Jinkee O.

Bantug Comparative Constitutional Law Professor Bruce Frohnen Comparative Study on the Legal Standing Doctrine under the U.S. Constitution and 1987 Philippine Constitution I. INTRODUCTION The 1935 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, the progenitor of the current 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, was written pursuant to the TydingsMcDuffie Act of the United States, which created the Philippine Commonwealth. The framers of the 1935 Constitution did not have much freedom in choosing any form of government they wanted as it had to be approved by the colonial government of the United States. Thus, the 1935 Constitution was a spitting image of the United States Constitution except the federal features of the U.S. government and the provision giving the Philippine president emergency powers.1 The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, however, born out of the People Power Revolution which ended the 20-year dictatorial regime of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, departed in several respects from that of the U.S. Constitution. One of these is on judicial power. Filipino constitutionalist Father Joaquin Bernas once said, Our new Constitution has cut the umbilical cord to American jurisprudence.2 This paper is a comparative study on the judicial power provision embodied in the U.S. Constitution and in the 1987 Philippine Constitution as it shapes the legal

Government Structure, Accessed 22 October 2011. http://countrystudies.us/philippines/79.htm Artemio V. Panganiban, Judicial Activism in the Philippines, Philippine Law Journal, Vol. 79, No. 2-03, Accessed 22 October 2011. law.upd.edu.ph/plj/images/files/PLJ volume 79/PLJ volume 79 number 2 -03- Artemio V. Panganiban - Judicial Activism in the Philippines.pdf
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standing concept between the two jurisdictions in the realm of judicial review.

In

doing so, this paper aims to unravel the institutional judicial philosophy between the two constitutional provisions that is, the tendency of the Philippine Supreme Court to embrace judicial activism and the deliberate effort to exercise judicial restraint on the part of the U.S. Supreme Court, on the other hand. The difference in this judicial philosophy is demonstrated on how the concept of legal standing or locus standi is used as a tool to advance such philosophy by these two supreme courts. II. LEGAL STANDING DOCTRINE IN THE LIGHT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ON JUDICIAL POWER IN THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND IN THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION Legal Standing Doctrine in the U.S. Constitution Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution provides: The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; - to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; - to all Cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; - to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; - to Controversies between two or more States; - between Citizens of different States; - between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States. The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted Article III legal standing to require that (1) the plaintiff have suffered an injury in fact, or at least, an imminent harm, (2) caused by the defendant, (3) that a favorable court ruling would redress.3

A.

Daniel C. Garnaas-Holmes, Taxpayer Standing: Maintaining Separation of Powers while Ensuring Democratic Administrative Action, Boston College International and Comparative Law Review Vol. 31, Issue 2 (2008). Accessed 22 October 2011, http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1032&context=iclr&sei-

This element of injury to the plaintiff was explained by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Frothingham v. Mellon4. The case was instituted by the State of

Massachusetts and Mrs. Frothingham, in her capacity as a taxpayer of the United States, to enjoin enforcement of the Maternity Act of 1921 which authorized appropriations from federal tax revenues for states that would comply with the provisions thereof, in order to reduce maternal and infant mortality. Appellant state argued that the law was unconstitutional because it invaded areas of exclusively state concerns in violation of U.S. Constitution Amendment X5 while appellant taxpayer argued that

misappropriations under the law would increase future tax burdens thus, taking her property without due process of law. The Supreme Court, through Justice Sutherland, dismissed the appeal on the ground of lack of legal standing on the part of the appellants, thus: Courts have no power per se to review and annul acts of Congress on the ground that they are unconstitutional. That question may be considered only when the justification for some direct injury suffered or threatened, presenting a justiciable issue, is made to rest upon such an act. Then the power exercised is that of ascertaining and declaring the law applicable to the controversy. It amounts to little more than the negative power to disregard an unconstitutional enactment, which otherwise would stand in the way of the enforcement of a legal right. The party who invokes the power must be able to show not only that the statute is
redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2Furl%3Fsa%3Dt%26rct%3Dj%26q%3Dtaxpayer%2520standin g%253A%2520maintaboston%2520college%2520international%2520and%2520comparative%2520law%26source% 3Dweb%26cd%3D1%26sqi%3D2%26ved%3D0CB4QFjAA%26url%3Dhttp%253A%252F%252Flawdigitalcommons.bc. edu%252Fcgi%252Fviewcontent.cgi%253Farticle%253D1032%2526context%253Diclr%26ei%3DUDGkTvihD4rW0Q HxhsW3BA%26usg%3DAFQjCNFklXXvfo12WtXrXNd1u4DFGo8A5Q#search=%22taxpayer%20standing%3A%20main taboston%20college%20international%20comparative%20law%22 4 262U.S.447(1923).http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=7a71e736ff9a492f9074d9c6923cc680&csvc=le&c form=byCitation&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzkzSkAb&_md5=b539211fb008e29c9a571 7e56fa2d1e9#1100-477 5 The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.

invalid but that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.6 <Emphasis supplied>

The Supreme Court in the ,Frothingham case, enunciated the legal injury test which emphasized the need for plaintiffs to allege an injury which had to be definite, direct and personal to the him/her and which is differentiated from the public at large.7 Thus, albeit there was an allegation of violation of constitutional provisions on the part of the legislative department, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to pass upon the merits of the case because appellants, particularly appellant taxpayer, failed to show that she had sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of the laws enforcement. The rationale of the decision was anchored mainly on the principle of separation of powers which in turn, translates to policy restraints adopted by the Court in the said decision. This principle of separation of powers would had been undermined had the Supreme Court proceeded to review the act of the legislature, even if the law would have found constitutional, as the process of reviewing per se, would have been tantamount to asserting its authority over the co-equal branch of the government.8
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Ibid.http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=7a71e736ff9a492f9074d9c6923cc680&csvc=le&cform=byCitati on&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzkzSkAb&_md5=b539211fb008e29c9a5717e56fa2d1e9# 1100-477 7 Joseph J. Guinta, Standing, Separation of Powers, and the Demise of the Public Citizen, The American University Law Review Vol. 24:835 (1975). Accessed 22 October 2011, http://www.wcl.american.edu/journal/lawrev/24/giunta.pdf?rd=1 8 In his article, Standing, Separation of Powers, and the Demise of the Public Citizen, supra, Mr. Joseph J. Guinta expressed the view, based on his appreciation of the text of the Frothingham Opinion that, Had the Court reached the merits, it would have been compelled to assert its authority over that of the other branches by deciding whether their actions should stand. Accessed 22 October 2011, http://www.wcl.american.edu/journal/lawrev/24/giunta.pdf?rd=1

On the other hand, in the case of Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co,9 the Supreme Court upheld respondent Kentucky Utilities Companys legal standing to challenge the legality of the act of Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), which was created under the Tennessee Valley Authority Act, in supplying power in two small Tennessee towns. The Court declared that its previous ruling that the economic injury resulting from lawful competition cannot in and of itself confer legal standing on the injured business to question the legality of any aspect of its competitor operations does not apply in this particular case. The Court painstakingly went through the legislative history of the TVA Act and held that when the particular statutory provision invoked reflects a legislative purpose to protect a competitive interest, such as in this case, the injured competitor has standing to require compliance therewith. In sustaining the legal standing of the respondent in the Hardin case, the Supreme Court did not abandon the rationale of its decision in the Frothingham case. It actually reinforced the same by affirming the legitimacy of the Congress own sphere in the constitutional order, that is, its power to create statutory rights and thereby permitting the judicial system to protect the same. Once again, the Court affirmed that its constitutional judicial power is inextricably restrained by the powers of the other coequal branches of the government. The Supreme Court, in the 1984 case of Allen v. Wright et. al.,10 applied a more stringent application of legal standing compared with the Frothingham case. In this case, plaintiffs were black parents whose children attended public schools in seven
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390 U.S.1 (1968) http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=4bd387a3ed3bfac558ccec8e00d6d33f&csvc=le&cform=byCitation&_ fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzkzSkAb&_md5=d6bc36197a1ab255e09dfa3d1b84a5d7 10 468 U.S. 737 (1984) http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=2b097c55da91bca08810bb237827c123&csvc=le&cform=byCitation& _fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzt-zSkAb&_md5=71fac5c64afa39769548b4c69e6ca3cd

states in school districts undergoing desegregation. They filed a class action against government officials, alleging that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) had not adopted sufficient standards and procedures to fulfill the mandate of the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) that racially discriminatory schools be denied both taxexempt status and eligibility for tax-deductible contributions under Section 170 of the Code. The plaintiffs alleged two injuries resulting from the IRSs allegedly unlawful conduct: First, they are harmed by the mere fact of Government financial aid to Second, the federal tax exemptions to racially

discriminatory private schools.

discriminatory private schools in their communities impair their ability to have their public schools desegregated. The U.S. Supreme Court denied legal standing to the plaintiffs by applying the three-pronged constitutional test of standing, which required that: (1) the injury

suffered by plaintiffs be distinct and palpable, (2) that the injury be fairly traceable to the challenged conduct, and (3) that relief from the injury be likely to result from a favorable decision. The first prong requires that the injury suffered by the plaintiffs be judicially cognizable. The second and third prongs form the causation element of the standing inquiry which means that the plaintiffs injury be caused directly by the defendants conduct.11 In the Frothingham case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the administration of any statute, which is likely to produce additional taxation to be imposed upon a vast number of taxpayers is a matter of public concern and not merely that of an individual.

11

Teresa Wynn Roseborough, Allen v. Wright: Standing Beyond the Bounds of Article III. North Carolina Law Review, 63 N.C.L. Rev. 1015 (1985), Accessed 28 October 2011, http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=7a382191cc10038a35a81fe2cff6ba05&csvc=le&cform=byCitation&_f mtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzV-zSkAA&_md5=f8a6ce8d21af58002281075dd2754a45

This may signify that if a good number of population, let us say a million, comes to the court, to challenge an appropriation act or a statute whose administration requires the outlay of public money, the Court, stretching farther its reasoning in the Frothingham case, may find the plaintiffs with legal standing to challenge such statute.12 However, this possibility of a million plaintiffs acquiring a legal standing to challenge an enforcement of a statute is completely discarded in the Allen case. The U.S. Supreme Court in the Allen case, ruled that while the diminished ability of plaintiffs children to receive an education in a racially integrated school was an injury differentiated from the public at large, the line of causation between this injury and the IRSs grant of tax exemptions to racially discriminatory schools was too weak on which to anchor their legal standing. The required line of causation would be present only if plaintiffs had alleged that there were enough racially discriminatory private schools receiving tax exemptions in their communities for withdrawal of tax-exempt status to make an appreciable difference in public-school integration. The Court noted that it was entirely speculative whether withdrawal of tax exemptions from racially discriminatory schools would affect public school integration.13 The Court anchored its finding of insufficient line of causation on the doctrine of separation of powers. Accordingly, the case-or-controversy clause of Article III of the U.S. Constitution underscores the fact that it is not the judiciary, but rather the executive branch, which is assigned the duty of taking care that the laws are faithfully

This assumes the non-applicability of a class action which is recognized under Rule 23 of U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 13 Teresa Wynn Roseborough, Allen v. Wright: Standing Beyond the Bounds of Article III, supra.

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executed. Thus, the Court cannot proceed to resolve the merits of the case without running afoul of that structural principle.14 Thus, we can see that the causation element of Article III standing test demands a very exacting measure of injury on the part of the plaintiffs and that any intimation of speculative description of harm directly caused by government action immediately strips off the plaintiffs of their legal standing in court. This prudential approach in judicial decision-making gives paramount importance to the doctrine of separation of powers. This approach on legal standing is dimly recognized in Philippines

jurisprudence even though the 1987 Philippine Constitution strongly echoes the doctrine of separation of powers enshrined in the U.S. Constitution.

B.

Legal Standing Doctrine in the 1987 Philippine Constitution Article III, 1 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution states: Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. The first component of the judicial power refers to the ordinary power of judicial

review, which is to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. The second component refers to the extraordinary or certiorari or, the expanded responsibility of the judiciary to decide issues involving

14

Allen v. Wright, et. al. supra note 10.

grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government, including the legislative and the executive departments.15 In Kulasang Mayo Uno Labor Center v. Garcia, Jr.16, the Supreme Court elucidated on the requirement of legal standing under Article III, 1 of of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, thus:

In Lamb v. Phipps, we ruled that judicial power is the power to hear and decide causes pending between the parties who have the right to sue in the courts of law and equity. Corollary to this provision is the principle of locus standi of a party litigant. One who is directly affected by and whose interest is immediate and substantial in the controversy has the standing to sue. The rule therefore requires that a party must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision so as to warrant an invocation of the courts jurisdiction and to justify the exercise of the courts remedial powers in his behalf. Thus, the elements of doctrine of legal standing used by the U.S. Supreme Court and the Philippine Supreme Court are evidently the same. The element of personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of a government act that is being challenged as opposed to a general interest or grievances shared by other members of the public at large, is likewise

applied by the Philippine Supreme Court. However, the Philippine Supreme Court, in a plethora of cases, has departed from the restrained application by the U.S. Supreme Court in the exercise of its judicial review. When confronted with constitutional issues or statutory validity of government actions, the Philippine Supreme Court has shown

15 16

Artemio V. Panganiban, Judicial Activism in the Philippines, supra note 2. G.R. No. 115381, (1994), http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1994/dec1994/gr_115381_1994.html

much tolerance in entertaining lawsuits with less exacting demonstration of legal standing as measured against that which is applied by the U.S. Supreme Court. In the case of Pascual v. Secretary17, the Philippine Supreme Court recognized the legal standing of the petitioner as a taxpayer and also the Provincial Governor of Rizal to file the action for declaratory relief with injunction which aimed to declare the unconstitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 115381 which appropriates a portion of the public fund for the construction of feeder roads in the province of Rizal. The petitioner claimed that the members of the Congress were made to believe that the projected feeder roads were public roads but they were actually private streets of a private subdivision owned by a private citizen. Thus, petitioner sought that unless the enforcement of those provisions is enjoined by the Court, the respondents would continue to execute those illegal provisions of law to the irreparable damage, detriment and prejudice not only to the petitioner but to the Filipino nation. The Court reasoned that Frothingham cannot be applied to the Philippines because the relationship between a Filipino taxpayer and the national government is not the same as the relationship between an American taxpayer and the Federal Government, but more analogous to the relationship between an American taxpayer and his/her state government. Hence, in the Philippines, the injury purportedly suffered by a taxpayer in cases of alleged unlawful disbursement of public funds or what we call the taxpayers suit, is considered acceptably personal, substantial and direct to give him/her standing in court.18

G.,R. No. L-10405, 29 December 1960, http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1960/dec1960/gr_l-10405_1960.html Solomon F. Lumba, The Problem of Standing in Philippine Law, Asian Law Institute Working Paper Series No. 003 (July 2009), Accessed 28 October 2011, http://law.nus.edu.sg/asli/pdf/WPS003.pdf.
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The liberalized approach by the Philippine Supreme Court in the law of standing is fully demonstrated in the judicial construct called transcendental importance. In cases impressed with transcendental importance, the question of the plaintiff or petitioners legal standing is irrelevant in view of the transcendental importance to the public of the issues involved in the case. In the case of Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Garcia,19 the Supreme Court explained the importance that the transcendental importance doctrine plays in the realm of judicial review, thus:

Assuming arguendo that petitioner is not possessed of the standing to sue, this court is ready to brush aside this barren procedural infirmity and recognize the legal standing of the petitioner in view of the transcendental importance of the issues raised. And this act of liberality is not without judicial precedent. As early as the Emergency Powers Cases, this Court had exercised its discretion and waived the requirement of proper party. In the recent case of Kilosbayan, Inc., et al. v. Teofisto Guingona, Jr., et al., we ruled in the same lines and enumerated some of the cases where the same policy was adopted, viz: . . A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers Cases, [G.R. No. L-2044 (Araneta v. Dinglasan); G.R. No. L-2756 (Araneta v. Angeles); G.R. No. L-3054 (Rodriguez v. Tesorero de Filipinas); G.R. No. L-3055 (Guerrero v. Commissioner of Customs); and G.R. No. L-3056 (Barredo v. Commission on Elections), 84 Phil. 368 (1949)], this Court brushed aside this technicality because "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. (Avelino vs. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2621)." Insofar as taxpayers' suits are concerned, this Court had declared that it "is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not it should be entertained," (Tan v. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677, 680 [1972]) or that it "enjoys an open discretion to entertain the same or not." [Sanidad v. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333 (1976)]. xxx xxx xxx

19

G.R. No. 115381, 23 December 1994, http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1994/dec1994/gr_115381_1994.html

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In line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi, ordinary taxpayers, members of Congress, and even association of planters, and non-profit civic organizations were allowed to initiate and prosecute actions before this court to question the constitutionality or validity of laws, acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various government agencies or instrumentalities. xxx. We did no less in De Guia v. COMELEC (Supra) where, although we declared that De Guia "does not appear to have locus standi, a standing in law, a personal or substantial interest," we brushed aside the procedural infirmity "considering the importance of the issue involved, concerning as it does the political exercise of qualified voters affected by the apportionment, and petitioner alleging abuse of discretion and violation of the Constitution by respondent. C. The Political Context of the Disparate Treatment of the Legal Standing Doctrine under the 1987 Philippine Constitution and the U.S. Constitution Based on the foregoing, it is clear that cases which touch on the legality or constitutionality of government actions, the Philippine Supreme Court unabashedly disregards the doctrine of separation of powers and proceeds to review the merits of the case based on assertion of violation of constitutional or statutory rights of the litigants. Notwithstanding that the issues raised are the validity of executive rules and regulations issued by a government agency or the exercise by the legislative department to apportion congressional districts, as long as there is an allegation of violation of some enshrined constitutional rights, the Philippine Supreme Court would trivialize the challenge on the lack of legal standing of the plaintiff or petitioner and construe it merely as a procedural infirmity which can be brushed aside in view of the transcendental importance to the public of the issues involved. This is in stark contrast with the substantive significance that the U.S. Supreme Court accords to the element of legal standing on justiciability of a certain issue, thus:

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Art. III doctrine of "standing" has a core constitutional component that a plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief. The concepts of standing doctrine present questions that must be answered by reference to the Art. III notion that federal courts may exercise power only in the last resort and as a necessity, and only when adjudication is consistent with a system of separated powers and the dispute is one traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process.20 The relaxation of the legal standing requirement in the judicial philosophy of the Philippine Supreme Court has been attributed to the expansion of judicial power which is mainly derived from the wordings of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.21 This

expansion of judicial power enshrined in the 1987 Philippine Constitution was a deliberate effort to prevent the Philippine judicial system from being used as an instrument by a co-equal branch of the government to perpetuate its own will and control of the government, unchecked by the other branches of the government on the convenient ground that the doctrine of separation of powers mandates such noninterference. As explained by Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. of the Philippine Supreme Court: The framers of the Constitution believed that the free use of the political question doctrine allowed the Court during the Marcos years to fall back on prudence, institutional difficulties, complexity of issues, momentousness of consequences or fear that it was extravagantly extending judicial power in the cases where it refused to examine and strike down an exercise of authoritarian power.22

Allen v. Wright, et. al., supra note 10. Rene B. Gorospe, Songs, Singers and Shadows: Revisiting Locus Standi in Light of the People Power Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, University of Santo Tomas Law Review, Vol. L1, AY 2006-2007, http://ustlawreview.com/pdf/vol.LI/Songs_Singers_and_Shadows.pdf 22 Dissenting Opinion in Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 (1991) at 708 cited by Rene B. Gorospe in Songs, Singers and Shadows: Revisiting Locus Standi in Light of the People Power Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, id.
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Thus, the Supreme Court of the Philippines, when it is engaged in judicial review, is less oblivious to the doctrines of separation of powers or political question than its counterpart in the United States because its Constitution is designed for the judicial power to step on the sphere belonging to the other branches of the government, even if it is a legitimately within the intent and meaning of the doctrines, when there is a potential danger of even the slightest irregularity in the actions of the other

branches of the government. This is the political order which the Filipinos affirmed when they ratified the Constitution in 1987 that is, for the judiciary to play a proactive role in protecting their constitutional and statutory rights. On the other hand, the United States has never been under any authoritarian regime before. Hence, it sees no need to tilt the balance of constitutional power in favor of any branch under certain circumstances. It could be said that there are certain political mechanisms such as those inherent in the federal features of its government which prevent the excessive arrogation of power by the other two branches of the government, but judicial review is not one of those mechanisms. Thus, U.S. Supreme Courts judicial philosophy is to exercise judicial restraint in cases where actions of the other two branches of the government are challenged by litigants. The Court will not proceed to review the merits of the case unless the litigant meets its interpretation on the constitutional standard of legal standing otherwise, it will be guilty of violating the doctrine of separation of powers. For the Court, this practice of self-restraint is

paramount to uphold its non-partisan stance in the political sphere of the government and thus, preserve the confidence of the people in its impartiality and independence.

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This was articulated by Justice Frankfurter in his Concurring Opinion in the case Dennis v. United States23 But how are competing interests to be assessed? Since they are not subject to quantitative ascertainment, the issue necessarily resolves itself into asking, who is to make the adjustment? Who is to balance the relevant factors and ascertain which interest is in the circumstances to prevail? Full responsibility for the choice cannot be given to the courts. Courts are not representative bodies. They are not designed to be a good reflex of a democratic society. Their judgment is best informed, and therefore most dependable, within narrow limits. Their essential quality is detachment, founded on independence. History teaches that the independence of the judiciary is jeopardized when courts become embroiled in the passions of the day and assume primary responsibility in choosing between competing political, economic and social pressures. III. CONCLUSION A comparative study of the legal standing doctrine incorporated under the judicial power provisions of the U.S. Constitution and the 1987 Philippine Constitution reveals that the expansion or contraction in its application is a function of the social and political history which gave birth to those Constitutions. The values and principles engraved in those Constitutions are concretized by the judicial philosophy adopted by the countrys Supreme Court. The relaxed application of the legal standing by the Philippine Supreme Court and its restrained application by the U.S. Supreme Court demonstrate the inclination towards judicial activism of the former and judicial restraint by the latter. In either case, these judicial philosophies serve as the Courts anchor in their faithful commitment to serve their own Constitutions.

23

341 U.S. 494 (1951), http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=2ce2a972545ed4ea4126f64b093ae703&csvc=le&cform=byCitation& _fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzB-zSkAl&_md5=9f47a29a73ecec2e5dfeb354a55bcba7#

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