1 Okeke, Jonathan Chimakonam, Department of Philosophy, University of Calabar, Cross River State, Nigeria. jonathansphilosophy@gmail.com, www.jonathansphilosophy.webs.

com WHY CANT THERE BE AN AFRICAN LOGIC? : A DIALOGUE AND AN EXISTENTIALIST DEFENCE1

1. Introduction Existentialism holds that humans of all cultures have peculiar

living circumstances which characterize their duel with nature and their survival thereof. Wherever there are entities, if they are humans, they have culture, they reason and they workout their survival all by themselves. The activity of working out a survival requires above all logic. I do not intend to call this another debate but am afraid that is what it has become! Uduma may not see any need or sense in a debate on the possibility of a peculiar African logic yet he makes the following provocative statement: For such jingoistic driven philosophers, from the assertion that there exists African philosophy, it became
1

Dedicated to all the African logicians in the dark portions of history who are now remembered only as ancestors *I owe enormous gratitude to Prof. Greg Restall of the University of Melbourne, Australia who read the initial draft of this paper, made recommendations and also assisted with some materials. *My gratitude also go to Prof. C. O. Ijiomah for series of discussions held on this subject and the useful insight gained thereof and to my colleague Mamadu Titus whose curious questions have led me to further insights.

necessary that there is a peculiar African logic. We reject this position in this essay because we hold that logic is universal with no continental boundaries (281). Apparently, it may seem unnecessary to raise a question about the possibility of an African logic since the debate on the existence of African philosophy has been settled. Uduma thinks it is nothing but a mischief making (280) or as he quotes Etuk, to stir the hornets nest (280). But not to engage in this debate am afraid, may amount to letting the witch cry another night. There are it seems, two reasons why this debate should take place: (1) if the assumption that there is African philosophy, therefore, there must be African logic cannot be allowed to stand, it must at least, be proved otherwise (2) if the rich and lush vegetation of African philosophy today, was cultivated during the debate, a point Uduma agrees on (280); perhaps, African logic could follow similar pattern. Since the debate is an alibi, it allows works which ought to take centuries, to be done in a rather crowded sessions and within a compressed bracket of time. Ijiomah belonging to the school I shall here designate as relativist holds that since philosophy is culture-based and there is African philosophy, logic being a part of philosophy is also culturebased and there is African logic (11). Etuk writing in defense of African logic opines that logic is central to the study of philosophy and as such, there

are as many logics as there are different philosophies, African logic being one of them (99) proponents of this view I shall call the pluralists. Then again, Uduma in rejecting the possibility of an African logic says that logic is universal with no continental boundaries. According to this view, we can apply the principles of logic to different socio-cultural situations but we have no peculiar regional logics (281). Promoters of this view I shall designate as the Universalist school. Thus, the critical mass is formed and I announce the beginning of the debate on the possibility of African logic and here lend my voice not by asking, can there be an African logic? But, why cant there be an African logic? My position here does not follow the nominal relativists who merely affirm the existence of African logic simply from the assumption that since there is African philosophy, there has to be African logic. My position is that logic is like a tool kit to doing philosophy and although, this validly yields the conclusion that different philosophies (African inclusive) have peculiar logics, I choose to prove this through argumentation and not by simple assumption for the purpose of demonstration, for according to Epictetus cited by Copi: When one of his audience said, Convince me that logic is useful, Epictetus replied,

Would you have me demonstrate it? Yes Well, then, must I not use a demonstrative argument? And, when the other agreed, he said, How then shall you know if I impose upon you? And when the man had no answer, he said, you see how you yourself admit that logic is necessary, if without it your are not even able to learn this muchwhether it is necessary or not (vi). What I mean by this is that I shall employ logic to justify my position that there are no reasons why there cannot be an African logic. Uduma may choose to contend that in this case, I employ principles of western logic which I do not deny. In fact, no one actually denies that formal logic has principles which can be applied in many a different setting. Indeed, it is Uduma, who has refused to concede that despite the universal influence of formal logic, it does not over-shadow and cannot annihilate the small but significant culture-based influence of informal logics. How could Uduma completely ignore the existence of informal logics is a question only he can answer? He fosters a position which I think, is groundless. He has chosen for his road, stumps and picks. Thus, for the mere advantage of an elevated view, he has sacrificed comfort, convenience and the surety of walking on a

plane, solid ground. In an attempt to see farther, he has lost the privilege of a closer look. He has in the words of Heine, sowed dragons and reaped a harvest of fleas (Okoye, 126), for African logic, like African philosophy yet lives. Uduma has written a paper entitled Can There Be An African Logic? Mine is in part, a response to that paper. For in the grand scheme of thought, one is apt to wonder why cant there be an African logic. His, was a hypothetical question based on the condition of inability. Hence, can there be an African logic where Africans are pre-logical? (Levy-Bruhl, 17). Prelogicality, meaning anything from lack of super culture to mental deficiency. What Udumas question betrays on a larger scale is a prejudgemental and assumptive conclusion that Africans from existentialist outlook were incapable of being logical before western civilization reached them. And as such, that myth (Karl Jasper in Onyewuenyi, 59: in Eneh, 4) rather than logic was central to an Africans way of life and philosophy if at all the latter existed. On the whole, Udumas approach to this argument is nihilistic. In other words, he denies the possibility of African logic prior to argumentation. Not that this approach is illogical but given the sensitivity of the subject and his claim, one would have expected him to suspend his conclusion till he has fully drawn out his proof.

The point I wish to establish here is that among the characteristics of African logic is the uniqueness of its proof approach. The western logician for instance, takes the middle position between A and B and only asserts one when he has fully drawn out his proof. The African logician however, asserts one of A and B before drawing out his proof to justify this position. This is principally why, by the standard of western logic any such reasoning pattern is said to be guilty of bias and prejudice and is accused of lacking in objectivity. It is by this standard that African thought pattern is said to be illogical. A good example of the approach to African logical inference is: There is God! The starry sky above and the moral law within prove it. While the approach to Western logical inference would have it: The starry sky above and the moral law within prove that there is God! Thus, it can be seen that Udumas research question which concluded before it began to draw out a proof follows the approach of African logic. It is therefore, ironical that a man who does so much to deny the existence of African logic employs the approach of African logic. This shows that there is African Logic! If he denies this, then all his argument would be illogical. My research question which keeps open the options employs no doubt, the approach of western logic in proving the existence of Africa logic. Thus, it is no less guilty as Udumas which employs the African logical

approach in denying the existence of African logic. But this does not call for a tug of war of winner take all, but exposes the subtlety of interdependence of different thought patterns. 2. Patterns of African Reasoning Why is it that two people will look at the same object and see different things? A jaundiced person may see the colour of a given object as yellow while a non-jaundiced person may see it as red. Why is it that as Thomas Calyle puts it: an optimist sees a stepping stone in a block of granite and a pessimist sees an obstacle in the same block of granite? Im not quite sure the reason but the nearest explanation could be in the first instance; that the duo have peculiar eye conditions while in the second instance, they have peculiar mental conditions. Talk of mental conditions could be redirected to the peculiar way they reason. In other words, we can say that the two men reason differently. However, reasoning in logic is somewhat different from the type portrayed above. What is common and of interest to this paper is the world peculiar or the character of peculiarity. This feature amplifies the possibility that among humans and by extension, among cultures there are bound to exist differences. If these differences concern skin colour, language etc., they will be superficial; if they concern character, they will be

fundamental; but if they concern reasoning pattern, they will be key to understanding the understanding the uniqueness among humans and by extension, among culture. Let me first address the contentious issue whether logic is a system of thought by which is meant the science of reasoning or the coherent arrangement of thought or whether it is solely the accounts of logical structures of consistency etc., which is not reducible to the structures of reasoning. My modest opinion here is that the distinction between the two is mild-in a way it can be likened to the difference between a man and his heart. We obviously can draw a line between a man and his heart but such a line is uncalled for because there can never be a time that a living man will not need his heart, neither can there be a time that a mans heart will stand alone and function on its own, all things being equal! Gilbert Harman has strongly recommended this distinction when he defines reasoning as a procedure for revising ones beliefs, changing ones view, acquiring new beliefs and abandoned old ones (107). He indicates that reasoning is not argument or proof and by implication has nothing to do with them and cannot be related to logic except that logic plays some roles in reasoning. This implication is far more disputable, for even if reasoning is not proof it is indistinguishable from argument.

Beyond this, reasoning also plays a delicate role in determining which assumptions we accept, which ones we abandon and which views we hold. At an extreme corner, one can also argue that reasoning determines the type of rules and laws procedure for revising assumptions, logicians sometimes formulate rules of inference, axioms and logical principles in accordance with the thought pattern of their cultural milieu. And since thought systems vary from culture to culture, it can also be argued that logic is culturesensitive (Ijiomah,11). It is therefore to be stated that the key to constructing any logic lies in understanding the prevailing reasoning pattern which characterize a peoples existentialist outlook to life. The further implication to this is that western classical logic for example is based on the foundation of western thought system. By extension, this also translates to other logicsthe Chinese, the Indian and perhaps the African logic. However, the task of constructing the latter, I shall reserve for another time, nevertheless, I shall make its existence plausible here. Indeed, why cant there be an African logic? What would be the reasons for its non-existence as for its existence? Uduma says that logic is universal (288). But he is referring to western logic which is based on the culture of the west. If logic like philosophy is culture-based as some agree, then Africans would have logic or they would not have a culture. But

10

Africans have a culture and so they have logic. Udumas position is that what qualifies as logic must have two characteristics or features: i. ii. It must be topic-neutral It must be non-contingent It is topic-neutral in the sense that the same principle of logic can be used in reasoning about diverse topics. And it is non-contingent in the sense that it does not depend on any particular accidental features of the world. Its validity depends on its form and its truth follows of necessity from this. African thought system on its part can be credited with the following features: it is context-dependent, para-contingent, customary, and interdependent. African logic on its part is: Context-dependent in the sense that logical truth and validity vary from one context to another. And it is para-contingent in the sense that logical validity depends on custom (not form) and logical truth do not always follow necessarily. In western thought system for example, the rule of modus ponens p p q q

11

is valid based on its form and the truth of the conclusion follows of necessity. But this would not hold in African thought system, because where the antecedent is true and the consequent false; in western reasoning, the operator would be false but in African reasoning, it would be true.( I have explained this in detail somewhere on the Implications of Some Inferential Rules in African Logic). This is sequel to the fact that in African reasoning pattern, validity depends on custom (not form) and truth does not always follow necessarily thereby partly falsifying the principle of noncontradiction. This law ensures in western thought that validity of arguments follow necessarily such that if you assert A then it cannot be the case that not A can at the same time be asserted. Thus modus ponens in African logic would be rewritten. p p in in r q q r

If we write another q q in in s r r s

12

It will follow the same principle of African modus ponens but surely, is placed in a different context from the one above. In western system, the second argument would be a substitution instance of the first. If the first is valid then the second is. However, in African system, the validity of the two arguments cannot be seen and cannot be established by merely looking at their forms. An appeal must have to be made to their contexts indicated in the structure of the arguments by in q and in r. These context indicators are however mere symbols or signs. They are prognostics pointing towards the contexts themselves. It is the duty of the African logician to assign these contexts as she may please. But until contexts are assigned, the validity of a given argument cannot be established. And it is from this that the truth of the conclusion follows either of necessity or contingently this is why African system can be said to be para-contingent. It is my candid opinion that logic like philosophy is an offshoot of a peoples peculiar cultural framework. When we talk of philosophy for example, we talk of the aggregate ingredients which make up a peoples problem solving methods and principles. It is in this light that regional philosophy becomes tenable since the circumstances of say, the Chinese, the West, the Indians and the Africans vary. It is therefore; no longer sensible to

13

argue that Africa has no philosophy simply because what an African might call her philosophy is different in structure from what a Briton would call a philosophy. Russells assertion that to understand an age or a nation, we must understand its philosophy the circumstances of mens lives do much to determine their philosophy (2), has helped in no small measure to inter the arguments opposed to the existence of regional, relative and peculiar philosophies. However, logic does not appear to wear the same structural garment as philosophy. Those opposed to the idea of regional logics have avowedly stuck with their position for they view logic as chiefly instrumental (Kerferd, 155: Etuk, 11: Baum, 4: Kneales, 737). And as an instrument, it has to be universal, a one-thousand disease cure medicine. An invented apparatus! A work of pure genius without a second copy. But was logic really invented or discovered? I shall revisit this point shortly. If philosophy consists of the ingredients which make up a peoples problem solving methods and principles, then logic to me is the tool kith containing the thought systems in each cultural framework. There is no gainsaying the fact that different peoples of the world have unique way which characterizes their reasoning patterns. It would take a man who has not traveled out of his community and whose community has not been

14

visited by strangers and who has not had any sort of contact with other peoples of the world, either directly or through books and the media to oppose this. And surely, the opinion of such a man would not be relevant. So it is settled that different peoples of the world have peculiar reasoning patterns. This in my view justifies regional logics. The idea that logic is universal stems from its instrumental conception. For as an instrument, it must have been invented Aristotle is widely given this credit (Mates, 196:Uduma, 1:Copleston, 277). I shall presently show that western logic was not invented but discovered and that its acclaimed universal nature is pseudo and generative. It is pseudo in the sense that it is not naturally immanent in the thought systems of all peoples of the world; and it is generative in the sense that as a dominant system, different peoples of the world who study it can apply it. Udo Etuk tells a story of how his manuscript on Logic for African Students was turned down by publishers because the African student does not study different logic from the one studied by different European and American students (106). But that western logic is studied in Jamaica, Britain, Australia and indeed in all of Africa does not make it universal in the sense that it becomes characteristics of all peoples reasoning pattern. It is universal only in a pseudo sense that it is studied in many a different country of the world. After

15

all, that a scholar in Africa studies and can apply western logic does not mean it is naturally the way she, as an African reasons. Etuk quotes Russell on Chinese Morals to drive home this point: The Duke of she addressed Confucius saying: We have an upright man in our country. His father stole a sheep and the son bore witness against him. In our country, Confucius replied, uprightness is something different from this. A father hides the guilt of his son and a son hides the guilt of his father. It is in such conduct that true uprightness is to be found (98). Imagine also in this same light, a conversation between John Dewey, a famous American pragmatic philosopher and his African counterpart Chuba Okadigbo. You see Dewey addressed Okadigbo, in my country we are natural pragmatists, we accept what works and cast away what does not work. The leaders are building more old peoples homes to stash away the worthless citizens because with age comes folly. In my country replies Okadigbo, that is not what pragmatism means. The leaders and the young ones

16

must seek the counsel of the elders because with age comes wisdom. Let me also point out the issue of time. In the western mans thought system time is universal and precise, but in the Africa mans thought system, it is not. Let us consider an incident which occurred in Igboland in the eighteenth century. A band of white missionaries had sought audience with an Igbo chief and were told by the chiefs messenger that the chief would see them in his Obi (a hall for receiving visitors) the next day. The missionaries demanded to know the time and were told after sunrise with a piece of warning not to come after the chief has entered his obi. The missionaries came as early as seven and by eleven the chief had not entered the obi. The missionaries implored the messenger to go and remind the chief in case he forgot. The chief does not forget he replied. Then why is he yet to come, it is long since sunrise? The chief would come at the time he said he would explained the messenger. So what time is it? After sunrise

17

Obviously, in African reasoning pattern time is not universal, it is relatively decided by whoever holds the aces. This is however not the case in western reasoning pattern. I have also contended that western logic was not invented but discovered. As a peculiar tool kith it marks the way the west reasons. As an instrument that distinguishes correct from incorrect reasoning, it protects the standard of western thought system. Such a standard is however, not the same as those of China, India and Africa. What forms the standard of correct reasoning in Africa, China, India and the West are naturally immanent in each peoples thought system. To systematize and compile it into a subject of study only requires discovery and not invention. Just the same way the magnetic and the wave fields were discovered by science, Aristotle discovered the principles of western logic. It is when we reach this resolve that western logic as of other logics could not have been invented that we may enter the road to accurate explanation concerning the instrumental and universal conceptions of logic. African logic therefore, can only be said not to exist in theory but never in practice. For once it is systematized and compiled into a subject of study, it will exist like the western, the Indian and the Chinese logics. And this, I think is the ultimate goal of this debate.

18

Etuk has raised a nagging question: is this formalized and abstract logic all that there is to logic? (105). And Uduma avidly accepted that logic is not exhausted in formal logic (289). This important concession places Udumas views at contradictory paths for if he accepted this far, why deny the possibility of African logic which could in the very least, be informal? however, he seems to make a case against the possibility of an African logic with a complete set of symbols and a peculiar form and structure. If this is what his closing paragraph emphasizes, then he failed to make it clear from the onset. Yet his argument would still be misdirected, for the promoters of African logic do not insist on a style that would model that of the west. We are seeking to discover the nature and structure of the African thought system, and thereafter construct African logic upon it. Western logic is sometimes called formal logic because the emphasis is on the form of an argument. It is through form that the issue of validity is settled. If all Negros are Africans, and Okonkwo is a negro, then Okonkwo is an African. The form of this argument according to Aristotle is AII-I (Pr.An.BKI,25b, p.40). A valid syllogism therefore is a formally valid argument, valid by virtue of its form alone (Copi, 214). This reveals a vacuum in the reasoning pattern of the West for it is possible for arguments

19

with false propositions to be valid and the truth of the conclusion (even if obviously false) to follow of necessity. Indeed, this shows that there is no logic that is completely sure footed. When the critics of African logic make allusions to properties of superstitions, they would be reminded of the properties of deception inherent in western logic. If deception on the other hand, is what logic means for the west, then superstition would be what it means for Africans. Noticing the great lacuna which this formal deception creates in the body of western logic, some logicians began to canvass for relevance to be brought into western logic (Mautner 480 81). The first major work along these lines was A. R. Anderson and N. Belnap. Entailment: The Logic of Relevance (1975). S. Read, Relevant Logic (1988) provide good introduction in this area. Relevance logicians hold that more should be required for validity. The extra criteria being that: i. The premises be genuinely inconsistent with the negation of the conclusion and ii. The premises and the conclusion have something in common or that the premises should be relevant to the conclusion. (Okeke, 36). This surely seems a reasonable demand but ongoing debates according to Mautner (481), has shown it to be more difficult than

20

expected for relevance logic to dislodge classical logic from its entrenched position as the bastion and the very pattern of western reasoning. Thus, peculiarity of thought systems is a reality. Unlike in western logic, the measure of validity in African thought system is the custom and not the form. What is valid and what is true must take their rise from the customary provisions. A young man must give up his seat in a gathering; his position on a queue; his share in booties etc., to someone older than him. An argument to the contrary would be invalid. There should be punishment for crimes committed, but the son-of-the-soil cannot be punished for crimes committed in his mothers community; people should join the queue to receive service, but a man of status must be served on arrival; respect is reciprocal is for people of the same age grade, the young must always respect the elder, and the elder owes the young no such obligation; a mans best struggles is for his daily meal, wealth comes from the gods alone. Any arguments to the contrary would be invalid. From the foregoing, if the western logic is called formal because of the centrality of form to it, African logic can therefore be called customary because of the place of custom in it. Thus, the divide between formal and informal logics is not that of established and non-established, superior and inferior but that of types. Informal simply means not dependent on form and

21

customary means dependent on custom. Therefore, as we speak of formal and informal logics, we can also speak of customary and non-customary logics. If African logic is informal, then western logic would be noncustomary. This is made more elaborate by the developments in the legal statues of many African nations. The admittance of customary laws and the establishment of customary courts take care of many issues which are insoluble under western judicial system directed by western reasoning process pattern. The place and the influence of logic to judicial decision having being long established ( Nwadialo, 5: Lind, 1: Toulmin, 7). Udo Etuk has chosen to call the African brand of logic Affective Logic but this is not fitting. Affective has a dictionary meaning of exciting affection or stirring emotion rather than thought (Webster, 24). If we choose to adopt this name then we shall be interring what we are still in the labour to discover. This is because African logic would then be mere expressions of our emotions. But we have shown it to encapsulate the very structure and pattern of our reasoning which is clearly different from the expression of our emotions. In Impact of Some Inferential Rules on African Logic I theorized that African world-view is definitive of African ontology which is definitive

22

of African thought system which is in turn definitive of African logic. This I termed the theory of ontological quadrant. Ontology for Africans is made up of the physical and the non-physical (Ijiomah, 76: Unah, 249: Idoniboye, 84). This also explains why African thought system is paracontingent. When inferences involve contexts which are physical, truths of the conclusions follow of necessity e.g using the characters in Achebes Things Fall Apart. Every citizen of Umuofia must join the queue to be served Unoka is a citizen of Umuofia. Therefore, Unoka must join the queue to be served. Also consider the following: Every citizen of Umuofia must join the queue to be served Ezeudu is a citizen of Umuofia Therefore, Ezeudu must join the queue to be served The truth of the conclusion in the first argument follows of necessity while that of the second does not because the personalities of Unoka being an ordinary citizen of Umuofia is not the same as that of Ezeudu who is an Ozo title holder. By the latters social status, he has privileges conferred on him by the gods. This makes the truth of the conclusion in the second argument contingent. Ezeudu cannot be asked to stand on the queue he can never! To ask him to do so would be to call down the anger of the gods

23

whose head he carries. Unoka may be asked to wait on the queue but for Ezeudu to be asked to do same would be an abomination. Abomination is not just a word, it is a logical term in African thought system meaning counter logic and this in turn means anything from invalid to incorrect reasoning. Someone like Ezeudu cannot be asked to wait. We can therefore see that although, the two arguments have the same form but while the first is valid, the second is not. For this one can see that modus ponens and indeed all the inferential rules which have material implication as major operator do not hold in African thought system. Thus, whenever an inference involves a spiritual aspect of African ontology, the truth of the conclusion would be contingent. Who dares oppose or stand in the way of the gods? There are some Igbo aphorism which give credence to this: i. Onye kporo nwunye Amadioha (god of thunder) n ehihie, Amadioha ezute ya nabali Whoever sleeps with Amadiohas wife by the day, shall face his consuming volcano by night.

ii. -

Onye tara amu ebule ji ibi ugwo. Whoever eats the testicles of a ram is indebted to hernia.

24

Unlike in western logic, the laws of reasoning do not and cannot prevent or interfere with the interest of the gods or the ancestors who constantly meddle with the affairs of men. Indeed, no African in his right mind dares to offend the gods. Gottlob Frege (289) has written that to discover the truth is the task of all sciences and that it falls to logic to discern the laws of truth. These laws as a matter of principle are not supposed to be infringed if one were to argue correctly. But this is not the case in African thought system. Every law bends at the involvement of the gods and the argument in which this happens, like the one above deemed purely valid. This may sound ridiculous to a logician of western dissent but that is the way Africans reason.

3. An African Look at the Laws of Thought2 i. Identity In African thought system identity is not a superficial property. It is a fundamental characteristic constituting of ontological properties. If we therefore say that a thing A is identical with another B, we do not mean this in a superficial sense where A is taken to mean something that appears or looks exactly like B. But rather we mean that the properties of A as a being
2

I wish to appreciate Miss Alice Victor, a final year student of the Department of Philosophy, University of Calabar at whose request I set to work on this African look at the laws of thought.

25

are the same or correspond or are of the same ontological nature with those of B. In mathematical formulation we may state it thus: A = B Iff, Ac Bc

Therefore the formula: OntoP A B A = B

Hence, in African thought system the formula of ontological property gives a convenient interpretation of the theory of identity. What this means is that African logicians do not say that a thing is the same as another but that a things ontological property is the same as anothers. In much the same way a mother cannot be the same as her daughter nor a twin as his twin brother, but their ontological make-up could be said to be the same. So we can see that from a superficial level where two things are different, we can get to a fundamental level where they could be identical. The theory of identity in African logic follows from the conception of being in African ontology. Being has the physical and the non-physical dimensions. Two distinct physical things A and B cannot be said to be the same. Clearly this would amount to an error of reasoning we may dub ontological fallacy. But their non-physical dimension can be said to be identical because such are properties which are not bound in space and time continuum. We therefore

26

say in Igbo, ihe di be oke, di be ogini, meaning, that which is found in rats domain, is also found in squirrels domain. Now this extrapolation does not suggest the identity of the two domains but the identity of the content of the two domains. It should be stated that Indentity in African thought is not overtly numerical but qualitative. The numerical sense of it is subsumed under the qualitative when we talk of degree of identity.

Again there are three degrees of identity namely; i. ii. iii. Category e.g. species humans Relation e.g. genders, family, history, etc. Ontological e.g. character and other fundamental traits, etc. For want of space we may not delve into that here. Thus in African logic, identity is not mere correspondence as Frege suggests, in his basic law V nor numerical cardinality as Hume states in his principle of cardinality but a case of ontological property resemblance. Thus the rule of commutation in African logic would be rewritten as: PVQQvP iff Pn Qn

ii. Excluded Middle For the law of excluded middle, African thought system does not subscribe wholly to bivalence principle which states that a thing is either A or B. That

27

would be too restrictive, even though Africans recognize that some things are that they are and others are not that they are not, there is a third value which suggests that the supposed African logic is three valued. This third value is undetermined but not in the sense of western three valued logic which is neither true nor false but in a truth glut form which is both true and false. Following the context dependent principle, Africans reason in a way that makes a true statement false in another context and vice versa. As it is said in Igbo, uwa naga ka agw , meaning the world moves like snake suggesting that change is a basic law of evolution; if a thing changes from A to B, it is not the case that it is both A and B. This is because, if it changes from A to B, then it is no longer A, and if it changes back to A, then it is no longer B. Therefore, we can restate the law of excluded middle: P v ~P To included middle: P ~P iii. Non-contradiction Non-contradiction is based on the principle of bivalence which says that a statement is necessarily true or false. I have indicated above that this is not the summation of African reasoning pattern. Africans go beyond this restriction; they acknowledge that there are statements that are both true

28

and false. This represents a possible third value. Deciding eventually which way the value falls is determined by context of a proposition. What these shows is that Africans have a peculiar reasoning pattern which is informed by their unique existential conditions. 4. Conclusion Udumas paper Can There Be An African Logic? was a response to Udo Etuks paper, The Possibility of African Logic. Here, I respond to Udumas paper and make a general reaction in unraveling and explaining the very structure of what could be called an African reasoning pattern or more broadly, thought system. Thus we conclude that Africans have a peculiar thought system because they share in every respect the quality of being human and with it the full existential conditions comprising of harsh realities of life and problem solving instinct and devices. If they had no thought system and if they had no logic, how as humans, with existential situations have they survived and progressed through the passage of time? And so, why cant there be an African logic if there is a peculiar African thought system? Why cant there be an African logic if Africans have a peculiar culture and peculiar existential situations? This paper is also a call to logicians of African dissent to lend their voices in this worthwhile debate. So that in the end, if it is discovered that

29

Africa has no peculiar thought systems and by extension logic as Uduma and others claim, then Africans would at lest concede without animosity the age long claim that they have no high cultures and have made no positive contribution to world history and civilization. If on the other hand, we move from articulating African thought system to the discovery of a peculiar African logic, then it would be the greatest intellectual achievement for Africa since post-colonial era. The discovery of such logic would importantly mark the beginning of Africas return to history. The witch has cried the previous night that Africans have no philosophy; not to engage in this debate am afraid, will amount to the witch crying another night, this time, that Africans have no systems of thought, no logic and which is worse, no existential situations.
Works Cited Achebe, Chinua. Things Fall Apart. London: Heinemann, 1958 Aristotle. Prior Analytics. A. J. Jenkinson (Transl). Great Books of Western World, Adler J. Mortimer (ed). J. Aristotle Vol. 1. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc, 2nd (ed) 1990. Anderson, A. R. and Belnap, N. Entailment: The Logic of Relevance and Necessity. Vol. 1. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975. Baum, Robert. Logic 4th (ed). Florida: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1996. Copi, Irving. Introduction to Logic. 6th (ed). New York: Macmillan, 1982. Copleston, Frederick. A History of Philosophy. Vol. 1, Image Books (ed). New York: Image Books, 1985.

30 Eneh, Joseph. Introduction to African Philosophy and Thought. Enugu: Satellite Press, 1999. Etuk, Udo. The Possibility of African Logic. The Third Way in African Philosophy, Olusegun Oladipo (ed). Ibadan: Hope Publications, 2002 . . . Rediscovering the Instrumental Conception of Logic. Paper Presented at the 3rd International Conference of Philosophy, University of Ibadan, October 26 28, 2006. Frege, Gottlob. The Thought: A Logical Inquiry Mind: A Quarterly Review of Psychology & Philosophy New Series, Vol. 65, No. 259, (July, 1956) pp. 289311. Harman, Gilbert. Logic and Reasoning. Synthese. 60, (1984), pp. 107-127 Idoniboye, D. E. The Idea of An African Philosophy: The Concept of Spirit in African Metaphysics. Second Order, Vol. 11, No. 1, Jan, 1973. Ijiomah, Chris. Modern Logic. Owerri; A. P. Publications, 1995. ---. Some Epistemological Tools with which Africans Relate to their Realities. Ultimate Reality and Meaning. Vol. 28, No 1, March, 2005, pp. 75 87. Kerferd, G. B. Aristotle. Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Paul Edwards (ed), Vol. 1, New York: Macmillan, 1967. Kneale, William and Martha. The Development of Logic. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962. Levy-Bruhl, Lucien. Primitive Mentality. Paris: University of France Press, 1947. Lind, D. Logic and Legal Reasoning. New York: The Professional Education Consult.; 1972. Mates, Benson. Elementary Logic. 2nd (ed). New York: Oxford University Press, 1972. Mautner, Thomas (ed) The Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy. 4th (ed). London: Penguin Books, 2000. Nwadialo, F. Modern Nigerian Law of Evidence. Lagos: University of Lagos Press, 1999. Okeke, Jonathan. From Syllogism to Symbolic Logic: An Epistemic Assessment. Unpublished M. A. Thesis. University of Calabar, 2009. Okoye, Mokwugo. Storms on the Niger: A Story of Nigerias Struggle. 2nd (ed). London: Billing and Sons, 1981.

31 Onyewuenyi, Innocent. The African Origin of Greek Philosophy: An Exercise in Afrocentrism. Nsukka: University of Nigeria Press, 1993. Read, S. Relevance Logic. Oxford: Blackwell, 1988. Russell, Bertrand. History of Western Philosophy. Routledge Classics (ed). London: Routledge, 2004. Toulmin, S. E. Uses of Arguments. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969. Typhoon International. The New International Websters Comprehensive Dictionary of the English Language. Encyclopedic (ed) Stephenson Smith (ed). Florida: Trident Press, 2004. Uduma, U. O. Can There Be An African Logic?. A. F. Uduigwomen (ed). From Footmarks to Landmarks on African Philosophy, 2nd (ed). Lagos: O. O. P, 2009. --- Logic and Critical Thinking: A Study of Impediments to Good Reasoning and Guide to Sound Argumentation. Abakaliki: Willy Rose & Appleseed, 2008. Unah, Jim. Ontologico Epistemological Background to Authentic African Socioeconomic and Political Institutions. A. F. Uduigwomen (ed) 2nd (ed). Lagos: O. O. P, 2009.