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MUSCAT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

Risk Management Analysis Lightning Protection System NORTH PIER

North Pier
North Pier is one of the piers of Muscat International Airport as shown below. It has four levels namely; Apron Level, Arrival Level, Departure Level, and Service Corridor Level. In the Arrival level, eight (8) numbers Bridge Houses are provided serving various aircrafts such as 738, 77E, F100, just to name a few. Substations 7 and 8 provide power to electric consuming loads of North Pier. Each substation is provided with two (2) number transformers. These substations are fed from 11kV power system routed through a network of underground ducts and manholes. 11kV power is stepped down to utilization voltage 415/230V wye, 3-phase, 4-wires, 50 Hz system via distribution transformer which then connect to Main Switchboard (MSB). IT/Data system is also routed underground through a network of underground ducts and manholes. Data and telecommunications systems utilizing fiber optic cables terminate to two (2) Main Entrance rooms. From these Main Entrance rooms, fiber optic cables are routed to Distribution IT rooms then to various IT rooms. This Risk Management Analysis is based primarily on BS EN 62305 Part 2. The dimensions of the structure are: L = 325.5 m W = 49 m H = 28.5 m In this structure, the risk of loss of Human life R 1, and the loss of service to the public R 2 will be considered.

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This Risk Management Analysis of the North Pier building is divided into eight parts: 1. Assigned Values 2. Definition of Zones 3. Collection Areas 4. Number of Dangerous Events 5. Probability of Damage 6. Expected Amount of Loss 7. Risk of Loss 8. Protection Measures

1. ASSIGNED VALUES The following tables identify the characteristics of the structure, its environment and the lines connected to structure. Table 1.1 Table 1.2 Table 1.3 Characteristics of the structure and its environment. Characteristics of incoming LV power line and connected internal equipment. Characteristics of incoming telecom line and connected internal equipment.

*Note : All tables and formulas used are from BS EN 62305-2. Table 1.1: Characteristics of the structure and its environment Parameter Dimensions (m) Location factor Line environment factor LPS Shield at structure boundary Shield internal to structure People present inside/outside the structure Soil resistivity Lightning flash density Equation NB 3: Notes: 1. From Table I of Fire Safety Strategy Report - Particular Specification. 2. Maximum value obtained from Soil Resistivity Measurement Tests Report Numbers 5331-1, 5331-2, and 5331-17 conducted by Fugro Comment Surrounded by smaller objects Urban None Yes Yes Yes (m) 1/km2/year Symbol Lb, Wb, Hb Cd Ce PB KS1 KS2 nt Ng Value 325.50, 49, 28.50 0.5 0.1 1 1.08 1.08 4855 16 0.2 Table A.2 Table A.5 Table NB.2 Equation NB 3 Equation NB 3 See Note 1 See Note 2 Table NK.2

K S1 = K S2 = 0.12 x w

Table 1.2: Characteristics of incoming LV power line and connected internal equipment Parameter Length (m) Height (m) HV/LV Transformer Line shielding Internal wiring precaution Withstand of internal system SPD Protection Notes: 1. Initial assumption is none. SPD protection to be included in the protection measures evaluation. Comment Buried Yes Yes Yes U w = 2.5 kV None Symbol Lc Hc Ct PLD KS3 KS4 P SPD Value 1000 --0.2 0.2 0.0002 0.6 1

from Annex A.4 Table A.4 Table NB.6 Table NB.5 KS4 = 1.5/Uw Table NB.3 (See Note 1)

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Table 1.3: Characteristics of incoming telecom line and connected internal equipment Parameter Length (m) Height (m) Line shielding Internal wiring precaution Withstand of internal system SPD Protection Notes: 1. Initial assumption is none. SPD protection to be included in the protection measures evaluation. Comment Buried Yes Yes U w = 1.5 kV None Symbol Lc Hc PLD KS3 KS4 P SPD Value 1000 --0.4 0.0002 1 1

from Annex A.4 Table NB.6 Table NB.5 KS4 = 1.5/Uw Table NB.3 (See Note 1)

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2. DEFINITION OF ZONES The following characteristics of the structure have been considered in order to divide it into zones: The type of floor surface is different in the entrance area and inside the structure. The structure is a unique fireproof compartment. No spatial shields exist within the structure Both electrical systems are common throughout the structure Zones Z1 Z2 Z3 Z4 Z5 Z6 Description Outside of building Concourse Baggage Sorting Hall Mechanical Rooms Electrical Services Rooms IT/Data Rooms Remarks See Table 2.1 See Table 2.2 See Table 2.3 See Table 2.4 See Table 2.5 See Table 2.6

Table 2.1: Characteristics of Zone Z1 (Outside of Building) Parameter Soil surface type Shock protection Loss by touch and step voltages People potentially in danger in the zone Comment Concrete None Yes Symbol ra PA Lt np Value 0.01 1 0.01 50

See Note 1 See Note 2 See Note 3 See Note 4

Notes: 1. Value is obtained from Table NC.2 2. Value is obtained from Table NB.1. Initial assumption for shock protection is none. Shock protection to be included in the protection measures evaluation. 3. Value is obtained from Table NC.1 4. The number of people indicated in this table is assumed only.

Table 2.2: Characteristics of Zone Z2 (Concourse) Parameter Floor surface type Risk of fire Special hazard Fire protection Spatial shield Internal power systems Internal telephone systems Loss by touch and step voltages Loss by physical damage People potentially in danger in the zone Comment Granite Ordinary Average Automatic Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Symbol ru rf hz rp K S2 Connected to LV power line Connected to telecom line Lt Lf np Value 0.001 0.01 5 0.2 1.08 0.0001 0.75 910 See Note 6 See Note 6 See Note 7

See Note 1 See Note 2 See Note 3 See Note 4 See Note 5

Notes: 1. Value is obtained from Table NC.2 2. Value is obtained from Table NC.4 3. Value is obtained from Table NC.5 4. Value is obtained from Table NC.3 5. Value is obtained from Equation NB.3 K S1 = K S2 = 0.12 x w

where: w = 6. Value is obtained from Table NC.1 7. Number of persons is calculated using the persons density as per Section 5.3 of ITT Specs SE-200-M-10300_T03

9m

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Table 2.3: Characteristics of Zone Z3 (Baggage Sorting Hall) Parameter Floor surface type Risk of fire Special hazard Fire protection Spatial shield Internal power systems Internal telephone systems Loss by touch and step voltages Loss by physical damage People potentially in danger in the zone Comment Polyurethane Coating Ordinary Average Automatic Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Symbol ru rf hz rp K S2 Connected to LV power line Connected to telecom line Lt Lf np Value 1 x 10 0.01 5 0.2 1.08 0.0001 0.75 166 See Note 6 See Note 6
-5

See Note 1 See Note 2 See Note 3 See Note 4 See Note 5

Notes: 1. Floor surface type is based on Architectural finishes schedule. Corresponding value of finished surface is obtained from Table NC.2. 2. Value is obtained from Table NC.4 3. Value is obtained from Table NC.5 4. Value is obtained from Table NC.3 5. Value is obtained from Equation NB.3 K S1 = K S2 = 0.12 x w where: w = 9m 6. Value is obtained from Table NC.1

Table 2.4: Characteristics of Zone Z4 (Mechanical Rooms) Parameter Floor surface type Risk of fire Special hazard Fire protection Spatial shield Internal power systems Internal telephone systems Loss by touch and step voltages Loss by physical damage People potentially in danger in the zone Comment Epoxy Resin Top Coating Ordinary Low panic Automatic Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Symbol ru rf hz rp K S2 Connected to LV power line Connected to telecom line Lt Lf np Value 0.01 0.01 2 0.2 1.08 0.0001 0.33 12 See Note 6 See Note 6 See Note 1 See Note 2 See Note 3 See Note 4 See Note 5

Notes: 1. Floor surface type is based on Architectural finishes schedule. Corresponding value of finished surface is obtained from Table NC.2. 2. Value is obtained from Table NC.4 3. Value is obtained from Table NC.5 4. Value is obtained from Table NC.3 5. Value is obtained from Equation NB.3 K S1 = K S2 = 0.12 x w where w = 9m 6. Value is obtained from Table NC.1

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Table 2.5: Characteristics of Zone Z5 (Electrical Service Rooms) Parameter Floor surface type Risk of fire Special hazard Fire protection Spatial shield Internal power systems Internal telephone systems Loss by touch and step voltages Loss by physical damage People potentially in danger in the zone Comment Epoxy Resin Top Coating Ordinary Low panic Manual Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Symbol ru rf hz rp K S2 Connected to LV power line Connected to telecom line Lt Lf np Value 0.01 0.01 2 0.5 1.08 0.0001 0.33 10 See Note 6 See Note 6 See Note 1 See Note 2 See Note 3 See Note 4 See Note 5

Notes: 1. Floor surface type is based on Architectural finishes schedule. Corresponding value of finished surface is obtained from Table NC.2. 2. Value is obtained from Table NC.4 3. Value is obtained from Table NC.5 4. Value is obtained from Table NC.3 5. Value is obtained from Equation NB.3 K S1 = K S2 = 0.12 x w where: w = 9m 6. Value is obtained from Table NC.1

Table 2.6: Characteristics of Zone Z6 (IT/Data Rooms) Parameter Floor surface type Risk of fire Special hazard Fire protection Spatial shield Internal power systems Internal telephone systems Loss by touch and step voltages Loss by physical damage People potentially in danger in the zone Comment Epoxy Resin Top Coating Low Low panic Automatic Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Symbol ru rf hz rp K S2 Connected to LV power line Connected to telecom line Lt Lf np Value 0.01 0.005 2 0.2 1.08 0.0001 0.33 20 See Note 6 See Note 6 See Note 1 See Note 2 See Note 3 See Note 4 See Note 5

Notes: 1. Floor surface type is based on Architectural finishes schedule. Corresponding value of finished surface is obtained from Table NC.2. 2. Value is obtained from Table NC.4 3. Value is obtained from Table NC.5 4. Value is obtained from Table NC.3 5. Value is obtained from Equation NB.3 K S1 = K S2 = 0.12 x w where: w = 9m 6. Value is obtained from Table NC.1

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3. COLLECTION AREAS

The collection area Ad/b is based on a ratio of 1:3 (height of structure : horizontal collection distance) as per Annex A.2.1. The collection area Am extends to a line located at a distance of 250 m from the perimeter of the structure as per Annex A.3. Symbol A d/b Am A l(P) A l(T) A i(P) A i(T) where:
2 A d/b = L x W + 6 x H x (L + W ) + 9 x x (H )

Area (m2) 102,954.88 399,549.50 3,658 3,658 100,000 100,000

from Equation A.2

A m = 500 x (L + W + 125) + (L x W) A l = (L c - 3(H a + H b)) A i = 25 L c for Buried for Buried from Table A.3 from Table A.3

4. NUMBER OF DANGEROUS EVENTS Symbol N d/b Nm N L(P) N L(T) N I(P) N I(T) where: N d/b = N g x A d/b x C d/b x 10
-6 -6

Value 0.010295488 0.069614412 0.00007316 0.00007316 0.0004 0.0004

from Equation A.4 from Equation A.7 from Equation A.6 from Equation A.8

N L = N g x A l x C d x C t x 10

-6 N M = N g x ( A m - Ad/bC d/b ) x 10

N I = N g x A i x C e x C t x 10-6

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5. PROBABILITY OF DAMAGE Table 5.1: Probability of damage P X PX PA Source of Damage Flashes to structure (S1) Flashes to structure (S1) Flashes to structure (S1) Flashes to structure (S2) Type of Damage Injury of living beings due to step and touch voltages (D1) Physical damage (fire, explosion, mechanical destruction, chemical release) due to lightning current effects including sparking (D2) Failure of internal systems due to Lightning Electromagnetic Impulse (LEMP) (D3) Failure of internal systems due to Lightning Electromagnetic Impulse (LEMP) (D3) Reduction of Probability By protection measures against step and touch voltage. BS EN 62305-2 Table NB.1 By Class of lightning protection system (LPS) installed. BS EN 62305-2 Table NB.2 By coordinated SPD protection. BS EN 62305-2 Table NB.3 By adopted lightning protection measures (LPMS), according to a factor KMS. BS EN 62305-2 Table NB.4

PB

PC

PM

PU

Flashes to the Injury of living beings due to step and touch service connected to the voltages (D1) structure (S3) Flashes to the service connected to the structure (S3) Flashes to the service connected to the structure (S3) Flashes near to the service connected to the structure (S3) Physical damage (fire, explosion, mechanical destruction, chemical release) due to lightning current effects including sparking (D2) Failure of internal systems due to Lightning Electromagnetic Impulse (LEMP) (D3)

PV

By characteristics of the service shield, the impulse withstand voltage of internal systems connected to the service and the presence or otherwise of service entrance SPDs. BS EN 62305-2 Table NB.6

PW

PZ

Failure of internal systems due to Lightning Electromagnetic Impulse (LEMP) (D3)

By characteristics of the service shield, the impulse withstand voltage of internal systems connected to the service and the presence or otherwise of service entrance SPDs. BS EN 62305-2 Table NB.6

Table 5.2: Summary of probabilities of damage Probability PA PB PC PM P U(P) P V(P) P U(T) P V(T) PW PZ Z1 1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Z2 Z3 Z4 Z5 Z6 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008

from Table NB.1 from Table NB.2 from Equation NB.1 As per Annex NB.4. As per Annex NB.5 As per Annex NB.6 As per Annex NB.5 As per Annex NB.6 As per Annex NB.7 As per Annex NB.8

See Note 1 See Note 2 See Notes 3 & 4 See Notes 3 & 4 See Notes 3 & 4 See Notes 3 & 4 See Notes 3 & 4 See Notes 3 & 4

Notes: 1. Initial assumption is structure not protected by LPS. LPS protection to be considered in Protection Measures Analysis. 2. K MS = K S1 x K S2 x K S3 x K S4 = 0.000139968 (Equation NB.2) 3. For a four core multi-core cable having wire armor, 600/1000V, maximum resistance of cable armor ranges from 0.35 to 3.10 per km. 4. Initial assumption is no SPD protection. SPD protection to be included in the protection measures evaluation.

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6. EXPECTED AMOUNT OF LOSS 6.1. Loss of human life In order to determine the values of Lt (loss due to injuries by step and touch voltages), L (loss due to physical damage), f and Lo (loss due to failure of internal systems), the following approximate relationship applies. LX = where: n p - is the number of possible endangered persons (victims). n t - is the expected total number of persons (in the structure). t p - is the time in hours per year for which the persons are present in a dangerous place, outside of the structure ( L t only) or inside the structure (L t , L f , and L o ). Since the values of n p are uncertain and the values of t p are difficult to determine, values of L t and L f from table NC.1 are used. np nt x tp 8760 from Equation NC.1

Summary of annual losses Zone 1 2 3 4 5 6 Lt1 0.01 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 Lf1 N/A 0.75 0.75 0.33 0.33 0.33

Summary of R1 component losses Probability Z1 Z2 Z3 Z4 Z5 Z6 L A1 1.0E-04 1.0E-07 1.0E-09 1.0E-06 1.0E-06 1.0E-06 L B1 0 7.5E-03 7.5E-03 1.3E-03 3.3E-03 6.6E-04 L U1 1.0E-04 1.0E-07 1.0E-09 1.0E-06 1.0E-06 1.0E-06 L V1 0 7.5E-03 7.5E-03 1.3E-03 3.3E-03 6.6E-04

LA = ra x Lt LU = ru x Lt LB = LV = rp x hz x rf x Lf

from Equation NC.2 from Equation NC.3 from Equation NC.4

6.2. Unacceptable loss of service to the public The values of Lf (losses due to physical damage) and Lo (losses due to failure of internal systems) can be determined in terms of the relative amount of possible loss from the following approximate relationship. LX = where: n p - is the mean number of possible endangered persons (users not served). n t - is the total number of persons (users served). t - is the annual period of loss of service (in hours). Since the values of n p are uncertain and the values of t are difficult to determine, values of L o and L f from table NC.6 are used. np nt x t 8760 from Equation NC.6

Summary of annual losses Zone 1 to 6 Lf2 0.1 Page 9 of 14 Lo2 0.01

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Summary of R 2 component losses Probability L B2 L C2 L M2 L V2 L W2 L Z2 Z1 0 0.01 0.01 0 0.01 0.01 Z2 0.0002 0.01 0.01 0.0002 0.01 0.01 Z3 0.0002 0.01 0.01 0.0002 0.01 0.01 Z4 0.0002 0.01 0.01 0.0002 0.01 0.01 Z5 0.0005 0.01 0.01 0.0005 0.01 0.01 Z6 0.0001 0.01 0.01 0.0001 0.01 0.01

Loss of service to the public is affected by structure characteristics and by a reduction ( p) as follows: r L B = L V = r p x r f x L f2 LC = LM = LW = LZ = LO from Equation NC.7 from Equation NC.8

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7. RISK OF LOSS Identification of Tolerable Risk R T (from Table NK.1) Type of loss Loss of human life or permanent injuries Loss of service to the public Loss of cultural heritage R T /annum 1 x 10 1 x 10-4 -4 1 x 10
-5

RX RA RB RC RM RU RV RW RZ

Source of Damage Flashes to the structure (S1) Flashes to the structure (S1) Flashes to the structure (S1) Flashes near the structure (S2) Flashes to a service connected to the structure (S3) Flashes to a service connected to the structure (S3) Flashes to a service connected to the structure (S3) Flashes near a service connected to the structure (S4)

Type of Damage D1 D2 D3 D3 D1 D2 D3 D3

D1 - Injury to living beings due to step and touch voltages D2 - Physical damage due to lightning current effects including sparking D3 - Failure of internal systems due to Lightning Electromagnetic Impulse 7.1. Risk of loss of human life R 1 R1= RA+ RB+ RC + RM + RU+ RV+ RW + RZ
1) 1) 1) 1)

from Clause 4.3

(Equation 1)

1) Only for structures with risk of explosion and for hospitals with life saving electrical equipment or other structures when failure of internal systems immediately endangers human life. Risk Components R 1 = R A1 + R B1 + R U1(P) + R V1(P) + R U1(T) + R V1(T) Risk to the structure resulting in physical damages R B in Zone 3 for example is: RA = ND x PA RB = ND x PB x LB R U = ( N L + N Da ) x P U x L U R V = ( N L + N Da ) x P V x L V from Clause 6.2 from Clause 6.2 from Clause 6.4 from Clause 6.4 (Equation 21) (Equation 22) (Equation 25) (Equation 26)

Summary of R 1 component risks Risk RA1 RB1 RU1(P) RU1(T) RV1(P) RV1(T) R1/Zone Z1 1.03E-06 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1.03E-06 Z2 N/A 7.72E-05 2.07E-10 4.15E-10 1.56E-05 3.11E-05 1.24E-04 Z3 N/A 7.72E-05 2.07E-12 4.15E-12 1.56E-05 3.11E-05 1.24E-04 Z4 N/A 1.36E-05 2.07E-09 4.15E-09 2.74E-06 5.47E-06 2.18E-05 Z5 N/A 3.40E-05 2.07E-09 4.15E-09 6.84E-06 1.37E-05 5.45E-05 Z6 N/A 6.80E-06 2.07E-09 4.15E-09 1.37E-06 2.74E-06 1.09E-05

Overall R1 = Summation of R1/Zone Page 11 of 14

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This result is now compared with the tolerable risk R T for loss of human life R 1. Thus: Overall R 1 = 0.00033601 Therefore, lightning protection for the structure is necessary. > RT = 0.00001

7.2. Risk of loss of service to the public R 2 R2= RB+ RC+ RM+ RV+ RW+ RZ Thus, in this case: R 2 = R B2 + R C2 + R M2 + R V2(P) + R V2(T) + R W2(P) + R W2(T) + R Z2(P) + R Z2(T) Risk to the structure resulting in physical damage R B in Zone 2 RC = ND x PC x LC RM = NM x PM x LM R W = ( N L + N Da ) x P W x L W RZ = ( NI - NL ) x PZ x LZ from Clause 6.2 from Clause 6.3 from Clause 6.4 from Clause 6.5 (Equation 23) (Equation 24) (Equation 27) (Equation 28) from Clause 4.3 (Equation 2)

Summary of R 2 component risks Risk RB2 RC2 RM2 RV2(P) RV2(T) RW2(P) RW2(T) RZ2(P) RZ2(T) R2/Zone Z1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Z2 2.06E-06 1.03E-04 6.96E-08 4.15E-07 4.15E-07 2.07E-05 2.07E-05 2.61E-08 2.61E-08 1.47E-04 Z3 2.06E-06 1.03E-04 6.96E-08 4.15E-07 8.29E-07 2.07E-05 2.07E-05 2.61E-08 2.61E-08 1.48E-04 Z4 2.06E-06 1.03E-04 6.96E-08 4.15E-07 8.29E-07 2.07E-05 2.07E-05 2.61E-08 2.61E-08 1.48E-04 Z5 5.15E-06 1.03E-04 6.96E-08 1.04E-06 2.07E-06 2.07E-05 2.07E-05 2.61E-08 2.61E-08 1.53E-04 Z6 1.03E-06 1.03E-04 6.96E-08 2.07E-07 4.15E-07 2.07E-05 2.07E-05 2.61E-08 2.61E-08 1.46E-04

Overall R2 = Summation of R2/Zone This result is now compared with the tolerable risk R T for loss of service to the public R 2. Thus: Overall R 2 = 0.00074216 Therefore, lightning protection for the structure is necessary. > RT = 0.0001

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8. PROTECTION MEASURES To reduce the risk to the tolerable value, the following protection measures could be adopted: Solution A To reduce R B1,we should install Lightning Protection System (LPS) in order to reduce probability of damageP B and P V. To reduce R B1, the structure's metal roof will be used to act as an air-termination system. The reinforced concrete framework will be used to act as a natural down-conductor system. This reduces R B1 to a lower value. In calculating R V1, SPD protection of Class I will also be used. For this structure , electrical insulation of down-conductors and effective soil equipotentialization will also be applied. This will reduce probability of damage P A and the risk R A1. The new values of probabilities of damage are summarised in the following Table. Probability PA PB PC PM P U(P) P V(P) P U(T) P V(T) PW PZ Z1 0.0001 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Z2 N/A 0.001 1 0.0001 0.2 0.001 0.4 0.001 0.2 0.008 Z3 N/A 0.001 1 0.0001 0.2 0.001 0.4 0.001 0.2 0.008 Z4 N/A 0.001 1 0.0001 0.2 0.001 0.4 0.001 0.2 0.008 Z5 N/A 0.001 1 0.0001 0.2 0.001 0.4 0.001 0.2 0.008 Z6 N/A 0.001 1 0.0001 0.2 0.001 0.4 0.001 0.2 0.008

from Table NB.1 from Table NB.2 from Equation NB.1 As per Annex NB.4. As per Annex NB.5 As per Annex NB.6 As per Annex NB.5 As per Annex NB.6 As per Annex NB.7 As per Annex NB.8

The re-calculated values relating to loss of human life R1 are summarised in the following Table. Summary of R 1 component risks for protection solution A Risk RA1 RB1 RU1(P) RU1(T) RV1(P) RV1(T) R1/Zone Thus: Overall R 1 = 0.00000065 < RT= 0.00001 Z1 1.03E-10 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1.03E-10 Z2 N/A 7.72E-08 2.07E-10 4.15E-10 7.78E-08 7.78E-08 2.33E-07 Z3 N/A 7.72E-08 2.07E-12 4.15E-12 7.78E-08 7.78E-08 2.33E-07 Z4 N/A 1.36E-08 2.07E-09 4.15E-09 1.37E-08 1.37E-08 4.72E-08 Z5 N/A 3.40E-08 2.07E-09 4.15E-09 3.42E-08 3.42E-08 1.09E-07 Z6 N/A 6.80E-09 2.07E-09 4.15E-09 6.84E-09 6.84E-09 2.67E-08

Therefore protection has been achieved with regard to loss of human life R 1. Risk R 2 is now re-calculated based upon the protection measures applied above. The re-calculated values relating to loss of service to the R 2 are summarised as follows. Summary of R 2 component risks for protection solution A Risk RB2 RC2 RM2 RV2(P) RV2(T) RW2(P) RW2(T) RZ2(P) RZ2(T) R2/Zone Z1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Z2 2.06E-09 1.03E-04 6.96E-08 2.07E-09 2.07E-09 2.07E-05 2.07E-05 2.61E-08 2.61E-08 1.45E-04 Overall R 2 = Z3 2.06E-09 1.03E-04 6.96E-08 2.07E-09 2.07E-09 2.07E-05 2.07E-05 2.61E-08 2.61E-08 1.45E-04 > Z4 2.06E-09 1.03E-04 6.96E-08 2.07E-09 2.07E-09 2.07E-05 2.07E-05 2.61E-08 2.61E-08 1.45E-04 RT= Z5 5.15E-09 1.03E-04 6.96E-08 5.18E-09 5.18E-09 2.07E-05 2.07E-05 2.61E-08 2.61E-08 1.45E-04 Z6 1.03E-09 1.03E-04 6.96E-08 1.04E-09 1.04E-09 2.07E-05 2.07E-05 2.61E-08 2.61E-08 1.45E-04

0.00072279

0.0001

The application of a structural LPS and service entrance lightning current SPDs is not sufficient enough to reduce the contributors to risk R 2 ie R C2 and R W2. With reference to Table 5.1, it can be seen that the reduction of probabilities P C, and P W is directly related to the presence of a coordinated set of SPDs. Therefore we will introduce a coordinated set of SPDs (corresponding to the structural Class LPS) to all internal systems Page 13 of 14

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connected to the incoming telecom and power lines to reduce components R C2 and R W2 and at the same time affects R Z2. The new values of probabilities of damage are summarised in the following Table.

Probability PA PB PC PM P U(P) P V(P) P U(T) P V(T) PW PZ

Z1 0.0001 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

Z2 N/A 0.001 0.001 0.0001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001

Z3 N/A 0.001 0.001 0.0001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001

Z4 N/A 0.001 0.001 0.0001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001

Z5 N/A 0.001 0.001 0.0001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001

Z6 N/A 0.001 0.001 0.0001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001

from Table NB.1 from Table NB.2 from Equation NB.1 As per Annex NB.4. As per Annex NB.5 As per Annex NB.6 As per Annex NB.5 As per Annex NB.6 As per Annex NB.7 As per Annex NB.8

The re-calculated values relating to loss of service to the public R 2 are summarised in the following table. Summary of R 2 component risks for protection solution B Risk RB2 RC2 RM2 RV2(P) RV2(T) RW2(P) RW2(T) RZ2(P) RZ2(T) R2/Zone Thus: Overall R 2 = 0.00000197 < RT= 0.0001 Z1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Z2 2.06E-09 1.03E-07 6.96E-08 2.07E-09 2.07E-09 1.04E-07 1.04E-07 3.27E-09 3.27E-09 3.93E-07 Z3 2.06E-09 1.03E-07 6.96E-08 2.07E-09 2.07E-09 1.04E-07 1.04E-07 3.27E-09 3.27E-09 3.93E-07 Z4 2.06E-09 1.03E-07 6.96E-08 2.07E-09 2.07E-09 1.04E-07 1.04E-07 3.27E-09 3.27E-09 3.93E-07 Z5 5.15E-09 1.03E-07 6.96E-08 5.18E-09 5.18E-09 1.04E-07 1.04E-07 3.27E-09 3.27E-09 4.02E-07 Z6 1.03E-09 1.03E-07 6.96E-08 1.04E-09 1.04E-09 1.04E-07 1.04E-07 3.27E-09 3.27E-09 3.90E-07

Therefore protection has been achieved with regard to loss of service to the public. Decision As can be seen in this calculation, the application of protection measures to reduce the risk of loss of human life R 1 does not automatically ensure the reduction of other primary risks, in this case R 2. The recommended solution is using the metal roof as an air-termination system and using the reinforced concrete framework as a natural down-conductor system. Service entrance lightning current SPDs of Type I on both incoming service lines will be installed. In addition to this, a coordinated set of SPDs Type II and III to all internal systems connected to the incoming telecom and power lines will also be installed. This solution ensures that the actual risks R 1 and R 2 are both lower than their tolerable value R T.

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