SECRET Subject: Immediate Report No.3 ---------------------In the Field 16 Jun 44 G(Ops) B Main HQ, 21 Army Gp.

Copy to :- Second Army HQ Reference Appendix "A" to 21A/Gp/2182/2/Ops B dated 3 Jun 44 - Information required from GSOs, 1(L). 1. General Sufficient experience has now been gained to enable the bulk of the questions contained in the above quoted questionnaire, to be answered. It must however be emphasised that the type of country in which 30 Corps is operating is very close. Grass fields surrounded by hedges of tall trees with banks covered with thick undergrowth are typical: in fact the country is very reminiscent of the more wooded parts of Sussex. This has a very great influence on tactics and the employment of weapons. 2. Answers to Questions Army/Air Co-operation Q 1 - No question. Q 2 - The handling of tentacles is entirely a matter of experience. Experienced staffs such as HQ 30 Corps have learnt to appreciate the value of a tentacle, how to use it and how to look after it. Some formations and staffs have not yet learnt this. Q 3 - On the whole the effect of air bombardment on enemy, concrete defences has produced good results if really heavy bombs in great number are used. On field defences, bombing has been very accurate but the effect appears to be largely moral and relatively fewcasualties have been caused. The moral effect is however great: the enemy dislikes air attack and is shaken thereby. Q 4 - Coloured smoke from 25 pounders has been very successfully used as a target indicator fired at the target to coincide with the ETA of the aircraft. It will not be long before the enemy realises the methods employed, and when he is shelled with red smoke will fire it back at our own troops. It will be necessary therefore for Army to make a definite plan for the use of coloured smoke so that colours are changed as required. Coloured smoke can be used as a navigational aid when the target is out of range, but this, though necessary in the desert, should not be required in France. Night landmarks have been produced at short notice and maintained by an NCO and three ORs. They are extremely simple and apparently satisfactory to the RAF. They are not desirable in congested areas such as a beachhead. 237/G

- 2 Q 5 - No information. Q 6 - The system at corps HQ works satisfactory. There is, however, a tendency for G(OPS) to handle air matters and brief the G2(Air) later. This leads to loss of time. Q 7 - In 30 Corps, the landmark party is found from Camp Staff and it is not possible to use the same men more than 2 - 3 times weekly. A number of NCOs should be trained in the use of day and night landmarks. An alternative satisfactory method is to make divisions in whose area the landmark is required take over responsibility for it. They can provide the personnel without difficulty - usually from Div RE. Q 8 - Yellow smoke is the only satisfactory means of identification for armoured formations. It is also best for infantry except in stabilised positions when they are particularly sensitive about revealing their positions. An instance has been reported of a regt RA being attacked by our own aircraft despite an extensive display of yellow celanese panels. It is suggested that the RAF should supply the answer as to whether celanese is readily visible from a distance or not. RAC Q 9 - The best organisation for a Sqn is still being argued in armd regts. The consensus of opinion appears, however, to favour a mixed sqn (i.e. three tps 75mm and one tp of 17 pr Shermans). This is because (a.) The enemy concentrates on knocking out the 17 pr Shermans. A case was reported of an enemy tank in ambush allowing two 75mm Shermans to pass and then knocked out the 17 pr Sherman which was following them. (b) It is felt that the aim of Sqn manoeuvre should be to draw the enemy on to the 17 prs. To this end they should be held well forward under the Sqn Ldr. 07) A single 17 pr Sherman can be detailed to carry out any specified task in support of a 75mm tp as required. Q 10 - Mines have not been encountered in any number up to date and have presented no problem. Q 11 - ) ) Have no information. Q 12 - )

- 3 Q 13 - No use of flame by the enemy has been reported on 30 Corps front to date. For use of flame by our own troops see answer to Q 16 below Q 14 - Armd cars have not so far been able to break through the enemy screen and carry out their proper task of strategic recce. The nature of the country has prevented them from deploying off roads to which they have been confined. They negotiated the beaches without difficulty. The Staghound is definitely handicapped in narrow lanes. Q 15 - Armd recce regts have been used for flank protection or to fill a gap between neighbouring formations. Their wireless has been satisfactory. The Cromwell, like every type of vehicle, has been unable to move freely across country. The REME organisation has not yet been seriously tested but has so far worked satisfactorily. The principle disadvantage of the recce regt appears to be its dual role. It is very difficult to concentrate on both fighting the enemy and reporting back information at the same time. Q 16 - Crocodiles were employed in the reduction of strong points whether sited in woods or villages. They are very popular and have been very successful. It is to be regretted that there are so few of them available as they provide a very valuable close-country close-support weapon. Their method of employment is to approach as close as possible under cover to the strong point while this is being neutralized by infantry fire. Q 17 - It is not possible to compare the damage to roads by different types of tanks because when they are driven straight along a road they do relatively little damage. When turning however with one track braked, all types, particularly the Sherman, do a great deal of damage. French tarmac appears to be softer than British, and the edges tend to break away very rapidly. The maintenance of tarmac roads will, if operations continue in a relatively restricted area, become a problem of considerable magnitude. Q 18 - ) Insufficient information on which to base a report Q 19 - ) at present. RA Q 20 - Our own RA A Tk guns and AA guns, allotted an alternative A TK role; have not yet had a shoot on 30 Corps front. Q 21 - The nature of the country has largely prevented cross country movement by our tanks. Tank shooting appears to have taken place at extra long or short, but not intermediate, ranges, i.e., from an ambush at 50 yds or from cover on dominating ground, at over 1500 yards. Our armd regts - as was the case in the desert - still appear to feel that they are out-gunned and out-telescoped by their opposite equivalents on the German side.

- 4 Q 21 - The following cases have been reported contd A Sherman 75mm knocked, out 3 Panthers at 50 yds range. A Firefly (17pr) knocked out a Mk IV special at 2200 yds. A Firefly knocked out a Tiger by a side shot at 1200 yds. A Sherman 75mm reported 20 hits with no effect on a Panther at 1500 yds. Q 22 - The co-operation between our own infantry and tanks has been very good. It is a great advantage if the two co-operating units know one another well. The part played by the tanks has been principally fire support from covered positions well forward. Q 23 - ) see report (Appendix A) supplied, by CE 30 Corps, Q 29 - ) who is being pressed to supply definite answers to the questions asked. Infantry Q 30 (a) No low flying aircraft have attacked tps in 30 Corps area. (b) The close nature of the country throws a great deal of responsibility on the junior leaders. These have to get well forward to see the situation and issue orders for each move forward; their casualties have been heavy. It is to be doubted whether patrolling and infiltration tactics are of a sufficiently high standard. This applies as much to troops which have been trained in the UK as to those from the Desert. It is considered that in training in the UK, the greatest possible attention should be paid to infiltration tactics, both offensively and defensively. The Garman has again shown that he is an adept at infiltration. (c) AVREs and Crocodiles were both used with good effect in co-operation with tanks and infantry in attacks on strong points. Where these weapons were not available, there has been no departure from normal practice. No concrete positions have been encountered behind the original beach defences. (d) The tendency is growing for infantry to rely more and more on artillery support. This may be due to two reasons (i) Bde and Bn commanders realize that, with centralized artillery control, a vast volume of artillery fire can quickly and accurately be put down on their front. They therefore naturally ask for this support.

- 5 (ii) The infantry on 30 corps front are becoming very tired and need more and more the support of artillery to get them forward. In the opening stages of the campaign they were willing to shoot themselves forward by the use of their own fire power. It is considered that highly trained infantry in the type of country in which 30 Corps is now operating should be able to work their way forward with their own resources. In any case such action is essential at the termination of the initial fire plan. (e) There has been no shortage of SAA or mortar ammunition with the forward troops. The cause is probably that neither have been fully exploited. Battalions are now beginning to realise the value of their mortars, and to use them more effectively. This may cause difficulties in amn supply but has not done so up to date. (f) The British Army as a whole is not sniper conscious and at present there are no signs in 30 Corps that the extensive use of snipers is being considered. It is unlikely that any development of sniping will take place until and if operations become static. There is no real reason why highly trained snipers should not, in the present type of country, inflict severe casualties on the enemy. (g) Reverse slope positions are not used because practically everywhere sufficient cover and covered avenues of approach exist. Q 31 - Organisation (a) The present organisation is a one. The division now has the and concentrating the fire of degree of decentralisation is without difficulty. great improvement on the former possibility of co-ordinating its supporting weapons: if some required this can be arranged

(b) No counter-mortar organisation is as yet in existence. It is considered that such an organisation will shortly be required and that it can be provided without great difficulty from existing divisional resources. In this connection it is suggested that full use is not being made of mortars. We should strive continuously to obtain mortar domination over the enemy by the offensive use of mortar fire and never letting him have the last word in any mortar duel which may ensue. (c) Six men appears to be the average. Q 32 - Casualties Yes. Casualties amongst junior leaders have been heavy and unless their replacement is immediate, whole units become temporarily ineffective.

- 6 Q 33 - Carriers LMG in Carriers provide a valuable reserve of fire power in the hands of Commanders. These LMGs when used as a battery can be particularly effective. The close nature of the country has prevented their use in this manner. They have often been used for patrolling. In this country this use of carriers is both wrong and expensive. They are also used extensively for carrying stores. Q 34 - LMG and 2 Mortar Have not sufficient information to make a reliable report. Q 35 - MMGs (a) The close nature of the country does not afford scope for MMGs to develop their full power though they have been used both offensively and defensively for short range fire (b) No, in this type of country they will not normally be used to protect an OP line. (c) As far as can be determined, no indirect fire has so far been employed. (d) Control is exercised by the Bde in whose support the MG coy has been placed, and not by the Bn Comd on whose front it is firing. It has been found by experience that when the Coy W/T set is put on the Bn net, no traffic is passed as it never gets on the air. It appears now to be the practice to put the Coy W/T set on the Bde Fwd Control. (e) Yes - almost invariably. Q 36 3 Mortar (a) It would appear that up to the present 3 Mortars have not been sufficiently used and that the enemy has mortar superiority. This is fully realised and action is being taken to wrest this superiority from the enemy. (b) No. (c) The value of concentrated mortar fire is beginning to be realised and instances are now occurring of the use of mortars in battery. Up to the present, sections have mostly been allotted to coys. (d) Yes (e) There is as yet insufficient experience to say.

- 7 Q 37 4.2 Mortar (a) It is difficult to say, owing to the difficulties of observation, but it would appear that this is a very accurate weapon. (b) Yes, very definitely. Concentrated fire is what produces results. (c) No. There appears to be no demand for an SP 4.2 Mortar at present. (d) The 4.2 WP Bomb has not been as yet used in an anti-personnel role, although it is considered by some officers that it would be very useful. It has also been suggested that 4.2 WP Bombs used en masse on the front of advancing tanks would bring these to a standstill. Q 38 - 6 pr A Tk gun (a) These have been successfully used in concealed positions for holding a firm base and have been very successful both in destroying tanks and beating off counter-attacks. (b) Sabot amn has been very good and an instance has been reported of a Tiger destroyed by a shot in the side at 700 yds (it should be noted that all enemy tks, are reported as Tigers - it is only when they are picked up that their true nature can be discovered). (c) No information available. Q 39 PIAT (a) The PIAT is very popular. It has been used against buildings and tanks. (b) It has been used with good effect against tanks up to 80 yds. Q 40 - ) 41 - ) Further information is being sought. Q 42 - Ammunition (a) SAA. (i) For Rifles on the man - 50 rds per rifle. Unit reserve - 50 rds per rifle. Second line - 50 rds per rifle.

(ii) For LMG With the weapon Unit reserve Second Line - 1000 rds per LMG. - 500 rds per LMG. - 700 rds per LMG.

- 8 It is fully realised that circumstances must govern the allotment of amn carried. When operations are fluid more petrol and less amn, is carried. When operations become more static, more amn and less petrol is carried. (b) The existing scales of 2 mortar amn are considered satisfactory and no revision is required. (c) This question is not understood. If it means Is enough SAA used, the answer is probably No, as there is a tendency to rely on artillery support and not much SAA has been used. Q 43 - Smoke has not so far been used on a large scale. Q 44 Bridging and River crossing (a) There is no demand at present for a light portable bridge. (b) No experience. Q 45 - (a) The 38 set is not entirely successful and should not be used below Sqn HQ. Its signals are so weak that they usually have to be amplified through the I.C. and a troop leader cannot compete with a 38 set, the I.C, and the 19 set at the same time. The telephone communication on the outside of the tank is both essential and satisfactory if the correct equipment is issued. One Armd Bde was issued with substitute equipment which did not prove satisfactory. It was found that the best method of ensuring intercomn was to detach a tank or scout car from Sqn HQ to the infantry HQ. This vehicle worked exclusively on the tank net. (b) Coloured smoke fired by artillery has been invaluable for indicating targets far bombing. On one occasion the RAF claimed six tanks "Brewed Up" following the use of this method. Ground to air yellow strips have been used by the forward troops, i.e. leading coys, but it is not known if they are visible to the RAF. The troops dislike using smoke in forward areas as they believe that it draws hosti1e fire. Q 46 - Vehicles It is not possible to comment on the allocation of vehicles to the different echelons as divisions have been on the light scale which is undoubtedly not sufficient for smooth working.

- 9 Q 47 - G 1098 Equipment (a) There are undoubtedly many items which could be deleted from G 1098 but no two units will agree upon which they should be. No two formations appear to carry the same and none work strictly to the book. (b) The mobile cooker is very popular. If it is not available, individual cooking on "Compo" is the best alternative. (c) Entrenching tools are used without delay on each bound. It would appear that every man who can procure a pick or a shovel is quite ready to carry it into action. The American entrenching tool appears to be an intermediate stage between our tool and a shovel. It is for consideration whether it would not be more satisfactory than our existing entrenching tool. The repercussions of the inclusion of additional shovels and picks in the G 1098 of an infantry Bn are so great that this change cannot lightly be recommended. Q 48 - Enemy Mines (a) NO. (b) The state of trg of Bns in the handling of enemy mines varies very greatly. In well trained Bns unnecessary casualties will be avoided. When further advances are made into areas in which the enemy has had time to lay mines and Bns, through battle wastage, have been filled up with semi trained reserves, casualties will undoubtedly occur. (c) There is insufficient evidence to give an answer. Q 49 - Maps (a) Yes (b) Yes when properly organized. (c) Yes. (d) Infantry usually work on 1/25,000; other arms on 1/50,000. 1/250,000 maps are required only by HQ formations. (e) No. Large numbers of 1/100,000 maps are demanded but these are not available. 3. Report on 17 pr Sherman A report on the 17 pr Sherman . supplied by the Comd of an Armd Regt is attached at Appendix "B".

B/JYH

Lt-Col, G 1 Liaison.

Appendix "B"_ NOTES ON SHERMAN 17 pr TANK 1. GUN The flash is excessive and leads to immediate pinpointing by the enemy. 2. SIGHTS The present sights are not good enough for rapid long range firing with success. The Hun has so far preferred to sit back and fire at a range of approx 1,500 - 2,000 yds. His better sights have given him an advantage. A more accurate means of applying charges of range to telescope would help. The present position of telescope is not satisfactory. The position of the gunner is cramped, and becomes impossible after any length of time. A binocular sight placed immediately in front of the gunner into which he could look without effort would be ideal. 3. MUZZLE BRAKE Scribe marks on the muzzle brakes would save a good deal of time for T & A ing, sights. Some looking device should be fitted to all muzzle brakes. 4. TRAVELLING LOCK These should be fitted in such a way so that the gun is not fully elevated, when it is locked. It would be better if the gun is depressed when not being used. 5. ARMOUR These tanks prove a better target than the 75 from the Hun point of view. In one case an A Tk gun let two Shermans 75 pass before knocking out the 17 pr. If possible they should be equipped with extra plate on the front of the hull and on the mantlet. Extra plate placed at an angle on hull and turret would also have a good effect on the crew morale. 6. TACTICS (i) Good hull down positions have been difficult to find in this close country. After firing they must change their position immediately before opening up again. (ii) With only five in a Sqn, they should be kept in reserve under command of the Sqn Ldr, until required. Enemy tanks, if possible should be drawn on by either 75s or lighter tanks, to the concealed, 17 prs.