the Prajiiaparamita System: With Special Reference
to the Sarvastivada Tradition (Ph.D. diss., University of Calgary, 2001),
87-88. Coincidently, the idea that arhants, pratyekabuddhas and buddhas
constitute three separate spiritual attainments shows up in the archaeological
record in a Gandharan inscription dating from 55 CE; see Sten Konow, "A
new Charsadda inscription." In: D. R. Bhandarkar Volume, ed. Bimala Churn
THE ORIGIN OF THE TERM 'MAHAyANA'
229
ric that culminates in the term mahayana come from and what was
its significance for those who adopted it?
The most likely hypothesis, and the one that I wish to expand
on here, was first suggested by Surendranath Dasgupta
25
in 1932
and expanded upon by Richard Gombrich
26
sixty years later. The
hypothesis is that the term mahayana is somehow derived from the
devayana patha and pitryana patha of the Brhadarmyaka- and
The idea of the two paths is in fact much older
- appearing already in the Atharvaveda
27
- but the point is still a
valid one. The gist of Gombrich's argument is that there is one text
in the Pali Canon, the lalJ-ussolJ-isutta of the Samyutta Nikaya, that
"puns" on the idea of 'yana' (which he argues should
otherwise be taken as "way" rather than "vehicle") to read it as a
chariot, and that passages such as the above passage from the
merely extend the punning that was already in the canon. Let me
state from the outset that I think that both Gombrich and Dasgupta
are correct, but that they are correct in ways that perhaps neither
anticipated.
I would like to begin with the passages to which
Dasgupta and Gombrich refer because the Buddhist appropriation
Law (Calcutta: Indian Research Institute 1940), 305-10. This is certainly
close to the time period of the Note however, that the inscrip-
tion itself does not refer to the three attainments as "vehicles."
25 Surendranath Dasgupta, History of Indian Philosophy, vol. I (Delhi: Mo-
tilal Banarsidass 1975), 125, note 2: "The word Yiina is generally translated
as vehicle, but a consideration of numerous contexts in which the word occurs
seems to suggest that it means career or course or way, rather than vehicle ....
The word Yiina is as old as the where we read of Devayiina and
Pitryiina. There is no reason why this word should be taken in a different
sense."
26 Richard Gombrich, "A momentous effect of translation: The 'vehicles'
of Buddhism." In Apodosis: essays presented to Dr W. W. Cruickshank to
mark his eightieth birthday (London: St. Paul's School 1992): 34-46.
27 See Atharvaveda 6.117.3 and 12.2.10.
230
JOSEPH WALSER
of the concept of the devayiina patha is not always as direct as it
might seem. In the we find the statement:
"For we have heard even the saying of the seer: I have heard of two
paths for men, the one that leads to fathers and the one that leads
to the gods. By these two all that lives moves on, whatever there is
between father (heaven) and mother (earth)."28 Gombrich states that
this may be one of the earliest articulations in India of a post-mor-
tem soteriology.29 Whether it is the earliest or not, it is cer,tainly an
articulation that held great authority in subsequent Indian thought.
Authority, however, does not mean consensus. It appears that there
were differing interpretations of these paths among
authors. The Kauifztakz for instance depicts the
devayiina pantha as leading up through successively higher tiers of
gods until the ultimate world of Brahma (brahmaloka) is achieved
in which one may converse with. a thoroughly anthropomorphic
Brahma.
30
On the other hand, the depicts
the devayiina as the path leading ultimately to the brahmaloka
where its traveler, " ... becomes (transparent) like water, one, the
seer without duality. This is the world of Brahma."31
Radhakrishnan translates yiina in this passage in the sense of
"leading to" instead of as the object of the verb itself. Indeed, in the
Vedic context starting from the onward devayiina is usu-
ally used as a bahuvrzhi compound modifying something else, usu-
ally patha, pantha or adhvan. In these contexts, yiina is read in the
sense of "leading to the gods." Reading it as a genitive tatpuruifa
in the sense of path of the gods is also possible (something like
"the path that is the way to the gods") but a "path that is a vehicle
28 Brh. 6.2.2; S. Radhakrishnan, The Principal (Delhi: Indus
Publications 1994), 310. See also Chilndogya 5.3.2 and (later) MU1}4 3.1.6.
29 Gombrich,36.
30 1.5-7. Radhakrishnan, 758-60.
31 Radhakrishnan, 266: "Sa lila eko bhavati, brahma-
lokal:z."
231
of the gods" is awkward (how can a path be a vehicle?), and I can
find no early text that continues the discussion as if the devayana
is a vehicle.
It is well known that Buddhists so thoroughly appropriated the
idea of the brahmaloka, that few Buddhist texts make mention of it
in its non-Buddhist context. Unlike the brahmaloka, appropriation
of the devayana by which one arrives at the brahmaloka is much
less pronounced and always retains something of its non-Buddhist
flavor. Nevertheless, the few examples in which the term appears
in the Pali Canon seem to represent a progressive distancing of
Buddhist interests away from this Vedic norm. Still, the lingering
authority of this idea even for Buddhists is attested by the fact that
no early Buddhist text simply rejects the idea outright.
Perhaps the earliest Buddhist reference to the devayana is found
in the Sutta Nipata. In a discourse in which the Buddha argues
with a Brahmin that caste is no obstacle to spiritual progress, the
Buddha reminds the Brahmin of the untouchable named Matanga
who was revered by Brahmins and alike. According to
the sutta, Matanga:
... set out on the unpolluted great way which leads to the devas, (and)
having discarded passion and sensual pleasures he reached the world
of Brahma. Birth did not keep him from being born in the world of
Brahma.
32
This sutta references an explicitly Vedic idea (the devayana maha-
patha) to argue that the one who follows Buddhist morality is the
real Brahmin. It denigrates neither the Vedic Hindu goal of the
devayana patha nor the brahmaloka but simply says that it is the
Buddhist practitioner who really achieves that goal.
32 K.R. Norman, 16; SN verse 139 (= PTS p. 24): devayiinaT[! abhiruyha,
virajaT[! so mahiipathaT[!; kiimariigaT[! viriijetvii, brahmalokilpago ahu; na
naT[! jiiti niviiresi, brahmalokilpapattiyii. Throughout the article, I have used
the CSCD CD-ROM version of the Pali Canon, except where noted.
232
JOSEPH WALSER
When the term appears again in the Kevaddhasutta of the Dzgha
Nikiiya the stance is more critical. There, the Buddha tells of a
monk who "attained to such a state of mental concentration that
the way to the deva-realms (devayaniyo maggo) appeared before
him."33 He then proceeds to pose a question to the gods of succes-
sively higher heavens, but receives no answer. Then in a separate
concentration, the path leading to Brahma (brahmayiiniyo maggo)
appears to him. That this text divides the path into two ~ u g g e s t s a
shared worldview with early abhidharma which relegates all heav-
ens below that of Brahma's retinue to the devaloka, which is ac-
cessible via the "8 skillful states of mind motivated by non-attach-
ment, friendliness and wisdom (kusala-citta)."34 By contrast, the
heavens from Brahma's retinue upward are only accessible via the
dhyiinas. The two concentrations employed by the monk are surely
to be understood as proper Buddhist fare, and yet the fact that none
of the gods encountered along either path can answer the monk's
question displays a kind of parodic critique of the system's Vedic
parentage.
In neither of these references to the devayiina can the yiina be
reasonably read as "vehicle." This way of reading the compound
only occurs late in the Pali Canon. The only canonical reference
to the devayiina that can be interpreted as a "vehicle of the gods"
can be found in a passage from the Apadiina. There an untouch-
able gives a couch (mafica) to the Buddha AnomadassI. As a re-
sult of that gift, the Buddha predicts that whether he be reborn
among the gods or among men, he will attain (patilabhissati) a
yiina in his future birth that will be the "counterpart (patibhiiga)
33 Walshe, The Long Discourses, 177. DN I 215: Atha kho so, kevatta, bhik-
khu tathiinrpaT[l samiidhiT[l samiipajji, yathiisamiihite citte devayiiniyo mag-
go piiturahosi. The passage is virtually identical to that of the Dfrghiigama
at T. 1, p. 102a26ff.
34 See Rupert Gethin, "Cosmology and Meditation: From the Aggafifia-
Sutta to the Mahayana," History of Religions 36.3 (1997, 183-213): 194.
THE ORIGIN OF THE 1ERM 'MAHAYANA'
233
of the devayiina."35 This passage seems to be blurring the idea of
the devayiina as that which leads to a post mortem reward with the
pan-Indian idea of a magnificent vimiina, or "estate," as the fruit of
meritorious activity.
We find a similar idea in the Milindapaiiha, albeit in one of
the sections generally considered to be late. Here again context
requires us to read devayiina as "vehicle of the gods" and, as in the
Apadiina, the vehicle is explicitly said to be result of meritorious
giving.
Suppose, 0 king, there were some virtuous Samana or Brahman, of
high character, and he were paralysed, or a cripple, or suffering from
some disease or other, and some man desirous of merit were to have
him put into a carriage, and taken to the place he wished to go to.
Would happiness accrue to that man by reason thereof, would that be
an act leading to rebirth in states of bliss?
Yes, Sir. What can be said (to the contrary)? That man would thereby
acquire a trained elephant, or a riding horse, or a bullock-carriage, on
land a land-vehicle and on water a water-vehicle, in heaven a vehicle
of the gods (devesu devayiinaf(l) and en earth one that men could use,
- from birth to birth there would accrue to him that which in each
would be appropriate and fit, - and joys appropriate would come to
him, and he would pass from state to state of bliss, and by the efficacy
of that act mounting on the vehicle of iddhi he would arrive at the
longed-for goal, the city of NirvaI).a itself.
36
It is only in this passage that there appears to be no reference to
Brahmanical practice, though even here it is the "iddhiyiina" that
takes him to nirvaI).a and not the devayiina. Regardless, we have
in this text and in the Apadiina, the idea of a spiritual vehicle (a
devayiina or an iddhiyiina) as a postmortem reward for merito-
rious behavior - just like a vimiina. That yiina as practice might
35 Apadlina, vol. 2. p. 147: devaloke manusse vli, nibbattissati puiiiiavli;
devaylina-patibhligal'(!, ylinal'(! patilabhissati.
36 The Questions of King Milinda, T.W. Rhys-Davids, trans, (Oxford: Clar-
endon Press 1890),336-7.
234
JOSEPH WALSER .
blend with the idea of yiina as vimiina is not as far fetched as it
might seem. Though not all vimiinas are vehicles; some certain-
ly are. More important for our purposes, size figures into some
of these reward vimiinas - some of which are explicitly said to
be either mahii-rathas or mahad-yiinas. One such vimiina in the
Vimiinavatthu is said to be a mahiiriitha measuring forty leagues
on each side and one in the Mahiibhiirata is referred to once as a
"mahad yiina."37
Further, as Jim Egge points out, most Buddhist texts discuss
the vimiina as a reward for meritorious giving, although this is not
always the case. The fact that some in the Vimiinavatthu receive
their vimiina in the brahmaloka suggests that one could merit a
vimiina from the practice of meditation as well, since rebirth in the
brahmaloka can only occur through meditation.
38
For its part, the
Mahiibhiirata passage referred to above offers different levels of
austerities as an explicit alternative to expensive sacrifices. Each
successive level of austerity results in a grander vimiina -thus not
necessarily being the results of meritorious giving. Certainly the
activities that lead to the awarding of a vimiina - diina and prajiiii -
37 MBh: 13, 110, 44; Vimanavatthu, 92. Most scholars consider MBh
chapters 12 & 13 to be later additions to the Mahabharata. While I have no
intention of getting into that debate, the passage in question does not display
allY obvious influence from Mahayana texts and so should be considered at
least to be an independent, even if later, tradition.
The connection of the idea of a mahayana with the vimana tradition may
help to explain a curious fact pointed out by Vetter (p. 66): "I have further
not found the idea of joint travelling in a great vehicle in connection with
the word mahayana even in the basic texts of the Pure Land tradition, where
it might be expected." It is noteworthy in this regard that the size of the
vimanas in this literature is simply to reward past behavior. There is no fur-
ther discussion of those so rewarded transporting anybody.
38 See James Egge, Religious Giving and the Invention of Karma in Thera-
vada Buddhism (Richmond, u.K.: Curzon Press, 2002), 86-7. For the argu-
ment that the brahmaloka is attainable only through meditation, see Visud-
dhimagga, 415.
235
are consonant with those stressed in MahayanasfLtras teaching the
bodhisattva path.39 The idea that one's spiritual accomplishments
will result in the magnificence and/or the size of one's spiritual ve-
hicle may well be behind the RatnagulJasaf!lcayagatha's reference
to the Mahayana as a mahavimana. Further, this would explain
the appearance of the word in early inscriptions and manuscripts.
When the word mahayana does begin to appear in the archeological
record (I am thinking particularly of one of the Niya documents,40
the Inscription of Arp.goka,41 the Copper Scroll of the son of Opan-
da in the Sch0yen Collection,42 and the fragment4
3
), the
phrase "one who has mounted the mahayana" appears to be a
term of prestige.
44
Finally, the only other parallel use of the word
39 As Jan Nattier has argued: " ... even in texts like the Ugra that do contain
the standard list [of six perfections] it is rare that equal attention is devoted to
each. Indeed, most bodhisattvasUtras seem to fall into one of two basic cat-
egories: those (like the Ugra) that emphasize dilna, and those (like the sLitras
belonging to the "perfection of wisdom" category) that emphasize prajfiil."
Nattier, A Few Good Men, 153.
40 Thomas Burrow, A Translation of the Kharosthi Documents from Chi-
nese Turkestan. London: The Royal Asiatic Society 1940: 79-80.
41 Richard Salomon, "A Stone Inscription in Central Asian Gandhara from
Endere (Xinjiang)," Bulletin of the Asia Institute, n.s. 13 (1999), 1-13.
42 Gundrun Melzer and Lore Sander, "A Copper Scroll Inscription from
the Time of the Alchon Huns." In Buddhist Manuscripts vol. 3, Jens Braarvig,
ed. (Oslo: Hermes Publications 2002), 251-278.
43 Richard Salomon. "A Fragment of a Collection of Buddhist Legends,
with a Reference to King as a Follower of the Mahayana." In Bud-
dhist Manuscripts vol. 2, Jens Braarvig, ed. (Oslo: Hermes Publications
2002), 255-267.
44 For the most part, even its latter day detractors refrain from attack-
ing it using the name Mahayana, preferring to refer to the movement by
the more pejorative designations of "Sunyavildin" (advocates of emptiness),
"Nilstivildin" (advocates of non-existence), or (advocates
of 'sky-flowers'). A notable exception being a report of an anonymous edi-
236
JOSEPH WALSER
yiina is in the context of the "three vehicles" of the sriivakayiina
[meaning the attainment of the arhat], pratyekabuddhaYiina, and
buddhayiina. At least one discussion contrasting the three vehicles
in the Mahiivibhii:jii makes it clear that the three yiinas refer to the
end results of practice, not to the paths leading to those results.
45
Given the echoes of vimiinas, we might understand mounting the
mahiiyiina to be less about getting somewhere than as a mark of
prestige and power awarded for prior spiritual
Great vehicles in the Sutra Pitaka
The liilJussolJisutta: yiina as sacrifice
Indeed, the image of vehicle as a mark of prestige is also very
much apparent in the liilJussorJisutta - the sutra which inspired
Gombrich's study. But even here, I would argue that the Vedic as-
sociations seem to linger as well. The Vedic connotations of the
devayiina are, in this case, amplified by what appears to be a refer-
ence to the Vedic idea of the chariot as a metaphor for the sacrifice.
The following is from the translation of Bhikkhu Bodhi:
At SavatthI. Then, in the morning, the Venerable Ananda dressed
and, taking bowl and robe, entered SavatthI for alms. The Venerable
Ananda saw the Brahmin JaI).ussoI).i departing from SavatthI in an all-
white chariot drawn by mares. The horses yoked to it were white, the
reins, goad, and canopy were white, his turban, clothes, and sandals
were white, and he was being fanned by a white chowry. People hav-
ing seen this, said: "Divine indeed sir is the vehicle! It appears to be a
divine vehicle indeed, sir!"
tor of the who records the condemnation of
Mahayana by his teachers. See Daniel Boucher, Bodhisattvas of the For-
est and the Formation of the Mahayana: A Study and Translation of the
(Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press 2008),
137 and discussion on p. 109-10.
45 See note 24 above.
237
Ananda reports all of this to the Buddha and asks if there is any-
thing in Buddhism that would be like this brahmanical vehicle. He
asks:
" .. .Is it possible, venerable sir, to point out a divine vehicle in this
Dhamma and Discipline?" ... the Blessed One said. "This is a designa-
tion for this Noble Eightfold Path: 'the divine vehicle' and 'the vehicle
of Dhamma' and 'the unsurpassed victory in battle'."
"Right view, Ananda, when developed and cultivated, has as its final
goal the removal of lust, the removal of hatred, the removal of delu-
sion. Right intention ... Right concentration, when developed and cul-
tivated, has as its final goal the removal of lust, the removal of hatred,
the removal of delusion."
"In this way, Ananda, it may be understood how this is a designation
for the Noble Eightfold Path: 'the divine vehicle' and 'the vehicle of
Dhamma' and 'the unsurpassed victory in battle' ... "
[verses:]
Its qualities of faith and wisdom
Are always yoked evenly together.
Shame is its pole, mind its yoke-tie,
Mindfulness the watchful charioteer.
The chariot's ornament is virtue,
Its axle jhana, energy its wheels;
Equanimity keeps the burden balanced,
Desirelessness serves as upholstery.
Good will, harmlessness, and seclusion:
These are the chariot's weaponry,
Forbearance its armour and shield,
As it rolls towards security from bondage.
This divine vehicle unsurpassed
Originates from within oneself.
The wise depart from the world in it,
inevitably winning victory.46
JaJ)ussol!i's vehicle is initially described as a va!aviibhiratha, not a
yiina. It is the crowd of onlookers that use the latter term, praising
46 Bodhi, Bhikkhu, trans. The Connected Discourses of the Buddha,
Somerville, Mass: Wisdom Publications 2000, 1525-6.
238
JOSEPH WALSER
his carriage as being like a divine vehicle (brahmayana-ruparrt).
Ananda, seeing how the people are attracted to this brahmayana,
asks the Buddha to describe what among his dharma and vinaya
would be like this vehicle. The prose section has the Buddha saying
that it is the Noble Eightfold Path that is "a brahma vehicle,a dhar-
ma vehicle and an unsurpassed victory in battle" ('brahmayanarrt'
iti pi, 'dhammayanarrt' iti pi, 'anuttaro sangama vijayo). The vers-
es, on the other hand, make no reference to the Noble Eightfold
Path, but rather portray a seemingly random collection' of Bud-
dhist virtues as the unsurpassed brahmayana. Note that the Pali
text does not use the term devayana. Gombrich nevertheless takes
the term brahmayana as an allusion "to that 'path to Brahman'
that the text of the calls the devayana." He
might be right here, and it is worth noting that the Chinese version
of the same sutra does have the Buddha call the vehicle (among
other things) both a devayana and a brahmayana (Yt*).47
Nevertheless, I think it best to read the brahmayana here not as a
punning reference to the devayana (or even as a reference to the
brahmayana magga of the Kevaddhasutta) but as a direct reference
47 T. 99, p. 201al. It is certainly anomalous that this verse would pres-
ent the devayiina, brahmayiina, mahayiina and the Noble Eightfold Path as
synonymous since most of the later texts in the Canon assign distinct roles
to these paths. In addition to the roles of the deva- and brahmayiinas dis-
cussed above in regard to the Kevaddhasutta, we find a more developed
paradigm in the (T. 310 (26)) ascribed to KumarajIva. It de-
scribes two different versions of the three vehicles. In the first version the
three vehicles are the devayiina, the brahmayana and the aryayiina. The
devayiina consists of the four dhyiinas, the brahmayana consists ofthe first
three brahmaviharas (karUlJii, maitrf and pramuditii - for the idea that the
brahmavihiiras were sometimes seen as yiinas, see note 57 beloW). The high-
est vehicle is the aryayiina which consists of the Noble Eightfold Path. This
taxonomy of three vehicles is distinct from the next set of three vehicles
consisting of the Sriivakayiina, pratyekabuddhayiina and Mahayana. The
liilJussOIJisutra, on the other hand gives us no indication that the devayana,
brahmayiina and mahayana represent distinct phases of the path, perhaps
reflecting a cosmology more like that behind the Sutta Nipata verse dis-
cussed above. My thanks to Jan Nattier for pointing this passage out to me.
239
to the use of chariots as a literal vehicle for Brahman in the Srauta
sacrifice. We find this in the Gopatha Brahmana's commentary on
the Agnyadheya Srauta ritual. There the text asserts that the es-
sence (or "rasa") of Brahman becomes the chariot (ratha) on which
the fire is to be carried to the appropriate altar in the agnyadheya
rite.
48
This is cited as the reason why the chariot (in addition to
gold and cows) is to be given to the Brahman priest.
49
Indeed, as
M. Sparreboom has amply shown, the chariot is not only used as a
metaphor for religious and martial prestige
50
in Vedic texts, but it
is also used as a metaphor (or one could even say metonym) for the
sacrifice itself.51 Thus, the connection between Brahman and the
chariot should not be surprising - the heart of the sacrifice lies in
the chariot that carries the fire. Under this reading, when Ananda
asks the Buddha to point out the Brahma-vehicle in Buddhism his
question is tantamount to asking what the core or essence of Bud-
dhism is.
Here we have what is, in the Pali Canon, the use of the yana
metaphor that is closest to its usage in the Perfection of Wisdom
in 8,000 Lines. JaI:LUSSoI!i's yana is a chariot employed as a met-
aphor for a spiritual essence. Further, just like the and the
RatnagulJasamcayagatha, the lalJussolJisutta presents its yana as
alternately a war vehicle and a posh mode of transportation. Yet,
since the text falls short of actually using the term mahayana itself
we would be hard pressed to say that Mahiiyanists looked to this
text as a precedent for their use of the term mahayana. For that we
will have to turn to the Chinese translation of the same text.
48 The agnyadheya rite is the status rite required for any who wish to es-
tablish the three fires in their household.
49 B.R. Modak, The Ancillary Literature of the Atharva-Veda: A Study
with Special Reference to the (New Delhi: Rashtriya Veda Vidya
Pratishthan 1993), 35.
50 M. Sparreboom, Chariots in the Veda (Leiden: E.J. Brill 1985), 13-27.
51 Ibid. 75-82.
240
JOSEPH WALSER
The equivalent satra in the Northern tradition is found in the
SalfLyuktiiganw (T. 99) translated by GUI).abhadra, between 436 and
443 C.E.
52
Here, we find a number of differences from the Pali, but
for our purposes it will suffice to focus on the Buddha's response
to Ananda's query: .
The Buddha said to A.nanda, "This common vehicle is not my dhar-
ma, vinaya nor a divine vehicle: A.nanda, my saddharma and vina-
ya vehicle is a vehicle of the gods presumably "dev,ayana"), a
divine vehicle "brahmayana"), and a great vehicle (**
"mahayana") capable of subduing the army of klesas. Listen care-
fully, ponder well, and I will explain to you. A.nanda, how is the sad-
dharma and vinaya a vehicle of the gods, a divine vehicle, a great
vehicle capable of subduing the army of kldas? It is said to be the
Eightfold Noble Path [comprising] Right View, up to Right Concen-
tration. A.nanda this is the so-called vehicle of the true dharma and
vinaya, the vehicle of the gods, Brahma's vehicle the great
vehicle, capable of subduing the army of afflictions. The Blessed one
then uttered these verses:
Faith and morality serve as dharma's yoke,
Shame acts as its tether.
Right mindfulness protects well and serves as a good charioteer.
and samadhi serve as the poles (on either side of the
horse).
Wisdom and valor are the wheels.
Detachment and patience are the armor.
Tranquil, like the dharma itself, it moves.
Charging straight ahead without turning.
Forever advancing to the place without sorrow.
The wise gentleman mounts this battle chariot that crushes igno-
rance and hatred. 53
What is important for our purpqses is the high probability that there
was a Northern Indic version of the Jii1}usso1}isiltra that refers to the
52 For a discussion of GUJ;labhadra's dates, see Etienne Lamotte, "Trois
Sutra du S81pyukta sur la Vacuite," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and
African Studies 36/2 (1973, 313-323): 313.
53 T. 99, p. 200c25-201a8.
241
Noble Eightfold Path as the "mahayana." I do not think there is suf-
ficient reason to argue that what we have here is a "contamination"54
or an "interpolation"55 inserted by an overeager Mahayanist parti-
san.
56
There is no obvious Mahayana agenda anywhere in this text
54 Jonathan Silk has argued that the Agamas in general are contaminated
with Mahayana material: "The materials to which we are comparing our ex-
tant Mahayana Buddhist literature may well have been written or revised in
light of that very Mahayana Buddhist material itself, and vice versa ad infini-
tum. Even theoretically, there is no way to produce a clean schematic of the
relations in question, any more than it would be possible to clarify a mixture
in a glass after orange juice had been poured into soda, that mix poured into
coffee, then added back into the orange juice, and so on. The contamina-
tion is complete, its history irreversible." ("What, if Anything, Is Mahayana
Buddhism? Problems of Definitions and Classifications," Numen 49/4 (2002,
355-405): 397-8.) Dealing with the issue of authenticity and contamination
is indeed difficult (see note 56 below) and should not be underestimated. At
the end of the day, we can ohly speak in probabilities concerning the authen-
ticity of any text. However, to claim that the task is impossible is simply to
ignore how much can be said about these texts - even if the end result falls
somewhat short of "proof."
55 Etienne Lamotte, for example, states that the "Mahayanist interpola-
tions" in the Ekottariigama are "easily discernible." History of Indian Bud-
dhism: From the Origins to the Saka Era, Sara Webb-Boin trans. (Louvain:
L'Institut Orientaliste de Louvain 1988), 156.
56 I say "high probability," since GUI}-abhadra's many other translations
were of indisputable Mahayana texts, and it is well known that Kumarajlva
- a contemporary of GUI}-abhadra - may have been a bit overzealous in his
translation of terms like agrayiina and and agra-
dharma with the same "**" in his translations of the Lotus sutra (see Frons-
dal, 59-61) and in his translation of the Vajracchedikii [see T. 235, p. 750c13].
More to the point, Jan Nattier has pointed out that GUI}-abhadra's transla-
tion of the Sal!!yuktiigama (T. 99) consistently translates the phrase ekiiyana
maggo with -*m which points to the One Vehicle, a term that ordinarily
populates Mahayana texts such as the Lotus sutra, the Srlmaladevlsutra, and
the Angulimiilanttra. Indeed, she argues that GUI}-abhadra's choice of transla-
tion terms in this Agama text was colored by his translations of Mahayana
texts that legitimately contained the term ekayiina. Nevertheless, I think it
would be hard to argue that GUI}-abhadra harbored some covert agenda to slip
242
JOSEPH WALSER
Mahayana terms into a canonical text, nor does Nattier claim that he was act-
ing in bad faith. At the end of her investigation, she states, "the translation of
ektiyana as yisheng dao is simply a mistake. Conditioned by his expDsure to
the term ekaytina in Mahayana texts, and perhaps unfamiliar with the very
rare word ekayana, GUl).abhadra may well have assumed that his source-text
was mistaken and amended it to read ekayana, which he then rendered into
Chinese using the by then well established translation of yisheng." (Jan Nat-
tier, '''One Vehicle' (-*) in the Chinese Agamas: New Light on an Old
Problem in Pali," Annual Report of The International Research Institute for
Advanced Buddhology at Soka University 10 (March 2007): 197).
Unlike the ekayana/ekayana translation mistake, we cannot make sense of the
presence of the term ** in GUl).abhadra's translation of the ltil}-ussol}-isutta
by a similar appeal to homophony, since we would either have to postulate
a term that GUl).abhadra could have misheard as mahtiytina, or would have
to explain how the ltil}-ussol}-isutta lends itself to some kind of Mahayanist
agenda. There are a number of terms that theoretically could have been
confused with mahayana, like mahtijiitina, mahadhyana, etc. [For a good
discussion of possible homophones, see Daniel Boucher, "GandharI and
the Early Chinese Buddhist Translations Reconsidered: The Case of the
Saddharmapul}-fj.arfkasutra" Journal of the American Oriental Society 118.4
(1998): esp. pp. 492-3.] Nevertheless, homophonic substitution is constrained
by syntagmatic context, and this story is clearly about a chariot. Further-
more, the Pali refers unambiguously to ytinas.
Could GUl).abhadra have simply played author here and inserted the terms
mahtiytina, devaytina and brahmaytina into his text? Probably not. Marcus
Bingenheimer has done a close comparison between the anonymous transla-
tidn of the Sal'{lyukttigama found in T. 100 with that of GUl).abhadra as well as
with Pali parallels where available (Bingenheimer, Marcus. "A Digital Com-
parative Edition and Translation of the Shorter Chinese SaIp.yukta Agama
(T.lOO)." http://buddhistinformatics.ddbc.edu.twIBZA/ [accessed July 14,
2008]). While T. 100 does not include the Jtil}-ussol}-isutra, Bingenheimer's
work does tell us a lot about GUl).abhadra's translation style. In his compari-
son of extant copies of the Sal'{lyukta collections he found that T. 99 and T.
100 were very close, and every time T. 99 differed from the Pali Canon, the
difference was also there in T. 100. He noticed no places where GUl).abhadra
inserted extraneous material and no instances of obvious Mahayana inter-
polation - assuming, of course, that we take his -* translations simply as
mistakes. (Marcus Bingenheimer, personal communication 7/25/08). Finally,
GUl).abhadra's use of the word mahayana in this text does not mesh well with
THE ORIGIN OF THE TERM' MAHAYANA'
243
since the Noble Eightfold Path is not a particularly Mahiiyana idea.
Nor is there any indication in this text that the term mahayana is
the most important of the epithets for the Buddhist path. Once the
metaphor of spiritual practice as a vehicle was in place, to call the
Buddhist yana a "great yana" is hardly a surprising development.
57
the doctrine of the other Mahayanist texts he translated. His translation of the
JiilJussOl:zisiitra uses the term ** to describe the Buddha's dharma itself. It
does not distinguish Mahayana from any other form of Buddhist doctrine
and, moreover, explicitly states that it is the Noble Eightfold Path. It is tempt-
ing to see this text identifying mahiiyiina with Buddhism itself as a subtle
allusion to the doctrine of the One Vehicle found in the Srfmiiladevfsiitra
and the Aligulimiilasiitra. Both texts state that the three vehicles are all
found in the Great Vehicle and hence the Great Vehicle is the One Vehicle.
However, despite an apparent nod at ecumenicity both siitras are keen to
make a firm distinction between Mahayana doctrine and that of the sriivakas
and pratyekabuddhas. More to the point, the Aligulimiilasiitra explicitly
states that the sriivakayiina's Noble Eightfold Path is not Mahayana and the
Mahayana's Noble Eightfold Path looks nothing like the one described in the
JiilJussolJisiitra. (See esp. T.l20, p.532a24-bl). Thus, the term mahiiyiina in
the JiilJUSSolJlsiitra of T. 99 was probably not inserted by GU1).abhadra since
it conveys a picture of Mahayana that contradicts the other Mahayana texts
he was interested in. Carrying this argument a bit further, we can also say
that the picture of mahiiyiina we glean from the JiilJussolJisiitra is unlike that
of any other Mahayana text of which I am aware. All of this suggests to me
that this word was in the text prior to the advent of Mahayana, since it would
be difficult to imagine someone consciously using an already loaded term in
such a contextually naIve way.
57 There is one other context in the Pali canon where "yiina" may be inter-
preted as a spiritual practice. There are quite a number of passages in which
the stock phrase "[x] bahulfkatii yiinfkatii vatthukatii ... " (x is made great,
is made into a yiina, is made into a ground ... ) occurs. This phrase is used
in two contexts. The first occurs in the MahiiparinibbiilJasutta (and all the
texts that reference this conversation), in which the Buddha tells Ananda, " ...
whoever has developed the four roads to power (iddhipiidii), practiced them
frequently, made them his vehicle, made them his base, established them, be-
come familiar with them and properly undertaken them, could undoubtedly
live for a century. The Tathagata has developed these powers ... " [Walshe,
The Long Discourses, 246; DN II 103].
244
JOSEPH WALSER
Nor do we find here any distinction being made between this prac-
tice and any other form of Buddhist practice. The' only contrast
here is between Vedic Hinduism (JiII)USso:Q,i is a stock Brahmin
character in the Tripitaka) and Buddhism. The only available read-
ing of this passage is that Buddhism itself (especially the Eightfold
Path) !. the Great In other words, we have here a text
The second context is discussions of the "six elements leading to
(the cha nissaralJiyti dhtituyo), these are referenced quite a number of places
as well [e.g. DN III 244-5, AN III 324-6, IV 300, Patisal'{!bhidtimagga II
13IJI: etc.]. The basic structure of the passages reads as follows:
Six Elements making for deliverance (nissaralJzya dhtituyo): Here, a monk
niight say: (a) "I have developed the emancipation of the heart (ceto-vimut-
ti) by loving-kindness (mettti), expanded it, made it a vehicle and a base,
established, worked well on it, set it well in train. And yet ill-will still grips
my heart." He should be told: "No! do not say that! Do not misrepresent the
Blessed Lord, it is not right to slander him thus, for he would not have said
such a thing! Your words are unfounded and impossible. If you develop the
emancipation of the heart through loving-kindness, ill-will has no chance
to envelop your heart. This emancipation through loving-kindness is the
cure for ill-will." [Walshe, The Long Discourses, 500; DN III 247-8].
This is repeated for each of the six nissaralJzya dhtituyo, pitting each of the
six techniques to achieve ceto-vimutti (i.e., mettti, karulJti, muditti, upekhti,
animittti, and aversion [vigata] to the idea of titman) against each of the respec-
tive hindrances to liberation (bytiptida, vihesti, arati, rtiga, nimitta-anustiri
and vicikicchti-kathankathti-salla). Unfortunately, neither the occurrences of
this term in the root texts nor the commentaries thereupon give any indica-
ti6n whether ytina as path or ytina as vehicle is being indicated in this phrase.
58 Vetter points out one more verse in Pali that is similar in imagery. This
occurs in the BhikkhunI Subhii's verses in the Therzgtithti (verse 389 in PTS,
verse 391 in CSCD): Stihal'{! sugatassa stivikti, maggatthangikaytinaytiyinf;
uddhatasallti antisavti, sufifitigtiragatti ramtimahal'{!o Caroline Rhys-Davids
translates this as, "Yea, the disciple am I of the Welcome One; onward the
march of me. Riding the Car of the Road that is Eightfold. Drawn are the ar-
rows out of my wounds, and purged is my spirit of drugging Intoxicants. So I
am come to haunts that are Empty. There lies my pleasure." [Caroline Rhys-
Davids, Psalms of the Early Buddhists (London: Pali Text Society, 1980),
153]. Regarding this verse, Vetter (p. 64, note 23) makes some interesting ob-
servations on this verse: " ... the demands of metre and the attempt for tonal
245
that uses the word Mahayana, which does not in fact appear to be
what we would call "a mahayana text." Does it pre-date the advent
of (what we wbuld call) Mahayana? I think that it does, but even if
this cannot be established, this sutra still presents us with a usage
of the word mahayana that remained quite independent of what we
would call Mahayana even in the 5
th
century.
The Mahaparinirval}asutra: yana across the river
The idea that Buddhism itself is a great vehicle shows up in one
other agamic text. It occurs in the Mahaparinirval}asutra, although
again only in Chinese translations. The episode occurs at the point
when the Buddha wishes to cross a river outside of Rajagrha. The
earliest translation of this episode into Chinese is ascribed to ZhI
Qian
59
sometime in the second quarter of the third century. The
passage in question reads as follows:
At that time there was a crowd of people who boarded boats to cross
(the river). There were those who boarded small boats, and boarded
bamboo rafts and wooden rafts to cross. There were many such travel-
ers. The Buddha sat in samadhi and thought: "In the past when I had
not yet become Buddha, I came here repeatedly and boarded these
boats more times than I can count. Now that I am emancipated, (I) no
longer board them, but I will enable my disciples to be free of them."
When the Buddha awoke, he said the following verses: .
The Buddha is the Capitan of the ocean ship. The Dharma Bridge
crosses the river. The Great Vehicle is the carriage of the Way.
effect result in maggattmigikayanayayinf expressing, rather awkwardly, the
fact that a nun treads the eight-fold way. yana here is not something with
which she has herself transported; rather, she herself effects her movement,
i.e., by her practice of an eightfold discipline. This discipline is normally
indicated by the word magga, but magga of the relevant compound, its mean-
ing superseded by that of yana has become only a superfluous qualifier for
atthmigikayana. "
59 For the ascription of this to ZhI Qian, see Nattier, A Guide to the Earli-
est Chinese Buddhist Translations, 126-8.
246
JOSEPH WALSER
Each delivers gods and men and indeed produces liberation, deliv-
ering (those gods and men) to the (other) shore to attain transcen-
dence. They enable my disciples to loosen their bonds and attain
nirVQlJa.60
The same verse can also be found in Buddhayasas' translation
of the Dlrghiigama, completed between 408 and 412, though the
prose prelude differs somewhat.
61
This pericope of the Mahiipari-
nirviiIJasutra plays upon the etymology of the word saf[lsii.ra. "Saf[l-
siira" comes from the root {Sr, meaning "to flow."62 The "flow" of
the river itself is saf[lsiira. With the river as saf[lsiira, Buddhism
is the "great vehicle" (mahiiyiina - here perhaps as a boat instead
of a chariot) ferrying men and gods across to the other side. The
verse also picks up on another common theme in the Trip itaka ,
namely that the Buddha's dharma is that which one holds onto
in order to cross the "flood" (Pali, oghaf[l63). Again, as with the
60 T. 6, p178a24-b3. The verse in ZhI Qian's translation appears as:
$t5)j}lJ5f:
-t)]51lf5'(A

Buddhayasas' translation of the same verse is virtually identical in the first
two lines with the exception that he substitutes for T. 6's This makes
better .sense to me in context and I think it is likely that is a copyist' mis-
take. I have translated the verse accordingly.
61 There area actually anumberof different versions of this scene. Ernst Wald-
schmidt, in his study of the different versions of the MahtiparinirvillJilsatra,
gives the greatest attention to Millasarvastivadin sources. Though he sum-
marizes three Chinese versions of this scene, he fails to mention that two
of them liken the path to a great vehicle. See Ernst Waldschmidt, Die Uber-
lieferung vom Lebensende des Buddha, first part, groups I-IV (Gottingen:
Vandehoeck & Ruprecht 1944), 60-65
62 Monier-Williams, Sanskrit Dictionary, "-{sr," s.v.
63 See, e.g., SN 1069, "Alone (and) without a support, Sakyan', said the
venerable Upaslva, 'I am not able to cross over the great flood. One with
all-round vision, tell me an object (of meditation), supported by which I may
THE ORIGIN OF THE TERM 'MAHAYiiNA'
247
Sal!lyuktiigama passage, the image of a "great vehicle" appears to
be quite natural to the setting (it has to be large, after all, to convey
both gods and men across) and like the liilJussolJi passage, does not
appear to be forwarding any obviously Mahayana agenda. Indeed,
this passage may well have been the inspiration for cases such as
the Dasabhumikasutra in which the Mahayana is referred to as
the mahiiyiinapiitra (the Great Boat).64 Thus, to the extent that we
can establish that this verse accurately reflects an lndic original
65
we can argue that as early as the first half of the third century (and
probably earlier), there was at least one version of the river crossing
episode that included a verse in which the Buddha refers to Bud-
dhism itself as a "great vehicle" capable of delivering gods and men
across the waters of sal!lsiira. Like the liilJussolJi passage discussed
above, the passage in question has nothing to do with Mahayana in
contradistinction to any other form of Buddhism. Rather it is Bud-
dhism itself that is referred to as "the Great Vehicle."
Conclusion
At this point, I would like to offer a few observations by way of a
conclusion and to suggest fruitful avenues for future inquiry. My
argument can be divided into two parts. The first part traces vari-
cross over this flood.'" Norman, 120. [=CSCD paragraph 1075:] Eko ahaY(!
sakka mahantamoghaT[l, (iccayasma upasfvo) anissito no visahami tarituy(!;
arammalJaT[l brahi samantacakkhu, yaY(! nissito oghamimaY(! tareyyaY(!.
64 P.L. Vaidya, ed. DasabhamikasfUram, (Darbhanga: The Mithila Insti-
tute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning 1967) 40;
T. 286, p.521b19-20.
65 The issues surrounding the accuracy or authenticity of Zhi QUin's trans-
lation is much more complicated than that of GUl).abhadra's, and a number
of variables must be taken into consideration. In all, I believe that this verse
probably does accurately translate an Indic original, although there is still
considerable room for doubt. For a full discussion and arguments for and
against, see my, "On the Authenticity of a verse from the MahaparinirvalJa
Satra" (forthcoming).
248
JOSEPH WALSER
ous contexts in early lndic literature that had to be in place in order
for a term like mahayana as Great Vehicle to become
ful. While the term mahayana does not appear in the Pali Canon
proper, the metaphoric complex into which it fits was certainly in
place among its later strata. It appears to be an organic outgrowth
of specifically Buddhist appropriations of the idea of
the devayana patha cross-pollinated with Srauta metaphors of
the sacrifice as chariot and more generally lndic ideas of vehicle
vimanas as a reflection of religious practice. Thus, when'the term
actually does appear in Chinese translations of the Dlrgha- and
Saf!Lyuktagama, we should not rush to see its presence there as an
interpolation or xenotype of a partisan nature but rather consider the
possibility that it appears there as a non-technical term, an organic
development of elements that were already there. Further, when we
find Mahayana texts talking about the mahayana, they may well be
referring to a term that was already in vogue among Buddhists who
were not in pursuit of the bodhisattva path. On the other hand, the
fact that we find this usage in texts translated between the first half
of the third and the beginning of the fifth centuries suggests that
Buddhists continued to use the term mahayana in a non-Mahayana
way even after the proliferation of Mahayana texts.
This part of the argument has a few implications for the fu-
ture study of early Mahayana and the origins thereof. For the term
mahayana to be coined as a spiritual metaphor, other ideas on
whose authority it draws would have to be in place. The devayana
patha of the alone would probably not be sufficient
since it is far from clear that early Brahmanic sources "heard" its
yana as a vehicle. The literary context most conducive to the use
of the term mahayana in the semantic range that we have come to
expect would have to have already normalized the term devayana
as a vehicle of the gods. Further, if I am correct that such a tech-
nical usage only occurred in the context of discussions of post-
mortem vimanas, then we should also look for a context in which
a corresponding belief in such vehicles was du jour. Placing early
Mahayana in the context of the Vimanavatthu, the Tattvarthasutra,
249
the Santi Parvan of the Mahabharata and the later chapters of the
Milindapafiha, of course, hardly helps us in dating the origins of
the movement since it opens up more chronological cans of worms
than I care to deal with here. But it is a different tub of worms than
scholars of Mahayana are used to wading through and so at least
presents a change of scenery. Nor would our work be completed
even if we could date the invention of the word "Mahayana." It
is quite probable that a movement that we can meaningfully call
"Mahayana" pre-existed the term itself. Nevertheless, the invention
of the term does appear to be an important piece of the puzzle since
it reflects something of the worldview of those who adopted it and
the expectations of (imagined) audiences whom they addressed.
The second part of the paper argues that two passages in the
Chinese translation of the Agamas contain usages of the term
mahiiyana that appear to be a kind of missing link between earlier
ideas such as the devayana patha and the term "Mahayana" used
as a designation for the bodhisattva path in contradistinction to the
Sravaka path. Though my argument for the authenticity of its pres-
ence in the Agamas is not unassailable, neither can it be ruled out
easily: If the word mahayana does occur there - and I have argued
that these passages would be rather odd as conscious interpolations
by Mahayanist partisans - its presence would be independent of
(and oblivious to) the any kind of partisan form of Mahayana. For
that reason I see no reason to assume that it post-dates the advent
of such a movement. If the term "Mahayana" was used in some
Buddhist texts in a non-sectarian way independent of (or prior to)
its adoption as a moniker by any particular Buddhist group, then
we must be open to the possibility that the word mahayana evolved
within the Agamas themselves. By the same token, if the word
mahiiyana evolved in the Tripitaka itself, and (if, as Paul Harri-
son has argued)66 our earliest Mahayana texts are second genera-
66 Harrison has discussed this problem in two works: "The Earliest Chi-
nese Translations of Mahayana Buddhist Siltras: Some Notes on the Works
Buddhist Studies Review 10/2 (1993, 135-177): 139-40; and,
250
JOSb"'PH WALSER
tion texts then the first generation of Mahayana texts might not be
Mahayana texts at all, but rather texts from the Agamas themselves;
put to a different purpose.
67
Bibliography
CBETA - Chinese Electronic Tripitaka Collection (CD-ROM), Taipei: Chi-
nese Buddhist Electronic Text Association, April 2009.
CSCD - Chattha Sangliyana CD-ROM Version 3, Igatpuri: Vipassana Re-
search Institute 1999.
Fronsdal, Egil. The Dawn of the Bodhisattva Path: Studies in a Religious
Ideal of Ancient Indian Buddhists with a particular Emphasis on the Ear-
liest Extant Perfection of Wisdom Sutra. Ph.D. diss., Stanford University
1998.
Gombrich, Richard. "A momentous effect of translation: The 'vehicles' of
Buddhism." In Apodosis: essays presented to Dr W. W. Cruickshank to
mark his eightieth birthday (London: St. Paul's School 1992): 34-46.
Monier-Williams, Sir Monier. A Sanskrit-English Dictionary. Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass 1999.
Nattier, Jan. A Few Good Men: The Bodhisattva Path According to the In-
quiry of Ugra (Ugrapariprcchli). Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press
2003.
Norman, K.R. The Group of Discourses (Sutta-Niplita), vol. II. Oxford: The
Pali Text Society 1992.
Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli. The Principal Delhi: Indus Publica-
tions 1994.

Vetter, Tilmann. "Once Again on the Origin of Mahayana Buddhism," Wie-
ner Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Sudasiens 45 (2001) 59-90.
Walshe, Maurice trans. The Long Discourses of the Buddha: A Translation of
the Dzgha Nikliya. Boston: Wisdom Publications 1995 ..
"Searching for the Origins of the Mahayana: What Are We Looking For?"
The Eastern Buddhist, n.s. 28/1 (1995, 48-69): 55-56.
67 This was a suggestion first made by Jan Nattier in regard to the Jatakas,
but may apply equally well to a number of other texts in the Siitra Pitaka. See
Nattier, A Few Good Men, 186.
Buddhist Studies in North America
Contributions to a panel at the XVth Congress of the International
Association of Buddhist Studies, Atlanta, 23-28 June 2008
Guest editor
Charles S. Prebish
NORTH AMERICAN BUDDHIST STUDIES:
A CURRENT SURVEY OF THE FIELD
CHARLES S. PREBISH
Introduction
In 1959 and 1960, Edward Conze wrote three segmented articles,
published in the Middle Way, entitled "Recent Progress in Buddhist
Studies." These were collected and eventually published in his vol-
ume Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies: Selected Essays by Edward
Conze. By that time two geographic "schools" of Buddhology had
been identified: the so-called Anglo-German and Franco-Belgian
schools. To these, Conze added a third: the Leningrad school. Each
school was essentially defined not only by location, but also by
emphasis. Conze was not the only scholar to research the nature
of the Buddhist Studies discipline. Jan de Jong published two ar-
ticles, in the 1974 and 1984 issues of the Eastern Buddhist, which
were eventually collected into his book A Brief History of Buddhist
Studies in Europe and America. While offering much interesting
data, a consideration of Buddhist Studies in America was virtu-
ally absent from the volume, despite its title. More recently North
American scholars have begun to investigate the discipline of Bud-
dhist Studies. In 1983, Charles Prebish published "Buddhist Stud-
ies American Style: A Shot in the Dark" in that year's Religious
Studies Review. More than a decade later, in 1994, he published
"The Academic Study of Buddhism in the United States: A Cur-
rent Analysis" in Religion. That same year Malcolm David Eckel
published "The Ghost at the Table: On the Study of Buddhism and
the Study of Religion" in the Journal of the American Academy of
Religion. The following year, the Journal of the International As-
sociation of Buddhist Studies devoted an entire issue to the topic
Volume 30 Number 1-2 2007 (2009) pp. 253-282
254
CHARLES S. PREBISH
of Buddhist Studies as an academic discipline, including insightful
articles by David Seyfort Ruegg, Jose Cabezon, and Luis Gomez.
Coupled with the success of the Buddhism Section of the Ameri-
can Academy of Religion, the rapid growth of the number of Bud-
dhist Studies scholars on the North American continent, and the
large number of venues for Buddhist Studies publication in North
America, it was becoming clear that a "North American School
of Buddhist Studies" was developing which rivaled, and perhaps
even surpassed, the earlier schools noted above. This rapid growth
and development has literally begged for analysis and evaluation.
This paper, and the three that follow it are the products of a panel
entitled "The Academic Discipline of Buddhist Studies in North
America presented at the Xyth Congress of the International Asso-
ciation of Buddhist Studies," held at Emory University in Atlanta,
Georgia (USA) from June 23-28, 2008.
In the Winter 1991 issue of the Journal of the American Acad-
emy of Religion, former editor Ray L. Hart was afforded 112 pages
to present the results of a survey entitled "Religious and Theologi-
cal Studies, in American Higher Education: A Pilot Study."l Thirty-
five pages of his "report" were devoted to a presentation of the
statistical evidence gleaned from a questionnaire distributed to 678
faculty members at 11 types of institutions; the rest of the space
was devoted to Hart's interpretive narrative. Interestingly, he de-
votes an entire section of that narrative to a consideration of the
key questions: "What is the relation between the study of religion
and theology and the practice of religion?" and "What should the
relation be?" Perhaps as expected, he could find only one statement
on which all faculty everywhere agree: "One who practices religion
1 See Ray L. Hart, "Religious and Theological Studies in American
Higher Education: A Pilot Study," Journal of the American Academy of
Religion 59,4 (Winter 1991), 715-827.
NORTH AMERICAN BUDDHIST STUDIES
255
needs to study it."2 This of course begs the larger question, and
Hart tries to clarify the three obvious positions he elicited:
3
1. The first view is that the study of religion and the practice of
religion are two integral "terms;" each has its "site" and the
two are not internally related.
2. The second view is that "the relation is completely open."
3. The third view will by now be obvious: the study of religion
presupposes practice, and is undertaken to prepare for and
enhance practice.
Hart's useful findings have already been widely utilized in the dis-
cipline, clearly reflecting the perceived importance of self-defini-
tion and self-recognition within the broad profession of Religious
Studies.
Curiously, Hart's findings were nearly chronologically coinci-
dent with a five-year administrative review of the Buddhism Sec-
tion of the American Academy of Religion, arguably the largest
academic arena for Buddhologists in North America (if not the
entire world). AAR's external evaluator for that review, Professor
Malcolm David Eckel of Boston University, noted in his December
1991 report:
The most important achievement of the Buddhism Group and Sec-
tion at the AAR in the last 10 years has been to create a safe and
reliable forum for Buddhist scholars who represent a wide variety of
approaches, disciplines, and geographical orientations to exchange
views and build bonds of cooperation and understanding that create
an active and imaginative scholarly community.4
2 Hart, "Religious and Theological Studies in American Higher Edu-
cation," 779.
3 Ibid., 780-81.
4 Malcolm David Eckel, "Review and Evaluation of the Buddhism
Section of the American Academy of Religion," 1991, 2.
256
CHARLES S. PREBISH
In a later article,
5
Eckel revealed that in the five years between 1986
and 1991, the attendance at the Buddhism Section's annual busi-
ness meeting grew from 60 to 140, and the mailing list expanded
from 106 to 600!
With interest piqued by the data included in Hart's report and
the suppositions inherent in Eckel's, in October 1992, I set out to
gather materials from the North American community of Bud-
dhologists that would afford this community data similar to Hart's
upon which to conduct a second level of self-reflection. It was clear
from the outset that the 600-member mailing list mentioned above
contained, in addition to so-called Buddhologists, a large number
of scholars of other Asian religions, many non-specialist compara-
tivists, and a profusion of "others." After careful sorting and syn-
thesis, a list of 125 scholars whose primary teaching and research
work fell within the discipline of Buddhist Studies was compiled,
and these individuals were sent requests soliciting both data and
narrative statements about the discipline. Following two additional
requests, and with a rather surprising response rate of 69.6 percent
(compared with Hart's 64 percent), the received material was col-
lated. The preliminary results were presented in a paper at the 1993
AAR annual meeting in Washington, D.C. and published in the
fledgling electronic journal Gassho, with the full results appear-
ing slightly later in Religion,6 jointly published in England and the
United States.
I should mention that my methodology then, and now, was a bit
unusual. Most surveys simply ask a series of forthright questions:
How many refereed articles have you published? In which journals
5 Malcolm David Eckel, "The Ghost at the Table: On the Study of
Buddhism and the Study of Religion," Journal of the American Academy
of Religion 62, no. 4 (Winter 1994), 1088.
6 See Gassho, "The Academic Study of Buddhism in America: A Cur-
rent Analysis," Volume 1, No.2 (January-February 1994), and Religion,
"The Academic Study of Buddhism in the United States: A Current Anal-
ysis," Volume 24 (1994), 271-78.
NORTH AMERICAN BUDDHIST STUDIES 257
have you published? How many books have you authored or edit-
ed? How many major honors and/or grants have you been awarded?
Tabulating results from questions such as these is a daunting task,
complicated by the fact the various scholars have differing notions
about what constitutes a refereed publication, what might be con-
sidered a "major" grant or fellowship, and so forth. Having served
on more search committees than I care to remember, I am also well
aware that scholars tend to exaggerate their credentials whenever
possible, and I wanted to avoid that dilemma. I wanted to achieve
as much consistency with regard to standards as possible. As such,
I chose not to offer standard questions on a standard form. Instead,
I simply requested a copy of each scholar's curriculum vitae (along
with any commentary they wished to provide). In this way, I could
standardize the overall tabulation by determining in uniform fash-
ion which journals could be counted as "refereed," which awards
could be considered "major," and the like.
Later, a second survey was conducted, beginning in Fall 1995.
In the intervening years, the survey list was updated, revised, and
refined, reflecting the arrival of new scholars into the Buddhologi-
cal community, the death of others, and shifting interests. Thus,
the initial list of requests in the second survey numbered 140, with
106 responses received (or 75.7 percent). On an individual level,
the results collected provided an ample view of the demographics
of Buddhist Studies in America. With regard to individual train-
ing, I was able to document the gender, educational background,
language facility, and the like for those polled. Institutionally, I
tracked the respective academic rank of the respondents, the type
of university in which they teach, and the specific department that
employs each. I collected data on memberships in professional or-
ganizations, editorships held, geographical area(s) of specialization,
grants and fellowships received, professional papers presented,
honors awarded, and various categories of publications (including
books, refereed articles, and book reviews). From the narratives in-
cluded with many of the responses, I was able to determine a sense
of the sample's collective perception of those issues deemed critical
258
CHARLES S. PREBISH
to the continuing development and advancement of the discipline.
It was also possible to compile information on universities with
extensive resources for the study of Buddhism.
In the years following the 1995 survey, no other scholar contin-
ued this line of empirical data collection, so in 2006 I decided to
once again collect new materials to update and augment my earlier
findings. In the intervening decade, one significant factor impacted
the methodology for this new study overpoweringly: the Internet.
It was no longer necessary to rely on the good wishes and patience
of colleagues to collate and print out a copy of their latest cur-
riculum vitae, send it along through the postal service, investing
valuable time in the process. Now with a couple of mouse-clicks
at their computer, they could dash off a Microsoft Word or Adobe
PDF file of their materials in less than the time it takes me to read
this sentence. Equally, on my end, it was no longer necessary to
pour through page after page of cumbersome printed documents.
Instead, I could scroll through the submitted materials, tally the
results, post them to a computerized spreadsheet, and even have
the totals .calculated by my unfailing Microsoft Excel program. By
2006, my list of colleagues to be invited for participation in the
study had grown to 189. Clearly, I am making no claims that this
sample is unwaveringly comprehensive. Nonetheless, after four de-
cades in the discipline of Buddhist Studies, and with numerous edi-
torial duties for a number of professional societies - including the
International Association of Buddhist Studies and the American
Academy of Religion - I am confident that I have a thoroughly rep-
resentative sample. Following my initial invitations, several follow-
up reminders posted in early 2007, and a final invitation posted on
H-Buddhism, I ended the study with 152 submissions (only six of
which submitted hard copy versions); that is, an 80.4 percent sub-
mission rate. Because I changed professional positions during the
2006-2007 academic year, I delayed tallying the results until May
2007. At that time I was assisted in data processing by Mr. Joshua
Pineault, my research assistant at Utah State University. It was his
259
significant investment of time that allowed me to bring the study to
a final conclusion in the summer of 2007.
Individual Results
Regarding basic demographics, in Hart's survey, 85.4 percent of
the respondents were male, 14.4 percent female, with .2 percent
not answering (p. 796). In my 1995 sample, 83 percent were male,
17 percent female, representing a small increase in percentage of
females from my previous investigation (which was 85.1 percent
male, 14.9 percent female). The 2006 survey yielded 76.8% males
and 23.2% females, clearly indicating a rise toward gender parity
in the previous decade. Hart's survey revealed 90 percent of the
respondents with one or more doctoral degrees; 9 percent with no
doctoral degree; and I percent expecting the doctoral degree (p.
800). In my initial sample, 99.1 percent (105 of 106) had a Ph.D/
Th.D. This was quite consistent with my 1995 survey, which re-
vealed a 98.8 percent rate for doctoral degrees. My 2006 survey
revealed a 98.0% rate for doctoral degrees. Not surprisingly, my
1995 sample seemed to suggest a slightly younger discipline overall
than my initial sample: my first sample yielded 1975.9 as the aver-
age year for the granting of the terminal degree, whereas my 1995
sample showed 1980.0 as the average year. My latest 2006 sample
shows 1989.3 as the average year. As expected, the newest survey
yields the youngest rate for the overall discipline. In decades, the
breakdown yields:
260
CHARLES S. PREBISH
Decade Ph.D/Th.D 1995 Respondents 2006 Respondent.
Granted
2000s 0 27
1990s 21 49
1980s 45 42
1970s 25 24
1960s 12 5
1950s 1 0
1940s 1 0
Unlisted 0 5
The majority of the respondents in my studies earned their docto-
ates at the following universities:
University 1993 Survey 1995 Survey 2006 Surve.
University of Chicago 8 14 19
University of Wisconsin 10 12 10
Harvard University 10 . 10 20
Columbia University 5 10 14
Yale University 6 7 6
University of Virginia 7 7 9
Stanford University 0 6 9
University of California 4 5 10
(Berkeley)
Princeton University 3 4 6
Temple University 5 4 4
Northwestern University 3 3 2
University of Michigan 0 3 7
University of Washington 0 2 0
Tokyo University 0 2 1
Leading the way in this category was Harvard University, whid
produced 20 Ph.D.s, doubling its 1995 total. The University of Chi
cago was close behind with 19 degrees, representing an increas"
261
of 35.7% from its 1995. Third place honors go to the Columbia
University with 14 degrees, a 40% increase from the last survey.
New to the 2006 survey were the University of California (Santa
Barbara) and McMaster University, with 3 Ph.D.s each, as well as
McGill University, the University of California (Los Angeles), and
the Australian National University, with 2 Ph.D.s each.
In my 1993 survey, 44.9 percent of those responding taught in
various public institutions, while 55.1 percent were employed by
private institutions. The 1995 sample closely mirrors that result,
with 44.4 percent of those responding teaching in various public
institutions, 52.8 percent employed by private institutions, and 2.8
percent employed in other professional settings. In the 2006 sample
50.7% taught in public institutions, 47.4% in private institutions,
and 1.9% in other professional settings. Regarding rank, the fol-
lowing results were obtained:
Rank 1993 Survey 1995 Survey 2006 Survey
Emeritus 2.8% 4.6%
Full Professor 36.0% 33.0% 38.2%
Associate 31.4% 33.0% 27.0%
Professor
Assistant 22.1% 22.7% 23.0%
Professor
Lecturer 3.8% 2.0%
Other 10.5% 4.7% 5.2%
In the 1993 survey, the emeritus rank was combined with Lecturer,
Adjunct Professor, Dean, and Acting Dean. In the 1995 and 2006
surveys a separate category for Emeritus is listed.
In terms of specialization, any comparison between samples
would be incongruous because, for the 1993 sample, only one pri-
mary specialization was recorded for each respondent, while in the
1995 sample, it became clear that in many cases, multiple special-
izations were emphasized. As such, in 1993, 37.0 percent of the
262
CHARLES S. PREBISH
sample reported specializing in Japan/East Asia, while 29.6 pr-
cent reported India/South Asia, 23.5 percent Tibet/Inner Asia, ;.2
percent China/East Asia, 2.5 percent Korea/East Asia, and 1.2 pr-
cent indicated other choices. Bearing in mind that multiple l i s t i ~ s
were allowed in the 1995, yielding a total in excess of 100 percelt,
the survey showed Japan/East Asia and India/South Asia leadilg
the way, with 36.8 percent and 34.9 percent respectively, follo\\d
by Tibet/Inner Asia with 20.8 percent, China/East Asia with II
percent, Korea/East Asia with 1.9 percent, and 2.8 percent indit-
ed other choices. For the 2006 sample, one primary specializatn
only was recorded, yielding 35.5 percent indicating India/Soh
Asia, followed by Japan/East Asia (27.6 percent), China/East Aa
(14.5 percent), Tibet/Inner Asia 11.8 perecent), Korea/East Aa
(2.0 percent), and 8.6 percent indicated other choices.
Area 1995 Percent 2006 Percent
Respondents Respondents
Japan/East Asia 39 36.8 42 27.6
India/South Asia 37 34.9 54 35.5
Tibet/Inner Asia 22 20.8 18 11.8
China/East Asia 16 15.1 22 14.5
Korea/East Asia 2 1.9 3 2.0
Other Areas 3 2.8 13 8.6
Language facility seems to be rather consistent with area speci<t-
ization, taking into account that many scholars develop a multipli!-
ity of language skills, and that Sanskrit appears to be the consistet
foundation language from which other studies in Buddhism pr!-
ceed:
263
Language 1995 Respondents 2006 Respondents
Sanskrit 59 48
Japanese 49 38
Pali/Prakrit 43 38
Chinese 37 34
Tibetan 33 37
Korean
2
Other languages cited in 1995 include Hindi, Sinhalese, Nepali,
Thai, Mongolian, Sogdian, and Vietnamese. In addition to these,
the 2006 sample also yielded citations for Gandhari, Khotanese,
Khmer, Newari, Lao, Uighur, and Burmese.
With regard to membership in professional and learned societ-
ies, Hart's study (p. 809) produced extremely surprising results,
considering the nature of his sample. Of the seven most populated
professional organizations,four had traditionally Asian constituen-
cies: the Association for Asian Studies (2nd; 22 percent), Ameri-
can Oriental Society (4th; 17 percent), International Association
of Buddhist Studies (tied for 6th; 8 percent), and the Society for
Asian and Comparative Philosophy (tied for 6th; 8 percent). Not
unexpectedly, the American Academy of Religion topped the list
with 67 percent, while the Society of Biblical Literature was third
with 19 percent. In the Buddhist Studies sample, a wide variety of
professional societies was noted. Presented below is a comparison
of the 1993, 1995, and 2006 results:
Organization 1993 1995 2006
Percent (No.) Percent (No.) Percent (No.)
Amer. Academy of 75.9% (66) 87.7% (93) 67.1% (102)
Religion
Association for Asian 57.5% (50) 57.8% (61) 42.1% (64)
Studies
264
CHARLES S. PREBISH
Organization 1993 1995 2006
Percent (No.) Percent (No.) Percent (No.)
International Assoc. 43.7% (38) 47.2% (SO) 32.9% (SO)
of Buddhist Studies
Society for Buddhist- 19.5% (17) 20.8% (22) 12.S% (19)
Christian Studies
Society for Asian and 17.2% (IS) lS.1% (16) 7.9% (12)
Compo Philosophy
American Oriental 16.1% (14) 12.3% (13) 11.8% (18)
Society
Society for the Study 10.3% (9) 11.3% (12) 12.S% (19)
of Japanese Religions
Society for the Study 8.0% (7) 11.3% (12) S.9% (9)
of Chinese Religions
Society for Tantric 9.4% (10) 2.6% (4)
Studies
International Assoc. 6.9% (6) 8.S% (9) 3.3% (S)
of Shin Buddhist St.
Pali Text,Society 6.9% (6) 4.7% (S) 9.2% (14)
Other societies garnering multiple mention by the respondents in
the 2006 sample, in decreasing order, include the International
Association for the History of Religion, American Philosophical
Association, American Society for the Study of Religion, and Bud-
dhist Peace Fellowship. As expected, most respondents reported
multiple, and often many, memberships. Many respondents in the
most recent Buddhist Studies sample reported significant offices
and administrative positions in the above societies. These include:
President (24)
American Academy of Religion: Midwest Region, Southeast Region, West-
ern Region (1 each)
American Society for the Study of Religion (2)
Association of Peer-Reviewed Electronic Journals in Religion (1)
Australian Society of Asian and Comparative Philosophy (1)
Canadian Association for Studies of Asia (1)
Canadian Council for Southeast Asian Studies (2)
International Association of for Tu-Yung Studies (1)
International Association for Wonhyo Studies (1)
International Association of Shin Buddhist Studies (1)
International Association of Tibetan Studies (1)
Kuroda Institute for the Study of Buddhism (1)
Sakyadhita: International Association of Buddhist Women (1)
Society for Buddhist-Christian Studies (4)
Society for the Study of Japanese Religions (4)
Vice President (15)
265
American Academy of Religion: Middle Atlantic Region, Southeast Region,
Western Region (1 each)
Association of Peer-Reviewed Electronic Journals in Religion (1)
Australian Society of Asian and Comparative Philosophy (1)
Canadian Association for Studies of Asia (1)
Canadian Association of South Asian Studies (1)
Society for Buddhist-Christian Studies (3)
Treasurer (3)
American Academy of Religion: Japanese Religions Group (1)
American Institute for Sri Lankan Studies (1)
Society for Tantric Studies (1)
Secretary (5)
International Association of Buddhist Studies (1)
Sakyadhita: International Association of Buddhist Women (1)
General Secretary (4)
Institute of Ethics and Politics (1)
Board Member (28)
American Academy of Religion (1)
American Association for the Study of Religion (1)
American Institute of Indian Studies (1)
266
CHARLES S. PREBISH
Association for Asian Studies (2)
Buddhist Peace Fellowship (1)
International Association of Tibetan Studies (1)
Mongolia Society (2)
Nepal Studies Association (1)
Society for Asian and Comparative Studies (1)
Society for Buddhist Christian Studies (4)
Executive Council (9)
American Academy of Religion: Sri Lankan Studies Group (1)
Association for Asian Studies-Korea (1)
Institute for the Study of Religion and Culture (1)
International Council of Thai Studies (1)
Society for Buddhist Christian Studies Advisory Council (1)
Chair/Co-Chair (32)
American Academy of Religion (26)
Asian Religions (1)
Buddhism Section (9)
Buddhist Critical Reflective Group (1)
Buddhist Philosophy Group (1)
Chinese Religions Group (1)
History of Religions Section (1)
Japanese Religions Group (4)
Lesbian and Feminist Issues in Religion (1)
Mid-Atlantic Region-East Asian Chair (1)
Ritual Studies Group (1)
Sacred Space in Contemporary Asia (1)
Steering Committee of the Academic Study and Teaching of Religion
Section (1)
Tibetan and Himalayan Heritage Group (2)
Women's Caucus of the Mid-Atlantic Region (1)
Association for Asian Studies (3)
Committee on Korean Studies (1)
Southeast Asia Council (1)
Sri Lankan Studies Committee (1)
Committee on Buddhist Studies and Computers (1)
International Society for Buddhist Studies (1)
Society for Tantric Studies (1)
Steering Committee (1)
267
In addition, 3 respondents served as regional representatives to in-
ternational societies, 53 served as members of steering commit-
tees, and 9 served on various councils of these societies.
The 1995 and 2006 samples have shown a remarkably high level
of activity in presenting scholarly papers at the annual meetings of
the above professional societies listed above. Additionally, those
sampled have been very active in presenting scholarly papers (not
simply "lectures") in other professional settings such as interna-
tional conferences, regional professional meetings, and thematic
conferences sponsored by various institutions. Adjusting the re-
sults to reflect those who did not respond with information on this
item, the findings show:
Papers at Annual Meeting
Other Scholarly Papers
1995 Sample
4.4 per
respondent
12.2 per
respondent
2006 Sample
6.4 per
respondent
10.5 per
respondent
Thus, the average respondent in the 1995 sample made 16.6 profes-
sional presentations during their academic career, while the aver-
age respondent in the 2006 sample has made 16.9 professional pre-
sentations during their academic career. These figures are slightly
lower than the 19.8 figure reported in the 1993. The 1995 sample
reflects the earlier supposition that this sample is slightly junior to
the previous group of respondents. The same suggestion applies to
the 2006 sample.
268
CHARLES S. PREBlSH
Buddhist Studies as a discipline presents a high magnitude of
success in grant and fellowship acquisition, both during graduate
training and after the granting of the Ph.D. degree. For example,
and adjusting for those who did not respond with information in
this category of inquiry, the 1995 sample reported 2.2 grants per
respondent at the graduate school level. This included such items
as National Defense Education Act Fellowships, Fulbright awards,
and the like, but not assistantships of any kind. With Ph.D. in hand,
all samples then reported:
Grant/Fellowship Agency 1993 1995 2006
Sample Sample Sample
(Number) (Number) (Number)
Nat. Endowment for the 57 73 53
Humanities
Fulbright 35 24 51
Amer. Council of Learned 14 24 20
Societies
Japan Foundation 13 17 20
Social Science Research 8 8 20
Council
American Academy of 5 15
Religion
Lilly Foundation 4 3
Pew Charitable Trusts 4 1
In the 1995 sample, grants from the Ford Foundation, Mellon
Foundation, Danforth Foundation, and Rockefeller Foundation
were cited, along with hundreds of grants internally administered
by the various faculty members' host institutions. In the 2006 sam-
ple, Mellon Foundation grants grew enormously (to 18), followed
by grants from the American Institute of Indian Studies (13), the
Bukky6 Dend6 Ky6kai (Numata Foundation; 9), and Association
for Asian Studies (7). In 1995, national and international grants
yielded 2.1 awards per respondent, while internal university grants
269
totaled 2.4 awards per respondent. In 2006, national and interna-
tional grants yielded 3.9 awards per respondent, while internal uni-
versity grants totaled 1.1 awards per respondent.
Just as the Buddhist Studies samples yielded highly active in-
volvement in professional societies, and significant success in grant
and fellowship acquisition, they also have demonstrated a high de-
gree of accomplishment in securing meaningful editorial positions
with leading academic presses and journals. In 1995, no less than
6 individuals were editors for book series with university presses,
while another 10 sat on university press editorial boards. Presses
represented in this group include Oxford University Press, Indi-
ana University Press, University of California Press, University of
Michigan Press, Princeton University Press, University of Virginia
Press, and the State University of New York Press. Additionally,
19 respondents edited book series for commercial/trade publish-
ers, while another 7 were editorial board members. Some of the
presses cited in this category include Snow Lion, Shambhala, Mo-
tilal Banarsidass, Curzon Press, Wadsworth, Buddhica Britannica,
the Kuroda Institute Series (published by the University of Hawaii
Press), and the AAR Monograph and AAR Texts & Translations
Series (both published by Scholars Press). In the 2006 sample, 9
respondents edited or co-edited book series for university presses.
Presses represented include Oxford University Press, Stanford Uni-
versity Press, Princeton University Press, University of Chicago
Press, and the University of Hawaii Press. Another 13 edited or
co-edited book series for commercial/trade publishers. Some of the
presses cited in this category include Macmillan, Motilal Banarsi-
dass, Wisdom, Routledge, E.J. Brill, Scholars Press, as well as the
Kuroda Institute (associated with the University of Hawaii Press)
and the American Institute of Buddhist Studies (associated with
Columbia University).
Many respondents in the 1995 survey reported major editorial
positions with journals, including:
270
CHARLES S. PREBISH
Editor-in-Chief/Co-Editor (14)
Buddhist- Christian Studies
Buddhist and Tibetan Studies
Critical Review of Books in
Religion
History of Religions
Indo-Judaic Studies
Japanese Journal of Religious
Studies
Journal of Buddhist Ethics
Journal of Buddhist Literature
Korean Culture
Pacific World
Associate/Assistant Editor (9)
Religion
The Eastern Buddhist
History of Religions
Journal of Asian Studies
Journal of Ecumenical Studies
Journal of the Inti. Assoc. of
Buddhist Studies
Journal of Religious Ethics
As well, 9 individuals held Book Review Editorships at Buddhist-
Christian Studies, Journal of Chinese Philosophy, Pacific World,
Philosophy East and West, and Religious Studies Review. Another
2 held Guest Editor positions at Cahirs d'Extreme-Asie, and Jour-
nal of Religious Ethics. Finally, 45 respondents cited positions on
the editorial boards of many of the journals listed above, as well
as the Chung-Hwa Buddhist Studies Journal, Garuda, Gender and
World Religion, Journal of Asian Philosophy, Journal of the Ameri-
can Academy of Religion, Journal of Chinese Religions, Journal of
Comparative Sociology and Religion Journal of Feminist Studies
in Religion, Numen, Soundings, Studies in Central and East Asian
Religion, T'ang Studies, and The Tibet Journal. In the 2006 sample,
we found:
271
Editor-in-Chief/Co-Editor (15)
Buddhist Literature
Religion
Japan Studies Review
Japanese Religions Bulletin
Journal of Feminist Studies in
Religion
Journal of Global Buddhism (3)
Journal of the Barre Center for
Buddhist Studies
Association of
Buddhist Studies (2)
Korean Culture
Sakyadhita: International
Association of Buddhist Women
Associate/Assistant Editor (20)
Buddhist- Christian Studies (2)
Buddhist Studies Review
History of Religions (2)
Journal of Asian and African
Studies
Journal of Asian Culture
Journal of Asian Studies (2)
Journal of Developing Societies
Journal of Ecumenical Studies
Japanese Journal of Religious
Studies
Assoc. of Buddhist Studies
Theosophical History
Korea Journal
Religious Studies Review (2)
Review of the Canadian Studies
Association
Sophia
Additionally, 18 held Book Review Editorships at the Journal of the
American Academy of Religion, Journal of Buddhist Ethics, Jour-
nal of Global Buddhism, Philosophy East and West, Pacific World,
Religious Studies Review, Religion, Indian International Journal
of Buddhist Studies, Buddhist and Tibetan Studies, Australasian
Journal of Philosophy, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Sophia,
Cognitive Science, and Nous. Finally, 65 respondents cited posi-
272
CHARLES S. PREBISH
tions on the editorial boards of many of the journals listed above, as
well as the Harvard Journal of Asian Studies, Journal of Religious
Ethics, and numerous others.
Although it has never been clear how to report scholarly publica-
tion data with precision, Ray Hart's study utilized three categories:
(1) Books, (2) Articles, Essays, Chapters, and (3) Book Reviews.
Hart was only concerned with the immediately past five-year pe-
riod. In other words, Hart presented no career publication data, a
statistic which may well be more revealing than his five year infor-
mation. Thus, in this study, I have confined myself to presenting
only career data. The categories are at once problematic in that
Hart did not distinguish between refereed and non-refereed publi-
cations, a distinction now made in virtually all colleges and univer-
sities. Equally, Hart made no distinction between books authored
and books edited, another distinction that is part of the politically
correct protocol of the American system of higher education.
In an attempt to address the exigencies of that system, I have
sought to refine Hart's categories somewhat in favor of presenting
more meaningful statistics. In so doing, I have separated the book
category into two sub-categories: (a) Books Authored/Co-Authored
and (b) Books Edited/Co-Edited. I have also pared Hart's Articles,
Essays, Chapters category into Refereed Articles and Chapters (tak-
ing the stand, not shared in all university evaluations, that most, if
not all, chapters are indeed refereed in some fashion, quite often
bringing to bear a higher standard than in many refereed journals).
In my schema, the following career results can be reported:
7 This category was not separated in the first survey, but redesigned in
the second.
8 Only 72 respondents listed book reviews, and this is reflected in the
statistical average.
9 Only 116 respondents listed book reviews, and this is reflected in
273
Category of 1993 Sample 1995 Sample 2006 Sample
Publication Average (No.) Average (No.). Average (No.)
Books Authored/ 2.4 (209) 2.3 (239) 2.4 (367)
Co-Authored
Books Edited/Co- 1.7 (148) 1.1 (116) 1.6 (245)
Edited
Refereed Articles 16.8 (1462)1 7.3 (769) 6.2 (944)
Refereed Chapters 6.5 (689) 8.2 (1243)
Book Reviews 12.7 (1105) 12.9 (962)8 7.6 (1154)9
Allowing adjustment of the sample to reflect career duration, the
three sets of results are remarkably similar. Further, by refining
the data collection in the 1995 sample it was possible to determine
that 126 of the 355 books reported were published with univer-
sity presses. In the 2006 sample, 239 of the 612 books reported
were published with university presses. Allowing for multiple au-
thorship/editorship, it was possible to name and rank those book
publishers most often utilized as publication avenues for Buddhist
Studies. As such, we can offer the following ranked list:
1O
the statistical average. Calculated on the basis of the actual number of
respondents who submitted book reviews, the average is 9.95.
10 To some extent, in the 1995 Sample, with regard to trade/commer-
cial publishers, the personal favorites of a number of prolific authors are
reflected. As such, the citations for Prentice-Hall and Tungta reflect the
publications of Robert Ellwood and Charles Fu, respectively. Other uni-
versity presses mentioned include Indiana University Press, University of
Virginia Press, Stanford University Press, and the University of Michi-
gan Press. Other trade publishers mentioned frequently include Allen &
Unwin, Harper & Row, M.D. Gunasena, Peter Lang, St. Martin's Press,
Curzon Press, HarperCollins, Beacon, Wadsworth, Scholars Press, Ani-
ma, Eerdmans, Munshiram Manoharlal, Mellen Press, Westminster, and
Mouton. In the 2006 Sample, Ellwood's publications again supported
Prentice-Hall, while Steven Heine's and Dale Wright's publications sup-
ported Oxford University Press.
274
CHARLES S. PREBISH
UNIVERSITY PRESSES
1995 Sample
1. State University of New York
Press
2. University of Hawaii Press
3. Princeton University Press
4. University of California Press
5. Oxford University Press
6. University of Chicago Press
7. Columbia University Press
8. Cambridge University Press
9. Penn State University Press
(tie)
University of S. Carolina Press
(tie)
TRADE PRESSES
1995 Sample
1. Snow Lion
2. Prentice-Hall
3. E.J. Brill (tie)
Motilal Banarsidass (tie)
5. Tungta (tie)
Wisdom Publications (tie)
7. Shambhala (tie)
Greenwood Press (tie)
Orbis (tie)
2006 Sample
1. University of Hawaii Press
2. State University of New York
Press
3. Oxford University Press
4. Princeton University Press
5. University of California Press
6. Columbia University Press
7. University of Chicago Press
8. Wilfrid Laurier University
Press
9. Harvard University Press (tie)
Penn State University Press
(tie)
Cambridge University Press
(tie)
2006 Sample
1. Snow Lion
2. Wisdom Publications
3. Roudedge/Curzon
4. E.J. Brill
5. Prentice-Hall
6. Harper Collins
7. Shambhala
8. Motilal Banarsidass
9. Peter Lang (tie)
. 275
Asian Humanities Press
(tie)
Macmillan (tie)
Asian Humanities Press
(tie)
Continuum (tie)
Orbis (tie)
Allen & Unwin (tie)
It is also possible to determine a ranked list of refereed journals
most often utilized as a publication outlet by the overall sample.
Comparison of the 1995 and 2006 Samples shows remarkable con-
sistency in the journals most favored by the scholars in the survey.
One notable addition to the journals list in the 2006 sample is the
online Journal of Buddhist Ethics, the first such journal to join this
exclusive list. This list includes:
ll
JOURNALS
1995 Sample
1. History of Religions
2. Buddhist-Christian Studies
2006 Sample
1. Journal of the International
Association of Buddhist
Studies
2. Buddhist Christian Studies
11 In the 1995 Sample, at least two cases, journals cited reflect the per-
sonal favorites of two prolific scholars: Journal of Chinese Philosophy (for
Charles Fu) and Studia Missionalia (for Alex Wayman). Other journals
receiving significant numbers of citations include: Cahiers d'Extreme-
Asie, Religious Studies Review, Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies,
Journal of the Pali Text Society, Journal of Feminist Studies of Religion,
Indo-Iranian Journal, Journal of Buddhist Ethics, Journal of Religious
Ethics, Buddhist Studies Review, and Korean Culture. In the 2006 Sample,
other journals receiving significant numbers of citations include: Cahiers
d'Extreme-Asie, Religious Studies Review, Journal of Chinese Religions,
Journal of Contemporary Buddhism, Indo-Iranian Journal, Religious
Studies, Japanese Religions, and Journal of Chinese Philosophy.
276 CHARLES S. PREBISH
1995 Sample 2006 Sample
3. Journal of the International
Association of Buddhist
Studies
4. Philosophy East and West
5. The Eastern Buddhist
6. Journal of the American
Academy of Religion
7. Japanese Journal of Religious
Studies
Oriental Society
9. Pacific World
to. Tibet Journal
11. Numen
11. Journal of Indian Philosophy
13. The Journal of Asian Studies
13. Religion
13. Monumenta Nipponica
13. Journal of Religious Studies
13. Studia Missionalia
13. Journal of Chinese Philosophy
Institutional Results
3. Japanese Journal of Religious
Studies
4. History of Religions
Academy of Religion
6. Philosophy East and West
7. Pacific World
8. The Eastern Buddhist
9. Journal of Indian Philosophy
to. Journal of Buddhist Ethics
11. Journal of Religious Ethics
12. The Tibet Journal
13. Journal of Feminist Studies in
Religion
14. Journal of Asian Studies
Oriental Society
15. Monumenta Nipponica
On the surface, it would appear that tracking institutional programs
in Buddhist Studies should be quite easy. One might simply turn
first to those universities, listed earlier, which produced the largest
numbers of doctoral degrees among the respondents to the individ-
ual portion of the survey. By cross-referencing with the latest Di-
rectory of Departments and Programs of Religious Studies in North
277
America (edited by David G. Truemper), and with the appropriate
portion of the World Wide Web pages maintained by these major
universities, the results ought to be readily apparent. One could
then add to the tracking process by following where the recipients
of these doctoral degrees are currently employed. To some extent,
that was how I compiled my 1993 results, although the World Wide
Web was far less useful at that time.
In 1993, I reported that only two North American universities
had more than three full-time faculty members whose work falls
within the discipline of Buddhology: the University of Virginia
and the University of Chicago. Additionally, I reported that Har-
vard University, Columbia University, the University of Michigan,
Princeton University, and McMaster University had three full-time
Buddhist Studies faculty members as well; a much larger list of
universities with two Buddhist Studies faculty was cited.
However, like all disciplines, Buddhist Studies is continually
changing, primarily as a result of faculty relocation, altered in-
terests, retirement, and new hires from the continually increasing
number of newly minted scholars entering the field. In the latest
(2006) survey, Harvard University now has nine faculty members
actively involved in Buddhist Studies. Columbia University has six
scholars, while the University of Washington and the University of
Wisconsin have five. Many universities, including Princeton, Vir-
ginia, Chicago, UCLA, Emory, and the University of California at
Berkeley have four. This represents a huge move forward overalL
Jose Cabezon accurately points out: "For about a decade or so, bud-
dhologists in North America have found employment in increasing
numbers in departments of religious studies and schools of theol-
ogy. Often this has meant that we have had to expand our pedagogi-
cal repertoire beyond courses in Buddhist Studies to accommodate
the curricular need of these institutions."12 After surveying a num-
12 Jose Cabez6n, "Buddhist Studies as a Discipline and the Role of
Theory," Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 18,
no. 2 (Winter 1995), 255.
278
CHARLES S. PREBISH
ber of issues having impact on Buddhist Studies, Cabezon goes on
to conclude:
All of these factors have contributed to what we might call the di-
versification of the buddhologist: a movement away from classical
Buddhist Studies based on the philological study of written texts,
and toward the investigation of more general, comparative and often
theoretical issues that have implications (and audiences) outside of
Buddhist Studies. Some colleagues have resigned themselves to this
situation: a set of circumstances that must be tolerated for the sake of
gainful employment. Others - and I count myself in this camp - have
found the pressure to greater diversification intellectually stimulating,
affording an opportunity to enter into broader conversations where
Buddhist texts are one, but not the only, voice.
13
Thus it is no longer completely clear what constitutes a full-time
Buddhologist, and when one factors in the movement in the oppo-
site direction - scholars from other disciplines incorporating Bud-
dhist materials into their work - the entire issue of listing the num-
ber of full-time Buddhologists in any unit becomes quite murky.
One such attempt to at least begin the task of surveying insti-
tutions was undertaken by Duncan Williams (while at Harvard
University). Williams devised a number of classificatory categories
(with his choice of institutions to be appropriately placed):14
Practitioner-Friendly Institutions
California Institute of Integral Studies
Graduate Theological Union
Hsi Lai University
Institute of Buddhist Studies
Naropa Institute
Most Comprehensive Programs
Harvard University
Indiana University
13 Ibid., 255-56.
14 Williams, "Where to Study?" Tricycle: The Buddhist Review 6, no. 3
Spring 1997),68-69, 115-17.
University of Chicago
University of Hawaii at Manoa
University of Michigan
University of Virginia
Institutions with Strength in East Asian Buddhist Studies
Princeton University
Stanford University
University of Arizona
University of California at Los Angeles
University of California at Santa Barbara
University of Pennsylvania
Yale University
Institutions with Strength in Indo-Tibetan Buddhist Studies
Harvard University
University of Michigan
University of Virginia
University of Washington
279
Institutions with Strength in Southeast Asian Buddhist Studies
Harvard University
University of Chicago
Other Noteworthy Programs
Columbia University
University of California at Berkeley
University of Texas at Austin
University of Wisconsin
While the attempt was admirable, then and now, the results re-
flect precisely the kind of dilemma of uncertainty suggested by
Cabez6n: what to include and what not to include, and who counts
where? For example, it might be possible to argue that the Nyingma
Institute and Barre Center for Buddhist Studies each have far more
developed Buddhist Studies programs than the more academical-
ly diversified Graduate Theological Union (whose faculty listing
notes ''Access to professors at The Institute of Buddhist Studies" ...
hardly an endorsement for inclusion in this list) or California Insti-
tute of Integral Studies. In some cases, Williams' choices appear
280
CHARLES S. PREBISH
rather arbitrary as well.
15
To further complicate the circumstance,
because of changing employment patterns, by 2006, many of Wil-
liams' classificatory judgments are clearly no longer accurate or
appropriate.
Conclusion
There is little doubt that the 2006 sample of Buddhist Studies
scholars in North America shows some obvious and expected sta-
tistical deviance from the earlier samples, each conducted more
than a decade ago. The new study shows a significant change in
gender status with almost one-fourth of the field now occupied by
women. Additionally, the sample is almost one full decade younger
with respect to the date at which the terminal degree was earned.
On the other hand, the sample seems quite stable with respect to
the leading Ph.D. producing universities, with Harvard, Chicago,
Columbia, Wisconsin, and the University of California at Berkeley
continuing to lead the way. Equally, employment remains almost
-
15 When Williams's list was published, the University of Wisconsin,
which was one of only two universities in the United States to offer a
Ph.D. in Buddhist Studies at that time, was omitted from the "Most Com-
prehensive Programs" list and cited only as a "Noteworthy Program."
Impending or recent retirements notwithstanding, the University of Wis-
consin continues to offer a complete and comprehensive curriculum in
Buddhist Studies with several primary faculty and several other ancillary
faculty. In some cases, an institution was listed on the basis of one very
strong scholar, while others were omitted despite several strong scholars.
There were omissions, too. Some scholars who merited inclusion in his
tally were simply left out. Finally, it is clear that when Williams uses
the term "America," he actually means "United States," as no mention at
all was made of Canadian universities, a number of which boast strong
Buddhist Studies faculties, such as McMaster University. The University'
of Calgary could easily have been included as well. The above critique
should by no means be construed as demeaning. Rather, it merely high-
lights that the problem of identifying and classifying the Buddhist Stud-
ies academic landscape is significantly more difficult than first meets the
eye. Quite simply, there is no easy way to synthesize faculty size.
281
evenly split between public and private universities. India/South
Asia continues to lead the way in area specialization, with Japan/
East Asia, China/East Asia, and Tibet/Inner Asia following. Curi-
ously, there is a significant drop in Japan/East Asia specialization.
Language training follows a similar path with Sanskrit dwarfing
the other languages, while Pali, Chinese, Japanese, and Tibetan
remain almost equal. As expected, the American Academy of Reli-
gion, Association for Asian Studies, and International Association
of Buddhist Studies lead the way in professional affiliations. Bud-
dhist Studies scholars play a markedly leading role in these and
other societies with 24 members having held the role of president,
15 vice president, 28 board members, and 32 as Chair/Co-Chair of
individual units (with 26 of these in AAR). Those surveyed also
played a significant editorial role for book publishers and profes-
sional journals. In the latest sample, 9 members edited book se-
ries for university presses, while another 13 served in this role for
trade/commercial publishers. Another 15 were Editor/Co-Editor of
scholarly journals, with 20 serving as Associate/Assistant Editor,
representing a significant rise from the 1995 sample.
Scholarly activity has seemed remarkably similar in all three
surveys. With respect to book publication, the three surveys tallied
4.1 books, 3.4 books, and 4.0 books chronologically. The leading
university presses, in order, were Hawaii, SUNY, Oxford, Princ-
eton, University of California, and Columbia; while the leading
trade presses include Snow Lion, Wisdom, and Routledge/Curzon.
Similarly, combined articles and chapters yielded 16.8, 13.8, and
14.4 chronologically. The leading journals include (in ranking or-
der) Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies,
Buddhist-Christian Studies, Japanese Journal of Religious Studies,
History of Religion, Journal of the American Academy of Religion,
Philosophy East and West, Pacific World, Eastern Buddhist, and the
Journal of Buddhist Ethics. In the 1995 sample, scholars presented
a total of 16.6 papers, while the 2006 sample yielded 16.9 papers.
Grant activity was significant as well, with National Endowment
for the Humanities and Fulbright awards leading the way, followed
282
CHARLES S. PREBISH
by the American Council of Learned Society, Social Science Re-
search Council, and the Japan Foundation.
There is little doubt that the latest sample demonstrates that the
discipline of Buddhist Studies is growing, thriving, and making a
most significant impact on the study of religion in North America.
Its impact can be witnessed in the overwhelming success of the
Buddhism Section of the American Academy of Religion which,
in its twenty-five year history has grown to become perhaps the
most influential unit in the AAR. Although not reported in any data
collected to date, it is also significant to note that the overall dis-
cipline has shown an enormous growth in the number of "scholar
practitioners" now teaching in universities and colleges throughout
North America. The implications of this development have yet to
be fully studied. Clearly, it will be interesting to note how the next
decade of Buddhist Studies scholars fares with respect to the above
categories studied.
THE CHANGING FIELD OF BUDDHIST
STUDIES IN NORTH AMERICA
JOSE IGNACIO CABEZON
This paper focuses on some of the changes that have taken place in the field
of Buddhist Studies in North America
1
during the last three decades. After
a brief overview of the past of the field to provide some context for these
shifts, the discussion turns to some of the more salient intellectual and insti-
tutional changes that have taken place in Buddhist Studies - changes in what
we study, and in how we study it, but also the institutional transformations
taking place. While generaIIy optimistic about the direction that Buddhist
Studies is taking in the United States and Canada, this essay also points to
some challenges that lie ahead.
I. The past of the field
2
To understand the intellectual and institutional changes that have
taken place in Buddhist Studies in North America, we need to re-
hearse something of the past of the field. As is by now well known,
the founding figures of Buddhology were concerned almost exclu-
sively with texts, and not with "texts" in the broad way we under-
stand the term today, but with written documents. Early Buddholo-
gists were interested in these documents not so much because of
what they told us about the people or societies in which the texts
were written, but because of the ideas (the doctrines and philoso-
phy), contained within them. Classical Buddhology, therefore, was
principally the study of the ideas found in classical Buddhist texts.
1 While the focus ofthis paper is North America, some of the trends men-
tioned below will also be found in European scholarship, as will be attested
to by some of the references found in the notes.
2 This section of the paper draws on the essays that appeared in the Jour-
nal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, vol. 18, no. 2 (1995),
especially those by Gomez, Cabezon and Tillemans.
Volume 30 Number 1-22007 (2009) pp. 283-298
284
JOSE IGNACIO CABEZ6N
The method for accessing these ideas was, of course, philology.
Classical Buddhology presupposed that its goal and method were
relatively straightforward and unproblematic: to gain a sense of the
earliest (and therefore the "purest") form of Buddhism - a form
of Buddhism unsullied by later "cultural developments" - through
methods that, being modeled on the natural sciences, were seen
as relatively objective. Just as the subjectivity of the scientist was
irrelevant to the doing of science, so too the subjectivity of the Bud-
dhologist was seen as more or less irrelevant to the study of Bud-
dhism. The "science of philology" would provide the scholar ac-
cess to the text as it had "left the hands either of its author, editor or
translator."3 Once the text had been "established," its meaning - the
author's intention - could be gleaned. Throughout this process, the
Buddhologist was (at least ideally) transparent, like a piece of glass,
neither adding to nor subtracting anything from what was already
present in the text itself.4
3 Christian Lindtner, "Editors and Readers," in Lama Doboom Tulku,
ed., Buddhist Translations: Problems and Perspectives (New Delhi: Mano-
har, 1995), p. 197; see also p. 194.
4 In Lindtner's words: "A Buddhist philologist['s) ... highest authority
ought to be reason and common sense. He is willing to go wherever these
authorities intend to lead him. He wants to study these ideas and their de-
velopment in a given context from a historical point of view. His personal
beliefs about the value of these ideas is irrelevant to his professional work ...
It goes without saying that a Buddhist philologist would never even dream of
reading feminist or other modern ideas into his text." ("Editors and Readers,"
pp. 193-94.) Although Lindtner recognizes that gleaning a text's meaning in-
volves an act of interpretation, he hastens to add: "When I speak of interpre-
tation, I do not wish to be misunderstood. I do not mean that we should look
upon the old texts through the dim and coloured glasses of, say, Marx, Freud,
Adler, Jung, Wittgenstein, Adorno, Chomsky, Neils Bohr, Levi-Strauss, or
other neo-intellectuals whose rather peculiar way of thinking has had, in
my opinion, a most obnoxious impact on modern academic life." ("Editors
and Readers," p. 198.) Lindtner, of course, is a contemporary scholar, but his
words reflect the earlier philological perspective I am attempting to charac-
terize here.
THE CHANGING FIELD OF BUDDHIST STUDIES IN NORTH AMERICA 285
Early Buddhology was concerned not with just any set of texts
and ideas. It was concerned with classical texts largely because of
the (often unspoken) presupposition, inherited from the European
Renaissance, that ancient and classical culture was more pure and
worthy of study, a highpoint in civilization, the pinnacle of human
achievement from which point there had been a steady decline. To
the extent that there was a concern with non-texual culture at all,
there was a concern with elite institutions: with the culture of the
writers of texts, which in the case of Buddhism were almost ex-
clusively monks. Because of the preoccupation with origins, early
Buddhology also tended to privilege Sanskrit and Pali Buddhist
literature, with the study of Chinese Buddhist texts a close second.
The study of Buddhism in other societies - societies in which Bud-
dhism entered at a later date - tended to be neglected, or even when
not, these subfields were seen at best as handmaidens of Buddhist
Indology. Hence, Tibetan Buddhist Studies, to take one example,
was not seen as an autonomous area of Buddhology, but was in-
stead considered a suppliment to the study of Indian Buddhism.
As late as the 1970s we find David Seyfort Ruegg arguing for the
autonomy of Tibetan Buddhist Studies, indicating the persistence
of this mind set up to recent times.
5
For all its concerns with origins, classical Buddhology was
largely ahistorical. Being focussed principally on texts and on the
ideas found in them, early Buddhologists were usually concerned
5 David Seyfort Ruegg, "The Study of Tibetan Philosophy and Its Indian
Sources," in Louis Ligeti, ed., Proceedings of the Csoma de Koras Memorial
Symposium Held at Matrafiired, Hungary, 24-30 September, 1976 (Buda-
pest: Akademiai Kiad6, 1978), pp. 378-391. As Professor Seyfort Ruegg (pp.
384-85) states, "it is a striking fact that even in a large number of institutions
which pursue Asiatic studies that require or could benefit from its repre-
sentation Tibetology, far from having acquired full droit de cite, has still to
establish so much as a foothold ... [a] rather circumscribed recognition ... To
make regular progress Tibetology must be adequately established as a sub-
ject of enquiry in its own right, rather than as a mere appendage of another
SUbject."
286
JOSE IGNACIO CABEZ6N
at most with dating the authors of these texts and with issues 01
relative chronology. They were not concerned with history in our
sense of the word today. For example, very few scholars wrote on
the social, political and economic context of the societies in which
Buddhism flourished even in classical times, much less in the mod-
ern period.
Early Buddhologists were also usually armchair scholars who
worked with texts that had been sent to Europe and North America
by missionaries and colonial officers. Rarely did they go into the
field. And rarely did they speak the languages that they read. All
of this, of course, led to a strong dichotomy between scholars and
the object of their study. Whether Buddhism and Buddhists were
idealized or denigrated, one thing was clear: "we" were not "them."
There was little meeting ground for the twain.
6
Finally - and this perhaps hardly needs saying, given the tech-
nology of the period in question - there was one medium for schol-
arship, the printed word; and one repository, the physical library.
The picture I have painted is of course simplified. There were
always, among the early Buddhologists, exceptions to the rule.
7
But
6 Hence, there was often a privileging of the textual sources and a dispar-
agement of the interpretations of living representatives of the tradition - and
this despite the words of one of the founding figures of Buddhist Studies,
who believed that consulting "living oracles," i.e" infomants, could on occa-
sion be valuable: "Whatever may be the general intellectual inferiority of the
orientals of our day, or the plastic facility of change peculiar to every form
of polytheism, let him [the scholar] not suppose that the living followers of
Buddha cannot be profitably interrogated touching the creed they live and
die in." Brian Houghton Hodgson, Essays on the Languages, Literatures, and
Religion of Nepal and Tibet (New Delhi: ManjurI Publishing House, 1972,
repro of the 1841 ed.), p. 100.
7 One thinks here, for example, of Alexander Csoma de K6ros (1784-
1842), arguably the founder of modern Tibetan Studies, who not only lived
his entire scholarly life in India and the Himalayas, but who also learned
spoken Tibetan, working closely with native informants. Although he was
one of the earliest writers on the Tibetan Buddhist canon, Csoma also wrote
although painted in broad strokes, the picture is not, I think, inac-
curate.
II. Intellectual shifts in the field
How then has Buddhist Studies changed? The shifts that most con-
cern me here are ones that have occurred principally in the last
three decades, which is to say in our own lifetime. These changes
have been quite profound. They are transformations in what we
study, in how we study it, in the tools at our disposal, and in the
media we use to disseminate our research.
First, what we study. The notion of "text" has exploded. This is
not to say that we no longer study written doctrinal and philosophi-
cal texts. Certainly we do. Indeed, in just the past few years there
has been something of a renaissance in doctrinal studies. But today
we are as interested in the context as we are in the content of such
texts.
8
For example, we not only study what the great texts say, but
how they were produced and used: the use of texts in educational
institutions, the patterns of patronage, the historical evolution of
book production, and so forth.9 And alongside doctrinal texts, we
also now study narratives, poetry and plays.1O We still study the
on a variety of other subjects.
8 An attempt to provide such a multi-disciplinary context is to be found,
e.g., in John Cliff or Holt, The Religious World of Kirti Sri: Buddhism, Art and
Politics of Late Medieval Sri Lanka (New York: Oxford University Press,
1996).
9 See, for example, Anne Blackburn, Buddhist Learning and Textual
Practice in Eighteenth-Century Lankan Monastic Culture (Princeton: Princ-
eton University Press, 2001); Justin McDaniel, Gathering Leaves and Lifting
Words: Intertextuality and Buddhist Monastic Education in Laos and North-
ern Thailand (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009); and Kurtis R.
Schaeffer, The Culture of the Book in Tibet (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2009).
10 See Paula Richman, Imagining a Place for Buddhism: Literary Culture
and Religious Community in Tamil-Speaking South India (Oxford: Oxford
288
works of elite monks, but increasingly we also study the oral and
literary traditions of the Buddhist laity.u We not only study what
Buddhists have written and what they think, but also what they
do - from complex monastic rituals to popular practicesY We also
now explore non-verbal "texts," reading Buddhism through the
lens of material culture.13 In short, realizing that our studies had
yielded a very incomplete picture of Buddhism, one that excluded
most of what Buddhists actually did, we have increasingly turned
our attention as a corrective precisely to those areas that had previ-
ously been neglected.
University Press, 2001); and Sarah J. Horton, Living Buddhist Statues in
Early Medieval and Modern Japan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007),
which, inter alia, relies on popular tales and poetry as source materials.
11 See, for example, Mark Halperin, Out of the Cloister: Literati Perspec-
tives on Buddhism in Sung China, 960-1279 (Harvard: Harvard University
Asia Center, 2006).
12 One thinKs here of two volumes edited by Donald S. Lopez, Buddhism
in Practice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995) and Religions of
Tibet In Practice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), but also of
a variety of other works that emphasize ritual and practice in Buddhist Asia:
e.g., Esben Andreasen, Popular Buddhsim in Japan: Buddhist Religion and
Culture (Surrey: RoutledgeCurzon, 1998); Rita Langer, Buddhist Rituals of
Death and Rebirth: Contemporary Sri Lankan Practice and Its Origins (New
York: Routledge, 2007); Donald K. Swearer, Becoming Buddha: The Ritual
of Image Consecration in Thailand (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2007); and Jose Ignacio Cabez6n, ed., Tibetan Ritual (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, forthcoming).
13 See, for example, Kevin Trainor, Relics, Ritual and Representation in
Buddhism: Rematerialising the Sri Lankan Theravada Tradition (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997); John Kieschnick, The Impact of Bud-
dhism on Chinese Material Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2003); Fabio Rambelli, Buddhist Materiality: A Cultural History of Objects in
Japanese Buddhism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007); and David
Germano and Kevin Trainor, eds., Embodying the Dharma: Buddhist Relic
Veneration in Asia (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007).
Classical Buddhology, as already mentioned, was largely tex-
tual and antiquarian, and its focus was on elite institutions. Bud-
dhist Studies today, by contrast, is also concerned with non-elite
institutions and practices that are in many instances hybrids of
Buddhist and non-Buddhist religious elements.
14
We continue to be
interested in classical Buddhist institutions (for examples, monas-
teries) but also now in new religious movements, movements that
are often non-monastic and that are considered (by elite Buddhists
at least) to transgress the bounds of orthodoxy. From an almost
exclusive concern with men and monks, we are now also interested
in the religiosity of Buddhist women and nuns.
15
And we are also
interested in the way that Buddhism crosses national boundaries,
including its particular manifestations in the West.
16
If what we study has changed, so too has how we study it, which
is to say that there has been a shift in our methods. Eschewing
broad generalizations, our studies now deal with more specific pe-
riods, places, individuals and institutions. The relative ahistoricism
of early Buddhology has also been replaced by a keen historical
14 See, for example, John C. Holt, The Buddhist V i $ ~ u : Religious Transof-
rmation, Politics and Culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004);
and Robert DeCaroli, Haunting the Buddha: Indian Popular Religions and
the Formation of Buddhism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
15 See, for example, Paula Arai, Women Living Zen: Japanese Soto Bud-
dhist Nuns (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Kim Gutsehow, Being a
Buddhist Nun: The Struggle for Enlightenment in the Himalayas (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2004); Janet Gyatso and Hanna Havnevik,
Women in Tibet: Past and Present (New York: Columbia University Press,
2005); and Tessa J. Bartholomeusz, Women Under the Bo Tree: Buddhist
Nuns in Sri Lanka (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
16 See, for example, Charles S. Prebish, Luminous Passage: The Prac-
tice and Study of Buddhism in America (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1999); Charles S. Prebish, Westward Dharma: Buddhism Beyond Asia
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Sally Meara, Land of Beau-
tiful Vision: Making a Buddhist Sacred Place in New Zealand (Honolulu:
University of Hawaii Press, 2007); and a variety of articles in the Journal of
Global Buddhism at http://www.globalbuddhism.org.
290
consciousness that seeks to contexualize Buddhist doctrines, prac-
tices and institutions within multiple contexts - social, political
and economic. Moreover, scholars no longer sit in armchairs. They
go into the field, and they often learn the spoken languages of the
cultures they study. Methodologically, Buddhologists increasingly
find themselves asking questions about rhetoric, power, material
culture, the production of goods, and forms of exchange, thereby
bringing the methods of literary theory, political science and eco-
nomics to bear on their studies.
Finally, information technology has revolutionized the field in
ways that we never could have imagined. Those of us who con-
tinue to work on classical texts now have at our disposal resources
unimaginable when we were beginning our graduate work. In the
subfield of Tibetan Buddhist Studies, to take the example with
which I am most familiar, we now have available a wealth of texts
and reference works that make our work easier and more efficient.
These include catalogues and databases of huge textual corpuses,
some of which had never even been previously catalogued. We
are also jus.t a click away from important collections of scanned
books and journals, Buddhist texts in PDF format, and (perhaps
most important) digitized searchable texts that make possible in a
few moments the answer to questions that would have previously
taken months if not years - for example, finding every instance of
a single term throughout the entire canon.
Most of the Buddhist canonical collections in the major Bud-
dhist languages - Pali, Sanskrit, Chinese, Korean, and Tibetan -
are either already available in digital form or else are in the process
of being input, sometimes even in multiple languages side-by-side.
Large bodies of post-canonical literature also exist as searchable
text. While we are still a long way from seeing all available Bud-
dhist literature as digital text, this is now at least imaginable.
The internet, moreover, has made possible the dissemination
of a vast amount of non-textual material that was previously inac-
cessible to scholars: art,17 of course, but also important historical
archives of photographs,18 films,19 and cartographical resources,20
some of them even interactive. These digital tools are also radi-
cally transforming pedagogy. Searchable dictionaries and online
video language-teaching tools are changing the nature of language
instruction. Online multimedia resources provide students with the
ability to hear and see what they are being exposed to in the me-
dium of the written word. We now even have our own digital text-
books in Buddhist Studies.
21
The next step, one which we have yet to take to any great extent,
is to think more systematically about the dissemination of research
in refereed digital publications. This is going to be a major issue in
years to come. University presses are increasingly loathe to pub-
lish specialized academic monographs, and scholars are going to
have to find alternative venues for their work. Or rather, we are go-
ing to have to create the infrastructure for new forms of academic
publishing, like peer-reviewed journals and digital monograph se-
ries. The web is an ideal place for publishing specialized academic
work, not only because of its relatively low cost, but also because
of the possibility of incorporating multi-media resources (images,
17 See, for example, Himayalan Art Resources at http://www.himala-
yanart.org; and the Huntington Archive of Buddhist and Related Art at
http://kaladarshan.arts.ohio-state.edu/.
18 See, for example, The Tibet Album: British Photography in Central
Tibet 1920-1950 at http://tibet.prm.ox.ac.uk/index.php.
19 The Frederick Williamson Collection of films about Sikkim, Bhutan
and Tibet is available at http://www.digitalhimalaya.com/collections/wil-
liamson/williamsonfilms.php.
20 See, for example, an interactive map of the hermitages that surround
Sera Monastery in Tibet: http://www.thlib.org/places/monasteries/sera/
hermitages/. This is part of the author's Sera Project.
21 See, for example, Charles S. Prebish and Damien Keown, Buddhism:
The Ebook, described at http://www.jbeonlinebooks.org/Buddhism/in-
dex.htm.
292
video, etc.) into scholarly publications. Some examples of this al-
ready exist,22 but we are going to have to be more intentional about
moving this process forward - for example, by creating the appar-
tus for the peer-review of digital publications, the chief mechanism
for quality-control within the field.
Broadly speaking, what the field has shifted to can perhaps be
subsumed under the rubric of Culture Studies. There has been in
Buddhist Studies, just as there has been in the Humanities general-
ly, a "cultural turn." But over and above the turn to culture broadly
speaking, there has been a turn to Cultural Studies, a unique field
(or perhaps better perspective) with a number of distinctive attri-
butes. In Buddhist Cultural Studies we find, first, a flattening out of
data hierarchies. Rather than privileging the classical and textual
as data, we are now interested in Buddhist culture in all its mani-
festations, elite as well as kitschy, "pure" as well as hybrid, classical
as well as modern, and not just in Asia, but everywhere that Bud-
dhism is found. The Cultural Studies approach has also brought
with it a certain amount of self-reflection and self-criticism, as we
have turned our attention from the study of Buddhism to the study
of the study of Buddhism (that is, to the study ofthe field), and from
the study of Buddhists to the study of those who study Buddhists
(namely, Buddhologists).23
22 The Journal of Buddhist Ethics (http://www.buddhistethics.org), the
Journal of the International Association of Tibetan Studies (http://www.
jiats.org), and Revue d'Etudes Tibetaines (http://www.digitalhimalaya.
com/collections/journals/ret/).
23 Several works come to mind as representative of this approach: Donald
S. Lopez, Jr., ed., Curators of the Buddha: The Study of Buddhism under Co-
lonialism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), and Donald S. Lo-
pez, Jr., Prisoners of Shangri-la: Tibetan Buddhism and the West (Chicago:
University of Chicago. Press, 1999). But see also Thierry Dodin and Heinz
Rather, Imagining Tibet: Realities, Projections and Fantasies (Boston: Wis-
dom Publications, 2001); Martin Brauen, Dreamworld Tibet: Western Illu-
sions (Trumbull, CT: Weatherhill, 2004); and David L. McMahan, The Mak-
ing of Buddhist Mondernism (New York: Oxford University press, 2008).
In addition to the transformation of the field already mentioned,
we have also seen the emergence of unexpected new areas of
study within the North American academy. Buddhist Theological
Studies,24 for example, includes a variety of subfields such as Femi-
nist Studies, Ethics, Contemplative Studies, and Buddhist Ministe-
rial Studies.
None of the shifts just described, including the digital and cul-
tural turns, and perhaps especially Cultural Studies, are of course,
without their problems. One sometimes wonders whether it is all
for the good. Will the field become fragmented: those who special-
ize in texts and doctrines, those who focus on culture and practices,
and those who specialize on the study of material artifacts? As we
move into increasingly smaller and more specialized ghettoes, will
this lead to balkanization? Will the cultural turn lead to decreased
mastery of the great texts? For all the tedium involved in searching
for a quote or a term through hundreds of pages of texts, the fact
remains that previous generations of scholars were forced to read
those hundreds of pages. What are the implications of the point and
click approach (as I call it in my more cynical moment) to textual
studies? And what are the implications of what I have called the
flattening out of data hierarchies? Will studies of the meaning of
plastic squeeky buddhas replace the study of the Buddhist "great
books"? Finally, will our present self-reflection on the field and on
the Buddhologist degenerate into a kind of narcissism? There is no
denying that these are all dangers, but in truth I do not see these
dangers materializing, at least not yet. Instead, the various shifts
mentioned, I believe, have been quite salutary for the field as a
whole.
24 See John Makransky and Roger R. Jackson, eds., Buddhist Theology:
Critical Reflections by Contemporary Buddhist Scholars (Surrey: Routledge-
Curzon, 1999).
294
III. Changing institutional patterns
The field has changed intellectually, but it has also changed insti-
tutionally. Initially located almost exclusively within area studies
departments, or in language and literature programs,25 in North
America graduate Buddhist Studies has increasingly moved in the
direction of Religious Studies.
26
While most of the area-studies
graduate programs are still active, we find graduate programs in-
creasingly housed within religious studies department. 27 Some pro-
grams
28
straddle the area studies/religious studies divide, with one
foot in each camp.
Not only have North American Buddhist Studies graduate pro-
grams moved into Religious Studies departments, the graduates of
Buddhist Studies programs increasingly find employment in Reli-
gious Studies departments - often in small, liberal arts colleges.
Whereas a generation ago it was rare to find Buddhologists in the
religion departments of smaller colleges, this has today become
the rule rather than the exception. Aside from simply providing
employment opportunities for recent PhDs, I have elsewhere ar-
25 One thinks here of the programs at Wisconsin, Michigan, Washington,
Harvard, UCLA and UC Berkeley.
26 Compare the situation in North America to what Max Deeg has to
say about the institutional location of the field in parts of Europe, namely
that it will be some time before "the professional study of Buddhism be-
comes integrated in the Religious Study programs of German-speaking
universities, closing the gap between the pure historical study of Bud-
dhism as a text-restricted tradition and the religious reality in Buddhist
countries." Max Deeg, "Buddhist Studies and its Impact on Buddhism in
Western Societies: An Historical Sketch and Prospects," online at http://
www.chibs.edu.tw/exchange/CONFERENCE/4cicob/fulltext/Deego
htm#jtnref85, last accessed January, 2009.
27 The Buddhist Studies programs at Virginia, Stanford, Columbia,
Princeton, Santa Barbara, Yale, Toronto, McMaster and Emory are examples
of those housed within Religious Studies departments.
28 These include, most notably, those at Chicago and Harvard.
gued that the movement of the field in the direction of Religious
Studies has been beneficial on intellectual grounds, broadening
the agenda of Buddhist Studies, forcing us to think more compara-
tively, and pushing us to learn to speak to colleagues outside our
own area of speciality. But the move into Religious Studies has also
posed its own practical challenges. In terms of graduate training,
it has meant that students have had to master an additional body
of theoretical literature and to learn a new set of skills on top of
the already weighty linguistic, historical, doctrinal and other re-
quirements that have traditionally constituted a graduate education
in Buddhist Studies. How individual programs balance these de-
mands is an important question - at least it is at my own institution
and in my own mind.
Let me conclude by mentioning what I see to be the newest
and most interesting institutional shift within Buddhist Studies in
North America. This has to do, on the one hand, with the emer-
gence of accredited Buddhist institutions of higher learning, and
on the other, with the relationships being created between Buddhist
religious organizations and North American universities.
Degree-granting Buddhist institutions are nothing new in the
United States: the Jodo Shinshu-affiliated Institute of Buddhist
Studies in Berkeley was founded in 1964 and joined the Gradu-
ate Theological Union in 1985. Naropa was founded a decade later
in 1974 and was accredited in 1986. Since then, several Buddhist
groups have founded new universities or institutes. Two of these,
both in Los Angeles, have already received accreditation:
Soka University, which was founded in 1987 and accredited
in 2005,29 and
The University of the West (formerly Hsi Lai), founded in
1991, and affiliated with Fo Guang Shan (Taiwan).
29 It should be noted that Soka University does not portray itself as a Bud-
dhist institution but rather as a secular liberal arts college. Its students are
mostly young people from Japan.
296
Three more specialized institutes are currently in the process of
being accredited, or else have arrangements with other accredited
institutions:
Dharma Realm Buddhist University, founded in 1976
The Won Institute of Graduate Studies, founded in 2000
The Maitripa Institute, founded in 2006.
By my reckoning, there are already seven institutions of higher
learning founded by Buddhist groups in the United States.
3D
I ex-
pect this trend - the institutionalization of Buddhism into the fabric
of North American higher education - to increase in the years to
come. Several of the existing institutions have for some years now
been a source of very qualified graduate students for the more well
established North American Buddhist Studies graduate programs.
These new Buddhist institutions are also beginning to absorb new
PhDs from mainstream Buddhist Studies graduate programs. If the
trend indeed continues, as I believe it will, we may one day see
across the North American landscape something like a network
of Buddhist u,niversities and divinity schools not unlike those of
other religious traditions. If this indeed comes to pass, it will have
profound implications for Buddhist Studies, for Buddhist ministry,
and indeed for Buddhists in North America.
There is one other way in which Buddhists, Buddhist "symtap-
thizers," and Buddhist organizations are affecting Buddhist Studies
graduate education in North America - through the funding of pro-
fessorships and curricular initiatives. One thinks here of the Numa-
ta Visiting Professorships, of the chairs funded by Barry Hershey
at Harvard and by the Khyentse Foundation at Berkeley, and of the
2006 gift of $4 million (Canadian dollars) by Mr. Robert Ho to the
University of Toronto in support of Buddhist Studies. These initia-
tives are already having a profound effect on the character of Bud-
30 Similar institutions are not unknown in Europe: for example, the Buda-
pest Buddhist University, which offers both BA and MA degrees, was found-
ed in 1991 and was accredited in 2001.
dhist Studies in North America, causing the field to take certain
directions it might not have otherwise taken.
IV. Conclusions
Within our own lifetime we have seen the field of Buddhist Studies
in North America undergo some fairly profound intellectual and
institutional shifts. Many of these shifts - e.g., the cultural turn and
the move to greater self-reflexivity - seem natural to us in hind-
sight, but as with all historical processes, it is far from clear that
we could have predicted them while we were living in and through
the earlier paragidm. Likewise, it is probably impossible to predict
what Buddhist Studies will look like a generation from now. Are the
intellectual shifts outlined in this essay a permanent part of the fab-
ric of Buddhology, or, like a pendulum, will we see the field swing
back and forth between different poles - for example, between the
doctrinal/philosophical and the cultural/material- at times empha-
sizing one, and at other times the other? Even if Buddhist Studies
ends up oscillating in this way, it seems clear that, like Foucault's
pendulum, we never return to precisely the same point where we
started, the new arc being influenced by all the forces that continue
to operate unceasingly in and around the field. And, indeed, there
is already evidence for something like this in the work of a new
generation of doctrinal specialists who insist that doctrine cannot
be understood apart from history, politics and context generally. As
Buddhist Studies has moved back toward doctrine and philosophy,
the endpoint of the new arc is a very different place from where the
pendulum began its journey. Put another way, although it is futile to
predict what the field will look like a generation from now, we can
be certain of one thing: that it will never again be precisely what it
was in the past.
And what of the institutional shifts outlined in this paper? What
will be the upshot of the new Buddhist institutions of higher learn-
ing and of the partnerships between mainstream universities and
Buddhist institutions? What new traditions of scholarship and what
298
new scholarly identities will result from this? It is not inconceivable
that such institutional shifts will give rise both to new subfields
and to new scholarly vocations - for example, to something like
academic Buddhist theology, a field that, although situated within
(a broader) mainstream Buddhology, is also responsible to a Bud-
dhist constituency. Given the history of the institutionalization of
other religions into the fabric of North American intellectual life,
new modes of academic inquiry and new scholarly identities are
to be expected. But only time will tell, of course, which of these
"many possible worlds" will be instantiated. Amidst these many
uncertainties, however, there is one other thing that we probably
can be sure of: that our own work and concerns will one day seem
as archaic to our scholarly heirs as the work of prior generations
seem to us today.
THE DISCIPLINES OF BUDDHIST STUDIES
NOTES ON RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT
AS BOUNDARY-MARKER
OLIVER FREIBERGER
In their contributions to the 1995 special issue of the Journal of
the International Association of Buddhist Studies on method, Jose
Cabezon and Luis Gomez masterfully analyze the state of Buddhist
Studies and discuss the implications, challenges, and opportuni-
ties of reflecting on method and theory in the field.! Their analysis
shows that there is a strong coherence in Buddhist Studies: It fea-
tures a common subject matter, "Buddhism" (- however that term
may be defined in academic practice), various institutions (profes-
sional associations, peer-reviewed journals, professorships and
chairs, graduate programs, etc.), and a recorded academic history.2
! Jose Ignacio Cabezon, "Buddhist Studies as a Discipline and the Role
of Theory," in: Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies
18 (1995): 231-268; Luis O. Gomez, "Unspoken Paradigms: Meanderings
through the Metaphors of a Field," in: Journal of the International Associa-
tion of Buddhist Studies 18 (1995): 183-230.
2 The most comprehensive survey up to 1990 is Jan Willem de Jong, A
Brief History of Buddhist Studies in Europe and America (Tokyo: Kosei Pub-
lishing Co., 1997). See also Edward Conze, "Recent Progress in Buddhist
Studies," in: Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies: Selected Essays by Edward
Conze (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1968), 1-32 [first pub-
lished in 1959/60]; George D. Bond, "Theravada Buddhism and the Aims of
Buddhist Studies," in: Studies in the History of Buddhism, ed. A. K. Narain
(Delhi: B. R. Publishing Corp., 1980), 43-65; Charles S. Prebish, "Buddhist
Studies American Style: A Shot in the Dark," in: Religious Studies Review
9.4 (1983): 323-330; David Seyfort Ruegg, "Some Observations on the Pres-
ent and Future of Buddhist Studies," in: Journal of the International Asso-
ciation of Buddhist Studies 15 (1992): 104-117; Donald S. Lopez, Jr. (ed.),
Volume 30' Number 1-2' 2007 (2009) pp. 299-318
300
OLIVER FREIBERGER
On the other hand, Buddhist Studies shows an extremely diverse
variety of methodological and theoretical approaches. In this paper
I shall argue that for conceptually organizing this "hodge podge"
(Cabezon),3 it is useful to view Buddhist Studies as a field of in-
quiry rather than a single discipline.
The nature - or, rather, the construction and conceptualization -
of academic disciplines has been discussed in various ways. David
Shumway and Ellen Messer-Davidow outline an approach for the
study of 'disciplinarity' that is particularly useful for discussing
Buddhist Studies. According to them, two major aspects, which
go back to the classical Latin term disciplina, characterize an aca-
demic discipline: knowledge and power. A discipline's knowledge
is the content of its academic inquiry and teaching; its power - the
ways in which students are "disciplined" and proper succession is
established - materializes in its institutions.
4
Today's disciplines
show a variety of such institutions: departments and centers, pro-
fessional associations, accepted publication forums such as spe-
cialized journals, a peer-review system, and funding agencies.
5
But in addition to featuring a common subject matter and common
institutions, a discipline needs to be rhetorically constructed: "[D]
isciplinary practitioners, who consider themselves to be members
Curators of the Buddha: The Study of Buddhism under Colonialism (Chica-
go: The University of Chicago Press, 1995); Charles S. Prebish, "The Silent
Sangha: Buddhism in the Academy," in id., Luminous Passage: The Practice
and Study of Buddhism in America (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1999), 173-202; Frank E. Reynolds, "Coming of Age: Buddhist Studies in
the United States from 1972 to 1997," in: Journal of the International As-
sociation of Buddhist Studies 22 (1999): 457-483. See also Birgit Kellner's
useful bibliography, "Buddhist and Tibetan Studies: publications about their
history and methodologies," http://www.birgitkellner.org/index.php?id=135
(access: June 9, 2008).
3 Cabez6n, "Buddhist Studies as a Discipline," 236.
4 David S. Shumway, Ellen Messer-Davidow, "Disciplinarity: An Intro-
duction," in: Poetics Today 12 (1991): 201-225, here: 202.
5 Shumway/Messer-Davidow, "Disciplinarity," 207f.
301
of disciplinary communities, engage in a differentiating activity
called 'boundary-work.' Boundary-work entails the development
of explicit arguments to justify particular divisions of knowledge
and of the social strategies to prevail in them."6 Shumway and
Messer-Davidow observe that boundary-work is performed to es-
tablish or protect a discipline, to expand into new territory, and to
regulate disciplinary practitioners? Here the power aspect comes
in. Boundary-work includes control over what is considered ap-
propriate within a discipline. For example, "[t]he 'refereeing' of
manuscripts not only limits what can be said to the confines of a
discipline, but also serves as the principal means of rewarding or
punishing researchers and as the basis for subsequent rewards or
punishments."8
Clearly, the rhetorical construction of a discipline by way of
boundary-work is not static. It is an ongoing process that often en-
tails controversies within a discipline.
9
But all interdisciplinary (or
6 Shumway/Messer-Davidow, "Disciplinarity," 208. The term 'boundary-
work' as denoting the social construction of science was first introduced by
sociologist of science Thomas F. Gieryn in his article "Boundary-Work and
the Demarcation of Science from Non-Science: Strains and Interests in Pro-
fessional Ideologies of Scientists," in: American Sociological Review 48.6
(1983), 781-795. See also his more recent chapter on "Boundaries of Sci-
ence," in: Handbook of Science and Technology Studies, ed. Sheila Jasanoff
et al. (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1995), 393-443.
7 Shumway/Messer-Davidow, "Disciplinarity," 209.
8 Shumway/Messer-Davidow, "Disciplinarity," 212. For studies on disci-
plinarity in several disciplines (unfortunately, none of them close to Buddhist
Studies or Religious Studies), see also Knowledges: Historical and Critical
Studies in Disciplinarity, ed. Ellen Messer-Davidow, David R. Shumway, Da-
vid J. Sylvan (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1993); see, in
particular, the editors' introduction (1-21).
9 For the distinction between descriptive and programmatic portrayals of
disciplines see Oliver Freiberger, "1st Wertung Theologie? Beobachtungen
zur Unterscheidung von Religionswissenschaft und Theologie," in: Die Iden-
fitat der Religionswissenschaft: Beitriige zum Verstiindnis einer unbekannten
302
OLIVER FREIBERGER
crossdisciplinary) work presupposes that the respective disciplines
are rhetorically constructed - only boundaries that exist can be
crossed.lO
I shall argue that because Buddhist Studies lacks the activity of
boundary-work, which is required for the construction of a disci-
pline, it may better be viewed as afield in which several disciplines
work. I wish to examine the ways in which boundaries between dis-
ciplines are drawn in this field by discussing one issue that is used
by some as a boundary-marker: religious commitment in scholar-
ship. This exemplary discussion shows, I believe, that identifying
the disciplines of Buddhist Studies and being aware of their bound-
aries illumines the nature of certain tensions and helps to clarify
scholarly standards.
Insider and outsider perspectives: A historical example
In 1877 Thomas William Rhys Davids' book Buddhism: Being
a Sketch of the Life and Teachings of Gautama, the Buddha was
published in London; its American edition appeared only one year
later in New,York,u In this book the famous Pali scholar describes
the later development of Buddhism in India, especially the emer-
gence of Tantra, as follows:
[U]nder the overpowering influence of these sickly imaginations the
moral teachings of Gautama have been almost hid from view. The
theories grew and flourished; each new step, each new hypothesis de-
manded another; until the whole sky was filled with forgeries of the
brain, and the nobler and simpler lessons of the founder of the religion
Disziplin, ed. Gebhard L6hr (Frankfurt/M.: Peter Lang, 2000), 97-121.
10 See Julie Thompson Klein, Crossing Boundaries: Knowledge, Discipli-
narities, and Interdisciplinarities (Charlottesville: University Press of Vir-
ginia, 1996).
11 Thomas William Rhys Davids, Buddhism: Being a Sketch of the Life
and Teachings of Gautama, the Buddha (New York: Pott, Young, & Co.,
1878).
303
were smothered beneath the glittering mass of metaphysical subtle-
ties.
As the stronger side of Gautama's teaching was neglected, the de-
basing belief in rites and ceremonies, and charms, and incantations,
which had been the especial object of his scorn, began to live again,
and to grow vigorously, and spread like the Blrana weed warmed by a
tropical sun in marsh and muddy soil. As in India after the expUlsion
of Buddhism the degrading worship of Siva and his dusky bride had
been incorporated into Brahmanism from the wild and savage devil-
worship of the dark non-A. ryan tribes; so as pure Buddhism died away
in the north, the Tantra system, a mixture of magic and witchcraft
and Siva-worship, was incorporated into the corrupted Buddhism ....
[T] he Tantra literature has also had its growth and its development,
and some unhappy scholar of a future age may have to trace its loath-
some history. The nauseous taste repelled even the self-sacrificing
industry of Burnouf, when he found the later Tantra books to be as
immoral as they are absurd.
12
It has become trendy to quote meaty passages from 19
th
-century
works on India, often taken out of context, in order to show that
those scholars constructed a narrative that imposes Western views
and values on colonized cultures and that thus served colonial dom-
ination. The general accusation of "Orientalism" - which is some-
times brought in by prosecutors whose own historical-philological
expertise is shaky at best - knows no presumption of innocence,
not even the benefit of the doubt, because the accusation is iden-
tical with the verdict from the very beginning. Even though fac-
tual evidence is thus not really required, the passage quoted above
would probably serve this purpose very well. My admiration for
Rhys Davids' expertise, knowledge, and contribution to the study
of Piili and Buddhism, however, prevents me from being that kind
of prosecutor.!3
!2 Rhys Davids, Buddhism, 207-209.
13 I do not mean to suggest that we should be uncritical of our scholarly
ancestors' work but that our evaluation should be thorough and fair. A good
example of a thought-provoking study that highlights important aspects of
304
OLIVER FREIBERGER
Instead of making bold assumptions about Rhys Davids' "Ori-
entalist" and colonialist agenda, I confine myself to looking at the
quote itself. It is located in the eighth chapter of the book, entitled
"Northern Buddhism." The first seven chapters discuss the life
of the Buddha, the "essential doctrines," Buddhist morality, the
sangha, and the Buddha legend; the ninth and last chapter explains
the further spread of Buddhism. It is obvious, I think, that Rhys
Davids is disgusted by what he perceives as Tantric Buddhism. He
makes value judgments by using expressions such as "sickly imagi-
nations," "forgeries of the brain," "debasing belief in rites and cer-
emonies," "nauseous taste," "immoral and absurd," and "corrupted
Buddhism" - as opposed to "the nobler and simpler lessons of the
founder of the religion." Generally, Rhys Davids' portrayal of Bud-
dhism is based on the P ~ i 1 i sources, which he knew very well, and it
is telling that the chapter on "Northern Buddhism," which includes
the quote, is the shortest of all nine chapters - it has exactly twelve
pages (out of 252).
To a certain degree this view of later developments in Bud-
dhism can be explained by the limited availability of Mahayana
and Tantric texts before 1877 - when the book was published - and
by the interest in origins that was common in the second half of
the 19
th
century. But this contextualization does not explain every-
thing, as becomes apparent when we consult a different, contempo-
rary portrayal of Indian Buddhism. I refer to Hendrik Kern's work
Geschiedenis van het buddhisme in Indie, which was first published
in Dutch and in German only a few years after Rhys Davids' book,
in 1882-84. A shorter English version appeared as the well-known
Manual of Indian Buddhism in 1896. Kern's book is outlined very
Rhys Davids' work is Charles Hallisey's "Roads Taken and Not Taken in
the Study of Theravada Buddhism," in Curators of the Buddha: The Study of
Buddhism under Colonialism, ed. Donald S. Lopez, Jr. (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1995),31-61. For a general analysis of the postorientalist
critique, see David Smith, "Orientalism and Hinduism," in The Blackwell
Companion to Hinduism, ed. Gavin Flood (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 45-
63.
305
much like Rhys Davids' work, but his portrayal of Tantra reads
differently:
The development of Tantrism is a feature that Buddhism and Hinduism
in their later phases have in common. The object of Hindu Tantrism
is the acquisition of wealth, mundane enjoyments, rewards for moral
actions, deliverance, by worshipping Durga, the Sakti of Siva - Prajiia
in the terminology of the Mahayana - through means of spells, mut-
tered prayers, Samadhi, offerings &c. Similarly the Buddhist Tantras
purpose to teach the adepts how by a supernatural way to acquire
desired objects, either of a material nature, as the elixir of longevity,
invulnerability, invisibility, alchymy; or of a more spiritual character,
as the power of evoking a Buddha or a Bodhisattva to solve a doubt, or
the power of achieving in this life the union with some divinity.14
I do not want to discuss the historical accuracy of these accounts.
My point is that Kern abstains from value judgments of the sort
we found in Rhys Davids' work.
15
As both authors were writing
roughly at the same time, we cannot explain Rhys Davids' scolding
and disgust by simply referring to lacking sources or to an interest
in origins, or by bellowing the buzz-words "colonialism," "Orien-
talism," or - most precisely - "19
th
century." Note also that the
authorized German edition of Rhys Davids' book - published years
after Kern's English version - includes our quote unaltered.
16
I wish to suggest that the main drive of Rhys Davids' color-
ful rejection of Tantric beliefs and practices is religious in nature.
But unlike some of his contemporaries, he does not condemn them
14 Hendrik Kern, Manual of Indian Buddhism (Strassburg: Triibner, 1896),
133.
15 I do not claim that Kern's book is free of value judgments, but the reader
notes significant differences regarding the quantity and the quality of such
judgments.
16 Thomas William Rhys Davids, Der Buddhismus: Eine Darstellung von
dem Leben und den Lehren Gautamas, des Buddhas, nach der 17. Auflage
aus dem Englischen ins Deutsche iibertragen von Arthur Pfungst (Leipzig:
Reclam, 1899), 214-216.
306
OLIVER FREIBERGER
from a Christian perspective, but from a Buddhist one. His depre-
ciation of Tantra is, at the same time, an apologia of a form of Bud-
dhism that is based on the texts of the Pali canon. We may recall
that Rhys Davids was the founder and first president of the Bud-
dhist Society of Great Britain and Ireland, whose objectives were,
among other things, to propagate Buddhism in the West, to form
a lay brotherhood, and to establish a sangha of monksP We may
therefore conclude that his presentation is based on an insider view,
while Kern's largely matter-of-fact style represents an outsider per-
spective.
18
Note that I do not take 'outsider perspective' to imply
objectivity; the term merely denotes the methodological decision
not to describe religious phenomena from within the tradition one
studies. For the sake of argument, I ignore for the moment other
biases and agendas that may come into play.
Religious commitment in Buddhist Studies today: Some obser-
vations
This historical case demonstrates that both insider and outsider
perspectives have been present in Buddhist Studies since its early
days.19 While-apologias that include negative value judgments such
17 See Ananda Wickremeratne, The Genesis of an Orienta list: Thomas
William Rhys Davids and Buddhism in Sri Lanka (Delhi: Motilal Banarsi-
dass, 1984), 197-201,231.
18 Again, the two short passages quoted here are not necessarily represen-
tative of the works they are taken from, nor is the conclusion meant to assess
the works in a comprehensive way. See, for example, the critical discussion of
Kern's interpretation of the Buddha as a solar deity in comparison with other
works of the time (Senart, Rhys Davids, Oldenberg) in: de Jong, "A Brief
History," 28-32.
19 Similarly, a compiler's religious commitment can also be a factor in
selecting textual passages for creating an anthology of Buddhist texts in
Western languages. See the discussion in Oliver Freiberger, "Akademische
Kanonisierung? Zur Erstellung von Anthologien buddhistischer Texte," in:
laina-Itihiisa-Ratna: Studies in Honour of Gustav Roth on the Occasion of
his 90
th
Birthday, ed. Ute Hiisken, Petra Kieffer-Pillz, Anne Peters (Swisttal-
307
as Rhys Davids' account of Tantra have become rare, religious
commitment in scholarship on Buddhism has remained observable
to this day. In 1999 Charles Prebish noted that a significant num-
ber - in his estimate at least 50% - of North-American scholars of
Buddhism are "scholar-practitioners."20 While some have encoun-
tered surprise and ridicule when they came out as Buddhists to
their non-Buddhist colleagues, most seem to feel comfortable with
stating their religious commitment among other scholars of Bud-
dhism.
21
Malcolm David Eckel speaks of the "delightful feeling"
that "one enters the academic gatherings of the Buddhism section
[in the American Academy of Religion, O.F.] with the sense that one
is joining a group of people for whom the Buddhist tradition has,
once had, or may some day have significant religious meaning."22
Let me mention some random observations that seem to support
this impression.
The Buddhist Scholars Information Network, H-Buddhism, is
a highly specialized academic discussion list and an invaluable re-
source. Unlike other lists, H-Buddhism has been kept by the editors
strictly academic. Still, attentive readers note that once in a while
subscribers introduce their - otherwise purely academic - mes-
sages with the phrase "Dear friends in the dharma," or close with
phrases like "Yours in the Dharma" or "Namo Buddhaya."23 To my
knowledge, neither subscribers nor list editors have ever found this
worthy of discussion. But it is conceivable that the subscribers and
Odendorf: Indica et Tibetica Verlag, 2006), 193-207.
20 Prebish, "The Silent Sangha," 180.
21 Prebish, "The Silent Sangha," 180-183.
22 Malcolm David Eckel, "The Ghost at the Table: On the Study of Bud-
dhism and the Study of Religion," in: Journal of the American Academy of
Religion 62 (1994): 1085-1110, here: 1098. He also mentions problematic
aspects and suggests an approach similar to Buddhist Theology (see beloW).
23 See, for example: Feb 26, 2002 (Shakya); Oct 29, 2003 (Heng Tso); Feb
17,2004 (Tu); Dec 13,2005 (Jantrasrisalai); May 2, 2006 (McRae); Dec 22,
2006 (Skilling); June 18, 2007 (Shakya).
308
OLIVER FREIBERGER
the editors of H-Buddhism would not be able to maintain this level
of tolerance if someone began closing his or her postings with the
phrase "Yours in Christ."
Today most academic books include, on their back covers, a short
blurb and information about the authors or editors. Besides data on
academic training and major publications, some scholars provide
the reader with additional information such as the following: "He
has been a practising Buddhist for over thirty years;"24 "he was
thirteen years in monastery practice as an ordained Rinzai monk;"
or: "he was ordained as a dharmachari in the Western Buddhist
Order and currently serves as the Buddhist chaplain for the XYZ
Chaplaincy Service."25 These are not edifying coffee-table books
but academic works whose readers are, most likely, primarily aca-
demics. The question is, of course, what purpose does a statement
about an author's religious practice serve? The rationale seems to
be that being a practitioner is a particular qualification that goes be-
yond mere academic education, beyond earning a Ph.D. degree and
writing scholarly books. What exactly this qualification adds to the
scholarly analY,sis is rarely discussed; but that it is mentioned in a
blurb insinuates some kind of profound authenticity. No-one seems
to complain about this practice, but it is unlikely that a Muslim
cleric can expect the same degree of trust in his authenticity when
he writes about Islamic history.26
In 2007 Mikael Aktor and Suzanne Newcombe conducted an
online survey on the religious commitment of scholars of Buddhism
and Hinduism among subscribers of H-Buddhism and RISA-L. Its
24 From Robert Bluck, British Buddhism: Teachings, Practice and Devel-
opment (London: Routledge, 2006).
25 Both from Teaching Buddhism in the West, ed. Victor S6gen Hori, Rich-
ard P. Hayes, and J. Mark Shields (New York: Routledge, 2002).
26 If someday someone conducts an empirical study that examines the
ways scholars of religion (and, in particular, scholars of Buddhism) perceive
Buddhism vs. how they perceive other religions, the results should tell us a
lot about our preconceptions.
309
preliminary results are published online. In a section of the survey
that was meant for further comments on the subject, one scholar
wrote: "It is hard for me to understand scholars that study Buddhism
and don't practice. It is like writing about swimming without ever
putting a foot in the water, or '" being a couch anthropologist."27
This pithy statement illustrates the sense of authenticity that defines
the insider perspective in Buddhist Studies. It reminds scholars of
religion of Rudolf Otto's influential work, The Idea of the Holy,
in which Otto claims that in order to fully understand religion, a
scholar must have had "intrinsically religious feelings."28 One stan-
dard response to this position is: Does one have to be a politician
to be a good political scientist? Or, more polemically put: Does one
have to be very old to study medieval history?29
27 See http://e-tidsskrift.dk/rel/Preliminary _results_Budd ism_ vs_Hinduism.
pdf, p. 3 (access: May 8, 2008).
28 Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry into the Non-rational
Factor in the Idea of the Divine and Its Relation to the Rational, transl. by
John W. Harvey, 2
nd
ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), 8. The
German original, Das Heilige, was first published in 1917.
29 The respective controversy between Religious Studies and Christian
Theology is of long standing and ongoing. Today a common counter-argu-
ment to the last point is that scholars of religion who claim to be objective
have biases too, but that theirs are hidden - as opposed to those of theo-
logians who openly declare their religious affiliation. This argument has,
again, been countered by pointing out that 'bias' refers to rather complex
combinations of mental and social factors that are related not only to one's
religious commitment but also to one's gender, sexual orientation, childhood
trauma, the novels one has read, the music one likes, the emotions one lives
through when caring for an ailing aunt, etc. It is impossible - and clearly not
practical- to fully disclose all one's biases. Some argue, therefore, that refer-
ing to the individual scholar's biases, as some theologians do, obscures the
fact that declaring one's religious affiliation in theology denotes the specific
programmatic decision for an insider perspective that scholars of religion
deliberately do not want to make. For further discussions, see my "1st Wer-
tung Theologie?" See also Francisca Cho, "Religious Identity and the Study
of Buddhism," in: Identity and the Politics of Scholarship in the Study of
Religion, ed. Jose Ignacio Cabez6n and Sheila Greeve Davaney (New York:
310
OLIVER FREIBERGER
One can find this sense of authenticity also in statements about
academic teaching. Not only would a majority of undergraduate
students prefer to be introduced to Buddhism by a Buddhist profes-
sor, since in their view such a person can teach Buddhism more
"authentically." (This is according to my occasional informal in-
quiries among students.) More importantly, a number of scholars in
Buddhist Studies believe that in the classroom the insider perspec-
tive is helpful, if not essential. As I have discussed elsewhere, some
claim that, "One must first be still in order to teach and learn Bud-
dhism. In no other way can its essence truly be known or shown.
Seen from this point of view, teaching and learning Buddhism, if
it is not filtered by meditation, is not worthy of attention." The de-
sired outcome is that "the spirit of Buddhism may rub off on [the
students]."3o
At first glance, all these pieces of anecdotal evidence seem to
prove that the insider perspective is a way of approaching Bud-
dhism that is well-accepted in today's Buddhist Studies. But argu-
ing from silence is problematic. There may be various reasons why
no-one complains about those statements and approaches; unlike in
Buddhist monastic law, silence does not necessarily indicate con-
sent. One possible reason may be that because the respective disci-
plinary discourses on methods - in Buddhist philology, art history,
sociology, etc. - rarely address the issue of the scholar's religious
Routledge, 2004), 61-76. Cho's description of the possible dimensions of re-
ligious identity in Buddhist Studies and her discussion of other factors that
may play into scholarship are interesting, whether or not one agrees with her
criticism of Robert Sharf's work.
30 O'Hyun Park, "Moving Beyond the 'ism': A Critique of the Objective
Approach to Teaching Buddhism," in: Teaching Buddhism in the West: From
the Wheel to the Web, ed. Victor S6gen Hori, Richard P. Hayes, and James
Mark Shields (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), 57-68, here: 59 and 68. For
the insider perspective in the classroom, see also the other chapters in that
book. For further discussion, see my "The Buddhist Canon and the Canon of
Buddhist Studies," in: Journal of the International Association of Buddhist
Studies 27 (2004): 261-283, here: 269-271.
311
commitment, some scholars do not regard this issue as one that
concerns their own work. In other words, some scholars of Bud-
dhism might ignore the above-mentioned statements and approach-
es because they consider them as belonging outside the boundaries
of their own disciplines (philology, art history, sociology, etc.). I
will come back to this point below. Some disciplines in the field of
Buddhist Studies, however, do discuss the religious commitment of
the scholar and, furthermore, use it for their 'boundary-work.' 1\vo
of these are Buddhist Theology and Religious Studies.
Buddhist Theology and Religious Studies: Determining bound-
aries
For more than ten years a group of scholars has been producing a
discourse that they most appropriately call "Buddhist Theology." In
a volume edited by Roger Jackson and John Makransky seventeen
Buddhologists discuss and employ this new approach. The blurb
summarizes the enterprise succinctly: "This volume is the expres-
sion of a new development in the academic study of Buddhism:
scholars of Buddhism, themselves Buddhist, who seek to apply the
critical tools of the academy to reassess the truth and transforma-
tive value of their tradition in its relevance to the contemporary
world."31 The academic standards are high. In his programmatic
chapter Jose Cabezon calls for a commitment to breadth of analy-
sis, to an "all-pervasive and all-penetrating critical spirit," and to
the use of a formal apparatus, such as a systematic presentation of
31 Roger Jackson, John Makransky (eds.), Buddhist Theology: Critical
Reflections by Contemporary Scholars (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2000),
back cover. See also the short definition given in the preface: "Speaking from
within Buddhist traditions as contemporary scholars, they employ two kinds
of reflection: critically analyzing some aspect of Buddhist thought toward a
new understanding in our time, or analyzing some aspect of contemporary
thought from the critical perspective of Buddhism" (ibid., ix). Before the
term 'Buddhist Theology' was coined, Malcolm David Eckel had called for
developing this approach within Religious Studies; see his "The Ghost at the
Table."
312
OLIVER FREIBERGER
arguments as well as proper annotation and citation.
32
He insists
that methodologically Buddhist Theology must be grounded in -
and compatible with - the Western academy, but he also calls for
recognizing - and building on - the achievements of traditional
Buddhist theology.33
What we are witnessing here is the formation of a new disci-
pline in the academy. Buddhist Theology should be classified as
a 'discipline' rather than a 'field of interest' or the like, because
it features the above-mentioned characteristics: institutions, sub-
ject matter and objective of inquiry, and the activity of rhetorical
construction, including boundary-work. The institutionalization
process has begun; the young discipline has already carved out an
institutional place in the academy, namely the "Buddhist Critical-
Constructive Reflection Group" in the American Academy of Reli-
gion, which met for the first time at the annual meeting in 2006.
34
It
may only be a matter of time before Buddhist Theology - just like
Christian Theology - will also be institutionally integrated into
the education of clerics, in the existing Buddhist chaplaincy pro-
grams, for example.
3
: Secondly, the discipline has been described
programmatically - its subject matter, its methods, and its objective
of inquiry: "to reassess the truth and transformative value of [the
Buddhist] tradition in its relevance to the contemporary world."
No other academic discipline does that. While the chapters of the
volume on Buddhist Theology mark out a range of questions and
approaches for the new discipline, Luis Gomez' "critical response"
32 Jose Ignacio Cabez6n, "Buddhist Theology in the Academy," in: Jack-
son/Makransky, Buddhist Theology, 25-52, here: 34-38.
33 Cabez6n, "Buddhist Theology," 40-43.
34 See the message on H-Buddhism, Thu, 09 Feb 2006; the founding co-
chairs are the editors of the volume mentioned above, John Makransky and
Roger Jackson.
35 Such programs are currently offered by the University of the West, the
Institute of Buddhist Studies at Berkeley, or the Sati Center for Buddhist
Studies.
313
- fairly challenging at times - demonstrates the depth of potential
scholarly controversy in the disciplinary discourse.
36
Finally, rhe-
torically constructing a discipline - or, boundary-work - includes
determining its relations to other disciplines. Some authors discuss
parallels to Christian theology and, in particular, distance their ap-
proach from Religious Studies. Jose Cabez6n writes:
[T]he Religious Studies academy in general, and Buddhist Studies
in particular, has shown itself to be somewhat allergic to the idea of
normative, especially theological, discourse. . .. I take this to be an
irrational and unsupported bias ... 37
And in his introduction John Makransky claims:
Under the rubric of religious studies, the functionally secular Western
academy mines world religions for its use: to generate research fin-
dings, publications, conferences to explore whatever may be of cur-
rent interest and benefit to the academy. The 'value neutral' method of
religious studies was of course never value neutral. Rather, it implic-
itly established a value in religions divorced from the normative inter-
ests of their own religious communities: a value found exclusively in
their capacity to fulfill the intellectual, social, and economic interests
of the Western academy.38
Religious Studies responded accordingly, if you will, in Richard
Pilgrim's review of the book. He writes:
Is it not risky to reinsert a theological enterprise into Religious Stud-
ies in the academy just when we have begun to make the case with
the larger community that Religious Studies and theology are distinct
enterprises? Do we not lend credence to the current critique of Reli-
36 Luis Gomez, "Measuring the Immeasurable: Reflections on Unreason-
able Reasoning," in: Jackson/Makransky, Buddhist Theology, 367-385.
37 Cabezon, "Buddhist Theology," 46 (note 21). Here Cabezon seems to
view Buddhist Studies as part of Religious Studies. \
38 John Makransky, "Contemporary Academic Buddhist Theology: Its
Emergence and Rationale," in: Jackson/Makransky, Buddhist Theology, 14-
21, here: 15.
314
OLIVER FREIBERGER
gious Studies as a 'crypto-theology' by bringing theology (Buddhist
or otherwise) back into the fold?39
This dispute results from the idea that both parties define the same
discourse. It might be more useful, however, to view the arguments
as boundary-work, performed to construct Buddhist Theology and
Religious Studies as two separate disciplines. Viewed this way,
complaining that Religious Studies was allergic to theology and
accusing it of ignoring normative interests of Buddhist theologians
is beside the point, as is the fear, in Religious Studies, of being
perceived as crypto-theology - there is nothing cryptic about Bud-
dhist Theology, and it does not claim to be Religious Studies.
Some would argue, however, that Religious Studies is not a
discipline at all, but merely a convenient administrative category.
After all, Religious Studies departments house philologists, theolo-
gians, philosophers, and other sorts of scholars.
40
Viewed descrip-
tively, this is certainly correct, but denying the disciplinary status
simply for this reason ignores the fact that Religious Studies - or,
the Academic Study of Religion - has also been programmatically
constructed in marry different ways. One approach that uses the
issue of the scholar's religious commitment for boundary-work is
manifest in Bruce Lincoln's 13
th
thesis on method:
When one permits those whom one studies to define the terms in
which they will be understood, suspends one's interest in the tem-
39 Richard B. Pilgrim, Review of Jackson/Makransky, Buddhist Theology,
in: Buddhist-Christian Studies 22 (2002): 228.
40 Also most contributors to the volume Buddhist Theology are institution-
ally affiliated to Religious Studies: Fifteen out of seventeen taught in some
sort of Religious Studies environment at the time or have done so since (pro-
gram or department). Exceptions are John Makransky, who teaches at the
Department of Theology at Boston College, and Kenneth Tanaka, who has
not taught in a Religious Studies environment so far (personal communica-
tion, May 15, 2008). The institutional affiliation of the agents, however, is
secondary when it comes to constructing a new discipline rhetorically. And
there are a number of scholars in that volume who, judging only from the
nature of their publications, have two or more disciplinary identities.
315
poral and contingent, or fails to distinguish between 'truths,' 'truth-
claims,' and 'regimes of truth,' one has ceased to function as historian
or scholar. In that moment, a variety of roles are available: some per-
fectly respectable (amanuensis, collector, friend and advocate), and
some less appealing (cheerleader, voyeur, retailer of import goods).
None, however should be confused with scholarship.41
We may grant Lincoln that by "scholarship" he means an approach
that is acceptable within the boundaries of Religious Studies. Simi-
larly, Russell McCutcheon envisions scholars of religion to be "crit-
ics, not caretakers." He writes:
[O]ur scholarship is not constrained by whether or not devotees recog-
nize its value for it is not intended to appreciate, celebrate, or enhance
normative, dehistoricized discourses but, rather, to contextualize and
redescribe them as human constructs.
42
These programmatic constructions of Religious Studies clearly
demand an outsider perspective, while the before-mentioned con-
struction of Buddhist Theology requires' an insider view. If we let
these constructions, for the moment, represent the two disciplines
Buddhist Theology and Religious Studies,43 we may conclude that
41 Bruce Lincoln, "Theses on Method," in: Method and Theory in the
Study of Religion 8 (1996): 225-227.
42 Russell T. McCutcheon, "Critics not Caretakers: The Scholar of Reli-
gion as Public Intellectual," in: Secular Theories on Religion: Current Per-
spectives, ed. Tim Jensen and Mikael Rothstein (Copenhagen: Museum Tus-
culanum Press, 2000), 167-181, here: 178.
43 Because a discipline's rhetorical and programmatic construction results
from an ongoing discourse, these examples have to be selective. To make
my point I have chosen straightforward statements which some scholars
would probably want to debate further. Robert Orsi, for example, discusses
the issue of religious commitment in Religious Studies with regard to an-
thropological fieldwork slightly differently in his book Between Heaven and
Earth: The Religious Worlds People Make and the Scholars Who Study Them
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). He suggests a "third way, be-
tween confessional or theological scholarship, on the one hand, and radically
secular scholarship on the other," especially in view of moral judgment: "a
316
OLIVER FREIBERGER
both demands make sense within their respective disciplinary dis-
courses but clearly have different objectives. The editors of Bud-
dhist Theology put it this way: "By and large, scholars trained in
Religious Studies ... critically analyze the data of a religion at a
distance from tradition, to develop theories of interest to the West-
ern academy. By contrast, contemporary theologians who have
been trained by and stand within a religious tradition use the same
tools for a different purpose: to draw critically upon the resources
of tradition to help it communicate in a new and authentic voice to
the contemporary
Buddhist Studies: A field of many disciplines
Both Buddhist Theology and Religious Studies are present in the in-
stitutional framework of Buddhist Studies, as are many other disci-
plines: Philology, for example, as in the identification and edition of
fragments of Buddhist manuscripts from Central Asia;45 Sociology,
as in an in-depth study of one Buddhist temple in a North Ameri-
can city; or Archaeology and Art History, as in the interpretation
of stiipa complexes in India - all such studies pass as research in
Buddhist Studies.
46
But the peers qualified to evaluate this research
and to negotiate its academic quality are members of the respective
disciplined suspension of the impulse to locate the other ... securely in rela-
tion to one's own cosmos" (198). Although being less blunt than Lincoln and
McCutcheon and acknowledging the personal challenges for the researcher,
in the end Orsi still advocates a - somewhat modified - outsider approach:
"Religious studies is not a moralizing discipline; it exists in the suspension
ofthe ethical, and it steadfastly refuses either to deny or to redeem the other"
(202f.).
44 Jackson/Makransky, Buddhist Theology, ix.
45 I use 'Philology' here as an umbrella term for the various, philologically
oriented disciplines of Indology, Tibetology, Sinology, etc.
46 For a survey of past and current approaches, and suggestions for future
avenues of research, see Seyfort Ruegg, "Some Observations," and Cabez6n,
"Buddhist Studies as a Discipline."
317
disciplinary communities - for these examples: philologists, soci-
ologists, archaeologists, and art historians. Certainly, many studies
do have an impact beyond disciplinary boundaries and are read by
a variety of scholars of Buddhism. But I am not aware that anyone
has ever attempted to establish a universal standard by which all
research in Buddhist Studies could be evaluated - that is, an all-
encompassing theoretical framework that rhetorically constructs
Buddhist Studies as a discipline and clearly distinguishes it from
other disciplines.
Therefore I propose that we conceptualize Buddhist Studies not
as a discipline but as a field of inquiry, in which various disciplines
operate. As such, it is roughly comparable in structure to area stud-
ies such as Asian Studies. This does in no way devaluate its existing
(interdisciplinary) institutions - on the contrary: Buddhist Studies
must be interdisciplinary. But acknowledging, understanding, and
respecting each discipline's discursive rules and values is crucial
for crossing disciplinary boundaries successfully.
In lieu of a conclusion I wish to highlight two particular benefits
of conceptualizing Buddhist Studies as a field rather than a disci-
pline. First, in this conception the performance of boundary-work
is an expected activity and can be identified more easily. This helps
us to appreciate the peculiarities of the respective disciplinary dis-
courses, to understand the nature of certain tensions, and to avoid
unnecessary disputes. The debate between Buddhist Theology and
Religious Studies is a case in point.
Second, relating all research to specific disciplines - rather than
to the broad and obscure category of 'Buddhist Studies' - clarifies
scholarly standards. The above-mentioned accounts of religious
commitment may serve as examples. Few scholars in Religious
Studies today would consider Rhys Davids' description of Tantra
an example of good scholarship, but it might pass in Buddhist The-
ology, as a statement made in its sub-field of polemics;47 certainly,
47 See Cabez6n, "Buddhist Theology," 42.
318
OLIVER FREIBERGER
whether or not it meets the standard there would have to be dis-
cussed within that discipline. But what about the other unsolicited
testimonies of religious commitment - on e-mail discussion lists,
on book covers, or in calls for authenticity in research and teach-
ing? Whether these have a place in Buddhist Theology, or to what
degree they can live up to its standards of critical reflection, is also
up to Buddhist Theologians to discuss. I am rather inclined to be-
lieve that this piety resides in a twilight zone of Buddhist Studies
that remains unclaimed, uncontested, and uncontrolled by any of
its disciplines - a space created by the Western enthusiasm about
Buddhism that has flourished since the 19
th
century and that as-
sumes the fundamental, deeply rooted, pre-critical agreement in
the Buddhist Studies academy that 'it's cool to be a Buddhist.' De-
termining disciplinary identities may help to illumine this shadowy
space as well.
STUDYING BUDDHISM AS IF IT WERE NOT
ONE MORE AMONG THE RELIGIONS
LUIS O. G6MEZ
Preliminaries
The present paper began as a response to a panel titled "The Aca-
demic Discipline of Buddhist Studies in North America," presented
at the XVh Congress of the International Association of Buddhist
Studies in Atlanta in June 2008. My efforts, however, soon became
less reactive, and led to a reflection on the presuppositions that have
set the direction for the study of Buddhism in the Academy, par-
ticularly in North America.!
In the interest of disclosure, I must begin by stating the obvi-
ous: the title of this paper is meant to be facetious - the intent of
the irony being to call attention to the way in which the study of
Buddhism in the Academy tends to be self-centered, treating Bud-
dhism as a phenomenon so unique or self-contained that we need
not imagine the subject (or the mUltiple subjects) of our intellectual
endeavors as in any way interconnected with broader problems of
human behavior, culture and life in society that obviously lie be-
hind our notions about Buddhism and our notions about the task of
the scholar.
1 Needless to say, the panel participants implicitly use the term North
America to refer only to Canada and the United States of America. They also
failed to reflect on the parallelism and divergences between the academic and
religious histories of both countries, or the odd fact that these histories and
cultures are dominated by the cultural preferences of middle-class, educated,
mostly liberal, Anglophone North Americans.
Volume 30 Number 1-22007 (2009) pp. 319-343
320
LUIS 0. G6MEZ
I realize that this observation is not new - it is, after all, be-
hind the now common complaint about traditional Western "Bud-
dhology." I do not wish to return to what arguably would be best
described in the colloquial language as a "gripe," and a polemical
stance at times based on a caricature of the efforts of the founding
fathers and mothers of Buddhology, their methods, and their con-
tributions (without which we would not be where we are). What I
would like to do is try to understand, rather than polemicize.
We need to understand the temptation to see the academic
study of Buddhism as a discipline with clear boundaries, a unique
subject or well-defined field, and, in its most extreme forms a self-
contained intellectual endeavor not open to cross-fertilization
with other intellectual projects. This tendency is in many ways the
central theoretical issue behind the papers in this panel, because
it has shaped the institutional manifestations of Buddhist Studies,
it has shaped the real or imagined conflicts between the Academy
and Buddhist "theology," and it is the focus of Freiberger's critical
paper.
The issues behind the problem of defining the field
This temptation possibly arises from four sources.
(1) The study of literate religions and of geographically defined
cultural spheres, by the very nature of the way they are imagined,
tends to create circumscribed spaces - of material textuality, lan-
guage, and physical spaces. "Religious Studies" (more appropriate-
ly, the academic study of religion and religions), like "Area Stud-
ies" (academic studies organized around special competences in
particular linguistic and cultural spheres), tend to be by their very
nature more or less closed spheres of academic discourse. Thus,
the academic study of Buddhism, which by necessity combines el-
ements of both "Religious Studies" and "Area Studies," tends to
STUDYING BUDDHISM
321
appear in specific places in the academic imaginary and within
academic institutional structures.
2
We are tempted to accept the internal assumptions of identi-
ty and coherence held by apologists for the tradition, despite our
knowledge to the contrary, perhaps because it would be difficult to
find an institutional home if our public face were as nuanced - not
to say, as tentative and blurred - as our scholarly understanding
of cultural and religious identity.
3
A similar phenomenon can be
observed in the case of the academic study of so-called Abrahamic
religions (to make use of the self-referential term that reinforces
this identity), despite their apparent closeness to general assump-
tions about religion in North America.
Needless to say, the apparent transparency (to North American
eyes) of identity and belief in Abrahamic religious is deceptive; but
institutionally it spares the academic teacher and students of these
traditions the permanent identity crisis we feel in Buddhist Stud-
ies. As any historian worth his or her salt knows, "our" Abrahamic
traditions and our past can be as foreign to us (not exclusively to the
younger generations) as those of other lands. But we can ignore, at
least in presenting our public and institutional face, this distance,
pretending that the study of our own culture is transparently the
study of what we are. That is not so easy to do in the case of Bud-
dhism or Asia - for historical as well as sociopolitical reasons.
(2) The apparent and undeniable sense of otherness generally
felt by a North American observer of Buddhism is in fact the sec-
2 It should be noted that this description applies mostly to the North
American academic enterprise. The same is not completely true of Europe,
where the picture is more complicated. Disciplines like Religionswissen-
schaft, histoire des religions, etc., are not exact parallels to Religious Studies,
and traditional philology, Tibetology, Sinology, Indian and Buddhist Studies,
etc. are generally not conceived as "Area Studies."
3 Such assumptions are also held by detractors of the tradition and by
those who have found some semblance of neutrality in their discourse about
Buddhism.
322
LUIS 0. G6MEZ
ond reason for our difficulties defining ourselves as students of
Buddhism in the Academy.
(3) This sense of otherness generates a reaction in the opposite
direction - which has become part of many apologetic moves, both
by believers and academicians, the move to "naturalize" Buddhism
in the Western Academy.
The clash between, on the one hand, those who, despite their
sophistication in the study of culture, continue to see Buddhism as
other (the majority, I suspect) and, on the other hand, those who,
despite their historical and philological sophistication, would like
to see Buddhism as altogether "not other,''4 is one of the roots of
our ambivalence towards Buddhist Studies.
As long as Buddhism is seen as wholly other, it is not threaten-
ing, it remains an exotic or archaic, if not arcane, subject of study.
Under these conditions it can stay on the margins of mainstream
intellectual conversations and the marketplace of ideas - in this
way we can cover "Buddhism" with the protective cloak of neutral-
ity worn by so 1Jlany academic disciplines.
As long as Buddhism is seen as wholly not other, it can be pro-
tected from historical scrutiny; and one can adopt new voices, not
recognized in the tradition's past, without having to account for or
justify the transformation.
(4) These two extreme moves intertwine with a fourth factor:
the attempt to separate religion from the academy and the academy
from religious apologetics. The underlying ideal or goal- academ-
ic neutrality with a modicum of objectivity - is commendable and
worth preserving, but it is an ideal impossible to reach (as so many
other ideals are likewise never reached, it is a beacon, a North Star,
not a destination); and we would do well to recognize this fact.
4 Needless to say, this attempt to "naturalize" Buddhism is not always
successful- it is not easy to transcend the effect of the mystification of Bud-
dhism, which has served both the interest of the religious apologist and the
interest of some academic students of Buddhism.
STUDYING BUDDHISM
323
The distance we try to create between our work as scholars and
the tradition is much greater than the distance a social scientist is
required to maintain from his or her social and political ideals.
We maintain a greater distance in the study of Buddhism for fear
of offending our colleagues in the Academy. And for fear that our
work may be confused with the program - conscious, unconscious,
or surreptitious - of the Christian scholar. We do not want to be
perceived as proselytizing.
Conveniently for us, it is in fact a common myth of the Buddhist
identity that Buddhism is not a religion as such, and that, therefore,
it does not pursue a program of conversion. This leads to a confu-
sion regarding the real distinction between the way in which, on
the one hand, Buddhist traditions have advocated their own cause,
and, on the other hand, the way in which some of the Abrahamic
religions have adopted exceptionalism, exclusivism and proselytis-
tic strategies as integral and structural elements in their self-defi-
nition. Understanding the strategies of apologetics and the tactics
of conversion in Buddhism is in fact part of our task as scholars,
a task that requires, obviously, that we recognize the presence of
such strategies even as we recognize the peculiar way in which
many (though not all by far) forms of Buddhism tend to blur the
program or enterprise of advocating the cause of their religious be-
liefs and practices. The difference between the Buddhist forms and
the way other religions set out to defend and expand their influence
requires subtle and problematic distinctions, but their subtlety does
not allow us to pretend that Buddhism is less of a religion or lacks
a will to convert and persuade others, and, above all, that it has no
interest in arguing for the falsehood of other religious beliefs.
The consequences have been that for long the study of Bud-
dhism was conducted as if it were not a manifestation of the life of
religious communities, but some sort of abstraction, either a histor-
ically disembodied textual tradition or an ideal, rarefied world of
ideas seen alternatively as a world of "non-discursive" (and hence
324
LUIS 0. G6MEZ
unassailable) experiences and as a very subtle rationality, somehow
consonant with but surpassing scientific argumentation.
These attitudes thwart our will and capacity to reflect on and
debate the purpose of our scholarly enterprise.
The papers
Now, how are we to begin the necessary examination of our dis-
cipline or field? The papers under review offer several models.
Although their contribution is far from complete, the papers open
several avenues of inquiry, and above all reflect, albeit at times in-
directly, some of the identity problems of the field.
The papers here published as a set are accurate mirrors of "the
field of Buddhist Studies" (and I use the phrase without any intent
of closing debate on the three terms and their possible referent -
Freiberger's paper offers an excellent opening into this debate). As
an example of the actual practice of Buddhist Studies (or the prac-
tices that constitute the field) the panel, and the resulting collection
of papers, offer a plethora of facts, they present a cross-section of
points that imitate the field of Buddhist Studies, in that, in the end
they leave open the question of the boundaries and goals of the field
- other than to mention the names of the institutions that support
our work or to mention the languages we study. In short, the papers
suggest an extensional definition of the field, but do not offer the
intensional definition that Freiberger is seeking.
I will first indulge in some reflections on my colleagues' papers
as examples of modes of knowledge as a way of clarifying the na-
ture of Buddhist Studies as organized, rational discourse.
The papers range from collections of facts to a very thoughtful
reflection on the nature of the field of inquiry that we call Buddhist
Studies. They reflect several of the major modes of organized, ra-
tional knowledge, namely, knowledge as the accumulation of ob-
servations, knowledge as the assimilation of previously accumu-
lated observations (assimilation being here a combined process of
STUDYING BUDDHISM
325
understanding, explanation and prediction), and dissemination of
knowledge.
By accumulation, I mean the counting and collection of facts.
This activity is not as mindless as it sounds (or at least it should
not be mindless). Of all three styles of knowledge, this is the one
that comes the closest to the acquisition and possession of knowl-
edge; it gives us the strongest sense of control and possession; but,
beyond this dimension of epistemological avarice, it also helps pre-
serve what others may find useful in other ways, it serves to pre-
serve and organize so we can further digest knowledge.
Anyone familiar with stamp collecting, or, more appropriately,
bird watching, will know that accumulation and ordering of data
can lead to something more than the mere gathering of data. A
shepherd who counts his sheep, does so not simply to keep himself
busy, celebrate his success or fall asleep; he must make sure that
none have run astray - counting and collecting therefore can serve
as a way of preserving and caring for something of value.
But the shepherd may also observe the reproductive cycle of
sheep and thus increase his flock and his income; and to be able to
observe the most effective way of breeding he must also keep count
of his sheep.
In the study of Buddhism, some of us sometimes collect and
count, and do so in order to preserve, whereas others among us, or
the same persons at other times, will use this scholarly counting in
order to account for patterns, motifs and paradigms.
However, if we return to the example of the smart shepherd,
turn him into a cow maid or a cowherd, and have one of them ob-
serve the course of cowpox, we begin to see an example of a more
subtle assimilation of data. For, this person could observe what
would later lead to the systematic development of vaccines - once
knowledge of cowpox is generalized to knowledge of smallpox,
and this, in turn is generalized to knowledge of other infectious
diseases, a different sort of knowledge takes shape. At this point,
326
LUIS 0. GOMEZ
our not-so-fictional cowherds and cow maids have laid the ground-
work for the scientist who will theorize on the mechanism behind
diseases and inoculation, and later the natural mechanisms behind
both phenomena.
Thus, one can go from counting or description to analysis and
generalization and to prediction (which in the Humanities is almost
invariably retrospective, and hence not prediction in the strict sense
of the word). Nothing as dramatic occurs in Buddhist Studies, but
one can theorize on both the nature and function of religious be-
haviors and on the nature and methodology of the scholarly work
that makes Buddhist traditions its focus of study.
In the papers under consideration one can almost see the gradi-
ent from one form of knowledge to the next, if we order the papers
in the sequence Prebish, Cabez6n, Freiberger.
Lastly, of course, one shares the fruits of other modes of know-
ing, we disseminate, we teach, we participate in conferences, and
by doing so hope to change the way people study our subject mat-
ter. Needless to say, the conference papers and their subsequent
publication exemplify this last form of knowledge.
In the academic study of Buddhism we accumulate to preserve
and organize, and this is good. And if we do this critically, that is,
not just count books or manuscripts, but compare them so as to
produce new texts (the philologist), then that is even better.
But, we seldom develop applied knowledge, if ever (as in the ex-
ample of the shepherd and or the vaccine); but we do theorize and
generalize (I suspect skipping too quickly the intermediate step of
understanding the processes that we study), we generalize about
Buddhism and hopefully about religion and culture generally. This
is, of course, the aspect of the discipline that was not well repre-
sented in this panel.
However, we do generalize and apply generalizations to new
knowledge, that is what we call method after all - method is of
STUDYING BUDDHISM
327
course mostly prescriptive rather than predictive, and occasionally
it is retrospective.
The absence of explicit reflection on method does not imply that
Buddhist Studies does not involve disciplines. Here I use the word
in a sense not noted by Freiberger, discipline as rigor, as reflection
arising from a critical stance ... even if the rigor is not formulated
in a clear disciplinary methodological plan.
Particulars
As already noted, Prebish's contribution is primarily descriptive.
However, the description goes beyond the numbers assembled in
the paper. Of the three papers, his paper is, in some peculiar way,
the one that best reflects the field. The panel as a whole does some-
thing similar, but Prebish's paper, best exemplifies the way in which
the field is diverse and disconnected.
If one could find fault in Prebish's paper it is to be found in
two points. The paper does not offer a means by which its descrip-
tive statistics could be used to generate statistical analysis for the
claims of trends and tendencies (too many categories of data may
render this goal unattainable). And, second, the data collected does
not include much on the interface between Buddhist Studies and
other disciplines in either the institutions in which the discipline of
Buddhist Studies is practiced, in the work of individual scholars, or
in the training of the scholars of future generations.
Prebish also highlights implicitly the fact - still to be under-
stood - that Buddhist Studies scholars do not contribute much to
theoretical work in other fields. It is not clear that Buddhist Stud-
ies has much of an impact (at least, we have no measure of such
an impact) on the study of culture and society generally, or on the
study of other religious traditions. Perhaps this tells us something
about Buddhism and the problems involved in studying Buddhism.
To the problems mentioned at the beginning of this paper, one may
add an additional factor that was suggested to me by Prebish's pa-
328
LUIS 0. GOMEZ
per: "Buddhism" itself is not, cannot be, the subject of study for a
single discipline, let alone a single individual. It is a conglomerate
of traditions so complex that even the study of one fraction of it
is enough to consume most of the energies and attention of many
scholars - not much time is left to seek interfaces and implications
that may produced the desired cross-fertilization. It is in this sense
perhaps that Buddhist Studies, without constituting a single disci-
pline or field has its own peculiar identity.
Prebish also notes that in his pool of North American scholars a
number of Buddhist scholars (or should we say "scholars studying
some aspect of Buddhist traditions and literatures"?) have some
sort of commitment to Buddhism; and he notes that the relative
number does not seem to have changed from the time of his first
survey to the time of his most recent survey. This already raises the
issue that seems to be most problematic to the authors of all three
papers, and which seems to be especially characteristic of North
American Buddhist Studies.
The tightrope that seems to be the only road to the academic
study of religiorr in North America, especially in departments of
so-called "Religious Studies," is represented by a quotation from
the departmental policy at the University of Calgary. The Depart-
ment, we are told, "neither sanctions nor censures religious behav-
ior nor belief." One can already see that the neutral, or middle of
the road, perspective can be advocated only as long as we imagine
two extremes: advocacy or rejection. In other words, the neutral
position is defined by the religious, especially Abrahamic, defini-
tion of truth: one is either for or against a particular truth claim.
Calgary's departmental statement continues by asserting that
teaching and research must be "based on the assumption that a
critical analysis of religious systems and practices is basic to the
study of social and cultural phenomena." This part of the statement
defines the aspirational goal of the enterprise: to produce knowl-
edge about social and cultural phenomena. But, is this satisfactory?
I would argue that, not only is this insufficient for the so-called
STUDYING BUDDHISM
329
practitioner or believer, it is not enough from a purely scholarly
point of view; because it assumes that one can understand religious
behavior without raising the question of whether religion is some-
thing more than social and cultural phenomena, and that one can
understand our material without raising issues of truth.
I do not advocate a simple answer to these questions; yet, it seems
to me that it is incumbent on us to raise them, and consider them.
Yet, the institutional, historical and socio-political framework of
North American secular universities constrains our freedom in ex-
ploring such issues.
The trap (which, in the interest of fairness, one must recognize
was inherent to the religious enterprise before it became an aca-
demic problem) is that "truth" or the possibility that at least some
religious phenomena are unique or sui generis are ideas that seem
to lead inevitably to forced personal choices. As the Calgary state-
ment expresses it, even as it denies its appropriateness in the Acad-
emy: teaching in the university is "not designed to foster personal
religious commitment or to evaluate to that end the relative merits
of various religious practices, traditions, and points of view." These
two activities of fostering and evaluation are inherent to most, if
not all, forms of religious discourse.
This quotation evidences a frequent occurrence of key prob-
lematic words and ideas that reappeared in the remaining papers.
Some of these words surfaced again during the discussion follow-
ing the panel presentation at the XVh Congress: fostering, commit-
ment, confession, evaluation, sanction and censure, belief, practice,
a practicing Buddhist, a believer, a devout Buddhist. Behind these
apparently transparent, but in fact complex (if not confused and ob-
scure and simplistic) terms lie the questions that form a good part
of the subject of inquiry in Buddhist Studies, and surprisingly, they
are bandied about without critical reflection, usually to tell us that
these are not within the purview of critical academic reflection for
the student of Buddhist traditions.
330
LUIS 0. GOMEZ
It is difficult to consider these questions if one has a strong in-
vestment in Buddhist truths, but a strong investment in truth is, in
fact, unavoidable, for the scholar as well as for the "believer." As I
shall argue presently, to claim otherwise is to be at best naively op-
timistic and at worst disingenuous. Thus, even seemingly narrow or
tangential issues hide issues of authority and professional (as well
as religious) identity.
In what appears to be a digression, Cabez6n raises the issue of
the impact of the Internet on Buddhist Studies. This digression is
perhaps only a passing or casual remark, yet, it reminds us of how
jealous we can be of our own sense of order and control over truth.
In defense of Internet users, let us not forget that the Internet is
not the Academy; it is far from being committed to the ideals of
academic disciplines, or, for that matter to the ideals of the Calgary
statement. But, being free from the scholar's fantasy of ordered
neutrality, it offers a richer sampling of the many ways in which
academic and religious discourses diverge and intertwine.
Cabez6n seems, to be, like many academics, wary or leery of the
influence of the Net, especially on teaching, but also on research.
One may invoke Michael Gorman's contention that the "net is like
a huge vandalized library."5 I find the metaphor at best puzzling,
and I am not persuaded that we need fear the Internet as a negative
influence on critical research or higher education.
Libraries, like much of the material that is the center of our
activity as scholars, are fragmented and unwieldy collections - as
much as our activity and "production" is fragmented and centrifu-
gal. Integration, order, authority are not only negotiable, they are
fluid and fleeting. It should not surprise us that the Internet, and
for that matter, our own sense of "the field" are collections of bro-
ken pieces - we do not need vandals for this. Scholarly work is
5 Ironically this is found in an article about cataloging, where it is assumed
that the act of cataloging is in some way a natural integration of knowledge.
Gorman, Michael. "The Corruption of Cataloging," Library Journal 120
(September 15, 1995): 34.
STUDYING BUDDHISM
331
not always as cohesive as we like to think - if it were, perhaps,
scholarly research would not be necessary. After all, the impulse
to investigate is born to a great extent from an awareness of gaps,
inconsistencies, peculiarities that make no sense.
Cabez6n also speaks of "trends," borrowing a term from sta-
tistics (using the word "statistics," as before, in a soft sense). The
word "trend" is a convenient tool to express a supposition about the
future without committing oneself to a prediction that may be chal-
lenged or subject to rigorous testing. But predictions are often (as
they have been since the days of the oracle bones and are still today
in the era of opinion polls) ways of influencing outcomes or, more
humbly, ways of expressing a wish. This is the way I understand
the word when applied to the question of the future of Buddhist
"theology" in the Western Academy. Furthermore, even if "Bud-
dhist Divinity Schools" should arise and succeed, their presence
would not resolve the tension between "theology" ("Divinity") and
the critical-historical study of Buddhist practices and institutions.
The tension is inherent to the subject matter, and not only in North
America, where it is of course rooted in the history of Anglophone
North American.
More importantly, even the existence of such schools would not
necessarily lead to a satisfactory solution of the parallel problem:
the presence of academicians, who are not avowed theologians or
theologians by profession or avocation, but are nonetheless practi-
tioners of some form of the Buddhist religion.
One thing that struck me about Cabezon's paper (and I trust by
now it will be evident that I do not mean this pejoratively) is that
it is prescriptive at the same time that it is rhetorically descriptive.
It is evidently very different from Prebish's presentations, where,
it seems to me, prescription is by implication, not necessarily by
intention. Thus, Cabezon begins to raise the issues that were ei-
ther seen as non-relevant or skirted in Prebish's paper. These are in
part, but not wholly, the issues raised by Freiberger.
332
LUIS 0. G6MEZ
Freiberger's paper is explicitly normative or prescriptive. He
calls for a redefinition of the field in a move that is frankly correc-
tive. Freiberger seems concerned with the field being some times a
hodgepodge of projects, not a discipline, but a vaguely defined field
of inquiry. Buddhist Studies, he notes, is not "a discipline." But
one wonders at times whether he realizes that the identity and the
methods of well-established disciplines are constantly re-negotiat-
ed; they do not happen without constant flux and contention. His
point however is well taken, even if it requires some fine-tuning:
Buddhist Studies is at one extreme (if it is not almost an outlier) in
the continuum of disciplines. Buddhist Studies, like Area Studies
and Religious Studies, is defined by its objects of study, rather than
by its methods; and those objects are bound to the cultures where
Buddhism arose, and bound by the intellectual traditions that de-
fined rational reflection in and on those cultures.
Freiberger describes what he calls the "rhetoric" and "boundary
work" of disciplines, concepts that he uses as the axis for his criti-
cism of the notion of Buddhist Studies as a discipline. I would add
to his apposite and perceptive observations on the problem of disci-
pline formation as intellectual and social processes that these pro-
cesses are always fluid - even in the well-established disciplines.
Note, for instance, the shift in biology from taxonomy to molecular
biology and evolutionary biology. The "Human Sciences" have un-
dergone similar, arguably equally dramatic, shifts.
Perhaps Buddhist Studies has not always kept abreast with such
shifts, but it is nonetheless a contended field at least in North Amer-
ica (as the region is implicitly defined by the authors of all four
papers). This contention - for influence, authority and identity - is
implicitly acknowledged in our use of the language of conquest and
rule. Fields have boundaries and territories, they can lay claim to
particular territories, they can be threatened or have to be defended
from the incursions (real or imagined) of another discipline. And,
they may be absorbed into another discipline.
STUDYING BUDDHISM
333
The language of identity is present throughout Freiberger's pa-
per, and it shows in a peculiarly interesting and relevant way in
his reflections on the "disgust" expressed by Rhys Davids when
speaking about Buddhist Tantra. In his observations on this dis-
gust, Freiberger points to an important issue in the study of reli-
gion: the extent to which our judgments, however carefully cloaked
in the language of rationality they may seem, are shaped by our
own sense of what is proper, normal or healthy. Are we not disgust-
ed by whatever offends our sense of moral order or, by whatever
threatens our sense of bodily and moral integrity? To what extent is
the struggle to define a discipline parallel to the struggle to gener-
ate, construct, and protect our own sense of individual and social
identity? Can we observe with an even mind what appears to our
own cultural eyes as bizarre, tolerating it long enough to reach an
understanding that is fair to the human beings behind the observed
behavior or belief?
This to me is not strictly speaking a religious, much less, a meth-
odological, issue. It is more a question of fundamental, unexamined
attitudes, deeply ingrained in all of us. Or, to put it in other words:
feelings of threat are an integral part of human life, not simply a
matter of religious belief or of scholarly endeavor, and they are
feelings that affect our scholarly work as much as they shape other
aspects of our social and psychological life. What is more, these are
feelings that gentleman scholars do not like to admit.
Hence, part of the problem facing the study of Buddhism in the
Academy is our reluctance to admit that many of the apparently
methodological issues arise from certain assumptions about what
is right and proper, feelings about pulchritude and propriety, what
is seemly and what is not. For instance, the panel did not raise (al-
though the issue surfaced in the ensuing discussion) the question
of whether it is "proper" or not, and if not, why not, for a scholar
to offer incense and flowers before a Buddha image in the morning
and deliver in the afternoon a well researched paper at the XVth
Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies.
334
LUIS 0. G6MEZ
At this point in the discussion I am not so much interested in
arguing for or against the "propriety" of such peculiar behavior. I
only wish to note that it is very difficult to discuss the matter with
any degree of equanimity - so much so, that the issue is seldom
discussed, it is "resolved" without careful reflection. Note that this
question is prior to the question of whether it makes sense for this
scholar to "do theology" with his scholarship, or "do theology" in
the classroom or at a scholarly conference.
Freiberger wonders, rhetorically, whether one has to be a poli-
tician to be a political scientist. The answer has a simple answer,
no. But the question is simplistic, and hence the reply (the simple,
obvious and categorical "no") rings true only provisionally, and
perhaps in the end is only deceptively true. After all, a person who
has not experienced the thrill of politics or who believes politics
is irrelevant and absurd, a figment of the imagination, would be
hardly motivated to study Political Science.
I would add by the way, and not simply to be facetious, but be-
cause it is relevant, that one could advocate two parallel axioms:
we do not want Political Science to be dominated by politicians,
and we do not want politics to be dominated by political scientists.
In the same way one does not have to be a Buddhist (practitio-
ner, believer, proselytizer, whatever) to be a student of Buddhist
traditions, and above all, we do not want a field of Buddhist Studies
dominated by Buddhists (whichever way we define the term). And,
likewise, we do not want the practice of Buddhism dominated by
scholars.
Even if some enlightened institution could open departments
of Buddhist Studies dominated by well-meaning practitioners who
could both defend there beliefs and keep academic neutrality, dis-
agree among themselves and keep their composure, the field (to say
nothing of the religious traditions themselves) would become stale
and sterile in the absence of alternative critical voices.
After all, departments of Political Science invite former or se-
nior statesmen to teach, with the understanding, of course, that
STUDYING BUDDHISM
335
their teaching is open to criticism; and occasionally, intelligent
politicians consult political scientist with the understanding that it
is the politician who will assume the responsibility of the political
decision.
The problem has no simple solution (perhaps the obsession with
a solution or resolution is the worst part of the problem); because
the problem, tension or conflict is centered in the last two require-
ments: that the practitioner-turned-scholar be open to criticism,
and that the scholar who is not in the role of practitioner defer to
the practitioner in matters of practice. These requirements gener-
ate strong dissonances (of identity and authority, more than simply
of cognition) for the religious person; but the dissonance is just
as disquieting for the academician. I cannot see an easy way to
overcome the natural tendency of the believer to attribute cynicism
(if not arrogance) to the scholar's methodological suspicion, or for
the scholar to interpret as naiVete or disingenuousness (if not arro-
gance) those motivations that appear to the believer as convictions
born of a deep personal experience.
And yet, I would argue that there should be room (and there
often is, despite all the arguments to the contrary) for Buddhist
theology or the participation of practitioners in the Academy. The
existence of some sort of compromise solution may be a natural
outgrowth of the North American compromise between sectarian
religion and religious tolerance (of sorts). What would be counter-
productive (to both the Academy and Buddhist traditions) would
be the use of religious authority as a basis for academic work (and
decisions) and, above all, the appeal to such authority in academic
teaching.
Furthermore, Buddhist Studies is not a science of inanimate ob-
jects, it cannot aspire to exist apart from the life of the tradition. Its
disciplinary and scientific mission has as an inevitable side effect,
if not as one of its objectives (and an important, though not the
most important one) the fertilization of religious life. What makes
the Academy unique is that this fertilization is a cross-fertilization,
336
LUIS 0. GOMEZ
that it is open to challenges from all rational voices. It is the pres-
ervation of these mechanisms for dialogue that is at the heart of
the study of religion in the Academy. This open dialogue can be
threatened by placing traditional voices in a privileged position,
but it is also threatened by the exclusion of traditional voices or the
exclusion of constructive theology as a rational endeavor; and it is
also threatened by a wish to close the boundaries of the "field" or
"discipline." These boundaries are constantly negotiated precisely
because the field is the place where we negotiate, constantly and
necessarily, the nature of out subject matter.
Freiberger invokes Bruce Lincoln and Russell McCutcheon,
with mixed approval, on the need for a clear and sharp distinction
between the work of the historian (and the disciplines) and reli-
gious thought. He quotes McCutcheon's pithy statement claiming
that scholars of religion are "critics, not caretakers" of religious
discourse. A point well taken, but requiring important qualifica-
tions. First, theologians are not necessarily caretakers, if by this is
meant someone who serves as a mere custodian. Theologians can
be, not only critical, but also committed to growth.
Secondly, the word "critic" has several meanings. I am sure the
intent in the quote is not to describe the scholar as a professional
faultfinder. One calls into question, critically, a particular under-
standing of a phenomenon or behavior, not simply because it is
there to be criticized, but because one is interested in an alterna-
tive understanding - a possibility still open to a responsible theo-
logian.
Apart from the peculiar meaning of "critic" as one who calls
something into question, a critic also judges the merits and the
value or truth of ideas and practices. There is no reason why the
theologian could not have such a role. Similarly, a critic also evalu-
ates and appreciates works of art or literature, or reflects on the
meaning of his or her own critical program. There is no reason why
the theologian could not serve any of these functions. Lastly, criti-
cism for criticism's sake (that is, to raise doubts) can benefit from
STUDYING BUDDHISM
337
dialogue with those less inclined to think critically (in this sense
of criticism).
McCutcheon further states that "scholarship is not constrained
by whether or not devotees recognize its value for it is not intended
to appreciate, celebrate, or enhance normative, dehistoricized dis-
courses but, rather, to contextualize and redescribe them as hu-
man constructs." Certainly one should not be constrained by the
approval or disapproval of the believer, but one would hope this
does not mean one should not be concerned with the opinion of the
believer. In any attempt at understanding it is helpful to test one's
understanding of the other person by listening to that person.
Again, one must agree that the scholar is not there to celebrate
(which does not mean he or she is not at liberty to do so). This is
certainly true, but it is not the whole truth about the relationships
between secular scholarship and religious thought. The historian
does not have to appreciate, celebrate or enhance religious life, this
is true, he or she does not HAVE to do so; but neutrality can go
just so far before it becomes deaf or, if criticism is taken one step
further, before it becomes the disgust we have noted before.
Furthermore, one cannot pretend that critical studies have no
impact on religious life or the life of the religion, hence, a meth-
odological constraint on appreciation can easily turn into a posture
of deprecation, or a reluctance to celebrate, a posture that can eas-
ily make us look askance with contempt, and as one succeeds in
abstaining from any enhancement, it is not so easy to avoid under-
mining.
The religious person deserves the opportunity to make a con-
structive use of criticism. The scholar faces the same problem that
the theologian faces when he or she begins to feel like only he or
she can speak about the truth or value of religious beliefs.
The believer may want to speak for Buddhism, and such a claim
is a construct. As a comment from the floor stated, Buddhists want
"to claim some of the ground ... to speak for Buddhism." What
struck me about this comment, however, is that the same expres-
338
LUIS 0. GOMEZ
sion is heard sometimes in academic discourse, where the so-called
neutral scholars, pretending to be safe because they believe they
can speak with an authoritative voice without making truth claims
about religion - a claim that seems to me absurd. But more than
that, we have to ask ourselves what is meant by the metaphor of
claiming some ground. What is meant by "claiming"? What is
meant by "ground"? To say nothing of the qualifier "some of the"
(which is in itself revealing of the impossibility of establishing the
ground to begin with).
Lastly, we must recognize that the fact that the study of a re-
ligious tradition inevitably will lead us to some sort of religious
reasoning, that is, to some sort of destructive or constructive or
de-constructive speculation about religious truths, assumptions as
to what is rational (read "proper and allowable" and within the pa-
rameters of good taste, of what is "becoming of" a scholar) and
that it leads inevitably to some sort of theological claim. To say that
something is a human construct inevitably is a theological state-
ment.
Anyone participating at meetings of the International Associa-
tion of Buddhist Studies or of the (North) American Academy of
Religion knows that a good number of papers, and a good number
of participants, are religious, that a good number of papers are try-
ing to prove some kind of religious point (some times under the
guise of historical analysis). This is of course especially character-
istic of Buddhist Studies in North America, but it has been true of
Buddhist Studies in the English-speaking world since the inception
of the discipline (or field, if you prefer).
Freiberger's paper can be easily linked to one of the opening
paragraphs in Prebish's paper, where he paraphrases Ray Hart in
asking the question of what exactly is the connection between re-
ligion and the scholarship of religion. Hart's three options for Re-
ligious Studies (scholarship and the practice of religion each have
"its 'site' and the two are not internally related, or the relation is
completely open, or the study of religion presupposes practice, and
STUDYING BUDDHISM
339
is undertaken to prepare for and enhance practice") occur as the fo-
cus of debate in reflecting on the nature of Buddhist Studies. I can
see how these three possibilities (which are very much in the spirit
of abhidharma formalism) represent logical possibilities, but I am
not persuaded that they represent actual attitudes and practices, or
that the issue can be categorized so neatly.
Freiberger's paper is in fact a good example of how these dis-
tinctions cannot be maintained. Freiberger applies the useful con-
cept of boundary work, arguing against a real opposition between
Religious Studies and Buddhist Theology. The illusory dispute, he
argues, "results from the idea that both parties define the same dis-
course." He views Buddhist Theology and Religious Studies as two
distinct "disciplines." Freiberger hints at another problem, however,
and that is, that his fine distinction is often ignored, by both sides
of this debate,
I agree that the distinction is valuable, but it has its limitations.
One could be critical of a Buddhist Theology claiming that the
Buddhist tradition says something about psychology, cognitive sci-
ence, and neuroscience or about anyone of the natural sciences
without validating those claims historically and scientifically - that
is, the claims cannot be made without appealing to criteria outside
of theology. Similarly, although in principle the academic study of
religion cannot (and should not) speak to theological questions di-
rectly (that is, in the form of statements about theological truth),
the fact that scholars do speak about what is or is not consistent or
historically accurate places them in a peculiar relationship vis a vis
theological truth claims, which makes neutrality difficult, if not im-
possible. In other words, even if the two "discipline" do not share
the same discourse, the two discourses, inevitably, overlap.
Most religious traditions do make claims about their own history
and claims about what believers actually do, as well as claims about
what texts actually do. There the boundary has to be crossed.
Furthermore, it seems at least problematic to me to assume that
there is no value in understanding religious thought from the in-
340
LUIS 0. GOMEZ
side, and not simply by explaining it from the outside. By inside I
do not mean the inside of the committed believer, but the inside of
the processes of imagination, belief and the construction of mean-
ing - processes that, arguably, may be peculiar or unique to the
religious imagination.
As I read a religious text, I often need to "think religiously" - I
need to empathetic ally attempt to think like the religious person,
even if it is not my preferred way of thinking. This effort lies astride
the boundaries of commitment, excitement (the thrill of under-
standing and sharing), and the equanimous observation of a critical
mind. To understand I still have to imagine how a tradition, a par-
ticular form of discourse, or certain individuals construct meaning,
how they think of their world and themselves; this includes reflect-
ing on what a particular discourse, attitude or statement is "intend-
ing to make me believe." There is, in many of the activities of the
Human Sciences, and even in some of the Social Sciences, a rule of
empathy (which should apply equally to communication with other
scholars): one needs begin with the assumption that the person or
persons who produce and participate in the human behavior under
study have ways of making sense of their own behaviors, and that
these ways of making sense are worth our attention and under-
standing - even if, in the end, we do not share them.
One has to remain astride the fence between understanding and
disagreeing - this is at the heart of critical thinking. The so-called
secular specialists of religion are trapped between these two equal-
ly problematic roles. On the one hand, they could take on the role
of mouthpiece for the religion, or in its softer mode, as the true
exegete for the religion. On the other, they could take on the role of
the secular critic of religion. Either way they cannot avoid taking
sides on a religious issue - or, if you will, on a "secular issue" (the
historical and constructed nature of culture) which is nonetheless
deleterious to the interests of some religious persons. One needs
to retain the right to disagree, but one needs to zoom out of the
STUDYING BUDDHISM
341
discussion to observe with empathy and equanimity the behavior
(including their discourse) of religious persons.
It is not my intention here to defend the position of any such re-
ligious person, or, for that matter, of religion or a religion (whatever
it might be). Rather, I only want to point out that we may have to
live with the fact that religious and scholarly personae tend to be
protean and amorphous, as well as often overlapping. As long as
there are different kinds of secular scholars and as long as there are
different kinds of religious scholars and as long as some scholars
will have distinctly religious preferences (not to mention prefer-
ences hostile to religion), we will live in the midst of a conflict
between religion and scholarship.
Furthermore, let us not forget that secular scholars who wish to
define themselves as secular are already taking a religious stance
that may clash with that of practitioners; religious scholars who
wish to assume the role of scholar/believer inevitably will have to
account for, or defend their position against, the views of those who
understand differently the tradition they themselves cherish. And
ostensibly neutral, like openly antireligious, scholars cannot act as
if their work said nothing about religious truth. But the scholars
who wish to follow the deceptively clear middle road of the secular
scholar sympathetic to the tradition find themselves in a similar
quandary. Of course one could imagine a scholar who is, or wishes
to be, somehow within the tradition but also wishes to maintain
his or her critical freedom. Such a scholar is faced, likewise, with
the impossible task of fighting off (or denying his or her affiliation
with) particular forms of the tradition at the same time that his or
her work has implications as to the value (truth value, ethical value
or some other value) of the tradition he or she studies. Each of these
quandaries is different, yet similar. These are the risks we take any
time we talk about religion.
342
LUIS 0. GOMEZ
Concluding Remarks
Needless to say, the papers in this collection could not possibly ac-
count for all aspects of, and all issues in Buddhist Studies in North
America. But the papers reveal several important points that invite
further reflection.
The great diversity of methods and topics of study is at the same
time symptomatic of the fragmented nature of the subject itself and
of the frazzled edges in the vast and complex set of traditions that
we call Buddhism.
The reluctance to address the issue of the goals of our academ-
ic efforts reflects an ambivalence towards religion and its public
role that may be uniquely North American, but this ambivalence
is transferred in part from other fields. Religious Studies and Area
Studies are still rooted, and draw some of the life from the interests
of missionaries and colonialists, even as they oppose proselytism
and colonialism (in the broadest sense of these terms).
We are still c<?nflicted over the exact nature and role of a pre-
sumed "neutrality" (to avoid the more problematic term, "objectiv-
ity") of academic endeavors. Our difficulty finding a middle ground
between the so-called "celebration" and the presumed "disparage-
ment" that are attributed, respectively, to theology and critical in-
quiry, cloud an important question. Taking "neutrality" for granted
(as if it were a self-evident and attainable goal) does not help us
with the fundamental issue of the field which is to understand a pe-
culiar form of human behavior in which neutrality is probably im-
possible, and commitment is hailed as necessary for the fulfillment
of human aspirations. The study of religion, Buddhism included,
demands of us understanding of behaviors (our own or those of
others), even those we may regard as not worthy of praise or im-
possible to emulate; it demands that we understand such behaviors
with a critical view of our own assumptions as well, even when they
include behaviors we would not adopt for ourselves or commend to
STUDYING BUDDHISM
343
others. And, needless to say, we must be ready to examine critically
those behaviors that we would adopt or recommend to others.
We need to acknowledge that the aspirations of the field remain
vague, and will remain problematic, given the nature of the subject
of study. It is therefore not surprising that the boundaries, goals and
methods remain not just debatable, but often remain obscure and
tentative - even as people forge ahead with their work, and seem to
make significant contributions to our knowledge of Buddhist tradi-
tions and to the life of the Academy.
As a final, perhaps not-so-parenthetical, remark I wish to add
that it would be of help to our efforts to see a panel similar to the
one described in this brief review but dedicated to a broader view
of the field, a panel that would include past models of Buddhist
Studies, and the models followed in different parts of Asia and Eu-
rope. This panel could also examine more closely the impact of the
social and political histories of the countries in which Buddhist
Studies is practiced - a relevant problem I have already noted in the
first footnote to this paper.
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
Jose Ignacio Cabez6n is XIVth Dalai Lama Professor of Tibetan
Buddhism and Cultural Studies at the University of California
Santa Barbara. He is author, editor or translator of eleven books
and over fifty articles. His most recent books include, Freedom
from Extremes, with Geshe Lobsang Dargyay (Wisdom Publica-
tions, 2006), and an edited volume, Tibetan Ritual (Oxford, 2009).
Cabez6n works chiefly in the areas of Buddhist philosophy, Tibetan
cultural studies, and the study of Buddhism and sexuality.
Jose Cabezon Religious Studies University of California at Santa
Barbara' Santa Barbara, CA 93106-3130 USA
Lewis DONEY is an AHRC-funded doctoral candidate and occa-
sionallecturer in the Study of Religions Department at the School
of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London. His
current research concerns the narrative representation of kingship
in early Tibetan histories. His thesis will chart the Buddhist trans-
formation of Tibetan historiography between the eighth and the
twelfth centuries, through an analysis of the changing depictions of
the late eighth-century ruler of Tibet, Khri Srong Ide brtsan.
Lewis Doney 101 Evering Road London N16 7SL UK
Oliver FREIBERGER is Assistant Professor of Asian Studies & Re-
ligious Studies at The University of Texas at Austin. His research
interests include Indian Buddhism, asceticism, and comparison in
the study of religion. His most recent publication is Der Askesedis-
kurs in der Religionsgeschichte (Harrassowitz, 2009).
Oliver Freiberger Department of Asian Studies The University of
Texas at Austin 1 University Station G9300 Austin, TX 78712
USA
Volume 30 Number 1-2 2007 (2009) pp. 345-348
346
Louis 6. GOMEZ is A. F. Thurnau Emeritus Professor of Asian Lan-
guages and Cultures, Religious Studies and Psychology and for-
merly The Charles 0. Hucker Professor of Buddhist Studies at the
University of Michigan at Arm Arbor. He is currently Professor
Investigator at EI Colegio de Mexico, Mexico. His research inter-
ests include Mahayana Buddhism in India, siitra and sastra litera-
ture, Buddhist exegesis and hermeneutics, as well as Psychology
of Religion. His most recent publication is Camino al despertar:
el Bodhicaryavatara de Santideva, traducci6n castellana del tex-
to sdnscrito, estudio y notas. Ediciones Sirueia, Madrid, Espana
(forthcoming, November 2009).
Luis Oscar G6mez Rodriguez Centro de Estudios de Asia y Africa
EI Colegio de Mexico Camino al Ajusco Num. 20 Mexico DF,
Mexico 01000
Tao JIN is an assistant professor of religion at Illinois Wesleyan
University (USA). He specializes in Chinese Buddhist exegesis and
hermeneutics. His current research examines the re-presentation
of a 6-century text, entitled the Awakening of Faith in Mahayana
(Qixinlun), at the hands of its classical commentators; his research
also concerns East Asian Buddhist views on the meaning of inter-
pretation (jie) as articulated and/or implied in Buddhist treatises,
commentaries and biographies.
Tao Jin Religion Department Illinois Wesleyan University PO
Box 2900' Bloomington, IL 61702-2900 USA
Ryan Bongseok Joo is an Assistant Professor of East Asian Reli-
gions at Hampshire College. He holds a B.A. in Religious Stud-
ies from the University of California, Berkeley (1996), an M.T.S.
from Harvard Divinity School (1999), and an M.A. and Ph.D. from
Princeton University's Department of Religion (2007). A native
of Korea, Ryan Joo has studied in China, Taiwan and Japan with
funding from the Fulbright-Hays fellowship program, the Japan
Foundation, and the Center for Chinese Study at the National Tai-
wan Library. His recent scholarly interests include the practice of
347
ordination certificates in medieval China and Korea, the appear-
ance of udumbara flowers in Korea and Taiwan, and the influence
of Western Buddhism on contemporary Korean Buddhism. He is
currently working on a book provisionally titled Buddhist Immor-
tals, Eminent Ancestors and Disguised Bodhisattvas: the' Cult of
Arhat in Medieval China.
Ryan Bongseok Joo 893 West St. (HA) Hampshire College Am-
herst, MA 01002 USA
Chen-kuo LIN is Distinguished Professor of Buddhist Philosophy
,in both the Department of Philosophy and the Graduate Institute
of Religious Studies at National Chengchi University, Taiwan. His
research interests include Buddhist philosophy, Chinese philoso-
phy and comparative philosophy of religions. Currently he serves
as President of Taiwan Philosophical Association.
Chen-kuo Lin Department of Philosophy National Chengchi Uni-
versity 64, Zhinan Road, 2nd Sect., Wenshan District Taipei 116,
Taiwan
Charles PREBISH is the Charles Redd Professor of Religious Stud-
ies at Utah State University, and Professor Emeritus of Religious
Studies at the Penrisylvania State University, where he taught for
more than thirty-five years. He has published more than twenty
books and nearly one hundred articles and chapters. He is best
known for his work on the Indian Buddhist monastic and sectarian
traditions and his pioneering work in the study of Western forms
of Buddhism. He was co-editor and a major contributor to the re-
cent Routledge Encyclopedia of Buddhism, and his latest article is
"Cooking the Buddhist Books: The Implications of the New Dating
of the Buddha for the History of Early Indian Buddhism" (in the
Journal of Buddhist Ethics).
Charles S. Prebish Utah State University Director, Religious Stud-
ies Program 0710 Old Main Hill Logan, Utah 84322 USA
348
Eviatar SHULMAN earned his PhD from the Hebrew University of
Jerusalem. He currently teaches in a number of Israeli universities,
among them the Hebrew University and Tel-Aviv University. His
research focuses on philosophical innovation in the development
of Indian Buddhism, primarily in early Buddhism and in Madhya-
maka.
Eviatar Shulman Department of East Asian Studies Faculty of the
Humanities Tel Aviv University, P.O. Box 39040 Tel Aviv 69978,
Israel
Sam VAN SCHAIK is a Senior Researcher for the International Dun-
huang Project (IDP) at the British Library. His current research
project, sponsored by the Leverhulme Trust, concerns the palreog-
raphy of manuscripts from Dunhuang. Publications include the
book Approaching the Great Perfection (Wisdom 2004), a cata-
logue co-written with Jacob Dalton entitled Tibetan Tantric Manu-
scripts from Dunhuang (Brill 2006), and a volume co-edited with
Matthew Kapstein entitled Aspects of Esoteric Buddhism at Dun-
huang: Rites and Teachings for this Life and Beyond (Brill 2009).
Sam van Schaik The British Library 96 Euston Road London
NWI2DB UK
Joseph WALSER is an associate professor of Religion at Tufts Uni-
versity, Medford Massachusetts. He received his Ph.D. in History
of Religions from Northwestern University and is the author of
Nagarjuna in Context: Mahayana Buddhism and Early Indian Cul-
ture (New York: Columbia University Press 2005). He is currently
writing a social history of early Mahayana.
Joseph Walser' Department of Comparative Religion Tufts Univer-
sity 126 Curtis Street Medford, MA 02155 USA
.. "Oi9
f

IMPERIAL-WAY ZEN
Ichikawa Hakugen's Critique,andLingering
Questions for Buddhist Ethics
Christopher Ives < <
BUDDHISM AND TAOiSM
FACE TO FACE <
Scripture, Ritual, and Ico,:ograpbic
Exchange in Medieval China
Christine Mollier < < < < <
WINNER OF THE STANlSLAS Jtir.IEN AsIAN STUDIES#
ACADEj\;UE DES INSCRIPTIONS ET
THE RECORD OF LINJI <
Translated In; Ruth Fuller Sasaki
Edited by Thomas YaM Kirchner
NANZAN LIBRARY OF AsIAN REUGION AND CULiURE
SOCIALLY ENGAGED BuDDHISM
Sallie R King
DIMENSIONS OF AsiAN SPIRITUALITY
ANCIENT CHINESE DIVINATION
Stephen L Fie/d
DllvfENSIONS OF AsIAN SPIRITUALITY
THE SHAOLIN MONASTERY
History, Religion, New in Paper
and the Chinese Martial Arts
Meir Shahar

SPIRITS OF TIIE PLACE
Buddhism and Lao Religious Culture
John Clifford Holt
DEATH AND TIIE AFTERLIFE
IN JAPANESE BUDDHISM
Edited by Jacqueline I. Stone
& Mariko l{amba Waiter
RIVEN BY LUST
Incest and Sclrism in Indian Buddhist
Legend and Historiography
JanathanA. Silk
BODHISATIVAS OF TIIE FOREST
AND THE FORMATION OF TIIE
MAHAYANA: A Study anp Translation
< of the Rii$!rcrpiilapariprcchii-sfltra
Daniel Boucher
STUDIES IN THE BUDDHIST TRADITIONS
Published in association With the Institute for the Study
of Buddhist Traditionsri!ru.versity of Michigan
THE FoUR GREAT TEMPLES
Buddhist Art, Archaeology, and Icons
of Seventh-Century Japan
Donald F. McCallum
CAMBODIAN BUDDHISM
History and Practice
Ian Harris
New in Paper
THE ORIGINS OF BUDDHIST
MONASTIC CODES IN CHINA
An Armotated Translation and Study
of the Chanyuan qinggui
Yifa New in Paper
CLASSICS IN EAST AsIAN BUDDHISM
Published in association with the Kuroda Institute
" III UNIYERS'ITYOF PRESS
WWW<UHPRESS,HAWAII.EDU ORDER TOll FREE 1-BBB-UHPRESS
The International Association of Buddhist Studies
Prof. Oskar von Hintiber (Freiburg)
President.
Prof. Cristina Scherrer-Schaub (Paris)
Vice-President
Prof. Tom Tillemans (Lausanne)
General Secretary
Dr. Jerome Ducor (Lausanne)
Treasurer
Regional Representatives:
Prof. Janet Gyatso (Cambridge, MA.)
Prof. Kazunobu Matsuda (Kyoto)
Prof. David Seyfort Ruegg (London)
Mr. Peter Skilling (Bangkok)
Directors at large:
Dr. Nalini Balbir (Paris), Prof. Georges Dreyfus (Williamstown, MA.)
Prof. Robert M. Gimello (Notre Dame, IN), Prof. Paul Harrison (Stanford)
Dr. Helmut Krasser (Vienna), Dr. Li-ying Kuo (Paris)
Prof. Ulrich Pagel (London), Prof. Richard Salomon (Seattle)
Prof. Lambert Schmithausen (Hamburg), Mr. Peter Skilling (Bangkok)
Prof. Jikido Takasaki (Tokyo)
The International Association of Buddhist Studies, founded in 1976, is devoted to
promoting and supporting scholarship in Buddhist Studies in all its aspects, past
and present, around the world. Membership is open to scholars of all academic
disciplines.
Membership dues are USD 40 for full members, USD 20 for student members, USD
1000 for life members. Subscriptions to the JIABS for libraries and other institutions
are USD 70. Dues and subscriptions may be paid in the following ways:
1. by direct bank to bank transfers in US dollars or in the equivalent amount in
Euros or Swiss francs. The transfers should be to the lABS accounts at the Banque
Cantona1e Vaudoise, PI. St-Franc;:ois, Ch-lOOl Lausanne, Switzerland (SWIFT
CODE: BCVLCH2L, clearing no. 7677), account numbers, 983.51.04 for US dollars,
5042.09.82 for EUR and 983.51.02 for Swiss francs.
2. by Visa or Mastercard
3. by cheque payable to the "Association Internationa1e d'Etudes Bouddhiques
(lABS)." There will be no supplementary charges for cheques drawn in Swiss
currency on Swiss banks. Otherwise, please add 10 dollars or 15 Swiss francs to
cover our processing charges.
4. by Euro cheque in Swiss francs.
Prospective members from developing countries may contact the Treasurer
concerning subsidized membership rates. Dues and subscriptions are payable per
calendar year by December 31 of the previous year. Payments other than direct
bank transfers should be sent to Dr. Jerome Ducor, Dept of Oriental Languages and
Cultures, Anthropo1e, University of Lausanne, CH-I015 Lausanne, Switzerland.

Jiabs 30.1-2

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Jiabs 30.1-2

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

JIABS

Journal of the International

Notes on contributors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345

You might also like