Zamoras vs. Su, Jr.

, 184 SCRA 248 , April 06, 1990 Case Title : VICTORIANO ZAMORAS, petitioner, vs. ROQUE SU, JR., ANITA SU HORTELLANO and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, respondents.Case Nature : PETITION to review the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission. Syllabi Class : Agrarian Law|Tenant|defined Syllabi: 1. Agrarian Law; Tenant, defined; Agricultural tenancy, defined.Un-der Section 5 (a) of R.A. No. 1199, a tenant is a person who by himself, or with the aid available from within his immediate household, cultivates the land belonging to or possessed by another, with the latters consent for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder or for a price certain or ascertainable in produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system (Matienzo vs. Servidad, 107 SCRA 276). Agricultural tenancy is defined as the physical possession by a person of land devoted to agriculture, belonging to or legally possessed by another for the purpose of production through the labor of the former and of the members of his immediate farm household in consideration of which the former agrees to share the harvest with the latter or to pay a price certain or ascertainable, whether in produce or in money, or both (Sec. 3, R.A. No. 1199; 50 O.G. 4655-56; Miguel Carag vs. CA, et al., 151 SCRA 44). 2. Agrarian Law; Tenant, defined; Requisites of tenancy relationship.The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landholder and the tenant; (2) the subject is the agricultural holding; (3) there is consent between the parties; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and (6) there is a sharing of harvests between landlord and tenant (Antonio Castro vs. CA and De la Cruz, G.R. L-34613, January 26, 1989; Tiongson vs. CA, 130 SCRA 482; Guerrero vs. CA, 142 SCRA 138). 3. Agrarian Law; Tenant, defined; Elements of personal cultivation.The element of personal cultivation of the land, or with the aid of his farm household, essential in establishing a landlord-tenant or a lessor-lessee relationship, is absent in the relationship between Su and Zamoras (Co vs. IAC, 162 SCRA 390; Graza vs. CA, 163 SCRA 39), for Zamoras did not cultivate any part of Sus plantation either by himself or with the help of his household. 4. Agrarian Law; NLRC, Jurisdiction; It is the NLRC, not the Court of Agrarian Relations, that has jurisdiction to try and decide Zamoras complaint for illegal dismissal.Since Zamoras was an employee, not a tenant of Su, it is the NLRC, not the Court of Agrarian Relations, that has jurisdiction to try and decide Zamoras complaint for illegal dismissal (Art. 217, Labor Code; Manila Mandarin Employees Union vs. NLRC, 154 SCRA 368; Jacqueline Industries Dunhill Bags Industries, et al. vs. NLRC, et al., 69 SCRA 242). Division: FIRST DIVISION Docket Number: G.R. No. 85611 Counsel: Paulo V. Briones, Pacifico C. Cimafranca Ponente: GRIO-AQUINO Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is reversed and a new one is entered, declaring Zamoras to be an employee of respondent Roque Su, Jr. and that his dismissal was illegal and without lawful cause. He is entitled to reinstatement with backwages, but because he is dead and may no longer be reinstated, the private respondents are ordered to pay to his heirs the backwages due him, as well as his share of the copra sales from the plantation for a period of three (3) years from his illegal dismissal in September, 1981, plus separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. Costs against the private respondents.

Fortune Cement Corporation vs. NLRC, 193 SCRA 258 , January 24, 1991 Case Title : FORTUNE CEMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (First Division) and ANTONIO M. LAGDAMEO, respondents.Case Nature : PETITION for certiorari to review the resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission. Syllabi Class : Labor Law|National Labor Relations Commission|Dismissal|Corporation Law|PD 902-A| Securities and Exchange Commission Syllabi: 1. Labor Law; National Labor Relations Commission; Dismissal; Corporation Law; PD 902A; Securities and Exchange Commission; A complaint filed by a corporate executive vice-president for illegal dismissal, resulting from a board resolution dismissing him as such officer is within the jurisdiction of the SEC, not of the NLRC.In PSBA vs. Leao (127 SCRA 778), this Court, confronted with a similar controversy, ruled that the SEC, not the NLRC, has jurisdiction: This is not a case of dismissal. The situation is that of a corporate office having been declared vacant, and of Tans not having been elected thereafter. The matter of whom to elect is a prerogative that belongs to the Board, and involves the exercise of deliberate choice and the faculty of discriminative selection. Generally speaking, the relationship of a person to a corporation, whether as officer or as agent or employee is not determined by the nature of the services performed, but by the incidents of the relationship as they actually exist. x x x The issue of the SECs power or jurisdiction is decisive and renders unnecessary a consideration of the other questions raised by Lagdameo. Thus did this Court rule in the case of Dy vs. National Labor Relations Commission (145 SCRA 211) which involved a similar situation: It is of no moment that Vailoces, in his amended complaint, seeks other reliefs which would seemingly fall under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter, because a closer look at theseunderpayment of salary and non-payment of living allowanceshows that they are actually part of the perquisites of his elective position, hence, intimately linked with his relations with the corporation. The question of remuneration, involving as it does, a person who is not a mere employee but a stockholder and officer, an integral part, it might be said, of the corporation, is not a simple labor problem but a matter that comes within the area of corporate affairs and management, and is in fact a corporate controversy in contemplation of the Corporation Code. (Italics ours.) Division: FIRST DIVISION Docket Number: G.R. No. 79762 Counsel: De Leon, Diokno & Associates Law Offices, Romarie G. Villonco, George C. Nograles Ponente: GRIO-AQUINO Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the questioned Resolution of the NLRC reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter, having been rendered without jurisdiction, is hereby reversed and set aside. The decision of the Labor Arbiter dated December 3, 1985 dismissing NLRC-NCR Case No. 1-228-85 is affirmed, without prejudice to private respondent Antonio M. Lagdameos seeking recourse in the appropriate forum. No costs.

Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa (IBM) vs. NLRC, 219 SCRA 536, March 05, 1993 Excerpt : 1. G.R. Nos. 81852-53. March 5, 1993. [*THIRD DIVISION.] ILAW AT BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA (IBM), petitioner, vs . NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER MANUEL P. ASUNCION, ABUNDIO IBASCO, ANTONIO MAGSIPOC, CARLOS VILLARANTE and BIENVENIDO RAMIREZ, respondents. PETITION for certiorari of the resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Potenciano A. Flores, Jr. for the petitioner. Gilbert P. Lorenzo for respondents A. Ibasco and A. Magsipoc. Renato Ramos for respondent Carlos Villarante. MELO, J.: Before e us is a petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of the order dated February 4, 1987, of respondent Labor Arbiter More Excerpts

Case Title : ILAW AT BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA (IBM), petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER MANUEL P. ASUNCION, ABUNDIO IBASCO, ANTONIO MAGSIPOC, CARLOS VILLARANTE and BIENVENIDO RAMIREZ, respondents. Case Nature : PETITION for certiorari of the resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission. Syllabi Class :Labor Law|Jurisdiction Syllabi: 1. Labor Law; Jurisdiction; Jurisdiction over subject matter is conferred by law.It is fundamental that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law (Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29 [1968]) and is determined by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein (Serrano vs. Muoz (Hi) Motors, Inc., 21 SCRA 1085 [1967]). 2. Labor Law; Jurisdiction; Internal Union Disputes.Clearly this is an intra-union disputea dispute between a labor union and its members. "Internal Union Dispute" includes all disputes or grievances arising from any violation of or disagreement over any provision of the constitution and by-laws of a union, including any violation of the rights and conditions of union membership provided for in the Code (Book V, Rule I, Section 1(a), Omnibus Rules Implementing The Labor Code). 3. Labor Law; Jurisdiction; Bureau of Labor Relations and Labor Relations Divisions have jurisdiction to act on all inter-union or intra-union conflicts.Article 226 of the Labor Code of the Philippines vests on the Bureau of Labor Relations and the Labor Relations Divisions jurisdiction to act on all inter-union or intra-union conflicts. Said Article thus provides: "Art. 226. Bureau of Labor RelationsThe Bureau of Labor Relations and the Labor Relations Division in the regional offices of the Department of Labor shall have original and exclusive authority to act, at their own initiative or upon request of either or both parties, on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes, grievances or problems arising from or affecting labor-management relations in all work places whether agricultural or non-agricultural, except those arising from the implementation or interpretation of collective bargaining agreements which shall be subject of grievance procedure and/or voluntary arbitration." Un- questionably, therefore, NLRC Case No. 1-092-87 and Case No. 0002-00731-87, the subject of which is an intra-union dispute, fall under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Labor Relations, and respondent Labor Arbiter and NLRC have no jurisdiction over said cases. Division: THIRD DIVISION

Docket Number: G.R. Nos. 81852-53 Counsel: Potenciano A. Flores, Jr., Gilbert P. Lorenzo, Renato Ramos Ponente: MELO Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the order dated February 4, 1987 issued by respondent Labor Arbiter, the decision rendered on May 29, 1987, by said respondent, the resolution dated October] 12' 1987, of respondent NLRC affirming the decision of respondent Labor Arbiter and the resolution dated January 11, 1988, of respondent NLRC are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Labor Arbiter is hereby ordered to dismiss NLRC Case No. 1-072-87 and NLRC Case No. 00-02-00731-87, without prejudice to private respondents' filing the same with the Bureau of Labor Relations.

Austria vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 310 SCRA 293 , July 14, 1999

Case Title : NAZARIO C. AUSTRIA, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ABETO A. UY and PHILIP-PINE STEEL COATING CORPORATION, respondents.Case Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari. Syllabi Class : Labor Law|Administrative Law|Words and Phrases|Sub-stantial Evidence| Explained| Hearsay Evidence|Witnesses Syllabi: 1. Labor Law; Administrative Law; Words and Phrases; Sub-stantial Evidence, Explained; The Supreme Court cannot affirm thePetitioner, in effect, assigns grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondent NLRC for its misappreciation of the evidence and giving it undue weight. Basic is the rule that judicial review of labor cases does not go so far as to evaluate the sufficiency of evidence on which the labor officials findings rest; more so when both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC share the same findings. This, notwithstanding, we cannot affirm the decision of the NLRC especially when its findings of fact on which the conclusion was based are not supported by substantial evidence. By substantial evidence, we mean the amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify the conclusion. 2. Same; Same; A suspicion or belief no matter how sincerely felt cannot be a substitute for factual findings carefully established through an orderly procedure.Accusation cannot take the place of proof. A suspicion or belief no matter how sincerely felt cannot be a substitute for factual findings carefully established through an orderly procedure. Such orderly procedure was denied petitioner by PHILSTEEL, as correctly found by the NLRC, thusIn the instant case, there was at least a partial denial of the complainants right to due process because there was no showing: (1) that he was given the required first written notice; (2) that he was given sufficient time to answer the charges against him; and, (3) that he had the chance to obtain the assistance of counsel. As there is a finding of illegal dismissal, an award of back wages, instead of indemnity, computed from the time of dismissal up to the time of his death, with legal interest plus attorneys fees, might properly assuage the hurt and damages caused by such illegal dismissal. 3. Same; Same; Hearsay Evidence; Witnesses; Loss of Trust and Confidence; Reliance both by the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission on the hearsay testimonies in assessing the evidence reflects a dangerous propensity for baseless conclusions amounting to grave abuse of discretion; While loss of confidence or breach of trust is a valid ground for termination, it must rest on some basis which must be convincingly established.The reliance both by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC on the hearsay testimonies in assessing the evidence of private respondents reflects a dangerous propensity for baseless conclusions amounting to grave abuse of 4. Same; Evidence; Burden of Proof; Pleadings and Practice; Unlike in other cases where the complainant has the burden of proof to discharge, in labor cases concerning illegal dismissals, the burden of proving that the employee was dismissed with just cause rests upon the employer.The NLRC grounded its findings on the following postulates: (a) the witnesses of PHILSTEEL are credible for petitioner failed to show any ground for them to falsely testify, especially in the light of his excellent job performance; and, (b) respondents witnesses are more credible than petitionersLukban who, insofar as the source of the information is concerned, impressed the NLRC as evasive. The NLRC however entertained a patent misapprehension of the burden of proof rule in labor termination cases. Unlike in other cases where the complainant has the burden of proof to discharge, in labor cases concerning illegal dismissals, the burden of proving that the employee was dismissed with just cause rests upon the employer. Such is the mandate of Art. 278 of the Labor Code. Division: SECOND DIVISION Docket Number: G.R. No. 123646 Counsel: Sobrevias, Diaz, Hayudini & Bodegon, Eufemio Law Offices for private respondents. Ponente: BELLOSILLO

Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Private respondent PHILIPPINE STEEL COATING CORPORATION (PHILSTEEL) is ORDERED to pay the heirs of petitioner NAZARIO C. AUSTRIA his back wages inclusive of allowances and other benefits, including death benefits, from 17 August 1989 up to 15 March 1997, with legal interest plus attorneys fees. The Labor Arbiter is DIRECTED to compute immediately the monetary benefits due petitioner as aforestated in accordance with law. Tolosa vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 401 SCRA 291 , April 10, 2003 Case Title : EVELYN TOLOSA, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, QWANA KAIUN (through its residentagent, FUMIO NAKAGAWA), ASIA BULK TRANSPORT PHILS., INC., PEDRO GARATE and MARIO ASIS, respondents.Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals. Syllabi Class : Labor Law|National Labor Relations Commission|Jurisdiction|Damages|Appeals Syllabi: 1. Labor Law; National Labor Relations Commission; Jurisdiction; The allegations in the complaint determine the nature of the action and, consequently, the jurisdiction of the courts.Time and time again, we have held that the allegations in the complaint determine the nature of the action and, consequently, the jurisdiction of the courts. After carefully examining the complaint/position paper of petitioner, we are convinced that the allegations therein are in the nature of an action based on a quasi delict or tort. It is evident that she sued Pedro Garate and Mario Asis for gross negligence. 2. Labor Law; National Labor Relations Commission; Jurisdiction; Damages; The jurisdiction of labor tribunals is limited to disputes arising from employer-employee relations.The jurisdiction of labor tribunals is limited to disputes arising from employer-employee relations, as we ruled in Georg Grotjahn GMBH Co. v. Isnani: Not every dispute between an employer and employee involves matters that only labor arbiters and the NLRC can resolve in the exercise of their adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC under Article 217 of the Labor Code is limited to disputes arising from an employer-employee relationship which can only be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or their collective bargaining agreement. 3. Labor Law; National Labor Relations Commission; Jurisdiction; Damages; Reliefs to be awarded by labor arbiters and the NLRC must still be based on an action that has a reasonable causal connection with labor laws.While it is true that labor arbiters and the NLRC have jurisdiction to award not only reliefs provided by labor laws, but also damages governed by the Civil Code, these reliefs must still be based on an action that has a reasonable causal connection with the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or collective bargaining agreements. 4. Labor Law; National Labor Relations Commission; Jurisdiction; Damages; Where such principal relief is to be granted under labor legislation or a collective bargaining agreement, the case should fall within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.It is the character of the principal relief sought that appears essential in this connection. Where such principal relief is to be granted under labor legislation or a collective bargaining agreement, the case should fall within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, even though a claim for damages might be asserted as an incident to such claim. 5. Labor Law; National Labor Relations Commission; Jurisdiction; Damages; It is not the NLRC but the regular courts that have jurisdiction over actions for damages.It is not the NLRC but the regular courts that have jurisdiction over actions for damages, in which the employer-employee relation is merely incidental, and in which the cause of action proceeds from a different source of obligation such as a tort. Since petitioners claim for damages is predicated on a quasi delict or tort that has no reasonable causal connection with any of the claims provided for in Article 217,

other labor statutes, or collective bargaining agreements, jurisdiction over the action lies with the regular courtsnot with the NLRC or the labor arbiters. 6. Labor Law; National Labor Relations Commission; Appeals; Well-settled is the rule that issues not raised below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.This argument cannot be passed upon in this appeal, because it was not raised in the tribunals a quo. Well-settled is the rule that issues not raised below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Thus, points of law, theories, and arguments not brought to the attention of the Court of Appeals need notand ordinarily will notbe considered by this Court. Petitioners allegation cannot be accepted by this Court on its face; to do so would be tantamount to a denial of respondents right to due process. Division: THIRD DIVISION Docket Number: G.R. No. 149578 Counsel: Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez & Gatmaitan, Dante H. Cortez Ponente: PANGANIBAN Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitio

Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. NLRC, 287 SCRA 672 , March 20, 1998 Case Title : PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, FERDINAND PINEDA and GOGFREDO CABLING, respondents.Case Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari. Syllabi Class : Labor Law|Remedial Law|Injunctions Syllabi: 1. Labor Law; Remedial Law; Injunctions; Injunction is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit.Generally, injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of ones substantive rights or interest. It is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. It is resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation. The application of the injunctive writ rests upon the existence of an emergency or of a special reason before the main case be regularly heard. The essential conditions for granting such temporary injunctive relief are that the complaint alleges facts which appear to be sufficient to constitute a proper basis for injunction and that on the entire showing from the contending parties, the injunction is reasonably necessary to protect the legal rights of the plaintiff pending the litigation. Injunction is also a special equitable relief granted only in cases where there is no plain, adequate and complete remedy at law. 2. Labor Law; Remedial Law; Injunctions; The power of the National Labor Relations Commission to issue an injunction writ originates from any labor dispute upon application by a party thereof, which application if not granted may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party; Labor dispute Defined.From the foregoing provisions of law, the power of the NLRC to issue an injunctive writ originates from any labor dispute upon application by a party thereof, which application if not granted may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party. The term labor dispute is defined as any controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or arranging the terms and conditions of employment regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employers and employees.

3. Labor Law; Remedial Law; Injunctions; Controversy and justiciable controversy defined.The term controversy is likewise defined as a litigated question; adversary proceeding in a court of law; a civil action or suit, either at law or in equity; a justiciable dispute. A justiciable controversy is one involving an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right on one side and a denial thereof on the other concerning a real, and not a mere theoretical question or issue. 4. Labor Law; Remedial Law; Injunctions; It is an essential requirement that there must first be a labor dispute between the contending parties before the labor arbiter.Taking into account the foregoing definitions, it is an essential requirement that there must first be a labor dispute between the contending parties before the labor arbiter. In the present case, there is no labor dispute between the petitioner and private respondents as there has yet been no complaint for illegal dismissal filed with the labor arbiter by the private respondents against the petitioner. 5. Labor Law; Remedial Law; Injunctions; National Labor Relations Commission exceeded its jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Order granting private respondents petition for injunction and ordering the petitioner to reinstate private respondents.On the other hand, the NLRC shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by labor arbiters as provided in Article 217(b) of the Labor Code. In short, the jurisdiction of the NLRC in illegal dismissal cases is appellate in nature and, therefore, it cannot entertain the private respondents petition for injunction which challenges the dismissal orders of petitioner. Article 218(e) of the Labor Code does not provide blanket authority to the NLRC or any of its divisions to issue writs of injunction, considering that Section 1 of Rule XI of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC makes injunction only an ancillary remedy in ordinary labor disputes. Thus, the NLRC exceeded its jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Order granting private respondents petition for injunction and ordering the petitioner to reinstate private respondents. 6. Labor Law; Remedial Law; Injunctions; Under the Labor Code, the ordinary and proper recourse of an illegally dismissed employee is to file a complaint for illegal dismissal with the labor arbiter.Under the Labor Code, the ordinary and proper recourse of an illegally dismissed employee is to file a complaint for illegal dismissal with the labor arbiter. In the case at bar, private respondents disregarded this rule and directly went to the NLRC through a petition for injunction praying that petitioner be enjoined from enforcing its dismissal orders. In Lamb vs. Phipps, we ruled that if the remedy is specifically provided by law, it is presumed to be adequate. Moreover, the preliminary mandatory injunction prayed for by the private respondents in their petition before the NLRC can also be entertained by the labor arbiter who, as shown earlier, has the ancillary power to issue preliminary injunctions or restraining orders as an incident in the cases pending before him in order to preserve the rights of the parties during the pendency of the case. 7. Labor Law; Remedial Law; Injunctions; When an injury is considered irreparable.An injury is considered irreparable if it is of such constant and frequent recurrence that no fair and reasonable redress can be had therefor in a court of law, or where there is no standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy, that is, it is not susceptible of mathematical computation. It is considered irreparable injury when it cannot be adequately compensated in damages due to the nature of the injury itself or the nature of the right or property injured or when there exists no certain pecuniary standard for the measurement of damages. 8. Labor Law; Remedial Law; Injunctions; An injunction, as an extraordinary remedy, is not favored in Labor Law.An injunction, as an extraordinary remedy, is not favored in labor law considering that it generally has not proved to be an effective means of settling labor disputes. It has been the policy of the State to encourage the parties to use the nonjudicial process of negotiation and compromise, mediation and arbitration. Thus, injunctions may be issued only in cases of extreme necessity based on legal grounds clearly established, after due consultations or hearing and when all efforts at conciliation are exhausted which factors, however, are clearly absent in the present case. Division: SECOND DIVISION

Docket Number: G.R. No. 120567 Counsel: Ferdinand D. Macaibay, Factoran, Tria & De Leon Law Office Ponente: MARTINEZ Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated April 3, 1995 and May 31, 1995, issued by the National Labor Relations Commission (First Division), in NLRC NCR IC No. 000563-95, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Pioneer Texturizing Corp. vs. NLRC, 280 SCRA 806 , October 16, 1997 Case Title : PIONEER TEXTURIZING CORP. and/or JULIANO LIM, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PIONEER TEXTURIZING WORKERS UNION and LOURDES A. DE JESUS, respondents.Case Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari. Syllabi Class : Labor Law|Illegal Dismissal|Due Process|Management Prerogatives|Loss of Confidence| Reinstatement|Statutory Construction Syllabi: 1. Labor Law; Illegal Dismissal; Due Process; Lack of a just cause in the dismissal from service of an employee renders the dismissal illegal, despite the employers observance of procedural due process.Gleaned either from the Labor Arbiters observations or from the NLRCs assessment, it distinctly appears that petitioners accusation of dishonesty and tampering of official records and documents with intention of cheating against de Jesus was not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. Petitioners simply failed, both before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, to discharge the burden of proof and to validly justify de Jesus dismissal from service. The law, in this light, directs the employers, such as herein petitioners, not to terminate the services of an employee except for a just or authorized cause under the Labor Code. Lack of a just cause in the dismissal from service of an employee, as in this case, renders the dismissal illegal, despite the employers observance of procedural due process. 2. Labor Law; Illegal Dismissal; Management Prerogatives; While an employer has the inherent right to discipline its employees, this right must always be exercised humanely, and the penalty it must impose should be commensurate to the offense involved and to the degree of its infraction.We also find the imposition of the extreme penalty of dismissal against de Jesus as certainly harsh and grossly disproportionate to the negligence committed, especially where said employee holds a faithful and an untarnished twelve-year service record. While an employer has the inherent right to discipline its employees, we have always held that this right must always be exercised humanely, and the penalty it must impose should be commensurate to the offense involved and to the degree of its infraction. The employer should bear in mind that, in the exercise of such right, what is at stake is not only the employees position but her livelihood as well. 3. Labor Law; Illegal Dismissal; Loss of Confidence; While loss of confidence is one of the valid grounds for termination of employment, the same, however, cannot be used as a pretext to vindicate each and every instance of unwarranted dismissalto be a valid ground, it must be shown that the employee concerned is responsible for the misconduct or infraction and that the nature of his participation therein rendered him absolutely unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position.Equally unmeritorious is petitioners assertion that the dismissal is justified on the basis of loss of confidence. While loss of confidence, as correctly argued by petitioners, is one of the valid grounds for termination of employment, the same, however, cannot be used as a pretext to vindicate each and every instance of unwarranted dismissal. To be a valid ground, it must be shown that the employee concerned is responsible for the misconduct or infraction and that the nature of his participation therein rendered him absolutely unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position. In this case, petitioners were unsuccessful in establishing their accusations of dishonesty and tampering of records with intention of cheating. Indeed, even if petitioners allegations against de Jesus were true, they just the same failed to

prove that her position needs the continued and unceasing trust of her employers. The breach of trust must be related to the performance of the employees functions. Surely, de Jesus who occupies the position of a reviser/trimmer does not require the petitioners perpetual and full confidence. 4. Labor Law; Illegal Dismissal; Reinstatement; Statutory Construction; As a rule, shall in a statute commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretionthe presumption is that the word shall, when used in a statute, is mandatory.We note that prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 6715, Article 223 of the Labor Code contains no provision dealing with the reinstatement of an illegally dismissed employee. The amendment introduced by R.A. No. 6715 is an innovation and a far departure from the old law indicating thereby the legislatures unequivocal intent to insert a new rule that will govern the reinstatement aspect of a decision or resolution in any given labor dispute. In fact, the law as now worded employs the phrase shall immediately be executory without qualification emphasizing the need for prompt compliance. As a rule, shall in a statute commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word shall, when used in a statute, is mandatory. An appeal or posting of bond, by plain mandate of the law, could not even forestall nor stay the executory nature of an order of reinstatement. The law, moreover, is unambiguous and clear. Thus, it must be applied according to its plain and obvious meaning, according to its express terms. 5. Labor Law; Illegal Dismissal; Reinstatement; Statutory Construction; To require the application for and issuance of a writ of execution as prerequisites for the execution of a reinstatement award would certainly betray and run counter to the very object and intent of Art. 223 of the Labor Code, i.e., the immediate execution of a reinstatement order.Article 224 states that the need for a writ of execution applies only within five (5) years from the date a decision, an order or award becomes final and executory. It can not relate to an award or order of reinstatement still to be appealed or pending appeal which Article 223 contemplates. The provision of Article 223 is clear that an award for reinstatement shall be immediately executory even pending appeal and the posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement. The legislative intent is quite obvious, i.e., to make an award of reinstatement immediately enforceable, even pending appeal. To require the application for and issuance of a writ of execution as prerequisites for the execution of a reinstatement award would certainly betray and run counter to the very object and intent of Article 223, i.e., the immediate execution of a reinstatement order. The reason is simple. An application for a writ of execution and its issuance could be delayed for numerous reasons. A mere continuance or postponement of a scheduled hearing, for instance, or an inaction on the part of the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC could easily delay the issuance of the writ thereby setting at naught the strict mandate and noble purpose envisioned by Article 223. In other words, if the requirements of Article 224 were to govern, as we so declared in Maranaw, then the executory nature of a reinstatement order or award contemplated by Article 223 will be unduly circumscribed and rendered ineffectual. 6. Labor Law; Illegal Dismissal; Reinstatement; Statutory Construction; In introducing a new rule on the reinstatement aspect of a labor decision under R.A. No. 6715, Congress should not be considered to be indulging in mere semantic exercise; On appeal the appellate tribunal concerned may enjoin or suspend the reinstatement order in the exercise of its sound discretion.In enacting the law, the legislature is presumed to have ordained a valid and sensible law, one which operates no further than may be necessary to achieve its specific purpose. Statutes, as a rule, are to be construed in the light of the purpose to be achieved and the evil sought to be remedied. And where the statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that construction should be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote the object for which the statute was enacted, and a construction should be rejected which would tend to render abortive other provisions of the statute and to defeat the object which the legislator sought to attain by its enactment. In introducing a new rule on the reinstatement aspect of a labor decision under R.A. No. 6715, Congress should not be considered to be indulging in mere semantic exercise. On appeal, however, the appellate tribunal concerned may enjoin or suspend the reinstatement order in the exercise of its sound discretion. 7. Labor Law; Illegal Dismissal; Reinstatement; Statutory Construction; Henceforth, an award or order for reinstatement is self-executoryafter receipt of the decision or resolution ordering the employees reinstatement, the employer has the right to choose whether to re-admit the employee to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or to reinstate the employee in the payroll.-

Furthermore, the rule is that all doubts in the interpretation and implementation of labor laws should be resolved in favor of labor. In ruling that an order or award for rein- statement does not require a writ of execution the Court is simply adhering and giving meaning to this rule. Henceforth, we rule that an award or order for reinstatement is self-executory. After receipt of the decision or resolution ordering the employees reinstatement, the employer has the right to choose whether to re-admit the employee to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or to reinstate the employee in the payroll. In either instance, the employer has to inform the employee of his choice. The notification is based on practical considerations for without notice, the employee has no way of knowing if he has to report for work or not. Division: EN BANC Docket Number: G.R. No. 118651 Counsel: The Law Firm of Chan, Robles and Associates, Clara Rita A. Padilla Ponente: FRANCISCO Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Labor Arbiter is hereby REINSTATED.Costs against petitioner.

Bustamante vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 265 SCRA 61 , November 28, 1996 Case Title : OSMALIK S. BUSTAMANTE, PAULINO A. BANTAYAN, FERNANDO L. BUSTAMANTE, MARIO D. SUMONOD, and SABU J. LAMARAN, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, FIFTH DIVISION, and EVERGREEN FARMS, INC., respondents.Case Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari. Syllabi Class : Labor Law|Backwages Division EN BANC Docket Number: G.R. No. 111651 Counsel: Lucilo V. Pocot, J.V. Yap Law Office Ponente: PADILLA Dispositive Portion: ACCORDINGLY, private respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, dated 10 April 1996, is DENIED.

Genuino vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 539 SCRA 342 , December 04, 2007 Case Title : MARILOU S. GENUINO, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, CITIBANK, N.A., WILLIAM FERGUSON, and AZIZ RAJKOTWALA, respondents., CITIBANK, N.A., WILLIAM FERGUSON, and AZIZ RAJKOTWALA, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and MARILOU GENUINO,

respondents.Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals. Syllabi Class : Labor Law|Dismissals|Termination of Employees|Due Process|Loss of Confidence|Agabon Doctrine|Payroll Reinstatement Syllabi: 1. Labor Law; Dismissals; Termination of Employees; Due Process; Twin Notice Requirement.In a string of cases, we have repeatedly said that the requirement of twin notices must be met. In the recent case of King of Kings Transport, Inc. v. Mamac, 526 SCRA 116 (2007), we explained: To clarify, the following should be considered in terminating the services of employees: (1) The first written notice to be served on the employees should contain the specific causes or grounds for termination against them, and a directive that the employees are given the opportunity to submit their written explanation within a reasonable period. Reasonable opportunity under the Omnibus Rules means every kind of assistance that management must accord to the employees to enable them to prepare adequately for their defense. This should be construed as a period of at least five (5) calendar days from receipt of the notice to give the employees an opportunity to study the accusation against them, consult a union official or lawyer, gather data and evidence, and decide on the defenses they will raise against the complaint. Moreover, in order to enable the employees to intelligently prepare their explanation and defenses, the notice should contain a detailed narration of the facts and circumstances that will serve as basis for the charge against the employees. A general description of the charge will not suffice. Lastly, the notice should specifically mention which company rules, if any, are violated and/or which among the grounds under Art. 282 is being charged against the employees. (2) After serving the first notice, the employers should schedule and conduct a hearing or conference wherein the employees will be given the opportunity to: (1) explain and clarify their defenses to the charge against them; (2) present evidence in support of their defenses; and (3) rebut the evidence presented against them by the management. During the hearing or conference, the employees are given the chance to defend themselves personally, with the assistance of a representative or counsel of their choice. Moreover, this conference or hearing could be used by the parties as an opportunity to come to an amicable settlement. (3) After determining that termination of employment is justified, the employers shall serve the employees a written notice of termination indicating that: (1) all circumstances involving the charge against the employees have been considered; and (2) grounds have been established to justify the severance of their employment. 2. Same; Same; Payroll Reinstatement; Where the decision of the labor arbiter is for the reinstatement of the employee, the employee shall either be admitted back to work or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll, and if the decision of the labor arbiter is later reversed on appeal upon the finding that the ground for dismissal is valid, then the employer has the right to require the dismissed employee on payroll reinstatement to refund the salaries s/he received while the case was pending appeal, or it can be deducted from the accrued benefits that the dismissed employee may be entitled to receive from his/her employer under existing laws, collective bargaining agreement provisions, and company practices. Ordinarily, the employer is required to reinstate the employee during the pendency of the appeal pursuant to Art. 223, paragraph 3 of the Labor Code, which states: In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein. If the decision of the labor arbiter is later reversed on appeal upon the finding that the ground for dismissal is valid, then the employer has the right to require the dismissed employee on payroll reinstatement to refund the salaries s/he received while the case was pending appeal, or it can be deducted from the accrued benefits that the dismissed employee was entitled to receive from his/her employer under existing laws, collective bargaining agreement provisions, and company practices. However, if the employee was reinstated to work during the pendency of the appeal, then the employee is entitled to the compensation received for actual services rendered without need of refund. 3. Same; Same; Due Process; Agabon Doctrine; The violation of an employees right to statutory due process by the employer warrants the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages, the amount of which is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, taking into account the relevant circumstances.-

In view of Citibanks failure to observe due process, however, nominal damages are in order but the amount is hereby raised to PhP 30,000 pursuant to Agabon v. NLRC, 442 SCRA 573 (2004). The NLRCs order for payroll reinstatement is set aside. In Agabon, we explained: The violation of the petitioners right to statutory due process by the private respondent warrants the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages. The amount of such damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, taking into account the relevant circumstances. Considering the prevailing circumstances in the case at bar, we deem it proper to fix it at P30,000.00. We believe this form of damages would serve to deter employers from future violations of the statutory due process rights of employees. At the very least, it provides a vindication or recognition of this fundamental right granted to the latter under the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules. 4. Same; Same; Loss of Confidence; In order to constitute as just cause for dismissal, loss of confidence should relate to acts inimical to the interests of the employer; For loss of trust and confidence to be a valid ground for an employees dismissal, it must be substantial and not arbitrary, and must be founded on clearly established facts sufficient to warrant the employees separation from work.Art. 282(c) of the Labor Code provides that an employer may terminate an employment for fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him/her by his/her employer or duly authorized representative. In order to constitute as just cause for dismissal, loss of confidence should relate to acts inimical to the interests of the employer. Also, the act complained of should have arisen from the performance of the employees duties. For loss of trust and confidence to be a valid ground for an employees dismissal, it must be substantial and not arbitrary, and must be founded on clearly established facts sufficient to warrant the employees separation from work. We also held that: [L]oss of confidence is a valid ground for dismissing an employee and proof beyond reasonable doubt of the employees misconduct is not required. It is sufficient if there is some basis for such loss of confidence or if the employer has reasonable ground to believe or to entertain the moral conviction that the employee concerned is responsible for the misconduct and that the nature of his participation therein rendered him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position. 5. Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the notice of charges given to an employee is inadequate, the charges being too general to enable the employee to intelligently and adequately prepare her defense, the dismissal could not be in accordance with due process.While the bank gave Genuino an opportunity to deny the truth of the allegations in writing and participate in the administrative investigation, the fact remains that the charges were too general to enable Genuino to intelligently and adequately prepare her defense. The two-notice requirement of the Labor Code is an essential part of due process. The first notice informing the employee of the charges should neither be pro forma nor vague. It should set out clearly what the employee is being held liable for. The employee should be afforded ample opportunity to be heard and not mere opportunity. As explained in King of Kings Transport, Inc., ample opportunity to be heard is especially accorded the employees sought to be dismissed after they are specifically informed of the charges in order to give them an opportunity to refute such accusations leveled against them. Since the notice of charges given to Genuino is inadequate, the dismissal could not be in accordance with due process. Division: SECOND DIVISION

Docket Number: G.R. Nos. 142732-33, G.R. Nos. 142753-54 Counsel: Benjamin C. Santos & Ofelia Calceta-Santos Law Offices; Oben, Ventura, Defensor, Abola & Associates, Santos, Parugao, Aquino & Santos Law Offices, Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De Los Angeles Ponente: VELASCO, JR. Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the petitions of Genuino in G.R. Nos. 142732-33 are DENIED for lack of merit. The petitions of Citibank in G.R. Nos. 142753-54 are GRANTED. The September 30, 1999 Decision and March 31, 2000 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 51532 and 51533 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that Genuino is entitled to PhP 30,000 as indemnity for non-observance of due process. Item (3) in the dispositive portion of the

September 3, 1994 Decision of the NLRC in NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-10-06450-93 (CA No. 006947-94) is DELETED and SET ASIDE, and said NLRC decision is MODIFIED as follows: Pfizer, Inc. vs. Velasco, 645 SCRA 135, March 09, 2011 Excerpt : 1. ...Page Edit Line Top G.R. No. 177467. March 9, 2011. [*] PFIZER , INC. AND/OR REY GERARDO BACARRO, AND/OR FERDINAND CORTES, AND/OR ALFRED MAGALLON, AND/OR ARISTOTLE ARCE, petitioners, vs . GERALDINE VELASCO , respondent. Labor Law; Illegal Dismissals; Under Article 223 of the Labor Code, an employee entitled to reinstatement shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll.Under Article 223 of the Labor Code, an employee entitled to reinstatement shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his More Excerpts Case Title : PFIZER, INC. AND/OR REY GERARDO BACARRO, AND/OR FERDINAND CORTES, AND/OR ALFRED MAGALLON, AND/OR ARISTOTLE ARCE, petitioners, vs. GERALDINE VELASCO, respondent. Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals. Syllabi Class :Labor Law|Illegal Dismissals Syllabi: 1. Labor Law; Illegal Dismissals; Under Article 223 of the Labor Code, an employee entitled to reinstatement shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll.Under Article 223 of the Labor Code, an employee entitled to reinstatement shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. It is established in jurisprudence that reinstatement means restoration to a state or condition from which one had been removed or separated. The person reinstated assumes the position he had occupied prior to his dismissal. 2. Same; Same; An order for reinstatement entitles an employee to receive his accrued backwages from the moment the reinstatement order was issued up to the date when the same was reversed by a higher court without fear of refunding what he had received.In sum, the Court reiterates the principle that reinstatement pending appeal necessitates that it must be immediately self-executory without need for a writ of execution during the pendency of the appeal, if the law is to serve its noble purpose, and any attempt on the part of the employer to evade or delay its execution should not be allowed. Furthermore, we likewise restate our ruling that an order for reinstatement entitles an employee to receive his accrued backwages from the moment the reinstatement order was issued up to the date when the same was reversed by a higher court without fear of refunding what he had received. 3. Same; Same; The option of the employer to effect actual or payroll reinstatement must be exercised in good faith.Foreseeably, an employer may circumvent the immediately enforceable reinstatement order of the Labor Arbiter by crafting return-to-work directives that are ambiguous or meant to be rejected by the employee and then disclaim liability for backwages due to non-reinstatement by capitalizing on the employees purported refusal to work. In sum, the option of the employer to effect actual or payroll reinstatement must be exercised in good faith. Division: FIRST DIVISION Docket Number: G.R. No. 177467 Counsel: Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez & Gatmaitan Ponente: LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,J.

Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Resolution dated October 23, 2006 as well as the Resolution dated April 10, 2007 both issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88987 are hereby AFFIRMED.

Garcia vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc., 576 SCRA 479, January 20, 2009 Excerpt : 1. ...Page Edit Line Top G.R. No. 164856. January 20, 2009. [*] JUANITO A. GARCIA and ALBERTO J.DUMAGO , petitioners, vs . PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondent. Labor Law; Wages; A dismissed employee whose case was favorably decided by the Labor Arbiter is entitled to receive wages pending appeal upon reinstatement, which is immediately executoryunless there is a restraining order, it is ministerial upon the Labor Arbiter to implement the order of reinstatement and it is mandatory on the employer to comply therewith.A dismissed employee whose case was favorably decided by the Labor Arbiter is entitled to receive wages pending appeal upon reinstatement, which is immediately executory More Excerpts Case Title : JUANITO A. GARCIA and ALBERTO J. DUMAGO, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondent. Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals. Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Unjust Enrichment ; Solutio Indebiti ; Syllabi: 1. Labor Law; Wages; A dismissed employee whose case was favorably decided by the Labor Arbiter is entitled to receive wages pending appeal upon reinstatement, which is immediately executoryunless there is a restraining order, it is ministerial upon the Labor Arbiter to implement the order of reinstatement and it is mandatory on the employer to comply therewith.A dismissed employee whose case was favorably decided by the Labor Arbiter is entitled to receive wages pending appeal upon reinstatement, which is immediately executory. Unless there is a restraining order, it is ministerial upon the Labor Arbiter to implement the order of reinstatement and it is mandatory on the employer to comply therewith. 2. Same; Same; Same; Having slept on its rights, Philippine Air Lines (PAL) should not now be heard to say that the reinstatement that should accompany the appealed arbiters decision has now become impossible due to ongoing corporate rehabilitation.On the authority of this provision, respondent PALwho by its actions showed that it wanted to pursue its appealshould not now be heard to say that the reinstatement that should accompany the appeal has now been rendered impossible because of the ongoing corporate rehabilitation. To state it another way, PAL was the corporate rehabilitation petitioner in whose behalf the suspension of claims and actions was granted by law, and who knew that a suspension was in place; yet PAL itself disregarded the supposed suspension by appealing to the NLRC. From the point of view of fairness, it is the height of inequity to recognize the efficacy of PALs appeal and the NLRCs consequent reversal of the labor arbiters decision, while not recognizing the reinstatement pending appeal that should have been in place while PALs appeal was pending. If indeed the suspension should have automatically set in, then such suspension should apply to all proceedings from and after the SECs suspension order, i.e., from the labor arbiters to the NLRCs proceedings. Unfortunately, this levelling of the playing field far from what would happen if the ponencia prevails. 3. Same; Corporation Law; Laches; Philippine Air Lines (PAL) slept on its rights when it failed to ask for suspension of labor proceedings.By failing to ask for the suspension of the labor proceedings, PAL clearly slept on its right. At the very least, PALs failure to seasonably assert its right to the suspension of proceedings raised the presumption that it had abandoned or declined to assert this right.

4. Same; Employee who receives salary based on labor arbiters decision of reinstatement has no obligation to refund employer when National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reverses arbiters decision.In the context of this case, Article 223 embodies a substantive grant that must be given to the dismissed employees, irrespective of the presence of fault or lack of it on the part of the employer. For this reason (separately from the reason more fully discussed below), I do not agree with the ponencias position that PALs corporate rehabilitation excused it from complying with Article 223. The corporate rehabilitation merely suspended the implementation of Article 223, but did not totally excuse PAL from the obligation to reinstate, or in lieu thereof, to pay the wages due during the appeal period. Thus, the reinstatement should be implemented upon the lifting of the suspension or stay order. The intervening reversal by the NLRC of the labor arbiters reinstatement decision cannot and should not affect that part of the grant that had already been vested prior to the reversal. With the suspension lifted, PAL should therefore be held liable for the wages due during the appeal period all the way up to the time of reversal. 5. Same; Same; Writs of Execution; In reinstatement decisions of a labor arbiter there is no need to ask for a writ of execution except when the employer disobeys.The word immediately has been understood to mean without delay or lapse or interval of time. Based on this definition, the Court has ruled that Article 223 does not need an application for and the issuance of a writ of execution as prerequisite for the execution of a reinstatement award. In other words, the reinstatement order is self-executory. This is the basis for the current NLRC Rules of Procedure that leaves the enforcement of the reinstatement order to the employer who is given the duty to submit a compliance report within 10 days from receipt of the decision. The labor arbiter issues a writ of execution only when the employer disobeys the above directive or refuses to reinstate the dismissed employee. 6. BRION,J., Separate Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:; Two alternatives in effecting reinstatement pending appeal with National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) from Labor Arbiters Decision.The law provides the employer two alternatives in effecting reinstatement pending appeal. The first is actual reinstatement, i.e., the worker returns to work and earns his pay while waiting for the result of the employers appeal. The second is payroll reinstatement where, in lieu of actual reinstatement, the employer complies with the obligation to reinstate by merely keeping the worker in the payroll but out of the workplacea privilege that Article 223 of the Labor Code itself grants. 7. Same; Same; Reinstatement pending appeal in illegal dismissal cases is a species of execution pending appeal sanctioned by the Rules of Court, which applies suppletorily to the rules of procedure in labor cases under Sec. 3, Rule I of the 2005 National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Revised Rules of Procedure.Reinstatement pending appeal in illegal dismissal cases is a species of execution pending appeal sanctioned by the Rules of Court, which applies suppletorily to the rules of procedure in labor cases under Sec. 3, Rule I of the 2005 NLRC Revised Rules of Procedure. While Sec. 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court allows such preliminary relief upon due motion and for good reasons, Art. 233 requires the immediate execution pending appeal of the reinstatement aspect of the arbiters decision and is self-executory. The reinstated employee need not file a motion nor adduce good reasons for the grant of a reinstatement order pending appeal. 8. Same; Reinstatement; While it is mandatory of the arbiter to issue the writ, still, in view of the numerous cases handled by the arbiter, there is a necessity of the employee to work for the release of said writ and have it implementedif the employee fails to have the writ implemented and the decision of the labor arbiter is eventually overturned by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) or a higher body, then the employee loses the right to reinstatement.While it is mandatory for the arbiter to issue the writ, still, in view of the numerous cases handled by the arbiter, there is a necessity for the employee to work for the release of said writ and have it implemented. If the employee fails to have the writ implemented and the decision of the labor arbiter is eventually overturned by the NLRC or a higher body, then the employee loses the right to reinstatement. The only instance when an employer becomes liable to pay the salaries of a dismissed employee is when the employer, despite the service on him of the writ of execution, unjustifiably refuses to reinstate the employee x x x.

9. VELASCO, JR.,J., Separate Opinion:; Procedural laws are adjective laws which prescribe rules and forms of procedure of enforcing right or obtaining redress for their invasionsubstantive law creates, defines, or regulates rights concerning life, liberty or property or the powers of agencies or instrumentalities for the administration of public affairs.A plain reading of the provision easily reveals that it is procedural in nature. Procedural laws are adjective laws which prescribe rules and forms of procedure of enforcing right or obtaining redress for their invasion. This is differentiated from substantive law which creates, defines, or regulates rights concerning life, liberty or property or the powers of agencies or instrumentalities for the administration of public affairs. Art. 223 of the Labor Code is not a substantive, but basically a procedural provision conferring at most on the prevailing employee at the labor arbiters level the right to execution of the reinstatement order pending appeal. It does away with the application or motion for the issuance of a writ of execution to prevent delay in the reinstatement of the employee. 10. Same; Corporate Rehabilitation; Although the Philippine economy was gravely affected by the Asian financial crisis, however, it cannot be assumed that it has likewise brought Philippine Air Lines (PAL) to the brink of bankcruptcyin effect, we held that the mere fact that PAL underwent corporate rehabilitation does not automatically mean that it suffered specific and substantial losses that would necessitate retrenchment.We do not agree that reinstatement pending appeal is inapplicable in the instant case since, as the majority puts it, PAL is similarly in a state of being resuscitated in order to survive. PAL even argues that retrenchment and cash flow constraints rendered it impossible to comply with the reinstatement order. In Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP) v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., et al., 559 SCRA 252 (2008), we noted that PAL failed to substantiate its claim of actual and imminent substantial losses which would justify the retrenchment of more than 1,400 of its cabin crew personnel. Although the Philippine economy was gravely affected by the Asian financial crisis, however, it cannot be assumed that it has likewise brought PAL to the brink of bankruptcy. In effect, we held that the mere fact that PAL underwent corporate rehabilitation does not automatically mean that it suffered specific and substantial losses that would necessitate retrenchment. In fact, PAL was on the road to recovery as early as February 1999 and was declaring profits in millions in the succeeding years. 11. QUISUMBING,J., Separate Opinion:; The principle of unjust enrichment does not apply, first, the provision on reinstatement pending appeal is in accord with the social justice philosophy of our Constitutionit is meant to afford full protection to labor as it aims to stop (albeit temporarily, since the appeal may be decided in favor of the employer) a continuing threat or danger to the survival or even the life of the dismissed employee and his family, second, the provision on reinstatement pending appeal partakes of a special law that must govern the instant casethe provision of the Civil Code on unjust enrichment, being of general application, must give way.The principle of unjust enrichment does not apply. First, the provision on reinstatement pending appeal is in accord with the social justice philosophy of our Constitution. It is meant to afford full protection to labor as it aims to stop (albeit temporarily, since the appeal may be decided in favor of the employer) a continuing threat or danger to the survival or even the life of the dismissed employee and his family. Second, the provision on reinstatement pending appeal partakes of a special law that must govern the instant case. The provision of the Civil Code on unjust enrichment, being of general application, must give way. 12. Same; Corporate Rehabilitation; Had there been no need to rehabilitate, respondent may have opted for actual physical reinstatement pending appeal to optimize the utilization of resourcesthen again, though the management may think this wise, the rehabilitation receiver may decide otherwise, not to mention the subsistence of the injunction on claims.There are legal effects arising from a judicial order placing a corporation under rehabilitation. Respondent was, during the period material to the case, effectively deprived of the alternative choices under Article 223 of the Labor Code, not only by virtue of the statutory injunction but also in view of the interim relinquishment of management control to give way to the full exercise of the powers of the rehabilitation receiver. Had there been no need to rehabilitate, respondent may have opted for actual physical reinstatement pending appeal to optimize the utilization of resources. Then again, though the management may think this wise, the rehabilitation receiver may decide otherwise, not to mention the subsistence of the injunction on claims.

13. Same; Writ of Execution; The new National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Rules of Procedure, which took effect on January 7, 2006, now require the employer to submit a report of compliance within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the Labor Arbiters decision, disobedience to which clearly denotes a refusal to reinstatethe employee need not file a motion for the issuance of the writ of execution since the Labor Arbiter shall thereafter motu proprio issue the writ, and, with the new rules in place, there is hardly any difficulty in determining the employers intransigence in immediately complying with the order.The new NLRC Rules of Procedure, which took effect on January 7, 2006, now require the employer to submit a report of compliance within 10 calendar days from receipt of the Labor Arbiters decision, disobedience to which clearly denotes a refusal to reinstate. The employee need not file a motion for the issuance of the writ of execution since the Labor Arbiter shall thereafter motu proprio issue the writ. With the new rules in place, there is hardly any difficulty in determining the employers intransigence in immediately complying with the order. 14. Same; Same; While reinstatement pending appeal aims to avert the continuing threat or danger to the survival or even the life of the dismissed employee and his family, it does not contemplate the period when the employer-corporation itself is similarly in a judicially monitored state of being resuscitated in order to survive.While reinstatement pending appeal aims to avert the continuing threat or danger to the survival or even the life of the dismissed employee and his family, it does not contemplate the period when the employer-corporation itself is similarly in a judicially monitored state of being resuscitated in order to survive. 15. Same; Reinstatement; It settles the view that the Labor Arbiters order of reinstatement is immediately executory and the employer has to either re-admit them to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to their dismissal, or to reinstate them in the payroll, and that failing to exercise the options in the alternative, employer must pay the employees salaries.The Court reaffirms the prevailing principle that even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court. It settles the view that the Labor Arbiters order of reinstatement is immediately executory and the employer has to either readmit them to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to their dismissal, or to reinstate them in the payroll, and that failing to exercise the options in the alternative, employer must pay the employees salaries. Division: EN BANC Docket Number: G.R. No. 164856 Counsel: Rolando Go, Jr. Ponente: CARPIO-MORALES Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY DENIED. Insofar as the Court of Appeals Decision of December 5, 2003 and Resolution of April 16, 2004 annulling the NLRC Resolutions affirming the validity of the Writ of Execution and the Notice of Garnishment are concerned, the Court finds no reversible error.

St. Martin Funeral Home vs. NLRC, 295 SCRA 494 , September 16, 1998 Case Title : ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and BIENVENIDO ARICAYOS, respondents.Case Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari. Syllabi Class : Labor Law|Judicial Review|Appeals|Pleadings and Practice|Jurisdiction|Statutes|Statutory Construction|Certiorari|Hierarchy of Courts Syllabi:

1. Labor Law; Judicial Review; Appeals; Pleadings and Practice; The Court feels that it is now exigent and opportune to reexamine the functional validity and systemic practicability of the mode of judicial review it has long adopted and still follows with respect to decisions of the NLRC.Before proceeding further into the merits of the case at bar, the Court feels that it is now exigent and opportune to reexamine the functional validity and systemic practicability of the mode of judicial review it has long adopted and still follows with respect to decisions of the NLRC. The increasing number of labor disputes that find their way to this Court and the legislative changes introduced over the years into the provisions of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 442 (The Labor Code of the Philippines and Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P. No.) 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) now stridently call for and warrant a reassessment of that procedural aspect. 2. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Hierarchy of Courts; All references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65consequently, all such petitions should henceforth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals.While we do not wish to intrude into the Congressional sphere on the matter of the wisdom of a law, on this score we add the further observations that there is a growing number of labor cases being elevated to this Court which, not being a trier of fact, has at times been constrained to remand the case to the NLRC for resolution of unclear or ambiguous factual findings; that the Court of Appeals is procedurally equipped for that purpose, aside from the increased number of its component divisions; and that there is undeniably an imperative need for expeditious action on labor cases as a major aspect of constitutional protection to labor. Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should henceforth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired. 3. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Certiorari; Pleadings and Practice; The Court is of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the special civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the NLRC; Appeals by certiorari and the original action for certiorari are both modes of judicial review addressed to the appellate courts.The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the special civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the NLRC. The use of the word appeal in relation thereto and in the instances we have noted could have been a lapsus plumae because appeals by certiorari and the original action for certiorari are both modes of judicial review addressed to the appellate courts. The important distinction between them, however, and with which the Court is particularly concerned here is that the special civil action of certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of Appeals; whereas to indulge in the assumption that appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court are allowed would not subserve, but would subvert, the intention of Congress as expressed in the sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No. 1495. 4. Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; A review of the legislative records on the antecedents of R.A. No. 7902 persuades the Court that there may have been an oversight in the course of the deliberations on the said Act or an imprecision in the terminology used therein.A review of the legislative records on the antecedents of R.A. No. 7902 persuades us that there may have been an oversight in the course of the deliberations on the said Act or an imprecision in the terminology used therein. In fine, Congress did intend to provide for judicial review of the adjudications of the NLRC in labor cases by the Supreme Court, but there was an inaccuracy in the term used for the intended mode of review. This conclusion which we have reluctantly but prudently arrived at has been drawn from the considerations extant in the records of Congress, more particularly on Senate Bill No. 1495 and the Reference Committee Report on S. No. 1495/H. No. 10452. 5. Same; Same; Same; Same; There are no cases in the Labor Code the decisions, resolutions, orders or awards wherein are within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or of any other court for that matter.-

The same exceptive clause further confuses the situation by declaring that the Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over decisions falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of B.P. No. 129, and those specified cases in Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. These cases can, of course, be properly excluded from the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. However, because of the aforementioned amendment by transposition, also supposedly excluded are cases falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Labor Code. This is illogical and impracticable, and Congress could not have intended that procedural gaffe, since there are no cases in the Labor Code the decisions, resolutions, orders or awards wherein are within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or of any other court for that matter. 6. Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Statutes; The excepting clause provided for in paragraph (3), Section 9 of B.P. No. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7902, contradicts what has been ruled and said all along that appeal does not lie from decisions of the NLRC.It will, however, be noted that paragraph (3), Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 now grants exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals over all final adjudications of the Regional Trial Courts and the quasijudicial agencies generally or specifically referred to therein except, among others, those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with x x x the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, x x x. This would necessarily contradict what has been ruled and said all along that appeal does not lie from decisions of the NLRC. Yet, under such excepting clause literally construed, the appeal from the NLRC cannot be brought to the Court of Appeals, but to this Court by necessary implication. Division: EN BANC Docket Number: G.R. No. 130866 Counsel: Isagani M. Jungco, Sebastinian Office of Legal Aid Ponente: REGALADO Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, under the foregoing premises, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby REMANDED, and all pertinent records thereof ordered to be FORWARDED, to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition consistent with the views and ruling herein set forth, without pronouncement as to costs.

EMCO Plywood Corporation vs. Abelgas, 427 SCRA 496 , April 14, 2004 Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals. Syllabi Class : Labor Law|Retrenchment|Standards to Justify Retrenchment|Words and Phrases|Notice Requirement|Resignation|Attorneys Fees|Quitclaims|Estoppel Syllabi: 1. Labor Law; Retrenchment; Standards to Justify Retrenchment; Words and Phrases; The loss referred to in Article 283 of the Labor Code cannot be of just any kind or amountthe losses should be substantial and not merely de minimis in extent.Retrenchment is one of the authorized causes for the dismissal of employees. Resorted to by employers to avoid or minimize business losses, it is recognized under Article 283 of the Labor Code. The loss referred to in this provision cannot be of just any kind or amount; otherwise, a company could easily feign excuses to suit its whims and prejudices or to rid itself of unwanted employees. The Court has laid down the following standards that a company must meet to justify retrenchment and to guard against abuse: x x x Firstly, the losses expected should be substantial and not merely de minimis in extent. If the loss purportedly sought to be forestalled by retrenchment is clearly shown to be insubstantial and inconsequential in character, the bona fide nature of the retrenchment would appear to be seriously in question. Secondly, the substantial loss apprehended must be reasonably imminent, as such imminence can be perceived objectively and in good faith by the employer. There should, in other words, be a certain

degree of urgency for the retrenchment, which is after all a drastic recourse with serious consequences for the livelihood of the employees retired or otherwise laid-off. Because of the consequential nature of retrenchment, it must, thirdly, be reasonably necessary and likely to effectively prevent the expected losses. The employer should have taken other measures prior or parallel to retrenchment to forestall losses, i.e., cut other costs other than labor costs. An employer who, for instance, lays off substantial numbers of workers while continuing to dispense fat executive bonuses and perquisites or so-called golden parachutes, can scarcely claim to be retrenching in good faith to avoid losses. To impart operational meaning to the constitutional policy of providing full protection to labor, the employers prerogative to bring down labor costs by retrenching must be exercised essentially as a measure of last resort, after less drastic meanse.g., reduction of both management and rank-and-file bonuses and salaries, going on reduced time, improving manufacturing efficiencies, trimming of marketing and advertising costs, etc.have been tried and found wanting. Lastly, but certainly not the least important, alleged losses if already realized, and the expected imminent losses sought to be forestalled, must be proved by sufficient and convincing evidence. The reason for requiring this quantum of proof is readily apparent: any less exacting standard of proof would render too easy the abuse of this ground for termination of services of employees. x x x. 2. Labor Law; Retrenchment; Standards to Justify Retrenchment; The losses must be substantial and the retrenchment must be reasonably necessary to avert such losses, and the employer bears the burden of proving the existence or the imminence of substantial losses with clear and satisfactory evidence that there are legitimate business reasons justifying a retrenchment.The Court is not persuaded. Not every loss incurred or expected to be incurred by a company will justify retrenchment. The losses must be substantial and the retrenchment must be reasonably necessary to avert such losses. The employer bears the burden of proving the existence or the imminence of substantial losses with clear and satisfactory evidence that there are legitimate business reasons justifying a retrenchment. Should the employer fail to do so, the dismissal shall be deemed unjustified. 3. Labor Law; Retrenchment; Standards to Justify Retrenchment; Retrenchment must be exercised essentially as a measure of last resort, after less drastic means have been tried and found wanting, and the fact that an employer did not resort to other such measures seriously belies its claim that retrenchment was done in good faith to avoid losses.Retrenchment is a management prerogative consistently recognized and affirmed by this Court. It is, however, subject to faithful compliance with the substantive and the procedural requirements laid down by law and jurisprudence. It must be exercised essentially as a measure of last resort, after less drastic means have been tried and found wanting. The only less drastic measure that EMCO undertook was the rotation work scheme: the three-day-work per employee per week schedule. It did not try other measures, such as cost reduction, lesser investment on raw materials, adjustment of the work routine to avoid the scheduled power failure, reduction of the bonuses and salaries of both management and rank-and-file, improvement of manufacturing efficiency, trimming of marketing and advertising costs, and so on. The fact that petitioners did not resort to other such measures seriously belies their claim that retrenchment was done in good faith to avoid losses. 4. Labor Law; Retrenchment; Notice Requirement; For a valid termination due to retrenchment, written notices of the intended retrenchment must be served by the employer on the workers and on the Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the actual date of the retrenchment, and the written notice should be served on the employees themselves, not on their supervisors.For a valid termination due to retrenchment, the law requires that written notices of the intended retrenchment be served by the employer on the worker and on the Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the actual date of the retrenchment. The purpose of this requirement is to give employees some time to prepare for the eventual loss of their jobs, as well as to give DOLE the opportunity to ascertain the verity of the alleged cause of termination. There is no showing that such notice was served on the employees in the present case. Petitioners argue that on January 20, 1993, Petitioner Jimmy Lim gave the DOLE a formal notice of the intended retrenchment and furnished the EMCO Labor Association and its general membership copies of the notice by posting it on the bulletin boards of their respective departments. On March 2, 1993, EMCO sent DOLE another written notice. The next day, Lim sent a Memorandum to the foremen, the section heads, the supervisors and the department heads instructing them to retrench some of the workers based on certain guidelines. Petitioners aver that the Memorandum also served as a written notice to all the employees concerned. Clearly, it is not the notice

contemplated by law. The written notice should have been served on the employees themselves, not on their supervisors. 5. Labor Law; Retrenchment; Notice Requirement; The Notice sent to DOLE is defective where it referred to the impending termination of the services of employees which was less than the number of workers that it eventually retrenched.The Notice sent to DOLE was defective, because it stated that EMCO would terminate the services of 104 of its workers. The corporation, however, actually dismissed 250. Petitioners aver that the 146 employees not listed in the Notice sent to DOLE voluntarily resigned; hence, the latter were not retrenched. This assertion does not deserve any consideration. Petitioners reiterate that those workers voluntarily resigned because of the atmosphere of uncertainty, which occurred after the Sawmill Department had been temporarily shut off in February 1993. The renewal of the permit on March 31, 1993, however, removed the alleged shroud of uncertainty. 6. Labor Law; Resignation; Words and Phrases; Resignation is the voluntary act of employees who are compelled by personal reasons to dissociate themselves from their employmentit must be done with the intention of relinquishing an office, accompanied by the act of abandonment.Moreover, resignation is the voluntary act of employees who are compelled by personal reasons to dissociate themselves from their employment. It must be done with the intention of relinquishing an office, accompanied by the act of abandonment. Therefore, it would have been illogical for respondents to resign and then file a Complaint for illegal dismissal. Resignation is inconsistent with the filing of the Complaint. 7. Labor Law; Attorneys Fees; The obligation to pay attorneys fees belongs to the union and cannot be shunted to the individual workers as their direct responsibility.The obligation to pay attorneys fees belongs to the union and cannot be shunted to the individual workers as their direct responsibility. The law has made clear that any agreement to the contrary shall be null and void ab initio. Thus, petitioners deduction of attorneys fees from respondents separation pay has no basis in law. 8. Labor Law; Quitclaims; The mere fact that the employees were not physically coerced or intimidated does not necessarily imply that they freely or voluntarily consented to the terms of the Waivers and Quitclaim Deeds; The employer, not the worker, has the burden of proving that the Quitclaims were voluntarily entered into.We hold that the labor arbiter and the NLRC erred in concluding that respondents had voluntarily signed the Waivers and Quitclaim Deeds. Contrary to this assumption, the mere fact that respondents were not physically coerced or intimidated does not necessarily imply that they freely or voluntarily consented to the terms thereof. Moreover, petitioners, not respondents, have the burden of proving that the Quitclaims were voluntarily entered into. 9. Labor Law; Quitclaims; Retrenchment; Where the retrenchment was illegal and of no effect, the Quitclaims were therefore not voluntarily entered into by the workers.Furthermore, in Trendline Employees Association-Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (TEA-SPFL) v. NLRC and Philippine Carpet Employees Association v. Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Corporation, similar retrenchments were found to be illegal, as the employers had failed to prove that they were actually suffering from poor financial conditions. In these cases, the Quitclaims were deemed illegal, as the employees consents had been vitiated by mistake or fraud. These rulings are applicable to the case at bar. Because the retrenchment was illegal and of no effect, the Quitclaims were therefore not voluntarily entered into by respondents. Their consent was similarly vitiated by mistake or fraud. The law looks with disfavor upon quitclaims and releases by employees pressured into signing by unscrupulous employers minded to evade legal responsibilities. 10. Labor Law; Quitclaims; Estoppel; Deeds of release or quitclaim cannot bar employees from demanding benefits to which they are legally entitled or from contesting the legality of their dismissal, and their acceptance of those benefits would not amount to estoppel.As a rule, deeds of release or quitclaim cannot bar employees from demanding benefits to which they are legally entitled or from contesting the legality of their dismissal. The acceptance of those benefits would

not amount to estoppel. The amounts already received by the present respondents as consideration for signing the Quitclaims should, however, be deducted from their respective monetary awards.

Divsion: FIRST DIVISION Docket Number: G.R. No. 148532 Counsel: Gavino F. Reyes, Danilo P. Rubio Ponente: PANGANIBAN Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

Wyeth-Suaco Laboratories, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 219 SCRA 356 , March 02, 1993 Case Title : WYETH-SUACO LABORATORIES, INC., AYERST LABORATORIES (PHILS.), INC. and THOMAS LEBER, petitioners, vs. -NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER DAISY G. BARCELONA and ROLANDO SANTOS, respondents.Case Nature : PETITION for certiorari to annul and set aside the resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission. Syllabi Class : Labor Law|Waiver of rights of employees and laborers|Quitclaims|Evidence|Appeal Syllabi: 1. Labor Law; Waiver of rights of employees and laborers; Quitclaims; A quitclaim executed in favor of a company by an employee amounts to a valid and binding compromise agreement between them.A quitclaim executed in favor of a company by an employee amounts to a valid and binding compromise agreement between them (Samaniego v. NLRC, 198 SCRA 111 [1991]). Article 227 of the Labor Code provides that any compromise settlement voluntarily agreed upon with the assistance of the Bureau of Labor Relations or the regional office of the DOLE, shall be final and binding upon the parties and the NLRC or any court "shall not assume jurisdiction over issues involved therein except in case of non-compliance thereof or if there is prima facie evidence that the settlement was obtained through fraud, misrepresentation, or coercion." 2. Labor Law; Waiver of rights of employees and laborers; Quitclaims; Reason why quitclaim are commonly frowned upon as contrary to public policy and they are ineffective to bar claims for the full measure of the workers' legal rights.Quit-claims are commonly frowned upon as contrary to public policy and they are ineffective to bar claims for the full measure of the workers' legal rights (Lopez Sugar Corporation v. FFW, 189 SCRA 179 [1990]). The reason for this is because the employer and the employee do not stand on the same footing, such that quitclaims usually take the form of contracts of adherence, not of choice. 3. Labor Law; Waiver of rights of employees and laborers; Quitclaims; While dire necessity as a reason for signing a quitclaim is not acceptable reason to set aside the quitclaim in the absence of a showing that the employee had been forced to execute it, such reason gains importance if the consideration for the quitclaim is unconscionably low and the employee has been tricked into accepting it.In the case at bar, both the labor arbiter and the NLRC found for private respondent primarily because of the fact that petitioners were guilty of misrepresentation by their failure to disclose to the ALPI employees the real nature of the negotiations and transaction between Wyeth and ALPI. The Court is bound by this finding of fact there being no showing that neither the arbiter nor the NLRC gravely abused their discretion or otherwise acted without jurisdiction or in excess of the same.

4. Labor Law; Evidence; Appeal; Court is bound by the findings of fact there being no showing that neither the arbiter nor the NLRC gravely abused their discretion or otherwise acted without jurisdiction or in excess of the same.Indeed, Santos resigned because of the uncertainty as to the future of ALPI. Like the other employees, he was made to believe that the deal between the two companies was merely a merger but it really was a projected buy-out. While "dire necessity" as a reason for signing a quitclaim is not acceptable reason to set aside the quitclaim in the absence of a showing that the employee had been forced to execute it, such reason gains importance if the consideration for the quitclaim is unconscionably low and the employee has been tricked into accepting it. Division: THIRD DIVISION Docket Number: G.R. No. 100658 Counsel: Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez & Gatmaitan Law Office, Dominador G. Magno Ponente: MELO Dispositive Portion: PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the questioned Decision of the Labor Arbiter and the Resolutions of the NLRC AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining order issued on July 24, 1991 is lifted.

Cooperative Rural Bank of Davao City, Inc. vs. Ferrer-Calleja, 165 SCRA 725 , September 26, 1988 Case Title : COOPERATIVE RURAL BANK OF DAVAO CITY, INC., petitioner, vs. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, MOLE, MANILA; FELIZARDO T. SERAPIO, MED-ARBITER DESIGNATE, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. XI, MOLE, DAVAO CITY; and FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS, respondents.Case Nature : PETITION for certiorari to review the resolution of the Bureau of Labor Relations. Syllabi Class : Labor Law|Certification Election|Remedial Law|Special Civil Action|Certiorari| Statutes|Cooperative| defined under PD 175|Collective Bargaining Syllabi: 1. Labor Law; Certification Election; Remedial Law; Special Civil Action; Certiorari; The instant petition for certiorari cannot be considered moot and academic simply because the certification election sought to be enjoined went on as scheduled.Contrary to the view espoused by the Solicitor General, this case cannot be considered moot and academic simply because the certification election sought to be enjoined went on as scheduled. The instant Petition is one for certiorari as a special civil action. Errors of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondents are alleged in the Petition itself. If the public respondents had indeed committed jurisdictional errors, the action taken by both the Med-Arbiter and the Bureau Director will be deemed null and void ab initio. And if this were so, the certification election would, necessarily, have no legal justification. The arguments raised in the instant Petition strike at the very heart of the validity of the certification election itself. 2. Labor Law; Certification Election; Statutes; Cooperative, defined under PD 175; A cooperative is defined to mean organizations composed primarily of small producers and of consumers who voluntarily join together to form business enterprises which they themselves control, own and patronize.However, under Section 2 of P.D. No. 175, a cooperative is defined to mean organizations composed primarily of small producers and of consumers who voluntarily join together to form business enterprises which they themselves own, control, and patronize. Its creation and growth was declared as a policy of the State as a means of increasing the income and purchasing power of the low-income sector of the population in order to attain a more equitable distribution of income and wealth.

3. Labor Law; Certification Election; Collective Bargaining; Employees of cooperatives who are themselves members or co-owners of the same cannot invoke the right to collective bargaining; the rule however does not apply to those employees who are not members or co-owners of such cooperatives.An employee therefore of such a cooperative who is a member and co-owner thereof cannot invoke the right to collective bargaining for certainly an owner cannot bargain with himself or his co-owners. In the opinion of August 14, 1981 of the Solicitor General he correctly opined that employees of cooperatives who are themselves members of the cooperative have no right to form or join labor organizations for purposes of collective bargaining for being themselves co-owners of the cooperative. However, in so far as it involves cooperatives with employees who are not members or co-owners thereof, certainly such employees are entitled to exercise the rights of all workers to organization, collective bargaining, negotiations and others as are enshrined in the Constitution and existing laws of the country. Division: FIRST DIVISION Docket Number: No. L-77951 Counsel: Herbert P. Artes, The Solicitor General Ponente: GANCAYCO Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the herein petition is hereby GRANTED and the resolution of public respondent Pura FerrerCalleja, Director, Bureau of Labor Relations, of February 11, 1987 is hereby MODIFIED to the effect that only the rank and file employees of petitioner who are not its members or co-owners are entitled to selforganization, collective bargaining, and negotiations, while the other employees who are members or coowners thereof can not enjoy such right.

Central Negros Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. Sec. of DOLE, 201 SCRA 584 , September 13, 1991 Case Title : CENTRAL NEGROS ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (CENECO), petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, and CENECO UNION OF RATIONAL EMPLOYEES (CURE), respondents.Case Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION for certiorari to review the order of the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment. Syllabi Class : Labor Law|Labor Organization|Collective Bargaining|Constitutional Law Syllabi: 1. Labor Law; Labor Organization; Collective Bargaining; Petitioner deemed to have submitted the issue of membership withdrawal from the cooperative to the jurisdiction of the med-arbiter and now estopped from questioning that same jurisdiction which it invoked in its motion to dismiss after obtaining an adverse ruling thereon.From a perusal of petitioners motion to dismiss filed with the med-arbiter, it becomes readily apparent that the sole basis for petitioners motion is the illegality of the employees membership in respondent union despite the fact that they allegedly are still members of the cooperative. Petitioner itself adopted the aforesaid argument in seeking the dismissal of the petition for certification election filed with the medarbiter, and the finding made by the latter was merely in answer to the arguments advanced by petitioner. Hence, petitioner is deemed to have submitted the issue of membership withdrawal from the cooperative to the jurisdiction of the med-arbiter and it is now estopped from questioning that same jurisdiction which it invoked in its motion to dismiss after obtaining an adverse ruling thereon. 2. Labor Law; Labor Organization; Collective Bargaining; Argument of CENECO that the withdrawal was merely to subvert the ruling of the Court in the Batangas case is without merit.The argument of CENECO that the withdrawal was merely to subvert the ruling of this Court in the BATANGAS case is without merit. The case referred to merely declared that employees who are at the same time members of the cooperative cannot join labor unions for purposes of collective bargaining. However, nowhere in said case is it stated that member-employees are prohibited from withdrawing their membership in the cooperative in order to join a labor union.

3. Labor Law; Labor Organization; Collective Bargaining; The right to join an organization necessarily includes the equivalent right that to join the same.It appears that the Articles of Incorporation of CENECO do not provide any ground for withdrawal from membership which accordingly gives rise to the presumption that the same may be done at any time and for whatever reason. In addition, membership in the cooperative is on a voluntary basis. Hence, withdrawal therefrom cannot be restricted unnecessarily. The right to join an organization necessarily includes the equivalent right not to join the same. 4. Labor Law; Labor Organization; Collective Bargaining; Constitutional Law; The avowed policy of the state to afford full protection to labor and to promote the primacy of free collective bargaining mandates that the employees right to form and join unions for the purposes of collective bargaining be accorded the highest consideration.The right of the employees to self-organization is a compelling reason why their withdrawal from the cooperative must be allowed. As pointed out by CURE, the resignation of the member-employees is an expression of their preference for union membership over that of membership in the cooperative. The avowed policy of the State to afford full protection to labor and to promote the primacy of free collective bargaining mandates that the employees right to form and join unions for purposes of collective bargaining be accorded the highest consideration. 5. Labor Law; Labor Organization; Collective Bargaining; Where a union has filed a petition for certification election, the mere fact that no opposition is made does not warrant a direct certification.We have said that where a union has filed a petition for certification election, the mere fact that no opposition is made does not warrant a direct certification. 6. Labor Law; Labor Organization; Collective Bargaining; The most effective way of determining which labor organization can truly represent the working force is by certification election.While there may be some factual variances, the rationale therein is applicable to the present case in the sense that it is not alone sufficient that a union has the support of the majority. What is equally important is that everyone be given a democratic space in the bargaining unit concerned. The most effective way of determining which labor organization can truly represent the working force is by certification election. Division: SECOND DIVISION Docket Number: G.R. No. 94045 Counsel: Enrique S. Tabino, Edmundo G. Manlapao

Ponente: REGALADO Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the questioned order for the direct certification of respondent CURE as the bargaining representative of the employees of petitioner CENECO is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The medarbiter is hereby ordered to conduct a certification election among the rank-and-file employees of CENECO with CURE and No Union as the choices therein.

Manila Electric Co. vs. Secretary of Labor and Employment, 197 SCRA 275 , May 20, 1991 Case Title : MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. THE HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, STAFF AND TECHNICAL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION OF MERALCO, and FIRST LINE ASSOCIATION OF MERALCO SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES, respondents.Case Nature : PETITION to review the decision of the Secretary of Labor and Employment. Syllabi Class : Labor Relations|Unions|Rep. Act 6715 Syllabi:

1. Labor Relations; Unions; Rep. Act 6715; The implementing rules of RA 6715, insofar as they disqualify security guards from joining a rank and file organization, are null and void, for being not germane to the object and purposes of EO 111 and RA 6715.As will be noted, the second sentence of Art. 245 embodies an amendment disqualifying supervisory employees from membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees. It does not include security guards in the disqualification. The implementing rules of RA 6715, therefore, insofar as they disqualify security guards from joining a rank and file organization are null and void, for being not germane to the object and purposes of EO 111 and RA 6715 upon which such rules purportedly derive statutory moorings. 2. Labor Relations; Unions; Rep. Act 6715; Security guards may now freely join a labor organization of the rank and file, or that of the supervisory union, depending on their rank.While therefore under the old rules, security guards were barred from joining a labor organization of the rank and file, under RA 6715, they may now freely join a labor organization of the rank and file or that of the supervisory union, depending on their rank. By accommodating supervisory employees, the Secretary of Labor must likewise apply the provisions of RA 6715 to security guards by favorably allowing them free access to a labor organization, whether rank and file or supervisory, in recognition of their constitutional right to self-organization. Division: EN BANC Docket Number: G.R. No. 91902 Counsel: Rolando R. Arbues, Atilano S. Guevarra, Jr., Gil S. San Diego, The Solicitor General, Felipe Gojar Ponente: MEDIALDEA Dispositive Portion: ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. We AFFIRM with modification the Resolution of the Secretary of Labor dated November 3, 1989 upholding an employees right to self-organization. A certification election is hereby ordered conducted among supervisory employees of MERALCO, belonging to Pay Grades VII and above, using as guideliness an employees power to either recommend or execute management policies, pursuant to Art. 212 (m), of the Labor Code, as amended by Sec. 4 of RA 6715, with respondents STEAM-PCWF and FLAMES as choices.Employees of the Patrol Division, Treasury Security Services Section and Secretaries may freely join either the labor organization of the rank and file or that of the supervisory union depending on their employee rank. Disqualified employees covered by Sec. 3, Art. I of the MEWA-CBA, shall remain with the existing labor organization of the rank and file, pursuant to the Secretary of Labors directive:The Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) issued on February 26, 1990 is hereby LIFTED. Costs against petitioner.

Philips Industrial Development, Inc. vs. NLRC, 210 SCRA 339 , June 25, 1992 Case Title : PHILIPS INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and PHILIPS EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION (FFW), respondents.Case Nature : PETITION for certiorari and prohibition to review the decision and resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission. Syllabi Class : Labor Law|Security Agencies Syllabi: 1. Labor Law; Security Agencies; Guards are allowed to form or join a union.Even if the issue was, indeed, as perceived by the NLRC, still, a palpable error was committed by it in ruling that under the law, all workers, except managerial employees and security personnel, are qualified to join a union, or form part of a bargaining unit. At the time Case No. NLRC-NCR-00-11-03936-87 was filed in 1987, security personnel were no longer disqualified from joining or forming a union. 2. Labor Law; Managerial employees and secretaries may not form or join a union.-

On the main issue raised before Us, it is quite obvious that respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing the decision of the Executive Labor Arbiter and in decreeing that PIDIs Service Engineers, Sales Force, division secretaries, all Staff of General Management, Personnel and Industrial Relations Department, Secretaries of Audit, EDP and Financial Systems are included within the rank and file bargaining unit. In the first place, all these employees, with the exception of the service engineers and the sales force personnel, are confidential employees. Their classification as such is not seriously disputed by PEO-FFW; the five (5) previous CBAs between PIDI and PEO-FFW explicitly considered them as confidential employees. By the very nature of their functions, they assist and act in a confidential capacity to, or have access to confidential matters of, persons who exercise managerial functions in the field of labor relations. As such, the rationale behind the ineligibility of managerial employees to form, assist or join a labor union equally applies to them. 3. Labor Law; Service engineers and salesmen may form their own bargaining unit separate from rankand-file employees.As regards the service engineers and the sales representatives, two (2) points which respondent NLRC likewise arbitrarily and erroneously ruled upon, need to be discussed. Firstly, in holding that they are included in the bargaining unit for the rank and file employees of PIDI, the NLRC practically forced them to become members of PEO-FFW or to be subject to its sphere of influence, it being the certified bargaining agent for the subject bargaining unit. This violates, obstructs, impairs and impedes the service engineers and the sales representatives constitutional right to form unions or associations and to self-organization. Division: THIRD DIVISION Docket Number: G.R. No. 88957 Counsel: Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz, Ronnie M. Nismal

Ponente: DAVIDE, JR. Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission in Case No. NLRC-NCR-00-11-03936-87, promulgated on 16 January 1989, is hereby SET ASIDE while the Decision of the Executive Labor Arbiter in said case dated 17 March 1988 is hereby REINSTATED, subject to the modifications above indicated.

National Association of Free Trade Unions vs. Mainit Lumber Development Company Workers Union-United Lumber and General Workers of the Phils., 192 SCRA 598 , December 21, 1990 Case Title : NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS (NAFTU), petitioner, vs. MAINIT LUMBER DEVELOPMENT COMPANY WORKERS UNION-UNITED LUMBER AND GENERAL WORKERS OF THE PHILIPPINES. (MALDECOWU-ULGWP), respondents.Case Nature : PETITION for certiorari to review the resolution of the Bureau of Labor Relations. Syllabi Class : Labor Relations|Judgments|Labor Law|Unions|Certification Election|Res Judicata|Bureau of Labor Relations Syllabi: 1. Labor Relations; Unions; Certification Election; The basic test of an asserted bargaining unit's acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights.Moreover, while the existence of a bargaining history is a factor that may be reckoned with in determining the appropriate bargaining unit, the same is not decisive or conclusive. Other factors must be considered. The test of grouping is community or mutuality of interests. This is so because "the basic test of an asserted bargaining unit's acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will

best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights." (Democratic Labor Association v. Cebu Stevedoring Company, Inc., et al., 103 Phil. 1103 [1958]). 2. Judgments; Res Judicata; The principle of res judicata applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public, executive, or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers.Secondly, the issue had been raised earlier by petitioner. The respondent Bureau of Labor Relations had already ruled on the same in its decision dated April 28,1986 affirming the Med-Arbiter's Order dated April 11, 1985 which granted the petition for Certification Election. NAFTU did not elevate the April 28,1986 decision to this Court. On the contrary, it participated in the questioned election and later it did not raise the issue in its election protest (Rollo, p. 210). Hence, the principle of res judicata applies. It was settled as early as 1956 that "the rule which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers x x x" (B.F. Goodrich Philippines, Inc. v. Workmen's Compen- sation Commission and Leandro M. Castro, 159 SCRA 355 [1988]). 3. Labor Law; Bureau of Labor Relations; Factual findings of the Bureau of Labor Relations, if supported by substantial evidence, are binding and must be respected.In the case of Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) v. Hon. Pura Ferrer-Calleja, et al., 162 SCRA 425 [1988]), this Court held that factual findings of the Bureau of Labor Relations which are supported by substantial evidence are binding on this Court and must be respected. Division: SECOND DIVISION Docket Number: G.R. No. 79526 Counsel: Salvador C. Ruiz, Banzuela, Flores, Miralles, Raeses, Sy, Taquio and Associ-ates Ponente: PARAS Dispositive Portion: PREMISES CONSIDERED, the resolution of public respondent Bureau of Labor Relations dated January 29, 1987 is hereby AFFIRMED.

Republic Planters Bank General Services Employees Union-National Association of Trade Unions vs. Laguesma, 264 SCRA 637 , November 21, 1996 Case Title : REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK GENERAL SERVICES EMPLOYEES UNION-NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF TRADE UNIONS, petitioner, vs. BIENVENIDO LAGUESMA and REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK, respondents.Case Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari. Syllabi Class : Labor Law|Unions Syllabi: 1. Labor Law; Labor Unions; No petition for certification election shall be conducted outside the sixtyday freedom period immediately before the expiry date of the CBA.We start with the restatement of the rule that no petition for certification election may be entertained if filed outside the sixty-day period immediately before the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement. The purpose of the prohibition against the filing of a petition for certification election outside the so-called freedom period is to ensure industrial peace between the employer and its employees during the existence of the CBA. Thus in Trade Unions of the Philippines vs. Laguesma, we held that when a legitimate labor organization has been certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rankand-file employees of a given employer, it means that it shall remain as such during the existence of the CBA, to the exclusion of other labor organizations, and no petition questioning the majority status of said incumbent agent or any certification election be conducted outside the sixty-day freedom period immediately before the expiry date of the CBA.

2. Same; Same; Since the persons involved are not employees of the company, they are not entitled to the constitutional right to join or form a labor organization for purposes of collective bargaining.The more applicable case is Singer Sewing Machine Company vs. Drilon, et al., where we ruled that if the union members are not employees, no right to organize for purposes of bargaining, nor to be certified as bargaining agent can be recognized. Since the persons involved are not employees of the company, we held that they are not entitled to the constitutional right to join or form a labor organization for purposes of collective bargaining. Division: SECOND DIVISION Docket Number: G.R. No. 119675

Counsel: Felimon C. Tercero, The Government Corporate Counsel Ponente: PUNO Dispositive Portion: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the present petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Filipino Pipe and Foundry Corporation vs. NLRC, 318 SCRA 68 , November 16, 1999 Case Title : FILIPINO PIPE AND FOUNDRY CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, NATIONAL LABOR UNION-TUCP, and EULOGIO LERUM, respondents.Case Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari. Syllabi Class : Labor Law|Strikes|Due Process|Unions Syllabi: 1. Labor Law; Strikes; A strike is baseless where it is still premature for a union to insist on the implementation of an adverted provision of a collective bargaining agreement, which is the subject of a pending writ of execution.A thorough sifting of the pertinent records discloses that the alleged union busting was not substantiated and the supposed non-implementation of the collective bargaining agreement was groundless because the demands of FPWU-NLU, at the time the notice of strike was filed and at the time the union actually struck, were the subject of a pending application for a writ of execution filed by the union in Case No. AB-7933-80 (NCR-CA-8-674-80), which application was granted on April 4, 1986 by the Labor Arbiter. Verily, the strike staged by FPWU-NLU was baseless since it was still premature then for the union to insist on the implementation of the adverted provision of the collective bargaining agreement, which was the subject of a pending writ of execution. 2. Labor Law; Strikes; Due Process; The failure of the union to serve the company a copy of the notice of strike is a clear violation of Section 3, Rule XXII, Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Codethe constitutional precepts of due process mandate that the other party be notified of the adverse action of the opposing party.Then too, the failure of the union to serve petitioner company a copy of the notice of strike is a clear violation of Section 3 of the aforestated Rules. The constitutional precepts of due process mandate that the other party be notified of the adverse action of the opposing party. So also, the same Section provides for a mandatory thirty (30) day cooling-off period which the union ignored when it struck on March 3, 1986, before the 30th day from the time the notice of strike was filed on February 10, 1986. 3. Labor Law; Strikes; Unions; The mother federation is a mere agent and the local chapter/union is the principal, notwithstanding the failure of the local union to comply with the procedural requirements that would make it a legitimate labor organization.-

In Progressive Development Corporation vs. Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment, the Court explained the nature of the relationship between a mother union/federation and a local union, thus: At this juncture, it is important to clarify the relationship between the mother union and the local union. In the case of Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union v. Liberty Cotton Mills, Inc., 66 SCRA 512 [1975], the Court held that the mother union, acting for and in behalf of its affiliate, had the status of an agent while the local union remained the basic unit of the association, free to serve the common interest of all its members subject only to the restraints imposed by the constitution and by-laws of the association. x x x The same is true even if the local union is not a legitimate labor organization. Conformably, in the abovecited case the Court ruled that the mother federation was a mere agent and the local chapter/union was the principal, notwithstanding the failure of the local union to comply with the procedural requirements that would make it a legitimate labor organization. 4. Labor Law; Strikes; Unions; As the local union, it is considered as the principal; the entity which staged the illegal strike, it is the one responsible for any resulting damages which might have been sustained by the company.Evidently, in the case under scrutiny, whether or not FPWU, the local chapter, complied with the procedural requirements that would make it a legitimate labor organization is immaterial. It would not affect its status as the principal and basic unit of the association. The requirement laid down in the Progressive Development case, that the local union must be a legitimate labor organization, pertains to the conditions before a union may file a petition for certification election and to be certified as sole and exclusive bargaining agent. In the present case, there is no dispute that FPWU-NLU is the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file employees of petitioner company. The unions status as a legitimate labor organization is therefore of no moment in the resolution of the controversy here. As the local union, it is considered as the principal; the entity which staged the illegal strike and the one responsible for the resulting damages allegedly sustained by petitioner company. 5. Labor Law; Strikes; Unions; Direct and primary responsibility for the damages caused by an illegal strike falls on the local union, being the principal, and not on the mother federation, a mere agent of the for-mer, which assisted it in filing the notice of strike.Evidently, direct and primary responsibility for the damages allegedly caused by the illegal strike sued upon fall on the local union FPWU, being the principal, and not on respondent NLU-TUCP, a mere agent of FPWU-NLU which assisted the latter in filing the notice of strike. Being just an agent, the notice of strike filed by Atty. Eulogio Lerum, the national president of NLU-TUCP, is deemed to have been filed by its principal, the FPWU-NLU. Having thus dismissed the claim for damages against the principal, FPWU-NLU, the action for damages against its agent, respondent NLU-TUCP, and Atty. Lerum, has no more leg to stand on and should also be dismissed.

Rivera vs. Espiritu, 374 SCRA 351 , January 23, 2002 Case Title : GERARDO F. RIVERA, ALFRED A. RAMISO, AMBROCIO PALAD, DENNIS R. ARANAS, DAVID SORIMA, JR., JORGE P. DELA ROSA, and ISAGANI ALDEA, petitioners, vs. HON. EDGARDO ESPIRITU in his capacity as Chairman of the PAL InterAgency Task Force created under Administrative Order No. 16; HON. BIENVENIDO LAGUESMA in his capacity as Secretary of Labor and Employment; PHILIPPINE AIRLINES (PAL), LUCIO TAN, HENRY SO UY, ANTONIO V. OCAMPO, MANOLO E. AQUINO, JAIME J. BAUTISTA, and ALEXANDER O. BARRIENTOS, respondents.Case Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition. Syllabi Class : Actions|Labor Law|Certiorari|Prohibition|Contracts|Words and Phrases|Collective Bargaining Agreement|Defined|Union Security Clauses|Unfair Labor Practice Syllabi: 1. Actions; Certiorari; Prohibition; Requisites.Petitioners allege grave abuse of discretion under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The essential requisites for a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 are: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board, or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course

of law. For writs of prohibition, the requisites are: (1) the impugned act must be that of a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions; and (2) there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 2. Actions; Certiorari; Prohibition; Certiorari and Prohibition are not proper where what exists is a contract between a private firm and one of its labor unions, albeit entered into with the assistance of an Inter-Agency Task Force created to address the problems between the contracting parties.The assailed agreement is clearly not the act of a tribunal, board, officer, or person exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. It is not the act of public respondents Finance Secretary Edgardo Espiritu and Labor Secretary Bienvenido Laguesma as functionaries of the Task Force. Neither is there a judgment, order, or resolution of either public respondents involved. Instead, what exists is a contract between a private firm and one of its labor unions, albeit entered into with the assistance of the Task Force. The first and second requisites for certiorari and prohibition are therefore not present in this case. 3. Actions; Certiorari; Prohibition; Contracts; Where the object of the action is actually the nullification of a contract between an employer and one of its labor unions, the proper remedy is an ordinary civil action for annulment of contract, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the regional trial courts, not certiorari or prohibition.Furthermore, there is available to petitioners a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. While the petition is denominated as one for certiorari and prohibition, its object is actually the nullification of the PAL-PALEA agreement. As such, petitioners proper remedy is an ordinary civil action for annulment of contract, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the regional trial courts. Neither certiorari nor prohibition is the remedy in the present case. 4. Labor Law; Words and Phrases; Collective Bargaining Agreement, Defined; The primary purpose of a CBA is the stabilization of labor-management relations in order to create a climate of a sound and stable industrial peace, and in construing a CBA, the courts must be practical and realistic and give due consideration to the context in which it is negotiated and the purpose which it is intended to serve.A CBA is a contract executed upon request of either the employer or the exclusive bargaining representative incorporating the agreement reached after negotiations with respect to wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment, including proposals for adjusting any grievances or questions arising under such agreement. The primary purpose of a CBA is the stabilization of labormanagement relations in order to create a climate of a sound and stable industrial peace. In construing a CBA, the courts must be practical and realistic and give due consideration to the context in which it is negotiated and the purpose which it is intended to serve. 5. Labor Law; Collective Bargaining; Article 253-A of the Labor Code has a two-fold purposeone is to promote industrial stability and predictability, and the other is to assign specific timetables wherein negotiations become a matter of right and requirement; Nothing in Article 253-A prohibits the parties from waiving or suspending the mandatory timetables and agreeing on the remedies to enforce the same.The assailed PAL-PALEA agreement was the result of voluntary collective bargaining negotiations undertaken in the light of the severe financial situation faced by the employer, with the peculiar and unique intention of not merely promoting industrial peace at PAL, but preventing the latters closure. We find no conflict between said agreement and Article 253-A of the Labor Code. Article 253-A has a two-fold purpose. One is to promote industrial stability and predictability. Inasmuch as the agreement sought to promote industrial peace at PAL during its rehabilitation, said agreement satisfies the first purpose of Article 253-A. The other is to assign specific timetables wherein negotiations become a matter of right and requirement. Nothing in Article 253-A, prohibits the parties from waiving or suspending the mandatory timetables and agreeing on the remedies to enforce the same. 6. Labor Law; Collective Bargaining; The right to free collective bargaining, after all, includes the right to suspend it.In the instant case, it was PALEA, as the exclusive bargaining agent of PALs ground employees, that voluntarily entered into the CBA with PAL. It was also PALEA that voluntarily opted for the 10-year suspension of the CBA. Either case was the unions exercise of its right to collective bargaining. The right to free collective bargaining, after all, includes the right to suspend it.

7. Labor Law; Collective Bargaining; The acts of the public functionaries in sanctioning the 10-year suspension of the PAL-PALEA CBA did not contravene the protection to labor policy of the Constitution.The acts of public respondents in sanctioning the 10-year suspension of the PAL-PALEA CBA did not contravene the protection to labor policy of the Constitution. The agreement afforded full protection to labor; promoted the shared responsibility between workers and employers; and the exercised voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation to foster industrial peace. 8. Labor Law; Collective Bargaining; Union Security Clauses; Unfair Labor Practice; The Court is unable to declare the objective of union security an unfair labor practice.The questioned proviso of the agreement reads: a. PAL shall continue recognizing PALEA as the duly certified bargaining agent of the regular rank-and-file ground employees of the Company. Said proviso cannot be construed alone. In construing an instrument with several provisions, a construction must be adopted as will give effect to all. Under Article 1374 of the Civil Code, contracts cannot be construed by parts, but clauses must be interpreted in relation to one another to give effect to the whole. The legal effect of a contract is not determined alone by any particular provision disconnected from all others, but from the whole read together. The aforesaid provision must be read within the context of the next clause, which provides: b. The union shop/maintenance of membership provision under the PAL-PALEA CBA shall be respected. The aforesaid provisions, taken together, clearly show the intent of the parties to maintain union security during the period of the suspension of the CBA. Its objective is to assure the continued existence of PALEA during the said period. We are unable to declare the objective of union security an unfair labor practice. It is State policy to promote unionism to enable workers to negotiate with management on an even playing field and with more persuasiveness than if they were to individually and separately bargain with the employer. For this reason, the law has allowed stipulations union shop and closed shop as means of encouraging workers to join and support the union of their choice in the protection of their rights and interests vis--vis the employer. 9. Labor Law; Collective Bargaining; Under Article 253-A of the Labor Code, the representation limit for the exclusive bargaining agent applies only when there is an extant CBA in full force and effect.We also do not agree that the agreement violates the five-year representation limit mandated by Article 253-A. Under said article, the representation limit for the exclusive bargaining agent applies only when there is an extant CBA in full force and effect. In the instant case, the parties agreed to suspend the CBA and put in abeyance the limit on the representation period. 10. Labor Law; Collective Bargaining; The PAL-PALEA agreement dated 27 September 1998 is a valid exercise of the freedom to contract, and under the principle of inviolability of contracts guaranteed by the Constitution, the contract must be upheld.In sum, we are of the view that the PAL-PALEA agreement dated September 27, 1998, is a valid exercise of the freedom to contract. Under the principle of inviolability of contracts guaranteed by the Constitution, the contract must be upheld. Division: SECOND DIVISION Docket Number: G.R. No. 135547 Counsel: Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity & Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), Estelito P. Mendoza, Adolfo M. Guerzon Ponente: QUISUMBING Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, there being no grave abuse of discretion shown, the instant petition is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.

General Milling Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 422 SCRA 514 , February 11, 2004

Case Title : GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION (GMC-ELU), and RITO MANGUBAT, respondents.Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Syllabi Class : Labor Law|Collective Bargaining Agreements|Unfair Labor Practices Syllabi: 1. Labor Law; Collective Bargaining Agreements; Unfair Labor Practices; The law mandates that the representation provision of a CBA should last for five years; Where the company refuses to send a counter-proposal to the union and to bargain anew on the economic terms of the CBA, it commits an unfair labor practice.The law mandates that the representation provision of a CBA should last for five years. The relation between labor and management should be undisturbed until the last 60 days of the fifth year. Hence, it is indisputable that when the union requested for a renegotiation of the economic terms of the CBA on November 29, 1991, it was still the certified collective bargaining agent of the workers, because it was seeking said renegotiation within five (5) years from the date of effectivity of the CBA on December 1, 1988. The unions proposal was also submitted within the prescribed 3-year period from the date of effectivity of the CBA, albeit just before the last day of said period. It was obvious that GMC had no valid reason to refuse to negotiate in good faith with the union. For refusing to send a counterproposal to the union and to bargain anew on the economic terms of the CBA, the company committed an unfair labor practice under Article 248 of the Labor Code, which provides that: ART. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers.It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practice: . . . (g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by this Code; . . . 2. Labor Law; Collective Bargaining Agreements; Unfair Labor Practices; The crucial question whether or not a party has met his statutory duty to bargain in good faith typically turns on the facts of the individual casethere is no per se test of good faith in bargaining; It bears stressing that the procedure in collective bargaining prescribed by the Code is mandatory because of the basic interest of the state in ensuring lasting industrial peace.We have held that the crucial question whether or not a party has met his statutory duty to bargain in good faith typically turns on the facts of the individual case. There is no per se test of good faith in bargaining. Good faith or bad faith is an inference to be drawn from the facts. The effect of an employers or a unions actions individually is not the test of good-faith bargaining, but the impact of all such occasions or actions, considered as a whole. Under Article 252 abovecited, both parties are required to perform their mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement. The union lived up to this obligation when it presented proposals for a new CBA to GMC within three (3) years from the effectivity of the original CBA. But GMC failed in its duty under Article 252. What it did was to devise a flimsy excuse, by questioning the existence of the union and the status of its membership to prevent any negotiation. It bears stressing that the procedure in collective bargaining prescribed by the Code is mandatory because of the basic interest of the state in ensuring lasting industrial peace. 3. Labor Law; Collective Bargaining Agreements; Unfair Labor Practices; Where the employer did not even bother to submit an answer to the bargaining proposals of the union, there is a clear evasion of the duty to bargain collectively.GMCs failure to make a timely reply to the proposals presented by the union is indicative of its utter lack of interest in bargaining with the union. Its excuse that it felt the union no longer represented the workers, was mainly dilatory as it turned out to be utterly baseless. We hold that GMCs refusal to make a counterproposal to the unions proposal for CBA negotiation is an indication of its bad faith. Where the employer did not even bother to submit an answer to the bargaining proposals of the union, there is a clear evasion of the duty to bargain collectively. 4. Labor Law; Collective Bargaining Agreements; Unfair Labor Practices; Where the ill-timed letters of resignation from the union members indicate that the employer had interfered with the right of its employees to self-organization, the company may be found guilty of unfair labor practice.Did GMC interfere with the employees right to self-organization? The CA found that the letters between February to June 1993 by 13 union members signifying their resignation from the union clearly indicated that GMC exerted pressure on its employees. The records show that GMC presented these letters to prove

that the union no longer enjoyed the support of the workers. The fact that the resignations of the union members occurred during the pendency of the case before the labor arbiter shows GMCs desperate attempts to cast doubt on the legitimate status of the union. We agree with the CAs conclusion that the ill-timed letters of resignation from the union members indicate that GMC had interfered with the right of its employees to self-organization. Thus, we hold that the appellate court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in finding GMC guilty of unfair labor practice for interfering with the right of its employees to self-organization. 5. Labor Law; Collective Bargaining Agreements; Unfair Labor Practices; The general rule is that when a CBA already exists, its provision shall continue to govern the relationship between the parties, until a new one is agreed upon, unless one of the parties abuses this grace period by purposely delaying the bargaining process, in which case a departure from the general rule is warranted.The provision mandates the parties to keep the status quo while they are still in the process of working out their respective proposal and counter proposal. The general rule is that when a CBA already exists, its provision shall continue to govern the relationship between the parties, until a new one is agreed upon. The rule necessarily presupposes that all other things are equal. That is, that neither party is guilty of bad faith. However, when one of the parties abuses this grace period by purposely delaying the bargaining process, a departure from the general rule is warranted. 6. Labor Law; Collective Bargaining Agreements; Unfair Labor Practices; Under ordinary circumstances, it is not obligatory upon either side of a labor controversy to precipitately accept or agree to the proposals of the other, but an erring party should not be allowed to resort with impunity to schemes feigning negotiations by going through empty gestures; If the company committed unfair labor practice by thwarting the negotiations for new economic terms of the CBA, the draft CBA proposed by the union may be imposed on the company.Under ordinary circumstances, it is not obligatory upon either side of a labor controversy to precipitately accept or agree to the proposals of the other. But an erring party should not be allowed to resort with impunity to schemes feigning negotiations by going through empty gestures. Thus, by imposing on GMC the provisions of the draft CBA proposed by the union, in our view, the interests of equity and fair play were properly served and both parties regained equal footing, which was lost when GMC thwarted the negotiations for new economic terms of the CBA. The findings of fact by the CA, affirming those of the NLRC as to the reasonableness of the draft CBA proposed by the union should not be disturbed since they are supported by substantial evidence. On this score, we see no cogent reason to rule other- wise. Hence, we hold that the Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it imposed on GMC, after it had committed unfair labor practice, the draft CBA proposed by the union for the remaining two (2) years of the duration of the original CBA. Fairness, equity, and social justice are best served in this case by sustaining the appellate courts decision on this issue. Division: SECOND DIVISION Docket Number: G.R. No. 146728 Counsel: Baduel, Espina & Associates, Balgos & Perez, Armando M. Alforque Ponente: QUISUMBING Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the assailed decision dated July 19, 2000, and the resolution dated October 26, 2000, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 50383, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

New Pacific Timber & Supply Company, Inc. vs. NLRC, 328 SCRA 404, March 17, 2000 Excerpt : 1. G.R. No. 124224. March 17, 2000. [*FIRST DIVISION.] NEW PACIFIC TIMBER SUPPLY COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs . NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, MUSIB M. BUAT, LEON G. GONZAGA, JR., ET AL., NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR, MARIANO AKILIT and 350 OTHERS, respondents. SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Siguion-Reyna, Montecillo Ongsiako for petitioner. Rene J. Santos and Romulo D. Plagata for private

respondents. Dioscoro Albarico, Sr. authorized representative of private respondents. KAPUNAN, J.: May the term of a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) as to its economic provisions be extended beyond the term expressly More Excerpts Case Title : NEW PACIFIC TIMBER & SUPPLY COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, MUSIB M. BUAT, LEON G. GONZAGA, JR., ET AL., NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR, MARIANO AKILIT and 350 OTHERS, respondents. Case Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari. Syllabi Class :Labor Law|National Labor Relations Commission|Appeals|Labor Code|Labor Unions Syllabi: 1. Labor Law; National Labor Relations Commission; Appeals; No grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC, when it entertained the petition for relief filed by the private respondents and treated it as an appeal, even if it was filed beyond the reglementary period for filing an appeal.We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC, when it entertained the petition for relief filed by the private respondents and treated it as an appeal, even if it was filed beyond the reglementary period for filing an appeal. Ordinarily, once a judgment has become final and executory, it can no longer be disturbed, altered or modified. However, a careful scrutiny of the facts and circumstances of the instant case warrants liberality in the application of technical rules and procedure. It would be a greater injustice to deprive the concerned employees of the monetary benefits rightly due them because of a circumstance over which they had no control. 2. Labor Law; National Labor Relations Commission; Appeals; Supreme Court has allowed appeals from decisions of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC, even if filed beyond the reglementary period in the interest of justice.The Supreme Court-has allowed appeals from decisions of the labor arbiter to the NLRC, even if filed beyond the reglementary period, in the interest of justice. Moreover, under Article 218 (c) of the Labor Code, the NLRC may, in the exercise of its appellate powers, correct, amend or waive any error, defect or irregularity whether in substance or in form. Further, Article 221 of the same provides that: In any proceeding before the Commission or any of the Labor Arbiters, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of this Code that the Commission and its members and the Labor Arbiters shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process. x x x 3. Labor Law; Labor Code; Labor Unions; Until a new Collective Bargaining Agreement has been executed by and between the parties, they are duty bound to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement.It is clear from the above provision of law that until a new Collective Bargaining Agreement has been executed by and between the parties, they are duty-bound to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement. The law does not provide for any exception nor qualification as to which of the economic provisions of the existing agreement are to retain force and effect; therefore, it must be understood as encompassing all the terms and conditions in the said agreement. 4. Labor Law; Labor Code; Labor Unions; When a collective bargaining contract is entered into by the union representing the employees and the employer, even the non-member employees are entitled to the benefits of the contract.In a long line of cases, this Court has held that when a collective bargaining contract is entered into by the union representing the employees and the employer, even the non-member employees are entitled to the benefits of the contract. To accord its benefits only to members of the union without any valid reason would constitute undue discrimination against nonmembers. It is even conceded, that a laborer can claim benefits from a CBA entered into between the company and the union of which he is a member at the time of the conclusion of the agreement, after he has resigned from said union.

Division: FIRST DIVISION Docket Number: G.R. No. 124224 Counsel: Siguion-Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako, Rene J. Santos, Romulo D. Plagata, Dioscoro Albarico, Sr. Ponente: KAPUNAN Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa M. Greenfield vs. Ramos, 326 SCRA 428 , February 28, 2000 Case Title : MALAYANG SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA M. GREENFIELD (MSMG-UWP), ITS PRESIDENT BEDA MAGDALENA VILLANUEVA, MARIO DAGANIO, DONATO GUERRERO, BELLA P. SANCHEZ, ELENA TOBIS, RHODA TAMAYO, LIWAYWAY MALLILIN, ELOISA SANTOS, DOMINADOR REBULLO, JOSE IRLAND, TEOFILA QUEJADA, VICENTE SAMONTINA, FELICITAS DURIAN, ANTONIO POLDO, ANGELINA TUGNA, SALVADOR PE-Case Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari. Syllabi Class : Labor Law|National Labor Relations Commission|Collective Bargaining Agreements|Union Security Clauses|Due Process|Jurisdiction|Evidence|Unions|Disaffiliations|Strikes|Abandonment|Unfair Labor Practices|Dismissals pursuant to union security clauses are valid and legal subject only to the requirement of due process|Corporation Law|Illegal Dismissal|Backwages Syllabi: 1. Labor Law; National Labor Relations Commission; There is nothing irregular in the temporary designation of an NLRC Commissioner from one division to complete another division, for the law empowers the Chairman to make temporary assignments whenever the required concurrence is not met; The territorial divisions of the National Labor Relations Commission do not confer exclusive jurisdiction to each division and are merely designed for administrative efficiency.It must be remembered that during the pendency of the case in the First Division of the NLRC, one of the three commissioners, Commissioner Romeo Putong, retired, leaving Chairman Bartolome Carale and Commissioner Vicente Veloso III. Subsequently, Commissioner Veloso inhibited himself from the case because the counsel for the petitioners was his former classmate in law school. The First Division was thus left with only one commissioner. Since the law requires the concurrence of two commissioners to arrive at a judgment or resolution, the Commission was constrained to temporarily designate a commissioner from another division to complete the First Division. There is nothing irregular at all in such a temporary designation for the law empowers the Chairman to make temporary assignments whenever the required concurrence is not met. The law does not say that a commissioner from the first division cannot be temporarily assigned to the second or third division to fill the gap or vice versa. The territorial divisions do not confer exclusive jurisdiction to each division and are merely designed for administrative efficiency. 2. Labor Law; Collective Bargaining Agreements; Union Security Clauses; Due Process; Although union security clauses embodied in the collective bargaining agreement may be validly enforced and dismissals pursuant thereto may likewise be valid, this does not erode the fundamental requirement of due process.This ruling of the NLRC is erroneous. Although this Court has ruled that union security clauses embodied in the collective bargaining agreement may be validly enforced and that dismissals pursuant thereto may likewise be valid, this does not erode the fundamental requirement of due process. The reason behind the enforcement of union security clauses which is the sanctity and inviolability of contracts cannot override ones right to due process. 3. Labor Law; Collective Bargaining Agreements; Union Security Clauses; Due Process; An employer cannot rely merely upon a labor federations allegations in terminating union officers expelled by the federation for allegedly committing acts of disloyalty and lor inimical to the interest of the federation

and in violation of its Constitution and By-Lawsthe company must also inquire into the cause of the expulsion and whether or not the federation had sufficient grounds to effect the same.In the case under scrutiny, petitioner union officers were expelled by the federation for allegedly committing acts of disloyalty and/or inimical to the interest of ULGWP and in violation of its Constitution and By-laws. Upon demand of the federation, the company terminated the petitioners without conducting a separate and independent investigation. Respondent company did not inquire into the cause of the expulsion and whether or not the federation had sufficient grounds to effect the same. Relying merely upon the federations allegations, respondent company terminated petitioners from employment when a separate inquiry could have revealed if the federation had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in expelling the union officers. Respondent companys allegation that petitioners were accorded due process is belied by the termination letters received by the petitioners which state that the dismissal shall be immediately effective. 4. Labor Law; Collective Bargaining Agreements; Union Security Clauses; Due Process; The right of an employee to be informed of the charges against him and to reasonable opportunity to present his side in a controversy with either the company or his own union is not wiped away by a union security clause or a union shop clause in a collective bargaining agreementAs held in the aforecited case of Carino, the right of an employee to be informed of the charges against him and to reasonable opportunity to present his side in a controversy with either the company or his own union is not wiped away by a union security clause or a union shop clause in a collective bargaining agreement. An employee is entitled to be protected not only from a company which disregards his rights but also from his own union the leadership of which could yield to the temptation of swift and arbitrary expulsion from membership and mere dismissal from his job. 5. Labor Law; Collective Bargaining Agreements; Union Security Clauses; Due Process; Even assuming that a federation had valid grounds to expel union officers, due process requires that these union officers be accorded a separate hearing by the company.While respondent company may validly dismiss the employees expelled by the union for disloyalty under the union security clause of the collective bargaining agreement upon the recommendation by the union, this dismissal should not be done hastily and summarily thereby eroding the employees right to due process, self-organization and security of tenure. The enforcement of union security clauses is authorized by law provided such enforcement is not characterized by arbitrariness, and always with due process. Even on the assumption that the federation had valid grounds to expel the union officers, due process requires that these union officers be accorded a separate hearing by respondent company. 6. Labor Law; Collective Bargaining Agreements; Union Security Clauses; Intra-Union Disputes; Illegal Dismissal; While it is true that the issue of expulsion of local union officers is originally between the local union and the federation, hence, intraunion in character, the issue is later on converted into a termination dispute when the company dismisses the union officers from work without the benefit of a separate notice and hearing; Notwithstanding the fact that the dismissal was at the instance of a labor federation which undertook to hold the company free from any liability resulting from such a dismissal, the company may still be held liable if it was remiss in its duty to accord the would-be dismissed employees their right to be heard on the matter.In its decision, public respondent also declared that if complainants (herein petitioners) have any recourse in law, their right of action is against the federation and not against the company or its officers, relying on the findings of the Labor Secretary that the issue of expulsion of petitioner union officers by the federation is a purely intra-union matter. Again, such a contention is untenable. While it is true that the issue of expulsion of the local union officers is originally between the local union and the federation, hence, intraunion in character, the issue was later on converted into a termination dispute when the company dismissed the petitioners from work without the benefit of a separate notice and hearing. As a matter of fact, the records reveal that the termination was effective on the same day that the termination notice was served on the petitioners, x x x Thus, notwithstanding the fact that the dismissal was at the instance of the federation and that it undertook to hold the company free from any liability resulting from such a dismissal, the company may still be held liable if it was remiss in its duty to accord the would-be dismissed employees their right to be heard on the matter. 7. Labor Law; Collective Bargaining Agreements; Union Security Clauses; Jurisdiction; The issue of whether or not the federation had reasonable grounds to expel the petitioner union officers is properly

within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Labor Relations, being an intra-union conflict.Although the issue of whether or not the federation had reasonable grounds to expel the petitioner union officers is properly within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Labor Relations, being an intra-union conflict, this Court deems it justifiable that such issue be nonetheless ruled upon, as the Labor Arbiter did, for to remand the same to the Bureau of Labor Relations would be to intolerably delay the case. 8. Labor Law; Evidence; The Supreme Court will not uphold erroneous conclusions of the National Labor Relations Commission as when it finds insufficient or insubstantial evidence on record to support those factual; findings, or when it is perceived that far too much is con-eluded, inferred or deduced from the bare or incomplete facts appearing of record.It is well-settled that findings of facts of the NLRC are entitled to great respect and are generally binding on this Court, but it is equally well-settled that the Court will not uphold erroneous conclusions of the NLRC as when the Court finds insufficient or insubstantial evidence on record to support those factual findings. The same holds true when it is perceived that far too much is concluded, inferred or deduced from the bare or incomplete facts appearing of record. 9. Labor Law; Unions; Disaffiliations; Freedom of Association; A local union has the right to disaffiliate from its mother union or declare its autonomy, and such disaffiliation cannot be considered disloyalty; In the absence of specific provisions in the federations constitution prohibiting disaffiliation or the declaration of autonomy of a local union, a local union may dissociate from its parent union.A local union has the right to disaffiliate from its mother union or declare its autonomy. A local union, being a separate and voluntary association, is free to serve the interests of all its members including the freedom to disaffiliate or declare its autonomy from the federation to which it belongs when circumstances warrant, in accordance with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association, x x x Thus, a local union which has affiliated itself with a federation is free to sever such affiliation anytime and such disaffiliation cannot be considered disloyalty. In the absence of specific provisions in the federations constitution prohibiting disaffiliation or the declaration of autonomy of a local union, a local may dissociate with its parent union. 10. Labor Law; Unions; Strikes; Unfair Labor Practices; Even if the allegations of unfair labor practice are subsequently found out to be untrue, the presumption of legality of the strike prevails.On the submission that the strike was illegal for being grounded on a non-strikeable issue, that is, the intra-union conflict between the federation and the local union, it bears reiterating that when respondent company dismissed the union officers, the issue was transformed into a termination dispute and brought respondent company into the picture. Petitioners believed in good faith that in dismissing them upon request by the federation, respondent company was guilty of unfair labor practice in that it violated the petitioners right to self-organization. The strike was staged to protest respondent companys act of dismissing the union officers. Even if the allegations of unfair labor practice are subsequently found out to be untrue, the presumption of legality of the strike prevails. 11. Labor Law; Unions; Strikes; No Strike, No Lockout Clause; A no strike, no lockout provision can only be invoked when the strike is economic in nature, i.e., to force wage or other concessions from the employer which he is not required by law to grant.Another reason why the Labor Arbiter declared the strike illegal is due to the existence of a no strike, no lockout provision in the CBA. Again, such a ruling is erroneous. A no strike, no lock out provision can only be invoked when the strike is economic in nature, i.e. to force wage or other concessions from the employer which he is not required by law to grant. Such a provision cannot be used to assail the legality of a strike which is grounded on unfair labor practice, as was the honest belief of herein petitioners. Again, whether or not there was indeed unfair labor practice does not affect the strike. 12. Labor Law; Unions; Strikes; Where violence was committed on both sides during a strike, such violence cannot be a ground for declaring the strike as illegal.On the allegation of violence committed in the course of the strike, it must be remembered that the Labor Arbiter and the Commission found that the parties are agreed that there were violent incidents x x x resulting to injuries to both sides, the union and management. The evidence on record show that the

violence cannot be attributed to the striking employees alone for the company itself employed hired men to pacify the strikers. With violence committed on both sides, the management and the employees, such violence cannot be a ground for declaring the strike as illegal. 13. Labor Law; Abandonment; Requisites.Jurisprudence holds that for abandonment of work to exist, it is essential (1) that the employee must have failed to report for work or must have been absent without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) that there must have been a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship manifested by some overt acts. Deliberate and unjustified refusal on the part of the employee to go back to his work post and resume his employment must be established. Absence must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work anymore. And the burden of proof to show that there was unjustified refusal to go back to work rests on the employer. 14. Labor Law; Abandonment; The filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal is inconsistent with the allegation of abandonment.This Court has ruled that an employee who took steps to protest his lay-off cannot be said to have abandoned his work. The filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal is inconsistent with the allegation of abandonment. In the case under consideration, the petitioners did, in fact, file a complaint when they were refused reinstatement by respondent company. 15. Labor Law; Union Security Clauses; Unfair Labor Practices; Due Process; Dismissals pursuant to union security clauses are valid and legal subject only to the requirement of due process; Dismissal of an employee by the company pursuant to a labor unions demand in accordance with a union security agreement does not constitute unfair labor practice.Anent public respondents finding that there was no unfair labor practice on the part of respondent company and federation officers, the Court sustains the same. As earlier discussed, union security clauses in collective bargaining agreements, if freely and voluntarily entered into, are valid and binding. Corrolarily, dismissals pursuant to union security clauses are valid and legal subject only to the requirement of due process, that is, notice and hearing prior to dismissal. Thus, the dismissal of an employee by the company pursuant to a labor unions demand in accordance with a union security agreement does not constitute unfair labor practice. 16. Labor Law; Corporation Law; Company officials cannot be held personally liable for damages on account of the employees dismissal because the employer corporation has a personality separate and distinct from its officers who merely acted as its agents.The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that respondent company officials cannot be held personally liable for damages on account of the employees dismissal because the employer corporation has a personality separate and distinct from its officers who merely acted as its agents. 17. Labor Law; Illegal Dismissal; Backwages; An employee who is dismissed, whether or not for just or authorized cause but without prior notice of his termination, is entitled to full backwages from the time he was terminated until the decision in his case becomes final, when the dismissal was for cause; and in case the dismissal was without just or valid cause, the backwages shall be computed from the time of his dismissal until his actual reinstatement.In Ruben Serrano vs. NLRC and Isetann Department Store (G.R. No. 117040, January 27, 2000), the Court ruled that an employee who is dismissed, whether or not for just or authorized cause but without prior notice of his termination, is entitled to full backwages from the time he was terminated until the decision in his case becomes final, when the dismissal was for cause; and in case the dismissal was without just or valid cause, the backwages shall be computed from the time of his dismissal until his actual reinstatement. In the case at bar, where the requirement of notice and hearing was not complied with, the aforecited doctrine laid down in the Serrano case applies. Division: THIRD DIVISION Docket Number: G.R. No. 113907 Counsel: Potenciano A. Flores, Jr., Gonzales, Batiller, Biloz & Associates, Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz

Ponente: PURISIMA Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission in Case No. NCR-00-09-04199-89 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and the respondent company is hereby ordered to immediately reinstate the petitioners to their respective positions. Should reinstatement be not feasible, respondent company shall pay separation pay of one month salary for every year of service. Since petitioners were terminated without the requisite written notice at least 30 days prior to their termination, following the recent ruling in the case of Ruben Serrano vs. National Labor Relations Commission and Isetann Department Store, the respondent company is hereby ordered to pay full backwages to petitioneremployees while the Federation is also ordered to pay full backwages to petitioner-union officers who were dismissed upon its instigation. Since the dismissal of petitioners was without cause, backwages shall be computed from the time the herein petitioner employees and union officers were dismissed until their actual reinstatement. Should reinstatement be not feasible, their backwages shall be computed from the time petitioners were terminated until the finality of this decision. Costs against the respondent company.

Manila Mandarin Employees Union vs. NLRC, 154 SCRA 368 , September 29, 1987 Case Title : MANILA MANDARIN EMPLOYEES UNION, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, and MELB A C. BELONCIO, respondents,Case Nature : PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission. Syllabi Class : Labor|NLRC|Jurisdiction|Judgments|Illegal Dismissal Syllabi: 1. Labor; NLRC; Jurisdiction; Where the dispute is not purely intra-union but involves an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement and whether or not there was an illegal dismissal, the NLRC has jurisdiction.On the issue of the NLRC jurisdiction over the case, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC conclusion that the dispute is not purely intra-union but involves an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) provisions and whether or not there was an illegal dismissal. Under the CBA, A, membership in the union may be lost through expulsion only if there is non-payment of dues or a member organizes, joins, or forms another labor organization. 2. Labor; NLRC; Judgments; Findings of facts of quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC are generally accorded not only respect but also finality if they are supported by substantial evidence.lt is a wellsettled principle that findings of facts quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence. (Akay Printing Press v. Minister of Labor and Employment, 140 SCRA 381; Alba Patio de Makati v. Alba Patio de Makati Employees Association, 128 SCRA 253; Dangan v, National Labor Relations Commission, 127 SCRA 706; De la Concepcion v. Mindanao Portland Cement Corporation, 127 SCRA 647). 3. Labor; NLRC; Illegal Dismissal; Reinstatement with backwages to be paid by the union; Dismissal of employee was through the insistence and demand of the union.The Hotel would not have compelled Beloncio to go on forced leave were it not for the union's insistence and demand to the extent that because of the failure of the hotel to dismiss Beloncio as requested, the union filed a notice of strike with the Ministry of Labor and Employment on August 17, 1984 on the issue of unfair labor practice. The hotel was then compelled to put Beloncio on forced leave and to stop payment of her salary from September 1,1984. 4. Labor; NLRC; Closed-shop agreement, nature of.A closed-shop agreement is an agreement whereby an employer binds himself to hire only members of the contracting union who must continue to remain members in good standing to keep their jobs. It is "the most prized achievement of unionism." It adds membership and compulsory dues. By holding out to loyal

members a promise of employment in the closed-shop, it welds group solidarity. (National Labor Union v. Aguinaldo's Echague, Inc., 97 Phil. 184). It is a very effective form of union secretary agreement. 5. Labor; NLRC; A closed-shop is a valid form of union security.This Court has held that a closed-shop is a valid form of union security, and such a provision in a collective bargaining agreement is not a restriction of the right of freedom of association guaranteed by the Constitution. (Lirag Textile Mills, Inc. v. Blanco, 109 SCRA 87; Manalang v. Artex Development Company, Inc., 21 SCRA 561). 6. Labor; NLRC; Union security clauses cannot be used by union officials against an employer, much less their own members, except with a high sense of responsibility and fairness.The Court stresses, however, that union security clauses are also governed by law and by principles of justice, fair play, and legality. Union security clauses cannot be used by union officials against an employer, much less their own members, except with a high sense of responsibility, fairness, prudence, and judiciousness. 7. Labor; NLRC; A union member may not be expelled from her union and from her job for personal reasons or for causes foreign to the closed-shop agreementA union member may not be expelled from her union, and consequently from her job, for personal or impetuous reasons or for causes foreign to the closed-shop agreement and in a manner characterized by arbitrariness and whimsicality. 8. Labor; NLRC; Union membership does not entitle hotel workers to be sloppy in their work and inattentive to customers and disrespectful to supervisors.This is particularly true in this case where Ms. Beloncio was trying her best to make a hotel bus boy do his work promptly and courteously so as to serve hotel customers in the coffee shop expeditiously and cheerfully. Union membership does not entitle waiters, janitors, and other workers to be sloppy in their work, inattentive to customers, and disrespectful to supervisors. The Union should have disciplined its erring and troublesome members instead of causing so much hardship to a member who was only doing her work for the best interests of the employer, all its employees, and the general public whom they serve, Diviion: THIRD DIVISION. Docket Number: No. L-76989. Ponente: GUTIERREZ, JR. Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the National Labor Relations Commission is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.