Hegels Critique of Kants Moral World View

Kenneth R. Westphal
University of East Anglia

Philosophical Topics 19.2 (1991):13376.

ABSTRACT : Few if any of Kants critics were more trenchant than Hegel. Here I reconstruct some objections Hegel makes to Kant in a text that has received insufficient attention, the chapter titled the Moral World View in the Phenomenology of Spirit. I show that Kant holds virtually all the tenets Hegel ascribes to the moral world view. I concentrate on five of Hegels main objections to Kants practical metaphysics. First, Kants problem of coordinating happiness with virtue (as worthiness to be happy) is contrived. Kant denies that there is any inherent connection between acting rightly and being happy, but his denial depends on his defining happiness in terms of satisfying inclinations, rather than in terms of achieving ends in general. Second, Kants view of moral motivation is contrived; he ultimately admits that we cannot resolve to act without taking inclinations into account. (We cannot resolve to act apart from the matter of our maxim.) Third, Kants idea about perfecting our virtue in an infinite progress is incoherent. Kant defines virtue, and evidence of virtue, in terms of overcoming inclinations. Inclinations die with the body. Therefore there can be neither virtue nor evidence of virtue after death. Fourth, Kants view of the autonomy of moral agency is inconsistent with viewing the moral law as a divine command. Fifth, Kants moral principles cannot be put into practice in concrete circumstances because he supplies inadequate guidance for classifying acts. I conclude that Hegels objections to Kants practical metaphysics are sound, and I show that the problems Hegel raised against Kants account of autonomy and moral motivation are still current, since they have not been resolved, e.g., by Onora ONeill's Constructions of Reason.

The definitive version of this article appears in:

Hegels Critique of Kants Moral World View

Kenneth R. Westphal

[P]hilosophy is the science of the relation of all knowledge to the essential ends of human reason .., and the philosopher is not an artificer in the field of reason, but himself the lawgiver of human reason. Kant There is a point in every philosophy when the philosophers conviction appears on stage ... Nietzsche

I. INTRODUCTION . The Nineteenth Century, especially on the Continent, was an age of grand metaphysical world views. Few were grander and none more influential than the one that set the philosophical agenda for the entire century, Kants Critical Philosophy. Few if any of Kants critics were more trenchant than Hegel. Here I wish to reconstruct some objections Hegel makes to Kant in a text that has received insufficient, indeed very little attention, the chapter titled the Moral World View in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Hegels chapter consists of an introduction and three sections. The first section expounds the moral world view, the second criticizes it, under the title dissemblance, and the third critically analyzes its alleged final form, conscience. I will not consider this chapters role within the Phenomenology, nor will I consider Hegels exposition of the moral world view, except insofar as it also contains criticisms, and I will not discuss Hegels analysis of conscience. I will restrict my consideration to Hegels criticisms of Kant, especially in the second section of his chapter, dissemblance.1 Since Kants postulates loom large in Hegels discussion, it may seem that Hegel considers only the second Critique. However, Hegel makes many quite specific allusions or references to others of Kants texts.2 This shows that Hegel here considers the moral world view articulated in the whole of Kants Critical philosophy. Properly understanding and evaluating Hegels objections requires considering not only the Critique of Practical Reason, but also the Critique of Pure Reason, the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, the Critique of Judgment, the Metaphysics of Morals, and the Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone.3 Hegel always strove for synopsis! It would be unfair to Kant, and unhelpful for assessing Hegel, to take Hegels own exposition of Kants views as a basis for considering Hegels criticisms of Kants over-all world view, especially since Hegel presupposes familiarity with the breadth of Kants writings and his presentation is intended to bring out alleged features of it that are not immediately evident. Hence it is appropriate to look at Kants world view in his own terms before turning to Hegels objections.4 II. KANTS MORAL WORLD VIEW : A SYNOPSIS. Kants Critical strategy for addressing the metaphysical issues of God, freedom, and immortality is sheer genius.5 Starting in the Critique of Pure Reason Kant develops and defends his transcendental idealism. Transcendental idealism holds a rationalist view of the significance of concepts, but also holds that empirical knowledge requires applying concepts to experienced objects. Transcendental 2

knowledge is restricted to knowledge of the a priori conditions of the experience of objects. Analyzing those conditions reveals that space and time are forms of intuition and that twelve categorial concepts structure our experience of objects. These results, together with an analysis of those fortunate metaphysical contradictions, the antinomies,6 justifies a kind of metaphysical dualism. Nature is a causally determined spatio-temporal realm of perceptible substances and events,7 though viewed transcendentally the entirety of nature is appearance, and nothing in itself. This makes for two quite distinct realms, each subject to its own legislation: the sensible realm of nature is subject to the legislation of the understanding, while the intelligible realm of freedom and norms is subject to the legislation of reason.8 One of the key problems for Kants practical philosophy and philosophical theology is to determine how these two realms might be coordinated.9 One of the key results of transcendental idealism is that, because nature is merely appearance, it at least possible that agents in themselves are negatively free from natural causal determinism and positively free to resolve to act on purely rational grounds. An independent analysis of the principles of practical reasoning reveals that practical reason legislates a priori the supreme moral principle, the formal principle of the categorical imperative, and autonomously commands obedience to it.10 Practical reason generates a non-natural, a priori rational feeling of respect for the moral law, which is the sole morally worthy motive.11 This motive suffices for action, independent of any desires, inclinations, purposes or ends we may have or any consequences we may bring about.12 The implications of transcendental idealism for traditional metaphysics are profound. Kant argues against rationalism that God, freedom, and immortality cannot be theoretically known a priori. He also argues against empiricism that the concepts of God, freedom, and immortality make sense and that their existence cannot be theoretically disproven either.13 Indeed, Kant contends that its a very good thing that we cannot know theoretically whether God exists. If we did, we would act out of fear of divine reprobation or in hope of divine reward, but almost never out of the sole morally worthy motive of respect for the moral law.14 In the absence of theoretical proof one way or the other, it becomes appropriate to determine whether any practical, that is, moral grounds support belief pro or contra.15 Kant of course does think there are such grounds. It is important to see that he is quite stringent about what those grounds can be. Unlike Kierkegaard, Kant will have no part in Tertullians dictum, credo quia absurdum est, I believe because it is absurd. Kant insists that concepts must be logically consistent, clear, and determinate if they are to have objects. Moreover, to ascribe objective reality to a concept, that is, to suppose that it has an object, requires that there are definite grounds for such a supposition.16 Kant recognizes that we construct the concept of God on analogy with our understanding, will, and moral ideas.17 Hence he must be stringent about the grounds for postulating an object for that concept. One main element of the primacy of practical reason over theoretical reason in the Critical philosophy lies in Kants analysis of the moral reasons for supposing that there are God, freedom, and immortality.18 Indeed, the theoretical critique would not have been worth Kants effort if it did not have this practical result.19 Kant argues that freedom and the moral law are reciprocal concepts. This means that a free will simply is a will whose principle is the categorical imperative, and that the categorical imperative formulates the rational universality of the maxims adopted by a free will.20 The moral law is given to us as an a priori fact of reason, namely, in our experience of being morally obligated.21 We cannot be obligated to do anything of which we are incapable.22 Consequently we must be, not only negatively, but also positively free to act on the moral law. The moral law is the ratio cognoscendi (the reason or cause of knowledge) of positive freedom, and positive freedom is the ratio essendi (the reason or cause of existence) of the moral law.23 Kant argues along the following lines that we must believe in immortality in order to understand 3

how we could fulfill our duty to perfect our virtue. We are always obligated to act out of respect for the moral law. Virtue consists in always acting from this sole morally worthy motive,24 and we are obligated to perfect our virtue.25 Ought implies can; one cannot be obligated to do what one is incapable of doing. Thus it must be possible for us to perfect our virtue.26 However, due to the frailty of human nature (and original sin), it is impossible for us to perfect our virtue in this worldly life.27 The only way to resolve this apparent contradiction is to believe that there is a future life during which we can continue to improve our virtue, ad infinitum,28 at least to the point where God, in an act of grace, accepts our effort for the accomplishment itself, on the basis of the merit he ascribes to us.29 One of the prime advantages of Kants moral proof of Gods existence over other proofs is that it justifies ascribing moral characteristics to God.30 Kant argues that we must believe in God in order to understand how we could possibly fulfill our duty to bring about the highest good. The highest good consists in a systematic connection of two heterogenous components, happiness and virtue.31 Happiness consists in the satisfaction of the sum of ones inclinations;32 it is necessarily the end of all finite rational agents.33 Virtue constitutes our worthiness to be happy.34 The highest good consists in happiness proportioned to desert, that is, to virtue.35 We are obligated to achieve the highest good.36 Ought implies can. Therefore the highest good must be achievable. The end of proportioning happiness to virtue seems quite beyond human capacities, individually or collectively. Though we cannot rule out that it may come about by nature,37 we cannot understand how that could happen; in our experience, happiness and virtue are not connected, certainly not systematically.38 Rationally willing an end commits one to willing that there be sufficient means, or at least conditions, to achieve that end.39 (Means are resources that are in our power;40 Kant wants to be sure that God is not thought to be under our power.41) Properly proportioning happiness to virtue among all humanity would require omniscience and perfect justice, to judge peoples otherwise inscrutable worthiness;42 omnibenevolence, to care for peoples welfare and happiness; and omnipotence, actually to proportion happiness to virtue, since happiness requires that nature cooperate with our desires. In short, actually achieving the highest good requires God.43 Therefore, we are committed to believing that God exists.44 Now Kant very much thinks that rational faith in God and immortality must be voluntary; faith can be neither compelled nor obligatory.45 Rational faith answers a need of practical reason to conceive of the possibility of achieving its ultimate object, the highest good. If we could not conceive of the possibility of this end it would be difficult, if not impossible, to will to obtain it.46 This practical faith allows us to believe in divine grace and to hope for happiness in the afterlife.47 It also allows us to believe that the world is fundamentally moral,48 and that the highest good, which would result if everyone did what he or she is obligated to do,49 will ultimately come about, as the Kingdom of God on earth.50 III. HEGELS CRITIQUE OF KANTS MORAL WORLD VIEW : PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS.

Kants moral world view is breathtaking in its scope and ambition. What does Hegel make of it? Answering this question will take some effort. The published Phenomenology of Spirit is basically Hegels first draft. The chapter under consideration, The Moral World View, especially bears marks of this fact; it is very compressed, highly allusive, and often enthymematic. Moreover, Hegel barely attempts to follow the procedures required by his own method.51 Thus an informative interpretation of Hegels objections will require a charitable reconstruction. In fairness to Kant, evaluating Hegels objections will require considering Kants views and texts in some detail. There has been substantial controversy about just how to understand Kants arguments for the postulates, especially concerning God.52 Fortunately, these controversies can be circumvented, due to a certain 4

philosophical economy in Hegels analysis. Hegel lets Kant have his arguments and focuses on his conclusions and the world view they articulate. He argues that Kants conclusions form an inconsistent set, and that some of his conclusions are themselves incoherent. Consequently, be the arguments what they may, they must be faulty. This approach, focusing on the conclusions and letting Kant have his arguments, leads Hegel to label several of Kants tenets postulates. Along with God, Hegel includes among the postulates the highest good and the conformity of inclinations to duty.53 This may sound odd; the postulates are usually regarded as pertaining strictly to God and immortality. However, Kant himself labels numbers of other ideas postulates. He refers to the supreme principle of all moral laws as a postulate, as well as the highest good and freedom, along with God and immortality.54 Given Kants definition of postulate, this expanded list is appropriate. Kant defines a postulate of pure practical reason as
a theoretical proposition which is not as such demonstrable, but which is an inseparable corollary of an a priori unconditionally valid practical law.55

Practical postulates are factual propositions which cannot be proven theoretically, but nonetheless are implied by moral imperatives as corollaries. Hegels usage is in line with Kants definition. (The conformity of inclinations to duty concerns certain issues about the highest good, discussed below [IV.6].) Hegels assessment of Kants moral world view is second in harshness only to Nietzsches.56 Hegel asserts that Kants description of the cosmological argument as a whole nest of dialectical contradictions is most appropriate as a description of Kants own moral postulates.57 He charges that Kants moral world view is rife with dissemblance, verging on hypocrisy, because it is fundamentally syncretic, that Kant cannot really be earnest about any of it, and that ultimately Kants views are driven by envy.58 It is important to note that these critical terms, hypocrisy, dissemblance, syncretism, and earnestness, are not at all foreign to Kants views; he uses these terms repeatedly.59 Thus Hegel contends that Kant has not avoided the difficulties in other views which he sought to avoid, nor has he maintained the earnestness he values. I propose to leave Hegels charges of dissemblance, hypocrisy, and lack of earnestness aside. Hegels charges of dissemblance largely rest on his view of the interrelations among Kants postulates. Addressing this part of Hegels criticism would require a more elaborate reconstruction than can be undertaken here. I also set aside much of Hegels contention that the root of the problems in Kants views is his dualism. I will focus on Kants alleged syncretism, that is, on inconsistencies in his views. Hegels obliquely phrased introduction to the Moral World View extols what amounts to autonomy.60 He then identifies the sharp division between sensible nature and intelligible norms and freedom both as the basis of the moral world view and as the ultimate root of its problems. He suggests that although it appears that the Kantian moral world view has achieved autonomy, it in fact capitulates it.61 One general way to think about Hegels objections is this. Given the sharp Kantian gulf between the sensible spatio-temporal realm of nature and the intelligible realm of reason, freedom, and normative principles, it would take a God to bridge the gulf, but given how Kant sets up the details of the problems, not even God can do the trick. Although some of Hegels objections are tendentious, he makes several interesting ones. I will concentrate on five of his main objections to Kants practical metaphysics. First, Kants problem of coordinating happiness with virtue (as worthiness to be happy) is contrived. Second, Kants view of moral motivation is contrived. Third, Kants idea about perfecting our virtue in an infinite progress is incoherent. Fourth, and most important, Kants view of the autonomy of moral agency 5

is inconsistent with viewing the moral law as a divine command. Fifth, Kants moral principles cannot be put into practice in concrete circumstances. I will consider each of these objections in this order (which differs from Hegels order). In conclusion, I will summarize the deep difficulties Hegel raised against Kants practical metaphysics, and I will show that the problems Hegel raised against Kants account of autonomy and moral motivation are still current, since they have not been resolved, e.g., by Onora ONeills Constructions of Reason.62 IV. KANTS PROBLEM OF COORDINATING HAPPINESS WITH VIRTUE . The problem of coordinating happiness with virtue arises, on Kants view, because there is no analytic connection between these two quite heterogenous components of the highest good.63 Since there is a duty to achieve the highest good, and there is no analytic connection between virtue and happiness, there must be a synthetic connection between them. Acting virtuously is within our power, because we can decide to act out of respect for duty; but becoming happy is not, since this requires the cooperation of nature, which we did not create and over which we have at best contingent control. Nature itself is causally determined and amoral, and so will not coordinate virtue with happiness. Thus some power other than our own is required to proportion happiness to virtue. Consequently, both the possibility of the highest good, and the power who brings it about, namely God, must be postulated. Hegels first objection to this line of argument is that successful moral action itself produces happiness. Happiness generally consists in achieving ones ends, and successful moral action involves achieving the end required by ones duty. Thus the problem of coordinating happiness with virtue shouldnt be nearly so great as Kant describes, and it shouldnt require postulating either its merely metaphysical possibility or the supernatural condition (God) for its actualization.64 Though Hegels objection can be easily stated, its significance is not so obvious. Assessing its significance will require examining what sorts of happiness or pleasure Kant thinks are, can be, or are not involved in virtuous action. Following out these issues reveals some crucial features of Kants overall account of happiness and moral agency. I treat these issues in the next eight sub-sections. 1. It may seem that Kant either does or can admit that success in moral action is a source of happiness or pleasure. Kant at one point admits, for example, that one can take pleasure in the moral law itself, or that one can find pleasure in exercising ones rational ability to make moral judgments.65 More directly to the point, Kant asserts that there can be pleasure in the fulfillment of duty.66 This looks to be just the sort of pleasure Hegel claimed Kant denied. However, a closer look shows that it is not, for two reasons. First, Kant understands fulfillment of duty to consist, not in successful action (which is Hegels concern), but resolving to act on the basis of respect for duty.67 A close look at the passages bearing on this point consistently reveal that Kant considers only the feelings attendant on the resolution of the will in view of the moral law, and not any feelings resulting from successfully executing ones action. Moreover, Kant wavers considerably about whether the feeling that results from resolving to act on the basis of duty counts as a positive pleasure, or is instead something else, a satisfaction, contentment (which is a negative satisfaction), or self-approval.68 Several times he insists that the feeling resulting from virtuous resolution cannot be a pleasure at all, in part because it involves thwarting the inclinations, which causes pain, so that we cant like doing our duty or derive happiness from it at all.69 The source of Kants vacillation, and the ultimate reason why he cannot regard virtue itself as a source of pleasure or happiness, is not far to seek. It lies in his anti-naturalism. Pleasure, Kant claims, is the idea of the agreement of an object or an action with the subjective conditions of life.70 Respect for the moral law, however, involves

respect for something entirely different from life, in comparison and contrast to which life and its enjoyment have absolutely no worth. ... The majesty of duty has nothing to do with the enjoyment of life; it has its own law, even its own tribunal ... 71

The heterogeneity of happiness and virtue is thorough, and thus a good will or virtuous motives must be a source of a kind of satisfaction other than happiness or pleasure.72 Equally important for present purposes is the point that this satisfaction, contentment, or self-approval (be it what it may) is a feeling that results from the resolution or the self-determination of the will to act on the basis of duty. This is a quite distinct source of feeling from the one Hegel emphasizes in his objection, namely, happiness that results from accomplishing what one resolved to do. Thus it does not answer Hegels charge. 2. It might seem that there is another obvious reason why Kant cant allow that happiness results from successful moral action. Kant sharply distinguishes acting on the basis of duty and acting on the basis of inclination. Since Kant defines happiness in terms of satisfying inclinations, successful moral action cannot result in happiness, since inclinations are strictly to be ignored. However, this argument is mistaken. To act on the basis of duty is to act on a specific kind of motive, and to resolve to act independently of any consideration of ends or consequences of ones action. Precisely because moral motives are independent of ends, it may happen that acting on duty also fulfills the end of an inclination. If a morally motivated action also obtains the object of an inclination, then that action would in fact produce some happiness. Notice that this point is the obverse of the one Kant frequently makes that acting on inclination only contingently produces right acts. As he explains, if an inclination happens to be directed toward something that is also morally good, then the inclination can motivate a morally right action, though ex hypothesi it wont produce a morally worthy one.73 The flip side of this coin is that if a morally worthy action happens to be directed toward something that would satisfy one or more of the agents inclinations, then that action would in fact satisfy that (or those) inclination(s), and thus it would in fact result in some happiness or pleasure. Though this point is significant, it is important to note that this source of pleasure or happiness is once again quite distinct from the source Hegel stresses in his first objection. Hegels objection stresses the success in bringing about the very state of affairs required by ones duty, not the contingent collateral success in bringing about the object of an inclination. Kant never admits that success in bringing about the state of affairs required by ones duty is itself a source of happiness.74 3. Hegel highlights this point by contrasting the attitudes towards action held by a Kantian moral agent and a (by Kantian standards) amoral agent. Hegel states the contrast in the following way:
The non-moral consciousness ... finds, perhaps by chance, its actualization where the [Kantian] moral consciousness sees merely an occasion for acting, but does not see itself even in part obtaining through its action the happiness from performance and from the enjoyment of achievement. (PG p. 325.3134/M p. 366.1317)

Hegel himself believes that successful moral action can itself be a source of happiness, and he believes that this idea is not at all far-fetched, indeed, that it is common-sensical. It may seem that Hegel simply begs the question against Kants analysis, or that, at best, he insists that Kants analysis conform to common sense (if it is common sense that successfully executing a morally motivated act is a source of pleasure). However, Hegel makes a deeper point here. To appreciate this point requires understanding an important feature of the kind of internal criticism afforded by Hegels phenomenological method. The feature in question shows the kinship of Hegels phenomenological method to Aristotles aim of saving the phenomena. Theories, even philosophical theories, are not simply formal systems; they are devised in order 7

to account plausibly and as adequately as possible for an intended domain of phenomena. An important feature of Hegels phenomenological method for critically examining a philosophical view internally is to examine how well that view accounts for the phenomena within its intended domain. This should be borne in mind when interpreting Hegels point about the satisfaction found in moral action. (I cannot query here the extent to which it is an acknowledged phenomenon, or even a phenomenon at all, that successful morally motivated action results in pleasure or happiness.) While saving the phenomena is an important philosophical desideratum, neither Aristotle nor Hegel hold that the phenomena are so sacrosanct as to exclude antecedently any revisionist accounts of them. Since the phenomenon in question, happiness produced by successful moral action, is (at best) a common-sensical one, and since transcendental idealism is not at all a common sense doctrine, at least in its analysis of action, it is little surprise to find that it offers a revisionist account of the kinds of feelings that result from successful morally motivated action. It is worth tracing out further the reasons why Kants revisionist account of motivation cannot admit that successful morally motivated action is itself a source of happiness. The fact that Kant cannot admit that happiness can result from successful morally motivated action shows that there is an inevitable blind-spot in Kants moral world view. As Hegel shows, this Kantian revision of the phenomena is conjoined with several others and serves as a prop for Kants postulates. Clearing away this blindness reveals that there are some reasons to expect virtue and happiness to coincide in this world. 4. It is somewhat surprising that Kant does not admit that successful morally motivated action is itself a source of happiness, for as he says in the third Critique, quite generally, [t]he attainment of an aim [Absicht] is always connected with the feeling of pleasure ...75 Kant never applied this general point to successful execution of a virtuous act. Why not? Four reasons may be found for this. First, Kant most often defines happiness and pleasure specifically in terms of satisfying inclinations, not in achieving ends (in general).76 Hence achieving the end of a virtuous act doesnt and cant naturally enter his list of sources of pleasure or happiness. Second, Kant repeatedly defines the happiness that results from satisfying inclinations in terms of the total satisfaction of all inclinations throughout ones life.77 As Hegel points out, this wholesale definition of happiness occludes piecemeal sources or occurrences of pleasure or happiness.78 If happiness requires total satisfaction, it is little surprise that no single act of whatever sort can produce happiness! Third, according to Kant there is an extremely deep cleft between the requirements of duty and objects of inclination. Reason despises the burdensome, despotic, vice-breeding inclinations, and can only wish to be free of those agitating obstacles to virtue.79 Indeed, in a passage that must have impressed Schopenhauerand inspired Nietzsches response to Schopenhauers pessimismKant states:
If the value that life has for us is assessed merely in terms of what we enjoy (i.e., happiness, the natural purpose of the sum of all our inclinations), then the answer is easy: that value falls below zero. For who indeed would want to start life over under the same conditions, or even under a plan ... that aimed merely at enjoyment? (KdU p. 434 note)80

On Kants view it is extremely unlikely that a virtuous action would also happen to result in satisfying an inclination. The contingent collateral source of pleasure or happiness from virtuous action that Kant can admit (above, 2) is extremely unlikely to be much more than a logical possibility. Hegel indicates one more reason why Kant cant admit that successful moral action causes happiness or pleasure, namely, Kants intentionalism throws success to the wind.81 This point raises several important issues, and so deserves some consideration. 5. For several related reasons, Kant quite decidedly comes to value intention over the consequences of acts. He distinguishes two senses of act. One sense of act is the adoption of a maxim; the other is the execution of the action enjoined by the maxim.82 The fulfillment of duty discussed 8

above is an act of the first sort, specifically, the autonomous adoption of a maxim because of its conformity to duty. Adopting a maxim out of respect for law, is, famously on Kants view, the locus of moral worth.83 The moral worth of an action is an intrinsic value. Kant insists that this intrinsic value is independent of the behavior that results from virtuously adopting a maxim, since that behavior is only externally related to the act of adopting the maxim.84 These considerations lead Kant to hold that the fulfillment of duty consists in the form of the earnest will, not in the intermediate causes for success.85 Kant is quite serious about the moral irrelevance of the consequences of actions:
All men could have sufficient incentive if (as they should) they adhered solely to the dictation of pure reason in the law. What need have they to know the outcome of their moral actions and abstentions, an outcome which the worlds course will bring about? (R p. 7 note/G&H p. 6 note)

This statement from the Religion recalls the second proposition of morality formulated in the Groundwork:
A good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishesbecause of its fitness for attaining some proposed end: it is good through its willing alonethat is, good in itself. (Gr p. 394)

Kant immediately admits that there is something strange about this idea, but he claims that it accords with common sense. Hegel disagrees. Moral theory is supposed to be a theory of action, including quite definitely behavior. Kants intentionalism slights action and the moral responsibility incurred by, and the moral value involved in, behaving outwardly among other people.86 Hegel follows the Greeks in finding freedom of the will in actual conduct. Now this is only to state an issue, not to resolve it, but it is important to note how one revision of the phenomena involves another. The underlying issues, freedom of the will and performance of duties, come up again below (V, VIII). For now it is enough to see that Kants wholesale definition of happiness and his intentionalism support his contention that achieving the highest good requires God. If happiness is wholesale satisfaction of inclinations, and if the consequences of moral action are only externally and quite contingently related to the fulfillment of duty, then achieving happiness by coordinating nature with our inclinations is very far out of our hands. 6. There is yet another way in which God is necessary to achieve the highest good. This point turns on the causally determined nature of inclinations; it becomes apparent in a shift in Kants definition of the highest good. Kant initially defines the highest good in terms of proportioning happiness to virtue.87 In this vein, Kant remarks, one must be prepared to renounce ones happiness if one lacks virtue.88 The task simply of proportioning happiness to actual merit, in terms of virtue, is certainly herculean. However, Kant does not leave the matter there. Happiness, as he defined it, involves total satisfaction. As his discussion of the highest good unfolds, Kant makes plain that the highest good involves universal happiness, and that it involves complete (or at least enormously high) happiness for each person.89 Now this high degree of distributive happiness requires that individuals have morally acceptable inclinations. Otherwise, their happiness, at least in part, would be contrary to their worthiness to be happy, and thus would be morally prohibited. This is Hegels reason for stating what Kants discussion implies, namely, that Kant must postulate that the inclinations accord with virtue.90 This goal of utter happiness for each of us is even more herculean than merely proportioning happiness to moral merit. However, there is a more specific reason why, given Kants analysis, achieving the highest good requires God. Utter happiness morally requires totally permissible inclinations. Our inclinations are given us by nature. Kant consistently stresses the causal determinism of nature, and this includes the causally determined nature of our psychological states, 9

such as our inclinations.91 Since we do not create nature, we do not determine the nature of our inclinations. Thus its a matter of pure luck, sheer coincidence, that any of ones inclinations are morally permissible, and its utterly astounding to think that all or even most of ones inclinations would be morally permissible. Astounding, that is, unless there is a God who created nature in such a way that our inclinations are in accord with the requirements of morality. As Hegel notes, this is one of the reasons Kant must look to God to co-ordinate the supersensible realm of the substrate of nature and the supersensible realm of morality.92 7. Seeing that Kants doctrine of the highest good involves such extremes allows us to understand (if not to endorse) the sense of two corollaries Hegel draws concerning Kants view of happiness, first, that Kant is concerned with happiness regardless of merit, and second, that the development of Kants views is motivated by envy. I discuss these two points in turn. Hegel recalls Kants view that human frailty inevitably results in imperfect virtue, and that God grants us happiness, not as a matter of justice based on strict desert, but as a matter of grace, based on accepting our sincere but defective efforts to be virtuous in place of moral perfection. Since it is not based on merit, Gods decision to grant us grace can only be arbitrarynot a moral decision at all. Hegel then infers that to hope for happiness in this way, in view of our moral imperfection, that is, our lack of desert, shows that the Kantian agent is interested in happiness itself regardless of merit.93 This conclusion can be reinforced by recalling Hegels point that the Kantian moral agent cannot view occasions for acting as opportunities to fulfill or actualize itself. If the Kantian moral agent did find fulfillment in successful individual moral acts, then s/he wouldnt be looking for fulfillment in utter happiness in the afterlife. Hegels second charge, that Kants views are motivated by envy, is based on the first, that hes ultimately concerned with happiness regardless of merit. Hegel recalls Kants claim, allegedly based on ample experience, that virtuous people often fare badly, while immoral people prosper.94 Hegel contends that this idea cannot be justified by experience, precisely because Kant claims that everyones virtue is imperfect. Consequently, there can be no such simple division and comparison between distinct groups of morally virtuous and morally vicious people. Thus the judgment, that the immoral prosper, can only be an arbitrary opinion, an opinion that must result from envy of those who are happier.95 Hegels charge may seem harsh in the extreme, but it looks more plausible when viewed in the context of Kants blindness to the piecemeal happiness that can result from successful moral action, his vacillating opinion about whether happiness might result from virtuous decisions, his strong, deep, and constantly reiterated cleft between inclinations and duty, and his ultimate contention that God grants us happiness as a matter of grace (rather than desert). Taken together, these points give strong grounds to warrant Hegels suspicion that Kant is envious of those who are happy. Kant admits, after all, that his desire for happiness is boundless, and that foregoing happiness to be virtuous can make one morose and surly.96 From such feelings as these it is but a short step to envy those who enjoy themselves, even at the apparent expense of their moral obligations. 8. What is to be made of Hegels objections? Hegels ad hominem corollaries may show that Kant himself was skewed in his assessment of the inclinations and the extent to which they are burdensome and at odds with virtue. However, one can revise this part of Kants moral theory without altering either its principles or its theory of action. At best, Hegel has shown, perhaps, that moral theory ought to approach the doctrine of original sin cautiously, if at all.97 Hegels point that Kants theory systematically occludes, if not excludes, the happiness (or at least the pleasure) that might result from successful moral action carries more weight. If one took a broader view of happiness as the result of successfully attaining ones ends, whatever those ends may be, then successful moral action, too, would itself be a source of happiness. In this case, the problem of proportioning happiness to virtue would not take on such gargantuan proportions as it does in Kants theory. Lessening the 10

proportions of this task, of course, weakens Kants grounds for such strong postulates as those of immortality and God. In this regard, Hegel is right that Kants metaphysical dualism generates a genuine problem for his account of the rewards of moral agency. Hegel is also right to point out that on Kants account of moral action, acting virtuously cannot be a matter of actualizing ones nature. This is an important issue, but Hegel raises it without settling it here. V. KANTS VIEW OF MORAL MOTIVATION . Hegels first objection concerned coordinating moral motives with external nature so as to afford happiness. Hegels next two objections concern coordinating moral principles with internal nature, our inclinations, in order to allow for action and for virtue, respectively. Hegels second objection concerns Kants views on moral motivation. As Hegel notes, Kants official view is that we can resolve to act independently of any inclinations, and that respect for the moral law is sufficient, of itself, to motivate us to act.98 Hegel contends that the alleged independence from inclinations of moral decision and motivation is belied in action, because all action is motivated by sensuous impulses and inclinations; they are required for any self-conscious human agent to actualize itself when acting on principle.99 It may seem that Hegel simply begs the question against Kants view of motivation.100 If we take Hegels method into account it is not hard to see that there is a good deal more to be said on Hegels behalf. It is worthwhile to reconstruct this objection, for it is fundamental to Hegels charge that Kants categorical imperative is empty. I will proceed in three stages. First, Ill sketch how this objection pertains to Hegels charge that the categorical imperative is empty. Then Ill sketch some of the metaphysical disagreements between Kant and Hegel that underlie this issue. Finally, Ill develop Hegels line of objection in a manner more internal to Kants views by showing that Kant ultimately holds that mixed motives are inevitable. 1. Hegel believes that motives, as causes of action, and the ends of action cannot be sharply distinguished in the way Kants analysis requires. He contends that humans act on the basis of the ends they seek to achieve, and that there are various ends sought in any action. In addition to any specific ends, Hegel believes that there is always a quite general end to any human action, the end of enjoying ones competence. This is a matter of enjoying ones effectiveness as an agent and enjoying having brought about the state of affairs one intended.101 If Hegel is right about this, then Kants contention that we must abstract from all ends and determine our acts solely on the formal requirements of the conformity of a maxim to moral lawfulness, performing an action solely because it is a duty, is impossible.102 It is impossible because such an abstraction would leave us with no reason to act, because reasons for acting always concern ends. If we did nevertheless act, our action could not be specified on the basis of pure dutifulness. Since Kants requirement of doing ones duty solely because it is a duty abstracts from all ends, it cannot have any content at all, since (Hegel contends) actions are always conceived, intended, motivated, and performed in view of ends.103 2. To say this much is to explain what Hegel is driving at, but it is not to defend his objection. Has Hegel simply begged the question, by denying what Kant maintains, namely, that we can abstract from all ends when deciding what to do? What can be said to justify Hegels objection? One point is straightforward. Hegels claim that all motivation must involve our sensibility is a reminder that, antecedently, a uniform account of motivation is strongly to be preferred. Kant offers a systematically revisionist account of human motivation based on his transcendental idealism. One of Kants main reasons for defending transcendental idealism is to defend the possibility and the actuality of human freedom and responsibility in the face of the causal determinism of nature, including our psychology.104 Kants account of moral motivation is designed to fit the quite narrow requirements of his transcendental idealism. 11

Is transcendental idealism required to defend freedom and responsibility? Can it defend them? Hegels answers to these questions can only be suggested here. I treat them in turn. Transcendental idealism defends freedom by purporting to solve the antinomy between freedom and determinism. While Hegel thought that this antinomy concerns genuine issues, he also thought that those issues have to do with autonomy, in the sense of rationally giving ourselves our own ends.105 Hegel regarded the metaphysical conflict between freedom and determinism as basically a pseudo-problem generated by importing mechanical accounts of causality into the domain of action, where they are inappropriate. Understanding and explaining action requires teleological explanation, of both functional and purposive varieties.106 If Hegel is right about this, then transcendental idealism is not required to defend freedom, and Kants bifurcation between the sole rational motive of respect and all other motives collapses. Hegel further contends that transcendental idealism cant defend freedom because Kants arguments to defend transcendental idealism are inadequate.107 However, Hegels direct criticisms of Kants arguments for transcendental idealism are not made in the Phenomenology. Has Hegel anything to offer on this count in this book? Indeed he has. Part of Kants defense of transcendental idealism rests on his claim that only transcendental idealism can provide a deduction, that is, a justification, of the applicability of basic categorial concepts to the objects we experience.108 The entire Phenomenology of Spirit provides Hegels alternative deduction of basic categorial concepts to the objects we experience. In particular, in the first six chapters Hegel purports to prove that we can be self-conscious if and only if we are conscious of perceptible spatio-temporal causally interacting substances, where our being conscious of such objects requires that we identify and individuate them by applying concepts of identity, number, substance, and cause and effect to them.109 Most importantly for the present point, Hegel purports to justify these claims while dispensing with the claims, central to Kants transcendental idealist deduction, that space and time are merely forms of our sensible intuition. If Hegel has made his case in those earlier parts of the Phenomenology, then he has strong grounds at this point for objecting to Kants transcendental idealist account of moral motivation, and the quite severe revisions of the phenomena of motivation it involves. 3. To say all this is, however, only to sketch the context of Hegels disagreement with Kant, and not even to begin to settle those debates. Can anything be said here to justify Hegels objection against Kant? Indeed so. Kant himself doubts whether we can abstract from all ends and inclinations in the way required by his account of moral motivation. This has some serious implications for his own analysis. Kants official view about motivation is that the sole proper determining ground for morally worthy action is respect for the formal universality of the moral law. This formal universality requires that ends are not among the determining grounds of our virtuous resolutions to act.110 He repeatedly warns us about the impermissibility and the dangers of acting on mixed motives; mixed motives defile and impair the strength and superiority of reason and they can lead to hypocrisy.111 However, Kant also admits that happiness is not only the necessary end of finite rational beings, it is also an inevitable determining ground [unvermeidlicher Bestimmungsgrund] of their wills.112 Inevitable doesnt simply mean frequent or strong; it means present and effective in every resolution.113 A determining ground is not simply a motivating consideration that one might ignore. A determining ground is a motivating consideration that enters into ones resolution. Thus Kants admission that happiness is always a determining ground (though not the sole determining ground) of the human will is an admission that mixed motives are the best that can ever be expected of humans. This concedes, not merely that no one ever does act solely from the motive of duty, but that no one can. Consequently, Kant either must rescind his crucial principle that ought implies can (and conversely), which would completely undo his postulates, or else he must admit that we are not obligated to act exclusively on the motive (determining ground) of respect for law. Perhaps we might 12

be obligated to minimize considerations of self-love and to maximize considerations of duty in determining what to do, but we cannot be obligated utterly to eliminate considerations of selflove.114 Furthermore, Kant holds that legislative reason can check the influence of the inclinations only by another end, namely the highest good, which allegedly is an a priori end.115 Kant claims that this end is given independently of the inclinations.116 This cannot be right. The highest good may be given independently of any particular inclinations, but it is not and cannot be given independently of inclinations altogether, since it is formulated on the basis of recognizing that as finite biological creatures, we have and must have inclinations.117 However the relation between the highest good and our inclinations ultimately is reconstructed, Kants admission that only another end can check the influence of the inclinations on our decision is crucial because it indicates Kants own doubts about, indeed, inconsistency concerning, whether we can completely abstract from all ends when determining the will. Therefore, if an end is necessary for determining the will to act (as Kant states), then considerations of the formal universality of law do not suffice to determine the human will. This conclusion is underscored by Kants gloss on end in this same passage, namely, that ends are grounds that determine the will to act.118 This conclusion is not affected by the fact that Kant claims that the highest good is an obligatory end. If it is our duty to promote or achieve this end, the morally worthy motive to do so lies in the formal universality of its maxim, not in the material of this end. However, Kant admits that the subjective condition under which we can set ourselves this end is happiness.119 This means that without a genuine anticipation of the material end of becoming happy, we would not be able to resolve to pursue the morally obligatory end of the highest good. This admission underscores the insufficiency of formal considerations of duty for determining the human wills decision to act. These consequences of Kants view were to be expected in view of his claim that no mixed will is in fact capable of holiness, of nothing but morally worthy self-determinations.120 This same conclusion may be reached by another route. In connection with the general duty to develop ones sympathetic feelings Kant remarks that sympathy is one of the impulses which nature has implanted in us so that we may do what the thought of duty alone would not accomplish.121 Henry Allison contends that Kants remarks to this effect should be taken to mean that sympathetic feelings ought to be used to counterbalance our tendency to subordinate duty to self-love. In this way, such feelings are not themselves directly motivating. By counter-acting a countervailing motive, they make it possible for us to determine what to do on the basis of duty alone. Only in this sense do such feelings enable us to do what the thought of duty alone would not accomplish.122 Allisons interpretation is subtle, but inadequate. There are two distinct points at issue: Is the motive of duty the sole determining ground of the will? Is the motive of duty a sufficient determining ground of the will? Allisons interpretation makes it conceivable that in the circumstances in question, sympathy enables the motive of duty to be decisive for our action. However, his interpretation does not make it conceivable that in such cases duty is a sufficient motive. Determining ourselves to do something in these circumstances still requires the co-operation of an inclination, sympathy, in order that the balance of interest (not of weight) can be shifted by our allegedly pure interest in duty. Such an action may not strictly speaking be from inclination (given the technicalities of Kants analysis of decision), but such an action nevertheless is not performed without that inclination either. Duty alone is insufficient in such circumstances to determine the will.123 Kants admissions on these counts are tantamount to conceding Hegels point that Kants account of the virtuous a priori motive of respect for the formal universality of the moral law is deeply flawed since no human resolution to act occurs without at least the cooperation of sensuous inclinations. If this is true, then Kants analysis of autonomy is inapplicable to human beings. There is thus all the more reason to hope, as Kant ultimately has to postulate (though he denies it 13

empirically), that our inclinations are largely in accord with duty, whether by nature or by grace.124 VI. KANTS IDEAL OF THE INFINITE PERFECTIBILITY OF VIRTUE . Hegels third objection concerns a different problem of coordinating duty with our internal nature, our inclinations, in order to be virtuous. Hegel charges that Kants idea of perfecting our virtue ad infinitum is incoherent. Hegels objection charitably leaves immortality itself aside, and focuses on the premises that purportedly ground this postulate. These premises are that we are obligated to perfect our virtue, and that, due to our sensibility, we as mixed wills inevitably have only imperfect virtue. Consequently, Hegel argues, we could only perfect our virtue if sensibility dropped out of our nature. However, if sensibility dropped out of our nature, we would no longer be mixed wills and we would no longer have obligations.125 Virtue, however, is defined in terms of overcoming the obstacles of the inclinations, virtue is exhibited in overcoming those obstacles, and virtue is only made evident by overcoming those obstacles.126 Consequently, if sensibility were to drop out of our nature, we could not be virtuous (much less perfect our virtue), either. Hegel charges that Kant avoids this contradiction between the obligation to perfect our virtue and virtues essential relation toand its inevitable deficiency due tosensibility by projecting the perfection of virtue infinitely into the future, so that its no longer clear what happens.127 Does sensibility drop out of our nature, or does virtue remain inevitably imperfect?128 Hegel is right that postponing perfection indefinitely does not resolve this dilemma. However, this purported dilemma is really a trilemma, since it rests on the duty to perfect (not simply to improve) our virtue. If there is a contradiction, it is between the alleged duty to perfect our virtue and the alleged fact that no finite, sensuously affected will can perfect its virtue. Kants solution to this difficulty is to weaken our obligation, so that we are obligated indefinitely to improve, but not to perfect, our virtue.129 This is Kants reply to Hegels objection. Can Kants postulate be saved by this weakening of our obligation? The answer is negative. Hegel may have ignored this move because he realized that this weakening of our alleged duty directly undermines Kants grounds for the postulates. Lets see why. Consider first an alternative obligation simply to improve our virtue. We can fulfill this obligation during our worldly life. Such an obligation does not require immortality. Consider next the Kantian obligation to improve our virtue continually and indefinitely. This stronger obligation does require that we continue to exist indefinitely, and that we can be virtuous indefinitely. However, there are no particular grounds to assume that we are obligated to improve our virtue indefinitely, rather than that we are obligated to improve our virtue so long as we are alive. Kants strongest ground for supposing that we must improve our virtue indefinitely is that this would be the maximum any finite, sensuously affected will could do to achieve the supreme condition of the highest good, which is perfect virtue. However, once Kant admits that the ideal of perfect virtue cannot be fulfilled, so that we are not obligated to achieve it, then he can no longer plausibly maintain (what was implausible to begin with) that the duty to achieve the highest good is a strict duty and thus requires that we actually achieve it, instead of doing all we can to bring the highest good into existence (where we might fulfill this duty while falling far short of completely achieving the highest good). Admitting that the duty to improve our virtue is (in this regard) a broad duty deflates the mainstay of Kants purported obligation to achieve the highest good. Consequently, weakening the duty to improve our virtue destroys altogether Kants ground for the postulate of immortality. Furthermore, Kants views entail that after death we are altogether incapable of virtue, and so cannot either improve or degrade it. A future life is no help to those who aspire to perfect their virtue. The reasons why are straightforward. Kant himself indicates that immortality requires dualism 14

of mind (or soul) and body.130 Our sensibility and our animality are functions of our body, and our inclinations are a function of our sensibility or animality.131 Since virtue is defined, exhibited, and made evident only in overcoming inclinations, there can be no virtue, no exhibition of virtue, and no evidence of virtue after death. Kant, indeed, comes close to acknowledging this point when he admits that
respect for the law cannot be attributed to a ... being ... free from all sensibility, since to such a being there could be no obstacle to practical reason. (KdpV p. 76; cf. p. 84.)

Since virtue consists in always acting out of respect for the moral law, any being freed from sensibility by death cannot be virtuous. In the Religion, Kant develops the idea first stated in the second Critique, that God determines the nature of our moral disposition at an intuitive glance, and adds that we need to represent our prospect as consisting of a future life in which we improve our moral disposition, because we can only gather evidence of our moral disposition over time as we see how we react to moral challenges.132 This modification wont save Kants position. Kant states ... mans sensuous nature and the natural inclinations arising therefrom ... afford the occasion for what the moral disposition in its power can manifest, namely, virtue ...133 If this is so, then upon bodily death there would be no further occasions for virtue, and certainly no occasions on which we could collect evidence of our moral disposition. Therefore no post mortem existence can have any bearing on ones over-all virtue, or on our evidence for it. Its worth pointing out the corollary that there can be no happiness in a future life either. Kant defines happiness in terms of satisfying inclinations. If the inclinations die along with the body, then they cannot be satisfied after death. Kants philosophy cannot hold out the hope of happiness in the future life. Indeed, his philosophy cannot hold our the promise even of a future life, and so also not of an indefinite improvement in our virtue.134 At the very least, if we cannot conceive clearly of what our agency is like after death, then we do not have the definite grounds required by the Critical philosophy to suppose that we are agents after death, much less whether we can either improve our virtue or be happy after death. VII. AUTONOMY , THE MORAL LAW , AND DIVINE COMMAND .

Hegels fourth and main objection to Kants moral world view is that Kants analysis of moral autonomy is inconsistent with viewing the moral law as a divine command.135 This basic objection is expressed in the midst of another more specific one concerning Kants view of the relation of the supreme principle of practical reason and particular duties. After some remarks about this more specific objection, I will reconstruct Hegels basic objection. Hegel charges that Kant vacillates between two opposed views concerning the relation between the supreme practical principle and specific duties. (1) The moral agent is responsible for the sanctity of the sole moral law, while God is responsible for the sanctity of specific duties; (2) God is responsible for the sanctity of the supreme practical principle, while the moral agent is responsible for the sanctity of specific duties.136 There is some language in Kant on which to hang this objection.137 However, Kants remarks about this issue are not systematic, and certainly not systematic in the way Hegel alleges. Thus Hegels specific objection is tendentious, though perhaps it is understandable in view of the fact that Kant never, not even once, spells out in any detail the kind of over-all practical syllogism he must have in mind, or at least that he needs, to lead from the supreme principle of practical reason to specific duties in specific circumstances.138 We shall return to this problem of applying the categorical imperative in practice in connection with Hegels fifth objection (VIII). 15

Nevertheless Hegel has identified a serious problem. Kant frequently refers to God as a holy law-giver, to the moral law as a divine command, and to duties as divine commands. Despite Kants efforts to finesse the point, these claims are ultimately inconsistent with Kants own analysis of moral autonomy. Without using the term itself, Kant succinctly states the nature of moral autonomy at the beginning of the Preface to the first edition of the Religion:
So far as morality is based upon the conception of man as a free agent who, just because he is free, binds himself through his reason to unconditioned laws, it stands in need neither of the idea of another being over him, for him to apprehend his duty, nor of an incentive other than the law itself, for him to do his duty. (R p. 3/G&H p. 3)

Precisely because we are free, autonomous moral agents, we can determine by our own reasoning what duty requires, and on that basis we can resolve and motivate ourselves to act. We neither need nor can allow any other party or source to tell us what the moral law requires, or that performing our duties is obligatory, or to motivate our performance of duties. Yet Kant also holds that God is the holy law-giver of the moral law and that the moral law or duty may and should be viewed as a divine command. He expresses this view at least once in the first Critique, once in the Groundwork, five times in the second Critique, six times in the third, four times in the Tugendlehre, and 20 times in the Religion.139 What is Kant driving at? There are two principles of divine command Kant officially eschews. He rejects the idea of deriving the content of the moral law from ideas about the divine will, which would be an illicit transcendent enterprise.140 He also rejects the idea of deriving the binding force of moral obligations from divine threats and rewards. These motives are the antithesis of moral autonomy.141 Kants official view of divine legislation is designed to do three things. One is to allow for an expansive moral feeling, such as the sense of gratitude for our existence that might overtake us at a relaxed moment amidst the beauties of nature, or the sense of obedience when we put off pressing affairs in order to fulfill our obligations, or the sense of humility when we realize that we have violated our duty.142 Another is to provide support for our possibly wavering commitment to achieve the highest good.143 A third is to provide support for our possibly wavering sense of, and capacity to act from, respect for the moral law.144 Unfortunately for Kants moral world view, each of these is inconsistent with his analysis of autonomy, and none of Kants attempts to finesse the point are adequate. I treat these two points in turn. Autonomy involves regarding ones own reason as legislating the moral law, regarding both its content and its obligation. As he states in the Tugendlehre, the categorical imperative is to be conceived as the law of your own will and not of will in general, which could also be the will of another.145 Kant blatantly violates this crucial feature of moral autonomy several times, in both early and late Critical writings, by portraying God as wielding promises and threats in order to enjoin acting on the moral law.146 Dismissing these remarks as unCritical slips of the pen will not save Kants moral world view, for even his official critical doctrines violate his analysis of autonomy, though in a more subtle manner. Commands enjoin actions; they are commands to obey.147 To view the moral law as a divine command is to view obedience as commanded by God (even if God does not formulate the law). To view the moral law as commanded by anyone other than oneself, even if that other being is God, is inconsistent with autonomy. Kants attempt to wed his account of moral autonomy to an account of divine command makes his moral world view syncretic. To put this problem into the context of Kants postulates, as Hegel does, the syncretic contradiction is this: The moral law commands absolutely and sufficiently and we obey it autonomously. The moral law commands that we achieve the highest good. To achieve the highest good, we must (or, we can) postulate God as the sufficient additional condition to achieve the 16

highest good. We regard God as commanding the moral law (or, we regard the moral law as a divine command). This last step is the capitulation of autonomy that agitates Hegel. To be consistent with autonomy, God should be viewed at most as a co-worker for the highest good, not a commander of the moral law. Kant cannot be rescued from this contradiction by appealing to his distinction between the ratio cognoscendi and the ratio essendi of the moral law. Indeed, this distinction clarifies Hegels objection. The duty to achieve the highest good, together with our obvious insufficiency to achieve this lofty end, are the ratio cognoscendi of Gods existence, from a practical point of view, as Kant qualifies this knowledge. Of what, then, is God to be the ratio essendi? If Kant portrayed God simply as the remaining sufficient condition for achieving the highest good, there would be no inconsistency. There would also be no complete theology, rational or otherwise. Thus it is no surprise that Kant does not leave the matter there. He repeatedly portrays God as the commander or the legislator of the moral law. This step goes considerably beyond anything Kants argument justifies. At best, Kants moral argument shows that God is omnipotent, omnipresent, and omniscient. These qualities are allegedly necessary to know who deserves how much happiness, and to bring just that amount of happiness to them. None of this either requires or allows that God commands the moral law, in the sense of ordering obedience to it. To portray God as the ratio essendi of the obligation to obey the moral law (and this is what it must mean on Kants view to view the moral law as a divine command) is to capitulate moral autonomy, because it is inconsistent with the archimedean point of Kants moral argument, and, indeed, his whole moral theory: our alleged self-legislative moral autonomy. Hegel points out that it is equally misleading to say, as Kant occasionally does, that it is permissible to postulate the existence of God because it is not contradictory to do so.148 It would be consistent with Kants premises about pure reason and morality to postulate God as an omnicompetent judge, but not as a legislator or commander, for the reasons just rehearsed.149 It is not even consistent to postulate God as an omnicompetent executioner (following final judgment), for this would lead us to act, as Kant himself insists, from fear of divine punishment or hope of reward in the hereafter but not from respect for law. Though one of the merits of Kants moral argument is that it justifies ascribing moral perfections to God, Kant is overly optimistic when he claims that his argument can justify all the transcendental attributes of God.150 Kant either must give up his analysis of autonomy, or else admit that his arguments for God specifically exclude Gods alleged attributes of commander of the moral law and executor of divine judgment, with its rewards or punishments, or else violate the highest, if most demanding, obligation of the philosopher: consistency.151 This is Hegels point in claiming that Kantian moral consciousness cannot be serious about the holiness of the absolute being, because this would conflict with its own autonomy.152 Lets look more closely at this conflict. In the first Critique Kant states the following:
So far ... as practical reason has the right to serve as our guide, we shall not look upon actions as obligatory because they are commands of God, but shall regard them as divine commands because we have an inward obligation to them. (KdrV A819/B847; cf. R pp. 99, 122/G&H pp. 901, 112)

This is proper Critical doctrine, and it is syncretic. Kant proposes to avoid heteronomy by not deriving the bindingness of duties from divine command, and to preserve autonomy by regarding the inherently obligatory nature of duties as the basis for regarding them as if they were divine commands. This ploy is a failure. To regard moral laws as divine commands is to regard them as enjoined by God. To regard duties as enjoined by God is to regard their bindingness as deriving from God. This is inconsistent with autonomy, and the inconsistency is not alleviated if we reach this portrayal, in the way this passage suggests, by recognizing our inward obligation to the moral 17

law and consequently portraying duties as if they were divine commands.153 This makes plain how frequently Kant transcended his own Critical principles by portraying God as a moral law-giver, or portraying the moral law as a divine command, and how much difficulty he had recognizing his mistake. Finally, it will also not do, as Kant would have it, to claim that in postulating God we arent making any objective claim about what really exists, but are only basing an idea on subjective grounds, as an idea useful for upholding our moral resolve.154 So long as the idea of God includes the ideas of divine command, judgment, reward, or punishment, the idea of God is inconsistent with moral autonomy and so cannot be used to support our autonomy. Yet these are precisely the divine attributes that are most important to Kant.155 Indeed, if the idea of God does not include these attributes, its hard to regard this alleged being as God. In this connection it is worth noting that it is dishonest of Kant to introduce God as the remaining sufficient condition for achieving the highest good, that is, that God makes up for what we cannot accomplish in achieving the highest good,156 and then to say that the real point of postulating God is to support our frail ability to act from respect for duty and our wavering commitment and efforts to achieve what portion of the highest good we ourselves can bring about.157 The root of the problem very likely is this: Kant finds it very hard to conceive of respect independently of the concepts of God as a moral legislator and of the moral law as a divine command.158 This thought surely lies behind Kants repeated descriptions (starting at least in the Groundwork) of the moral law and of duty as holy.159 If it is not possible to conceive of respect independently of these concepts, then it is not merely Kants over-all moral world view that is incoherent, but his very concept of autonomy itself. Autonomy is the power of acting out of respect for the moral law. If respect for duty cannot be conceived apart from God, then the very concept of respect is incoherent, and if respect is incoherent, so is Kants analysis of autonomy. Hegel is right that Kant is mistaken that ethics leads to religion. Certainly the ethics of moral autonomy do not lead to Christian ethics in any traditional sense. VIII. CONCRETE CASES OF ACTION AND MULTIPLE OF GROUNDS OF OBLIGATION .

Hegels fifth objection is that Kants moral theory cannot come to terms with actual cases of action, because any actual case is complex in ways that cannot be handled by the categorical imperative. Hegel argues as follows. Any specific case of moral action occurs in specific, concrete circumstances. Because they are specific, actual circumstances of moral action as such involve a variety of morally relevant factors. This multitude of morally relevant factors engenders a manifold moral relationship on the part of the agent to those circumstances. This multitude of morally relevant factors and the morally complex relation of the agent to present circumstances engenders a variety of distinct duties which embarrass the Kantian moral agent in any specific circumstance of action.160 Is Kants moral theory embarrassed by concrete cases? Should it be? Why? Kant recognizes that cases of action may involve a variety of duties,161 and he expresses nothing but confidence about cases of conflicting duties, or, more carefully, about conflicting grounds of obligation. At one point Kant indicates, obviously enough, that absolute duties take precedence over conditional ones,162 just as strict duties take precedence over broad ones. Kants official view in the Tugendlehre is that there can be no conflicts of duties, only conflicts among opposed grounds of obligation. In such cases, the stronger ground of obligation takes precedence.163 Now Hegels argument can easily be restated in terms of conflicting grounds of obligation, and Kant doesnt explain how we are to determine the relative strength of grounds of obligation. However, that would seem to be merely an incompleteness of, and not an embarrassment for, his ethical theory. Has Hegels objection 18

misfired? No. It is a fine thing if the categorical imperative can determine that suicide or lying are wrong, but this information is of limited help if we arent also informed about how to distinguish between suicide and political martyrdom, or between morally reprehensible lying and permissible, innocent, socially expedient white lies that deceive no one. Kant raises these and similar kinds of casuistical questions in several sections of the Tugendlehre, without giving the slightest indication of how to proceed in answering them.164 Hegels objection poses the problem of relevant descriptions under which actions are performed. Even if Kants answer is that the relevant description is contained in the agents maxim, this does nothing to insure that the agent has taken all the relevant factors into account, nor does it instruct the agent about how to assess these different factors. What can Kant say about applying his principles to concrete cases? First, Kant is on solid ground in claiming that applying rules cannot be fully determined by rules, but requires exercising trained judgment.165 What role does the Critical Philosophy play in guiding judgment? Unlike general logic, transcendental logic must include rules of judgment, at least in the negative sense of rules for avoiding errors. This task is lightened by the fact that transcendental logic concerns a priori relations of cognitive judgments to objects.166 Similarly, the critique of teleological judgment needs to determine maxims for guiding judgments of objective purposiveness.167 Kant provides no critique of moral judgment; he simply reiterates that moral judgment requires practice, training, and maturity.168 The problem is this. Kant stresses repeatedly that moral laws are categorical and that acting on them is unconditionally necessary. However, it is very difficult to maintain that moral laws are categorical and that acting on them is unconditionally necessary if one cannot say precisely what one categorically and unconditionally ought to do.169 This is because, as Hegel stresses, any dutiful act is a specific act in quite specific circumstances, and the nature of those circumstances are essential to the moral character of the act. Now broad or meritorious duties allow considerable latitude in deciding just how much to do and when to do it. Actions that fulfill duties of virtue cannot be specified after the manner of narrow duty.170 How precisely can Kant specify narrow duties? Kant never explains. In his casuistical questions concerning two perfect duties to oneself, suicide and lying, Kant basically throws up his hands in the face of the very questions he poses. Even if he wasnt embarrassed by this, this is an embarrassment for his theory, for it shows that the specification of duties must be quite sensitive to circumstances; indeed, so sensitive that Kants claims about the categorical nature of duties and the unconditional necessity of acting on them could only be sustained by packing the antecedents of the statements formulating those duties with a enormous number of conditions. This threatens to reduce the categorical necessity of Kantian obligations to the following: Respect persons as beings with dignity, however that is best done in your circumstances. Kants treatment of casuistical questions lends support to Hegels charge, leveled in the Philosophy of Right, that Kants categorical imperative reduces to preaching duty for dutys sake.171 At the very least, Hegel is right to point out that Kant overestimates how much is accomplished in moral theory by working out only its pure a priori principles. Hegels criticism points out that the connection between moral principle, and even the virtuous resolution to act on moral principle, may be much more contingently related to right action than Kant ever realized. This point takes much of the force out of Kants claim that acting on inclination is only contingently related to right action, while acting from duty leaves no doubt about the rightness of the action.172 Kants response to this charge is that his project concerned the metaphysical foundations and principles of ethics, and not their application to specific circumstances.173 Hegels objection makes clear, however, that Kant must retract some of his optimistic claims in the Groundwork about how the Categorical Imperative can function as a compass to guide our action, even in ignorance of the ways of the world,174 and it makes clear that Kants claim about the categorical necessity of acting from duty is at best tenuous, in view of how conditional that necessity becomes when applied to 19

concrete circumstances. Hegels suspicion, in fact, is that once duties are specified concretely enough to act on them, it will be found that agents can only conceive performing their duty, and can only motivate themselves to perform their duty, in terms of the ends enjoined by their duty. If this is the case, then Kant is wrong to claim that we can act solely out of respect for the formal universality of a dutiful maxim, in utter abstraction from its end or material.175 If this is the case, then Kants analysis of morally worthy action, and indeed his analyses of freedom and moral responsibility, are seriously compromised. Even if Hegels suspicion on this count ultimately is not borne out, his criticisms make plain that the issue of how exactly to apply Kants principles to concrete cases of action is not ancillary to Kants project, because a rationalist solution to this issue is necessary to show that reason can, of itself, be practical, that is, can guide our moral decisions about what specifically to do. Kant has another response to Hegels charge that taking specific circumstances into account makes duties conditionally rather than categorically necessary: This conditionality is irrelevant to the main issue, because Kants contrast between hypothetical and categorical imperatives fundamentally concerns the issue of whether motives or reasons to obey the moral law are internal or intrinsic to the moral law, or are external to it.176 Kant rejects externalism by rejecting hypothetical imperatives as the basis of the moral law. Consequently, Kant develops his account of respect as a motive intrinsic to the moral law. He infers that there must be such a motive because all willing requires a motive and his analysis of the formal universality of the categorical imperative abstracts from all ends or material of the will.177 Hegel endorses motivational internalism. However, his stress on the circumstantial conditionality of duties shows that Kants dichotomy between categorical and hypothetical imperatives is probably not exhaustive. If this dichotomy is not exhaustive, then Kant cannot defend motivational internalism simply by rejecting consequentialism and its hypothetical imperatives. Kant must then find other grounds for defending motivational internalism. IX. CONCLUSIONS. Hegels critique of Kants moral world view takes up issues in the Critical Philosophys practical metaphysics along with issues much more specific to Kants moral theory. Though many of them need reconstruction, Hegels criticisms of Kants practical faith in the highest good, immortality, and God, are basically sound. This is a devastating blow to the Critical philosophy, which promised success in previously fraught metaphysical conundrums. Not only were Kants arguments unsuccessful, Hegel showed that they couldnt be, since a complete concept of God is inconsistent with moral autonomy. Kants moral world view is syncretic and therefore untenable. Hegel claims that the moral world view collapses internally and is rescinded even by its proponent form of consciousness.178 While this claim has a quite particular meaning within Hegels phenomenological method, it is worth noting that Kant himself admits that agnosticism [Zweifelglaube] serves as well as practical faith for supporting ones fundamental moral maxim.179 Hegels criticisms completely undo Kants answer to the third leading question of philosophy, What may I hope?180 There may well be a way to reformulate the Critical philosophy so as to avoid Hegels objections, but that will require distinguishing between the spirit and the letter of Kants philosophy, something to which we know Kant took offense.181 Hegels criticisms of Kants ethical theory considered here are less decisive. However, they set an agenda of problems that still need to be resolved by contemporary proponents of Kantian ethics. Hegels criticisms of Kants accounts of respect and the necessity and specificity of the Categorical Imperative challenge Kants cleft between reason and sensibility and the extent to which the grounds of obligation are purely a priori and context-independent. A brief look at Onora ONeills 20

Constructions of Reason will show that, despite her effort to reconstruct Kants views while avoiding his metaphysical extravagances,182 she either has ceded many of these points to Hegel, or else still remains subject to his criticisms. Professor ONeill probably has done more than any other recent commentator to rebut Mills charge that the test of Kants Categorical Imperative rests on consequentialist considerations. She rightly stresses that the universalizability test rests, not on what people desire or on what would be desirable for people in general, but instead on what it is possible for all to do.183 However, she shifts ground when considering the relevant universality. At one point she claims that the Categorical Imperative requires us to omit those principles that cannot be adopted by all potential agents, regardless of their variable characteristics. Occasionally she describes it as requiring that others be able to share ones maxim. Most specifically, she claims that it requires that others be able to adopt or to share in the very same maxim on which the agent acts. We must respect others possibility of collaborating or consenting.184 These are not equivalent formulations, and their differences must be resolved. The most serious shortcoming of her analysis to date is that she has yet to address two closely related issues that are fundamental to Kants analysis and to both his consequentialist and Hegelian critics: Why is acting on the test of the Categorical Imperative obligatory? Why is acting on the test of the Categorical Imperative motivating? On Kants view, avoiding heteronomy requires that we be motivated solely by the formal universalizability of our maxim. Though she is quite eloquent about what is involved in respecting human beings as ends in themselves, she has omitted consideration of these fundamental questions.185 Without a defence of these aspects of autonomy, either consequentialists or Hegelians can co-opt her reconstruction of the Categorical Imperative by contending that the fundamental obligation and the fundamental motivation to comply with the strictures of the Categorical Imperative is that one of our fundamental ends or desires is to be active agents, and so we desire to have our capacities for agency respected, and we recognize the prima facie importance of universalizability because there are no morally relevant differences among human agents that would justify partiality. Her analysis also raises a fundamental issue regarding the universality and specificity of moral imperatives specified by the Categorical Imperative. Though she recognizes that Kant thought the Categorical Imperative could guide action quite specifically,186 on her reconstruction Kants test focuses on the worth of underlying principles of action and provides no determinate standard of outward behavior.187 On her view, the Categorical Imperative is not a moral algorithm, but it does set constraints on permissible courses of action.188 Rules of whatever sort, including moral rules, require judgment to apply them to particular cases.189 She makes some interesting suggestions in this connection for applying Kants maxims for reflective judgment to cases of moral judgment.190 However, these maxims of judgment do not bridge the gap between universalizable maxims and the quite specific circumstances and manner in which any action must be performed. ONeill recognizes this insufficiency when she recognizes that particular courses of action and the maxims one might consider when deliberating about those courses of action inevitably rely on the agents institutional and social context. Consequently, a theory of right must be bound to particular social and cultural settings. In this regard, she admits that Kants view of right action is inadequate.191 She claims Kant contributed some fundamental guidelines and some suggestions about how to introduce these guidelines into our actual lives.192 If the Categorical Imperative is a test on the intelligibility of plans and is compatible with a variety of different customs and traditions that condition the specific way in which plans were conceived and conducted,193 then Kants claim that we are to act solely on the basis of respect for the lawfulness of our maxim, where the lawfulness in question is a universality that holds of all rational agents as such, is seriously undermined. Once ONeill admits that the Categorical Imperative 21

requires that acts achieve a certain sort of intelligibility, where intelligibility is dependent on ones social context and tradition, then Kants universality is given up.194 Giving up Kants unconditional universality undoes Kants link between universality and necessity. Such maxims become conditionally necessary, at best, where those conditions are only met by members of that social tradition, and hence those duties only hold of those members of that social tradition. This makes moral imperatives conditional, but not hypothetical (in Kants strict sense of holding only on condition of desiring a specific elective end).195 ONeills reconstruction opens a gap between what Kant regarded as the exclusive and exhaustive dichotomy between categorical and hypothetical imperatives. This disjunction is crucial to Kants analysis of duty in the Groundwork and the second Critique.196 Without this disjunction, Kant cannot argue that the categorically obligatory character of the moral law stems solely from its formal (and unconditioned) universality. Correlatively, ONeill must grant that ones grounds of obligation stem at least in part from ones tradition, along with the conditional universality of the duties that hold within it. This is a significant departure from Kants analysis, and a significant step in Hegels direction. ONeills departure from Kant raises the related issue of the nature and rationality of traditions. Social institutions develop out of needs, resources, abilities, and ingenuity. At least the first two of these concern what Kant called our sensibility, and they raise important questions about Kants sharp division between reason and sensibility, a division ONeill accepts and Hegel rejects when rejecting Kants analysis of moral motivation. Even on Kants view, our sensibility is essential to us as human beings. Our sensibility makes us finite rational agents, it distinguishes us from the theoretical fiction of the pure will, it leads us to generate various maxims that are tested by the categorical imperative, and it is part of what constrains our possible courses of action in ways probed by the test of the Categorical Imperative. ONeill follows Kant by insistently identifying what is essential to us with rationality, and finding autonomy solely in rationality defined as something noncontingent and non-variable.197 Given her concessions to social context, she cannot consistently hold that maxims of autonomous action must hold equally for all rational agents regardless of their particular contingent and variable characteristics, nor that the authority of morally required maxims stems only from reason so defined, nor that we are only obligated to act on those maxims that can be universalized regardless of our contingencies.198 Her concessions to social context indicate that moral reasoning must be much more specific and context-sensitive than the Categorical Imperative by itself. Furthermore, our sensibility, pragmatic rationality, and desires are so fundamental to the nature of social institutions and to the development of our individual personalities within them, that it is quite untenable to dismiss desires and sensibility in general as alien because (technically) they are contingent and variable. This goes against everything known about character development; these factors are not contingent to who each of us is as a person. In this regard, the following statement is insupportable:
One corollary of refusal to bow under an alien yoke is that what counts as the principle of reason cannot hinge on variable and contingent matters, all of which, however intimately human, are alien causes.199

Not only is this statement untenable, it rests on a category mistake. ONeill contends that reason is not an alien cause because it is inseparable from each of us as an agent. Desires, in contrast, are alien because they are contingent, transient, varied, and naturally caused.200 This is a category mistake. The opposite of reason would be desire (in the generic singular), and the opposite of desires would be reasons or reasoning. Even if all desires are contingent, that doesnt entail that desire itself is contingent; and even if reason itself isnt variable, this doesnt entail that reasoning or reasons arent as variable as desires. At best, reason in this abstract sense would amount to little more than formal 22

logicand logic has a variable history! Conversely, Hume makes a significant point when contrasting the remarkable stability of artistic canons with the incessant change of views within those paragons of rationality, science and philosophy.201 Ethical rationalists should not be so intemperate in their assessment of sensibility. Since Kant and ONeill equate reason and autonomy, this problem also affects their analyses of autonomy. Reason, when contradistinguished from sensibility, cannot be the sole basis of autonomy. As Hegel contends, human rationality, including especially practical rationality, must be a joint product of intellect, sensibility, need, desire, and ability. Where ONeill exhorts those who wish to understand autonomy properly to deal with the metaphysical background of Kants view of autonomy, Hegel dealt with that background deftly. He showed that Kants background was quite flawed metaphysically and ethically. Now ONeills reconstruction of Kant is, as her subtitle indicates, exploratory, so I would not say that Hegel has conclusively shown that ONeills analysis is similarly flawed. However, Hegel has shown that, as so far developed, ONeills analysis has not escaped the flaws Hegel highlighted in Kants views.202 In conclusion, one might wonder whether in attempting to reconstruct and defend Kant, ONeill has already given up too much of Kants views. Kant, of course, thought the Categorical Imperative did provide a definite guide for behavior; this is why he described the Categorical Imperative as a compass and claimed it could be used in utter innocence of the ways of the world.203 Additionally, ONeills reconstruction leads her to disown Kants Rechtslehre as fitting neither into a critique of practical reason nor into a metaphysics of morals, precisely because determining the outward behavior required by morally worthy action is dependent on social context.204 Finally, her concluding discussion of charity, a duty to minister to agency-threatening needs, comes very close to recognizing a right of necessity. A right of necessity is a right to use someone elses property when necessary to save ones own life. The duty of charity, once set into a social context that includes property, would require such a right. ONeill appears to endorse it.205 Kant rejected it as an absurd contradiction.206 Significantly, Hegel endorsed the right of necessity. Indeed, he regarded it as the telling case in point to show that principles of right and principles of welfare mutually condition one another. He took this to show that neither kind of principle is adequate by itself, and he used this case to argue that one had to reject the alleged self-sufficiency of both Kants moral theory and utilitarian principles and take up a critical analysis of Sittlichkeit.207 These remarks should suffice to show that Hegels criticisms of the ethical aspects of Kants moral world view are still very much on the agenda for contemporary reconstructions of Kantian ethics.208 NOTES
1. For an insightful discussion of the third sub-section on conscience, see Moltke Gram, Moral and Literary Ideals in Hegels Critique of the Moral World-View (Clio 7 No. 3 [1978], pp. 375402). The epigrams come from the first Critique (A839/B868) and from Jenseits von Gut und Bse (Beyond Good and Evil) 8. Citations of Hegel refer to the following texts: Phnomenologie des Geistes (Bamberg and W rzburg, 1807; W. Bonsiepen and R. Heede, eds. Gesammelte Werke [Rheinisch-Westflischen Akadamie der Wissenschaften in association with the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. H. Buchner and O. Pggeler, eds. Hamburg: Meiner, 1968 f.], Vol. 9), pp. 323340, abbreviated PG. A. V. Miller, tr., Hegels Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1977), pp. 364383, abbreviated M. All translations from Hegel are my own. When quite specific references are needed, I have cited the line numbers in the Gesammelte Werke, and I have cited line numbers in Millers translation. Both are given as decimals following the page number. References to the German precede references to the translation, which follow a /. Counting lines of text is a tedious process. I have therefore devised a simpler method for referring to line numbers in Millers translation. I have used a ruler, marked off in line numbers from 1 to 40, which can be laid down a page of text in order to determine line numbers. Such a ruler may be made by laying a strip of paper or card stock down a full page of text in Millers translation, numbering each line of text along the edge of the strip. In using this gauge I have allowed simplicity to override accuracy in two regards. First, if a heading appears at the top of a page, I have set the gauge at the first line of text, and not at the heading. Second, where a heading interrupts the body of the text, I have

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ignored the gaps this produces and measured from the top line of text on the page. Since the point of adopting line numbers is to facilitate referring readers to Hegels text, ease of use is paramount. 2. Of all the tenets Hegel ascribes to the moral world view, I failed to find only two of them in Kant. They are the idea that a successful individual moral act achieves the complete or absolute purpose (PG p. 334.911/M p. 376.89) and the idea that because duty itself is holy, specific duties are not holy (PG p. 337.2935/M p. 380.1220). A third attribution is questionable, but there is text on which to hang it. (See below, VII.) Although no Kantian starting with Kant has accepted Fichte as a bona fide spokesman for the Critical philosophy, Hegel typically regarded both Kant and Fichte as its expositors, and they were often the common target of Hegels so-called Sollenkritik (cf. Enzyklopdie [Werke 8] 42, 94z; Vorlesungen ber die Geschichte der Philosophie III [Werke 20], pp. 369, 386 [Lectures on the History of Philosophy {Haldane & Simson, trs. New York: Humanities, 1955} III, pp. 461, 478]; Friedrich Heinrich Jacobis Werke: Dritter Band [Werke 4, p. 445]). (References to Hegels Werke are to Michel & Moldenauer, eds., Werke in Zwanzig Bnden [Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1968].) The difficulty of interpreting Hegels chapter on the Moral World View has generally led people to suspect that there must be a strong admixture of Fichte in it. If there were, there would be little surprise that Hegel would find contradictions in the moral world view, since it would be a composite of incompatible philosophies. My success, on the contrary, at finding in Kant the tenets Hegel ascribes to the moral world view suggests that the first two sections of his chapter ought to be treated as dealing with Kant himself, regardless of the extent to which the views Hegel considers were also held by Fichte. I do not discuss Fichtes philosophy here. 3. Citations of Kant refer to the following works: Ak. KdrV Gr KdpV T&P KdU RL TL R An Gesammelte Schriften. Kniglich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, ed. Berlin, Leipzig: de Greuter, 1922. Critique of Pure Reason. N. K. Smith, tr. New York: St. Martins, 1929. (1 st ed. [A], Ak. IV; 2 nd ed. [B], Ak. III.) Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. H. J. Paton, tr. New York: Harper and Row, 1964. (Ak. IV) Critique of Practical Reason. L. W. Beck, tr. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956. (Ak. V) On the Proverb: That May be True in Theory, But is of No Practical Use. In: Perpetual Peace and Other Essays. T. Humphrey, tr. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983. (Ak. VIII) Critique of Judgment. W. S. Pluhar, tr. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987. (Ak. V) The Metaphysical Elements of Justice: Part I of the Metaphysics of Morals. J. Ladd, tr. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965. (Ak. VI) The Doctrine of V irtue: Part II of the Metaphysics of Morals. M. J. Gregor, tr. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1964. (Ak. VI) Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone. T. M. Greene & H. H. Hudson, trs. New York: Harper, 1960. (Ak. VI) Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. M. J. Gregor, tr. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1974. (Ak. VII)

I have referred to the Akademie pagination, which has been carried over into all recent translations of Kant. Gregors Akademie pagination in TL is off by one page. Add 1 to the numbers given in her translation. (This is not so difficult. Read those Akademie page numbers as if they marked the end of the indicated page.) The Akademie pagination is not indicated in Greene & Hudsons translation of the Religion. I abbreviate their translation as G&H and give its pagination after the Akademie, following a /. 4. Obviously, Hegels own presentation must include many of the elements mentioned below. I cite his mention of them in the notes. 5. Kant identifies these three as the objects of metaphysics in KdrV B395 note, A798/B826, cf. A849/B877. 6. Kant remarks on the good fortune of the antinomies in KdrV A464/B492 and KdpV p. 107. 7. Kant frequently insists on strict causal determinism in the phenomenal realm, including human behavior. Cf. KdrV A798/B826 and KdpV pp. 9495. 8. KdU pp. 1667; cf. PG p. 325.624/M pp. 365.22366.4. At the end of this passage Hegel identifies Kants dualism as the ultimate source of most of the problems he urges against Kant. 9. KdU p. 176. 10. Gr pp. 4323, 444, 448; KdpV p. 31; R p. 3/G&H p. 3.

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11. Gr pp. 401 note, 4312, 434, 446; KdpV pp. 32, 73, 74, 75, 76, 79, 80, 85, 117, 118, 124; TL pp. 390, 464, 4678; PG p. 335.1618/M p. 337.2325. 12. Independence from inclinations: Gr pp. 400, 420 note, 426, 4312, 439; KdpV pp. 72, 74, 912, 93, 118; independence from ends (objects): KdU p. 471 note 1; R pp. 3, 4, 7 note/G&H pp. 3, 4, 6 note; independence from consequences: KdpV p. 45. 13. KdrV A591/B637. 14. KdpV p. 147, KdU pp. 481482. 15. KdpV pp. 1445, RL p. 354. 16. Logical consistency is sine qua non but insufficient: KdrV A673/B701, TL p. 382; unclear or uncertain concepts have no objects: KdrV A4812/B50910, cf. TL p. 461; definite grounds required for supposition: KdrV A76970/B7978, A822/B850; cf. KdpV pp. 34, 5. 17. KdrV A67071/B6989, A678/B706, A818/B846; KdpV p. 57; KdU pp. 456, 457, 465: TL pp. 443, 487; R pp. 1689, 168 note 2/G&H pp. 1567, 157 note; cf. Gr p. 4089; KdpV pp. 44, 118; KdU p. 481; cf. PG 332.2124/M p. 374.1620. While Kant approves of such construction and postulation, Hegel and later Feuerbach do not. As will become somewhat more evident below, by upholding an account of autonomy derived from Kant while dispensing with Kants postulates, Hegel already began what m ade Feuerbach famous, namely, treating all religious deifications as transcendent reifications of human characteristics. On Hegels adoption of such an analysis, see my book, Hegels Epistemological Realism (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989), pp. 1846. 18. On the primacy of practical reason, see KdrV A840/B868, A8001/B8289; Gr p. 456, KdpV pp. 5, 6, 106, 121, 132, 139, 140. 19. Cf. KdrV A798/B826. 20. Gr p. 450; KdpV pp. 2930, 9394. 21. KdpV pp. 31, 32, 47; cf. PG pp. 325.25, 333.810/M pp. 366.56, 374.39375.21. 22. KdrV A807/B835, KdpV pp. 122, 125; TL p. 380, R pp. 47, 50, 62/G&H pp. 43, 46, 55. 23. KdrV B431; KdpV pp. 34, 6, 2930, 47, 121. 24. TL pp. 405; R p. 160/G&H p. 148; cf. KdpV pp. 3233, 8384. 25. KdpV pp. 122; TL pp. 3867, 446; R pp. 478, 6061, 62, 95/G&H pp. 43, 54, 55, 86. 26. KdpV p. 122. 27. KdpV pp. 3233, 77, 812, 83, 122; TL pp. 433 note, 446; cf. R pp. 67 note/G&H p. 61 note; cf. PG p. 331.2930/M p. 373.16. 28. KdpV pp. 32, 83, 122, 123, 123 note, 1234; TL pp. 409, 433 note, 446; R pp. 48, 51, 67, 68/G&H pp. 43, 46, 6061, 62; cf. PG p. 327.3335/M p. 368.2628. 29. KdpV pp. 123, 123 note; R pp. 70, 70 note, 98 note, 131 note; PG pp. 330.515, 330.2326, 332.611/M pp. 371.1932, 372.26, 373.36374.3. 30. KdrV A814/B842, A815/B843; KdpV pp. 125, 131, 13940; KdU p. 444; R p. 139/G&H pp. 13031. 31. KdpV pp. 11213. 32. KdrV A800/B828, A806/B834; Gr pp. 399, 405; KdpV pp. 22, 73, 124; KdU pp. 431; TL p. 480. 33. Gr pp. 415, 430; KdpV pp. 25, 61; KdU p. 451; R pp. 67 note/G&H67 note; cf. PG p. 326.1/M p. 366.22. 34. Gr p. 393, 396; KdpV p. 110, cf. p. 122; cf. R p. 5/G&H p. 4. 35. KdpV pp. 11011, cf. p. 130; KdU p. 453, cf. p. 451; cf. R p. 5/G&H p.4. 36. KdpV pp. 11314, 115, 1212, 124, 125, 143 note, cf. pp. 4, 108; KdU pp. 450, 451; R p. 7 note/G&H p. 6 note; cf. PG p. 326.13/M p. 366.2224. 37. KdpV pp. 144, 145; cf. KdU p. 469. 38. KdrV A810/B838, 814/B842; Gr pp. 438, cf. p. 442; KdpV pp. 113, 11415, 1245, 128; KdU pp. 450, 471 note 1; R p. 7 note/G&H pp. 6 note; cf. PG 333.1115/M p. 375.37. 39. KdrV A8234/B8512; Gr p. 417. 40. R p. 192/G&H p. 180. 41. See his searing condemnation of means of grace (R pp. 194200/G&H pp. 1828). 42. Even though we are obligated to know our own moral perfection (TL p. 441), and we need to know the moral worth of others acts if we are to act to bring about the highest good, Kant repeatedly insists that we cannot know our moral perfection at all, largely because there is no experiential evidence for a spontaneous rational act of adopting a maxim. This is itself a serious problem in maintaining that we are obligated to achieve the highest good, and so is a serious

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problem with Kants postulates of immortality and God. On the unknowability of moral worth, see KdrV A551/B579 note; Gr pp. 407f., 419; TL pp. 3923, 441, 4467, cf. p. 474; R pp. 51, 63, cf. p. 95/G&H pp. 46, 567, cf. p. 87. At one point in the Religion he claims that we can know our own character to some extent (R p. 767/G&H p. 71). 43. KdrV A81011/B8389, A8156/B8434; KdpV pp. 125, 129; KdU pp. 444, 450; R pp. 5, 8 note, 99, 182, 183/G&H pp. 45, 7 note, 9091, 170, 171; PG p. 329.2224/M p. 370.3133. 44. KdrV 811/B839, A814/B842; KdpV p. 125; KdU pp. 469, 470. 45. KdpV pp. 144, 1456; KdU p. 469 note. 46. KdpV pp. 1423, 1456; cf. R p. 154 note/G&H p. 142 note. 47. KdrV A805/B833; KdpV pp. 1289, 130. 48. KdrV A80810/B8368, A8156/B8434. 49. KdrV A80910/B8378, cf. A81112/B83940; cf. KdpV pp. 43, 44. 50. KdpV pp. 13031. 51. For a concise discussion of some central points of Hegels method, see my article, Hegels Solution to the Dilemma of the Criterion (The History of Philosophy Quarterly 5 No. 2 [1988], pp. 173188). For extended discussion see Hegels Epistemological Realism (op. cit.). 52. For a critical review of these issues, see Manfred Kuehn, Kants Transcendental Deductions of Gods Existence as a Postulate of Pure Practical Reason (Kant-Studien 76 No. 2 [1985], pp. 152169). 53. God: PG pp. 329.4, 330.1112/M pp. 370.9, 371.2628; the highest good: PG pp. 326.1934, 328.1617, 333.1011/M pp. 367.421, 369.1516, 375.23; and the conformity of inclinations to duty: PG pp. 327.2528, 328.1718/M pp. 368.1618, 369.1618. 54. Supreme practical principle: KdU p. 470; highest good: KdpV p. 125, 126, cf. KdU p. 469; freedom: KdpV pp. 94, 132; God: KdrV A814/B842; KdpV pp. 125, 132; KdU p. 470; immortality: KdpV pp. 122, 132; KdU p. 470; cf. TL p. 490 note. 55. KdpV p. 122; cf. p. 132. The postulates of practical reason are quite distinct in kind from the postulates of empirical thought analyzed in the first Critique (KdrV A218235, B265294). 56. For a taste of Nietzsches assessment, see Der Antichrist 10 and Gtzen-Dmmerung (Twilight of the Idols) Bk. IV, How the True World Finally Became a Fable. 57. KdrV A609/B637, cf. A606/B634; PG p. 332.2728/M p. 374.2325. 58. Charges of dissemblance: PG pp. 332.28333.7, 335.11, 337.36/M pp. 374.2538, 377.15, 380.20; hypocrisy: PG p. 340.910/M p. 383.56; lack of earnestness: PG pp. 333.56, 333.2829, 333.3637, 334.25, 335.1, 335.6, 335.23, 335.32, 336.1415, 338.3, 338.6, 340.4/M pp. 374.37, 375.2425, 375.3435, 376.25, 377.56, 377.10, 377.33, 378.4, 378.29, 380.26, 380.29, 382.36; envy: PG p. 337.18/M379.40; syncretism: PG p. 339.28/M p. 382.20. 59. Kant makes charges of hypocrisy: KdpV pp. 72, 86; TL pp. 430, 4356; R pp. 42 note, 153 note, 185 note, 198/G&H pp. 37 note, 142 note, 172 note, 186; dissemblance: KdpV pp. 98, cf. p. 106; syncretism: KdpV pp. 24, 98; R p. 22/ G&H p. 18; and he honors earnestness: KdpV p. 85, KdU p. 451, R p. 154 note/ G&H p. 142 note. 60. PG pp. 323.31324.4, 324.1532/M pp. 364.819, 364.34365.14. 61. PG pp. 324.30325.24/M pp. 365.11366.4. 62. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. 63. KdpV pp. 11212. 64. PG p. 333.830/M pp. 374.39375.27. 65. KdpV pp. 25, 160, respectively. 66. Gr p. 460. 67. Kant is explicit about the contrast between successful action and virtuous resolution to act (KdU p. 451). 68. Virtuous motives are a source of pleasure: KdpV p. 116; KdU p. 1789; TL pp. 378, 391, cf. p. 485; performing duty is a source of pleasure: R p. 24 note 1/G&H p. 19 note; the legality of ones action is a source of pleasure: KdpV p. 38, TL p. 399; liking to do duty is a sign of a m orally good disposition: KdpV p. 83; fulfillment of duty is a source of satisfaction: Gr p. 460; action resulting from virtuous motives is a source of satisfaction: KdpV p. 116; virtuous motives are a source of self-approbation: KdpV pp. 8081; virtuous motives are a source of contentment, as a negative satisfaction: KdpV pp. 117, 118; a good will is a source of contentment: Gr pp. 396; KdpV pp. 11718. 69. Virtuous motives are not a source of pleasure: KdpV p. 117, cf. pp. 912; respect is not a pleasure: KdpV p. 77; pain from thwarting inclinations: KdpV pp. 7273; cf. Gr pp. 396; cannot like doing ones duty: KdpV p. 83; doing ones duty not a source of happiness: KdpV p. 88. 70. KdpV p. 9 note.

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71. KdpV p. 88. 72. For discussion of the complexities of the feeling of respect for duty, see Henry Allison, Kants Theory of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 123f.. (Unless otherwise noted, all references to Allisons work are to this book.) 73. Gr p. 390; R pp. 3031, 36, cf. p. 42/G&H pp. 26, 32, cf. p. 37. 74. Christine Korsgaard has argued that Kant can allow that successful moral action results in happiness. Her case turns on claiming that Kants analysis does not exclude the common sense idea that successfully pursuing purposes will generate happiness, because all Kant requires is that the motive for pursuing a morally obligatory purpose (and every duty does have a purpose) be its dutifulness, and not the purposes or consequences (Kants Analysis of Obligation: The Argument of Foundations I [The Monist 72 No. 3 {1989}, pp. 311340], pp. 3256). This am ounts to the contingent collateral source of happiness I have discussed in this subsection. She does not take into account the complexities of Kants philosophical psychology discussed here that prohibit such an attribution to Kant, and she does not notice that this happiness cannot result from successful execution of ones duty qua duty. Hegels objection may seem unfair to Kant in view of his doctrine in the first Critique that all human behavior is open both to a com plete causal explanation (A550/B578) and to an intentional account in terms of free decisions (A5534/B5812). Kants key to rejecting the exclusive disjunction between natural causal determinism and free rational action (A536/B564) is to maintain that the impact of rational self-determination on the natural course of phenomenal events is not to rupture the sequence of causes and effects, but to alter the intelligible ground of causal relations, so that exactly what kind of effect a cause (specifically an agent) has is affected by what a free rational will decides to do (cf. A539/B567, A549/B577, A5512/B57980, A556/B584). Unfortunately, not even transcendental idealism can let Kant have it both ways. If freedom is to be effective, it must be able to make a difference in the causal course of nature, and if it can make a difference, then exact predictability based on natural causal laws must be given up, and vice versa. Henry Allison has shown that even Kants account of practical freedom (as distinguished from transcendental freedom) involves the Incorporation Thesis, and as such involves a certain amount of indeterminism (cf. A534/B562). Consequently, Kants doctrine of strict determinism of human behavior at the psychological level must be given up (op. cit., Part I). Even if this doctrine were retained, it would not afford the happiness at issue in Hegels objection, namely, happiness resulting from succeeding at a moral act qua moral act. 75. KdU p. 187. 76. I say most often in view of Kants recognition, in the third Critique, that judging the aesthetic purposiveness of an object produces a specifically aesthetic pleasure in the judging of the object (KdU pp. 190). He also recognizes that the purposiveness of an object can be represented on the objective basis of (roughly) recognizing that the form of the object harmonizes with the purpose that produced that object. A judgment of objective purposiveness is also a source of pleasure. While a judgment of objective purposiveness would seem to be the kind of judgment relevant to enjoying ones success in accomplishing a virtuous act, Kant quite specifically indicates that this pleasure is not a pleasure in the thing judged, but is instead a pleasure in our own understanding as we judge the object (KdU p. 192). Thus a judgment of the objective purposiveness of a successful virtuous act, even if it is ones own, would not give a pleasure in the success itself, but only in ones ability to judge that success. Thus even if Kant could be brought to apply his doctrine of the pleasure in judging objective purposiveness to successful virtuous actions, that pleasure is once again quite distinct from the pleasure Hegel emphasizes in his first objection. 77. See the references given in note 32 above. 78. PG p. 334.17/M p. 375.37376.4. 79. Gr pp. 411, 428, 454; KdpV pp. 118, 160; KdU pp. 432, 4334; TL pp. 376, 405. Kant repeatedly describes the inclinations as obstacles [Hindernisse] to virtue that must be subdued and overcome: KdrV A809/B837; Gr pp. 397, cf. p. 405; cf. KdpV p. 37; cf. KdU pp. 173, 403, 433; TL pp. 380, 394, 397, 484, cf. pp. 379, 383, 485; R pp. 478, 58 note, 61, 183/G&H pp. 434, 51 note, 55, 171. While Allison is quite correct that Kants language of psychic force and obstacle is misleading, since no inclination becomes an end unless it is incorporated into a maxim, where the adoption of any maxim is a free and spontaneous act of will (Willkr) (op. cit., pp. 115, 1267), Kants language underscores his conviction about how strongly tempting it is to adopt maxims that aim to achieve inclinations, and how much at variance with performing ones duty this is, both in terms of motive and rightness of action. Kant pours all this scorn on the inclinations despite the fact that the inclinations themselves are morally innocent; only our choices about them lead to evil (R p. 58/G&H p. 51). 80. In 341 of The Gay Science Nietzsche proposes the idea of the eternal recurrence of ones life, exact in every detail, as a way of distinguishing those who would be utterly crushed at the mere thought of such recurrence from those who are exuberant enough to affirm this prospect joyously. For discussion see Maudemarie Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), ch. 8. 81. Cf. PG pp. 325.58, 334.17/M pp. 365.1924, 375.37376.4. At one point, Kant says that a will cannot achieve satisfaction (sich selbst nicht Genge thun kann) unless it has a definite goal for any act it contemplates performing (R p. 4/G&H p. 4). Unfortunately, Kant does not follow up on this remark, and this remark leaves unspecified just what kind

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of satisfaction this is and whether it is found in presenting oneself an end or in achieving the end. This remark is therefore unhelpful in the present context. 82. This is most clearly stated in the Religion (R p. 31/G&H p. 26). 83. Gr p. 390; KdpV p. 71; TL pp. 391, 446, cf. p. 387. 84. Gr p. 439; KdU p. 471 note 1. 85. KdU p. 451; emphasis added. 86. Allison downplays Kants intentionalism significantly, which (over-) simplifies his task of responding to those who charge that there is something m orally amiss in responding to others in need out of duty rather than out of direct concern (op. cit., pp. 1934, 1978). 87. KdrV A809/B837; KdpV pp. 11011, 130; KdU pp. 451, 471 note 1; R p. 5/G&H p. 4. 88. R pp. 56/G&H p. 5. 89. KdrV A851/B879, KdpV pp. 128, (the greatest happiness) 129; (the greatest possible welfare) KdU p. 453. As Beck and Allison note, Kant offers no support for this stronger definition. (Beck, A Commentary on Kants Critique of Practical Reason [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960], p. 268; Allison [op. cit.], p. 172.) 90. PG p. 335.1516/M p. 377.2123. Now to deserve so much happiness also requires that people are very virtuous. Kant indeed states this as well (KdpV pp. 122, 124; KdU p. 453; R p. 60/G&H p. 54). This combination of perfect (or at least extraordinary) virtue and utter (or at least enormous) happiness, which constitutes the highest good, is what leads Kant to speak of the highest good as the final end of creation and as the kingdom of God (KdpV pp. 13031). 91. Regarding strict determinism in phenomenal realm, see KdrV A798/B826; KdpV pp. 945. I fully agree with Allisons contention that Kants account of agency, especially his account of choice, even at the psychological level, involves a certain sort of indeterminism, due to what Allison calls the Incorporation Thesis, the thesis, namely, that an inclination does not become ones end unless one elects to adopt a maxim that enjoins satisfying that inclination. My present points rests on the causally determined nature of those inclinations themselves, not our choices about them. 92. KdrV A8156/B8434; KdpV pp. 1245, 128; KdU pp. 444, 4534, cf. pp. 1956; cf. R p. 86/G&H p. 81; PG p. 329.2224/M370.3133. 93. PG pp. 336.33337.2/M p. 379.919. 94. Cf. Gr. p. 442, and the experienced disjunction between happiness and virtue indicated in the passages cited in note 38 above. 95. PG pp. 337.921/M p. 379.2840. In the Tugendlehre Kant states that our judgment of the vicious is not competent (TL p. 474). If this is so, then Hegel is right that we cannot have reliable evidence about who is vicious, and so cannot have reliable evidence for whether the vicious prosper. 96. KdpV pp. 12930; TL p. 484; respectively. Kants words are finster und mrrisch. Hegels charge that Kants views are motivated by envy is especially striking in view of Nietzsches contention that envy of the happy noble is a primary motive of the slave revolt in morality (cf. Zarathustra II 7, On the Tarantulas). 97. Henry Allison is right that Kants analysis of duty doesnt need to be altered in order to assuage concerns raised by Schiller that Kantian duty is burdensome or by recent commentators that acting from duty is repugnant (op. cit., pp. 1834, 197, respectively). However, he completely understates the extent to which reason, on Kants view, despises the inclinations (ibid., p. 149), and so he doesnt notice that Kants assessment of the waywardness of the inclinations needs to be revised in order to meet those concerns. 98. See the references given in notes 11 and 12 above. 99. PG p. 335.1929/M p. 377.2739. 100. This is the crux of Allisons reply to Hegels charge (op. cit., p. 180). 101. This is to fill out just a bit what Hegel means by the self-actualization of self-consciousness mentioned here, and the actualization of the amoral agent mentioned previously (PG pp. 335.2425, 325.3132/M pp. 377.34, 366.14, respectively). 102. Cf. Elements of the Philosophy of Right (H. B. Nisbet, tr. [Cambridge: Cambridge U niversity Press, 1991]; hereafter abbreviated Rph), 124. 103. Cf. Rph 135 Remark. Andreas Wildt and Allen Wood have done a great service to Hegel scholarship by reconstructing this crucial line of Hegelian argument. See Wildt, Autonomie und Anerkennung (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1982), pp. 8496; and Wood, The Emptiness of the Moral Will (The Monist 72 No. 3 [1989], pp. 454483). 104. For discussion of why Kant thinks that transcendental idealism is needed to reconcile freedom and natural determinism, see Allison (op. cit.), pp. 4346. 105. I sketch Hegels approach to these issues about autonomy in The Basic Context and Structure of Hegels Philosophy of Right (in: F. C. Beiser, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Hegel [Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1992]).

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106. For a good discussion of Hegels views on teleology, which form the background to his view of the issue of freedom and determinism, see Willem deVries, Hegels Dialectic of Teleology, in this volume. 107. I have defended Hegels position on this matter in chapter 3 of Hegels Epistemological Realism (op. cit.), in which I specifically criticize Henry Allisons defense of Kant (Kants Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983]). 108. The modality of this claim rests on the fact that Kant argues by elimination against transcendental realism and empirical idealism, both in the Transcendental Aesthetic (A23/B378, A25/B40, A323/B49) and in the Antinomies, where he offers transcendental idealism as the only route out of these otherwise inevitable metaphysical contradictions (A497502/B525530). This modality is also reflected in Kants claims in the Preface that transcendental idealism represents the only remaining path to pursue in these domains (Axii; cf. Bxvi, Bxviixxi, Bxl note). 109. I reconstruct the structure of Hegels argument in the Phenomenology in Hegels Epistemological Realism (op. cit.), ch. 11. 110. Gr pp. 399, 400, 402; KdpV pp. 29, 34. 111. KdpV pp. 25, 72, 81, 128; R pp. 2930/G&H pp. 24, 25. 112. KdpV p. 25. Kant here uses the term Begehrungsvermgen, faculty of desire, not will. However, that does not affect the present point, for in his immediately preceding Remark he distinguishes between the lower and the higher faculty of desire, where the latter is practical reason itself (KdpV pp. 2225). The fact that in the sentence quoted Kant speaks of Bestimmungsgrund rather than Triebfeder or Neigung indicates that the higher faculty of desire, which he later calls Wille, is at issue. 113. R pp. 7 note, 36/G&H pp. 6 note, 31. 114. It is worth noting that the claim that happiness always is a determining ground appears to have as much justification as Kants claim that happiness is necessarily the end of finite rational beings. If this latter claim is sufficiently a priori to justify a duty to promote the highest good, then the former claim must be sufficiently a priori to justify a priori rejecting Kants account of autonomy as inapplicable to human beings. 115. TL pp. 38081. 116. Ibid. 117. KdpV p. 25; R. pp. 67 note/G&H pp. 67 note. 118. TL p. 381; cf. pp. 384, 385. At one point Kant states that the lack of an idea of a comprehensive end to all our dutiful action would be a hinderance to moral decision (R p. 5/G&H p. 5). 119. KdU p. 450. 120. KdpV pp. 32, 1225. 121. TL p. 457; cf. The End of All Things (Humphrey, tr. [op. cit.]) Ak. VIII pp. 3378. 122. Allison (op. cit.), p. 167. 123. Compare Allisons own treatment of alleged cases of overdetermination (op. cit., p. 118). 124. Allison admits that if ends and motives cannot be distinguished in the way Kant requires, then Hegels objections go through (op. cit., p. 188). My way of presenting Hegels objection shows that it holds independently of the issue of whether Kant was a determinist; it holds even in view of Kants Incorporation Thesis, that an inclination is not ones end unless one chooses to adopt it as such. Consequently, Allisons response, that Hegels objection looses its force because Kant is not a determinist (in the way Wood portrays him to be), is simply beside the point (ibid., p. 189). 125. On the nature of our mixed wills, see Gr pp. 400, 449; KdpV pp. 1920, 76; KdU pp. 4034; TL p. 379 & note; R pp. 356/G&H p. 31; on mixed wills standing under imperatives, see Gr pp. 397, 412, 414, 434, 439; KdpV pp. 20, 32, 82, 834; TL p. 379; R p. 42/G&H p. 37. 126. Definition of virtue: KdpV p. 84 (2); TL pp. 380, 383, 407, 477; exhibition of virtue: R pp. 345/G&H p. 30; evidence of virtue: TL pp. 394, 405; cf. R pp. 61, 7677/G&H pp. 55, 71. 127. Kant, indeed, makes precisely this inference, when he infers that the real object of our will must be an endless progress because we as finite rational wills cannot achieve holiness (KdpV p. 122). 128. PG pp. 327.3328.15, 336.123/M pp. 367.28368.14, 378.1139. Hegel phrases his argument in terms of moral consciousness either existing or not. Hegels argument holds if it is formulated in terms of virtue. Reformulating it in terms of virtue is justified by Hegels stress on the close relation between morality and duty, where duties hold (on Kants analysis) only of mixed wills, and where mixed wills can at best aspire to virtue, and not (really) to holiness. 129. See the references given in note 28 above. 130. KdrV A77980/B8078; R p. 128 note/G&H p. 119 note. 131. KdpV p. 75; TL p. 435; R pp. 6 note, 34/G&H pp. 6 note, 30. 132. R pp. 667/G&H pp. 601; cf. KdpV pp. 1234.

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133. R pp. 345/G&H p. 30. 134. Beck and Allison cede that Kants postulate of immortality is unsuccessful, and Beck notices that Kant cannot grant that we may be happy after death. (Beck [op. cit.], pp. 2171; Allison [op. cit.], pp. 1725.) At one point Kant distinguishes moral happiness from physical happiness (R pp. 678/G&H p. 61). However, this moral happiness seems not to be a feeling at all, since Kant equates it with having a constant disposition to improve our virtue, having which would give us a basis to hope to receive physical happiness. This addition to his doctrine does not solve the problems I have raised here; it involves them all over again. 135. PG pp. 332.1927, 337.22338.35/M pp. 374.1323, 380.4381.22. 136. PG pp. 328.33330.3, 337.2637, 338.914/M pp. 369.38370.8, 380.1112, 380.3240. 137. It is familiar that Kant speak of the categorical imperative as the sole moral law or as the (one and only) supreme principle of practical reason (e.g., Gr p. 444; R p. 39 note/G&H p. 34 note). Less familiar perhaps is Kants speaking of God as comprehending all moral laws, in the plural (KdrV A815/B843; KdpV p. 129; KdU pp. 481; TL p. 487; R pp. 141, 160/G&H pp. 132, 148). 138. In this regard, recent commentators such as Onora ONeill, Barbara Herman, and Christine Korsgaard deserve credit for reconstructing a much improved Kant. 139. KdrV A8189/B8467; Gr p. 439; KdpV pp. 823, 123, 129, 131, 131 note; KdU pp. 444, 4456, 455, 460, 481, 482; TL pp. 227, 443, 460, 487; R pp. 6, 42, 72, 84, 99 note, 99, 103, 110, 11314, 122, 139, 141, 142, 144, 153, 156, 182, 183, 192, 194, cf. pp. 4950, 60, 154/G&H pp. 56, 37, 54, 79, 90 note 2, 9091, 94, 95, 100, 104, 112, 131, 132, 133, 135, 142, 144, 170, 171, 180, 183, cf. pp. 45, 54, 143. It will not do to suggest that Kant holds that we are to perform our duties solely on the basis of their being enjoined by the Categorical Imperative, while disregarded the fact that they are also divine commands. As several of the passages just cited indicate, Kant holds that we are to perform our duties as divine commands, and that we are to view transgressions of duty as transgressions of divine commands. Consequently, Kant holds that divine command enters into our motivating considerations. How could it not, given what is at stake in divine judgment? 140. KdrV A8189/B8467; cf. R p. 114/G&H p. 104. 141. See the references given in note 14 above. 142. KdU p. 4456. 143. KdpV pp. 1423; R p. 183/G&H p. 171. 144. KdU pp. 4523; TL p. 487, cf. p. 443; R p. 183, cf. p. 110/G&H p. 171, cf. p. 100. 145. TL p. 389; cf. Gr p. 448. 146. KdrV A81112/B83940, A81213/B8401; A815/B843; TL pp. 443, 487; R p. 69 & note/G&H p. 63 & note; cf. TL p. 489. 147. Cf., e.g., Gr p. 416; KdpV p. 37; TL p. 227. 148. KdU pp. 4456, 4523. 149. Kant portrays God as judge several times: Gr p. 439; TL p. 489; R pp. 67, 139/G&H pp. 6061, 131. 150. KdrV A8145/B8423; R p. 139/G&H pp. 13031. 151. KdpV p. 24. 152. PG p. 338.38/M p. 380.2531. 153. Kants strategy in the Religion for reconciling the antinomy between atonement and moral rejuvenation, namely, to argue that the antinomy is only apparent, since, through a misunderstanding, it regards the self-same practical idea, taken merely in different references, as two different principles (R p. 119/G&H p. 110), cannot be applied here. For to take the moral law in reference to God as a divine command is to violate autonomy, even if in some way the moral law is supposed to be the will of God expressed in us (R pp. 104, 144/G&H pp. 95, 135). If its Gods will, then its not our own will (Kant distinguished G od from man, and places God outside of man [R p. 6/G&H pp. 56]), and if we dont resolve to act of our own will, then were not autonomous. 154. See the references given in notes 143 and 144 above. 155. R p. 139/G&H p. 131. 156. See the references given in note 43 above. 157. See the references given in notes 143 and 144 above. 158. Compare the following statements: ... the operation of the moral law which fills man with fervent respect and hence deserves to be regarded as a divine command; Godliness comprises two determinations of the moral disposition in relation to God: fear of God is this disposition in obedience to his commands from bounden duty (the duty of a subject), i.e., from respect for the law; love of God, on the other hand, is the disposition to obedience from ones own free choice and from approval of the law (the duty of a son). Both involve, therefore, over and above morality, the concept of a

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supersensible being provided with the attributes which are requisite to the carrying out of that highest good which is aimed at by morality but which transcends our powers; [men typically] cannot well think of their obligation except as an obligation to some service or other which they must offer to God ... (R pp. 11314, 182, 103, cf. pp. 4950, 61/G&H pp. 104, 161, 94, respectively; cf. pp. 45, 54). 159. Kant explains the holiness of the moral law in terms of its inviolability (KdpV p. 87). However, if inviolability were the whole issue, he should regard the laws of logic and mathematics as holy, which understandably he never does. 160. PG pp. 328.27329.1, 339.310/M pp. 369.30370.5, 381.3038. 161. KdpV p. 159. 162. T&P p. 300 note; cf. RL 235236 for a parallel treatment of the right of necessity. 163. TL p. 224. 164. TL pp. 4234, 426, 428, 4312, 4334, 437, 454, 458. 165. KdrV A1324/B1714; KdU p. 169; T&P p. 275; TL p. 433 note; An p. 199. 166. KdrV A1356/B1745. 167. KdU pp. 379, 3857, 3889, 3978. 168. See the references given in note 165 above. Presumably, Kant does not provide an analysis of such maxims for aesthetic judgment because aesthetic judgments do not judge the object, but only the viewers response to the object. This position can be sustained only so long as Kant remains a formalist and ignores the aesthetic relevance of genre. 169. This issue is prominent in Hegels discussion earlier in the Phenomenology of reason as legislating moral laws (PG pp. 228232/M pp. 252256). For discussion of these earlier sections, see David C. Hoy, Hegels Critique of Kantian Morality (History of Philosophy Quarterly 6 No. 2 [1989], pp. 207232). 170. TL p. 433 note. 171. Rph 135 Remark. 172. See the references given in note 73 above. Kant once admits that one might be mistaken in ones judgment of ones duty (TL p. 401). This is an interesting admission, but it does not count even as a recognition of the problem Hegel posed. 173. Kant does say that a metaphysics of morals must contain principles for applying universal principles, but he only takes develops this so far as to apply his principles to human nature in general (TL pp. 2167). This level of application leaves us with the very casuistical questions that give rise to Hegels objection. This problem is not addressed by Kants counterpart to the metaphysics of morals, moral anthropology, because this doctrine only concerns the subjective conditions that hinder or help man in applying the metaphysical principles of morals (TL p. 217). Mary Gregor points out that Kants claim that casuistry has no role in juridical laws holds only when the general principle has been formulated so precisely as to include all necessary exceptions (Laws of Freedom [Oxford: Blackwell, 1963], p. 103). She notes that grappling with specific circumstances may reveal that there are morally necessary exceptions to otherwise universal principles of obligation (cf. ibid., pp. 1012). She contends that Kants principles do provide some guidance for dealing with these questions. She doesnt notice that Kant can never rule out a role for casuistry for interpreting juridical laws, because there can be no assurance (especially on Kants view) that all of the empirically based necessary exceptions have been determined. The problem of relevant descriptions has been discussed extensively in the literature. Onora ONeill gave considerable attention to it in her first book, Acting on Principle (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975; chs. 2, 3, 6, 7). Though she made significant headway on it, she admits that Kants solution to the problem wont work in cases of mixed motives or self-deception (p. 114), and that only a partial solution can be reached by reinterpreting and supplementing Kants theory (pp. 1256). She offered the interesting suggestion that when conflicting grounds of obligation are recognized, their relative priority can be determined by determining which of the maxims that give relative priority to one ground over the other tends least towards a state of nature (p. 135). Barbara Herman has argued convincingly that any Kantian theory must be supplemented outright by a set of rules of moral salience that help agents determine what features of their circumstances are morally relevant. (See The Practice of Moral Judgment [The Journal of Philosophy 82 No. 8 {1985}, pp. 414436.) While all of this work makes significant contributions to working out a Kantian ethic, it also implicitly concedes that Kants account of moral reasoning is quite incomplete as it stands, and I suspect that it will ultimately confirm Hegels suspicion that once the details are worked out, acting on specific duties in concrete circumstances is motivated as much by ends as by formal universality. 174. Gr. pp. 403, 404. 175. PG p. 339.810/M p. 381.3638. 176. This is the topic of Korsgaards essay (op. cit.). Her discussion is quite good, though she stops short of reconstructing Kants grounds for contending that we are autonomous (ibid., p. 332). However, her response to Hegels objections to the categorical imperative are inadequate. (This is also true of her replies to Hegel in Kants Formula of Universal Law [Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 66 {1985}, pp. 2447], but I cannot discuss this here.) First, Korsgaard

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understandably doesnt recognize that a main element of Hegels charge of emptiness concerns Kants account of moral motivation, and she doesnt address this issue. Second, Hegel endorses m oral autonomy and motivational internalism, but he does not endorse Kants specific analyses of them (contra Kants Analysis ..., p. 330 and note 62). Hegel does not propose to import something external to the moral law to provide content; he instead contends that Kant must do this. This importation is present in Korsgaards reconstruction, too. The principle of the categorical imperative supposedly is given by pure practical reason. If so, then the principle of obligatoriness is given a priori. However, this does not suffice to generate specific laws to which our wills commit us (as Korsgaard would have it [ibid., p. 330]), for those laws are only generated on the basis of analyzing ones maxims, where ones maxims are generated in view of our particular circumstances, resources, abilities, aims, and knowledge. All of these factors, on Kants analysis, are external to pure practical reason. This lies behind Hegels charge that Kants view provides no immanent doctrine of duties (Rph 135 Remark). Korsgaard avoids this problem only by using the term will in a much broader and looser sense than is allowed by Kants transcendental idealist moral psychology. (It may be that Kant trades on a narrower and broader concept of the will, and illicitly claims that the apodictic necessity pertaining to the principles of the former also pertains to the specific duties of the latter.) 177. See the references given in note 110 above. 178. PG pp. 339.2832, 339.36340.13/M pp. 382.2025, 382.31383.10. 179. KdU p. 472. 180. KdrV A805/B833. 181. Fichte propsed such a distinction (Zweite Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre [J. H. Fichte, ed., J. G. Fichtes Smmtliche Werke {Berlin: Veit & Comp, 1845} vol. I], pp. 4789 & notes), and Kant repudiated it in his Open Letter on Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre, August 7, 1799 (Ak. XII pp. 3701; tr. A. Zweig, Emmanuel Kant: Philosophical Correspondence [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967], pp. 2534). 182. Constructions of Reason (op. cit.), p. 212 note 7. In singling her work out for critical comment, I do not at all wish to demean or diminish the accomplishments of her reconstructions, many of which are quite penetrating. 183. Ibid., pp. 59, 81, 94, 131, 1389, 156. 184. Ibid., pp. 64, 156, 133, 1389; respectively. 185. On treating others as ends, see ibid., chs. 6, 7, and pp. 229230. She infers that reason can be practical simply because the Categorical Imperative can sort permissible, obligatory, and forbidden maxims, overlooking the issue of reasons providing a sufficient motive for acting on these determinations (ibid., p. 82). 186. Ibid., pp. 88, 154; Gr p. 404. 187. Ibid., pp. 88, 103, 152. In apparent contrast to these remarks, she also suggests that we can at least determine whether outward behavior conforms to a morally worthy maxim (ibid., pp. 130, 141). 188. Ibid., pp. 59, 128; x, 19; respectively. 189. Ibid., pp. 467, 160, 181f., 189 note 2. 190. Ibid., pp. 1813; cf. pp. 467. 191. Ibid., pp. 150, 154, 158. 192. Ibid., p. 161. Although she claims that Kants test solves the problem of relevant descriptions (ibid., p. 87), she doesnt address this issue in her recent collection. Her lowered estimation of the extent to which the Categorical Imperative can guide or determine right action would appear to require further retracting or restricting the effectiveness of her earlier effort to solve the problem of relevant descriptions in connection with determining right action. 193. Ibid., pp. 103104. 194. She grants that intelligibility is dependent on ones social context and tradition (ibid., p. 70); she insists that autonomy only requires rationality (ibid., pp. 54, 76). 195. On the conditional nature of Kantian obligations, cf. ibid., pp. 1056, 115, 1178, 137, 139 note 13. 196. See the references given in note 110. 197. Ibid., pp. 54, 76. 198. Ibid., pp. 54, 64. 199. Ibid., p. 58, emphasis added; cf. p. 54. 200. Ibid., p. 64. 201. Hume, Of the Standard of Taste (in: T. H. Green & T. H. Grose, eds., Essays, Moral, Political and Literary [London: Longmans, 1882] vol. I, pp. 266284). 202. Once this is recognized, her grounds for chastising deontological liberals for flirting with preference-based accounts of practical reason erode considerably (ibid., p. 227 note 16).

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203. See the references given in note 174 above. 204. Op. cit., p. 158. 205. Ibid., pp. 230233. 206. RL pp. 2356, T&P p. 300. 207. Rph 1268. For discussion, see The Basic Context and Structure of Hegels Philosophy of Right (op. cit.). 208. I am very grateful to Karl Americks, Sally Sedgwick, and Robert Scharff for their prompt and very helpful comments on the previous draft of this paper.

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