BRUCE G.

TRIGGER
A History
of
Achaeological
Thought
Second Editon
CBRDGE
::: UNIRSIT PRESS
CHAPTER I
Studying the Histor of Achaeology
Tough there exist one major academic industry ... telling the
social scientists ... how they can turn themselves into genuine
scientists, there exists another, with at least as fourishing an
outpu putatively establishing that the study of man and societ
cannot be scientific.
ERN . S T GEL L N E R , Relativism and the Social Sciences ( 1985), p. 120
Since the I950S archaeology, especially in North Aerica and western
Europe, has shifed from a seemingly complacent culture-historical
orthodoxy to ambitious theoretcal innovations. These innovations
have led to growing disagreements about the goals of the discipline
and how these goals can be achieved. Increasing numbers of archae
ologists, following in the wake of historians and sociologists, have
abandoned positvist certainty and begun to entertain doubts about
the objectivity of their research. They see social factors as determining
not only the questions they ask but also the answers they judge to be
convincing. Extreme versions of this view deny that archaeologists
can ofer interpretations of their data that are other than a refec
tion of the transient vues of the societies in which they live. Yet, if
archaeology cannot produce some kind of cumulative understanding
of the past and a commentary that is at least partially independent of
specic historical contexts, what scientfc - as opposed to political,
psychological, or aesthetic - justcation can be ofered for doing
archaeological research?
These concerns have enco.uraged studying the history of archaeo
logica thought as a means bywhich problems of subjectivity, objec
tivity, and the gradual accmnulation of knowledge can be assessed.
A growing number of archaeologists have come to agree with the
philosopher and archaeologist 5 G. Collingood
(
1939: I32
)
that
"no historical problem should be studied without studying ... the
history of hstorical thought about it." The clear implication of
I
Collingwood's position is that archaeological interpretation and the
history of archaeology are closely agned. In recent dcades, histori
cal investgations of archaeological interpretation have multiplied and
more advanced methodologies for carrying out such sndies have
been adopted from the history of science (Corbey and Roebroek
2001). Christopher Gosden (1999: 34) has argued that to be efec
tive, dsciplinary histories must not be purely intellectual or social
but both.
Ths historical approach is not, however, without its critics.
Michael Schifer (1976: 193) once asserted that graduate courses
should cease to be "histories of thought" and instead should system
atically expound and articulate current theories, as, in a general sort
of way, K. R. Dark has since done in his book Theoretical Archaeolo
gy
(1995). Schifer's position embodied the view that the truth or false
ness of theoretical formulations is independent of social infuences
and hence of history but can be determined by applying scientifically
valid procedures of evaluation to adequate bodies of data. Taken
to an extreme, this view implies that the history and phiosophy of
archaeology are totally unrelated to each other.
The prima goal of this book is to survey the intellectual. his
tor of archaeology in an attempt to evaluate the claims of three
alternative epistemologies that are currenty being applied to archae
olog. Positivist epistemologists maintain that society and culture
exert no signcant influence on the development of archaeology,
which is shaped by explanations based on explicit theories being
tested in the light of adequate evidence and accordng to proper
scientifc methods. ?xtrene relativists argue that the interpretation
of archaeological data is so influenced by the intellectual persua
sions' class interests, ethnic loyalties, gender prejudices, and per
sonal selfinterest of archaeologists that objectivity is impossible.
There is no such thing as objective knowledge, and, therefore, no
one truth but many possibly antithetical truths. Moderate relativists
concede that archaeologcal interpretations are influenced by socier,

culture, and self-interest but maintain that archaeological evidence
constrains speculation. The term relativism, as used here, embraces
bOtll relativism, in the strict sense of phenomena being perceived,
valued, and lmderstood dferently as a result of cultural variation
and subjectivism, which refers to how phenomena are perceived, val
ued, and understood diferently as a result of variations in individual
2
.maymg the Hstor of Achaeolog
comprehension. To address these questions, it is necessary to con
sider what archaeologists have learned about the past, how the meth
ods they use to study the past have changed, what ideas have guided
tlle development of archaeology at diferent periods, how tllese ideas
relate to broader social, cultural, and intellectual trends, whether
diferent societies produce diferent kinds of archaeology and, if so,
what are the diferences, and finally whether there is long-term con
vergence or divergence in the development of archaeology. It also
cannot be assumed that the sanle factors necessarily influence archae
ology to the same extent at every stage in its development.
Archaeology is not a universal or self-evident activity. In some
countries, people debate whether foreign archaeologists are treasure
hunters or spies. They cannot imagine that anyone would be inter
ested in going to so much trouble and expense to study the past for
its own salce. In Western civilizaton, despite te popularity of the
Indiana Jones stereotype, it is general y accepted that archaeology is
an esoteric discipline that has no relevance for the needs or concerns
of the present. Ernest Hooton (1938: 218) once described archae
ologists as "the senile playboys of science rooting in the rubbish
heaps of antiquity." Yet for almost 200 years a widespread concern
for the broader implications of archaeological discoveries has con
tradicted this image of archaeology. No one would deny the rOlnan
tic fascination aroused by spectacular archaeological fnds, such as
those by Austen Layard at Nimrd or Heinrich Schliemann at Troy
in the nineteenth century, and the more recent discoveries of the
tomb ofTutankhamen, the Palace of Minos at Knossos, the life-size
ceranuc army of tlle Chinese Emperor Qin Shihuagdi, and numer
ous several-million -years-old remains of hominids in East Mica. :hs
does not, however, explain the intense public interest in the contro
versies that have surrounded the interpretation of many more routine
archaeological finds, the attention that giverse political, social, and
religious movel nents throughout the world have paid to archaeolog
ical research, and rigorous eforts by various totalitarian regimes to
control the interpretation of archaeological data. During the second
half of the nineteenth centty, archaeology was looked to for sup
port by both sides in the debate about whether evolutionisll or the
book of Genesis provided a more reliable account of human origins.
Later, W. M. F. Petrie, Leonard Woolley, and John Garstang claimed
to have made fnds in Egyt, Iraq, and Palestine that supported
3
A History of Achaeological Thought
historical--accounts in the Hebrew Bible. Elsewhere German and
Polish archaeologists engaged in polemics about whether the
Lusatian culture had been created by prehistoric Germans or Slavs. As
recently as the 1970s, Peter Garlake, a government-employed archae
ologist in Southern Rhodesia, found his position no longer tenable
because he refsed to cast doubt on conclusive archaeological evi
dence that stone ruins in that part of central Aica had been built
by ancestors of the Bantu peoples who live in that region. Today,
the fndings of ecological archaeologists are being coopted both by
conservationists ad by those who are anxious to minimize legal
restaits on environmental polluton and degradation.
My adoption of a historical perspective does not mean that I
claim any privileged status with respect to objectivity for such an
approach. Historical interpretations are notoriously conjectural and
open-ended, to the extent that some historians have characterized
them a merely expressions of personal opinion. It is also recognized
that, because of the abundance of historical data, evidence can be
selectively marshaled to "prove" almost anything. There may, how
ever, be some truth in William McNeill's (1986: I64) argument that,
ven uhistorical interpretation is a form of myth-making, such myths
lelp to guide public action and can be regarded as a human substtute
Dr instinct. If m is so, it follows that they are subject to the opera
ion of the social equivalent of natural selection and hence may more
:los ely approximate reality over long periods of time. This, however,
s a tenuous basis on which to base hopes for the objectvity of his
orical interpretatons.
I therefore do not claim that the historical study presented here
; any lTOre objective than are the interpretatons of archaeologi
1 or ethnological data that it examines. I believe, however, as do
lany others who study the history of archaology, that a histori
H approach ofers a special vantage point fom which to examine
le changing relations between archaeological iterpretation and its
)Cial and cultura milieu. The time perspective provides a diferent
asis for studyng the ties between archaeology and society than do
llilosophical or sociological approaches. In particular, it permits the
:searcher to ident the infuence of subjective factors by observing
)w and under what circumstances interpretatons of the archaeo
'gical record have changed. Although this does not elimnate the
as of the observer, or the possibilty that this' bias will inuence
4
Studying the History of Achaeology
the interpretation of archaeological data, it increases the chances of
gaining more rounded insights into what happened in the past.
Approaches to the History of Archaeology
The need for a more systematic study of the history of archaeological
interpretation is indicated by serious disagreements about the nature
and signifcance of that history. Much of the controversy centers on
the role played by explanation in the study of archaeological data
over the last two centuries.
Some historians of archaeology believe that the dscipline has
evolved in a predetermined nlanner through a series of stages
(Schwartz 1967; Fitting 1973). In A History of American Archaeology,
G. l Willey and J. A. Sablof (1974,1980) posited an initial Spec
ulative period (1492-I 840) followed by Classifcatory-Descriptive
(1840-1914), Classifcatory-Historical (1914-1960), and Explanatory
(1960-) ones. This scheme was based in part on Douglas Schwartz's
(1967) previous dvision of the history of American archaeology into
three stages: Speculative, Empirical, and Explanatory. Only in the
1993 editon of A History of American Archaeology was the fnal
period, which began in 1960, renamed the Modern one. Although
this series of stages was applied only to New World archaeolog,
Willey and Sablof (I974: 209-10) observed that their scheme was
likely to apply everywhere. They proposed that over the course
of 150 years archaeology had developed according to an inductive
Baconian model of doing science, which involves frst collecting data,
then describing and classifg it, and fnally tring to explan it. Yet
this approach does not account for why archaeological findings were
already highly controversial during the nineteenth .century. Such
debates were only possible because various conclusions about the
past were already being drawn on the basis of available evidence and
some of these conclusions were ofending people. Also, uarchaeolo
gists could not draw any conclusions, what motivated them to con
tinue to study the past or to colect artifacts? As the British historian
E. H. Carr (I967: 3-35) has remded us, the mere characterization
of data as being relevant or irrelevant, that occurs even in the most
descriptive historical studies, implies the existence of some kind of
theoretical famework. It can frther be argued in opposition to the
idea of a neutral observational language that not even the simplest
5
A History of Achaeological Thought
archaeological fact can be established independently of a theoreti
cal context (Wylie 1982: 42). In the past, most of these fameworks
were not fonnulated explicitly or even consciously by archaeologists.
Today, especially in the context of American and British archaeology,
many theoretical propositions are systematically elaborated. Explana
tion was an inherent aspect of archaeology fOln the beginning, even
if much of the theory that was employed was lef implicit ratller than
clearly spelled out.
David Clarke (1973) proposed a convergent Inodel of archaeolog
ical development. He argued that until the 1960s archaeology had
consisted of isolated regional traditions of research, each following its
own idiosyncratc and largely uncritical practices and characterized
by its own preferred forms of descripton, interpretation, and expla
naton. Because these sorts of archaeology were scientifcally undis
ciplined, tlleir Inodes of analysis tended to be highly subjective and
produced the results tlat local archaeologists expected. According to
Clarke, in the 1960s these prescientifc approaches were replaced by
a new, sophistcated, self-critical, universal, and objective scientifc
archaeology. This is a false, or at best partial, view of the history of
archaeology. Internatonal contacts characterized archaeolog fom
the earliest stages of its development. Therefore, if local forms of
research have been radically diferent fom one another, an explana
tion other than mutual isolation is required.
Many archaeologists have utilized the philosopher Thomas Kuhn's
(1962) 1970) more relativistic concept of scientifc revolutons to
to understand the development of archaeology. Kuhn formulated
his ideas to explan tlle development of the physical sciences and, in
the frst edition of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), he
spoke of a preparadigmatic period to which)1is concept of scientifc
revolutions did not apply. He also appears -to have believed that all
social sciences remained in that category. However, in the second
edton, he accepted that imature disciplines might be described
as having multiple research paradigms (Kuhn 1970). Kulln described
a research paradigln as havg an accepted canon of scientifc prac
tice, including laws, theory, applications, and instentation, that
provides a model for a "particular coherent tradition of scientifc
research." Such a tradition is sustained by a "scientifc community,"
defned as a group of scholars working together in the sae discipline.
Kuhn argued that every scientifc community develops a paradigm
6
Studying the Hstory of Achaeolog
that infuences the types of questions thought to be worth asking,
the theories that are used to explain data, and tle procedures that
are employed to collect and analyze evidence. Scientists promote
such paradigms through their control of teaching, journals, r

search
grants, professional accreditation, hiring, tenure,
.
an
.
d promotlOn. I
normal times scientists conduct their research Wlth11 the context of
the dominan paradigm, which they seek to elaborate. ParadiglTS are
thus not merely scientc theories but also belief systems that con
stitute the cultue of scientfc communities. In adopting this view,
Kuhn was building on the work of Ludwik. Fleck ([ I935], English
translation 1979), who maintained that science was a collective cre
ation within, a social milieu.
According to Kuhn, paradiglT shifs occur when an old paradigm is
seen as not supported by accumulatg data or when scientists work
g within it grow interested in problems that tle existing paradigm
is not equipped to answer. Kuhn maintained that this leads to the
old paradiglT'S being replaced by a new one. He also argued lat
successive paradigms are incommensurate. This means that a SCIen
tist working in terms of one paradigm can never understand how
matters are perceived by someone working in terms of an alternative
one. Kuhn originally argued in extrene relativistic terms tllat a new
paradgm was not necessarily more comprehensive or accurate than
its predecessor. Eventually, he accepted that, at least in the physical
sciences, later paradigms are lnore comprehensive and account for
more than do antecedent ones (Kuhn 1970; Bird 2000). Ths repre
sented a shif fom an extreme to a more moderate relatvist posi
tion. He also argued late in hs career that witl1out debates among
scientists who hold diferent views, incorrect assumptions would
go unchecked and improved scientifc insights w6uld be impossible
(Kuhn 19
7
7)
Some archaeologists, especially processual ones seeking to nance
the innovatveness of their Inovement, combined Kuhn's idea of
scientifc revolutions with a uear evolutionary view of the
development of their discipfue. They maintained that successive
phases in tlle development of archaeological theory display enough
interna consistency to qualif as paradigms ad that the replace
ment of one paradigm by another constituted a scientifc revolu
tion (Sterud 1973). According to this view, successive innovators,
such as Christian Thomsen, Oscar Montelius, Gordon Childe, and
7
A History of Archaeological Thought
Lewis Binford, recognized major anomalies and inadequacies in cOl
ventonal interpretations of archaeological data and created new
paradigms that significantly changed the direction of archaeologi
cal research. These paradigms not only altered the signifcance that
was accorded to archaeological data but also determined what kinds
of problems were and were not regarded as important. Clarke, how
ever, regarded archaeology before I960 as beig in a preparadigmatc
state.
Such unilinear views of the histor of archaeology fail to account
for why archaeologists or otller social scientists, in part because of tlle
emergent complexity of tleir subject matter, never agree about high
level theory. This disagreement has meant that several rival paradgms
coexist at any one time. Currently, processual archaeology treats ideas
as epiphenOInenal, whereas postprocessual archaeology regards tlem
as the principal determinants of behavior. Simultaneously, evolution
ar archaeology is seeking to create a new paradigm by combining ele
ments of culture-historical archaeology wth a selectionist Daan
eJ.rlanation of changes in material culture. Although archaeologists
ofen display considerable bias in thei support for diferent schools,
tllere is no evidence that tlley are trapped in noncommunicating
discourses or that it is impossible for tem to understand their oppo
nents. On the contrary, their arguments ofen display considerable
knowledge of such positions. Robert Chapman (2003: I4) argues that
in archaeology rival positions are not only not hermetically sealed
but also internally highly variable. Thus, they are not incommensu
rate with one another in the rZuhnian sense. BOtll Michael Schf er
(1996: 659) and Todd and Christine VanPool (2003) maintain that
regardg theoretcal orientations as paradigms radicalizes positions
and encourages exclusion and polemic rather tllan the systematic
cOITparison, testing, and synthesis of ideas.
The relevance of Kuhn's concept of revolutionary change also
has been questioned. Most alterations in tlle theor and practice of
archaeology appear to occur gradually and there are growing doubts
tat even what appear to be rapid shifts accord with his concept of
revolutions. Kuhn also failed to aCCOlUlt for the longevity of vari
ous positions and for why rival positions fluctuate in relatve impor
tance, ofen repeatedly, rather tan one position defnitively replac
ing another, or for why few positons are ever totally abandoned.
Thus, the new cultural anthropology and postprocessual archaeology
8
Stdyng the History of Archaeology
address many of the same issues that Boasian culture-historical
anthropology and archaeology once did, and early neoevolutionary
archaeology strongly resembled nineteenth -centur uear archae
ology. To accommodate tlle concept of paradignl to tllese real
ities, Margaret Masterman (1970) diferentated three main tyes
of paradigm: metaphysical, relating to the worldview of a group of
scientists; sociologica, that define what is accepted; and construct,
that supply the tools and methods for solving problems. No one
of these types alone constitutes "the" paradigm of a particular era.
Despite such eforts to mod Kuh's ideas, tl1ere is a growing sense
that the concept of paradigm may not be appropriate to describe
changing trends in interpretation in archaeology or any of tlle social
sciences, and perhaps not even in science in general (Gandara 1980,
1981 ). Finally , Jean Molino (1992: 19) argues that nothing is more
dangerous than the belief that a scientfic revolution allows a sci
ence to start again. Old questions, methods, and answers frequently
remain valid. Once the principle of stratigraphy was established as
a reliable technique for inferring chronology, it contnued to be
used by archaeologists regardess of what other views they might
. espouse (Dunnell 200I: I298). The same is true of Ian Hodder's
(1982 b) delTOnstration that material culture can be used to ds
tort or invert as well as to reflect social reality. The development
of such broad agreements is another factor reducing the incommen
surability of diferent bodies of theory. For all tllese reasons, I v
avoid tlle term "paradigm" and speal simply of schools or theoretical
positions.
Shaun Hides (I996) and, in a more nuanced and carefl manner,
Ian Morris (I 994b) have attempted to understand tlle development
of archaeology in relation to Mchel Foucault's (1970, 1972) concept
of four successive but radically diferent and in his view discontinu
QUs epistemes or modes of kowledge: Renaissance (ca. 1400-r650),
Classical (ca. 1650-1800), Modern (ca. r800-1950), and Postmodern
(ca. 1950-). Foucault understands these epistemes as general modes
of thought, each of which in turn influenced all felds of knowledge
and dominated an era of modern Western civilization. Each episteme
is radically diferent from any other. No one could escape the epis
teme of the time in which they lived, which imposed a particular set
of norn1S and postulates on a tg. Thus, epistemes, as dom
inant cultural patterns, are very diferent from Kul's paradigms,
9
A Histor of Achaeological Thought
although both have been used to characterize general stages in the
development of scientific interpretation.
.
Although Foucault's views about epistemes have potentially valu
able contributions to make to understanding the development of
archaeological thought, they have been criticized because of his reluc
tance to study causation and how epistemes may have been influ
e;ced by changing social realities (Morris 1994b: 10; Gutting 1989).
Foucault also appears to underestimate the extent to which epistemes
have overlapped and mutually influenced people's thinking. Epis
temes can contribute little to understanding the theoretical diversity
that characterizes archaeology at any given point in tie.
A alternatve uea evolutionary view to those based on
the ideas of Kuhn and Foucault, and that accords with Stephen
Toulmin's (1970) tllesis that sciences do not experience revolutons
but, rather, gradual changes or progressions, holds that tlle history of
archaeology has been characterized by a CUlnulative growth of know I-
ede about the past fom early tmes to the present (Casson 1939;
Helzer I962a; Meltzer 1979). It is maintained that, although various
phases in this development may be delineated arbitrarily, in reality
archaeolog changes i a gradual fashion, with no radical breaks or
sudde trs
.
foations. Some archaeologists view the development
of ther diSCIpline as following a course tat is inevitable. Jaroslav
Malina and Zdenek VaSIcek (I990) document how an expanding
database, witll evidence increasingly being derived from settlement
dta and ecofacts as well as fom artifacts and monuments, together
Wt new theories fom the other social sciences and biology has
shaped the development of archaeology. Lilee other uear views
thirs does not take account of the variability of archaeological the
ones at any one tie. Nor does it explain the frequent failure of
archaeologists to deVelop their ideas in a systematic fashion. For
example, although nineteenth -century naturaists with archaeolog
ic
.
interests, such as Japetus Steenstrup (Morlot 1861: 300) and
William Buckland (Dawkins 1874: 281-4), carried out experiments
to determine how faunal remains were introduced into sites research
of this sort did not become routine in archaeology until ie 1970S
(Binford 1977, 1981).
b
.
Otler hstorians of achaeology have rejected unilinear interpreta
tons II favor of cyclical ones. Ths view began with Stuart Piggott
(1935, 1950, 1968, 1976, 1985) and Glyn Daniel (1950). They argued
10
Studying the History of Achaeology
that archaeological interpretations were iuenced by the varying
popularity of the opposig rationalist and romantc views of human
behavior that had been constructed in France during the eighteenth
century. The romantc view was seen as encouraging an interest
in culture-history, ethnicity, ad idealism in archaeology, whereas
rationalism encouraged the adoption of evolutionary and material
ist approaches. Piggott and Daniel assumed that human behavior
was too complex and unpredictable ever to be flly lmderstood.
They believed that archaeological interpretations therefore tended to
reflect the dominant intellectual fashions of the time, which them
selves changed in an unpredictable manner. It was therefore con-
,;. eluded that little progress could be made in understandng the past
apart from that facilitated by a growing database. Archaeologists
ofen returned to studying the same problems afer long gaps during
which what had been learned previously had been forgotten. Another
applicaton of a cyclical view to studyig the history of archaeology
is Kristian Kristiansen's (2002) characterization of Danish archae
ology as consisting of alternating phases of interest in ecologica
and culture-historical problems. Although these shifs can be con
strued as alternatons of rationalst and romantic approaches, they
do not appear to have been produced by alterations in general intel
lectual fashions but by processes internal to Danish archaeology and
society.
Some archaeologists doubt that the basic interests and concepts
of their discipline change significantly from one period to another.
Bryony Orme (1973: 490) has maintained that the archaeological
interpretations ofered in the past were more Wee those of the present
than is commonly believed and that archaeological preoccupations
have changed little. Jean-Claude Gadin (1980: 165-80) argues that
it is wrong to believe that there is a great gap between the present and
earlier tmes in the "small world" of archaeological interpretation. He
suggests that there has been little change in what archaeologists do
over tme, that tlle same formulae have been used for site reports over
a long period, and tllat tllere is no gulf between processual and post
processual approaches. Long-term continuities in interpretation have
been shown to occur in studies of human evolution (Landau 1991;
Stoczkowski 2002). A remarkable antiquty also can be demonstrated
for some ideas that are commonly believed to be modern. Archaeol
ogists argued that growing population densities led to the adoption
I I
A History of Achaeological Thought
of more labor-intensive forms of food production long before they
rediscovered tllis idea in the work of the economist Ester Boserup
(Smith and Young 1972). early as 1673, the British statesman
William Temple had adumbrated this theory with his observation that
high population densities force people to work hard (Slotin 1965:
I 10-11). In 1843, the Swedish archaeologist Sven Nilsson (1868:
li) argued that icreasing population had brought about a shif
fom pastoralism to agriculte in prehistoric Scandinavia. This con
cept also was implicit i the "oasis"theory of the origin of food
production, as expoluded by Rphael Ptlllpelly (1908: 65-6) and
adopted by Harold Peae and H. J. Fleure (1927) and then by
Gordon Childe (1928). They proposed that postglacial desiccation
in the Middle East had compelled people to cluster around surviving
sources of water, where they had to innovate in order to feed higher
population densities. Yet, although ideas persist and recur in the his
tory of archaeology, this does not mean that there is nothig new in
the interpretation of archaeological data. Such ideas must be exam
ined i relation to the diferent conceptual faeworks of which they
were a part at each period. It is from these fameworks that these con
cepts derive their signicance to the disciplie and, as the frameworks
change, their signifcance does as well. According undue importance
to pacular ideas and not paying enough attenton to their chang
ig context will lead archaeologsts to underestmate the anlount
of change that has characterized the development of archaeological
interpretation. It also has been argued that a major goal of the his
tory of archaeology must be to study critically how archaeological
concepts ad understandings have altered over time, so that they
are not accepted a natural ad given i their current state (Trigger
1978b). Recent work along these lines has been ispired by Pierre
Bourdieu's ( 1980) concept of the social history of the social sciences
(Moro Abadia and Gonzalez Morales 2003).
May archaeologists note that one of the pricipal characteristics
of archaeological interpretaton has been its enduring regional diver
si1' Leo Kjn (1977,1990) and Trigger and Glover (1981-I982)
have examined the history of archaeology as one of regional schools.
In her review of Japanese and North Amercan studies of the Jomon
culture, JunIo Habu (2004: 5) has demonstrated how assumptions,
goals, methods, and theoretical developments cannot be considered
apart fom one another in a single traditon of archaeological practce
12
Studying the Histor of Achaeology
and hence the distinctive and ofen complementary fidings of difer
ent research tradtions cannot be sucessfly synthesized without a
understandig of the specic circumstances i which these findings
were produced. Nadia Abu EI-Haj (2001) argues that specific expres
sions oJ chaeological practice must be examined independently i
order to understand how each of them artculated with, and both
transformed and was shaped by, local social and political conditions.
She implies that little is to be gained by comparing such situations
and trying to geperalize about tem. Yet, although Abu EI-Haj is
correct that ever practice of archaeology has unique features, this
does not mean that detailed comparisons may not help to lderstand
better archaeological practice and the history of archaeology.
Ro bert Dunnell (2001: 1290-I) argues that the overall history of
archaeology displays both a lack of linear development and much
parochial diversity. This is because archaeology is not a science in the
sense that it systematically uses theory to explain evidence. Dunnell
regards archaeology as remaining in a preparadigmatic state. Only
occasionally has something resembling a paradigm arisen and tl1.ese
have proved to be short-lived.
It is clear that there have been, and stll are, regional traditions
in archaeological interpretation and that each of-them has its own
unique features (Daniel 1981b; Evans et al. 1981: 11-70). Wat has
not yet been studied adequately is the ignifcance of their diver
gences. To what degree do they represent irreconcilable diferences
in the understandig of human behavior, diferences in the questions
being asked, or the same basic ideas being studied tmder the guise
of dif erent terminologies?
Over the past few decades, archaeologists have idented vari
ous tpes of approaches to doing archaeology, each of wllich is
represented by various examples in diferent parts of the world.
Although these began with geographical groupings, a the list has
expanded it has come to include other types of social df erences.
Each type is distinguished by the cause whose iterest it serves:
national archaeology (Fleury-TIett 1996: 200-1), nationalist archaeol
ogy, colonialist archaeolog, imperialist archaeology (Trgger I984a),
third-world archaeology (Chalraba 2001: II91-3), continentalist
archaeology (Monis 1994b: 11), regional or proto-national archae
ology (Dfaz-Andreu 1996b: 86), community archaeology (Moser
1995a; Marshall 2002), indigenous archaeology (Watkins 2000),
A Histor of Achaeological Thought
internalist archaeology (Yellowhorn 2002), workng-class archaeol
ogy (McGuire and Reckner 2003), touristic archaeology, and the
archaeologies of protest (Silberman 1995: 261), of the disenfran
chised, and of cultural identity (Schanl 2001). The list might tech
nically include gender archaeology although this approach is difer
ent because, instead of simply representng an alternative focus of
research, it bas established itself as a necessary and integral part of all
other archaeologies. Although no two examples of any one of these
varied approaches to archaeology are identical, they share sufcient
features to identif each approach as a distnctive tpe, the develop
Ient and fnction of which are worthy of study.
Yet ideas difse and convergent as well as independent develop
ment characterize archaeology. Studies of archaeology, with a few
notable exceptions (1. Bernal 1980; Chakrabarti 1982), have failed
to take accolmt of the vast itellectual exchange that characterized
the development of archaeology in all parts of the world during the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This is dramatically ilustrated
by the early study of shell mounds. Reports of the pioneering studies
by Danish scholars, who began their work i the 1840S, stimulated
a large number of investigations of shell heaps along the Atlantic
and later the Pacifc coasts of North America in the latter half of
the nineteenth centu (Trigger 1986a). When the American zool
ogist Edward Morse went to teach in Japan, afer analyzing mate
rial from shell mounds along the coast of Maine for the Harvard
Universit archaeologist Jefies Wynan, he discovered and exca
vated in 1877 a large Mesolithic shell deposit at Omori, near Tokyo.
Some of his students dug another shell mound by themselves and it
was not long before Japanese archaeologists who had been educated
in Europe established the study of the Mesolithic J omon culture
on a professiona basis (Ikawa-Smith 1982). The Scandinavian stud
ies also stimulated the early investigaton of shell mounds in Brazil
(Ihering r895) and Southeast Asia (Earl 1863). Even the ideologi
cally opposed archaeological traditions of Western Europe and the
Soviet Unon signcantly influenced each otler, despite decades
when scientific contact of any sort was very difcult and politcally
dangerous for scholars on both sides of the Iron Curtain. For all
these reasons it seems unwise to overestimate the historical inde
pendence or theoretical distnctiveness of these regional archaeolo
gies. One of the important tasks for historians of archaeology is to
Studying tlle Histor of Achaeology
detennine to what extent developments in one region did or did not
infuence developments elsewhere. For early times, this is hard to do
because archaeologists ofen failed to indicate the sources of their
ideas.
Less attention has been paid to the efects of disciplnary special-
izaton within archaeology on the ways in which archaeological data
are interpreted (Rouse 1972: 1-25). Yet difering orientations along
these lines may account for as many diferences as do social and polit
ical orientations. Classi2al archaeology, Egyptology, and Assyriology
have been strongly committed to studying epigraphy and art history
within a historical famework (Bietak 1979). Medieval archaeology
developed as an investigation of material remains that complements
research based on written records eM. Thompson 1967; D. M. Wilson
1976; Barley 1977; Andren 1998). Palaeolithic archaeology developed
alongside historical geology and palaeontology and has maintained
close ties witll these disciplines, whereas the study of later prehis
toric periods fequently combines information fom numerous other
disciplines, including linguistcs, folldore, biological anthropology,
and comparative ethnology, wth archaeological findings (D. McCall
1964; Trigger 1968a; Jennings 1979)
Yet, although many of these types of archaeology have developed
in considerable intellectual isolation fom each other over long peri
ods and have been frther estranged as a result of the ballcanization of
their respective jargons, historical connections, sporadic interaction,
and common Inethodological interests have been sufcient for all of
them to share numerous interpretive concepts. Tim Murray (200 ra:
xix-xx) points out that, despite archaeology's great diversity, the
common questions and fndamental activities, such as classification,
that lie at the core of archaeology enable archaeologists to cOlnmu
nicate with each other and exchange knowledge. Yet, although they
share a general commitment to making the hu past intelligible
and to developing tlle intellectual tools required for ts task, archae
ologists have gone about doing their work in many diferent ways and
have sought to use archaeology to serve many diferent politcal and
cultural ends.
More narrowly focused studes of the hstory of archaeology exam-
ine the role played by institutions, such as archaeological societies
and archaeological departments in museums or universities, in pro
moting the development of archaeology. Michael O'Brien, R. Lee
IS
A Histor of Archaeological Thought
Lyman, and Michael Schf er ( 2005 ) have taced the development of
New Archaeology in terms of the contributions of individual archae
ologists and of clusters of cooperatng or competing archaeologists .
Michael Balter ( 2005 ) has studied, again fOl the perspective of the
individual partcipants, the interactive team that has been excavating
at the early Neolithic site of Gatalh6ylik, in Turkey, under the inno
vative leadership of Ian Hodder. This fine-grained type of approach
reveals much about the social dynamics and academic strategies that
have shaped broader trends in the development of archaeology.
Biography and autobiography have long been pat of the history
of archaeology, but they have generally been viewed as a means
of celebrating or justfng the caeers of individual archaeologists.
Today, there is growing interest in using a biographical approach
to investigate how achaeologists have interpreted the past. John
Chapman ( 1 998) explains the role that the real-life experiences of the
Lithuanian-born archaeologist Marija Gimbutas played i shaping
her interpretatons of European prehistory, especially the distnction
that she drew between what she believed had been a.matriarchaLand
peacefl Early Europe and the patriarchal and warlke Indo-European
societies that replaced it. Jean-Pau S7I-I972) explored. in
detail the problems of ths sort of approach i his innovative "total
biography" of the French novelist Gustave Flaubert. He showed how
Flaubert was shaped by the culture in which he lved and the social
class to which he belonged. He also demonstrated, however, that
many aspects ofFlaubert's life and writings could only be understood
by means of a detailed psychological analysis of his childhood and
family relations. Clearly, if we are to understand all aspects of what
archaeologists do, we have to study theln as individuals. Same's work
malces it clear that because of psychological factors even archaeolo
gists who share similar ethnic and class backgrounds and the same
historical experiences are unlikely to interpret archaeological data in
precisely the san1e manner. By contrast, analogous social and cul
tural contexts produce general similarities in the interpretaton of
archaeological data that are deserving of consideration.
Although biographical and sociopolitical perspectives on the his
tOly of archaeology are complementary, some of the specific ap
proaches outlined above are contradictory and hence not all of them
can be valid. Because this study attempts to trace the development
of archaeological thought fom a broad perspective, it is impossible
16
Studyig te Histor of Archaeolog
for it to examine the contributions of all archaeologists or even to
investigate systematically the developments that have taken place
in each cOlmtry and each branch of archaeology ( Schuyler 1 97 1 ).
Instead, I will investigate a number of major interpretve trends in
roughly the chonological order in which they can1e into prominence.
These trends fequently overlapped and interacted with one anotl1er,
both temporaly and geographically, and te work of individual
archaeologists ofen refects several of these trends, either at difer
ent stages of tei careers or in some combinaton at a single point in
time. My thematc approach allows a historical study to talce account
of changing styles of archaeological interpretaton that cannot be
fitted into clearly defned chronological or geographcal pigeon
holes but that refect waves of innovation that have transfonned
archaeolog .
Social Context
No one denies that archaeological research is infuenced by many dif
ferent kinds of factors. The most controversial of tlese is the social
context i which archaeologists live and work:. Very few archae
ologists, including those who favor a positivistic view of scientifc
research, would reject the proposal that the questions archaeologists
ask ae influenced at least to some degree by this milieu. Yet posi
tivists Inaintan that, so long as adequate data are available and these
data are analyzed using proper scientifc methods, the validit of tl1e
resulting conclusions is independent of the prejudices or beliefs of
the investgator. Other archaeologists believe that, because their dis
cipline's findings concerning the past consciously or unconsciously
are perceived to have implications for the present or about human
nature generally, and because people easily accept what they want to
believe but demand overwhelming evidence before they accept ideas
that they find abhorrent, changing social conditions iuence not
only the questions archaeologists ask but also the answers that they
are predisposed to fmd acceptable. Even statistical tests, because they
employ arbitrary levels of confidence, are open to subjective interpre
tation. Strong positivists, who believe tat a single exception ivali
dates a law, would theoreticaly have to examine all possible cases to
prove that they are dealing with a universal generalization. Because
such proof is normaly ipossible, faitl1 is also involved tl1ere.
A History of Achaeological Thought
David Clarke (1979: 85 ) had these subjective factors in mind when
he described archaeology as an adaptive system "related internally to
its changng content and externally to the spirit of the tilnes . " Else
where he wrote: "Through exposure to life in general, to educational
processes and to the changing contelnporary systems of belief we
acquire a general philosophy and an archaeological philosophy in
particular - a partly conscious and partly subconscious system of
beliefs, concepts, values and principles, both realistic and metaphys
ical" ( Ibid. : 25 ). Still earlier, Collingwood ( 1 939: II4) had observed
that every archaeological problem "ultimately arises out of 'real'
life . . . we study history in order to see more clearly into the situ
ation in which we are called upon to act. "
I recent decades archaeology has been powerflly influenced by
the attacks that relativists have launched against the concept of sci
ence as a rational and objective enterprise. These attacks have their
roots in the antipositivism of the para-Marxist Frankfrt School,
as represented in the writings of Walter Benj amin (1969), Jiirgen
I-Iabermas (197 I ) , and Herbert Marcuse (1964). These philosophers
stressed that social conditions infuence both what data are regarded
as important and how they are interpreted ( Kolalowski I978c: 341 -
95 ) . Their views have been strengthened by Kuhn' s paradigmatic
concept, by the arguments of tlle sociologist Barry Barnes (I974,
I977) that scientific knowledge is not diferent in kind from any other
forms of cultura belief, and by the anarchistic claims of the Anerican
philosopher of science Paul Feyerabend (197 5 ) that, because obj ec
tive criteria for evaluating theories do not exist, science should not be
fetteted by rigid rules and personal preferences and aesthetic tastes
"
may be relied on when evaluatng rval theories. Ideas of this sort have
attracted a considerable following among self-styled critical archae
ologists, especially in Britain and the United States .
Although some relativists argue that, in the long run, greater
awareness of social biases will promote more obj ectivity ( Leone
1982), otllers maintain that even basic archaeological data are men
tal constructs and, hence, are not independent of the socia milieu
i which they are created and utilized ( Gallay 1986: 5 5-61) . The
more extreme relativists ignore the qualifcatons of Habermas and
Barnes that "knowledge arises out of ow' encounters with reality
and is continually subject to feedback-correction fom these encoun
ters" ( B. Barnes 1977: 10) . Instead, they conclude tllat archaeological
18
Studying the History of Achaeology
interpretations are deternnned entirely by their social context rather
than by any objective evidence. Thus statements about the past can
not be evaluated by any criteria other than the internal coherence of
a particular study "wInch can only be critcised in terms of internal
conceptual relations and not in terms of externally imposed standards
or criteria for 'measuring' or ' determining' tuth or falsety" (Miller
and Tilley I 984 b: 15 I ) . A broad spect of alternatves separates
those hyperpositivistic archaeologists who beleve that only the qual
ity of archaeological data and of analytcal techniques detennines the
value of archaeological interpretations . and the hyperrelativists who
are inclined to accord archaeological data no role, but instead explain
archaeqlogical interpretations entirely in ternlS of the social and cul-.
tural loyalties of researchers. Despite its extrenles and inconsistencies,
-
the relativist critique of science has played an important and on the
whole a benefcial role in malcing social scientsts more aware of the
subj ectve biases that influence their fndigs.
Although the influences that societes exert on archaeological
interpretations are potentially vel diverse, the development of
archaeology has corresponded tenlporally with the rise to power
of the lniddle classes in Western society. Many of the early patrons
of classical archaeology belonged to the aristocracy, but ever since
the Italian trader Ciriaco de' Pizzicolli in the feenth century,
those who have actively studied archaeological remains have come
predominantly fom the niddle classes. They have been civil
servants, clergymen, wealthy merchants, country squires, and, with
increasing professionalization, university teachers and museolo
gists. I addition, much of the public interest in archaeological
findings has been associated with the educated melnbers of the
bourgeoisie.
branches of scientifc investigations that have developed since
the seventeenth century have done so under the aegis of the middle
classes. Because archaeology and hstory are readily intelligible disci
plines' their fndings have important implications for shapig views
of human nature and how and why modern societies have come
to be as they are ( Levine 1986) . This transparent relevance for cur
rent political, economic, and social issues has made relations between
archaeology and society especially complex and important. It there
fore seems reasonable to examine archaeology as an expression of the
ideology of te middle classes and to u to dscover to what extent
19
A Histor of Achaeological Thought
hanges in archaeological interpretation refect the altering fortunes
of that group. Yet, although it is reasonable to assume that archae
ologists are always influenced by the circumstances in which they
live, it does not necessarily follow that, as archaeologica data accu
mulate and archaeology develops as a disciplie, all archaeological
interpretations will be inuenced to the saIne extent by contempo
=
-
rary social biases.
Moreover, the middle classes have not been a homogeneous phe
nomenon, either over time or in any one society. Their interests
and degree of deVelopment have varied greatly fom one country to
another and within each country they have been divided into various
strata, wth individuals who prefer either more radical or more con
serative political options being present in each stratum. The bour
geoisie of the Ancien Regime in France, composed largely of clerics,
professionals, and royal administrators, has to be distingished fom
the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie and factory owners of tlle industrial
era (Darnton 1984: 113; E. Wood 2000). It is also evident that archae
ology has not been of equal interest to the whole middle class, but
mainly to that part of it, largely composed of professionals, which
is inclined to be interested i scholarship ( Kristiansen 198 I ; Levine
1986). Karl Marx noted rather condescendigly that in many ways
intellectuals were very diferent in outlook and interest from otller
members of the middle class. He argued that what made tllem "rep
resentatves of the lower-middle class is the fact that in their minds
they do not get beyond the liits which the lower-middle class do
not get beyond in life, and that they are consequently driven, theo
retically, to the same problems and social positions to which material
interest and social position drive tlle latter in practice" (Marx [ 1852J
in Marx and Engels 1962, I: 275).
Relations between interests and ideas are contextually mediated by
a large number of heterogeneous factors. Archaeologists therefore
cannot expect to establish a one-to-one correspondence between
specific archaeological interpretatons and particular class interests.
Instead, they must analyze the ideas influencing archaeological inter
pretations as tools with which social groups seek to achieve their
goals in particular situations. Among these goals are to enhance a
group's self-confdence by making its success appear natura, pre
destined, and inevitable; to inspire and justif collective action; and
to disguise collective interests as altruism (B. Barnes 1974: 16); in
20
Studying te History of Achaeology
short, to provide groups and whole societies with mythical charters
(McNeill 1986). Without denying the signifcance of individual psy
chological traits and cultural traditions, such considerations provide
an important focus for examining the relations between archaeology
and society.
Most professional archaeologists also believe archaeological inter-
pretation to be significantly infuenced by a large number of other
factors. All but the most radical relativists agree that one of tllese is
the archaeological database. Archaeological data have been accumu
latng continuously over several centuries and new data are held to
consttute a test of earlier interpretations. Yet what data are collected
and by what nlethods are infuenced by every archaeologist's sense of
what is signifcant, which in turn reflects his or her theoretcal presup
positions. This creates a reciprocal relation between data collection
and interpretation that leaves both open to social influences . More
over, the data recovered in the past are ofen neither adequate nor
appropriate to solve the problems that are considered important at a
later time. This is not simply because archaeologists were unfamiliar
with techniques that became important later and therefore failed to
preserve charcoal for radiocarbon dating or soil samples for phytolith
analysis, altlough such gaps in documentaton can be extremely lim
iting. New perspectives frequently open up whole new lines of inves
tigation. For example, Grahame Clark's (1954) interest in the sub
sistence economy of the Mesolithic period led him to ask questions
that could not be answered using data collected when the main inter
est of Mesolithic studies was typologica ( Clark 1932). Likewise, the
development of an interest in settlelnent archaeology revolutionized
archaeological site surveys (Willey 1953) and provided a stronger
impetus for the recording and analysis of itrasite dstributions of
features and artifacts ( Millon et al. 1973). Hence, although archaeo
logical data are collected continuously, tlle results are not necessarily
as cumulative as many archaeologists believe. Indeed, archaeologists
ofen seem to build more readily on what their predecessors con
cluded about
'
the past than on the actual evidence on which tllose
conclusions were based.
What archaeologists can study is also infuenced by the resources
that are made available for archaeological research, tlle institu
tional and public contexts in which research is carred out, and the
kinds of investgations societes or governments are prepared to let
21
A Histor of Achaeological Thought
archaeologists undertake. To obtain support archaeologists must
please their sponsors, whether these be wealthy patrons ( Hinsley
I 98S ) , colleagues and politicians managing the allocation of pub
lic fnds (Patterson I 986a, I 999) , or the general publ ic. There also
may be social restrictions on excavating certain kinds of sites, such
as cemeteries or religious localities. To protect cultural resources,
governments frequently enact stringent controls over when and how
archaeologists excavate and how they record their fndings . They
sometimes prevent archaeologists fom sending even mundane fnds,
such as soil samples, abroad for analysis. There is also a growing ten
dency to assign responsibility for managing archaeological research
to local or etllnic groups on the grounds that such resources are part
of their heritage. Although may archaeologists accept these controls
as appropriate, they may impose major constraints on the reseach
archaeologists do and how they interpret their fnds. Such constraints
have given rise to considerable tensions between archaeologists and
aboriginal resource managers (Moser 1 995b; Nicholas and Andrews
I 997; Swidler et al . 1 997; D. Thomas 2000) .
Unti the twentieth century, few archaeologists were educated in
the discipline. Instead they brought to archaeology a variet of skills
and viewpoints acquired i many diferent felds and avocations . All .
of them had studied a general school curriculum in which classical
and biblical material was emphasized. Basic principles derived from
a widespread interest in numismatics played an important role in
the developnlent of tpology and seriation by Christian Thomsen,
John Evans, and other early archaeologists (McKay I 976) . In the
nineteenth century, a growing number who took up the study of
archaeology had been frther educated in te physical and biological
sciences. Even now, it is claimed that signifcant diferences can be
noted between the work done by professional archaeologists whose
undergraduate studies were in the humaites and in the natural sci
ences (R. Chapman 1979: I 2 I ) . More recently, a large number of pre
historic archaeologists have been educated in anthropology or hiStO
departments, depending on local preferences. In general, archaeol
ogists trained within tlle context of histor remain interested in the
pasts of specifc countries or peoples, whereas archaeologists trained
i anthropology are more likely to be interested in studying the past
from a comparative perspective.
22
Studying te History of Achaeology
The roles played by particularly successfl or chaismatic archae
ologists as exemplars in shaping the practice of archaeology on a
national and an international scale also are signifcant, even uthey
probably developed their ideas in contexts that were fertile to those
ideas . Younger archaeologists may strike of in new directions and
pioneer novel techniques of analysis or interpretation in order to try
to establish professional reputations for themselves.
Archaeological interpretation aso has been infuenced by tech
nical developments in the physical and biological sciences. Untl
recent decades, when collaborative research involving achaeologists
and natural scientists became routie, with rare exceptions the fow
of information between tllese disciplines was undirectional, with
archaeologists being the recipients. Hence, research in the natural
sciences was only fortuitously related to the needs of archaeolo
gists, although from time to time discoveries were made that were of
tremendous importance for archaeology. The developnlent of radio
carbon and other geochronometric dating technques afer W orId
War II rovided archaeologists for the frst time with a universally
applicable chronology that allowed the approximate year as well
as the relatve order of archaeological manifestations to be deter
mined. These dating techniques aso constituted an independent
test of chronologies that had been ierred by means of seriation
alone or were based on limited textual data. Pollen analysis provided
valuable new insights into prehistoric climatic and environmental
changes and trace- element analyses added an important dimension
to the study of the prehistoric movement of certain kinds of goods.
While tllere is considerable variation in how quicldy and insightflly
archaeologists apply innovations derived from tlle physical and bio
logical sciences to their work, once they have been incorporated into
archaeological research such inovatons tend to spread throughout
the world rapidly and with little resistance. The main obstacle to
their spread is lack of fnds and trained scientifc personnel, 'ctors
that probably create more disparity between the archaeology of rich
and poor nations than any other. Yet even now, when more physi
cal and biologica research is being undertaken specifcally to solve
archaeological problems, discoveries in tese felds remain among
the least predictable factors infuencing archaeological interpretation
(Nash 2000a) .
2 3
A HistO of Achaeological Thought
The proliferaton of electronic forms of data processing has revolu
tionized archaeological analysis no less tha did radiocbon datng.
It is now possible to correlate in a routine fashion vast amounts of
data, which in the past only an exceptonal archaeologist, such as
W. M. F. Petrie, would have attenlpted to analyze ( Kendall 1 969,
1 97 1 ) . This allows archaeologists to use the abtl dant data at their
disposal to search for more detailed patterning in the archaeological
record ( Hodson et al. 1 97 I ; Doran and Hodson I97s ; Hodder I 978b;
Orton I 980; Sablof I 98 1 ) and to explore the test implications of ever
more complex hypotheses about human behavior so that these find
igs can be compared wit the archaeological record (Wobst 1 974;
Mithen 1 993; Costopoulos 2002 ) . New theoretical orientations have
been encouraged by specific developments of a mathematical nature.
General systems theory ( Flannery 1 968; Steiger 1 97 1 ; Laszlo 1 972a;
Berlinski 1976) and catastrophe theory (Thor 1 97 5 ; Renfew 1 978a;
Renfew and Cooke 1 979; Saunders 1 980) are both mathenlatical
approaches to the study of change, even if their strictly mathematical
aspects have been emphasized less than the underlying concepts in
applying them to archaeological problems.
The interpretation of archaeological data also has been signifcantly
af ected by me changing theories of human behavior and cogniton
espoused by the social sciences . It has been especially infuenced by
concepts derived fom ethnology and history, tlle two related dis
ciplies with which archaeologists have maintained the closest ties.
Theoretical concepts derived from geography, sociology, economics,
and politcal science also have infuenced archaeology, either directly
or through anthropology and history. Yet, because a these disci
plines have been shaped by many of the same social movements that
have ifuenced archaeology, it is ofen dfcult to distinguish social
science infuences on archaeology fom those of society at large.
The interpretation of archaeological data is also iuenced by
established beliefs about what has been learned fom the archaeo
logical record. Ofen specific interpretations of the past ae tllcriti
cally accommodated to changing general views, rather than careflly
scrutinized and assessed, even when mese interpretatons were for
mulated in accordance with a general view that has been rej ected.
Because of this, specific views about the past can persist and infu
ence archaeological interpretation long after the reasoning tllat led
to their formulation has been discredited and abandoned. In their
Studying the Hstory of Achaeology
detailed study of research at the Neolithic site of Ave bury in England,
Peter U cleo et a. ( 1 99 I ) demonstrated how the uncritical accep
tance of older fndings has constrained more recent research. Vari
ous studies have traced how interpretive Inotifs derived from clas
sical and medeval Europe have infuenced tlle understandig of
early htlan behavior and how Marcelin Boule's and Arthur Keith's
contrasting portrayals of Neanderthals have contnued to play a
central role in constructing knowledge about mem ( Moser 1 992;
Trikaus ad Shipman 1 993; Stringer and Gamble 1 993 ) By con
trast, David Wen grow ( 2003 : 1 34) has argued that studying the his
tor of archaeology can contribute to the better understanding of
me past and present through reengagement in a new context with
ideas long forgotten as a result of what Laura Nader ( 200 I ) calls the
"collective amnesia" associated with changing research programs . It
thus becomes obvious that, although achaeologists' understandings
of the past are infuenced by the social milieu in which they exist,
they also are influenced by many factors that relate to the ongoing
development of archaeology as a discipline or set of disciplines. A h
tory of archaeological thought requires knowledge not only of the
social setting in which archaeological research is caried out but also
of the ongoing developlnent of archaeology as a practice.
Like other studies of tlle history of science, the history of archae
ology is characterized by two broad approaches: internalist and
... externalist or contextual ( Kuh 1 977 : 1 09-1 0; Bauer I 992 : I I O-14)
Internalist studies trace the dscoveries and intellectual debates that
have shaped archaeological interpretation. P excellent example of
such an endeavor is Donald Grayson's The Establishment of Human
Antiquity ( I 983 ) . Internalist approaches continue to be preferred by
epistemological positivists and political conservatives . They also are
generally accepted as a valid way to study the history of archaeol
ogy. Externalist approaches seek to relate changes in archaeologi
cal understanding to changes in the social, economic, and political
milieus in which archaeology is practiced. Although there is growing
interest in such studies in bOtll Western and ex-colonial countries
(Klindt-Jensen 1 97 5 ; 1. Bernal 1 980; Robertshaw 1 990; Patterson
1 995; Marchand 1 996) , conservative archaeologists and historians of
science ofen criticize such interpretations on tlle grouds that they
are speculative and ideologically driven ( Daniel and Renfrew 1 988:
1 99) . In recent years, however, this sort of approach has acquired
A I-istory of Achaeological Thought
new levels of respectability as a result of Adrian Desmond's ( 1 982 ,
1 989; Desmond and Moore 1 992 ) studies of the social and political
implications of biological evolutionism in Victorian England. More
over, there is a large body of evidence that interpretations are influ
enced by social milieus. Although it would seel ideal for studies to
combine both approaches, in practice few historians of archaeology
attempt to do this. I will, however, apply both approaches in this
book.
Histories of science also are expected to avoid presentism, which
involves judging past developments in terms of the current prac
tices and belefs of the discipline. This sort of approach evaluates
what happened in the past in terms of present concerns and treats
the history of archaeology as a chronicle of its progress toward its
presen state. Presentism is generally regarded by historians of sci
ence as a common shortcoming of amateur historians, especially
scientsts writing about their own disciplines. More sophsticated
studies are expected to J to understand past events on their own
terms and in relation to past social and political, as well as disci
plinary' contexts . Yet Tim Murray ( I 999h) embraces an "avowedly
presentist" approach and Robert Dunnell ( 200 1 : 1 29 1 ) objects that
by avoidig presentisn1 historians of achaeology fail to distinguish
beteen scientifc discoveries of lasting value' and those that are of
no importance for the development of the discipline. To be relevant,
Dunnell argues, studes of the history of archaeology must be theo
retcally informed. Thus, his position appears to be an endorsement of
presentism.
Archaeological Interpretation
Achaeologists debate whether their discipline, or any social science,
can or should be scientific. In part, these debates arise from dis
agreements about what consttutes science and scientc behavior.
Most historians and philosophers of science trace the origin of mod
ern science back to the philosopher Francis Bacon and regard it as a
method oflnowing rather than a body of knowledge. Bacon sought
to persuade scholars to cease relying on reveaed or authoritative
knowledge to understand the world and instead to employ observa
tion, classifcation, comparison, and where possible experimentation
to achieve this goal . In this way, scientifc lmowledge was made the
Studying the History of Achaeology
ever-developing product of communities of researchers ( Zimmerman
200 1 : 1 1 7 ) .
I t is a fndamental tenet of science that nothing is significant by
itself but only in relation to hypotheses; hence only theories can
explain phenomena ( Dunnell I982b; Bird 2000: 1 8) . Scientists must
search for order, most ofen in the form of systemic properties,
tat facilitates the construction of explanations, without subjecting
themselves to ay a priori lmiting presuppositions about the general
extent or nature of that order. Their goal is to dscover mechanisms
that account for how things work and have come to be as they fnd
them ( Bunge 1 997)
A scientfic viewpoint treats the idea of absolute, unchanging truth
a a dangerous and absurd illusion. Although scientists seek the most
comprehensible and enduring understanding that their data permit,
they acknowledge that they are unable to transcend the limitations
of their data and what they are capable ofperceiving at any partcular
point in time. Hence, they expect that in due course ever scientific
theory will be altered and probably become outmoded. Scientists are
professionally obligated to test every theory against new evidence and
to ensure that no theory logically contradcts any other accepted ones
(Klejn 2001 a: 86) . Contrary to Karl Popper's ( 1 959) argument that
theories can only be disproved rather than proved, the philosopher
of science Mario Bunge ( 1 996: 1 80-3) argues that, because even the
reftaton of a theory is not necessarily definitive, scientists are jus
tified in supporting a likely theory until convincing evidence to the
contrary emerges . It is also now widely accepted that the processes
of recovering and analyzing data are generally no less biased than is
their explanation.
There is no fndamental disagreement between this position and
relatvist claims that science is an ensemble of social practices that seek
to make the world and human behavior meaningfl and intelligible;
that science is embedded in society; and that its claims are at best par
tial, negotiated, and contested positons about what is to be taken
for granted (Shanls 1 996: 1 03 ) , provided that it is also recognized
that archaeological data were created independently of archaeologists
and therefore have the capacity to resist their interpretations (Wylie
1 982, 1 989b, 2002 ; Trigger I989b, 1 998b) . Kristiansen ( 2002 ) argues
that achaeologists must regard such observatons not as invitations
to cultivate subjectvit but as a challenge to try hard to be objective.
A Histor of Achaeological Thought
Science presupposes a commitment to use more than rhetoric, per
suasion, and political power or academic authority to recruit support
for a position.
Jean - Claude Gardin ( I 980: 4) identifes the goal of archaeology
as being to create intellectual constructions relating to the study of
objects of all sorts that originated in the past. Leo Kejn ( 2001 a: 88)
defnes archaeology as a discipline constructed by theories related to
the study of material culture and antiquity. Lynn Meskell ( 2002 : 293 )
observes that what sets archaeology apart from histor and anthropol
ogy is its materiality. Yet David Wengrow ( 2003 : 1 34) identfies it with
an improved understanding of human behavior and history, whereas
others have suggested that its goal shoud be to generalize about pro
cesses of cultural change (Binford 1 962, 1 983b) . These perspectives
are not antthetical . Archaeology is based on recovering and study
ing material culture but that does not prevent archaeologists fom
trying to study past huan behavior, any more than palaeontologists
are precluded fom trying to understand the behavior of prehistoric
animals. Today, there is a growing tendency to view archaeologi
cal theory as a subset of antropological (or social science) theory
dealing with how human behavior and beliefs are related to material
culture and how material Culture inuences human behavior.
Scientific theory is a form of generalization that addresses how
things work and change. Theories generally promote an understand
ing of one realm or dimension of reality by ignoring others. They
do not seek to analyze the world as it is observed but through what
are judged to be appropriate categories (Hegmon 2003 : 2 1 3 ) . To
account for a specifi c situation, it is necessary to combine various
explanations of this sort to fonn an explanatory argument ( Roberts
I 996) . a result of increasing relativism, there is growng interest
in how knowledge is consuucted, including how archaeologists eval
uate knowledge claims and reach conclusions. This has produced a
growing concern with archaeological theory even umany archaeol
ogists, including archaeological theorists, believe that the close rela
tions between theories and practice cast doubt on the desirability of
establishing a separate subdscipline of theoretical archaeology.
Archaeology is a social science in the sense that it ties to explain
what has happened to specifc groups of human beings in the past.
Yet, unlike ethnologists, geographers, sociologists, political scien
tists, and economists, archaeologists cannot observe the behavior of
Studying the Histor of Achaeology
the people they are studying and, unike historians , most of them do
not have direct access to the thoughts of these people as recorded in
written texts. Instead, archaeologists must conjecture human behav
ior and ideas fom the material remains of what human beings have
made and used and te lasting physical impact of their activities on
the environment. The interpretation of achaeological data depends
on a "derstanding of how hUlnan beings behave at the present time
and particularly of how ths behavior is reflected i m.aterial culture.
Archaeologists also must invoke uniformitarian principles in order to
use an understanding of geological and biological processes going
on at the present time to infer how natural processes have helped to
shape te archaeological record. Yet they ae far fom agreed how
such understandg can be applied legitimately and comprehensively
to derive an "lmderstanding of past human behavior fom their data
( Biford I 967a, 1 98 I ; Gibbon I 984; Gallay I986) .
For a long time, most archaeologists were naive empiricists, ofer
ing what appeared to be plausible explanations for the evidence
they were recovering. Then, in the I 960s, processual archaeolo
gists embraced a positivist epistemology that emphasized establish
ing general regulrities beteen observable phenomena and explain
ing these regularities . They also treated explanation and prediction
as equivalent. This approach favored stdying behavior, as it priv
ileged what can be witnessed instead of dealing with more elusive
thoughts ad motives. It also privileged methodological individual
ism and because it doubted the epistemological validity of emergent
properties was reductionist. It therefore promoted a belief in a "uni
fied science," which sought to apply methodologies derived from
the physical sciences to study everything (Hempel and Oppenheirn
I 948; Hempel I 965 ) . Postprocessualists, and still earlier archaeolo
gists such as R. G. Collingwood, embraced an opposing }dealist epis
temology that maintains that perceptions only acquire meaning as a
result of discriminations that occur in the observer's mind. Idealists
therefore believe that concepts play an important role in de termin -
ing percepton: humans do not adjust to the world as it really is but
to the world as they imagine it to be. !dealism thus emphasizes the_
value of a cultural rather than a behavioral approach to understand
ing human actvites ( Collingwood 1 946; Barnes I 974; Laudan 1 990) .
Postrocessualists object that positivists ignore the cogntively medi
ated nature of human behavior and hence downplay the importance
29
A History of Achaeological Thought
of culture. Positivists maintain tat, because of its wholly subj ec
tive nature, the hermeneutic method does not provide a scientifc
approach for the study of beliefs. Each of these approaches is the
formalization of a way of gaining a type of knowledge that is vital for
everyday human living. Positivism relates to the sort of knowledge
that is necessary to adapt to the natural world and idealism to what
is required to interact with other human beings.
The inadequacies of both positivism and i dealism as epistemologies
for the social sciences have promoted the popularity of a third option:
realism ( Bhaskar I 978; Harre I 970, I 972; Harre and Madden I 97 5 ;
Bunge 2003 ) . Mario Bunge ( I 996: 35 5-8) maintains that realism is
the epistemology that all reasonable and productive scientists actu
aly follow, whatever epistemology they advocate. Re_ali jfentif
the object of scientc study as being not only what can be_perceived
with the senses or conceptualized in the brain but all that exists and
happens . Thus, realists pay equal attention to all things, whether
they can observe them or ony their efects . Ideas are viewed as pro
cesses that occur in the human brain and hence can be studied from
a materialist perspective. Realists maintain that some imperceptble
entities are appropriate objects of study. Thus, they do not confme
themselves to appearances, as positivists do, but they also do not
malce common cause with idealists in belttIing the signifcance of
appearances. Ofen they begin wt appearances and try to explain
them by postulating unobservable entities, as Gregor Mendel did
when he proposed that what are now caled genes were necessary to
explain the results of his interbreeding of diferent valieties of garden
peas. Because it accepts tIle validity of studying structures as well as
entities, realism is antireductionist. a result of acknowledging the
complexit of the real world, it also rejects the positvist equating of
explanation and prediction.
Generalizatons, which can concer both patterns and the mecha
nisms that account for patterns, play a role in all scientifc operations
relating to the collection, description, classifcation, and interpreta
tion of data. Archaeologists folow the example of philosophers of
science (Nagel I 96 1 ) and other social science disciplines in classif
ing thei generalizations into high, middle, and low categories (Klejn
I 977; Raab and Goodyear I 984) (Figure I . I ) . Ony middle- and high
level generalizations count as hypotheses or theories, according to the
extent of tIleir confrmation, because they alone propose mechanisms
Studyig the History of Achaeology
Level s of
Theory
Hi gh
Mi ddl e
Low
o
1
o 0
1 1
o 0
1 1
Ar chaeol ogi cal Data
l ogi cal t fact ual
coherence cor respondence
( l ength of arrow i ndi cates rel ati ve i mportance of r el ati ons hi p)
Figure 1 . I Relations beteen levels of generalization
that account for why things are as they are and change as they do in
multiple instances.
Low-level generalizations seek to discover patterns in archaeolog-
ical data ( Klejn 1 977: 2 ) . These patterns appear to be the same as
Ernest Nagel's ( I 961 : 79-1 5 ) experimental laws, of which he ofers
as an example the propositon that all female whales suclde their
young. Such generalizations are normally based on regularities that
ae repeatedly observed and can be refted by the observation of
contrary cases. The vast majority of generalizations on which higher
level archaeological interpretations are based are empirical ones of
this sort. They include most tpological classifcations of artifacts;
the delineaton of specifc archaeological cultures; the demonstration
by means of stratfcation, seriation, or radiocarbon datig that one
archaeological manifestaton dates earlier, or later, than another; and
tIle observaton that in an individual culture al humans are buried in
3 I
A History of Archaeological Thought
a particular position accompanied by specifc types of artifacts . These
generalizations are based on observations that specifc attributes or
artifact tpes occur repeatedly in a particular association with each
other, correlate with a specifc geographical locality, or date to a cer
L period. The dimensions of such generalizations are the classical
ones of space, time, and form ( Spaulding 1 960; Gardin 1 980: 62-
97 ) . Archaeologists also may assmne that specific types of projectile
points served particular fnctions and that each archaeological cul
ture was associated with a specific people. These inferences, which
refer to human behavior, df er substantially from generalizations that
are based on empirical observations of correlations between two or
more categories of archaeologically tangible data and do not con
stitute examples of low-level generalizations. In many instances, the
behavioral assumptons turn out to be incorrect, unproved, or mis
leading ( Hodder and Hutson 2003 : 1 73-5 ) .
Because of the nature of archaeological data, low-level gen
eralizations never refer to human behavior. They - Dily reveal
correlations between one sort of archaeological observation and
another, thus providing evidence of hitherto unnotced patterning or
ordering in archaeological data. These empirical observations never
provide explanations but constitute patterns that require explanation.
Discovering generalizations of this sort is the most time-consuming
and arguably the most productive activity in which archaeologists
engage. Yet, nOi1 a theoretical perspective, it is the least studied of
archaeological actvities. Most historical work of this sort has been
done by archaeologists interested in classifcation and seriation and
by logicists ( Gardin I 980: 1 0; Malina and VaSIcek 1 990: 149-209) .
Middle-level theories have been defmed as generalzations that
attempt to explain the regularities that occur between to or more
variables in multiple instances ( Raab and Goodyear I984) . Such gen
eralizations can be produced either by refning high-level theories
so that they are applicable to specifc data sets ( such as archaeolog
ical data) or by seeking to provide an explanaton for why certain
low-level generalizations occur in multiple instances . social sci
ence generalizations should have cross-cultural validity and also make
some reference to human behavior. In addition, they must be suf
ciently specifc that they can be tested by applying them to particular
sets of data. A example of a middle-level anthropological general
ization is Ester Boserup's ( 1 965 ) propositon that among agricultural
32
Studying the HistOlY of Archaeolog
economies increasing populaton pressure leads to situations that
require more labor for each unit of food produced morder to derive
more food from each available unit of arable land. This theory would
be archaeologically testable if archaeologists could establish reliable
measures of absolute or relatve changes in population, the labor
intensiveness and productivity of specifc agricultural regimes, and a
sufciently precise chronology to specif the temporal relationship
between changes i population and food production. Doing this
would require elaboratig what Lewis Binford ( 1 981 ) calls middle
range theory, which attempts to use ethnographic data to establish
reliable correlations between archaeologically observable phenom
ena and archaeologically unobservable human behavior. Altlough
"middle-level" and "middle-range" theories are not identical, in that
middle-level theory can refer exclusively to human behavior, whereas
middle-range theory must by defnition refer to both human behavior
and archaeologicallyobservable traits, all Biord's middle-range tle
ory can be regarded as a special tpe of middle-level theor. Middle
range theory is vital for testing all middle-level tlleory relating to
archaeological data.
High-level, or general -theories, which Marvn Harris ( 1 979: 26-
7 ) has called "research strategies" and David Clarke ( 1 979: 2 5-30)
labeled "controlling models, " have been defed as abstract rules
that explain relatons among the theoretical propositions that are
relevant for understanding a major field of knowledge. Darwinian
evolutionism and llore recently the synthetic tlleory of biological
evolution, which combines Darwinian principles with genetics, are
examples of general theories relating to the biological sciences. In
tlle human domain, general tlleories exclusively relate propositions
about human behavior to one another; hence, there are no tlleoret
ical formulations at this level that pertain specifcally to archaeology
rather than to the social sciences in general. Ths is true even oftheo
ries that relate human behavior to material culture. Examples of rival
high-level theories that currently infuence archaeological research
are selectionism, cultural ecology, cultural materialism, and histori
cal materialism (Marxism) . These are all materialist approaches and
overlap to varying degrees. In recent years, there has been a resm'
gence of interest in high -level theories that attempt to explain human
behavior in terms of cultur. beliefs or underlying cultural structures.
Such theories share an idealist approach. Still otller tlleories, such as
33
A History of Archaeological Thought
neo-Marxism, bridge the gap between materialist and idealst high
level positions creating a broad spectrum of high -level social science
theories.
Because hgh-level theories attempt to interrelate concepts about
human behavior rather than to account for specifc observations, they
cannot be confrmed or falsifed directly (M. Harris I 979: 76) . Ithat
respect, they resemble relgious dogmas . Their credbility can, how
ever, be infuenced by the repeated success or failure of middle-level
theories that are logicaly dependent on them. Yet such testng is
anything but straightforward. Athough many middle-range theo
ries may have signifcance for distinguishing between materialist and
idealist modes of explanation, the complexity of all hUlnan behav
ior and its symbolically mediated nature create much opportunity
for obfscation. Social scientsts exbit great ingenuity i dismiss
ing results that do not agree with their presuppositions as excep
tons or even reinterpreting them as likely confirmation of what they
believe. the result of a growing appreciation of the role played
by ideas in infuencing human behavior, many Marxists have shifed
from a purely materialist to a more idealist view of human behavior.
Sometimes this new position is distinguished as neo-Marxism,
sometimes it is not (McGuire I 993; Trigger I 993 ) . Likewise, in recent
years, many cultural ecologists have shifed fom a more deterministic
to a less deterministc position. The overlapping nature of high -level
theories of human behavior provides considerable opportunities for
such intellectua gymnastics . It is still more dfcult for archaeolo
gists to assess the relative utility of the various materialist positons
lsted above. Tests of Boserup's middle-level theory have implica
tions for both cultural materialsm and cultural ecology and hence
would be of little use for assessing the relatve utility of one or the
other. The faure of mddle-level theories to confirm preferred high
level ones also ca be dismissed as the result of inadequate or inap
propriate data rather than accepted as casting doubt on high -level
propositions .
Because of the indirectness of tests, the rise and fall in the popu
larit of specifc high-level theories seems to be infuenced more by
social processes than by the scientifc examination oflogically related
middle-level theories. Between I 85 0 and I 945 , a strong empha
sis was placed on biological, and more specifcally racial, explana
tons of variation in human behavior. Scientifc demonstatons that
34
Stdyig the Histor of Archaeolog
explanations of this sort did not hold in specifc instances were inad
equate to undermine the faith that many scholars had in the general
validity of a racist approach (M. Harris I 968a: 80-I07) Yet racial
and, for a time, almost all biologically based theories were aban
doned as scientifc explanations of human behavior following the
military defeat of Nazi Germany in I 945 and the consequent rev
elation of the fll extent of its racist-inspired atrocities. It ofen
has been observed that materialist theories tend to fourish in the
social sciences when midde-class intellectuals feel secure, whereas
idealist ones are espoused during periods when economic and social
upheaval create uncertainty (Engels [ I 868] in Marx and Engels I 964:
263-8) .
Archaeologists generally accept, mostly implicitly, that scientifc
explanations are subject to two types of verifcation ( Lowther 1 962 ;
Kosso 2001 ) . The frst test is that of correspondence truth. This test
seeks to determine if an explanation corresponds to the facts. It is use
less to suggest that a drought aCCOllts for the collapse of centralized
political control in an early civilization if no evidence of a drought can
be produced. The second test is that of coherence trUtll: whether or
not an argument is logically consistent. Over two and a half millen
nia, rationalst philosophers have developed logic as a powerfl tool
for detecting flaws in explanations. Few archaeologists have studied
formal logic, but they enjoy discovering logical flaws in one another's
arguments as a way of dscrediting both unwelcome theories and aca
demic rivals. COlnplex arguments are needed to cope with phenom
ena relating to human behavior. Political collapse might result fom
a severe famine but only if a society lacks stored surpluses or access
to alterative sources of food. Hence, monocausal explanatons are
rarely, uever, adequate in the social sciences. Moreover, the same
efect may result from a number of diferent causes : a breakdown in
normal patterns of succession to hgh leadership also might result in
political collapse. This is a situation known as equifnality.
Ideally, it should be possible to establish a logically coherent rela
tionship among high, middle, and low levels of theory and a factual
correspondence between middle- and low-level generalizations and
observable evidence. Because low-level generalizations are empirical
in nature, coherence tests do not apply to tlle relations between them
and evidence, whereas, as we have already noted, factual correspon
dence rarely serves as a direct test of high - level theories . American
35
A Histor of Achaeologcal Thought
archaeologists have fercely debated whether mddle-level theory
ought to be derived deductively as a coherent set of interrelated con
cepts from high -level theories or whether it also can be constlucted
inductively fom evidence and low-level generalizations. Those who
support the deductive approach argue that explanations of human
behavior, as opposed to empirical generalizations about it, should be
based on covering laws stated as hypotheses and tested against inde
pendent sets of data (Watson et al . 1 97 I : 3-1 9; Binford 1 97 2 : I I I ) .
They seek to establish explicit, logical connections between high - and
middle-level theory. Generally, however, they underestmate the ten
uous, complex, and intractable nature of the relations between these
two levels. By contrast, because high-level theory is hard to verif,
highly susceptible to subjective influence, and not absolutely required
to create middle-level theories, many inductivists regard the creation
of high-level theories as an ultinate goal that archaeologists should
address only after they have established a large corpus of reliable
generalizations at the middle level ( M. Salmon 1 982 : 3 3-4; Gibbon
1 984: 3 5-70; Gallay 1 986: 1 1 7-2 1 ) . In keepig with what they regard
as the Baconian tradition of science, inductivists also maintain that,
although deductive research cannot go beyond confrming or dis
proving existing theories, an inductive approach has the potential for
makng genuinely new discoveries about aspects of hUlan behavior.
They also believe that an inductive approach is superior because it
is grounded on evidence collected without presuppositons. Yet it
is evident that theories are not derived fom evidence but imposed
on it.
The debate whether explanatons are better produced by induc
tion or deduction poses a false dichotomy. Observations that Charles
Darwin made in the course of a fve-year voyage around the world
led him to doubt whether creationism could best account for the
geographical distributions of various species of plants and animals .
For over two decades he collected vast amolmts of information on
variations within ad between diferent species. Yet, according to his
own account, the concept of natural selecton occurred to him not
as a direct result of his research but as a consequence of his reading
the economist Thomas Malthus's ( 1 798) theory that the main cause
of human sufering is the natural tendency for human populaton
increase to outrun the available food supply. Once the theory of nat
ural selecton had occurred to Darwin, he was able to use the data
Studying the History of Achaeology
he had collected to present convincing argUlnents in support of his
idea. Both induction and deduction played signifcant roles in the
development of the theory of natural selection and continue to do
so in the creation of all scientific theories. The credibility of all sci
entific theories depends on their Iaintaining logical coherence with
other relevant theories and satisfactory correspondence with relevant
evidence. Because numerous iplcit assumptons about the nature
of human behavior color what is believed to be any sound explana
ton of archaeological data, high-level concepts can be ignored only
at the risk that implicit ones will unwittingly distort archaeological
interpretatons . Successfl theory-building involves the combining
of both approaches.
Archaeologists also disagree about the formal nature of the gen
eralizatons that they seek to elaborate. Processual archaeologists
assumed that all laws must be universal in nature. They also believed
these laws to be primariy ecological, although today archaeolo
gists are deriving a growng number of such generalizations from
evolutionary psychology, neuroscience, ad biology. Such laws
relate to variables that are assumed to hold true regardless of the
tempora period, region of the world, or specific cultures that are
being studied. These generalizations vary in scale from major assump
tons about historical processes to regularities dealing with relatvely
trivial aspects of human behavior ( M. Salmon 1 982 : 8-30) . A good
example of this sort of approach is formalist economics, which main
tains that the rules used to explain the economic behavior of Western
societies explain the behavior of al human beings . Such an approach
accouts for significant variations in human behavior in diferent
societies by viewing them as the results of novel combinations and
permutations of a fied set of interacting variables ( Burling 1 962 ;
Cancian 1 966; Cook 1 966) . Universal generalizations are fequently
interpreted as reflecting an invariant human nature.
Other archaeologists maintain that universal laws concelning
human nature are relatively few in number and that most cross
cultural generalizations apply only to societies that share the same or
closely related modes of production. This position is similar i gen
eral orientation to that of the economic substantivists. In contrast to
formalists, substantivists maintain that the rules, as well as the forms,
of econOlnic behavior are fndamentally transforn1ed by evoluton
ary processes ( Polanyi 1 944, 1 966; Polanyi et al. 1 95 7; Dalton 1 96 1 ) .
37
A History of Archaeological Thought
The substantivist approach implies that novel properties can and do
emerge as a result of sociocultural change ( Childe 1 94 7a) . This dis
tnction between universal generalizations and more restricted ones
may not be as far-reaching or absolute as its proponents maintain.
Generalizatons that apply only to specific types of societies can be
rewritten in the form of universal generalizatons, whereas univer
sal ones may be reformulated, usually in greater detail, so that dley
apply specifcally to a partcular class of society. Yet those who stress
the importance of restricted generalizations argue that all or most of
them cannot be transformed into universal generalizations without
a severe loss i content and signcance (Trigger 1 982a).
The third tye of generalization is specific to an individual culture
or to a single group of historically related cultures. Examples would
be the defnitions of dle canons that governed ancient Egyptim or
classical Greek art ( Childe 1 947 : 43-9; Montane 1 980: 1 30-6) . Such
generalizations are potentially very important inasmuch as most cul
tural patterning is probably of this sort. Yet, where no culturally
specific meanings can be applied to such patterns, they remain at de
level of empiical generalizations.
Chalenge
A fnal question is whether a historical study can measure progress i
the interpretaton of archaeological data. Are steady advances being
made toward a more objective and comprehensive understanding
of archaeological findings, as many archaeologists assume? Or is the
interretation of such data largely a matter of fashion and the accom
plishments of a later period not necessarily more comprehensive or
objective than those of an earlier one? Answering this question is
vital for considering whether the development of archaeology does
or does not promote greater objectivity in its findings.
In examining the patterns that have characterized the interpre
tation of archaeological data, I shall attempt to ascertain to what
extent archaeological techniques as well as a general understanding
of human history and behavior have been irreversibly altered as a
result of archaeological activity. There is evidence of some linearity
mthe development of archaeology as, for example, with the continu
mgrelevance of the principle of stratigraphy, of fequency seriation,
and of Ian Hodder's ( 1 982b) deillonstration that material culture
Studyg the HistOlY of Achaeolog
can play an active as well as an epiphenomenal role i social pro
cesses. Yet there is no evidence that archaeologists at any one period
are less influenced by subjective beliefs and social circumstances than
they are at any other. In addition, contingent factors, personalities,
academic policies, sheer ignorance, professional biases, and fnding
a influence the acceptance and application of new ideas and tech
luques (Nash 2000b: 208) . It is possible, however, that archaeolog
ical interpretation, although initially highly subjectve, becomes less
infuenced by social biases and less susceptible to political lllanipu
lation as the archaeological database becomes more ablUldant, and,
therefore, that an understanding of the past grows llore obj ective as
Inore archaeological research is caried out. That trend would accord
with the claims of moderate relativists that archaeological evidence
has the capacity to limit speculation about the past. If archaeological
interpretations are wholly, or even largely, subjecti ve, we should not
be able to discover many signicant long-term patterns but only ran
dom variations brought about by changes in the economic, social,
and intellectual milieu. If evidence plays a role in limiting speculation,
the development of archaeology should be increasingly constrained
by knowledge that belongs to the discipline, even if subjective factors
continue to influence signficantly the answers to what are regarded
at any given time as interesting questions. If archaeological evidence
plays a significant role in shaping an understanding of the past, the
study of ontology, in particular of the factors dlat constrain human
behavior, will become as - if not more - important dlan learning
about epistemology, or the nature of understanding, for the fture
development of our discipline. That would reverse a trend that has
prevailed since the 1 960s or even the I 930S. By learning more about
how archaeological questons are answered over time, we may hope
to gain additional insights into dle obj ectivity or subjectivity of
archaeological interpretations; to what extent archaeology can be
more than dle past relived in the present, i the sense Colngwood
defined dat process; and the degree to which any sort of understand
ing can be communicated fom one age or culture to another.
3
9