The Madrid Bombings and Global Jihadism By Fernando Reinares* First published in: Survival | vol. 52 no.

2 | April May 2010 | pp. 83 DOI 10.1080/00396331003764629 104 Since the attacks of 11 September 2001 on New York and Washington DC there has been an ongoing controversy about whether the real threat of global terrorism is posed by al-Qaeda, its territorial extensions and affiliated organisations, or by decentralised groups inspired by, but unconnected to, such entities. The 11 March 2004 Madrid train bombings are often held up as the archetype of an independent local cell at work, and the perpetrators depicted as selfrecruited, leaderless terrorists. Six years after the blasts, however, new evidence connecting some of the most notorious members of the Madrid bombing network with al-Q ea sn r ad ei s o leadership, along with features of the terrorist network itself and distinctive elements of the likely strategy behind the blasts, suggest that these assumptions are misleading. Judicial documentation now fully acs b aS a N t nl orad t re vn pi a o ces l t pi s aoaC utn o er eatr r r ie n i h l m y secondary sources can help us better understand what the attacks can tell us about al-Qaeda and a global terrorism in transition, as well as about the changing nature of the threat to open societies. 911 days after Two-and-a-half years, or exactly 911 days, after 9/11, another spectacular act of masscasualty terrorism took place on the other side of the Atlantic, and against a much softer target: commuter trains on the railway line connecting the historical town of Alcal de H nr wt Mar dw t n t h s t nT ien o b,ah otn g o es ea s i e h di s o n w Ao a ti . h t bm sec cn i n n l d o c ao re ai s than 10 kilograms of dynamite and about 650 grams of ironmongery, were placed inside plastic bags and backpacks in 12 different carriages on four trains filled to rush-hour capacity. Some of the 10 to perhaps 13 terrorists who placed the bombs arrived in two vehicles. One, a van, was found by the national police on the morning of the attacks and the other, a car, was discovered three months later. In the former, detonators and traces of explosives were found next to audio cassettes with recordings of Koranic recitations, while in the latter there was a suitcase with more tapes exalting a bellicose notion of jihad. Ten of the bombs exploded almost simultaneously, between 7:37 and 7:41am. They were detonated by means of cellular phones synchronised in the alarm function (the same brand and model of cellular phone had been used in a similar way in the November 2002 bombings in Bali). Another two devices placed in the rail carriages, as well as an additional bomb left on a flag-stop platform, failed to explode. Disposal experts successfully defused ne of these bombs in the early hours of 12 March, providing crucial evidence to further the police investigation of the attacks. As a result of the blasts in the commuter trains, however, 191 people were killed and 1,841 injured. Though the attacks caused immediate material damages of 7 2 ii , e 1. m lo t 6 ln h minimum direct economic cost has been estimated at more than 1. m The Madrid train 21 8 . 5 bombings were thus not only the most devastating act of insurgent terrorism in modern Spain, but in Western Europe. In lethality, moreover, they were second only to the mid-air bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over the Scottish town of Lockerbie in December 1988 that killed the 259 passengers and crew on board and 11 people on the ground. But the Madrid bombings

were not the only attacks intended by their perpetrators. On 2 April, making use of similar explosive substances and detonators, individuals belonging to the same terrorist cell prepared to derail a Seville-bound high-speed train in transit through the province of Toledo. The subsequent police investigation found that they had accumulated information on new targets in and around Madrid, such as a Jewish recreational facility for children and young people, a Jewish school, British educational centres and national public institutions. The terrorists had stored weapons and explosives in abundance. They had formally rented their rural operational base in the municipality of Chinchn, in use by cell members since October 2002, on 28 January 2004. On 4 March, they had rented a safe house close to the city of Granada, in southern Spain, and from 8 March a hideout in the metropolitan dormitory city of Legans, near Madrid. They also retained a financial reserve of almost . . y o pro, e 1 m B cm a snt 5 i h overall cost of the 11 March train attacks was estimated by the authorities at no less than 0, 0ahuh oa ps b epne a included in this calculation. The Madrid 15 0,l og ntl os l xess r 0 t l ie e bombing network was mainly financed through trafficking in illicit drugs, which were also traded for industrial explosives stolen from a mine in Asturias, in northern Spain, by a criminal band of native Spaniards. Further terrorist plans were disrupted not so much by the initial arrests on 13 March, but on 3 April, when experts from the then rather small national police intelligence unit devoted to i e aoat rrmd cvr t cls i otn ea. fh e ht rrtpeet n r t nle oi i oe dh eh eu i L gnsO t i te ois r n tn i r s s e e l d e g r s s , one managed to escape on foot, while the remaining seven, all cornered in the same flat, first fired shots and shouted Islamic slogans, then blew themselves up minutes after 9:00pm. A special-operations agent was killed and several others injured by the explosion, and a complete apartment complex (evacuated by the security forces) was destroyed. This may well have been the first suicide explosion in Western Europe related to the current web of global terrorism. E e it s a aecv i i npo p d yh t rrt pr p o o a vnfh w s r t en d trm t b t e ois e et n fn i ai ce e e r s c i ongoing police operation against them, among those who perpetrated the commuter-train blasts were individuals willing to become suicide bombers at any time, as suggested by the farewell letters left behind, at least one of which had been written prior to the Madrid attacks. The bombings of 11 March 2004 had other serious domestic consequences, both political and social. They occurred three days before the Spanish general elections on Sunday 14 March. Pi e n t Js Ma a za snu bnl e l r Mi s ro r A nr i m eti r -conservative Partido Popular (Popular m ie c ba Party, PP) had every reason to believe it would retain its m j i iS a b a e l a ryn pi s i m r ot n c a parliament and control over the central government. Reliable surveys conducted in the weeks bfrpln dyhw vrr ie d gaul nr wn gp n i i t t th P e e o i a,o ee e s r a r ay a o i a adn c e h t Ps o lg , g te d l r g d ad a e support was statistically very close to that of the moderate left-wing Partido Socialista Obrero EplS ai S c lt re a yP O )R grl s f t ros e t n sao(pn h oii Wokr Pr , S E. ea e o o ecni r i s s as s t ds h d ao ( c d gh gvrm n s on rrdcv i iec t th B su t rrt ru E A i l i t oe et cut pout en s neh t aqee oi gop T nun e n e i st a e r s was behind the attacks, when emerging evidence clearly pointed towards jihadist terrorism) there is little doubt that the mobilisation of a significant additional segment of the electorate spurred by the terrorist massacre and its contentious aftermath securedh S c lt victory. t oiis e as After the election, Spanish society became deeply divided over who was to blame for the train blasts. Yet, on the same day of the bombings, at around 7:30pm local time in London and 8:30pm in Madrid, Al Quds al Arabi, a well-known Arabiclanguage daily published in the British capital received an e-mail claiming responsibility for the attacks. Earlier that evening the editor had been told over the phone by someone in a country in the Gulf to expect this special e-mail. Like other messages sent by Osm b L dns rai t n oh nw ppri eh le a a i aeogn ao t t e saes c t a n si e n e t

1990s, it was seen as a genuine al-Qaeda communiqu, and immediately made public. It was signed by the Abu Hafs al Masri Brigade/al-Qaeda. This same designation, referring to Mohamed Atef, a former head of al-Q ea m la cm ie w o a k l i 20 i ad it y o m te h w s ie n 01n s ir t ld Afghanistan, had been used before to claim responsibility for attacks such as those of November 2003 in Nasiriya and Istanbul. Moreover, two days later, on 13 March, at around 7:30pm, an individual, speaking in Spanish but with a noticeable Arab accent, called the regional broadcasting corporation Telemadrid to let its executives know of a video cassette left inside a litter bin near the so-called M-3 m su, di sa ets m c l e 0 oqeMar l gsIa ip c of d r l a worship and community centre. On the tape, recorded minutes after 5:00pm that same day by the train bombers themselves, a hooded terrorist, dressed in white and holding a Sterling assault rifle, read a statement claiming responsibility for the train attacks on behalf of Abu Dujan al Afghani, presented as the spokesman of the military wing of Ansar al-Qaeda in Europe. Outside Spain, the issue is certainly not whether the Madrid bombings were an expression of jihadist terrorism or the indiscriminate manifestation of Basque ethno-nationalist terrorism. There is an overwhelming consensus broadly attributing the commuter-train blasts to individuals associated with a radical Islamist orientation. The issue is rather the characteristics of those individuals and whether they are to be conceived as part of an amorphous and leaderless phenomenon or as part of a polymorphous and still more-often-than-not centrally led web of global terrorism. Were the Madrid bombings a case of home-grown, al-Qaedainspired terrorism or did those who prepared and executed the blasts have international connections with al-Qaeda or any of its affiliated organisations? Analysis of the Madrid bombing network, new evidence available about its ties with al- Q ea cm ad t c r ad o m n sut e s r us in North Waziristan, and an assessment of the strategy behind the commuter-trains blast support the second of these propositions. Analysing the network The network behind the 2004 Madrid train bombings came together between September 2002 and November 2003. First the desire and then the decision to perpetrate a terrorist attack in Spain led to the coalescing of four relatively small clusters of people. Two of these clusters were particularly interconnected, as they evolved from the remnants of an important al-Qaeda cell established in Spain around the middle of the 1990s. This jihadist cell was substantially, but not completely, dismantled during the months following 11 September 2001, when it was led by the Syrian-born Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas, better known as Abu Dahdah. A third cluster was linked to the structure established that same decade by the Moroccan Islamist Combatant Group (MICG) across Western Europe, particularly in France and Belgium. The fourth cluster initially consisted of a gang of delinquents active throughout Spain who specialised in the trafficking of illicit drugs and stolen vehicles. Although the number of people directly or indirectly connected to the network may be larger, there are 27 individuals about whom there is both empirical evidence and legal grounds to implicate them in the preparation or execution of the 11 March attacks. These individuals comprise the 16 already tried and convicted (13 in Spain, two in Morocco and one in Italy) in relation to the blasts on the commuter trains; the seven who committed suicide on 3 April 2004; and four known fugitives, one of whom was handedbover to the Moroccan authorities after being arrested in Syria in 2007 and finally convicted in Rabat in January 2009 for

involvement in the Madrid bombings. Not unexpectedly, all were men, born between 1960 and 1983. More than half were aged between 23 and 33 at the time of the train bombings. Most were native Moroccans, except for three Algerians, an Egyptian, a Tunisian and a Lebanese national. All but three were living in Spain, most of them in or around Madrid, when the attacks took place. Two, however, lived in Brussels and one in Milan. Typically, although not exclusively, they were economic migrants, some residing legally and others illegally. Many were single, although a significant number were married and a few even had children. Although their sociological profiles were quite diverse, they tended to show low levels of both formal education and occupational status. But those mobilised in the Madrid bombing network (which can hardly be considered a case of homegrown terrorism) did not all adopt jihadist ideology, become radicalised and be recruited in the same place, at the same time or through the same processes. Three of the 27 individuals implicated in the Madrid bombings were involved in the earlier alQ ea e i S a : a ae e A dl ad ahtbtr nw a h T n i eas ad cl n pi Sr n bn be j Fke(ee ko n sT e uia bcue l n h m i t sn of his country of origin) and Jamal Zougam, both of whom played key roles in the attacks, and Said Berraj, also a prominent member of the network. The owner of the property in Chinchn rented by the terrorists as their base of operations was Mohamed Needel Acaid, a Syrian detained in November 2001 for his involvement in that same al-Qaeda cell and convicted in 2005. Allekema Lamari, one of the Legans suicides, had indirect ties with the same cell. Initially arrested in Valencia in 1997 for membership in the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria (GIA) and later convicted, he was released from prison due to a judicial error in 2002. His GIA cell was led by Salaheddin Benyaich, also known as Abu Mugen, who was close to Abu Dahdah in those years. A classified report from the Centro Nacional de Inteligencia (CNI, the Spanish National Intelligence Centre) dated 6 November 2003 ment nd a a ssios eai rn m n oe r i li om n w o os e d i e L m rsup i bhv u ad et nd ea en r at h cni r o i cu o i lb f s de he was likely to organise and execute an imminent act of terrorism in the country. A further classified CNI note, dated 15 March 2004, commented that after his release from the pn etr h hd s onht piw u py e da y o h a etadhth ee ein a e a r t S a ol a vr er fr i r s n t e vn t iy w a n d y l s r a dc r t t e ol cm iati o i a o o dr l et T e o a o t s dht el e h h w u o m tc n l n r n r e i n . h nt l ses t ad a d s vvg s am e s r e a h ke w l a ni T dl Madrid and Alcal de HenaresHassan el Haski and e nw e V l c , ue , l e a a . Youssef Belhadj, two prominent members of the MICG based in Belgium, were also among the 27 individuals involved in the Madrid bombing network. The former was very close to Abdelkader Hakimi, head of the MICG in Europe, well aware of the terrorist plans in Spain and an acquaintance of Jamal Zougam. Youssef Belhadj was also, according to the declaration of his nephew during the judicial investigation of the train attacks, a member of al-Qaeda. He frequently travelled to Madrid to meet his associates who had joined the local jihadist cell. On 3 March 2004 at 8:35pm, just eight days before the attacks, he flew back to Brussels from Madrid, where he had been for the previous month. Indeed, when the Belgian police arrested Belhadj they found two cellular phones in his Brussels bedroom. The one he regularly used operated with a pre-paid card acquired on 19 October 2003, the day after Osama bin Laden threatened Spain in a message aired on the Qatari-based television channel al-Jazeera, although it had been obtained with a false identity, with a fake 11 March 1921 date of birth. T e eod hn fud n e aj bdom cm olue b h bo eMi onue h scn poeon i B l d s ero ,o m n sd y i rt r m u,sd h y s h another pre-paid card purchased shortly after the first and again obtained using a false identity, this time with 16 May as the fictitious date of birth. It may not have been coincidence that 16 May and 11 March were the dates of the 2003 Casablanca attacks when a Spanish restaurant was targeted the planned date for the Madrid bombings, respectively. and Similarly, 1921 may have been chosen as a reference to Sura 21 of the Koran, which alludes

t t t e hn neee i nte b t w r ofh fermt if e,o yt oh i w e ublvr wl ob al o a ft i f h ra snr e em i s l e d er o e c f mt ibcsad o e cn ec t m r h r ak,n n hl a r hh ! o e p a e . Another individual involved in the Madrid bombing network was Rabei Osman el Sayed A m d ko n sMoa e t E ytn)aom r e br fh E ytn s m c i d h e (nw a hm dh gp a fr e m m eo t gp a Ia iJ a e i , e i l h (merged with al-Qaeda in 2001). He spent at least five years in the Egyptian army and served in a brigade based in Port Said specialising in explosives. Confidential sources indicated to the Spanish authorities that Rabei Osman had been interned in the maximumsecurity penitentiary of Abu Zaa Abal, where those suspected or convicted of terrorist activities were usually imprisoned. He was an active al-Qaeda recruiter in Western Europe of people likely to become suicide terrorists. The Italian security forces secretly taped and filmed him doing just that in the flat where he lived in Milan before he was arrested in June 2004 because of his close links with some of the commuter-train bombers detained in Spain. Rabe Osman lived in Spain from 2002 to February 2003, during which, together with Fakhet, he was active in radicalising youngsters in and around mosques. As one of the Italian films clearly shows, in the course of indoctrinating a potential new recruit he claimed involvement in the Madrid bombings. Indeed, he opened and activated an e-mail account in a Yahoo server, inserting fictitious personal data, including 11 March 1970 as date of birth. Rabei Osman also knew in advance about the 11 March date. On 4 February 2004, following his return to Italy from a last trip to Spain before the attacks, In addition to the individuals already mentioned, and their associates, the Madrid bombing network also included several former delinquents, individuals who had been part of a gang regularly engaged in trafficking drugs and stolen cars before joining the jihadist network in summer 2003. Their boss Jamal A m dn a o nw a h h i ( s ko n sT e a l C i s hw vrw s oa e cm roi d ti l . e a bcm r i le b h ee ,o ee a nt nw o e tj ai c c sH hd eo ea c i d y n ) , h s re d as 1996, following four years of internment under a false identity in the Spanish penitentiary of Valdemoro, near Madrid, convicted of drug offences. His attitudes became even more extreme during a further period of imprisonment in Morocco between 2000 and June 2003. Pi t t si 19, h i n ewtA u adht n edr f pi s l r roh , 99A m d m t i b D ha, e l eo S a a o i n a h h a n -Qaeda cell, in the Netherlands and expressed the desire to go and fight in Chechnya. L yl t a sT e oayo r h t w d C i sa t bnl cp ,em thv be t ky at it i o e etn h h ee sh adsy hi se so ae enh e f o nh n l m nit n , e n n e cr e vv e commuter-train plot of this group of petty criminals. An al-Qaeda connection The clue that connects the Madrid bombing network to the al-Qaeda hierarchy appeared more than four years ago, although it was only confirmed over the last two months of 2009. It came to light in a remote mountainous location in northwestern Pakistan, not far from the Afghan border. In the early hours of 1 December 2005, a Hellfire missile hit a compound in the village of Haisori, close to Miran Shah, the administrative capital of Northern Waziristan, one of the seven agencies which form the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The core of al-Q ea l dr i m so i cm adra w la m n o i m m e adhs o ad e e h , otft o m ne s e s ay ft e br n t e f s a sp s s l s s o affiliated groups, relocated in FATA and the adjacent North West Frontier Province between late 2001 and the beginning of 2002. Al-Qaeda also relocated a large number of its active militants and most of its training infrastructure to North Waziristan between the middle of 2004 and the beginning of 2005, and has benefited from the protection afforded by Talibanised sectors of the indigenous Pashtun communities. The Hellfire, launched by one of the unmanned Predator drones used by the US Central Intelligence Agency to target al-Qaeda leaders and commanders detected along the frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan, killed five people. Among them was Egyptian Hamza Rabia, then head of al-Q ea et nl ad x ra s e

oe t n cm ad n t m n epni eo t ogn aop tiN r A e c pr i s o m n ad h a r os lfrh rai t ns l sn ot m r a ao e s b e si o h i and Western Europe. At the time of his death, Rabia was regarded as one of the top five (possibly top three) people at al-Q ea cr E r i20, sm b L dn a sl a ad oe a yn 02O a a i ae hd p tl s . l n i Q ea oe t nlt c ri ow cm ad. h i e aoe t n cm ad a ad pr i asut en to o m nsT en r lpr i s o m n w s s ao r u t tn ao assigned to Mustafa al Uzayti (also known as Abu Faraj al Libi), focusing on Afghanistan and Pakistan. Leadership of the external operations command was initially assigned to Khalid Sheik Mohamed, who masterminded the 11 September attacks in the United States. When Khalid Sheik Mohamed was arrested in Rawalpindi on March 2003, al Libi likewise became engaged in external operations, although command was assumed by Rabia. One of the four men who died with Rabia was identified by US intelligence, some weeks later, as Amer Azizi. A Moroccan, Azizi gained prominence as a member of the al-Qaeda cell established in Spain during the 1990s. Abu Dahdah, the leader of that cell after 1995, recruited Azizi and sent him to a training camp in Afghanistan perhaps as early as 2000, but certainly before mid-20. z i a fr ay rsct iasn a y pi s aoa 01A i w som l poeu dn bet b S a N t nl z l e i n i Court for terrorist offences attributed to that cell after he managed to escape from Spain following the police operation which substantially dismantled the cell in November 2001. Wh e cv i S a a i at en pi s l l i n -Qaeda cell, Azizi forged close ties to individuals who later became key members of the Madrid bombing network. These included the network initiator, Mustafa Mam ui o i pi nd n rco o t C sb na tcsa w la h y on nw m roe i Mooc frh aal c aak,s e sT e , s e a t l T n i Z ua ad e a uia , ogm n B r j sn r. In the past there has been speculation that Azizi was the instigator of the attacks. But it was only in December 2008, when a Crown Court in Manchester convicted two British citizens of Pakistani extraction (under surveillance since 2005 and arrested in 2006), of being an important member of al-Qaeda ad iaoy , ai i t n t t t rrt i A i n h cl et tn c i sh ae oi wt z i s t h d ao a r s h z s background was a key associate of Rabia emerged. This individual, called Ilyas, was mistakenly believed to be Mamoun Darkazanli. A British expert commented during the Manchester trial that Darkazanli was wanted in Spain for the Madrid bombings, which was not the case. Darkazanli, moreover, continues to live in Hamburg, Germany. Ilyas, however, is also one of the aliases used by Azizi. When Rabia was killed, his likely right-hand man Azizi died alongside him. According to senior American officials, information on the death of A i,s ai s d t t a fr a e t t S ai at ri i om l iSp m e z i R b aj a , sow r d oh pn h u oie n r ayn et br za a un w d e s h ts f l e 2006 and through a printed report in September 2007. Azizi is repeatedly mentioned in no less than 141 of the 241 volumes on the Madrid bombings compiled by the National Court in Spain. His name is also referred to in eight of the 30 supplementary volumes completing the vast judicial documentation on the case. Taken together, these documents, the result of specialised law-enforcement investigations and international police exchanges, reveal on the one hand the close ties between Azizi and the individuals who played pivotal roles in the formation and subsequent development of the local terrorist cell that prepared and placed the 11 March bombs, and on the other hand his links with individuals and groups from North Africa involved in the web of global terrorism. It was through these links that he ended up in positions of importance within al-Q ea sn redr i I f t e r bcm n a e ad ei l e h .n a , f e eo i ky s o a sp cbo g associate of Rabia, Azizi operated alongside Abd al Hadi al Iraqi and was already linked to Said al Masri and Khalid Habib, all senior al-Qaeda leaders. Back from his trip to Afghanistan in early summer 2001, Azizi coopted Maymouni, also a Moroccan, who became his closest collaborator. In 2002 Maymouni, at the instigation of Abdulatif Mourafik (also known as Malek el-Andalusi), a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) who allegedly became an associate of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (later head of al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia),

initiated the network that perpetrated the Madrid bombings, and first rented the Chinchn base of operations in October of that year. Maymouni was investigated by the Spanish police in 2003 following the Casablanca attacks. After he was detained and imprisoned in Morocco in May 2003, other members of the local cell rented the property again in January 2004. A o eMoocnD i C el ad T e uiaa eoedh network when nt r rca, rs hb ,n h T n i cm tl t h s i sn a e Maymouni was arrested. Chebli himself was incarcerated in Spain four months later, after bi i p ct it A u adh e cs,n h T n i ea eh l ar g ae e gm la dnh b D ha cl aead T e uia bcm t o li l dr n i e e l sn e c ne of the terrorist network. As the criminal proceedings on the Madrid bombings have shown, h T n i a a o ai T e uia w s l r c sn s d alised and recruited by Azizi. A i ad T e uia a z in h T n i hd z sn euncn c n cm ui t b e f qetot t ad o m n a d y -mail in 2002 and 2003. A 2005 report from r as ce S a cn aplen lgne n s t t tiis true that Amer Azizi was a friend of pi s et l o c i ei c ui te h n r i tl e tad a t Sarhane ben Abdelmajid Fakhet, and it is possible that he provided advice through the Internet and even interceded in favour of the terrorist proj te g r a dn di . e bi pe r iMar The c n pe d court records show close links between Azizi and other perpetrators of the train bombings such as Zougam and the still-fugitive Berraj. Following a formal request from the French authorities concerning Zougam, already suspected of jihadist terrorism activities in 2000, the Spanish police searched his home in Madrid in June 2001 and found written contact details for Azizi. Berraj was with Azizi in Turkey in 2000, possibly on their way to Afghanistan, when both took part in a meeting with other known jihadists such as Salahedin Benyaich and former Guatnamo inmate Lahcen Ikasrien, all of whom were arrested by the Turkish authorities. A itso l ad z i i t a ea zs e -Q s affiliated North African organisations were consolidated during his stay in Afghanistan. The Martyr Abu Yahyia camp where he trained, around 30km north of Kabul, was run by the LIFG. Members of the MICG were indoctrinated and trained there as well. Indeed, leaders of both organisations agreed, towards the end of the 1990s, to coordinate their activities. It was in the Martyr Abu Yahyia camp that Azizi met el-Andalusi and a fellow Moroccan, Karim elMejjati, an important al-Qaeda operative and terrorist organiser later killed by Saudi security forces. Indeed, el-Mejjati visited Spain in 2001 and met with Azizi. Thus, as a result of his stay in the camp, Azizi became attached to the LIFG while retaining strong links with, if not a kind of dual membership in, the MICG. The MICG became affiliated to, and supported by, alQaeda from the beginning of 2001, when its founder Nafia Noureddine met first with Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri, and then with Mohammed Atef (Abu Hafs al Masri). At a training facility established by the MICG near Jalalabad, in Afghanistan, militants acquired expertise in constructing remote-control detonators and in how to use cellular phones to activate improvised explosive devices. A meeting that delegates of the LIFG, the MICG and the analogous Tunisian organisation held in Istanbul is of the utmost significance to make full sense of the Madrid train bombings. The Istanbul meeting was held in February 2002, the Casablanca attacks were perpetrated in May 2003 and the Madrid train bombings occurred in March 2004. It was at the Istanbul meeting that it was decided the jihad should not be limited to conflict zones but should be carried into the countries from which members of the groups originated or in which they were residing. The identical argument had been disseminated within the emerging Madrid bombing network since at least autumn 2002. Several of the individuals implicated in the Casablanca attacks were also involved in the Madrid bombings. Moreover, before el- Andalusi instructed Maymouni to form a terrorist cell in Madrid, he had ordered him to set up another one, also in 2002, in Kenitra, Morocco. A Spanish police report prepared with contributions from some foreign security services, moreover, substantiates information on cell-poe xhne bten T e uian A u bu a a hn ecags e e h T n i ad b A dlh l w sn l -Sadeq,

emir of the LIFG, then temporarily in East Asia, a few months prior to the attacks. Al-Sadeq was later arrested in Bangkok and handed over to the Libyan authorities. An underlying strategy? The will to perpetrate an act of jihadist terrorism in Spain dates to late 2001 and early 2002. It was initially motivated by revenge following a major police operation which dismantled and incarcerated most of the members of the al-Qaeda cell led by Abu Dahdah. It is no coincidence that three prominent members of the Madrid bombing network were tied to that cell. Soon afterwards, the desire to attack was enhanced by the determination expressed by the joint strategic decision adopted at the meeting in Istanbul in February 2002. The invasion of Iraq added a further motivation and provided an opportunity for those wishing to perpetrate a terrorist attack to converge. A good starting point for assessing the strategy underlying the 2004 Madrid bombings is the audio recording by Osama bin Laden aired by al-Jazeera in October 2003, in which he threatened Spain and five other countries (in addition to the United States), for having deployed soldiers in Iraq. On 26 October, an e-mail sent to the Londonbased al-Majallah weekly by Abu Muhammad al Ablaj (referred to by the paper as an important al- Q eai r anucd a pea n fr get an a l enh ad f ue none:We r r r g o a r dy i p c it g ) e pi a a e Wet n on i et nd y sm b L dnn im s g,xl i t U id s r cute m n oe b O a a i ae ih es eec d gh n e e rs i n s a un e t States. A number of observers have been inclined to view the commuter-train blasts as i p e b toi d t ou et O ehdn r : oe ad agr ,otn a n i d yw j ai dcm n . n,J a i I qH ps n D ne cn i sr h s s i a s as spii t a u et n o t i ueh U id teoli pr e , prcl oh ta d r m no hw on c t n e Sa scat n a nr i a i a sc e g d e t t io t s n tu r Spain, then a major European contributor, to pull their troops out of Iraq by striking at their soldiers, so that other countries might b epc d o o o . h o edcm n Mesg e xet t fl w T e t r ou et A s e e l h , a t t S ai Pol ,i e at ps b i o a aak i in Spain. However, by the oh pn h ep h t th os it fn tc wt e s e n d e i ly t h time the former was promulgated in September 2003 and both were published on the Global Islamic Media Centre website in December, the Madrid bombing network was nearly complete and the decision to perpetrate a major attack already made. There are, moreover, no traces of either document having been viewed or downloaded through any of the computers used by the terrorists. The timing, sequence and contents of the communiqus claiming responsibility for the attacks are also interesting. Besides those issued on 11 and 13 March, a communiqu from the Abu Hafs al Masri Brigades/al-Qaeda appeared on 15 March (the day after the general election) and a second message from the local terrorist cell, whose members also recorded some unreleased videos on 27 March, was broadcast on 3 April. The 11 March communiqu by the Abu Hafs al Masri Brigades/al-Qaeda was sent by e-mail to the editor of Al Quds al Arabi who, on the basis of previous experience with other al-Qaeda claims received by the same newspaper, considered it authentic. The Spanish national police, which r e t cm ui sr avlt s ot cr br e hw the e-mail was forwarded a d h o m n u a li yr t r y,or oa d o t e q e te u w h o t from Iran, though it could have technically originated in Yemen, Egypt or Libya. The text, written in Arabic, said among other things that: The death squad has managed to penetrate the bowels of Crusading Europe, striking one of the pillars of the Crusader alliance, Spain, with a painful blow. This is part of the settling of old scores with the Crusading Spain, the ally of America in its war against Islam. Where is America, Aznar? Who will protect you, Great Britain, Italy, Japan and other agents? When we struck against the Italian troops in Nasiriya w a ed sna a i tA e caet wt r f mt ai c aa sIa .t e l ay et w r n o m r a gn : i da r h la e gi ts m I r ng i s s h w o e ln n l thus claimed responsibility for the attacks and justified them by referring to Spain both as an ally of the United States and as a country with which there was a score to settle. This might well allude to the Muslim territory on the Iberian Peninsula lost to the Christians in the fifteenth century, to the persecution and imprisonment of many al-Qaeda members and

followers in Spain since autumn 2001, or both. The issue of Iraq is framed in the broader terms of armed religious confrontation, and the Spanish prime minister is mentioned as the personification of that policy. The Nasiriya attacks of 12 November 2003 were also attributed to al-Qaeda by Abu Muhammad al Ablaj in an e-mail sent nine days later to al-Majallah. One of the bombers in those attacks was recruited and travelled to Iraq through the same transnational network that helped some of those implicated in the Madrid blasts to escape from Spain. However, there appeared to be no implicit or explicit allusion in this initial communiqu to the general elections to be held on 14 March. The message does include a clear demand, reiterating the notion of a clash between religions, to citizens of the West as opsdohirl g le:T e ep o t ai o t U id te solfr t i poe tt ru n et h pol fh le fh n e Sa s hu oc h r e i is e e ls e t t d e e governments to end this alliance in the war against terrorism, which means the war against Islam.f o s ph w rw sa s p us At uhh i ai ad cuao o I q Iyu t t a e hl t or . l og t n s n n ocpt n fr o e , lo h e v o i a were overwhelmingly unpopular in Spain and had became a major electoral issue, the terrorists might have been seeking to affect Spanish public opinion in general, to influence governmental foreign-policy decisions, rather than voting behaviour in particular. The v et ee ae o 1 Ma h yh l acli l e s t etsc a e el e u i o p r esd n 3 r b t o le n u d te n uh sw dc ror d a l c e c l cd am s a responsibility for what happened in Madrid exactly two and a half years after the attacks on N wY r ad si t n e w ab t Am gtt tf o d nta i yu e ok n Wah g n ad w s er yh l i yh iyu o ohl n or no e h a t injustice and in the deaths of Moslems with the excuse of combating terrorism, we shall blow your houses up in the air and spill your blood as if it were a river. We are prepared for what wlflor er wtt rr At uhh t rrtd nte ro h gnr e cos i i yu ha s i e o. l og t e ois i o r ett ee ll t n, ll t h r h e r s d f e a ei the tape was hurriedly recorded at around 5:00pm on the eve of election day and delivered in time for nationwide release by the media. After the 14 March election, the extent to which the local cell in Madrid followed the directives issued by Abu Hafs al Masri Brigades/al-Qaeda from the Gulf became clear. On 17 March, a fax signed by the latter organisation and dated 15 March was received in another London-based Arabic-language newspaper, Al Hayat, and also sent by e-mail to Al Quds al Arabiya. This communiqu mentioned both the elections and the electoral outcome when explaining why the initial claim of responsibility had appeared with uuulpe:I t cs o t bte f di t t eat w s e i pr nt nsased h ae fh alo Mar , ei f o a vr m ot to n e e t d h m cr y a f i wtt gvrm no t cn m t lA nr ad de t tw hv g e t i s i h oe et fh ot p b za ,n add h e ae i nh nh h e n e e ie a v e Spanish people the choice between war and peace, and they have chosen peace by voting for t pr t tt d p gi th A e cn lac ii w rgi ts m . l r h a yh s o u aa st m r a ai ent aaa sIa Ce l e t a o n e i ln s n l ay aui tS a Ia ips a w la t t i o i gvrm n ianucdht u l d go pi ss m c at s e soh n m n oe et tnone t or l n n l , l e c g n , a leadership has decided to halt all operations on the soil of Al Andalus against what are known as civilian targets until we are sure of the direction the new government will take, that has promised to withdraw Spanish troops from Iraq, and thereby make sure that there is no interference by the new executive in matters concerning Moslems. For this reason we reiterate the decision to all battalions on European soil to cease operations. This communiqu was posted on the Global Islamic Media Centre website on 18 March, as o f ao frh N t n ea i t sses n f pr i snh l d f l na s N ti t n o t ao r r n h upni o oe t n it a o A A dl ic i e i gdg e o ao e n u. It was downloaded the following morning at 10:16am to a portable computer found by the Spanish police in the home of Jm l h i nh C i sThis explains the second a aA m d ,T e h ee a n . message from the local cell (once more presented as coming from Abu Dujan al-Afgani) on 3 April, hours before the suicide explosion in Legans. This message was hand-w ie b h rt y T e tn T n i n f e t t nt nle saeA Ci Mar , i t w ri t tw , the uia ad a d oh aoanw ppr B n di wt h a n h e sn x e i d h e ng a D a B tl nanuc t anl etf u pei srct et i S ai d wt et aao,noneh nu n o or r o t e h a n g pn rs i h ti e m vu u ,r en a h ai yu cut a i e o n m k g or l d l l ei r ul s e a m k g oron y n n r ad ai yu b o f w i r e n scr i n r fn n o o k vs e tn demands, including the withdrawal of troops from Iraq and Afghanistan, were met within 24

hus yh ep ad oe m no S a But it was not the local cell but rather the orb t pol n G vr etf pi . e e n n Abu Hafs al Masri Brigades/al-Qaeda that had declared the truce this message was now terminating. The local cell in Madrid seems always to have accepted the premises transmitted in advance by the Abu Hafs al Masri Brigade/al-Qaeda from the Gulf. Whether they directed the local cell to end the truce or the decision was adopted autonomously (though in line with the 15 March communiqu) is uncertain. However, in the message faxed 3 April, the local cell leader established a 24-hour deadline, whereas in a video he and other terrorists recorded on 27 March that was never released, the deadline was fixed at eight days. So at least as early as 27 March, days after the new government expressed its intention to withdraw Spanish troops from Iraq but increase the number of soldiers in Afghanistan, the Madrid bombers clearly had it in mind to perpetrate a new act of terrorism on or after 4 April. Al-Q ea l drs seem to ad e e sa have been more restrained than other global terrorists in exploiting the 2004 Madrid bombings for propaganda purposes. Osama bin Laden first mentioned them a month later in an audio recording broadcast by Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya on 15 April in which he offered a peace treaty to the Europeans. In this message, the commuter-train blasts were interpreted from a Mul df c ag :T e iaesn ea i w ahpesn cui Pl t e n sm e ne nl hr s l o r r n htapn iocp d a sn ad i e e e s gdg e ei what happened on September 11 and March 11. These are or od r undo o.On 16 yu gose re t yu t November 2005, top al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri alluded to the 11 March attacks in a v e pa i t sid bm i s f Jl20 i L no a e l sd a w i , k i o r s gh u i o b g o 7 uy 05n odn st b s r d h hl e d in e c e n h ee i c i its illustrious predecessors in New York, Washington and Madrid, took the battle to the ee ys w si. until 19 January 2006, when a new video recording was aired by Al nm o n o Not l Jazeera, did bin Laden again refer to the case, this time indirectly and in conjunction with the London bombing:T e aaa sA e c ad tai hs or a e l ido r , sh w rgi t m r a n i le a nte i di t tI q n i s ls m n me a as Bush claims. Evidence of this is the explosions you have witnessed in the capitals of the most important European countries that are membero t s ote oli . Since s fh hslcat n i i io September 2008, al-Qaeda has frequently introduced graphic material from the commutertrain blasts to illustrate the actions of its global jihad. These images are now being reproduced in propaganda videos by al- Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb as well. It is no accident that the sentence in the Madrid bombing case refers to all those individuals prosecuted and convicted frh aak a e bro t rrtes n gop o j ai t e In contrast to the o t tcs sm m e fe oi cl ad rus fi d ty e t s r s l h s p. conventional wisdom, in this important judicial document there is not a single mention of cles dpnetes dpnetoacl ri irocp .nedw a l acl i eedn cl i eednl leso s l cnet Ide, ht o l, n l, n c l ma s the commuter-train bombings revealed about al-Qaeda and global terrorism two-and-a-half years after the 11 September attacks in the United States, is far more dynamic and complex. In the broadest sense, what happened in Madrid was telling about al-Q ea cn ne ad ot ud s i activity in instigating, approving and probably facilitating spectacular acts of terrorism in the West, particularly in Europe. This activity continues, even if there has been a noticeable change in the scope and limitations of al-Q ea cpb ie. h cm u r ad aaitsT e o m t -train blasts also s li e shed light on the re-orientation from 2002 onwards of al-Q ea a ia d orth African ad flt N s fie organisations, leading to the recent constitution of an al-Qaeda regional extension in the Maghreb. In a more detailed sense, the attacks spoke volumes about the mobilisation, within open societies, of firstgeneration Muslim immigrants as terrorists. This adds to the radicalisation and recruitment of second- and third-generation immigrants elsewhere. Overall, the Madrid train bombings revealed much about global terrorism as a polymorphous phenomenon, with diverse and heterogeneous interacting components whose leaders recognise a top-down hierarchy of command and control, but which is flexible and adapted to specific circumstances, producing extraordinary combinations when necessary and allowing the strategies of international actors and the aspirations of local activists to converge at the operational level.

But the attacks of 11 March 2004 illuminate not just jihadist terrorism in transition. They also shed light on the changing nature of the threat. They were not planned, prepared or executed by al-Qaeda alone. Neither were they the product of autonomous self-constituted cells. The Madrid bombing network speaks for itself as a complex, composite source of threat, where individuals from different groups and organisations converge. The blasts also point to the t rrt l t g r ico fr ul-transport systems as soft targets, their preference for e ois a i pe l t n o pb c r s sn de i i the use of improvised explosive devices and their suicidal determination. Finally, the Madrid attacks reveal much about terrorist strategy. Al-Q ea bod u ensdc i s dp d ad ra gi l e,eio aot s di sn e by associated organisations and the subordinate vision of local cells can converge to make the best of favourable opportunities.

*Fernando Reinares is Professor of Political Science and Security Studies at Universidad Rey Juan Carlos in Madrid, and Co-Director of the Program on Global Security and Senior Analyst on International Terrorism at Real Instituto Elcano.