Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila EN BANC OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR, Petitioner, COURT A. C. No. 5355

Present: - versus CORONA, CJ, CARPIO, VELASCO, JR., LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ, MENDOZA, SERENO, REYES, and PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ. Promulgated: December 13, 2011 x--------------------------------------------------x DECISION Per Curiam: The Case

ATTY. DANIEL B. LIANGCO, Respondent.

This is an administrative Complaint for Disbarment filed by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) against respondent Atty. Daniel B. Liangco. In a per curiam En Banc Resolution in Gozun v. Hon. Liangco,[1] dated 30 August 2000, this Court ordered the dismissal from service of respondent as judge of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Fernando, Pampanga and as acting judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Mexico-San Luis, Pampanga. His dismissal was with forfeiture of all his retirement benefits and accumulated leave credits; and with prejudice to his reinstatement or reemployment in any branch, instrumentality or agency of the government, including government-owned or -controlled corporations. The Court further directed the OCA to initiate disbarment proceedings against him for misconduct as a member of the bar. Hence, this present case for resolution by the Court. The Facts We quote the facts as stated in A. M. No. MTJ-97-1136,[2] as follows:
Complainant Hermogenes T. Gozun (hereinafter referred to as Gozun) was in open and adverse possession of subject land for a period of more than thirty years. His familys house was erected on the land. The house was made of old vintage lumber, cement, hollow blocks, G. I. sheet roofing and other strong materials. Gozun inherited the house and lot from his parents. The municipality of San Luis, Pampanga claimed to own the same lot. On January 12, 1996, the Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis, Pampanga issued Resolution No. 26-96, stating: RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED that the Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis, Pampanga do hereby consider (sic) the lot under Tax Dec. No. 114 owned by the Municipal Government of San Luis, Pampanga, specifically the lot where Mr. Hermogenes Gozun and family were squatting (sic) as the new site of the Rural Health Center will rise (sic). On May 17, 1996, the Sangguniang Bayan issued Resolution No. 34-96 to amend the correct Resolution No. 26-96.

On May 24, 1996, Romulo M. Batu, Vice Mayor, on behalf of the Sangguniang Bayan, filed with the MTC, San Luis, Pampanga, a petition for declaratory relief. We quote the petition: PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF THE HONORABLE JUDGE DANIEL LIANGCO In behalf of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis, Pampanga, We would like to petition your good office to render legal opinion on the following matters, to wit: 1. The validity of the attached Resolution. 2. The powers of the Municipal Mayor to enforce said Resolution. 3. To issue an order to the PNP to assist the Municipal Mayor in implementing said Resolution. These request are (sic) in connection with our plan to construct a new site for the Rural Health Center of San Luis, Pampanga. However, the designated place thereof is presently being squatted (sic) by a certain Mr. Hermogenes Gozun and inspite of the official notice of Atty. Benlfre S. Galang, our Provincial Legal Officer, and personal request of our Municipal Mayor Jovito C. Bondoc to Mr. Gozun to vacate his (sic) premises, he continues to defy such notices and request to the detriment of the proposed project. WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this petition will merit your favorable consideration and appropriate action for the sake of public interest. On the very same day, May 24, 1996, respondent judge issued a resolution, reasoning: First, the municipality of San Luis, Pampanga through its Sangguniang Bayan may enact resolutions and ordinances to regulate the use of property within its jurisdiction. Second, Resolution No. 34-96 is not contrary to law, morals and public policy. Third, the municipal mayor through an executive order may order the Philippine National Police or any government law enforcement agency to enforce or implement the resolution, using reasonable force if necessary and justified. Fourth, squatting in government property is considered a nuisance per se. Respondent judge ruled: With the issuance by the Municipal Mayor of an executive order, the municipality of San Luis may order the Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed in San Luis, Pampanga to effect

the eviction of Hermogenes Gozun and all other persons who may be claiming any right under him from Lot No. 114 covered by tax Declaration No. 6030 (underscoring ours). Again, on the same day, March 24, 1996, the municipal mayor, Jovito C. Bondoc, pursuant to the aforequoted resolution, issued Executive Order No. 1, series of 1996, ordering the PNP to implement Resolution No. 34-96. Note that complainant Gozun was not served with summons or given notice of the petition for declaratory relief. On June 2, 1996, complainant Gozun learned about the resolution. On June 3, 1996, complainant Gozuns wife together with other public school teachers went to the office of the respondent judge. When asked about the resolution, respondent judge answered, Ing Apung Guinu yu y Mayor Bondoc at kaya ko makisabi (Your God is Mayor Bondoc and you should talk to him). On August 8, 1996, agents of the municipal government demolished complainant Gozuns house, using respondent judges resolution and the mayors executive order as basis. On December 18, 1996, complainant Gozun filed this administrative complaint with the Office of the Court Administrator. He averred that respondent judges issuance of the resolution amounts to gross misconduct, gross inefficiency and incompetence. Complainant Gozun further accused the municipal mayor of having bribed respondent judge. Mayor Bondoc told complainant Gozun that the respondent judge is in his pocketbecause he (Mayor Bondoc) has given him (respondent judge) a lot of things (dacal naku a regalo kaya). On January 20, 1997, the Office of the Court Administrator submitted the petition to this Court for its consideration, recommending that the complaint be given due course. On March 21, 1997, the Court resolved to require respondent judge to comment thereon, within ten (10) days from notice. On May 15, 1997, respondent judge submitted his comment, denying the charges and urging that the case be dismissed. On June 23, 1997, we referred the case back to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation.

On April 13, 2000, after investigation, Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo submitted a memorandum, recommending the dismissal from office of respondent judge.[3]

A.M. No. MTJ-97-1136 Dismissal of Respondent from the Bench The OCA Resolution was forwarded to this Court for evaluation and action and docketed as A.M. No. MTJ-97-1136. On 30 August, 2000, the Court En Banc promulgated a per curiam Resolution adopting the report and recommendation of the Court Administrator. It ruled that respondent had blatantly ignored the basic rules of fair play, in addition to acting without jurisdiction in entertaining a Petition for Declaratory Relief despite his being a judge of a first-level court.[4] The Court also pointed out that his ruling on the said Petition resulted in the demolition of the house of complainant Gozun, thus rendering his family homeless.[5] It described respondents acts as biased and maleficent and ruled that those acts merited the punishment of dismissal from the service,[6] viz:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court hereby orders the DISMISSAL of respondent Judge Daniel B. Liangco, Municipal Trial Judge, Municipal Trial Court, San Fernando, Pampanga, and Acting Judge Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Mexico-San Luis, Pampanga, from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and accumulated leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to reinstatement or reemployment in any branch, instrumentality or agency of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. The Court directs the Court Administrator to initiate disbarment proceedings against respondent Judge for misconduct as a member of the bar within thirty (30) days from finality of his decision. This decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED.[7]

A.C. No. 5355 Disbarment

On 10 November 2000, the OCA filed a Complaint for Disbarment against respondent.[8] In its Complaint dated 06 November 2000, docketed as Administrative Case No. (A.C.) 5355, the OCA charged him with gross misconduct for acting with manifest bias and partiality towards a party, as well as for inexcusable ignorance of well-established rules of procedure that challenged his competence to remain a member of the legal profession. Thus, it prayed that he be disbarred, and that his name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.[9] On 28 November 2000, the Court En Banc promulgated a Resolution requiring respondent to file his Comment on the Complaint for Disbarment against him.[10] On 01 June 2001, he filed his Comment on/Answer to Complaint for Disbarment,[11]appealing for understanding and asking that the Court allow him to continue practicing as a lawyer. He reasoned that when he acted on the Petition for Declaratory Relief filed by the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of San Luis, Pampanga, he was merely rendering a legal opinion honestly and in good faith;[12] and that his actions were not attended by malice, bad faith or any other ulterior motive.[13] He further pleads for compassion from this Court and for permission to remain a member of the bar, because the practice of law is his only means of livelihood to support his family.[14] On 07 August 2001, the Court En Banc noted the submission of respondent and referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from receipt of the records of the case.[15] IBPs Report and Recommendation The IBP held a series of hearings on the disbarment case with respondents participation. On 03 October 2003, the investigating commissioner issued her Report and Recommendation[16] finding justification for the disbarment of

respondent and recommending that his name be struck off the Roll of Attorneys. The investigating commissioner found that, based on the facts of the case, there was clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence to warrant the disbarment of respondent.[17] She observed that he had exhibited lapses, as well as ignorance of well-established rules and procedures. She also observed that the present Complaint was not the first of its kind to be filed against him. She further noted that before his dismissal from the judiciary, respondent was suspended for six (6) months when he assigned to his court, without a raffle, fifty-four (54) cases for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1602 a violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 7 dated 23 September 1974. Also, pending with the Supreme Court were three (3) administrative cases filed against him for dishonesty, gross ignorance of the law, and direct bribery. In the bribery case, he was caught by the National Bureau of Investigation in an entrapment operation.[18] On 30 January 2009, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration[19] of the Report and Recommendation of the IBP. He alleged that the evidence presented in the proceedings for his dismissal as judge was the same as that which was used in the disbarment case against him. Thus, because he did not have the chance to cross-examine the witnesses, he claimed to have been deprived of due process.[20] In addition, respondent emphasized the submission by Gozun of an Affidavit of Desistance from the Complaint the latter had originally filed against him and contended that the case should have been dismissed.[21] Lastly, respondent averred that he had endeavoured to improve himself as a devout Catholic by joining religious organizations. He also impressed upon the IBP his effort to improve on his knowledge of the law by attending Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE).[22] On 12 May 2009, respondent filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration[23] wherein he implored the IBP to take a second look at his case. He emphasized the submission by Gozun of an Affidavit of Desistance and the fact

that the former had already suffered the supreme penalty of dismissal as MTC judge.[24] Respondent also reiterated the grounds already stated in his first Motion for Reconsideration. On 09 October 2008, the IBP board of governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-525,[25] which adopted the Report and Recommendation of the investigating commissioner, who found that respondent had acted with manifest bias and partiality in favor of a party-litigant and shown inexcusable ignorance of the Rules of Procedure. The Resolution likewise adopted the recommendation to disbar respondent. On 30 June 2011, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline transmitted the case records of A. C. No. 5355 to this Court, which noted it on 16 August 2011.[26] The Courts Ruling The Court affirms in toto the findings and recommendations of the IBP. The evidence on record overwhelmingly supports the finding that respondent is guilty of gross misconduct and inexcusable ignorance of well-established rules of procedures.

Gross Misconduct In Sps. Donato v. Atty. Asuncion, Jr.[27] citing Yap v. Judge Aquilino A. Inopiquez, Jr.,[28] this Court explained the concept of gross misconduct as any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned with the administration of justice; i.e., conduct prejudicial to the rights

of the parties or to the right determination of the cause. The motive behind this conduct is generally a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. In the case at bar, respondent acted upon the Petition for Declaratory Relief filed by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis, Pampanga, without the mandatory notice to Gozun who would be affected by the action. The records show that respondent, upon receipt of the Petition, had it docketed in his court, designated Gozun as respondent in the case title, and quickly disposed of the matter by issuing a Resolution all on the same day that the Petition was filed without notice and hearing. Respondent admitted that, to his mind, he was merely rendering a legal opinion at the local governments behest, which he gladly and expeditiously obliged. Without denying this fact in his Comment, he admitted that he had erred in acting upon the Petition, but emphasized that his actions were not attended by malice or bad faith.[29] We find his statements hard to believe. The undue haste with which respondent acted on the Petition negates good faith on his part. Moreover, the testimonial evidence on record indicates that he maintained close relations with the municipal vice-mayor of San Luis, Pampanga, a party-litigant who had an obvious interest in the outcome of the case. The testimony of Romulo A. Batu, former vice-mayor of San Luis, Pampanga, showed that respondent denigrated his impartiality as a judge is as follows:
COMM. SANSANO: You dont remember therefore that at any time at all you were with the mayor in going to see the respondent? WITNESS: (Mr. Batu) I do not know any instance that the mayor visited the respondent, Your Honor. I do not know any instance that I was with him.

COMM. SANSANO: But other than the occasion of the filing of this request there were times when you went to see the respondent also in his office? WITNESS: There was no other visit, Your Honor. COMM. SANSANO: So May 24, 1996 was the first time you went to see him in his office? WITNESS: Before that, Your Honor, nagpupunta na kami doon kung minsan may nagpapatulong na mga may kaso. COMM. SANSANO: Yon ang tanong ko kanina sa iyo kung bago May 24 pumupunta ka na sa opisina niyang datihan? WITNESS: Yes, Your Honor.
[30]

The testimony of respondents own witness clearly showed his wanton disregard of Canon 1, Sections 4 and 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, which requires the observance of judicial independence and its protection from undue influence, whether from private or from public interests.[31] In Edao v. Judge Asdala,[32] we explained the rationale behind this imposition:
As the visible representation of the law and justice, judges, such as the respondent, are expected to conduct themselves in a manner that would enhance the respect and confidence of the people in the judicial system. The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges must not only maintain their independence, integrity and impartiality; but they must also avoid any appearance of impropriety or partiality, which may erode the peoples faith in the judiciary. Integrity and impartiality, as well as the appearance thereof, are deemed essential not just in the proper discharge of judicial office, but also to the

personal demeanour of judges. This standard applies not only to the decision itself, but also to the process by which the decision is made. Section 1, Canon 2, specifically mandates judges to ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of reasonable observers. Clearly, it is of vital importance not only that independence, integrity and impartiality have been observed by judges and reflected in their decisions, but that these must also appear to have been so observed in the eyes of the people, so as to avoid any erosion of faith in the justice system. Thus, judges must be circumspect in their actions in order to avoid doubt and suspicion in the dispensation of justice. To further emphasize its importance, Section 2, Canon 2 states: Sec. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the peoples faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done. As early as June 6, 2003, OCA Circular No. 70-2003 has directed judges as follows: In view of the increasing number of reports reaching the Office of the Court Administrator that judges have been meeting with party litigants inside their chambers, judges are hereby cautioned to avoid in-chambers sessions without the other party and his counsel present, and to observe prudence at all times in their conduct to the end that they only act impartially and with propriety but are also perceived to be impartial and proper. Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is made. As such, judges must ensure that their conduct, both in and out of the court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary. In the same vein, the Code of Judicial Conduct behooves all judges to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all their activities, as such is essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge in order to maintain the trust and respect of the people in the judiciary.

Also relevant is Canon 3, particularly Section 2 of the new code, which exhorts judges not only to be impartial in deciding the cases before them, but also to project the image of impartiality.[33] Unfortunately, as shown by the facts of the case, these rules were not properly observed by respondent as a judge of a firstlevel court.

Inexcusable Ignorance of the Law We are appalled by respondents ignorance of the basic rules of procedure. His wanton use of court processes in this case without regard for the repercussions on the rights and property of others clearly shows his unfitness to remain a member of the bar. A cursory look at the Resolution dated 24 May 1996 issued by respondent would prompt an ordinary person to conclude that an action in the form of a Petition for Declaratory Relief was indeed filed, because it bears the name and the branch of the court of law that issued it. It had a docket number and the names of the parties involved. The Resolution even states the justiciable question to be resolved and accordingly makes a judicial determination thereof. In reality, though, there was no notice sent to Gozun, the named respondent in the Petition; nor was a hearing held to thresh out the issues involved. As far as respondent was concerned, he simply issued a legal opinion, but one with all the hallmarks of a valid issuance by a court of law, despite the absence of mandatory processes such as notice especially to Gozun and hearing. Even this excuse is unacceptable. Judges do not, and are not allowed, to issue legal opinions. Their opinions are always in the context of judicial decisions, or concurring and dissenting opinions in the case of collegiate courts, and always in the context of contested proceedings. What is most unfortunate is that the Sanguniang Bayan, relying on the Resolution respondent issued, caused the demolition of the house of Gozun and his family, who were thus ejected from the property they had been occupying for decades. In effect, Gozun was deprived of his property without due process. To us, this is precisely the injustice that members of the bench and the bar are sworn to guard against. Regrettably, respondent as judge was even instrumental in its commission. When his liability for his act was invoked, he casually justifies them

as honest mistakes not attended by malice or bad faith. His justification is unacceptable to us. As a member of the bar and former judge, respondent is expected to be wellversed in the Rules of Procedure. This expectation is imposed upon members of the legal profession, because membership in the bar is in the category of a mandate for public service of the highest order. Lawyers are oath-bound servants of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest for truth and justice, for which they have sworn to be fearless crusaders.[34] As judge of a first-level court, respondent is expected to know that he has no jurisdiction to entertain a petition for declaratory relief. Moreover, he is presumed to know that in his capacity as judge, he cannot render a legal opinion in the absence of a justiciable question. Displaying an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he in effect erodes the publics confidence in the competence of our courts. Moreover, he demonstrates his ignorance of the power and responsibility that attach to the processes and issuances of a judge, and that he as a member of the bar should know. Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer must uphold the Constitution and promote respect for the legal processes.[35] Contrary to this edict, respondent malevolently violated the basic constitutional right of Gozun not to be deprived of a right or property without due process of law. Under Canon 10, Rule 10.03, respondent as lawyer is mandated to observe the Rules of Procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.[36] In this case, however, the opposite happened. Respondent recklessly used the powers of the court to inflict injustice.

Should the misconduct of respondent as judge also warrant his disbarment from the legal profession? We answer in the affirmative. In Collantes v. Renomeron,[37] we ruled therein that the misconduct of the respondent therein as a public official also constituted a violation of his oath as a lawyer:
As the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro said: "A person takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar which is designed to impress upon him his responsibilities. He thereby becomes an officer of the court on whose shoulders rest the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper, fair, speedy and efficient administration of justice. As an officer of the court he is subject to a rigid discipline that demands that in his every exertion the only criterion be that truth and justice triumph. This discipline is what has given the law profession its nobility, its prestige, its exalted place. From a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are expected those qualities of truth-speaking, a high sense of honour, full candor, intellectual honesty, and the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility - all of which, throughout the centuries, have been compendiously described as 'moral character.' xxx xxx xxx

"A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession." (Rule 7.03, Code of Professional Responsibility.) This Court has ordered that only those who are "competent, honorable, and reliable" may practice the profession of law (Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293) for every lawyer must pursue "only the highest standards in the practice of his calling" (Court Administrator vs. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269, 278).

Recently, in Samson v. Judge Caballero,[38] we ruled that because membership in the bar is an integral qualification for membership in the bench, the moral fitness of a judge also reflects the latters moral fitness as a lawyer. A judge who disobeys the basic rules of judicial conduct also violates the lawyers oath.

We note that on 25 August 2011, respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing Resolution No. XVIII-2008-525 dated 09 October 2008 promulgated by the IBP board of governors, which adopted and approved the findings of the investigating commissioner recommending his disbarment. Respondent alleged therein that he had served as assistant provincial prosecutor in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga for thirteen (13) years prior to his dismissal as MTC judge of San Luis, Pampanga and as acting MCTC judge of Mexico-San Luis, Pampanga. He also complains that he was deprived of due process by the IBP board of governors when it approved and adopted the findings of the investigating commissioner recommending his disbarment; and he prays for a second look at his case, considering the withdrawal of the Complaint originally filed by Gozun. In the light of our ruling in this case, we can no longer consider the undocketed Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by respondent. In the first place, such kind of petition is not available to assail the resolution of the IBP in an administrative case. His remedies from an adverse resolution is to seek a reconsideration of the same, and when denied, to raise the same defenses against administrative liability before this Court. He has availed of both remedies in this case. Disbarment proceedings are sui generis. As such, they render the underlying motives of complainant unimportant and of little relevance. The purpose of disbarment proceedings is mainly to determine the fitness of a lawyer to continue acting as an officer of the court and as participant in the dispensation of justice an issue which the complainants personal motives have little relevance. For this reason, upon information of an alleged wrongdoing, the Court may initiate the disbarment proceedings motu proprio.[39]

Recently in Garrido v. Atty. Garrido,[40] we reiterated the unique characteristic of disbarment proceedings and their purpose in this wise:
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as the verification of pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant do not apply in the determination of a lawyers qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar. We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to depart from this ruling. First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration of justice and is a matter of public interest because it involves service to the public. The admission qualifications are also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern that the State may inquire into through this Court. In this sense, the complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party whose interest in the outcome of the charge is wholly his or her own; effectively, his or her participation is that of a witness who brought the matter to the attention of the Court.

Thus, despite Gozuns desistance in A.M. No. MTJ-97-1136, from whence this case originated, respondent is not exonerated. WHEREFORE, this Court resolves to DISBAR Atty. Daniel B. Liangco for the following offenses: 1. GROSS MISCONDUCT in violation of Canon 1, Sections 4 and 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary 2. INEXCUSABLE IGNORANCE OF THE LAW in violation of Canons 1 and 10, Rule 10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Daniel B. Liangco in the Office of the Bar Confidant and another copy furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

The Bar Confidant is hereby directed to strike out the name of Daniel B. Liangco from the Roll of Attorneys. SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO JR. Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO BRION Associate Justice

ARTURO D.

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA BERSAMIN Associate Justice

LUCAS P. Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ABAD Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA SERENO Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.M. No. P-07-2300 December 12, 2011 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 05-2231-P] ATTY. RUTILLO B. PASOK, Complainant, vs. CARLOS P. DIAZ, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Tacurong City, Respondent. DECISION PER CURIAM: Before us is an administrative complaint1 filed by Atty. Rutillo B. Pasok (complainant) against respondent Carlos P. Diaz (respondent), Sheriff IV of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacurong

City, Branch 20 for Dishonesty, Gross Inefficiency, Abuse of Authority and violation of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The charges stemmed from numerous cases wherein respondent sheriff allegedly extorted money from winning litigants on the pretext that said amounts will cover the costs of implementing court processes. Complainant averred that if parties failed to pay the amounts demanded, respondent would also refuse to perform his duty. In a nutshell, the charges arose in the following cases: 1. In Civil Case No. 761 entitled "Spouses Cayena, et al. vs. Spouses Pascua, et al."2 for collection of sum of money and damages: Complainant alleged that respondent Diaz personally demanded money from him to answer for expenses in the implementation of the writ of possession. Respondent reasoned that his meager salary as a court sheriff prevented him from taking action on the same. In order to avoid undue delay in the implementation of the said writ, complainant utilized his own vehicle to bring respondent to the subject property. However, it turned out respondent conferred with the defendants and then unilaterally postponed the implementation of the Writ in order to give the latter additional time to amicably settle with the prevailing party in the suit. Complainant protested and reminded respondent that his duty to implement the writ is ministerial and that he could not substitute the directive of the court with that of his own. Nevertheless, respondent still refused to implement the writ. Later on, respondent explained to complainant that the defendants are his relatives. 2. In Civil Case 02-104 entitled "Spouses Jovencio Sabanal and Eden Sabanal vs. Spouses Roger Agtarap and Erlinda Agtarap" for collection of sum of money and damages:3 Complainant alleged that respondent sent him a Letter4 dated April 1, 2005 and demanded the amount of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) to cover the expenses to be incurred in implementing the writ of execution issued by the RTC, Branch 20, Tacurong City. When he refused to accede to respondent's request, no action was taken on the case. 3. In sixteen (16) Civil Cases5 for collection of sum of money involving plaintiff-Spouses Nicandro and Priscilla Loyola (plaintiffs): Complainant alleged that respondent demanded the amount of Five Hundred (Php 500.00) to One Thousand (Php 1,000.00) pesos per case in order to execute the respective writs of execution issued thereon. However, due to the refusal of complainant to give in to respondent's demand, no writs of execution have been implemented. Neither were there any Sheriff's Reports on the said cases. On October 12, 2004, Spouses Loyola made a personal follow up of the cases and inquired on the status of the writs for implementation. Respondent then demanded the amount of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) pesos for the implementation of the sixteen (16) writs and promised that he will submit the Sheriff's Report within the week from the receipt of the amount of P2,000.00.6 However, despite the receipt of the P2,000.00, respondent failed to implement the writs.7 In April 2005, Spouses Loyola inquired again on the status of the implementation of the writs. To which, respondent explained that he was too busy that he has no time to attend to their cases. Respondent, likewise, insinuated that since he is receiving only P6,000.00 as his salary, the initial amount of P2,000.00 which was given to him was insufficient to cover the cost of implementing the

writs. Despite Spouses Loyola's warning that they will file a complaint against respondent should he refuse to perform his duties, respondent failed to implement the writs.8 4. In Civil Case No. 02-076 entitled "Gerry Roxas Foundation, etc. vs. Spouses David Douglas Sespea and Jocelyn Sespea, et al." for sum of money and damages: Complainant alleged that respondent sent a demand letter to the Manager of his client, Gerry Roxas, and asked the amount of Ten Thousand (Php 10,000.00) pesos for the implementation of the writ of execution.9 Likewise, as in the above-mentioned cases, respondent did not implement the writ when complainant's client failed to deposit the former's requested amount. 5. In Civil Case No. 671 entitled "Sultan Kudarat Construction and Development Corporation, etc. vs. Spouses Darlito Sumagaysay, et al." for sum of money and damages: Complainant alleged that, upon the payment by the judgment debtor of the sum of One Million Fifty Thousand (P1,050,000.00) pesos, respondent demanded the amount of P50,000.00 purportedly as legal fees incurred in the execution of the writ. On September 26, 2003, on the condition that respondent will issue an official receipt, complainant paid the amount of P50,000.00 to respondent.10 On the same day, complainant proceeded to the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC) to secure the Official Receipt incurred in the execution. However, Mr. Pelagio Hilario, Jr., the OIC Clerk of Court, apparently issued only two (2) receipts for a total amount of Thirty-Seven Thousand Six Hundred (Php 37,600.00) pesos only.11 According to Mr. Hilario, that was the only amount turned over by respondent Diaz to the OCC. Complainant confronted respondent regarding the balance of Twelve Thousand Four Hundred (Php 12,400.00) pesos, but the latter explained that he was entitled to said amount for services rendered in the garnishment of the amount subject of the writ of execution. Finally, complainant emphasized that, in all the above-mentioned cases, respondent not only demanded and received money from party-litigants, he, likewise, refused to perform his duties in accordance with the law in the absence of the demanded money.
1 avvphi 1

Thus, the instant administrative complaint against respondent. On July 4, 2005, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) directed respondent sheriff to file his Comment on the allegations against him.12 In a Comment13 dated August 19, 2005, respondent Diaz explained his position in the following manner: (1) With respect to Civil Case No. 761, respondent admitted that he indeed conferred with the defendants and gave them three (3) days within which to comply with the conditions of the writ of possession.14 After said period, respondent claimed that defendants informed him that their lawyer advised them that they still have the right to repurchase the property for which they will pursue in court in order to protect their right, which precluded him from proceeding with the implementation of the writ.

Respondent claimed that he never received a single centavo from either the Spouses Cayena or complainant even for the gasoline expenses. (2) As to Civil Case No. 02-104, respondent admitted that he required the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) from complainant's clients to be deposited in his office.15 He, however, asserted that the requirement to deposit is pursuant to the standard practice of writing to the parties or their counsel to inform them of their obligation to finance the writ of execution,16 citing Section 10 of the Amended Administrative Circular No. 35-2004 dated August 30, 2004. (3) As to the sixteen (16) civil cases17 of the Spouses Loyola, respondent denied that he demanded any amount from the parties, although he admitted having received Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) from the Spouses Loyola as sheriff's expenses.18 He claimed that the amount was utilized in the service of sheriff's notices to the defendants. Respondent further reasoned that upon service of the sheriff's notices, he discovered that many of the defendants were indigent and have no properties which may be subject to execution.19 He likewise averred that complainant also failed to inform him of the particular properties to be executed.20 (4) As to Civil Case No. 02-076, respondent clarified that contrary to the allegations of complainant, no money was ever deposited at the Office of the Clerk of Court. He argued to have only made an estimate of the expenses which will be incurred in the implementation of the writ. He claimed that if the parties found the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) to be exorbitant, then they could have just requested for a reduction thereof.21 (5) As to Civil Case No. 671,22 respondent admitted that he indeed received the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00)23 from defendant Sumagaysay as payment for the legal fees of the Two Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,500,000.00) which was subjected to garnishment in compliance with the writ of execution.24 He explained, however, that the balance amount of Twelve Thousand Four Hundred Pesos (P12,400.00)25 from the P50,000.00 was voluntarily given to him by defendant Sumagaysay.26 Finally, respondent countered that while complainant repeatedly complains on the delay of the implementation of the writs, he, however, never paid the required legal fees in order to carry out his tasks. He prayed, thus, that the complaint against him be dismissed. On January 15, 2007, the OCA, after reviewing the positions taken by both parties, found that the complaint cannot be resolved by mere examination of the records; thus, it recommended that the instant matter be referred to Executive Judge Milanio M. Guerrero, RTC, Branch 20, Tacurong City, for investigation and submission of report and recommendation.27 On February 26, 2007, the Court resolved to docket the instant complaint as a regular administrative matter and refer the same to Executive Judge Milanio M. Guerrero, RTC, Branch 20, Tacurong City, for investigation, report and recommendation.28 After a series of delays and extensions, on February 8, 2011, Executive Judge Guerrero submitted his Investigation Report recommending the imposition of sanctions upon respondent Diaz for failing to follow the appropriate procedure in the collection of fees relative to the service of processes, writs and execution of judgment in Civil Case Nos. 761, 02-104, 02-076, the sixteen cases of the Spouses Loyola and Civil Case No. 671.

On August 24, 2011, the OCA recommended that Diaz be dismissed from service for having been found guilty of grave misconduct. It further recommended the filing of corresponding criminal charges against Diaz for violation of R.A. 3019.29 RULING We adopt the recommendation of the OCA. Time and again, this Court has pointed out the heavy burden and responsibility which court personnel are saddled with in view of their exalted positions as keepers of the public faith. They should, therefore, be constantly reminded that any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of official functions must be avoided. Those who work in the judiciary must adhere to high ethical standards to preserve the courts good name and standing. They should be examples of responsibility, competence and efficiency, and they must discharge their duties with due care and utmost diligence since they are officers of the court and agents of the law. Indeed, any conduct, act or omission on the part of those who would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary shall not be countenanced.30 There is no question as to respondent Diaz's guilt. The facts and the evidence, coupled with respondents own admission, sufficiently established his culpability. His categorical admission of having demanded and collected money from complainant and his clients to defray the expenses of the implementation of the writs is clearly in violation of the procedures laid down by the Rules with regard to the payment of legal fees. Under Section 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, the sheriff is required to secure the courts prior approval of the estimated expenses and fees needed to implement the court process. Specifically, the Rules provide: SEC. 9. Sheriffs and other persons serving processes. - x x x xxxx (l) For money collected by him by order, execution, attachment, or any other process, judicial or extrajudicial, the following sums, to wit: 1. On the first four thousand (P4,000.00) pesos, four (4%) per centum. 2. On all sums in excess of four thousand (P4,000.00) pesos, two (2%) per centum. In addition to the fees hereinabove fixed, the party requesting the process of any court, preliminary, incidental, or final, shall pay the sheriff's expenses in serving or executing the process, or safeguarding the property levied upon, attached or seized, including kilometrage for each kilometer of travel, guard's fees, warehousing and similar charges, in an amount estimated by the sheriff, subject to the approval of the court. Upon approval of said estimated expenses, the interested party shall deposit such amount with the clerk of court and ex officio sheriff, who shall disburse the same to the deputy sheriff assigned to effect the process, subject to liquidation within the same period for rendering a return on the process. Any unspent amount shall be refunded to the party making the deposit. A full report shall be submitted by the deputy sheriff assigned with his return, and the sheriff's expenses shall be taxed as costs against the judgment debtor.31

Thus, following the above-mentioned rules, it is imperative that a sheriff shall observe the following: (1) the sheriff must make an estimate of the expenses to be incurred by him; (2) he must obtain court approval for such estimated expenses; (3) the approved estimated expenses shall be deposited by the interested party with the Clerk of Court and Ex Officio Sheriff; (4) the Clerk of Court shall disburse the amount to the executing sheriff; and (5) the executing sheriff shall disburse/liquidate his expenses within the same period for rendering a return on the writ.32 Any unspent amount shall be refunded to the party who made the deposit. Likewise, we have repeatedly ruled that sheriffs are not authorized to receive any voluntary payments from parties in the course of the performance of their duties. In this case, respondent's act of receiving the balance ofP12,400.00 from Sumagaysay in Civil Case No. 671 is indeed a violation of Canon III, Section 2 (b) of A.M. No. 03-06-13-SC,33 which prohibited court employees from receiving tips or any renumeration for assisting or attending to parties engaged in transactions involved in actions or proceedings with the Judiciary. Corollary, a sheriff cannot just unilaterally demand sums of money from a party-litigant without observing the proper procedural steps; otherwise, it would amount to dishonesty or extortion.34 We also take note that respondent's issuance of a temporary receipt,35 which was handwritten on a scrap of paper, also constituted a violation of Section 113 of Article III, Chapter V of the National Accounting and Auditing Manual which provides that "no payment of any nature shall be received by a collecting officer without immediately issuing an official receipt in acknowledgment thereof."36 Furthermore, it must be stressed anew that the duty of sheriffs to promptly execute a writ is mandatory and ministerial. Sheriffs have no discretion on whether or not to implement a writ. There is no need for the litigants to "follow-up" its implementation. When writs are placed in their hands, it is their ministerial duty to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute them in accordance with their mandate. Unless restrained by a court order, they should see to it that the execution of judgments is not unduly delayed. Clearly, in Civil Case No. 761,37 when respondent took it upon himself to mediate between litigants and even provided an extension of the implementation of the writ, he appeared to be lacking in the amount of diligence required of him in the performance of his duties. Under the circumstances, respondent is clearly guilty of grave misconduct which the Court will never tolerate. No less than the Constitution mandates that all public officers and employees should serve with responsibility, integrity and efficiency. Indeed, public office is a public trust. Thus, We have often stated that the conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, is circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. The Judiciary expects the best from all its employees who must be exemplars in the administration of justice.38 We come to the imposable penalty. As per records, this is not respondent's first offense. In A.M. No. P-07-2332 dated September 4, 2009,39respondent had been previously suspended for one (1) month and one (1) day for Simple Neglect of Duty.40 Under the Civil Service Rules, if the respondent is found guilty of two or more charges, the penalty to be imposed should be that corresponding to the most serious charge and the rest will be considered aggravating circumstances. Grave misconduct, a grave offense punishable by dismissal on the first offense, is the most serious charge of which respondent sheriff is found guilty. Thus, following the Civil Service Rules and the fact that this is his second infraction involving similar charges, dismissal from service is the appropriate penalty to be imposed on respondent sheriff.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds CARLOS P. DIAZ, Sheriff IV, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Tacurong City, GUILTY of GRAVE MISCONDUCT,41 and orders his DISMISSAL from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and privileges, except accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. The Legal Division of the Office of the Court Administrator is likewise, DIRECTED to INITIATE appropriate criminal proceedings against respondent Diaz. SO ORDERED. RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA Associate Justice BIENVENIDO L. REYES Associate Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.* Associate Justice ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO Associate Justice ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE Associate Justice

Footnotes

EN BANC

EVELINA C. BANAAG, Complainant,

A.M. No. P-11-3011 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 09-3143-P) Present: CORONA, C.J., CARPIO, VELASCO, JR., LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA,

- versus -

BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ, MENDOZA, SERENO,

REYES, and OLIVIA C. ESPELETA, Interpreter III, Branch 82, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Respondent. PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

Promulgated: December 16, 2011

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Can a man scoop fire into his lap without his clothes being burned? Can a man walk on hot coals without his feet being scorched? So goes an early admonition against immorality from the Holy Book that is as valuable today as it was thousands of years ago. In the judiciary, moral integrity is more than a virtue; it is a necessity. A court employee who has fallen short of the exacting standards of morality and decency has to face the consequences, even after the embers have died and the scars have faded.
1

The Facts

The present administrative case originated from a letter-complaint dated May 3, 2009 filed by complainant Evelina C. Banaag before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) charging respondent Olivia C. Espeleta with Gross Immorality and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service for engaging in an illicit and immoral relationship with her husband, Avelino C. Banaag.
2

Evelina met Olivia for the first time in October 2005 when the latter accompanied Gloria Tubtub to her house at JB Crystal Building,Quirino Highway, Lagro, Quezon City, to request for encashment of a check in the amount of P11,000.00. It turned out that the check, which Evelina encashed out of pity for Gloria who was her sister in a Marriage Encounter group and who told her that she needed money for her grandchild who was supposedly hospitalized, actually belonged to Olivia. According to Gloria, she did not intend to deceive her friend but only wanted to help Olivia, who gave her a small token for the transaction.
3

At the same meeting, Olivia introduced herself as a court interpreter in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 82. Believing that Olivia could assist her and her husband in their pending cases before the court, Evelina introduced Olivia to her husband who, after learning that they both hail from Batangas, asked for Olivia's cellphone number. Little did Evelina know that said casual meeting would eventually blossom into an amorous relationship between Olivia and her husband.

Evelina claimed that she learned about the affair the following year, 2006, when her husband asked to withdraw P180,000.00 from their joint bank account to lend to his brother, Reynaldo, who was then confined in the hospital. She later found out from the latter's wife, Ana Fe, that Avelino gave him (Reynaldo) only P80,000.00. Ana Fe cautioned Evelina against releasing more money to her husband who has a mistress working at the City Hall.

Upon investigation, Evelina learned that on two separate occasions in 2006, her husband had gone to Olivias house in San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan, accompanied by his friend, Engr. Pacifico Jun R. Sabigan. On both occasions, according to Sabigan, they had some drinks, and Olivia danced. Avelino, already tipsy, danced with her. Although Sabigan did not witness any compromising exchanges between the two, nonetheless, Avelino had confided to him that he and Olivia were seeing each other, and that he had been giving OliviaP5,000.00 for her groceries.
4

Evelina confronted her husband right away. He was tight-lipped at first, but he eventually admitted his romantic involvement with Olivia. Worse, Evelina discovered that her husband, using their conjugal funds, had been depositing substantial amounts of money to Olivia's Landbank account for three years spanning 2006 to 2009, as well as to the Metrobank account of the latter's daughter, AnaKharmela E. Rules. He also made deposits to the Landbank accounts of Olivia's coemployees, Pacencia Rodriguez and Olga Abesamis . When confronted, Olga allegedly confirmed that the deposits to her account were for the benefit of Olivia who, at that time, had no ATM card.
5 6 7 8

Evelina claimed that more than P3 Million had been deposited to Olivia's account but she was able to retain in her possession deposit slips amounting only to P1.429 Million, having lost the others in a scuffle with her husband, who tore them to pieces and flushed them in the toilet. For a long time, Avelino was the administrator of the family-owned JB Crystal Building, which earned rentals that he himself collected in cash. This, Evelina surmised, enabled her husband to support Olivia financially.

To bolster her claims, Evelina attached to her letter-complaint (1) photocopies of cash deposit slips evidencing Avelino's deposits to Olivia's account wherein he indicated his relationship to the latter as a cousin, as well as to the accounts of Olivia's daughter and co-employees; and (2) summaries of unremitted rentals from their commercial building and unauthorized withdrawals made by Avelinofrom their bank
9 10

account. She likewise submitted in evidence the affidavits executed by Gloria Tubtub and Engr. Sabigan confirming the illicit relationship.
11 12

The Action and Recommendation of the OCA

The OCA directed respondent Olivia to comment on the letter-complaint within ten (10) days from receipt of its 1st Indorsement dated May 18, 2009. However, Olivia failed to comply therewith. A similar notice was subsequently issued by the OCA on August 19, 2009, to no avail. On January 21, 2010, the OCA reported the matter to this Court recommending that Olivia be directed for the last time to submit her comment otherwise the case against her shall be resolved on the basis of the record on file. Accordingly, the First Division issued the pertinent Resolution dated April 28, 2010, which was, however, returned unserved with the notation No occupant at given address. It was served anew per Resolution dated August 16, 2010, but was likewise returned unserved for the reason RTS-Moved. The Court thereafter sent the case back to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation.
13 14 15 16 17 18 19

Upon verification with the Office of Administrative Services (OAS), it was found that Olivia had filed a letter of resignation dated June 11, 2009, which was favorably endorsed both by the Presiding Judge of Branch 82 and the Executive Judge of the RTC. In a subsequent letter dated August 12, 2009, Presiding Judge Severino B. De Castro, Jr. informed the OCA that Olivia had gone to the United States, and that it was not known whether she intended to return to the country. Hence, upon the recommendation of the OCA, the resignation was accepted by this Court on February 26, 2010 without prejudice to the outcome of the instant administrative case.
20 21 22 23

On August 11, 2011, the OCA reported its findings on the case and recommended that:
24

1. The instant administrative matter be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative complaint against Olivia C.Espeleta, former Interpreter III. Regional Trial Court, Branch 82, Quezon City; and 2. Respondent Olivia C. Espeleta be found GUILTY of Gross Immoral Conduct, and be ORDERED to pay a FINE in the amount of P50,000.00, which may be deducted from whatever sums that are due her, as accrued leave credits, if sufficient.
25

The Issue The only issue to be resolved is whether respondent Olivia C. Espeleta is guilty of immoral conduct.

The Ruling of the Court After a careful evaluation of the records of the instant case, the Court finds respondent Olivia C. Espeleta guilty of Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct under Section 46(b)(5), Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 which, as defined in Section 1 of CSC Resolution No. 100912 dated May 17, 2010 (Revised Rules on the Administrative Offense of Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct), is an act which violates the basic norm of decency, morality and decorum abhorred and condemned by the society and conduct which is willful, flagrant or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinions of the good and respectable members of the community.

Respondent's act of maintaining an illicit relationship with a married man comes within the purview of disgraceful and immoral conduct, which is classified as a grave
26

offense punishable with suspension from the service for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense, and dismissal for the second offense.
27

In Sealana-Abbu vs. Laurenciana-Hurao (2007), where two court stenographers engaged in an illicit affair were suspended for one (1) year, the Court emphasized that (i)t is morally reprehensible for a married man or woman to maintain intimate relations with another person of the opposite sex other than his or her spouse. In Elape vs. Elape (2008), a process server of the RTC was suspended for six (6) months and one (1) day for cohabiting with his mistress, abandoning his family and depriving them of financial support. Another process server was suspended for the same period in Regir vs. Regir (2009) for carrying on an illicit relationship with a woman not his wife, with whom he begot a child. Recently, in Babante-Caples vs. Caples (2010), a utility worker in the MTC, who had resigned, was nonetheless ordered to pay a fine for maintaining an illicit relationship with a woman not his wife.
28 29 30 31

As in Babante-Caples, respondent herein was given the opportunity to be heard and refute the charges against her; yet, she chose not to file any comment. Instead, as aptly pointed out by the OCA, respondent rather hastily tendered her resignation on June 11, 2009, just a few days after receipt on June 2, 2009 of the 1st Indorsement specifically requiring her to answer the letter-complaint. That respondent fully intended to run away from accountability for her indiscretions is betrayed by her perfectly-timed departure for the United States of America shortly after her resignation. Respondent's actuations when confronted with the charges against her are, thus, strongly indicative of guilt on her part.
32

The deposit slips indicating various amounts credited both directly and indirectly to respondent's account indubitably prove the allegation that she had been receiving substantial amounts of money from complainant's husband, in callous disregard of the heartache and financial dislocation of the latter's family. There could thus not be any serious doubt that respondent was indeed in an intimate relationship withAvelino, a married man.

In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant.
33 34

"It cannot be overstressed that the image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official and otherwise, of the personnel who work thereat, from the judge to the lowest of its personnel. Court employees have been enjoined to adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency in their professional and private conduct in order to preserve the good name and integrity of courts of justice." This Court has thus consistently penalized court personnel who had been found wanting of such standards, even if they have precipitately resigned from their positions. Resignation should not be used either as an escape or as an easy way out to evade an administrative liability or an administrative sanction.
35 36

Had respondent not resigned from the service, she would have been suspended for six months and one day in accordance with the prescribed penalty in the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service , this being her first offense involving immorality. Instead, the Court adopts the OCA's recommended fine in the amount
37

of P50,000.00 not exceeding respondent's six months' salary, which may be deducted from her accrued leave credits, if sufficient. WHEREFORE, respondent OLIVIA C. ESPELETA is found GUILTY of Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct. In view of her resignation, a FINE in the amount of P50,000.00 is imposed on respondent, to be deducted from her accrued leave credits, if sufficient; otherwise, she is ORDERED to pay the amount of the fine directly to this Court.

The Employees Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services of the Office of the Court Administrator, is DIRECTED to compute respondents accrued leave credits, if any, and deduct therefrom the amount representing the payment of the fine.

Let a copy of this Decision be filed in the personal record of respondent. SO ORDERED.