The CollectedWorks of EDITH STEIN

Sister Teresa Benedicta of the Cross DiscalcedCarmelite

Volume Three

ON THE PROBLEM OF EMPATHY

Third Revised Edition

Translated by Waltraut Stein,Ph.D.

ICS Publications Washington, D.C. I 989

O W a s h i n g t o n P r o v i n c e o f D i s c a l c e dC a r m c l i t e s , l n c . 1 9 8 9

ICS Publicatiorrs 2 l 3 l L i n c o l n R o a d ,N . E . WashingtonD.C.20002 ,

'lypeset a n d P r o d u c e c li n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e so f A m c r i t a

CONTENTS
Forsu,ord to the Third Edition Prefaceto the Third Edition Prefaceto the First and SecondEditions Introduction Translator's l,{otes the Translation . . . on xxiv
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xii
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Couerphoto: Edith Stein at home in Breslau, 1921. Courtesl of CologneCarmel.

ON THE PROBLEM OF EMPATHY

Forruord Chapter11.The Essence of Acts of Empathy l. l'he Method of the Investigarion 2. Description of Empathy in Comparison with Other Acts . (a) Outer Perceptionand Empathy (b) Primordiali\ and l,lon-primordialitl . . (c) Memory, Expectation, Fantasy, and Empathy . . . . 3. Discussionin Terms of Other I)escriptior.rs of Empathy-Especially f'hat of Lipps-and Continuation of the Anall'sis (a) Points of Agreement (b) The Tendenclto Full Experiencing (c) Empathl and Fellow Feeling (d) l,tregatiue Enpathy (e) Empathy and a Feelingof Oneness (f1 Reiterationof Empathy-Refexiue Sypathy . . . . .

Library

of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication S t e i n .E d i t h . l 8 9 l - 1 9 4 2 . On the Problem of Empathv.

Data

II

(The collected s'orks of Edith Stein : v. 3) 'l'ranslation of: Zum Problem der Einliihlung. Includes index. l Enrpathl'. 2. Phenomenologicalpsvchokrgl'. -Iitle. I I . S e r i e s : t e i n . E d i t h , l 8 9 l - 1 9 4 2 . W o r k s . E n g l i s h .1 9 8 6 r v . 3 . S I, 8 3 3 3 2 . 5 6 7 2 8 5 . { l g 8 6 r o l . 3 1 9 3s [ 1 2 8 ' . 3 ] 8 9 - 1 9 4 9 l s B N 0 - 9 3 5 2 1 6 - ll - l

t2 t2 t4
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l6 l8

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Edith Stein -I'he 4. Controversy Between the View of Idea and 'I'hat of Actuality 5. Discussionin Terms of Genetic Theories of the . Comprehension of Foreign Consciousness . . . . . (a) On theRelationshipof Phenornenology Psycholog to (b) The Theory of Imitation (c) The Theory of Association (d) The Theory of Inference by Analogl 6. Discussionin Terms of Scheler'sTheory of the Comprehension of Foreign Consciousness . ' ' 7. Mtinsterberg's Theory of the Experience of Foreign Consciousrress l8 2l 2l 22 24 26 27 35

Contents (h) The Foreign Lizting Body as the Bearer of Voluntarl Mouement (i) The Phenomenaof Lxfe (h) Causality in the Structure of the Ind.iaidual (l) The Foreign Living Bodl ai the Bearer of P henomenaof Expre ssion (m) The Correction of Empathic Acts (n) The Constitution of the psychic Indiaidual and Its Signifcance for the Correction of Empathy . .. (o) Deceptionsof Empathy (p) The Signifcance of the Foreign Indiuidual's Constitution for the Constitutionof Our Own PsychicIndiaidual

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66 68
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ID

84 86 86

88

ChapterIII. The Constitution of the Psycho-Physical Individual

I

The Pure "1" . .

2 . The Stream of Consciousness .). The Soul 4 . "1" and Living Bodr, .
(a) The Giuennessof the Living Body . (b) The Liaing Body and Feelings Causality . . (c) Soul and Liuing Body,Psycho-Physical (d) The Phenomenon Expression of (e) Will and Liaing Body . . 5. Transition to the Foreign Individual (a) The Fields of Sensationof the Foreign Liaing Bodl (b) The Conditionsof the Possibility SensualEmpathv of (c) The Consequence SensualEmpathyand itsAbsence of in the Literature on Empat@ [Jnder Discussion. . . (d) The Foreign Liuing Bodl as the Center of Orientation of the Spatial \\'orld @ fhe Foreign World Image as the Modifcation of Our Oun World Image . oJ (f) Empathy as the Condition of the Possibility Constituting Our Own Indiaidual (g) The Constitutionof the Real Outer W'orld in I ntersubjectiae Experience

38 38 39 40
4l 48 49
5l

54 56
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58 60 6l 62 63 63

Chapter114Empathy as the Understanding of Spiritual persons -Ihe l. Concept of the Spirit and of the Cultural Sciences[Geisteswissenschaften] 9l 2. The Spiritual Subject 96 3. The Constitution of the person in Emotional Experiences 9g 4. The Givennessof the Foreign person l0g 5. Soul and Person l0g -Ihe 6. Exisrenceof the Spirit . ll2 7. Discussionin Terms of Dilthey I 13 (a) The Being and Value of the person I 13 (b) Personal Typesand the Conditions of the Possibilityof Empathy With persons. . . . . tt4 8. T'he Significanceof Empathy for the Constitution of Our Owr.rperson I 16 9. The Question of the Spirit Being Based on thePhysicalBody. ...... PersonalBiography l{otes Index I lg

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ON THE PROBLEM OF EMPATHY

Foreu)ord to the Third Edition
ranslatiorris alwaysa difficult task. It calls for a high order of intellectual virtue, demanding expertise in languages and in the art of interpretation. Dr. Waltraut Stein gives evidence in this n'ork of these competenciesand especiallyof the ability to penetrate and transmit empathically the text of her great-aunt's rvork OrztheProblemof Empathy(Zum Problemder Einfuhlurzg).This statementis no mere play on words but is meant rather to express the translator's human understanding and rapport u'ith Edith Stein'sthought. This is the first reason why I was huppy to learn that a third edition of the translation lvas projected and u'hv I readily agreed to write a brief preface. In my research and writing on E. Stein'sphilosophy, I have used the secondedition extensivelv and regretted that the book r.r'as not available to many others becauseit rvasout of print. Another reason u'hy I welcome the new edition is the important place that this work occupiesin E. Stein's philosophy and in the development of phenomenology. Anyone who r,r,'ishes pento ett'ateher thought should begin with this early $'ork. It skerches tl.tebroad outlines of her philosophy of the human person, details rit rvhich she frlls in in subsequent investigations. For her, the a\\'arenessthat empathy is and of what it is are linked essentially
IX

Foreuord to the Third Edition

xi

l,,,n.n. undersrandi ,r,rlno.u.!r,:t;:;..,"", a way underand or

standing person is through descriptive analysesof empathy. By means of the latter, she gives what may be called a first draft of the psycho-physical-spiritual nature of person, one which is not superficialbut n'hich raisesmany quesrionsto be addressedin her future n'orks. It was E. Stein's conviction that phenomenology was the most appropriate approach to the investigation of the structure of the human person, and she gave it her best efforts t h r o u g h o u t h e r s c h o l a r l yc a r e e r . This work, which was her Ph.D. dissertation, reveals both in method and content the breadth, depth, and precision of her philosophizing even at the beginning of her career. It revealsalso something of the enthusiasm and excitement which she, one of Edmund Husserl's most brilliant pupils, experienced in the la_ borious researchand writing that was required. Even at this time, in preparing a dissertation which had to win the ,.Master's', ap_ proval, Edith displaysan originality and independenceof thought that anticipated later existential developments in pheno-meqo.logy.Not only does she differ from Husserl-albeit diplomatically-in some respects,birt she also takes issuewith some theo_ ries of Scheler, T. Lipps, Miinsterberg, and others of her contemporaries, in the processof formulating her own theory. I n a d d i t i o n r o t h e r r a n s l a t i o no f t h e r e x t a n d t h e v a l u a b l ef o o t notes, the translator has supplied an introduction which gives r e a d e r sa n e x c e l l e n l e n t r 6 e i n t o r h e t h o u g h t r t o r l d o f t h e p h e _ n o m e n o l o g i s t s f t h e t i m e . W i t h i n r h e s p a i e o f a f e u . p a g e s .s h e o gives a helpful introduction into the Husserlian viewpoini which i n f l u e n c e dE . S r e i n a n d i n t t . rt h e o r g a n i z a t i o na n d s i g n i f i c a n c e f o t h e v a r i o u s s e c t i o n s f t h e t e x t . I n t h e f i n a l s e c t i o no f h e r i n t r o o duction, she raisesa question regarding whether E. Stein holds an unjustifiable assumprionconcerning the type of rationality which values and feelings have. This is an example of an issue which seems to me to be elucidated later in the Beitriige zur philosophischen Begrilndung der Psychologie und d,er Geisduissenschaften fContributions to the Philosophical Grounding of pslchotogy and the cultural sciencesl published in 1922. It is a questi"" tt-rii may be legitimately raised on rhe basisof this first work. Finally, it should be noted rhat rhe book has the porential to be

useful to scholarsin psychology.E. Stein's own srudiesin psychology befbre concentrating on phenomenology appear to have been of'great value to her in this and later works, in which the of'human experiences are a springboard to an underanalyses of'the nature of the human person. statrdir.rg Mary Catharine Baseheart,S.C.N. M.A., Ph.D. Spalding University Louisville, Kentucky S e p t e m b e r ,1 9 8 8

Prtfoce to the Third Edition

hen the Institute of Carmelite Studies asked me to pre/ Y Y pare a new edition of my translation of Edith Stein's doctoral dissertation for their series of her collected works in English, I was delighted to do so, becausea wider audience will now have the opportunity to examine a young scholar'srigorous and technical work in the light of her later reputation as a powerful and revered spiritual giant. At this time, about thirty years afrer presenting this translation as my thesisfor the degree of Masrer of Philosophy,I find myself again drawn to my great-aunt'swork, this time as a guide to living the Christian life fully and deepll'. I am srruck by the fact that she returned to scholarly work in a new way after her conversion to Christianity and continued in this work for the remainder of her lif'e.This teachesme thar God expectsme to use all of my gifts in His service and challengesme to find a way ro do so rather than withdrawing from the exigenciesof this earthli life. I rvant to thank Sr. Mary Catharine Baseheartfor her encouragement and her thoughtful foreword and Reverend John Sullivan for his generous help in preparing this neu,edition. \ Waltraut Stein,Ph.D. Atlanta, Georgia October, 1988

Prtfoce to the Firs t and SecondEditiofls

he translation of Zurn Problem d,er Einfi,-hlung presented here is a translation of the doctoral diss.z:rtation of'Edith Stein, done under Edmund Husserl. -I'he degre 4 \\'as awarded tn l9l6 at the University of Freiburg in Breisgiu, and the disserta-I-he title of the tion in this form n'aspublished in ig t 7 at U'alte. t treatise originalll' rvasDas Einfi)htungsproblem in seiner historischen Entuichlung und in phiinomenologisiei Betrachtu.ag [The Empathy Problemas It Dneloped Historicail and.ConsideyT Phlttomenologid callyl.'I'he first historical chapter u'asomitred i1 . publication and seemsno longer to be extant. This work is a description of the narure of errr pathy within the f r a n t e r + ' o r k f H u s s e r l ' sp h e n o m e n o l o g l a s p r e . e n t e d n r a i r t l yi n o Volume I of ldeas' As Husserl's assistanl,Edith Frad the opportunity to become intimately acquainted with his 1 rinking. In fact, she edited Volume ll of ldeas (cf. Husserliar La IY, Martinus N1ihotr, 1952) which deals to a large exrenr u,it]-, the same problems as her own work on empathy. -lhough she c aims not to have seen Volume II before completing herlwn wr:rk (see Au.thor's Foreword), she had evidently been iollowing Hu...serl very closely as he was at that time r.r,orking out his ideas.-Thu: her dissertation clearly shorvshow she has develol>ecl her inter'i)retation rlf the
" - \ . p r p e rl r r r k r t . p r i r r l , r f t h r I l : r l l c r , < l i r l r u . : r ,r r u b l i . h r t l o \ r ' r l : r g , r l N l i i n t h e ni r r l 9 X 0 I il i l r l i r h _ S r c i r r _ K a r n r ri . h i r r g t I' roblemder Linfihlung). 1'1 ( icrharrl.KrffLr r ' I - ?l l l h \ t r t r t ' Z u m

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Edith Stein

Pr{ace to the First and SecondEditions

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later presented in problem of empathy in terms of u'hat Husserl ihis *ork left unpublished bv him' '^'ih. presented n::t ^I: ,lg.tifi.ar,.. of the work by E' Stein in relation to Maurice becomes evident when considered Since de influen tial Ph'enom'enologie la perceptiozi'r U".f.^"-p"nty's manuscript of to had access the same unpublished Merlear'r-Pontv number of his most important and irltere.stVolume Il of ideas,a t o t h o s eo t L ' s t e l r l ' i n g f o r m u l a t i o n st a k e o n a s t r i k i n g s i m i l a r i t y 'Ihis lived or living body is particularly true of the coricept of the (Le CorPs a1cu or Leib)' '" completiono{ E' Stein'swork on empathy' t;; i."rs after the (1931)' in hts Caitesian Med'i'tations French H;;;'p..r.,',t.d Nijhoff' 1960)' In (Martinus which is now also availablein English different however, Husserl is eirphasizing a somewhat this work, of possibili'tv the problem of t*pati'y t the !h" lltt ;;p:;t;i of this other' Thus rather than the phenomenolo[ical description with his earlier concepCartesian Meditattons is more in contrast meansthat E' Stein'su'ork on tiotrs tharl similar to them' This also Meditations' However' both empathy is in contrast with Cartesian works to the necessityfor n. 3t.irl'u.ta Husserl adhere in all these Therefore' a ohenomenological reduction to Pure consciousness' in the strict rvorks oi phenomenology ;; ioiria.,ta ;ti.;.;; sense. Husserlian of -fhe "The Essence Acts of last third of E. Stein's chapter on of Scheler'sconceptron oI Empathy" consistsof a careful critique (1913)' presented in his first edition of Sympathiegefuhle .*i".ni so pertinent that he referred Scheler considered Steirr'sar-ralysis this work (1923)'2 to it three times in the second edition of der EinJi)hlun-gfits. into the This, then, is how Zum Problem On the other hand' history of the phenomenological movement' fact that E' Stein has made the reader must not out'loik that some original contributions to the phenomenological.description contributions' as the o{' the nature of empathy' Some tf th"tt tle considered in the following translator understands them, will introduction to the work' Dr' At this time I want to acknowledge my indebtlqlttt- 1o. thesis at Ohto Untverof my master'-s James Shericlan' director was made' It is he sitt', in connection with rvhich ihis translution

,vho first led me ro an understanding of the phenomenological ,rosirionand the contents of E. Stein's rvork. Also Alfred Schuetz, 'H".b.tt Spiegelberg,William Earle' as well as my fellow graduate most helpful by ,tud.r.,tt ai Northwestern University, have been encouragement' However,.,I corrections, and their suggestiot.ts, still mvself u.tu-" full responsibility for any errors that may r " i r r a i ni n t h i s t r a n s l a t i o n . Waltraut Stein, Ph.D. l 964

Translator's I ntroduction

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Translator' s I ntro duction

he radical viewpoint of phenomenology is presented by .I'his viewpoint seemsquite Edmund Husserl inhis ldeas.:' simple at first, but becomes exceedingly complex and involves intricate distinctions when attempts are made to apply it to actual problems. Therefbre, it may be well to attempt a short statement of this position in order to note the general problems with which it is dealing as well as the method of solution which it proposes.I shall emphasize the elements of phenomenology which seem most relevant to E. Stein's work. Husserl deals with two traditional philosophical questions,and in answerinithem, develops the method of phenomenological -fhese reduction which he maintains is the basis of all science. questionsare, "What is it that can be known without doubt?" and "How is this knowledge possiblein the most general sense?" as In the tradition of idealism he takesconsciousness the area to be investigated. He posits nothing about the natural world. He puts it in "brackets," as a portion of an algebraic formula is put in brackets,and makes no use of the material within these brackets. 'I'his does not mean that the "real" world does not exist, he says emphatically; it only means that this existenceis a presupposition which must be suspendedto achieve pure description. as It should be noted that the existenceof most essences well as that of things or facts is suspended in this bracketing. Clear knowledge of'the existenceof the idea of a thing transcendent to consciousness just as impossibleas clear knowledge of the exisis tence of natural objects, Husserl maintains.'' have But what can pclssiblyremain when things and essences Husserl saysthat a realm of'transcendentalconbeen suspended?
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remains, a consciousness which is in contrast with indisciousness in consciousness the natural world. This transcendentalor vidual includes a subject, an act, and an object. Huspure consciousness is emphasizesthat consciousness always active and always ierl d i r e c r e d t o w a r d s o m e t h i n g .T h i s a c t i v e d i r e c t e d n e s s e c a l l s j n h The subject of consciousness what wills, perceives, is tentionality. 'fhe act is the willing, remembers, knows, evaluates,fantasizes. p e r c e i v i n g .e t c . T h e o b j e c t , c a l l e d " i n t e n r i o n a l o b j e c t " o r ' . p h i n ( ) m e n o n , i s w h a t i s w i l l e d , p e r c e i v e d .l n o r d e r t o t a l k i n t h i s i t r n a y , t i s n o t n e c e s s a r yo s t a t e t h a t t h e p h e n o m e n o ne x i s t sa n y _ Furthermore, Husserl intends the where but in consciousness. designation"transcendental" to indicate that this consciousness is fundamental to any natural scientific effort because it prescribes what knowledge of the narural world must include. It is intersub_ jective in the same sensethat natural scienceis. In other words, the phenomenologist's description of consciousness verifiable is by other people who are employing his method. Husserl clearly is referring to Descartes'"Cogito, ergo sum,' in stating that pure consciousness what is known indubitably. -I.he is area of'certain knowledge is that of consciousness. It now becomesimportant not to confuse Husserl's,,phenomenon" with the usual designation of phenomena as appearances or rellections from objects. Husserl has no such intentions. pure consciousness concerned with a realm of objects which are the is sameobjects existing in the natural world. It only hasa different "standpoint" in regard ro them. Answering the question of frow knon,ledge is possiblein the most general sense,Husserl maintains that a reduction to phe_ nomena in an orderly manner is necessary.phenomenologists must intuit the field of investigation so that the exact nature of the radical change from the nitural standpoint and of the limits of'the descriptive undertaking may become perf'ectly clear. Husserl callsthis a methodological necessityand ihus thereduction is called the phenomenological reduction. When this reduction has Decn made, the phenomenologist is in a position to intuit the esse_lce eidos of phenomena. Husserl calls this special or kind of act Wesenschauung (intuition of essence). E. Stein in the dissertation here presented takes the phenom_

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Edith Stein

Translator's Introduction

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enological standpoint. She claims that the description o{'emPathy of afier the suspensior.r the existenceof emwithiri cor-rsciousness pathy must be the basis{or any other dealings with the problem 'I'he description she ty psy.hologists, sociologists,or biologists' phenomenou as is n-rakes a description of the pure transcel)dental it is observed from the special standpoint described above' It is she maintains as a phenomenologist, filr the esserlce imp<lssible, ofempathy to be anything else if she has proceeded correctly' But it is still possible to describe the gerresisof empathv in a real 'fhe psyindividual, the province of psychologv.5 psycho-physical insofar as he or she chotogiit's u'ork, however, only has validity begins with and returns t() the phetlomenon which the phenom'I'his is horv phen<lmenologyis the basis enologist has described. of' psychology and at the same timr how the analysesshe has if undertaken must be taken seriouslyby psychologists they grant to any other work. that pure clescriptionis fundamental 'fhis means that t-hesignificanceof E. Stein's work lies i1 her individual, and of' descriptionsof empathy, of the psycht>-physicai 'fhe indidescriptionsof the psvcho-physical the sp.iritualperson. are necessaryin order to show vidual and of'the spiritual Pers()n of the f ull implicatiorrsand applicatior-rs the doctrine of empathy' 'fhis takes place as follows. development ln Chapter II E. Stein explairls what it mealls to say that.er,r,lpathy is the givenness offoreign subjects and their erperietrqes' She of'experience living does this in terms of'the pure "I," the sub-iect is Her c<tnclusiol'l that empath)' is not perception, in experierrce. representati()n nor a neutral positing, but sai generis.t'If is a";1 of experienc.e being led by the fbreign experience and takesplace levels as fbllows: on three I t. tn" energence of the exPerience; 2. The lulfilling explication: 3. The comprehensiveobjectification of the explained experience.7 amortg description makes it possibleclearly to distingtrisl.r empathy, syntpathy,and a I'eelingo1'oneness' il C h a p t e r I l l d e s c r i b e sh o w t h e p s v c h < > p h y s i c an d i v i d u a l i s 'I-his

as constituted within consciousness sensed, living body and as 'fhis constitutior) is unified by orrtu'ardlyperceived physicalbody. 'fhe soul, an experience which is the rhe phenomenon of fusion. basicbearer of'all experiences,is founded on the body, and soul individual. and body together form the psycho-physical Irr developing this conception of the psycho-physicalindividare among the real constituual, the author notes that sensations -I'hese and cannot be bracketed.s are absoents of consciousness given just asjudging, willing, and perceiving. But there is a lLrtely between sensations and these other acts.Sensations do difl-erence llot issue from the pure "l" and never take on the form of the tn they are never cogito which the "1" turns toward an object,{}i.e., -fhey are spatially localizedsomewhere at a au'areof themselves. from the "I" and these locationsare alwayssomeplacein clistarrce the living body. On the contrary, the pure "I" cannot be localized. Nevertheless,my living body surrounds a "zero point of orientation" to u'hich I relate my body and everything outside of it. Whatever ref'ersto the "I" is given as at no distance from the zero point and everything given at a distancefrom the zero point is also given at a distance fiom the "L" Arr external thing can contact not me, btrt my physical body. Then its distance from my physical body 'fhus but not from me becomeszero. the living body as a whole is at the zer() point while all physical bodies are outside of it. 'l'his indicates that bodily' space(of which the zero point is the "1") and ()uter space (of which the zero point is the living body) are very different. For instance, it cannot be said that the stone t h a t I h o l d i n m y h a n d i s t h e s a m e d i s t a n c eo r o n l y a t i n y b i t tarthcr fl'r>mthe zero poinr of orientation (i.e., from me) than the hand itself. In this case, the living body itself is rhe cenrer of orientation and the stone is at a distance from it. T'his means that the distance of the parts of my living body from me is completely trtcomparablewith the distance of'foreign physical bodies from
me.lo

Let us consider for a moment the lrroblem that this notion of a zero point of' <trientati()n seems to be intended to solve and r v h e t h e rt h i s s o l u t i o n i s a c c e p t a b l e 8 , . S t e i n h e s i t a t e s o t a k e t h e . t s t e Pf r o m t h e c o n s t i r . u t i o n f t h e p u r e " I " t o t h a t o f ' t h e p h y s i c a l , o

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Edith Stein

Translator's Introduction

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living body.rr Why?'fhe reason seemsto be that she recognizes "I" is related that ihe has the pr,blem of showing how the pure ;'I" i.t a living body' This, it seemsto me' is very to the empirical close to the problem which Descartes also faced in trying to explain how an extended substance(matter) can be related to a non-extended substance (mind). Thus it aPpears that even have solvedthe epistemothough phenomenologistsvery p<lssibly problem of how a kn.wing subject is related to the object logicil oi'it, kno*ledge by rheir concept of intentionality discussed {ind themselves{aced with the ontological above, they sud-denly of how an extended substanceis related t() a non-exproblem tended one. Assuming, then, that this is the problem E' Stein faces at this point, let us-examineher solution. she begins by maintaining that sensations are among the real constituents of consciousness, which means that they cannot be suspendedor doubted any more than the cogito can. This, I believe, is a very exciting thesisthat.l have not found elaborated by other phenomenologists in this way. She seemsto see these sensationsas the bridge <lr link bet*..,] the pure "I" and the living body' Let us seehow this might belong t<l the pure "I" becausethey cannot be be so. Sensations s u s p e n d e do r b r a c k e t e d . T h e y t h e r e l b r e h a v e o n e f o ( ) 1 .s ( ) t o the speak, in the realm of pure consciousness, realm <;f the nonextended in this discussion.on the other hand, sensationsare always given as at some place in the living body, such as.in. the h."i f- visual data or on rhe surfaceof the body for tactile data. In this way they participate in the realm of the extended, that ofthe physical body become a living body. Furthermore' sensations u.. ul*uy, mine , giving further evidence that they belong to the "I." But note that E. Stein must still maintain that sensationsare spariallylocalized u,hile the "I" is non-spatial. If it is meaningf ul however, and if'sensationsare to say that the "I" has sensati<lns, ahvaysspatiallylocalized,then it must be possibleto saywhere the "I" is. Sh. utt.*pts to deal with this strange question by saying that "I" is at the "zero point of orientation" o{'the living body and has no distance from this, while any particular sensatioll is given at a distancefrom it. However, she adds that this zero point

is at no particular place.r2For purposes of outer perception, the living body itself servesas the zero point of orientation, and I see no reason to dispute this last observation. However, it seemsto me that further clarity must be gained on .n'hat means to say that the "I" is at the zero point of orientation it of the living body. Since this zero point is at no particular place, what does it mean to say that it is a point of orientation? What she wants to say, of course, is that the "I" is non-spatially localized, but what this means requires further elaboration. Until this has been clarified, it cannot be understood how the literally spatially localizedsensationsare at a distance from the non-sDatiallvlocalized "I," and the problem of the relation of the extended ro the r)on-extended cannot be considered as entirely resolved. However, this does not mean that this problem cannot be resolved by acknowledging sensationsas real constituents of consciousness and given at placesin the living body. E. Stein continues her analysisby noting that the living body is constituted in a two-fold manner: (l) as sensed or bodily perceived living body fLeib] and (2) as outwardly perceived physical body lKorper] of the outer world.r3 It is experienced as the same in this double givenness. By bodily perception she means rhe perception of my body from the inside as distinguished from outer perception or sensations objects. But she does not fail to of note that sensations objects are given at the living body to the of living body as senser,ra and so they are intimately connected with bodily perception. She calls this double mode of experiencing objects the phenomenon of "fusion": I see the hand and what it senses touches and also bodily perceive this hand touching this or object. Furthermore, this psycho-physical individual only becomes aware of its living body as a physical body like others n'hen it empathically realizes that its own zero point of orientation is a spatialpoint among many.'I'hus, it is firsi given to itself in the full sensein reiterated empathy.r5 In her description of the spiritual person in Chapter IV, E. Stein shows how the spirit differs from the soul. The soul, as a part of'nature, is sub.jectto natural causality.The spirit, which laces the natural n'orld, is subject to a meaning context based on

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Edith Stein

Tr an sI ator' s I ntr oductittn

xxlll

motivation. She describes motivation as the symbolic' experienced proceeding of one experience from another without a She develops this conception clf' detour over the ohject sphere.rri person in terms of feelings which are the necessary the spiritual basisfbr volition and ground valuing. The description of f'eelings revealsan "I" with various depths or levels.This is, of course, not t h e p u r e " I " o f ' C h a p t e r I I . W i t h t h e a d d i t i o n a l c o n s i d e r a t i o no f intensity and spread, a hierarchy of value feelings can be established and a doctrine of types of persons developed. On the basis volitions, and valamong f'eelings, of these complex relati<lnships revealing types, the spiritual person becomes intelligible. E. ues Stein then observesthat we become aware of levels of value in ourselvesby empathizing with persons of our own type. By becoming aware, also by empathy, that there are persons of types different from ours, we seethat certain ranges of value are closed t() us. There seems to be an assumpti()n in this discussion of the spiritual person that, while probably following Husserl and 'fhis is the contenScheler, neverthelessseemsto be un-lustified. tion that values and f'eelingshave a rationality no different fiom logical rationality. The experienced proceeding of one experi'fhese ence from another fbrms meaning contexts, E. Stein says. contexts indicate an a priori rational lawf ulnessin values,volition, and action like that in logic.rTShe develops this notion with the implication that the person can, in principle, be understood completely in terms of various depths of values and feelings which form themselvesinto personal types. 'I'his makes the intelligibility of the spiritual person parallel to the intelligibility of the physical individual understood in terms o{' mechanicalcausality.She seems,then, to be assumingthat when a person violatesthis rational lawfulnessof valuesand feelings, this irrational and incomprehensible. person's behavior is necessarily But it seems that, just because some feelings and values are deeper than others and we actually expect certain kinds ofbehavior fiom individuals of certain types, it does not at all follow that the oerson who violates these expectations and levels is necessari l y i i r a r i o n a l i n a s t r i c t l yl o g i c a l, . n r . . I t i s t r u e t h a t s u c h a p e r son'sbehavior does n()t make senseto us now, but may this not be

the thult 'f the types and the depth hierarchy we have described? I1 this approach to understanding spiritual personsis to be useful, \\'e must continually revise our classifications new phenomena as present themselves,rather than dismiss some fbrms of behavior a s " i r r a t i o n a l . " T . d i s m i s sb e h a v i o r i n t h i s w a y i s a c t u a l l y t o abdicate a readinessto understand. 8,. Stein is certai'ly to be credited here with seeing that mecharical causationas an explanation of physicalphenomena is not l r r p p r o p r i a r eo r e x p l a i n i n gs p i r i r u a lp h e n o m e n a ,a n d r h e i n t e r _ pretative scheme she proposes is very interesting. But it seems that such a scheme must be left open and distinguished from logical rationality rarher than identified with it. I n t h i s w o r k E . S t e i n h a st h u s s h o w n w h a t e m p a t h y i s a n d h o w i t is important in understanding our own nature as well as that of others. She has done an admirablejob of analyzing and describ_ ing the various aspectsand presentationsof'the phenomenon of empathy within the framework of the phenomenological meth'd. Her approach is clear and direct und h". e*amples'are apt. She also makes distinctions with a finenessof percepti,-,n that is truly remarkable. A final possiblevalue of this work may lie in an insight which E. Stein has in common with Sigmund Freud but has apparently arrived at independently. she shows that an experience u'hich took place in the past can exist in the background of present experience and still have an effect.18 she calls this mode of existerce the mode of non-actuality.Freud in his analysisof personali t r s a y st h a t a n e x p e r i e n c em a y b e r e p r e s s e d y t h e s u p e r e g ob u t b continue to exist in the id. At a later time, if the superigo is rveakened,the repressedexperience may break out of the id and affect the behavior of the ego. T'he mode of existenceof material rn the id Freud calls unconscious.A synthesisof the views of nonactuality and unconscious, one of which was arrived at by the nrethod of phenomenology and the other by an architectonic of the person in a naturalistic context, might be both profitable and i rr re r e s it n g . Waltraut Stein,Ph.D. l 962

I{otes on the Translatiort

xxv

Noteson the Translation

he pagination of the original has been retained in the lefthand margin and all footnotes and cross references refer to these pages. In general, W.R.B. Gibson's translation of the Ideenlehas been followed for the translation of technical phenomenological terminology. An exceptionis AusschaLtung, which has been rendered "exclusion" rather than "disconnection." In Chapter III the distinction benveenKdrper and Leib becomes very important. While this distinction is quire clear in German, the usual translation in English is "body" for both rvords.K'drper signifies the material or physical aspectsof one's body, i.e., that which can be sensually perceived as matter. By contrast, Leib emphasizes the animation of the body, the perception of it as alive instead of simply as a thing. In accordance with this distinction the word Kdrper has usually been rendered as "physical body" and Leib as "living body." The distinction between Erlebnis and Erfahrung becomes important in several places. E. Stein used, Erlebni.s the mosr genin eral sense of experience, i.e., as anything which happens to a subject. In the feu'places lvhere she usesErfohrung, she is emphasizing senseexperience, such as the experience or perception of foreign experience. To make this distinction clear, Erfahrunghas been rendered as "perception" or "perceiving," with the Germarr in brackets to distinguish it from Wahrnehmung. Erlebnishas consistentlybeen translated as "experience." -l'he word hineinuersetzen has no simple English equivalent. also Literally it ref-ers the acr of transl-erringor putting oneself into to another's place. "Projection into" seemedto be the most satisf-actorY tra115l21iqn. xxiv

A frrrther problem arose with the translation of Seeleand seelemost clearly means "soul" in the senseof psyche and seelisch. has bee' rendered as such. Howe'er, "soulful" o. ,,rpi.it.,ol" i' English does not render rhe senseof seelisch. far as the transla_ As tor ccruldsee,E. Stein is not making a distinction between seerisch anclpsychisch so both words havb been rendered as ,.psychic.,, and 'rhe translation of ceis,t chapter IV presented a sp.iiar in p.oblem, since neither of the two usual renderings inio English, "-i"{' or "spirit," is reaily satisfactory.The connorarions of "rnind" are too narror{,',while those of "spirit" are too broad. "spirit" has been selecredfor this third ed'ition with the cavear rhat the reader keep in mind that the author is nor referring to a moral or religious entity in this context. Rather, the sense i, Jf tne creative human spirit that is the subjecrmatrer of what we call the humanities, the social sciences, andlaw and that the Germans call G e i s t e s u . i s s e n s c h a f tletn ,r a l l y , , i n v e s t i g a t i o n s i n t o i e spirit.,, Geisteswissenschaften bee. transrated as""curtural r.i..,...,,, has a c()mmon rendering of this term.

ON THE PROBLEM OF EMPATHY

Foreword
he complete work, fiom which the following expositions are taken, began with a purely historical treatment of'the problems emerging one by one in the literature on empathy belore me: aestheticempathy, empathy as the cognitive source of fbrergn [fremdes)experience, ethical empathy, etc. Though I firund these problems mingled together, I separatedthem in my presentation. Moreover, the epistemological,purely descriptive, anclgenetic-psychological aspectsof this identified problem were undistinguished fiom one another. This mingling showed me rvhv no one has fbund a satisfactorysolution so far. Above all, it seemed that I should extract the basic problem so that all the others would become intelligible from its viewpoint. And I wanted to submit this problem to a basic investigation. At the same tinre, it seemed to me that this positir,'ework was a requisite foundation for criticizing the prevailing conclusions. I recognized this basic problem to be the question ofempathy as the perceiving lErfahrungl of {breign subjects and their experience lErLeben]. The fcrllowingexpositior.rs deal with this queswill
tr()l).

<V>

I am very well aware that my positive results represent only a v e t y s r l a l l c o n t r i b u t i o n t o w h a t i s t o b e r e a l i z e d .I r r a d d i t i o r r , specialcircumstanceshave prevented me from once more thor- <VI> oughly revising the work before publication. Since I submitted it t o t h e f a c u l t y , I h a v e , i n m y c a p a c i t ya s p r i r . a t e a s s i s t a n t o m y

Edith Stein

Husserl, had a look at the manuscript of Part respectedProf'essor II of his "Ideen," dealing in part with the same question' Thus, naturally, should I take up my theme again, I would not be able to refrain from using the new suggestionsreceived. Of course, the statement of the problem and my method of work have grown entirely out of intellectual stimuli received from Professor Husserl so that in any case what I may claim as my "spiritual property" in the following expositions is most questionable.Nevertheless,I can say that the results I now submit have been obtained by my own efforts. This I could no longer maintain if I nou' undertook changes.

Chapter II

of The Essence Acts of Empathy

l. The Method of the Investigation ll controversy over empathy is based on the implied as- < I > ^ta. sumption that foreign subjects and their experience are -fhit-rk..s given to ,rr. deal with the circumstances of'the occuri",,.., the effects, and the legitimacy of this givenness' But the m o s t i m m e d i a t eu n d e r t a k i n gi s t 0 c o n s i d e r t h e p h e n o m e n o nr l f We..shall in gir.'enness and by itself and t<l investigate its essence"phenomenologicalreduction,'' d o t h i s i n t h e s e t t i n go f ' t h e 't'he goal of phenomenology is to clarify and thereby to findthe 'fO reach this goal it considers ultimat-ebasis of all kn<tu'ledge. "doubtful," nothing that can be eliminothing that is in any way n a t e d . ' i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e , i t d o e s n o t u s e a . y r e s u l t so f . s c i e n c e 'I'his is self-evident, for a science which propoSes u'hatsoever. k u l t i m a t e l yt o c l a r i f y a l l s c i e n t i { i c n o w l e d g e m u s t n o t , i n t u r n , b e basedon a sciencealready extant, but must be grounded in itself'. l s i t b a s e do t t n a t u r a l e x p e r i e n t e r h e n ? B y n o m e a l l s ' l - t t re v e n t h i s a s w e l l a s i t s c o n t i n u a t i o n , r e s e a r c h i n n a t u r a l s c i e n c e 'i s subject to cliverseinterpretations (as in materialistic or idealistic -I'herefcrre, phiiosrphy) and thus stands i. .eed .1clari{rcati.n. thc entirg surrounding world, the physicalaswell as the psychop h l s i c a l , t h e b o d i e s a s w e l l a s t h e s o u l so f ' m e n a l t d a n i m a l s ( i n c l u c l i n gt h e p s y c h o p h y s i c a lp e r s o n o f ' t h e i n v e s t i g a t o rh i m s e l f ) i s s t r b i e c t < > h e e x c l u s i o no r r e d u c t i o n . t

Edith Stein

The Essence

of Acts of Empathy

W h a t t a n b e l e l i i f t h e w h o l e w o r l d a n d e v e r tt h e s u b j e c te x p e r i eDcing ir are cancelled?In fact, there remains an infinite Iield o1' pure i.vestigation. For let us consider what this exclusiot'tmeatts. i can doubr whether what I see befbre me exjsts' Deception is p o s s i b l e .J ' h e r e f b r e , I m u s t e x c l u d e a n d m a k e n o u s e o f t h e p . , s i t i n g o l e x i s t e n c e .B u t r ' r ' h a tI c a n n o t e x c l u d e . w h a t i s n o t iubject to doubt, is my experience of the th"!pg (the perception' *"-,r.y, or other kind <lf comprehension) t<;getherwith its correlate, the full "phenomenon of the thing" (the object p;ivenas the san'rein series of diverse perceptions or memories)' l'his ohenomenon retains its entire character and can be made int<lan ob.jectof consideration. (There are difhculties in seeing how it is of ro p<tssible suspenclthe pr>sitirrg existcnce and still retain the The caseof hallucination illustrates i.,ll .hn.u.t.r of'perception. this possibility.Let us suppose that someone suffers {iom halluc i n a i i o n s a n d h a s i n s i g h t i n t o h i s c o n d i t i < l n .I n a r o o m w i t h a that he seesa door in the wall and healthy person, he may supPose it. Whell his attentiorl is called to this, he \\'ant ti) go through r r e a l i z e s h a t h c i s h a l l u c i n a t i n ga g a i n . N o w h e n o l o n g e r b e l i e v e s that the door is present, even being able to transf'er himself into 'I'his offers him an excellent opporthe "cancelled" perception. , t l o r s t u < l y i n gh e n a t u r e o f p e r c e p t i o n i n c l u d i n gt h e p o s i t tunity o{'existence,evelt though he no longer participates in this) ing tl-hus there remains the whole "pheIl<lmen<ln<lf the world" lvhen its positing has been suspended.And these "phetlomena" are the object r>f phenomenology' However, it is not sufficient merely to comprehend thern individually and to explain what is i m p l i e d i n t h e m , i n q u i r i n g i n t o t h e t e n d e n c i e se n c l o s e di n t h e Rather, $'e must press iorsimple havilrg of'rhe phen<-rmenon. n,ard to their essence.Each phen<lmencln{brms an exemplary 'fhq phenomenology of basis firr the consideration of essetrce. perceptiqn, Itot satisfied n'ith describing the single Perceptioll, \\'ants [o ascertain rvhat. "perceptign is essentially as such." It acquiresthis knou'ledge fit>rn the single casein icleationalabstract i<) r-l.:" it We must sljl-L"shoLrC[gt means to sa)'that my experier4e is empirical ,r,irf.;6E6ie-Med. It is lot-lirdu6itable that i exist, tl"ris " 1 " o l t h i s n a m e a n d s t a t i o n ,g i v e n s u c h a n d s u c h a t t r i b u t e s .M y

u,hole past could be dreanr ed or be a deceptive recollection. 'l'herefbre, it is subjectto thc- exclusion, only remaining an object "I," the experiencing a 1;{corrsideration s a phen. - menotl. But ' the who considers w(? rld and my own person as phenomesubiect a , , , r , ' ," 1 " a m i n e x p e r i e n c e - n d o n l y i n i t , a m . j u s t a s i n d u b i t a b l e , to cancelas e- xperience itself. and impossible Norv let us apply this way ,-, f thinking to our case.lhe lvorld.in --vorld of physical bodies but also..of r.vlrichwe live is not orrll'a tls, of whose experiences we extF-;lel'to erxperiencing s.ubjects -fhis knowledge is nc, : indubitable. Precisely here we are know. subject to such diverse dec.=ptions that occasionally we are in-v of knowledge in this domain at all. clined to doubt the possibilit life is i'duhitehlv tbels' But the-phenomeron ef foreig*Jxyehk er. -want.to-exas+ir+--++his-a-lirde-furrh r!-g-D.ovc and Horvever,.the-dlrectiA! cr:.,the investig-ationis not yet clearly prescribed. \\'c could.proce<d f rom the complete, concrete phei,,r-.t'r,r. before us in our e- xperiential world, the phenomenon individu, -al which is clearly distinguishedfrom r>f'a psvcho-physical 'fhis indir r dual is not givett as a physical body, thing. a phy,sical but as a sensitive,living bo.r,ly belonging to an "I," an "I" that , s e r ) s e sh i n k s ,f ' e e l sa n d w i l l - . ' l ' h e l i v i n g b o d y o f t h i s " I " n o t o n l y t,

eq l fi ts i nto my p_!-rgmena .n:a;lcif lur"u-Lielfuhc.cenrerrrf-orieiua-

a tion of'sr',ch phenomenal r.. orld. It facesthis rvorld and commun l c a t e sw l t n m e . And we could investigate how whatever appears to us beyond t h e m e r e p h y s i i a lb o d y g i r . - : n i n o u t e r p e r c e p t i o n i s c o n s t i t u t e d u'ithin consciousness. Moreover, we could cons-, der the single, concrete experiences < r f t h e s e i n d i y i d u a l s .D i f f e r . = n t r v a y so f b e i n g g i v e n w o u l d t h e n appear, and we could f-urt -rer pursue these. It would become apparent that there are oth- er ways of being given "in the svmb o l i c r e l a t i o n " t h a n t h e g i v e r l l l e s sw o r k e d o u t b y L i p p s . I n o t o n l y and gestures,but also in know what is expressed fie cial expressions Perhaps I seethat someone makes a rvhat is hidden behind thent sad {irce but is not really sa 'd. I may als<lhear someone make an 'I-hen I not only understand the indiscreet remark and bh-r= h. r e m a r k a 1 d s e e s h a r n ei n - - h e b l u s h , b u t I a l s o d i s c e r n t h a t h e knou's his remark is indis.-,reet and is ashanled rif' himself' fbr

<4>

Edith Stein

The Essence Actsof Empathy of

judgment about having made it. Neither this motivation nor the his reirark is expressedby any "sensory appearance'.' w3y's 9f This investigutionwill be concerned rvith these various "and pgssibly- witb the qnderlying .reiatio,nslrips being given All these pr.r! ttl But a still more radical examination is possible' nature of actsin bata oifbr.ign experience point back to the basic Iv!'e now \^'ant to which fgl"jgl :;5pg1l,encgganmpreh,.g.+-ded' " r ad i d esi g n if e i hti" i. t t- i t A - pa t h y, r ega r d-l"s s o f aI I h i st o r i caI t these acts in the tioniattached to the *.'ia: 1." grasp and describe greatest essentialgenerality will be our first undertaking' Acts l. Description of Empathy in Comparison With Other we shall be able ro see empharic acts best in their individuality if u,e confront rhem u'ith othenect! olprc-eqlllllglsl9s'(our field of considerarion afrer making the describedreduction)..I e*t us take an example to illustrate the nature of the act qf gmpalhy' A friend?ell, -J that hi hai lbst his brcithei and I become aware is of his pain. What kind of an arvareness this?I anr not concerned here with going into the basison which I infer the pain' Perhaps his face is"pale and disturbed, his voice toneless and strained' Perhaps he also expresseshis pain in words' Naturally, these but they are not mv concern here'.I things can all be investigatecl, but rvhat it not horv I arrive at this awareness' *ot,id like to kr-row, itself is. and EmPathl (a) Outer PercePtion Needlessto sav,I have no outer perception of the pain' Outer perception is a term for acts in u'hich spatio-temporal conctete t.ir-tg'and occurring come to me in embodied givenness'This beini has the quality of being there itself righl now; it turns this to-nib ii embodied in a or tliat ffied It is liri6-oi-cli{$xhere in comparison with sidescospecific sense. perceived but averted. -I'he is pain is not a thing ar.rd not given to me-4sa thigg' even ';in" the pained countenance'I perceive of it u,hen I am alvare this countenanceout$'ardl1'and the pain is given "at one".rvith it' There is a close,yet very loose,parallel between empathlc acts and the averted sides of rvhat is seen, because ln Progresslve

perception !.a14-Uaysnrors-ne.wsidesofrheLhhg-to-,nri-u.ordial givenness. Each side can, in principle, assume this primordial giviiiness I select. I can consider the expression of pain, more a c c u r a t e l y t h e c h a n g eo f f a c e I e m p a t h i c a l l yg r a s p a s a n e x p r e s . sion of pain, from as many sides as I desire. yet, in p.rincipl", i .ur., never get an "orientation" where the pain irself is primordiall.y glven. Thgs empathy doesnot have the character of outer perceptign, though it does have something in common with outer perception: In both casesthe objeq_q itself is present here and now. We have c o m e t o r e c o g n i z eo u t e r p e r c e p t i o na s a n a c r g i v e n p r i m o r d i a l l y . B u t . t h o u g h e m p a t h ) i s n o t o u r e r p e r c e p t i o n .t h i s i s n o t r o i u y that it does not have this "primordialitv."

<6>

(b) Primordialitl and \Von-primordiality Tl:r: are things other than rhe ourer world given to us pri_ rnordially; for insrance,there is ideation rvhich ls the intuiiive c<lmprehension essential of states.Insight into a geometric axiom is primordially given as well as valuing. Finally and above all, our own qxp9"1-i-eng.es as they are given in reflection haye the character of primordialiry. Since empathy deals with grasping u,hat is here and new, it is trivial to say rhat it is not ideation. (whether ir can serve as a basis tbr ideation, which is the attainment of an essentiar knowledge .f e x p e r i e n c e s i,s a n o t h e r q u e s t i o n . ) Nor, there is still rhe question of rvhether empathy has the primordiality of our own experience. Before we can answer this question, we must further differentiate the meanins. of experience itseiprt Btlt not all experiencesare primordiaill, given nor primordial . i' their colttent. Menrorl', expectati.n, ur-rdfu,-rtury not have, do their.objec_t.lodilypresenrbefore therrr. Thev only represent it, and this character of representation is an immanent, essential lr moment ol'these acts,not a sign fiom their objects. Finally, there is the question of the givenness of our own gx_ periences themselv-es. is p<tssible It for ever1,experience to be

5>

fti@ffi?r more primordial rhan What could be

Edith Stem

The Essence Acts of Empathy of

for the reflecting glance of primordially given, i'e'' it is.possible ,.t,, in the experiencero be there bodily itself. Furthermore, it in. non-primordially is possible fbr our olvn exPerlences to b-egiven or fantas;' inhmory' expectation' whether empathy is Now we ugii,-t tuk" up the questi;n of sense' what Primordial and in (c) Memorl, Expectation,Fantasl' and Empathy of empathy and There is a well-known analogy between acts expfrlglrces 4Ie!v9! qon-primordially' acts in which our own representallonal act now The memory of a joy is primordial as a its co^ntentof joy is non-primordial' being carried out, tiro"gn I could study' but the fhis act has the iotal character ofjoy which and bodily there' rather joy is not primordially ""t' ":-liil:g "been expe.ence' can aliueland this "once," the time of the past points b e d e f i n i t e o r i n d e f i n i t e ) ' l T h ep r e s e n t n o n - p r i m o r d i a l i t y h t l i t p a s t h a s t h . ec h a r a c t e r o [ a ' back to the past primordii[iiy' what'is rerlgmforrner ".to*." Accordingly' memory posits' and bered has being' "1" as the subject of Further, theie are two possibilities:The can look the act of'remembering, in this act of representation, intentional object of back at the pastjoy'-fhen the pastjoy is th.e tle .,1,,,its sublelt being with and in the "I" of the past. fLr.us the and objegt' subject present.:'I" -l'd the puti"t" face.eachother as of samecoinciie, though there is a consciousness They do not ness.Butthisisnotapositiveidentificationand'moreover'the "I" and the distinction between th-eprimordially remembering also be "I" non-primordiall,vremembered persists'Memory can representationin accomplishedin other modes' The same act of asa whole implies which what is remembered emergesbefore me expose "traits" in certain tendencies.When these unfold, they experience their temporal course, how the whole remembered was once prlmordially constituted'22 .l.hisprocesscanoccurpassively..inme''orlcandoitactively well asthe active' step by itep. I can evencarry out the passive'as the present course o{'memory rt'ithout reflecting' without having in.anyway' Or I of "1," the sub-iect th. utt of memory, before me set mvselfback to that time in a continuousstream .url .*pr"rriy

<7 >

of'experiences, allowing the past experiential sequence to re<8> awaken, living in the ryrqgrnLelgd glpg{ence instead of turning t o i t a s a n o b j e c t . H o n e v e r , t h e . m e m o r y a l w a y sr e m a i n s a r e p r e which is in contrast with sentation ylllqq-prlinordralsubject 'I'he reproduction of the the subject dqing -the,remqpqbering. lormer experience is the clarification of what was vaguely intended at first. At the end of the process theqis a new_ gpjgqqlicatign. I now unite the past eap6iience, which first arose before me as a whole and which { tbS. fpt'apj=rr-t while projec'tjng myself into it, in an \trnelle-for-miof "appercepti\grfp memory can have a variety '['hus of'gaps. tt is poisible for me to represent a past s-ituation to myself and be unable t9 repember rny iqner behavilr in this tl situation. As I transfer myself back into this situa,tiop;f,'surrogata ; 'I'his image of the past frrr the missing memory comes into focus. behavior is not, however,a representation of what is past. Rather, of'the memory image to get the it is the "-qursltejg-lrpletion n i'rg,,1'i he * ht lE-ii canTave t he cha;;aFioad;ubt,cbnjec", ture, or possibility,but never the character of being. It is hirdly necessary go into the caseof expectatron.since it t6 is so parallel. But something can still be said about free fhntasy. Fantasy, too, can be accomplishedin various ways: An experience of'fantasy can arise as a whole and the tendencies implied in it fulfilled step by step. In faplasy there is no temporal distance, filled by continuous experiences,between the fantasizingand the fantasized"l," provided I do notjust happen to be dealing with a larrtasized emory or expectation. m 'l'he "I" But there is also a distinction here. producing lhe lantasizedworld is primogdial: the "I" living in it is non-primo,rdial. The fhntasized experiences are in contrast with memory h e c a u s e h e y a r e r r o t g i v e n a s a r e p r e s e n t a l i o no f a c t u a l e x p e r i t ettces but as the non-primordial form of present experiences. -l'his "present" does not indicate a present of'objective time but an experienced present which in this casecan only be objectified 'I-he ttt a "neutral"::r present of fantasized time. neutralized or <9> tton-positedfirrm of'the present memory (the representation of'a sivennessnow real but not possessing body) is in contrast with a a tteutralized pre- and post-memory. That is to say,it is in contrast

t0

Edith Stein

The Essence Acts oJ'Empathl of

II

with a fantasy of the past and of the future, with the representation of unreal past and future experiences.It is also possiblefor me to meet myself in the realm of fantasy(asrvell as in memory or expectation), i..., to meet an "I" which I recognize as m-f1.elf though there is no linking continuity of experience to establish the unity, so to speak,to meet my mirror image. (This reminds us, for example, of the experience Goethe relates in Dichtung und One evening he was coming from Sesenheim after sayW'ahrheit. ing good-bye to Friederike, and he met himself on the way in his fui..re form.) But this does not seem to be the genuine fantasy of our own experiences.Rather, it seemsto be an analogue to empathy which can be understood only from the viewpoint of empathy. So now to empathy itself. Here, too, we are dealing with an act which is primordial as present experience though non-primordial in content. And this content is an experience which, again, can be had in diFerent ways such as in memory, expectation, or in fantasy.When it arisesbefore me all at once, it facesme as an object (such as the sadness I "read in another's face"). But u'hen I inqqlre into its implied tendencies (try to bring another's mood to to clqar givenness mysel|, the content, having pulled me into it' is no longer really an object. I am now no longer turned to the of content but to the object of it, am at the sub.ject the content in executed after successfullv the original subject'splace. And only again face me as an object.2a clarification, does the content Thus in all the casesof the representation of experiencesconsidered, there are three levels or modalities of accomplishment even if in a concrete case people do not always go through all Ievelsbut are often satisfied lvith one of the lower ones. These are (1) tne emergence of the experience,(2) the fulfilling explication, ind (3) the comprehensive ob.iectificationof the explained experience. On the first and third levels,the representationexhibits the non-primordial parallel to perception, and on the second lervelit exhibits the non-primordial parallel to the having of the experietrce.The subject of the empathized experience, howet'er, is not the subject empathizing, but another. And this is what is fundamentally new in contrast with the memory' exPectation,or the fantasy of our own experiences. These two subjects are sepa-

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ra[e and notjoined tggether, as previclusly,by a consciousnessof sameness.ora coruinuity of experience. And $'hile I am living in the other's joy, I do not feel primordial .joy. It does not issuelive fiom my "L" Neither does it have the character of once having lived like rementberedjoy. But still much less is it merely f'anta'fhis sized rvithout actual life. sther subject is primordial all clo not experignce-ifas.primordial. In nry non-primorthough dial experience I feel,(as-il-were, led by a primordial one not experienced by me but still there, manifesting itself in my nonprimordial experience. Tbrrs errrpat-hyis a.kindof act of perceiuiag{eine ,|rt erfahrender Aktu) suigeneris.We have set ourselves the task of expounding it in its peculihrity befbre tackling any other question (of whether such experience is valid or how it occurs).And we have conducted this investigation in purest generality. Empathy) which rve examined and sought to describe,.is th9 g1pe1!gnggof.ful'eign colsciousrress in general. irrespective ofthe kind ofthe experiencing subject or o l t h e ' s u b i e c t w h o s e c o n s c i o u s n e sis e x p e r i e n c e d .W e o n l r d i s s cussedthe pure "I," the subject ofexperience, on the subject'sas u,ell as on the object's side. Nothing else n'as drawn into the investigation. 'l'he experience which an "I" as such has of another "I" as such < I I > l o o k s l i k e t h i s . T h i s i s h o w h u m a n b e i n g sc o m p r e h e n dt h e p s y c h i c lif'e of'their fellows. Also as believers they comprehend the love, the anger, and the precepts of their God in this way; and God can comprehend people's lives in no other way. As the possessor of complete knowledge, God is not mistaken about people's experiences,as people are mistaken about each others' experiences.But people's experiences do not become God's own, either; nor do they have the same kind of givennessfor Him. 3. Discussion in Terms of Other Descriptions of EmpathyEspecially That of [T.] Lipps-and Continuation of the Analysis Naturally, this general presentation of the nature of "ernpathy on the u'hole" does not accomplish much. \{e must now investigate how empathl is differentiated as the perceptiop of psy'cho-

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physical individuals and thcir experierce of personality, erc. yet fror, the c.nclusi.ns already reached, it is possibreto criticize s , m e h i s r o r i c a lt h e o r i e s o f h o r . rf o r e i g n c o n s c i o u s n e sis e x p e r i s e n c e d .B y m e a n so f t h i s c r i t i c i s m ,w e c a n a l s oc o m p l e t eo u r a n a l v _ s i sa l o n g s o m e l i r r e s . Lipps' description of' the experience of-entpathy agrees with ours ln many respects.(we shall not deal with his causal-genetic h1,p'thesis<lf the circunrsrances of'empathy, the the.ry oi i.,n.. imitatio.r, becausehe mixes it almost entirely with pure descript i o n . ) T o b e s u r e , h e d o e s n r > tc o n d u c h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o ni n p u i e generality, sticking ro the caseof the psycho-physicat indi'idual a.nd to "symbolic givenness," but we can still generalize in part the conclLrsions reaches. he (a) Points of Agreement , L.ipps depicts emparhy as an fljnnef parricipation" in foreign Drubrless, this is eq,ivalent to our highest le'el"ol' yre.xperiences. / the consurnrnationof empathy-where we are ..at" the foreign s u b j e c ta n d t u r n e d w i t h i t t o i t s o b j e c t . H e s t r e s s e t h e o b i e c t i v i t v s .r the "demanding" characrer of'empathy ar.rdthus .ip..rr", w h a t w e . n r e a n b y d e s i g n a t i n gi t a s a k i n d o f a c t u n d e r g o n e . Further, he indicateshow errrpathy, akin to memor),.and e-xpec_ is tation. But this brings us directly to a point where.r.r, *uy, pu.,. (b) The Tendency Full Experiencing to Lipps speak.s the f-actrhat .ever) experience about which I of kn'u', including those remembered and expected as well as those e m p a t h i z e d ," r e n d s " t o b e f ' u l l v e x p e r i e n c e d .A ' d i t i s f u l l y e x p e r i e n c e di f n o t h i n g i r . r e o p p o s e s t . A t r h e s a m e t i m e t h e , , I , , , m i a n o b j e c t u n t i l n o w , i s e x p e r i e n c e d '.f h i s i s s o w h e t h e r t h e , . I , , i s p a s t c i r f u t u r e , m y ( ) w n o r r h e f o r e i g . " I . " H e a l s o c a l l st h i s f u l l e x p e r i e n . i . g . f f r r r e i g ne x p c r i e r r c e m p a t h y .I n d e e d ,h e f i r s r s e e s f u l l e m p a t h l h e r e , t h e o t h e r b e i n g a n i n c o n r p l e t e ,p r e l i m i n a r y levelol empathv. -I'hat t h e s ' b j e c t o f ' t h e r e m e r n b e r e d e x p e c t e d ,r > re n r p a t h i z e d , e x p e r i e n c ei n t h i s s e c o n df < r r m . o f ' m e m o r y ,x p e c t a t i o r ro r e m p a _ e , t h y 'i s n o t p r o p e r l v a n o b j e c ri s i n a g r e e m e n tw i t h o u r c o n c e p r i ; n . But we dr .'t agree that there is a c.mplete c.'i.cidence *iih tne

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l3 ,.1,', renrembered, expected, empathized that they become -or o n e . L i p p s c o n f u s e st h e f o l l o w i n g t w o a c t s :( l ) b e i n g drawn into r h e e x p e r i c n c ea r f i r s r g i ' e n o b j e c r i v e r y n d f r r t f i i l i n gi i s i m p r i e d a tendencieswith (2) the transition from non-primoraiil to p.i-,rrdial experience. A memory .is entirely lulfilred and identified when o.e has lirllowed out all its terrdenciesto exprication anrr estabrished the experie'tial continuity to the prese.ri. But this does no, -ut .-,rr. remembered experience primorQia-|.The present viewpoint of rlre remembere. stare.f affairs is comptetely independen, of rn. remembered viewpoint. I can remember a perception and now be ct>n'inced that I u'as formerry under a derusion. I .emember my discomfort in an embarrassirrg situation and now think it *u, u..y f u n n y . I n t h i s c a s et h e m e m ( ) r y i s ' o m o r e i n c o m p r e t e ttun if t again take the former viewpoint. We agree that a shift from remembered, expected or empa_ <13> thized to primordial experience is possible.But we ao r that, when this tendency has been Iulfilled, memory, "", "gi." expectation, or empathy is still present. Let us consider the case further. I actively bring to mind a j f t r r m e r j o y , f o r e x a m p l e ,o [ a p a s s e d x a m i n a i i o n . e I r r a n s f e rm v _ self into it, i.e., I rurn,ro the joyful evenr and depict i, ,; ;yr.iiT, a l l i t s j o y f u l n e s sS u d d e n l yI n r i t i c et h a t I , t h i s p r i m o r d i u l , . ,'._.__ bering "1," am full ofjoy. I rqmembql the joyful ar.d.tuk. primordial .foy in the rernemtrer,edevent. rio*"u.., "uent ,r," -.-".i . l f ) ' a n d t h e m e m o r y " I " h a v e v a n i s h e do r , a r m o s t , p e r s i s t e s i d e b tne.prrmordral..;oy d the primordial .,I." Naturally, an t h i sp r i m o r _ dialjoy over past events can also occur directly. .Ihis *ould b" mere representation of the event without my remembering " the former joy or making a transition from the remembered to the primordial evenr. Fin?!y, I may be primordially;"yfuf ou., rh. past.foy,making the differencecu c t w e e n th e s e r r r r c r c I r L between l n t w o a c t se s p e c i a l l y pr<tminent. Now let us take the parallel to ernpathy.My friend comesro me beaming u'ith joy and tells me he has passed his examinatior.,. i comprehend his joy empathically; transferring myself i"," i,, i t o m p r e h e n d t h ej o 1 l - u r ' e s s r t h e e v e n r a n d o u-.-no* p.im.r.aiaitu l ( ) y t u to v e r i t m y s e l f ' .I c a n g l s o b e j o y f u l w i t h o u r f i . . r . o m p . e _

The Essence Actsof Empathy of

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of The Essence Actsof Empathy

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hending the.joy of the other. Should the examination candidate step into the tense,impatient family circle and impart the.ioyful news, in the first place, they will be primordially.joy{ul over this ' nervs. Only when they have been joyful long enough" themselves,will they be joyful over their.joy or, perhaps as the third possibility,be joyful over his joy.2r'Rut his joy is neither given to us as primordialjoy over the evelrt nor as pri,mordialjoy over his .joy. Rather it is given as this non-primordial act of empathy that we have already described more precisely. On the other hand, if, as in mem6ry, we put ourselvesir-rthe place of'the fbreign "I" and sgpprgssit while we surround ourselveswith its situation, we hav'eone of these situationsof "appropriate" experience. If we then again concede to the foreign "I" its place and ascribethis experiemce him, we gain a knort ledge to of his experience.(According to Adam Smith, this is how foreign experience is given.) Should empatht trail, this procedure can make up the deficiency, but it is not itself an experience. We could call this surrogate for empathy an "assumption" but not strictly empathy itsetf, ai-ifl-nleirrong'doei."' empatfiiirur defined sens*e thg experience of foreign consciousness as can only , be the non-primordial experience which announcesa primordial one. It is neither the primordial experience nor the "assumed" one. (c) Empathy and Fellou Feeling Should empathy persist beside primordial .joy over the joyful event (beside the comprehension of' the joy of the other), and, moreover, should the other really be conscious of the event as joyful (possiblyit is alsojoyful for me, for example, if this passed examination is the condition for a trip together so that I am huppy fbr him as the means to it), we can designatethis primordial act asjoy-with-him or, more generally, as f'ellow feeling,(syrzpathy).21 be Sympathizedand empathizedjo1, need rrot necessarily the same in content at all. (They are certainly not the same in respect to quality, since one is a primordial and the other a nonprimordial experience.)The joy ofuhe most intimate participant will generally be more intense and enduring than the others' joy. But it is also possiblefor the others' joy to be more intense. i'hey

may be naturally capable of more intense I'eelingsthan he; they may be "altruistic" and "values for t>thers"zo ipso mean moreJ() finally, this event may have them than "values fbr themsely.es": lost s()me of its value through circumstances unkn<lu'u to the others. On the other hand, in the ideal case (where there is tr<r deception) empathic joy expresslyclaims to be the same in every joy, respectascompreherrclecl to have the samecolltent and only a different mode o{ being given. (d) lttegatiueLtnpathl Lipps hascalled the primordial experiencethat can be added to the experience of empathy full, positive empath\'. With this he has contrasted a negative empathy: the case in which the tenclencyof'the empathic experience to become a Prim'rdial experi- I ence'of ml <rrn'n-Ennotbe realized becausq"sor'.'"thing.in me" i exp.ri.nfe tf my I u -o-.ntnry .m own or ml kind of personalirl. Weralso want to investigatethis further, again, in pure general'fhe "personality"' as has transcendencies u'ell as a qualitaity. tively developed present "1," which are themselves sub-jectto Let r-rs exclusion and are only considered by us as phen<>mena. take the {bllowing case. I am completely filled u'ith grief'over a at bereavement, the moment nry friend tells me the joyful ndws. -I'his grief does not permit the predominance of sympathy with the .joy. T'here is a .nnf irt (again, not real but phenomenal) 'I'he "I" living entirely in the grief perhaps involving-ii')levels. -I'his at first experiencesempathy as a "background experience." is comparable to geripheral areasof the visual held that are seen ob.1'ects the full sense, are r.rot and yet u.. n@Ir pulled toward two sides of actual attentiorr.And now the "I" f'eels at once, both experiencesclaimirrg to be a "cogito" in a specific sense(i.e.,actsin which the "1" lives and turns torvard its object). Both seek to pull the "cogito" into themselves.l-his is preciselv the experienceof being split. Thus on the Iirst level there is a split betlveenour own actual experience and the empathic experience. I t i s f u t t h e r p o s s i b l e f < r rt h e " l " t o b e p u l l e d i l r t o t h e e m p a t h i c < 1 6 > experience,to turn to the other's.joyful object. At the same tinre, t h i s o t h e r p u l l m a y n o t c e a s es ( )t h a t a n a c t u a l - j o yc a n p r e v a i l .

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The Essence Actsof ErnPathy of

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Br.rt it seenls to me that in neither case is it a ouestion of a specific trait of in- or rvith-feeli ng (empathlor sympatiy),but of one of the typical forms of transition from one "cogito" to another in general. There are numerous such transitions: A cogito can be completely lived out so that I can then "entirely spontaneously" flow over inro another one. Further, while I am living in one cogito, another can appear and pull me into it rvithout causing conflict. Finally, the rendenciesimplied in the cogito and not yet entirely consummated can obstruct the transition to a new cogito. And all this is just as possiblein perception, memory, in theoretical contemplation, etc. as in empathy. Q) Empathy and a Feeling of Oneness I would also like to examine a little more closely this unity of ' i o.,. owq.and the fqf-e_jgl l.l-I"in gmpaphy.ghatwas earlier rejecr,ed. Lipps saysthat as long as empathy is complete (exactly what we no longer recognize as empathy) there is no distinction between our own and the foreign "I," that they are one. For example, I am one with the acrobat and go through his motions inwardly. A distinction only ariseswhen I step out of complete empathy and reflect on my "real 'I'." Then the experiencesnot coming from me appear to belong to "the other" ar.rd lie in his movements. to Were this description correct, the distinction between foreign and our own experiences,as well as that between the foreign and olrr own "I," would actualll'be suspended.This distinction rvould first occur in association with various "real 'I's' " or psycho-physical ir-rdividuals. What my body is doing to my body and what the foreign body is doing to the foreign body would rhen remain completely obscure, since I am living "in" the one in the same \4'ayas in the other, experience the movements of the one in the same lvay as those of the other. This assertion is nor only refuted by its consequences, but is also an evidently false description. I am not one with the acrobat but only "at" him. I do not actualll' go rhrough his molions but quasi. Lipps also stresses,to be sure, that I do not outwardly go throuS;h his motions. But r.reitheris what "inwardly" corresponds to the movements of the body, the experience that ,,I move," primordial; it is non-primordial for me. A4d in rhesenon-primor-

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dial movements I {'eelled, accompanied,by his movements.'l'he-ir primordiality is declared in my non-primordial movements which are only thgre for me in him (again understood as experienced, since the pure bodily movement is also perceived outwardly). Every movement the spectator makes is primordial. For example, he may pick up his dropped program attd not "know" it because he is living entirely in empathy. But should he reflect in the one instance as in the other (for which it is necessaryfor his "1" t<l carry out the transition from one cogito to the other), he would find in one instance a primordial and in the other a non-primordial givenness.And this non-primordiality is not simple but is a , non-primordiality in which foreign primordiality becomesappar- / ent. What led Lipps 4!!Iay in his description was the confusion of / through which I can surrender myself to anyI self:forget{'ulness, with a.di-ssolqtion the "1" in the object. Thus, strictlyl of object, speaking,;empathyis not a feeling of oneness.i thing as a feeling of But this does not mean that there is no si"lch ()neness. Let us go back to sympathy with foreign experience. We said that the "I" in co-experiencing another is turned toward the object of the foreign experience, that it has the foreign experience present empathically at the same time, and that the sympathetic and empathic act do not have to coincide in content. Now let us modify this case somewhat. A special edition of the paper reports that the fortress has fallen. As we hear this, all of us are seized by an excitemelrt, a joy, a -iubilation. We all have "the same" feeling. Have thus the barriers separating one "I" from another broken down here? Has the "I" been fieed from its <18> monadic character? Not entirely. .! feel my joy while I empathically comprchend the orhers' and see it as the same. And, seeing this, it seems that the non-primordial character of the 1 l'oreign joy has vanished. Irrdeed, this phantom joy coincides in every respectu'ith my real livejoy, and theirs isjust as live to them a s m i n e i s t < > e . N o w I i n t u i t i v e l yh a v e b e f o r e m e w h a t t h e y f e e l . m It comes to life in my feeling, and from the "I" and "you" arisqs the "ryel' as a subrject of'a higher level.?E And it is also possible fbr us to bejoyful over the same event, though not filled with exactly the same joy. Joyfulness may be more richly accessible the others, which difference I compreto

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of The Essence Acts of EmPathY

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hend empathically.I empathicalryarrive at the "sides" of'joyfurness obstructed in my own joy. 'fhis ignites my.ioy, ar,d oniv now is there complete coincidence with what is empathized. If the same thing happens to the others, we empathiially enrich our {eelingso that "we" now f'eela different joy from ..I,i' ..you,', and " h e " i n i s o l a t i o n .B u t " I , " , . y o u , " a . d . , h e ; ' are retainei in .,we.,, A "we," nor an "I," is the subject of the empathizini. Ne_t through the feeling of'oneness,but through empathizing, dot; experienceothers. 'I'he fbeling of orrenessind the enrichment of our own experience become possiblethrough empathy. (fl Reiterationof Empathy-Refexiue Sympathy I would like t' call attentic-rn to.iust one more concept from Lipps'description: that which he designatesas .,reflexive sympa_ thl'" and which I wourcr rike ro calr tte ireiterarion of empathyf m o r e e x a c t l y ,a p a r t i c u l a r c a s eO f ' r e i t e r a t i < t n . has this attribute ir.r commr>nwirh many kinds of'acts. _.Empathy fhcre is not only reflection, but also reflecrion on reflection, etr.. as.anideal possibility ad infnitum. simirarry, there is a wiiling of willing, a liking of liking, itc. ln fact, all represenrarions can be rerterated. [ can remember a memory, expect an expectation, ranrasya fanrasy' And ro I can arso emparhize rhe enipathized, u-ong the acts of anorher that I comprehend empathically l:.., lhere can be empathic acts i. *,hich the oth., .o-pr.h..d, or,_ 'rther's acts.This "other" can be a third person o. -. myself. In the second casewe have "reflexive " . . x p e r i e n c e r e t u r l ) s . . , ' . , . , . 7 , u , . ' @s) mpathJ/ . l where my originar ,n..:rn..i n.in.. this pheromenon in the give ur-rd tok. be*veen i.diviitrars does "fo t 'r .eed t o c o n c e r n u s h e r e b e c a u s e e a r e o n r l ' d e a l i n gw i t h t h e w {eneral essence of'empathy and not u,ith its effect. 4. The Controversy Between the View of Idea and That of Actuality from the viewpoint of our description of empathic ,,_._t..nupr 'r'rts' we ca' find access to the much-cliscussed questir>n 'f \''herher empathy has the character of an ipea lvorsteirungl<troI

. , , . r r r e l i t l M . l G e i g e r h a s a l r e a d l s l r e s s e dt h a t t h i s q u e s t i o r r i s \. (I p a, 1 . , , , r 1 , , . , . . nt< lt h a t v a r i < l u s o i n t s n t u s t b t ' d i s t i n g u i s h e d : 2 " ) A r c primordial ()r not? (2) Are foreign 6';1),l",r,hized experiettt'es a s s o m e t h i n Hf a c i n g m e o r g i v e n e x y ,.,]i.',t.'., obje<:tivelgivert Are they irtuitively or n'n-i'tuitively given 1a'd [criertially? (3) or of representatiolr)? in li:i,rtr-ri,iu.iy' the character of perception discussion, rve.carl.{latly answer the-srst After the preceding easily answer the question in the ,[eiativr. But we cannot so in terms of .ur presentation. There is a ttr-o.'..,r,-raquestio. experience of 6v1 ,ia.an.ti to thq essence.olempathic acts: an an<lther one. And there are various levels of .r$'r, onttorrncirlg turn trtward the a . c ( ) m p l i s h m e r tp o s s i b l e .F o r i n s t a . c e , w e m a y i experietrce and feel ourselves led by it' Or empathic lirreign meant. In crpliiationmay lead us to realize what n'as first I'aguelv case, one cannot speak of objectivity in a pregrlant <20> t5e second the firreign experience certainly "is there" fbr even thor-rgh sense,
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third quesrion likewise requires further investigation. \ve already .seenwhat.distinguishes emPathll liom perccp-tlon have ancl u,hat they have itr common.iP-g;ce-ptiq1!3: it: object bqfcrr-eit ; i n e m b o d i e d g i v e n n e s se m p a t h y d o e s n o t . , B t t t b o t h h 3 v e . - t h e i r meer ir directly where it is anchored in the object iisel{'th?re ar-rd being. They need not represent it in order to dr:trtit conrinRiry,g.f cl,rseiN'lereknowiedge lWissenlis also characterized by this "encountering" by the subject, but is created in this encounter. It is "hlrve" n<lthing ,ro...'Knowleclge reachesits object but does not it. Knowleclge is it. Ir sunds befirre its ob.ject but does rlot see always pointing back to some kind of blind, ernpty, and restless, experierrced,seen acr. A'd rhe experierrce ba.ckto u'l'riclrktttrrvledge of forgitrin experience p<)int9is called eTpat*lty: I.knorr' .of' a.Ither's g.Gf, i..., either I ha'e comprehendd this grief e r n p a t h i c a l i yb u t a n t n o l o n g e r i n t h e " i n t u i t i n g " a c t , c ( ) r t t e n t .t'a or u,iti.rempty kn.r,r,ledge, I kn.u' .f' this grief't>n the. bas.is 'l'hen t() rne irltuitively, the grief is not Fiivcll c,r--.,,ii.ution. though surely to rhe communicator. (should this be the grie\er hirrself , it is primorclially given to hirn in reflectiotr' Shoulclit bt' a third persorr, he crtnrprehendsit non-primordially in empathy.)

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The Essence Acts of Empathy of 5. Discussion in Terms of Genetic Theories of the Comprehension of Foreign Consciousness

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And from his experience I once more have an experience, i.e., I comprehend the grief empathically. A further analysis of the relationship of'"ernpathy" to "know'ledge of foreign experience" is not required at this point. It is enough that we have reciprocally limited them. The crlnclusionfrom t>ur discussionis that the original controversial question was badly put. Thus no answer to it could be correct. For example, Witasek, a particularly energetic defender does not take our distinctions into considerof the viervof idea.:'0 ation at all. He takes the objective character of empathy to be proved along with its representational character. By a further ecluivocationof idea (which is an intellectual experience in contrast with an em()tional one), he arriv'es at the absurd consequence of denying that empathized feelings involve em()tion. He even baseshis conclusion on a specialargument: Empathy cannot involve feelings because the "assumption of f-eeling" is missing (the "something" to which feeling could be related). The empathizing subject would only assumefeeling in the subject having the feelings if he were dealing with a projection fHineinuersetzenl. Witasek lrroves that the subject cannot be dealing with a projection, not by analysisof the experience of empathy, but by a logical cliscussion of'possible meanings of pro-jection.It could be a judgment, an assumpti()n,or even a fiction that the empathizing sub-ject is identical with the subject under consideration. Aesthetic empathy does not demonstrate all this and so it is not projection. Unfortunately, the dis.junctionis not complete, exactly the possibility applying to the present case being missing. To pro.ject oneself into another means to carry out his experience with him as we have described it. Witasek's contention that empathy is an i n t u i t i v e i d e a o f a n o t h e r ' s e x p e r i e n c eo n l y a p p l i e s t o t h e s t a g e where empathized experiencesare made into objects, not to the stage of fulfilling explication. And fbr this last case we cannot a n s w e rt h e q u e s t i o nO f w h e t h e r i t i s " i n t u i t i v e i n t e r m s o f p e r c e p tion or in terms of idea (i.e., non-primrirdially)" because,as rve h a v e s h o w n , e m p a t h y i s n e i t h e r o n e i n t h e u s u a l s e n s e .I n f a c t , i t refusesto be classifiedin one of the current pigeonholes of psyc h o l o g v b u t u ' i l l b e s t u d i e c li n i t s o w n e s s e n c e .

As we have seen,philosophicaI investigation has already often But its come to grips with the problem of foreign consciousness. has usually question of'hqw we perceive fbreign consciousness individual the pertaken the turn of how in one psycho-physical 'I-his has led to'the ception of another such individual occurs. origination of theories of imitation, of inference by analogy, and ,rf cnrpathl by association. (a) On the Relationship of Phenomenology Ps2chology to

<22>

It may not be superfluousto elucidate the relationship of psychological investigationsto what we are doing. Our position,is that there is the phenomenon o{'"foreign experience" and correlatively the "perception of foreign experience." For the p r e s e n t w e m a y l e a v e u n d e c i d e dw h e t h e r t h e r e r e a l l y i s s u c h a fbreign experience or rvhether this perception is authentic. "I'he phenomenon in which all knowledge and certainty must finally be anchored is indubitable. It is the genuine object of nqdq 'fhus q'Aoooq ia. the first task in this domain, as in all domains, is to comprehend the phenomenon in its pure essence,freed frorn all the accidentsof appearance. What is foreign experience in its gi'l'enness? How does the perception of foreign experience look? We must know this before we can ask how this perception occurs. It is self-evident rhat this first question cannot in principle be ansn'ered by a genetic-psychological investigation of cause,3r for such an investigationactuallypresupposes the being whose development it is seeking to ground-its essenceas well as the exist e n c e ,i t s " w h a t " a s w e l la si t s " t h a t . " N o t o n l y t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n f o the nature of the perceprionof foreign experiencing but also the .justificationof this perceptionmust thus precede genetic psychology. And if this psychologyalleges ro accomplish both of these <23> thirrgs itself, its claim must be re-jected rhoroughly unjustilied. as -I-his is not to dispute its title tcl existence in any way. On the contrary, it has its task already very definitely and unequivocally f o r m u l a t e d . I t i s t o i n v e s t i g a t eh e o r i p ; i n a t i o no f ' t h e k n o w l e d g e t

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that a real psycho-physicalindividual has of other such individuals. Thus a rigorous delineation of u'hat phenomenology and ps1'chology are to accomplish for the problem of empathy by no meansproclaims their complete independencefrom one another. Indeed, examination of the phenomenological method has shown us that it does not presuppose science in general and especially not a factual science. Thus pheaomenology is not tied to. the results of genetic psychology,either. On the other hand, psychology pretends to no assertions about the circumstances ol- the process it is investigating, and it does not occur to phenomenology to encroach upon its privileges. Nevertheless,psychology is enrirely bound to the results of phenomenology. Rhefrq.rag{rpl"ogy investigates..the essetrceof empathy, and'*'herever.empathpis realized this general essencemust be retained. Genetic psychology, presupposing the phenomenon of empathy, investigates the processof this realization and must be led back to the phenomenon when its task is completed. lf, at the end of the process of origination it delineates,a genetic theory finds something other than that r.r'hose origin it r+'antedto discover, it is condemned. Thus in the results of phenomenological investigation we find a criterion for the utility of genetic theories. (b) The Theory of Intitation Now we want to test present genetic theories in terms of our conclusions.Lipps endeavorsto explain the experience of foreign psvchic life by the doctrine of imitation already familiar to us. (-Io be sure, it appearsin his writings as an element of description.) A n'itnessedgesture arousesin me the impulse to imitate it. I do this to express all my experiences. Experience 4nd expression a-reso closely associatedthat when one occurs it pulls the other after it. 'fhus we participate in the experience of the gesture together with this gesture. But, since the experience is experienced "irr" the foreigrr gesture, it does not seem to me to be mine, but another's. We do not want to go into the objections that can be raised againstthis theory nor those which have already been raised,with

rtr without justification.32trVeonly want to employ, for criticism rvhat lve have already worked out for ourselves.We must therefore say that this theory only distinguishesour own from fbreign experience through affiliation with different bodies, n,hile both experiences are actually different in themselves.By the means indicated, I do not arrive at the phenomenon of foreign experience, but at an experience of my own that arouses ir.r me the fbreign gestures witnessed. This discrepancy between the phenomenon to be explained and that actually explained sufficesas a refutation of this "exolanation." I n o r d e r t o c l a r i f y i h i t d i r . . " p u n c y . l e t u s a n a l y z ea c a s eo f r h e second kind. \de are familiar with rhe facr thar feelings arre aroused.in us bv witnessed "phenomena of expressi,on." A child seei4g.another g.rying cries, foo. When I see a member of my family going around with a long face, I too become upset. When l want to stop worrying, I seek out happy company. We speak of the contagion or transference of feeling in such cases.It is very <2b> plain that the actual feelingsaroused in us do nor servea cognitive I u n c t i o n . t h a t t h e l d o n o t a n n o u n c ea f o r e i g n e x p e r i e n c et o u s a s empathy does. So we need not consider whether such a transference of feeling presupposesthe comprehension of the foreign feeling concerned, since only phenomena of expressionaffect us Iike this. On the contrary, the same change of face interpreted as a grimace certainly can arouse imiration in us, but not a f-eeling. It is certain that as we are saturated b), rrch "transferred" feelings, r v el i v e i n r h e m a n d t h u s i n o u r s e l v c s . ' f h i s p r e v e n t s o u t r r r n i i g r ;, toward or submerging ourselvesin the foreign experience, wh'ich I is the attitude characterisricof emparhy.33 l If we had not first comprehended the foreign experience in some other way, we could not have brought it to givenness to ourselvesat all. At most we could have concluded the presenceof the foreign experience from a feeling in ourselveswhich required the foreign experience to explain its lack of motivation. But thus we would only have gotten a knowledge of, not a "givenness" of, the Foreign experience, as in empathy. It is also possible for this transf'erenceitself to be experienced so that I f'eel the feeling, rvhich was at first a foreign feeling, overffor.r,ingme. (For instance, this would be the case if I seek out cheerful companv to

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cheer me up.) Here, too, the difference between comprehendirrg and taking on a feeling is clearly apparent. Finally, in all casesthere is a distinction between the transference of feeling and ngl only empathl', but also $yrnpathy and a feeling of oneuess, these latter being based on an empathic subnersion i-nthe fbreign gxpgrielrc.e.3a From rvhat u'e have said, it should be sufficiently clear that the theory of imitation cannor serve as agenetic explanation of'empathy.

(c) The Theory of Association <26> The theory of associationis a rival of the lheory of imiration. The optical irnage of foreign gestures reproduces the optical image of our o\\,'ngestures.This reproduces the kinesthesisand this, in turn, the feeling with u'hich the kinesthesiswas linked 'Ihis earlier. feeling is norv experienced not as our own, but as foreign, because(l) ir facesus as an objecr, (2) it is nor motivared by our own previous experiences,and (3) it is not expressedby a gesture. Here, again, we want to raise the question of whether the phenomenon of empathy stands at the end of this process of development. And again the answer is no. By the proposed course we arrive at a feeling of our own and we have grounds for viewing it not as one of our o\\'n feelings, but as a foreign one. (At this point we can waive the refutation of these claims.)Now, on these grounds we could conclude that this is another's experierrce.But in empathy we draw no conclusions because the experience is given as foreign in the character of perceprion. Let us illustrate this opposition in a typical caseof comprehending foreign psychic life in terms of the theory of associatior-r.see I someone stamp his feet. I remember how I myself once stamped my fe.etat the same time as my previous fury is presented to me. Then I say to myself, "This is how furious he is now." Here the other's fury itself is not given but its exisrenceis inferred. By an intuitive representation,my own fury, I seek to draw it near.3:, By contrast, emparhy posits being immediately as a perceived act, and it reachesits object directly withor,rtrepresentarion.'I'hus the theory of associationalsp fails to reveal the genesisof empathy.

I realize that this type of associativeexplanation (prandtl,s) probably does not include all associational psychologists. Accordirrg to Paul Stern, for example, association is not merely the <27> linking of single ideas,one reproducing anorher, but is the unity t r f a p e r c e p t u a lc o n r e x t l E r f a h r u n g s z u s a m m e n h a nn j w h i c h t h i s ir context is alwaysbefore us as a whole. Such a perceptual context is both outside of and within an individual. But this raises more questions. Certainly association should mean more than the descriptive unity of a perceptual context. It should certainly explain how it arrives at this unity. Thus perhaps all that is given to consciousness the same time is linked to a at u'hole reproduced as such. But then what distinguishesthe unity of the objects of my visual field (that can again arise before me as a whole), from the unity of one object?We cannot do everything in this casewith the one word "association." Further, for such a perceptual context to originate, certainly at some time its parts must be given together. But when do I have a person's inner and outer sidesgiven together? Actually, such casesdo occur. Someone has an expression at first unintelligible to me, for instance,he may put his hand over his eyes. On inquiry, I learn that he is meditating deeply on something just now. Now this meditation that I empathize bec()mes"connected by association"with the perceived pose. When I seethis pose again, I see it as a "meditative" pose. Then in this repeatedcaseempathy is, as a matter of fact, basedon association. But this associationitself requires an empathic act, thus does not suffice as a principle to explain empathy.36Furthermore, association only mediatesknowledge, for we say to ourselvesthat this is how he looks when he is meditating. Associationdoes not mediate our understanding of this pose as the expression of an inner condition. This I gain in empathic projection as follows: He is <29> meditating: he has his mind on a problem and wanrs to shield his train of thought from disturbing distractions; therefore he is covering his eyesand cutting himself off from the outer world,32 We must distinguish Volkelt's theory of fusion from this theory , r f a s s o c i a t i o nV o l k e l t s a y sl h a r r h e f e i t c o n r e n t i s n r > tl i n k e d w i r h . tntuition but fused u'ith it. Of course, this is r-rot genetic explanaa tion but only a description of the empathic experience. Later we

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of The Essence Ats of Empathy

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this viewpoint clarishall return to this phenomenotl and see that This clarificafies the origin of certain empathic experiences':r8 oi "e*utt explanation" the tion is certainly far tiom the t<ina such an exit.ory of associationis intended-to give'.Whether in {uestion' This question can can be given at all is still plunulior-, and still so disputed the infy U. decided rn'"hen old, much 6;5su5sed clarified'.Thus-u'e .orr..p, of associationhas been adequately in which the for,"pf"'r, Volkelt in his position, agai'-t't .Siebeck content with its psychic mer maintains that thelrnity of a"material assoclation'3eOn the other content is not explained by mere a satisfactory genetic hand, we must airee*iin siJu*t if he findsa0 in Volkelt explanation of e'mpathy lacking (d) The Theory of Inference by Analogy experience of foreign psychic life was alrnost oFthis theory (tor edged before r-ippsopp"ted it. The standpoint of outer uiJ*)it as follows' There is evidence eximple,J. S. lr'l'iil's atlhe facti t:h:i and of inner perception and wg-can orlly Let

to. by The rheoryof inference analogy explain:l: :lO^r:,.:lll: getlerally,acKnowl-

29>

uy fr.r-tirh -.u"-. "ri@1 percepti,r,t, these

t11',lp^E]::j:

phytl:il the present caseas fbllowsi-I-kf,'5$'ThT6'ffgt, 1Y::: body and,lts modlncaI know my own physical its modifications;

onlv consider it from the one side Even so, we cannot deny that by inl-erences analogy do occur tr knowledge of foreign experifor another's expressionto remind me of ence. It is easilypossible meaning expressionits r-rsual 1lneof mv own sothat I ascribeto his the ftrr me. Only then can we assume comprehension of atrother 'I'he infer"1" u'ith a bodilv expression as a psvchicexpression. the empathy perhaps denied. It does not enceby analogy replaces vield perception but a more or leisprobable knorvledge of the Further, thistheory does not really intend fbreign experience.a2 to give a genetic explanation,thouqhit also occurs as such, and so <30> \\'e must present it here with the others. Rather, it intends to usneis. lt specifiesthe fbrm in u'hichknowledge of loreign conis of sciousness "possible." But the value such an empty form, not oriented toward the nature of krowledge itself, is more t.han doubtful. Exactlr how appropriate the inference by analogy rvould be for such a demonstrationcannot be treated here. 'l'hus we conclude from our critrcal excursions that nr-rneof the for cul'rent genetic theories can account empat\y. Of course, we carr guess rvhy this is so. Before ooecan delineate the genesis of s o m e t h i n g ,o n e m u s l k n o n $ ' h a t r ti s . ' 6. Discussion in Terms of Scheler'sTheory of the Comprehension of Foreign Consciousness We have still to measure empathl against one more theory of fbreign consciousnessthat deviate' considerably from all those discussed far. According Lo'ScheLer,{'' perceive the foreign so lve "1" n'ith its expertenceinwardly jutt as we perceive our own "1." (We need not go into his polemic against empathy, since it is not directed against rihat we call empathy.) lnitially there is "a neutral stream of experience" and out 'own" and "foreign" experi'Ib encesare first gradually crystallizeo of it. illustrate this, he out cites the fact that we can experiercea thought as our olvn, as foreign, or even as neither of there.Further, initially we do not c()me upon ourselves as isolated.but as placed in a n'orld of ps1'chic our o\\'11 experiences experience.At first we experience mr,rch lessthan thoseof our environment.Finally, out of our ou'n

of the latter are tions. Further, I know thai the modifications likewise given' conditions and implications of my experiences' <tf physical appearal:-es Now, becausein this casethe succession I assumesucn a can only take place when linked u'ith expe.rience' alone' are giver-r linkage where physical appearances Before' n'e again, we shall'olrly put o"' oJd question' He?e, lead to the percepnot could poini out that the other theoties did Here we see the still more striking foreign consciousness. tion oi

ffi;#';i3il;;;;;"on

mainThis'thet>rr ignored' is simplv

^--^.---r..r - , , r r- h . , s i c a l soulless alld

is required to After our earlier expositions, nothing further as a genetic theory'ar refute the cloctrine of iirference by analogy longer in order to Nevertheless,I would tik. io tingti httt a iittle the theory when we take this odium of complete abiurdity fr.m

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<31>

<32>

experiences we only perceive rvhat moves along prescribed courses, especially those objecrs for which we already have a previous term.{{ -I'his bold rheory, starrdir-rg opposition to all theories up to in now, has something extremelv seductive about it. Nevertheless, to get some clarity, we must examine precisely all the concepts used here. f'hus we first ask l'hat inner perception is. scheler answersthat inner perception is not the perception of self, for ye can perceive ourselves as our bodies outwardly, too. Rather, inner perceprion is distinguished from outer perception by beirft directed roward acrs. It is the type of act giving us rhe psychic. These nvo modes of perception are not to be disti'guished on the basis of a difference of objects. Conversely,the physical is ro be distinguished from the psychic because,in principle, it is differently given.a5Nevertheless,Scheler's critique does not seem to corroborare earlier attempts r() reciprocally timit psychic and physicala6 distinguishing criteria. It deals solely with an essen_ by tial difference of givennessand not rvirh the distinction between objects having different modes of being. To such objects a different mode .f givenness would essentially fwesensgezetslichl correspond. \4'e could accept "inner perception" in this sense of a definitely constituted act without creating a conflict r.r,ith our doctrine of empathy. (A more precise explication follows immediately.) It is possible to differentiate within this speciesof "inner perception" acts in which our own and foreign experience are given. But this is still not sufficiently clear. What do ..on,n" and ,.for_ eign" mean in the context in rvhich Scheler usesthem? If we take his discussion of a neutral stream of experience seriously, we cannot conceive of how a differentiation in this stream can occur. But such a stream of experience is an absolutelyimpossiblenotion because every experience is by nature an ,.I's" experience that cannot be separated phenomenally from the .,I" itself. It is only becausescheler fails to recognize a pure "I," alwavsraking "I'l as "psychic individual," that he speaks of an experience presenr before "I's" are constituted. Naturally, he cannot exhibit such an "I-less" experience. Every casehe brings up presupposes our own as well as the foreign "I" and does not verify his theory at all.

Onll if we leave the phenomenological sphere do these terms nrake good sense."Own" and "foreign" then mean: belonging to different individuals, i.e., different substantial,qualitatively elaborated, psychic subjects.Both these individuals and their experito enceswould be similarly accessible inner perception. Suppose that I do not feel mine, but foreign feelings. Accordingly, this means that feelings have penetrated my individual from the foreign individual. I am initially surrounded by a world of psychic ()ccurrences, that is to say,at the same time as I discover that my body is in the world of my outer experience against the background of the spatial 'world spread out boundlesslyon all sides,I also discover that my psychic individual is in the rvorld of inner experience, a boundlessworld of psychic individuals and psychic lif'e. All this is certainly incontestable. But the basis here is altogether different from ours. We have excluded from t}le field of our investigation this whole world of inner perception",our own -fhey are individual and all others, together with the outer world. not within, but t.ranscend,the sphere of absolute givenness,of pure consciousness. Tha "I" has another meaning in this sphere of absolute consciousness, being nothing but the subject of exof perience living in experience. In these terms, the question_ whether an experience is "mine" or another's becomessenseless. What I primordially feel is preciselyrvhat I feel irrespectiveof this f'eeling'srole in the sum total of my individual experiencesor of lrorvit originates (perhapsby contagion of feeling or not).17 These experiencesof my on,n, the pure experiencesof the pure "I," are given to me in re flection. This means that the "I" turns back and arvayfrom its object and looks at the experience of this object. moren <33> Now wf at distinguishesreflectionlp:"InrugMp,'9n.

exacr|y.t;@,T;il1.r

actual turning toriErclan'---actual while inner percepexperien-ce, tion itself can be non-actual. In principle, it can also encompass the fringe of non-actualities that form m)' present experietrce together rvith perception. Further, I may vien'my experiencesin such a lvay that I no longer consider them as such, but as evidence of the transcendenceof my individual and its attributes. My recttllectionsannounce my memory to me; my acts of outer percep-

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<34>

of tion announce the acuteness my senses(not to be taken as sense organs, of course);my volition and conduct announce my energy' etc. And these attributes declare the nature of my individual to me. We can designate this viewing 25 inner perception of self. We have reliable evidence for the contention that Scheler's of "inner perception" is the ap-perc_eption "self in the senseof rhe indiirdUalTndtrlFerperiences r+'ithin the conrext o{' individual experience. He ascribescomplexes of experience to the objects of inner perception which come to givennessin a uniform intuitive act, for example, my childhoo6'+s (Of course, I would not call this perception, but one of those "abridgments of memalluded to earlier' We must reserve an ory" fErinnerungsabrAg'es] analysisof this for the phenomenoiogy of represetltatiotralcolrsciousness.) F u r t h e r , h e m e a n st h a t t h e " t o t a l i t y o f o u r ' I " ' i s g i v e n i n i n n e r perceptionjust as in the act of outer perception; not single sgns-ual qualities, but the totality of nature is given.aeScheler could not characterizethis totality more clearly than as an apperception of a transcendence even if he stressed the difference betn'een the unity in variety characteristicof inner and of outer perception (or "separateness"and "togetherness")."0This "I" is fundamentally different from the pure "1," the subject of'actual experience' The unities constituted in inner perception are different frt>m the unity of having an experience. And the inner perception giving us these complexes of experience is different from the reflection in which we comprehelrd the absolute being of an actnal experience. between reflection and innerperScheler himself distinguishes ception,5rwhich he denies is a compreheusion of acts in cQntrast with reflection. Thus it is still more striking that he did not seethe his distinctior-r'between owt.tand Husserl'sconcept of "inner perceptiol't," and that he even carries on a pcllemicagainst Husserl's preference for inner perception over outer.:'2Precisely because the term "inner perception" could have a number of meanings, Husserl substituted "reflection" for it to designate the absolute Nor lvould he sa)' that inner percepgivennessof experience.f':] \ t i o r r i r r S c h e l e r ' ss e r l s e \ a s n r o r e c o t l c l u s i r et h a n o u t e r p e r c e P tion.

The difference between reflection and inner perception also of becomes very clear in a cor.rsideration the dtceptionsof inner perception presented in Scheler's ldolenlehre. Should I be deceived in my feelings for another person, this,lsgspliqn cannot mean that I comprehend an act of love by refiectionthat is r-rot present in fact. There is no such "reflective dec,:ption."Should I comprehend an actual erotic emotion in reflrction, I have an absolute not to be interpreted away in any ::ranner.I can be deceived in the object of my love, i.e., the prrson I thought I comprehended in this act may in fact be drferent, so that I mplghglggd a phantom. But the love was ::ill genuine. perc-o. ha@ndure as one exiectid, but ceases rery shortly. This is not a reason, either, fbr ,aying it was not genuine as long as it lasted. But Scheler is no: thinking of such deceptions. 'fhe first kind of "idol" he presents is a decellivedirecting. As u'e live in the feelings of our environment, $'e 4ke them for our own, though they do not clarify our own feelirSs all. We take <35> at "acquired by reading" to be our ort'n fe1 instance, the I-eelings young girl thinks she feelsJuliet's love.sa I think we still need distinctions and thorouih analyseshere. Suppose that I have taken over from my envi rnment a hatred and contempt for the members of a particular :aceor party. For example, as the child of conservativeparents, I ::ayhateJews and social democratsr gr raised with more liberal e1vs, mav hate I 'Junkers" [aristocratic landowners]. Then thi rvould be an entirely genuine and pincerehatred savefor the i,:t that it is based on an empathic valuing, rather than on a prirjp4l21 one. l-his hatred may also be increased by contagion ol'eeling ro such a d e g r e e t h a t i t i s n o t l e g i t i m a t e l yr e l a t e d t o t h e : - 1 d i s v a l u e . h u s T I am not under a deception rvher-r comprehen, my hatred. T1a,o I deceptions can be present here: ( I ) a deception -: value (as I think I comprehend a disvaluethat does not exist at a r;(2) a deception about my.person, if I were to imagine, on thr Sasis my ciwn of insight, that these feelings are exalted and r,'ic my prejudice as "loyalty." In the second casethere is really a c-reprionof inrrer I Perception but certainly not a deception of rer'g1isp.5" canpot be clear in reflection abor-rtthe failure of tht tasic primordial

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<J U l> \ 16

<27

valuing becauseI cannot reflect on an act that is not present. But should I carry out such an act and bring it to givennessto myself, I gain clarity and thus also the possibilityof unmasking the earlier deception by comparing it with this case. Feelings "acquired by reading" are no differqnt. Should the enanrored schoolboy think he feels Romeo's passion, this does not mean he believes he has a stronger feeling than is actually present. He actually feels passionbecausehe has blown his spark into a flame bv borrowed embers. This flame will go out of its own accord as soon as the embers die out. Becausea primordial valuing is lacking as a foundation, we also have :'norr-genuinen.rrt here. Th-is rcsults in a false relarionstip betueen the febling, on the one hand, and its subject and object, on the other. And the youth's deception is that he atrributes Romeo's passion to himself, not that he thinks he has a strong feeling. Now let us look at the other deceptivedirecting where experiI encesactuallv present do not come to givenness. do not seehow we can call a feeling actually present a deception if, becauseit is -fhe beyond traditional lines, it is not perceived. turning to$'ard our o\\rnexperience naturally means the cessation the foreign of attitude. It requires special circumstancesto direct attention to our orvn experiencing. Thus, if I do rlot notice a feeLng becaus.e norhing has made me aware thar there is "such a thing," this is e n t i l e l y n a t u r a l a n d i s d e c e p t i v ea s l i t t l e a s m v n o l f , e a r i n " g a sclundin my environment or overlooking an object in my visual Scheler is certainly not discussing field.56 deceptivereflection, for "reHection" is the comprehension of an experience, and it is trivial to saythat an experienceI comprehend does not elude me. It is a different story if the experiencedoes not elude me but I take it, rather, to be imagined becauseit does not fit in with mv ertlir<lnment. Here it seemsthat I do not want to participate in this experience and u'ould like to get it entirely out of'my rvorld. It is not that I think the experience is non-primordial and am actually deceived. us,r'7 are, again, ncll $,e It the motive of our beharior deceives perceiving a motive in reflection that is not present, Either we experlencent>clearlt consciousmotive for our conduct or there

are other motives operating besides the moti'e before us. \te calrn()tbring these other motives clearly to gi'enness ro ourselves becausethey are not actual, but "background," experiences.For r h e r e f l e c t i r r gg l a n c e t o b e d i r e c t e d t o w a r d a n e x p e r i e n c e ,t h r s experience must assume the form of a specific ..cogito." For example, supposethat I go into the military serviceas a"volunteer under the impression that I am doing so out of pure patriodsm ard do not notice that a longing for adventure, vanity, or a dissatisfactionwith my present situation also play a parr: The;r these secondary motives withdrarr; from rly ..fl..iing'glrn...Juit as if they were not yet, or no longer,3.t"'i1. I am th-us-u'deia,r inner perceptual and value -deception if I take this action as it appears to me and interpret it as evidence of a noble character.. People are generally inclined to ascribe to rhemselves better motives than they actually have and are not consciousof manv of their emotional impulses at all5' because these feelings arready seem to have a disvalue i. the mode of non-actuality,and people do not allow them to become actual at alr. But this does noi .u.,r. the feelings ro cease enduring or functioning. The fact that we ca' feel past or future events to be valuable or rvorthlessrvherr thev themselves are no longer, or not yet, ..conceived" is also based on this difference betrveeu u.trurity and non-actuaritv.5s Tl.rus,an actual valuing can be basedon a non-actual memory or expectation. We can hardly hold that this would be a pure valuing without a basic, theoretical act. There are no such^experience's c<lntradictingthe essence rhe experience of value. of Scheleris also dealing u'ith "background experiences', when he says that the same experience can be perceived more or less e x a c t l y . 6A p a i n t h a r " e n t i r e l y d i s a p p e a i sf r o m o u r g l a n c e ' o r u is only present as a very general imprtision while we aie laughing and joking" is a non-acual experience persisting in the'backl g r o u n d w h i l e t h e " I " i s l i ' i n g i ' o r h e r a c t u a l i t i e s* " . u n o n l y . say <3g> that an experience is differintlv .,presented', in the contexts of the perceptions into u'hich it enteri. No matter how figurativerv n'e take it, a' experie.ce comprehended in reflecti<r'. has no
SlOes_

conclusion, by this contrast rr,ecan 'nclerstand why Scheler ,.lt distinguishes betwee. "peripheral" experiences that sever o.e

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of The Essence .\cts of Enpathl 7. Miinsterberg's Theory of the Experience of Foreign Consciousness

35

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an()ther in sequenceand "cetrtral" experierlcesthat are giverl as a u n i t y r e v e a l i n gt h e u n i t y o f ' t h e " 1 . " W e h a v e a s e q u e n c ea t a l l artother. But levels in the sensethat one actual experience ser,'ers s()me experiences disappear as soon as they have faded out (a delight, an act of perception), while others sensorypain, a serrsory The latter lirrm c()lttinue to endure in the mode of non-actrrality. perceptually back into the those unities that enable us to glance past (at a love, a hatred, a friendship), and they constitute the s c o m p l e xs t r u c t u r ct h a t c a nc o m c l o g i v e t t n e s1 o u s i n a n i n t u i t i v e my student days, etc.(ir I hope this act, sr.lchas my childhood, exhibits the difference betweenreflection in which actual experience is given t<l us absolutelyand inner percepti()n itr 5;eneral. Also this should indicate the differcnce between the complex unities basedorr these different actsand the individual "I" revealing itself in them.ii2 inner percepNou'we can already seethe relationship betr.r'een tion and empathy.Just as our own individual is announced in our own perceived experiences, so the fbreign individual is arrnounced in empathized ones. But we also see that in one case there is a primordial; while in the other a-..non-primordial, givennessof the constituting experiences.l{ I experience'a feeli n g a s t h a t o f a n o t h e r , I h a v ei t g i v e n t w i c e : o n c e p r i m o r d i a l l y a s my own and once non-primordially in empathy as originally foreign. And preciselythis non-primordiality of empathized experime encescauses to reject the general term "inner perception" for Should the comprehension of our orrn and foreign experience.';:r one desire to stresswhat thesetwo experienceshave in common, it would be better to say "inr.rerintuition" linnere Anschauungl. -I'his would include, then, the non-primordialgivenness f.our o own experiencesin rnemor\, expectation, ()r fantasy. B u t t h e r e i s s t i l l a n o t h e r r e a s o n h y I o b j e c tt o i n c l u d i n g e m p a w -f thy under inner perception. here is really only a parallel on the l e v e l o f ' e n p a t h y w h e r e I h a v et h e f t > r e i g n x p e r i e n c ef a c i n g m e . e -I'he level where I am at the fi;reign "1" and explain its cxperience bv living it a{ter the other seemsto be much rrore parallel to t h e p r i m o r c l i a l e x p e r i e n c e i t s e l f t h a n t o i t s g i v e n n e s si n i n n e r perception.

It is still n.rorediffictrlt fbr me to sift the phettomenal contetrt ( ) r r to f ' M i i n s t e r b e r g ' st h e o r y t h a n i t w a s i n S t h e l e r . O u r e x p e r . i ence of lirreign subjects is t() cortsistof the underscanding of tbreign acts of rvill. He agreeswith our analysisbl characteriz.ing t h i s a c t o { ' t r t r d e r s t a n d i n ga s a l l a c t i n r v h i c h t h e " f i l r e i g n r v i l l e l t t e r s i n t o m i n e " a n d s t i l l r e m a i t r st h a t < l f t h c o t h e r . B r t t u ' e s c a n n ( ) ts e e u ' h y t h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g h t t u l d b e c o t l f i r t e dt o a c t s ( ) f r ^ ' i l l .A s r v e s a \ \ ' ,i t a p p l i e s t o a l l k i n d s o f ' e m p a t h i c a q t s . N ( ) w N'[iinsterbergtakes "act of will" in a broader sense.\fle incltrdgs u n d e r i t a l l " a t t i t u d e s " t h a t " a n t i c i p a t e , "t h i s a n t i c i p a t i n sc l i n s irrg to attitudes filr the one u'ho comprehendsthem. But rve cann()t accePt his thesiseven il-tthis broader sense.An in is empathized mc-rod an experienceof foreign crlnsciousness the attitude is. Both include compresame senseas an empathizecl a h e n d i n g t h e f o r e i g n s u b j e c t .W h a t d i s t i n g u i s h e s t t i t u d e si s t h a t containsa contrast betu'eell the inherer.rtin tl-rem the anticipatiotr <lneand the other subject not found in other cases. Nlilnsterberg believes he has an immediate awarenesso{'forh i u n s r - r b j e c t sc r e t h a t p r e c e d e st h e c o n s t i t u t i o n o { ' t h e i n d i v i d e t u a l . ' I i r g a i n a c c e s s ( ) t h e s e l i n e s r t f t h o u g h t , w e l n u s t P u r s u et h e o c ( ) n s t i t u t i ( ) n f t h e i l t d i v i d u a l .A r t d t h i s w i l l b e o u r I l e x t u l l d e r t a k lllg.

<'10>

Chapter III

The Constitution of the cho-Phy sical Indiaidual Psy

e have now achieved an essentialdescription of the empathic act and a critique of historical theories of foreign from the point of vielv of our description. We still consciousness have a far greater undertaking before us. We must treat empathy as a problem of constitution and answer the question of how the objects in the usual theories, such as the psycho-physical individual, personality,etc., arise within consciousness. Within the framework of a short investigation we cannot hope even to approach the ansn'er to this question. We shall have fulfilled our purpose if u'e succeed in showing the paths to this goal and that the investigationsof empathy so far could not be satisfactorybecause,except for a very few attempts, these thinkers have overlooked these basic questions. This is very clear in Lipps, who has certainly achieved the most progress toward our goal. He seemsto be bound by the phenomenon of the expression of experiencesand repeatedly comes back to that from which he also wants to begin. With a few words he lays aside the profusion of questions present in the treatment of this problem. For instance, he saysabout the bearer of these phenomena of expression, "lVe believe a consciouslife to be bound to certain bodies by virtue of an 'inexplicable adjustment of our spirit' or a 'natural instinct."' 'f his is nothing more than the proclamation of wonder, declar- <41 >
it

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Indiuidual Constitutionof the Psycho-Physical

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i n g t h e b a n k r u p t c yo { ' s c i e n t i f i cn v e s t i g a t i o n A n d i f s c i e n c e s n o t i . i p e r m i t t e d t o d o t h i s , t h e n e s p e c i a l l yn o t p h i l o s o p h y . F o r h e r e there is no longer any domain into which it can push unsolved 'fhis q u e s t i o n s s a l l o t h e r c l i s c i p l i n ec a n . a s m e a n st h a t p h i l o s o p h y must give the final answer,gain final clarity. rv!'e have final clarity and no questions remain open rvhen we have achieved what we call progres5-1|rs constitution of'transcendental objects in imm a n e n t l y g i v e n . p u r e c o n s c i o u s n e s T.h i s i s t h e g o a l o f ' p h e n o m s enology. Now let us lurn to the c()nstitution of'the indiviclual and make c l e a r , i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e ,w h a t a n i n d i v i d u a l i s . l. The Pure "f" So far rve have alrvaysspoken of the pure "1" as the <tthenvise indescribable, qualityless subject of experience. In various authors, such as Lipps, *e ha'e fou'd the i.terpretatio. that this is not an "individual 'I"' bur first becomes individual in contrasr n'ith "you" and "he." What does this individuality mean? First of a l l , i t m e a n so ' l v t h a t i t i s " i t s e l f ' a n d n o o t h e r . T h i s , , s e l f n e s si"s experienced and is the basisof all that is "mine." Naturally, it is first brought into relief in contrast rvith another n'hen another is give'. This other is at first not qualitativelv distinguishedfrom it, since both are qualityless, bur onll' distinguished as simply an "other." This otherness is apparent in the type of givenness:it is other than "I" becauseit is given to me in another way than ,.I.,, Therefore it is "you." But, since it experiencesitself as I experience myself, the "you" is another "I." 'fhus the ,,I" does nor bec.me i.di'idualized becausea.orher facesit, but its indir,iduality, or as rve would rather sav (becausewe must reserve the term "individuality'" for somerhing else), its selfnessis brought into relief in contrast with the otherness of the other. 2. The Stream of Consciousness <42> \{'e ca'r take the "1" in a seconcl senseas the Lrnity.f'a stream of c o n s c i o u s n e s s .e b e g i n w i t h t h e " l " a s t h e s u b j e c t ' I a n a c t u a l w experience. However, when we reflect on this experience, we find that it is not is.lated, but ser against the backgr.und of a stre:rm of such experiences more ()r less clearly' and distinctll'

-l'he "I" of this experience was not alwaysin it but shifted siven. irr,.r o. was drau'n into it from another experience, and so on. Going over these experiences,we continually come upon experiencesin w'hich the present "I" had orrce lived. This is even true rvhen u'e can no longer directly grasp the experience, finding it to ltecessary view it through rememberilrg represetrtation' all Preciselythis affiliation o1- the stream's experienceswith the present, living, pure "I" constitutes its inviolable ur-rity.Norv "other" streams of consciousness face this "same" stream: the srream of the "I" faces those of'the "you" and the "he." Their and clthernessare based on those of their subject. Hort'selfness ever, they are not only "others," but also "varied" becauseeach every single exone has its peculiar experiential coutent. Sir.rce perience of a stream is particularly characterizedbv its position in the total experiential context, it is also characterizedapart from belonging to an "I." Thus it is also qualitative as the experience are of this and no other "l," and streamsof consciousness qualitatively distinguished b1' virtue of-their experiential content. But even this qualitative distinction does not yet take us to what is usually understood by an individual "1" or an individual. characterized as "it itself and no The stream of conscior-rsness, other" u'ith a nature peculiar to it, results in a good sense of precisely liniited individuality. Qr"ralitativepeculiarity u'ithout selfness would be insufficient for individualization becausewe can also arrive at oualitative variation of the stream ot'consciousness by thinking of'the one grven stream as qualitativelv modified in -I'his does not mean that its affiliation the course of experience. "I" ceases;the stream only becomes another by <43> n,ith the same belonging to another "I." Selfnessand qualitative variation together-thus individuality in two senses-constitute a further 'I' " of common parlance, i.e,, step in progress to the "individual unity. a characteristicallystructured psycho-physical

3. The Soul N e x t u ' e c a n e x a m i n e t h e i n d i v i d u a l u n i t y o f ' t h e p s y c h ea s s u c h u ' h i l e n e g l e c t i n g t h e l i v i n g b o d y a n d p s y c h o - p h y s i c arle l a t i o n ships. Our urriform, isolated stream of consciousrress lr()t our is

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Indiuidual Constitutionof the Psycho-Phlsical

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soul. But, as we already saw in examining inner perception. am()ng our experiencesthere is orre basic experience given to us which, together u'ith its persistent attributes, becomes apparenr 'I'his i n o u r e x p e r i e n c e s s t h e i d e n t i c a l" b e a r e r " o f ' t h e m . a is the substantialsoul. We have already become acquainted with single -fhe such psvchicattributes, too. acLlteness our senses of apparent in our outer perceptions is such an at.tribute. Another is the -fhe energ! apparent in our conduct. tension or laxity' of our volitions manif'ests the vivacity and strength or the weaknessof o u r w i l l . I t s p e r s i s t e n c ti's f o u n d i n i t s d u r a t i o n . T h e i n t e n s i t yo f o u r f e e l i n g s ,t h e e a s ew i t h u ' h i c h t h e y a p p e a r ,t h e e x c i t a b i l i t yo f our sentimentsetc. disclose ur disposition. , o It is hardly necessaryto follow out these relationships further. We take the soul to be a substantial nity which, entirely analou t o t h e p h y s i c a lt h i n g , i s m a d e u p o f c a t e g o r i c a e l e n t e n t s n d l a fl()us the sequenceof'catep;ories. elements appear as individual inIts stancesr>f these categt>ries, and the soul firrms a parallel to the sequenceof experiential categories.Among these categoricalelements there are s()methat point beyond the isolated soul to col)r r e c t i ( ) n w i t h o t h e r p s y c h i ca s w e l l a s p h y s i c a lu n i t i e s ,t o i m p r e s s si<lns rr'hich the sor,rl makes and slrffers. "Causality" and "changeability" are also among the psychic categories. 'I'his s u b s t a n t i a lu n i t y i s " m y " s o u l n ' h e n t l . r ee x p e r i e n c e si r r r v h i c h i t i s a p p a r e n t a r e " m y " e x p e r i e n c e s( ) r a c t s i n w h i c h m y 'fhe pure "1" livt's. p e c r - r l i a rr r l r c t u r eo f ' p s y c h i c n i t y d e p e n d so n s u the peculiar content of the stream of'experience:and, conversely, (as we must say afier the s<.rul has been constituted for us) the c()ntent of'the stream Of'experiencedepends ()n the structure of t h e s o u l . W e r e t h e r e s t r e a m so f c o n s c i o t r s n e s s i k e i n c < l n t e n t , r i a al t h e r e u ' o u l d a l s ob e s o u l s< t ft h e s a m e k i n d o r i n s t a n c e s f ' i d e a l l y o t h e - s a m es o r r l . H o w e v e r , w e d r l n o t h a v e t h e c o m p l e t e p s y c h i c p h e n o m e n o n ( n r t r t h e p s y c h i ci n d i v i d u a l )w h e n w e e x a m i n e i t i n isolation. 4. "1" and Living Body For greater clarity here, n'e must n()\\'take a step that rve have b e e n r e l u c t a r . rtto t a k e u n t i l t h e c o u r s e o f ' t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o nd e -l'his n r a n d e di t . i s t h e s t e p f i - o m p s y c h i ct o p s v c h o - p h y s i c aO u r l.

I-)roposed division between soul and body was an artificial one, for t i-re roul is always necessarily soul in a body. What is the body? a F{or, .' and as what is it given to us? (a) The Giuennessof the Liuing Body \.\ e again proceed from the sphere forming the basisof all our How is my body lLeibl i r -rve ;tigations: that of pure consciousness. c ( )ns tituted vvithin consciousness?I have my physical body I NAr Oerl given once in acts of outer perception. But if we suPpose it to be given to us in this manner alone, we have the strangest r > l l e - c t . ' l h i s w o u l d b e a r e a l t h i n g , a p h y s t c a lb o d y , w h o s e m o t i \ *1re. I successive appearances exhibit striking gaps. It would withl-r, lld its rear side with more stubbornness thart the moon and ir-. vit e me continually to consider it from new sides.Yet as soon as I -rm about to carry out its invitation, it hides these sidesfrom me. 'l-.r to b ,e sure, things that withdrar.r'from the glance are accessible t t ' u g h . B u t p r e c i s e l l ' t h e r e l a t i o n s h i pb e t u ' e e ns e e i n ga n d t o u c h ir -. q i s different here than anywhere else.Everything else I seesays tt ' n: e, "'fouch me. I am really what I seem to be, am tangible, <45> arrd n o t a p h a n t o m . " A n d w h a t I t o u c h c a l l st o m e , " O p e n y o u r (as c\ es and 1ou will seeme ." The tactile and visual senses one can sl-.,ea < of sense in the pure sphere) call each other as witnesses, tl- ou gh they clo not shift the responsibility on olle another. is the outu'ardly perceived physical b<>dy I'hris unique defect <>f in co ntrast with another peculiarity. I can appr<tach and withdrarT' fi- trr any other thing, can turn toward or away from it. In the -I'his l:r - te - -:approaching and rvithcase,it vanishesfrom my sight. dt- nr" ing, the movement of my physical body and of'other things, A is -1() rumented bv an alteration of'their successive appearances. r l i - t i r l c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e s e t w o c a s e s :t h e m o v e m e n t o f < > t h e r tl-r ..ngj,s and the movement of my' physical body, is inconceivable. N , rr ,s it possibleto seehow we comprehend the movement of our ()\-- n physicai bodies at all as long as we maintain the fiction that or- 1 not 1-rhysical body is only c()nstituted in outer percepti()n and 'I'hus 2l\ a :haracteristically living body. we must say, more pret ' i - - , 1 r , t h a t e v e r y o t h e r t > b - i e cits g i v e n t o m e i n a n i n f i n i t e l y vrt -ia ble multiplicity of appearances nd of changing positions, a ;ttr I u here are alsotimesu'hen it is not given to me. But this one

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ob.ject(my physicalbody) is giverrto me ir.r successive appearances only variable within very narrow limits. As long as I have my eyes o p e n a t a l l , i t i s c o n t i n u a l l yt h e r e w i t h a s t e a d f a so b t r u s i v e n e s s , t alwayshaving the same tangible nearnessas no other object has. It is always "here" while other objects are always "there." But this brings us to the limit of our supposition nd wc must a suspendit. For even if'we shut our eyesrightly and stretch out our arms, in fact allowing no limb to contact another so that we can neither touch nor seeour physicalbody, even then we are not rid of it. Even then it stands there inescapablyin full embodiment (hence the name), and we lind ourselvesbound to it perpetually. Precisely this a{Iiliati<tn,this belonging to me, could never be constituted in ourer perceprion. A living body lLeibl only perceived ounvardly would always be only a particularly disposed, actually unique, physical body, but never "my living body." Now let us observe how this new givennessoccurs. As an instaDceof the supreme category of "experience," sensationsare amonfJ the real constituentsof consciousness, this domain imof possibleto cancel.The sensationof pressureor pain or cold isjust as absolutelygiven as the experience of'-judging,willing, perceiving, etc. Yet, in contrast with these acts, sensation is peculiarly characterized.It does not issuefrom the pure "1" as they do, and it never takes on the form of the "cogito" in which the "I" turns toward an ob.ject. Since sensation is always spatially localized "somewhere" at a distance from the "l" (perhaps very near to it b u t n e v e r i n i t ) , I c a n n e v e r f i n d t h e " l " i q i t b y r e f l e c t i o n .A n d this "somervhere" is not an empt! point in space,but somethillg filling up space.All these entities from which my sensarions arise are amalgamated into a Lrniry,the unitl' of my living body, and they are thentselves places in the living body. -l'here are differences in this unified givennessin which the -I-he living body is alwaysthere for me as a rn,hole. variorrsparts of the living body coltstituted for me in terms of sensationare various distancesfrom me. Thus my torso is nearer t() me than my extrernities,and it makes g<xtcl senset() savthat I bring my hands 'I-o near or move them away. speak Ol distance fioln "me" is i n e x a c tb e c a u s e c a n n o t r e a l l y e s t a b l i s h n i n t e r v a l f r o m t h e " I , " I a for it is non-spat.ial and cannor be localized.But I relate the parts

of'my living body, together u,ith everything spatial outside of it, to a "zero point of orientation" which my living body surrounds. 'I'his zero point is not to be geometrically localizedat one point in my physical body; nor is it the same for all data. lt is localized in the head for visual data and in mid-body for tactile data. Thus, rvhatever ref'ers to the "l" has no distance from the zero point. arrd all that is given at a distance from the zero point is also given a t a d i s t a n c ef r o m t h e " I . " However, this distance of bodily parts lrom me is fundamentally different from the distance of other things from each otlrer and f rom me. Two things in spaceare at a specificdistance <47 > Il-om each other. Thel' can approach each other and even come into contact, whereupon their distance disappears. is also possiIt ble (if the objects are not materiall,v impenetrable, but, for instance,are hallucinatory objects of different visual hallucinators) fbr them to occllpy the same portion of space.Similarly, a thing can approach n.re,its distance from me can decrease,and it can contact not me, but my physicalbody. Then the distancefrom my physical body, but not from me, becomes zero. Nor does the distanceof the thing f rom the zero point become the same as the distanceofthe contacted part ofthe physical body from rhe zero p<>int. could never say that the stone I hold in my hand is the I same distance or "only a tiny bit farther" from the zero point than the hand itself. The distance ofthe parts ()f my living body from me is completely ir-rcomparable with the distanceof foreign physical bodies fiom me. The living body as a rvhole is at the z-ero point of orientation with all physical bodies outside of it. "Body space" fLeibraum]and "outer space" are completely different from each other. 1\Ierely perceiving outwardly, I would not arrive at the living body, nor merely "perceiving bodily" fLeibuahrnehmendl, at the outer world. But the living bod1,is constituted in a two-folcl nlanner as a sensed(bodily perceived) living body and as an outwardly pcrceived physical body of the outer lr'orld. And in this 'I'herefore, cloubledgivennessit is experienced as the sante. ir has a location in outer spaceand fills up a portion of this space. -I'here is still something to sav aboLrtthe relati<tnshipbenveen 'l'he sensation and "bodil1. perception." ar.ralysis sensar.ions of

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usually comes up in other contexts. we usually look at sensations ,.give" us the outer n'orld, and in this sensewe separate as whar .,sensatioi" from "what is sensed" or "content of sensation" ..sensatlon function" in stumpfs sense.we separate,for as fiom of example, the seen red and the possessing this red.65I cannot object'sredis "perceived" and I must distinagree with him.'fhe of gi,irh b.t*.en perception and what is perceived. The analysis to "sensory dara" so that I can look at the p.r..pti.rn leais me p..."ptio,-'ofqualitiesas-an..objectificatiorrofsensorydata,''But thisdoesnotmakequalitiesintoperceptionsnorperceptionsinto of qualities or giving aits. As constitu.ents outer perception, both anall'zable' are elements not further Non,if we considersensationin terms of the side turned torvard the living body, we find an entirely analogous phenomenal state of a of affairs. I can speakof a "sensed" living body as little as ,.sensed"object in the outer world. However, this also requires an objectifyingapprehension.Ifmyfingertipscontactthetable,I first, the sensationof touch' the tactile datum to ha"ve clisiing.rirh, nor further divisible.secondly, there is the hardnessof the table with its correlativeact of outer perception and, thirdly, the touch..bodlly percePtion.,'What ing fingertip and the correlative act of mikes'the connectionbetrveen sensationand bodilv Perceptioll particularly intimate is the fact that sensationsare given at the iiving body to the living body as senser' in An investigationof all kinds of sensations their meaning for bodilvperceptionwouldbebeyorrdthescopeofthiswork.Butwe ..outer', and must discussone more point. We said that the ,.bodily perceived" living body is given as the same.This requires still further elucidation.I not only see my hand and bodily perbut I also "see" its {ields of sensationcorlsticeive it as sensing, for me in bodily perception. on the other hand, if I contured sciousll emphasizecertain parts of mv living body, I have an ,,image" of itris part of the physical body. 'fhe one is give' rvith the oiher, thougir rheyare not perceived together. This is exactly to analr_rgous the province of outer percePtion. we n9t only see but n'e also "see" its hardness.The taLle and feel its hardness, the paintingsal.enot only as shiny as silk but also robes in Van DVck's call this phenomenon as smooth and as sofi as silk. Psychologists

fusion and usually reduce it to "mere association."This "mere" indicates psychology'stendency to look at explanation as an explaining away, so that the explained phenomenon becomes a <49> "subjective creation" without "objective meaning'" We cannot accept this interpretation. Phenomenon remains phenomenon' An explanation is very desirable,but this explanation adds nothing to or subtracts nothing from it. Thus the certainty of tactile qualities would continue to exist and lose none of its merit whether or not associationcan explain it. 'fo be sure, we do not think such an explanation possible because it contradicts the "phenomenon" of association.Associat i o n i s t l p i c a l l v e x p e r i e n c e da s " s o m e t h i n g r e m i n d i r r g m e o l something." For example, the sight of the table corller reminds me I once bumped myself on it. However, this corner's sharpness is not remembered, but seen. Here is another instructive example: I seea rough lump clf'sugarand know or rememtrer that it is sweet. I do not remember it is rough (or only incidentally), nor see its sweetness.By contrast, the flower's fragrance is really taste. This begins to sweet and does not remind me ol'a s\^/eet ()pen up perspectivesfor a phenomenology of the senses and of senseperceptions that, of course, we cannot go into here. At this point we are only interested in applving these insights to our case' -I'he seen living body does not remind us it can be the scene of manifold sensations.Neither is it merely a physical thing taking up the same spaceas the living body given as sensitivein bodily perception. It is given as a sensing,living body. So far we have only considered the living body at rest. Now we can go a step farther. Let us supposethat I (i.e., my living body as a rvhole) nrove through the ro()m. As long as we disregarded the constitution of the living body, this was not a peculiarly characterized phenomenon. It was no different than the kaleidoscopic shifting ol-the surrounding outer world. Nou' the experience that of "I mr>ve" becomesentirely new. It becomes the apperceptior.r based on manifold sensationsand is entirely our own movement different from the outwardly perceived movement of physicaL b < l d i e s N o w t h e c o m p r e h e n s i o no f ' o u r o w n m o v e m e n t a n d t h e . alteration of'the outer world are combined in the fbrm of "if <50> . . . t h e n . " " l f ' I m o v e , t h e n t h e p i c t u r e o f m y e n v i r o n m e n ts h i f t s . "

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<51>

This isjust as true for the perception ofthe single spatial thing as for the cohesivespatial world, and, similarly, for movements of parts of the living body as fbr its movement as a whole. If I rest my hand on a rotating ball, this ball and its movement are given ro me as a succession changing tactile data merging into an intention of permeating the whole. These dara can be comprehended together in an "apperceptive grasp," a unified act ofouter perception. Data have the same sequenceif my hand glides over the still ball, but the experiencethat "I move" supervenes anew and, with t h e a p p e r c e p t i o n f t h e b a l l , g o e si n r o t h e f b r m o f " i f . . . r h e n . " o Visual dara are analogous.While being still, I can see the changing appearances of'a rolling ball; and the "shadesof' the ball" can look the same if the ball is still and I move my head or only my e y e s .1 ' h i s m o v e m e n l , a g a i n , i s g i v e n t ( ) m e i n " b o d i l v p e r c e p tion." 'I'his is how parts of the living body are consrituted as moving organs and the perceprion of the sparial world as dependent on the behavior of these ()rgans.But this does not yet show us how we comprehend the movements of living bodies as movements of physicalbodies.When I move one of my limbs, besidesbecoming bodily aware of my own movement, I have an ()uter visual or tacrile perception of physicalbody movemenrsto which the limb's changed appearancestestify. As the bodily perceived and outwardly perceived limb are interpreted as the same, so there also arisesan identical coincidence of the living and physical body's 'I'he movemenr. moving living body becomesthe moved physical body. And the fact that "I move" is "seen with" the movement of a part of my physicalbody. The unseenmovement of the physical body in the experience of "I move" is comprehended jointly. The afliliation of the "I" with the perceiving body requires some further elucidation. The impossibility of being rid of the b o d y i n d i c a t e s t s s p e c i a g i v e n n e s sT h i s u n i o n c a n n o t b e s h a k e n ; l i . the b<tndstying us to our bodies are indissoluble. Nevertheless, we are permitted cerrain liberties. All the objects in the outer world have a certain distance from me. 'fhev are alwavs,.there" while I am alwayshere. T'hey are grouped around me, around my "here." 'Ihis grouping is not rigid and unchangeable. Objects approach and withdraw from me and fiom one another, and I

myself can undertake a regrouping by moving things farther or nearer or exchanging their places. Or else I can take another "standpoint" so that I change my "here" insteadof their "there." a Every step I take discloses new bit of the world to me or I seethe old one from a new side. In so doing I alwaystake my living body along. Not only I am always "here" but also it is; the various "distances" of its parts from me are only variations within this "here." Nou', instead of in reality, I can also "regroup" my environment "in thought alone." I can fantasize. For example, I can fantasize my room empty of furniture and "imagine" how it l'ould look then. I can also take an excursion through the n'orld of fantasy. "In thought" I can get up from my desk, go into a corner of the room, and regard it from there. Here I do not take my living body along. Perhaps the "I" standing there in the corner has a fantasizedliving body, i.e., one seen in "bodily fantasy,"if I may say so. Moreover, this body can look at the living body fLeibkorperl at the desk it has left .just as well as ar other things in the room. Of course, this living body then also is a represented object, i.e.,one given in representing outer intuition. Finally, the real living body fLeib] has not disappeared, but I actuallycontinue to sit at my desk unseveredfrom my living body. 'fhus my "I" has been doubled,66 and, even though the real "I" cannotbe releasedfrom its body, there is at leastthe possibilityof "slipping out of one's skin" in fantasy. But a body without an An "I" u'ithout a body is a possibility.6i "1" is utterly impossible.To fantasize my body fbrsaken by my "1" means to fantasizemy living body no longer, but a completely parallelphysical body, to fantasizemy corpse.(If I leave my living body, it becornes for me a physical body like others. And, instead of my leaving it, should I think of it away from me, this removal is not "one's o\ /n movement" but a pure movement of the physical 'fhere body. is still another way of showing this. A "wiihered" limb without sensationsis not part of my living body. A fbot ''gone to sleep" is an appendagelike a foreign physicalbody that I cannotshake off lt liesbeyond the spatial zone of my living body rntowhich it is once more drawn when it "awakens." Every movenent I make of it in this condition is like "moving an object," i.e.,

<52>

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m y a l i v e m o v e m e n t e v o k e s a m e c h a n i c a lm o v e m e n t . A n d t h i s moving itself is not given as the living moving of a living body. For the living body is essentiallyconstituted through sensations: sens a t i o n s r e r e a l c o n s t i t u e n t s f c o n s c i o u s n e s sn d , a s s u c h ,b e l o n g a o a 'I'hus hou'could there be a living body not the body of to the "I." ,tr " I "l.'' W h e t h e r a s e n s i n g" l " i s c o n c e i v a b l ew i t h t > u ta l i v i n g b r d y i s another question. This is the questi<>n rr'hether there could be of -f in sensations rvhich n<lliving body is constituted. he answer can be given with<lut firrther ado because, already stated,the sensaas tions of'the varior-rs sensory provinces do not share in the struc'I'hus ture of the living b<tdyin the same manner. we have to assay 'w'hether the localization of the sensesclearly experienced at i p l a c ' e sn t h e l i v i n g b r d y - o l t a s t e ,t e m p e r a t u r e , , r p a i n - i s n e c a e s s a r y n d i n c o m m u t a b l e .I f t h i s i s t h e c a s e ,i t w o u l d m a k e t h e m o possible nly for a living bodily "1" sothat another analysis f the o senses sight, hearing, etc. w()uld still seem to be necessary. of We need not decide these cluestions here, though a phenomeno l o g y ' o f o u t e r p e r c e p t i o nw o u l d n o t b e a b l e t o a v o i d t h e n r . N e l ' e r t h e l e s st,h e s e n s e s a v e a l r e a d yc o n s t i t u t e dt h e u n i t y o f ' " I " a n d h living body for us, even though not the complete range of reciprocal relationships as yet. Also the causal relationship between the psychic and the physical already confronts us in the province Purely physical events such as a foreign br:ldybeing of the senses. fbrced under my skin or a certain amount of'heat coming into contact with the surface of my physical body is the phenomenal causelUrsacfrel sensations pain and of temperature. It turns of of out to be "stimulatiorr." We shall come upon such phenomenal causalrelationshipsofien now as we further pursue the relations h i p sb e t w e e n s o u l a n d l i v i n g b o d y . (b) The Liuing Body and Feelings Sensations feelings lGef)hlsempfndungenl sensualfeelings of or fsinnlichenGeflhlel are inseparable from their founding sensa'I'he tions. pleasantness a savory dish, the ag()ny of a sensual of pair-r, the comfirrt of'a s<lftgarment are noticed where the fbod is tasted, where the pain pierces, where the garment clings to the body's surfhce. Hou'ever, sensualfeelings not ()nly are there but

they issue fiom my "I." General in et the same time als<1 me; feelings. Not have a hybrid position similar to_sensual Ieelings ,.I" feels vigorous or sluggish,but I "notice this in all my ,,nty tt" every paln' every acttvlty ot linrbs." Every mental act, everyJoy' toiether with every bodily "-::i?"' every movement I thought, "I" feel sluggish' My living it ,.I.,"k", sluggish and colorlesswhen with me' Thus our familiar <54> lreclv and ^ii itt pu.tt are sluggish of fusitln againappears' Not only do I seemy hand's ,rhe,r,rmett,rrt at ir.,.ru.*.n, and feel its sluggishness the sametime, but I also see We alu'ays movement and the hand's sluggishness' the sluggish general feelingsas coming from the living body with "*rr..i.n.e ,,r'acceleraiing or hindering influence on the course of experie'ce. This is ti.,e even *'hen these general feelings arise in conr)ection with a "spiritual feeling,'' Moods are "general feelings" of a non-somaticnature, and so \\,eseparate them from strictly Fieneralf'eelingas a speciesof their ou,D.Cheerfulnessand melancholy do not fill the living body. It is rrOtcheerful or melancholyas it is vigorousor sluggish,nor could a purely spiritual being be sub.iect to moods. But this does not run beside one imply t'hai psychic and bodily general l-eelings ouoti,.. undisturbed. Rather, one seemsto have a reciprocal I "influence" ()n the other. For instance,supPose take a trip t<-r recuDerateand arrive at a sulrny, pleasantsPot.While lookirrg at of the view, I f-eelthat a cheerful mood wantsto take possession "I shall f'eel sluggish and tired' me, but cannot prevail because I be cheerful here as s()onas I have rested up," I say to myself' I nray know this fiom "previous experience,"yet its foundatit>n is al$rys in the phenomenon of the reciprocalaction of psychic aI-rd somatic exPeriences. Causality (Q Soul and Lit'ing Body, Psycho-Physical o{ characterizedby this deper-rdence The psychic is in essence Everything psychic is bodyexperiences ()n somatic influences' psychic experiand bound c<lnsciousness, in this area essentially etc., are distinguishedfrom acciences.b<tdv-bclundsensatiorls, dental physical experiences,the "realizations"of spiritual life.6!' in single psychicexperiences, As the iubstantial unit\ announced 'fhis is shown in the phenombody. the soul is based on the living

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Edith Stein

IndiuiduaL Constitutionof the Psycho-Phlsical

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55>

56>

enon of "psycho-physical causality" we have delineatedand in the nature of sensations. And the soul together with the living body forms the "psycho-physical" individual. Now we must consider the character of so-called "spiritual 'fhe feelings." term already indicates to us that spiritual feelings are accidentally psychic and not body-bound (even if psychologists would not like to ackno$'ledge this consequence.)Anyone who brings the pure essenceof a bodiless subject to givenness would contend that such a subject experiencesno pleasure,grief, or aesthetic values. By contrast, many noted psychologistssee "complexes of organic sensations"in feelings. As absurd as rhis de{inition may seem as long as we consider feelings in their pure essence, concrete psychiccontexts we actually do find phenomin ena which do not ground feelings, to be sure, though they can make them intelligible. "Our heart stops beating" for joy; u'e "wince" in pain; our pulse races in alarm; and we are breathless. Examples which all deal with psycho-physical causality, with effects of psychic experience on body functions, can be multiplied at will. When we think the living body away, these phenomena disappear,though the spiritual act remains. It must be conceded that God rejoices over the repentance of a sinner u'ithout feeling His heart pound or other "organic sensations,"an observation that is possiblewhether one believesin God or not. People can be convinced that in reality feelings are impossible rn,ithout such sensationsand that no existing being experiencesthem in their purity. However, feelings can be comprehended in their purity. and this appearanceof accompaniment is experienced exactly as such, as neither a feeling nor a component of one. The same thing can also be shown in cases purely psychiccausality."I lose of my wits" for fright, i.e., I notice my thoughts are paralyzed. Or "my head spins" for joy so that I do not know what I am doing and do pointlessthings. A pure spirit can also become frightened but it does not loseits wits. IIts understanding does not stand still.] It feels pleasureand pain in all their depth u'ithout these feelings exerting any effect. I can expand theseconsiderations.As I "observe" myself, I also discover causalrelationships betu'een my experiencesu'ith their announced capacities and the attributes of my soul. Capacities can

()ut and ber developed and sharpened by use as well as \vorn 'fhus my "power of observati<ltt"increasesas I work in ciulled. rratural science;fbr example, my power f<rr distinguishing colors as I work with sorting threads of finely shaded colors, my "capacitv fbr en-joyment" as I have pleasures. Every capacity can be srrenpithenedby "training." On the other hand, at a certain "habituation" point the opposite effect takes place. I "get enough of" an "object of pleasure" continually placed befirre me. It eventhe physical rually arousesboredom, disgust,etc. In all these cases is phenomenally having an effect on the psychic. But it is a question of what kind of'an "effect" this is and o{'whether this pherl()menon of'causality enables us to arrive at an exact ctlncept of causality{br natural scienceand at a general law of cause. Exact patural scienceis basedon this c()ncept,while descriptive science <lnlywith the phenomenal concept of causality.It is also the cleals casethat an exact c()nceptofcausality and unbroken causalprecisl()n are a presupposrtiont>l'the exact causal-geneticpsychology aspire in conjunction n"ith the example set to n'hich psychologists by the modern scienceof physical nature. We must content ourselveshere with pointing out these problems u'ithout going into their solution.T0 (d) The Phenomenon ExPression of he considerationof the causaloperation of'feelings has led us f urther than u'e anticipated. Nevertheless,we have not exhausted r r h a t f e e l i n g sc a t t t e a c h u s . l ' h e r e a r i s e sa n e n p h c n o m e n o n r l { . the expression o{' feeling beside this appearance of accompaniment. I blush fbr shame, I irately clench my list, I angrily furrow 'l'he relation- <57> rny brow, I groan with pain, am.iubilant with.joy. ship of'feeling to expressionis completely different from that of f'eeling to the appearance of' physical accompatriment. In the issuing out ol lormei case I do not notice physical experier.rces psychic ones, much lesstheir mere simultaneity. Rather, as I live through the f'eeling,I feel it terminate in an expressionclr release i i F t ' x p r e s s i o n u l o f i t s e l f . ; r e e l i r r gl r i t s p u r e e s s e l l ( es n o l s o m e o thing complete in itself'.As it were, it is loaded rvith an energ) u'hich must be unloaded. 'I'his unloading is possiblein different ways. We know one kind 'f

Edith Stein

Constitution of the psyho_physicat Indiaid.ual

f unloading very well. Feelings releaseor motivate volitions and ions, so to speak. Feeling is related to the appearance of exion in exactly the same rvay.The samefeeling that motivates volition can also motivate an appearanceof expression. And ing by its nature prescribeswhat expressionand what volitiorr can motivat..tt By nature it must alwaysmotivate something, alwal'sbe "expressed." Only different forms of expression re possible. It could be objected here that in life feelingsoften arise without ivating a volition or bodily expression.As is u'ell-known, we ivilized people must "control" ourseh'esand hold back the ily expression of our feelings. We are similarly restricted in activities and thus in our volitions. 'Ihere is, of course. still e loophole of "airing" one's wishes.The employee who is alwed neither to tell his superior by contemptuouslook s he thinks im a scoundrel or a fool nor to decide ro remove hirn, can still ish secretly that he n'ould go to the devil. Or one can carry out in fantasy that are blocked in realitl'.One who is borrr into tricted circumstancesand cannot fulfill himself in reality caries out his desire for grear things by winning battles and pertrming wonders of valor in imagination. The creation of anher world where I can do what is forbidden to me here is itself a trm of- expression. Thus the man dying of thirst sees in the istance before him oasesn'ith bubbling springs or seas that ree him, as Gebsattel reDorts.T3 The jov filling us is not a meditative devotion to rhe pleasing ject. Rather, it is externalized in other situationsas \'e entirel; rround ourselveswith what is enioyable.We seek it in or-rrreal rrounding world or induce ir by"mem.rryor freely fantasizing epresentation. We neglect everything that does not fir in rvith it Lntil our frame of mind is in complete harmony with our surnding world. l'his peculiarity of expression requiresa comprehensive clariation. It is not enough to state that f-eelings influence the,,rerduction of ideas" and how frequenth this occurs, as psycholv usually does. But expression or its surrogate is possible still another way, in nd to this the ..controlled" person who fbr social,aesthetic. or

Sz

jlt'j,,.if pc,isib'ities.,Feerin'Jsujr H:::"l.ffi ;Hn*i:{ meaning, nor

forms issuing from feeling u"d'i;;;;

expression. The var

J;#;t,s il:,',T.,;:ff :l;:;;:'r.,J,ff _'#:,:..::"".;;;ffi so rar, we can .:l:I"j. rhai

feeling by its narure demands

:i" ; tn i t s,, r;J:,:,:::JJ::r., f :: l. g:' :.f..l; ; ;..mnae i. ;ts"; J""fi

f'eelingitself objective. The "i;.',iil[;i#TiliJ:l? i'r..-i,rat.r,,in this act o' "*p..i.r.. reflection just as in a volition or bodily expression.we usua,y say that reflection weakens.feelirrg ur,d'thut the 1sfls61ing man is incapabte intense of feelings.

rerreats. can Feering rereasea* an

ethical reasonsputs on a uniform count

<5g>

rnt i"ra.l";;.;:::::,ii9.

causally. bodily The .*p..rrion,ii;;i#

the ,, aasameoccurrf-l1t"tttt"n ors n ;i ",p.;;;;' f, nf":ff;'#".:,ltT:;ill;**;

i :['l*L: lf'l ;: i":t ence

;Ijji,?::ij::,T,:lT,iJ:risn in"ii,,r,.,.-.u,",have same i g to- ;;;;;;" r the

of anger,in.another .*pe.i I

0 ro.,'a.p"r, ;t"; ".:n I., uoi"*p.!r, i,, J.n ;.:;il Trllff:;TJ#: <6 > r"

rsrakenapartin bodilyperception, a'd &p.es.lon is separated as independeni ph..,on'"no". ir.rn. same 1-1;lativelr time it itself Decomes productive.I-can stretch my mouth ,. il;;;,.;,fi,j "taken foi" a smile but actuallynor be a smile. perceptual .no-.'nu a[il', pt __ -Similar

; ;.: :l H i:'I J :t i. :.o i.-,..d, ; ;';;:;J :'Jj X,lI: i1J:' i ";t

andexpression hasbJen."nr,ir.ri.J beside rhe sensory ,t":"ng Expressio.n uses s),f ho-physi.rr .u"r}i,y to become rir"j' l1.I.. f ..u

Fl;[:'+rr;:ffi?l;f{:;ti::#:.T'.:::::T:"'.",r;

neousbodily perception in the mode if "rlffi;ilT:H:1,:: I am not, so to speak,.or.rr.lo.rJoI it. should I then"", ,.rr-actualit/'

irs expression mode inihe oractu"r,ii

thisexpression in. given. b"dilyp";;;;,i"r,. rr,. ,.ii. time I have ;,-, ,"i;.n _y preasureexperientially rs externalizedu, ,n" ,un-'.-r,;" is me as a stretching of my lips. ;*" i: As I live in th

de{iny.*fr iter ..i."..a r 1oi ""iin it,ryj[.ilij; [",liJ:$il:: rnto expressionand ,.un_loaded,,", but at the 52ms

il:il,.

;il"J;#H#:

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Edith Stetn

Constitutionof the Pslcho-PhlsicalInditidual

55

have said that it requires an observant glance to make the bodily perceived expressiotrinto an intentional object in the pregnant sense.Yet the felt expression, even though experienced in the mode o{'actuality,also requires a particular turrring of the glance to become a comprehended object. This turnilrg of'the glance is n()t the transition from non-actuality to actuality that is characacts and their correlates.t" teristic of all l'ron-theoretical -I'he fact that I can <tbjectifyexperietrced phenomena of exis pression and comprehend them as expressi<ln a further conditior-rof the possibility of voluntarily producing them. Nevertheless, the bodily change resembling an expressiorr is not really given as the same. The furrorving of the bron' in anger and the furrowing of the brow to simulate anger are clearly distinguishable in themselveseven when I passover from bodily perception t() outer perception. Since phenomena of expression appear as the outpouring <>ffeelings, they are simultaneously the expression of the psychic characteristicsthey anllouttce. For exanrple, the furious glance reveals a vehement state of mind. \,!'e shall conclude this investigation by a consideration of experiencesof will. (e) WilL and Liaing Body Experiences o[ will also have an important meaning for the constitution of psycho-physicalunity. For one thing, they are (senof important because accompanying physical manif-estations sati()nsof tension, etc.), though we shall not consider these further becausewe are already farniliar with them from our discussion of f'eelings. Other phenomena of b<dily expression being considered do not appear to be the expressionof volition itself, but to be feeling corrponents <lf complex volitional experietrces. I may sit here 'fhen I have chosen, quietly weighing two practical possibilities. have made a decision. I plant my {'eeton the floor and spring up 'fhese vivaciously. movements do not express a volitional deciof sion, but the resulting feeling of decisiveness, activity, of unrest that fills me. Will itself is not expressed in this sense,but, like in neither is it is<>lated itself, having to work itself'out.Just f-eeling, as feeling releasesor motivates v<llition from itself'(or another

6l>

possible"expression" in a wider sense),so will externalizesitself To act is always to produce what is not present. The irr actior-r. "freri" of *'hat is willed conforms to the "fiat!" of the volitional clecisionand to the "facere" of the subject of the rvill in action. 'l'his action can be physical. I can decide to climb a mountain and carry olrt my decision. It seems that the action is called forth errtirely by the will and is fulfilling the r,r'ill.But the action as a rlhole is willed, not each step. I rvill to climb the mountain. What is "necessary,"for this takes care "of itself." The will employs a psvcho-physicalmechanism to fulfill itself, to realize n'hat is willed,just as feeling usessuch a mechanism to realize its expression. At the sane time the control of the mechanism or at least the "srvitching on of the machine" is experienced. It may be experiat enced step by step if it means overcoming a resistance the same time. If I become tired halfway up, this causesa resistanceto the movement to seizemy f-eetand they stop serving my will. Willing and striving oppose each other and fight for control of the organisrn. Should the will become master, then every step may now be lvilled singly and the effective movement experienced by overcoming the countereffect. 'fhe same thing applies in purely psychic domains. I decide to take an examination and almost automatically do the required preparation. Or m1'strength may give out before I reach my goal, and I must call to life each requisite mental act by a volition to overcome a strong resistance.The n'ill is thus master of the soul as of the living body, even though not experienced absolutelynor u'ithout the soul refusing obedience. The world of objects disclosed in experience sets a limit to the u'ill. The will can turn toward an object that is perceived, felt, or otherwise given as being present, but it cannot comprehend an object not present. This does not mean that the world of objects itself is beyond the range of my rvill. I can bring about a change in the world of' objects but I cannot deliberately bring about its perception if it itself is not present. The will is further limited by countereffective tendencieswhich are themselvesin part body-bound (when they are causedby sensory f'eelings) and in part not. Is this effect of r,r,illing on and tending on the soul ar-rd the living

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Edith Stein body psycho-physicalcausality or is it that much-talked-about causality in freedom, the severing of the "continuous" chain of causality?Action is always the creation of what is not. This probut the initiation of cesscan be carried out irt causalsuccession, the process,the true intervention of the will is not experienced as -I'his does not mean that the will has causalbut as a specialeffect. nothing to do with causality.We find it causallyconditioned when w.efeel how a tirednessof body prevents a volition from prevail'I'he will is causally effective when we feel a victorious will ing. overcome the tiredness, even making it disappear. The will's fulfillment is also linked to causalconditions, since it carries out all its effectsthrough a causallyregulated instrument. But what is truly creative about volitiorr is not a causaleffect. All these causal relationships are external to the essenceof the will. The will disregards them as soon as it is no longer the will of a psychophysical individual and yet will. Tending also has a similar structure, and action progressing from a tendency does not appear as a either. The difference is that in tending the "I" causalsuccession, is drawn into the action, does not step into it freely, and no creative strength is lived out in it. Every creative act in the true sense is a volitional action. Willing and tending both have the causality,but it can only capacity to make use of psycho-physical "I" is the master of the living bocly. be said that the willing 5. Transition to the Foreign Individual We have at least outlined an account of what is meant by at.t individual "1" or by individuals. It is a unified object inseparably .joining together the consciousunity of an "l" and a physicalbody in such a way that each of them takes on a nerr character. The occurs as the physical bocly occurs as a living body; consciousness individual. This unity is documented by the soul of'the unified fact that specificevents are given as belonging to the living body general feelings.The and to the soul at the same time: sensations, between physical and psychic events and the resulting causal tie mediated causalrelationship between the soul and the real outer -I'he individworld further document this unity. psycho-ph1'sical

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rial as a n'hole belongs to the order of nature. The living body in contrast with the physicalbody is characterizedby having fields of sensation,being located at the zero point of orientation of the spatial world, moving voluntarily and being constructed of moving organs, being the field of expressionof the experiencesof its " I " a n d t h e i r r s t r u m e n to f t h e " I ' s " w i l l . 7 6W e h a v e g o t t e n a l l rhese characteristicsfrom considering our own individual. Now rve must shorv how the foreign one is structured for us. (a) The Fields of Sensationof the Foreign Liaing Body Let us begin by considering what permits the foreign living bodv to be comprehended as a living body, what distinguishes it from other physical bodies. First we ask how fields of sensation are given to us. As we saw, we have a primordial givennessin "bodily perception" of our own fields of sensation.?7 Moreover, they are "co-given" in the outer perception of our physicalbody in that very peculiar way where what is not perceivedcan be there itself together with what is perceived. The other's fieldsof sensation are there for me in the same way. Thus the foreign living body is "seen" as a living body. This kind of givenness, that u'e want to call "con-primordiality," confronts us in the perception of'the thing.is The averted and interior sidesof a spatialthing are co-given with its seen sides.In short, the whole thing is "seen." But, as we have already said,this givennessof the one sideimplies tendenciesto advance to ne$' givennesses. we do this, then in a If pregnant sense we primordially perceive the formerly averted sidesthat were given con-primordially. Such fulfillment of what is intended or anticipated is alsopossible in the "co-seeing" of our owrr fields of sensation,only not in progressiveouter perception, but in the transition from outer to bodily perception. The co-seeing of foreign fields of sensatiorr also implies tendencies,but their printordial fulfillment is in principle excluded here. I can neither bring them to primordial givennessto myself in progressive outer perception nor in the transition to bodily perception. Empathic representation is the ,rrlv f'lfillment possiblehere.

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Edith Stein body psycho-physicalcausality or is it that much-talked-about causality in freedom, the severing of the "continuous" chain of causality?Action is always the creation of u'hat is not. This probut the initiation of cesscan be carried out in causal succession, the process,the true intervention of the will is not experienced as 'fhis does not mean that the will has causalbut as a specialeffect. nothing to do with causality.We find it causallyconditioned when u'e feel how a tirednessof body prevents a volition from prevail-I'he ing. will is causally effective when we feel a victorious u'ill -l-he will's overcome the tiredness, even making it disappear. fulfillment is also linked to causalcor-rditions, since it carries out all its effectsthrough a causallyregulated instrument. But what is truly creative about volition is not a causaleffect. All these causal 'fhe will relationships are external to the essenceof the will. disregards them as soon as it is no longer the will of a psychophysical individual and yet nill.'fending also has a similar structure, and action progressing fiom a tendency does not appear as a causalsuccession, either. The difference is that in tending the "I" is drarvn into the action, does not step into it freely, and no creative strength is lived out in it. Every creative act in the true sense is a volitional action. Willing and tending both have the capacity to make use of psycho-physical causality,but it can only be said that the u'illing "1" is the master of the living body. 5. Transition to the Foreign Individual We have at least outlined an account of what is meant by an individual "I" or by individuals. lt is a unified object inseparably joining together tl-re consciousunity of an "I" and a physicalbody in such a way that each of them takes on a new character. The physical body occurs as a living body; consciousness occurs as the soul of'the unified individual. This unity is documented by the fact that specificeverts are given as belonging to the living body and to the soul at the same time: sensations, general feelings.The causal tie between physical and psychic events and the resulting mediated causalrelationship betlveen the soul and the real outer world further document this unity. T'he psycho-physical individ-

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ual as a whole belongs to the order of nature. The living body in contrast with the physicalbody is characterizedby having fields of sensation,being located at the zero point of orientation of the spatial world, moving voluntarily and being constructed of movirrg organs, being the field of expressionof the experiencesof its "I" and the instrument of the "I's" will.76 We have gotten all these characteristicsfrom considering our own individual. Now rve must show how the foreigr-t one is structured for us. (a) The Fields of Sensation of the Foreign Living Body Let us begin by considering what permits the foreign living body to be comprehended as a living body, what distinguishesit fiom other physical bodies. First we ask how fields of sensation are given to ns. As we saw, we have a primordial givenness in "bodily perception" of our own fields of sensation.TT Moreover, they are "co-given" in the outer perception ofour physical body ir.rthat very peculiar r.r'ay where what is not perceived can be there itself together with what is perceived. The other's fields of sensation are there for me in the same way. Thus the foreign living body is "seen" as a living body. This kind of givenness,rhat we want to call "con-primordiality," confronts us in the perception of the thing.78The averted and interior sidesof a spatialthing are co-given u,ith its seen sides.In short, the whole thing is "seen." But, as we have already said, this givennessof the one side implies tendenciesto advance to ne\l' givennesses. we do this, then in a If pregnant sense we primordially perceive the formerly averted sidesthat were given con-primordially. Such fulfillment of rvhar is intended or anticipared is also possible in the "co-seeing" of our own fields of sensation,only not in progressiveouter perception, but in the transition from outer to bodily perception. The co-seeing of foreign fields of sensarion also implies tendencies,but their primordial fulfillment is in principle excluded here. I can neither bring them to primordial glvenness to myself in progressive outer perception nor in the transition to bodily perception. Empathic representation is the <tnlyfulfillment possiblehere.

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Edith Stein by empathic presentation or con-primordiality, I can ing these fields of sensationto givennessby making them for me, not in the character of perception, but only ntationally. This was delineated in the description of emacts. Fields of sensationowe the character of being "there lves" to the animatedly given physical body with which e given. This becomesstill clearer in the consideration of sensationsthemselvesinstead of fields of sensation.The ing on the table does not lie there like the book beside it. s" against the table more or less strongly; it lies there or stretched; and I "see" these sensations pressure and of in a con-primordial way. If I follow out the tendenciesto nt in this "co-comprehension," my hand is moved (not in ') but "as if to the place of the foreign one. It is moved into pies its position and attitude, now feeling its sensations, not primordially and not as being its own. Rather, my feels the foreign hand's sensation "with," precisely the empathy whose nature we earlier differentiated r own experience and every other kind of representation. this projection, the foreign hand is continually perceived ing to the foreign physicalbody so that the empathized are continually brought into relief as foreign in conith our orvn sensations.This is so even when I am not toward this contrast in the manner of au'areness. of ) The Conditionsof the Possibility SensualEmpathy possibility of sensualempathy ("a sensing-in," we should be exact) is warranted by the interpretation of'our own rdy as a physical body and our own physical body as a rdy because of the fusion o{' outer and bodily percepIt is also u'arranted by the possibility of spatially altering ysical body, and finally by the possibility of modifying its ties in {hntasywhile retaining its type. Were the sizeof Ird, such as its length, width, span, etc. gtven to me as ably fixed, the attempt at empathy with any hand having llt Properties would have to fhil becauseof the contrast n them. But actually empathy is also quite successful with and children's hands which are very different fiom mine,

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lor my physicalbody and its members are not given as a fixed type but as an accidental realization of a type that is variable u'ithin definite limits. On the other hand, I musr retain this type. I can only empathize with physical bodies of this type; only them can I interpret as living bodies. 'l'his 'I-here is not yet an unequivocal limitation. are types of various levels of generality to which correspond various possible lcvels of empathy. The type "human physical body" does not clefine the limits of the range of my empathic ob.jects, more exactly, of lvhat can be given t() me as a livir"rgbody. However, it r:ertainlymarks off a range withrn which a very definite degree o{ cmpathic fulfillment is possible.In the caseof empathy u'ith the firreign hand, fulfillment, though perhaps nor "adequate," is yet ltossibleand very extensive. What I sensenon-primordially can coincide exactly u'ith the other's primordial sensati()n. Shr uld I perhaps consider a dog's paw in comparison with my hand, I d<r n()t have a mere physical body, either, but a sensitive limb of a living body. And here a degree of projection is possible,roo. F()r e x a m p l e , I m a y s e n s e - i np a i n w h e n t h e a n i m a l i s i n j u r e d . B u t o t h e r t h i n g s , s u c h a s c e r t a i n p o s i t i o n sa n d m o v e m e n t s ,a r e g i v e n to me only as empty presentationswithout the possibilityof f ul{illmertt. And the further I deviate from the type "human being" the smaller does the number of possibilities of fulfillment bec()me. 'fhe interpretation of foreign living bodies as of'my type helps make sense out of the discussion of "analogizing" in compreh e n d i n g a n o t h e r . O f c o u r s e ,t h i s a n a l o g i z i n gh a s v e r y l i t t l e t o d o rr ith "inferences by ar.ralogy.""Associarion by similarity" also I u r n s o u t t o b e t h e c o m p r e h e n s i o no f a s i n g l ei n s t a n c eo f ' a f a m i l i a r t y p e . V o l k e l t , a l o n g u ' i t h o t h e r s , e m p h a s i z e sh i s a s i m p o r t a n t t firr empathy.so order to ultderstand a movement, for example, In a {restureof pride, I must first "link" it to other similar m()vem e n t sf a m i l i a r t o m e . A c c o r c l i n gt o ( ) u r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,t h i s m e a n s t h a t I m u s t f i n d a f a m i l i a r t v p e i n i t . n r - f h i s d i s c u s s i o no f f e r s t h e m e s f b r e x t e n d e d i n v e s t i g a t i r l n sW e m u s t s a t i s f y o u r s e l v e s . rvith the lbregcling as an indication of the "transcendental" quest t t l n s a r i s i n g , s i n c e $ ' e c a l t n o t a l l o n ' o u r s e l v e sa m o r e d e t a i l e d rliscussion.

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A t t h e e n d o f t h e e m p a t h i c p r o c e s s ,i . , u r c a s e a s w e l l a s usually', there is a nel' objectification where *,e firrd the "perceivi ' r g h a n d " f a c i ' g u s a s a t t h e b e g i n n i n g .( 1 b b e s u r e , i t i s p r e s e n t the whole rime-in contrast with progressiclnin ()uter perceplien-1ynly not in the mode of attention.) Norv, however, it has a neu' dignity becausewhat was presented as empty has found its 'fha'ks f ulfillment. rr>the fact that sensarions essentiallybelong r < > n " l , " t h e r e i s a l r e a d ya f o r e i g n , . I " g i v e n r o g e t h e r w i t h t h i a co.sriruti()n rf' the sensual level of the frrreign physical body ( u ' h i c h ,s t r i c t l y s p e a k i ' g , w e m a y n o w n o l o n g e r c i l l a , , p h y s i c a l -lhis "I" c'^ become cr>nsci'us itseif, even thougir it is b<,dy"). of " n o t n e c e s s a r i l ya w a k e . ' As we already nored, this basic revel of consriturio. has always bee. ign.red so f'ar. Volkelt goes i.to "sensing-in" i. various ways, but he briefly characterizesit as the reproductio. of sensati.n and does not explore its own essence.Neither does he cons i d e r i t s m e a n i n g f t r r t h e c o n s r i r u r i o n f t h e i n d i v i d u a r ,o n l v c o n o sidering it as an aid to the occurre.ce of what he alone designates as empathy. I'his is the empathizing of feelings and especiallvof moods. He d,es not want to call se.satior empathy because,if empathy stopped at sensatirns, it wruld be "s'methirrg franklv piti{irl a.d lanrenrable." e do.ot wanr ro impute thisio.nrpu'w t h y b y a n y m e a n s .o n t h e o t h e r h a n c r , u r p r e c e d i n gd e m o n s t r a o tions show that sensati<)ns cannot be assessed quite so narrowlv. F i n a l l y ,e m ( ) t i o n a lr e a s o n ss h o u l d n o l c a u s eL r st o s e p a r a t ew h a t essentiallybelongs together. 'rhe comprehension of fcrreign experiences-be they sensations,feelings, or what p1;1_is i unified, typical, even rhough diversely differentiated mocrificationof consciousness and requires a uniform name. -I'herefore, we have selectedthe already cust()maryterm "empathy" fbr some of these phenomena. Should one desire to retaii"rthis fcrr the narrrlver d.main, the' lre must coilr a new expressionfbr the broader one. In .ne place Lipps contrasts sensatiorrs with f'eeli'5;s.He says t h a t I k r o k a r r h e m a n w h o i sc o l d , n o t a t t h e s e n s a r i o n f c . l d n e i s , o but at the disc<lmfbrt he feels. It is reflection that first c'nclucles

\,Vecan easilysee how that this discomfort arisesfrom sensations. [,ipps arrives at this contention. It is implied by his one-sided focusing on the "symbol," the phenomenon of "expression." Only those experiences expressed by a countenance, a gesture, are erc. are given to him as "visible" or intuitive. And sensations certainly nol expressedactually. However, it is certainly a strong contention that they are thus not given to us directly at all, but gnlv as the basic support of statesof feeling. He who does nor see rhat another is cold by his "goose flesh" or his blue nose, having first to consider that this discomflort he feels is indeed a "chillilless," must be suffering from striking anomalies of interpretation. Furthermore, this chilly discomfort need not be based on of sensations coldnessat all. For example, it can also occur as the psychic accompanying appearance of a state of excitement. On the other hand, I can very well "be cold without being cold," i.e., can have selrsations coldnesswithout feeling the least bit unof comfbrtable. Thus we would have a badly-appointed acquaintance rvith foreign sensatioltsif we could only reach them by the cletour over states of f'eeling based on such sensarions. (d) The Foreign Liuing Body as the Center of Orientation of the Spatial World \{'e come to the second constituent of the living body: its position at the zero point of orientation. The living body cannot be separated from the givenness of the sparial outer world. The ot.her'sphysical body as a mere physical body is spatial like other things and is given at a certain location, at a certain distancefrom me as lhe center of spatial orientation, and in certain spatial relationships to the rest of the spatial rvorid. When I now interpret it as a sensing living body and empathically project myself tnto it, I obtain a new imagesz the spatial world and a new zero of point of orientation. It is not that I shift my zero point to this place, for I retain my "primordial" zero point and my "primordial" orientation u'hile I am empathicallv, non-primordially obtaining the other one. On the other hand, neither do I obtain a fantasizedorientation nor a fantasizedimage of the spatialworld. But this orientation, as well as the empathized sensations, conis primordial, becausethe living body to which it refers is perceived

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as a physical bocly at the same time and becauseit is given primordially to the other "I," even though non-primordially to rns. J'his orientatir>ntakes us a long way in constituting the foreign i n d i v i d u a l ,f o r b y m e a n s o f i t t h e " l " o f t h e s e n s i n g , i v i n g b o l y l empathizes the whole fullness of ourer perception in which the spatial world is essenriallyconstituted. A sensing subject has be_ c o m e o n e w h i c h c a r r i e so u t a c t s . A n d s o a l l d e s i g n a t i o n se s u l t i n g r from the immanent essential examination of perceptual con-sci<>usness apply to it.83 This also makes statements about the essentiallypossible various modalities of the accomplishment of a c t s a n d a b o u t t h e a c t u a l i t y a n d n o n - a c t u a l i t yo f p e r c e p t u a la c t s and <-rf'whar perceived applicable to rhis subject. In principle, is the outwardly perceiving "I" can perceive in the manner of the "cogito," i.e., in the mode of specific "being directed" toward an o b j e c t ; a n d , s i m u l t a n e o u s l yg i v e n , i s t h e p o s s i b i l i t yo f ' r e f l e c t i o n on the accomplished act. Naturally, empathy with a perceiving consciousness general does not prescribe the f<rrm of accomin plishment actually presenr: fbr this we need specific criteria according to the case.Hor.vel'er,the essential possibilitiespresent in particular casesare determined a priori. (e) The Foreign l|orld Image as the Modification of Our Oun World. Image The world image I empathize in the other is not only a modification of my own image on the basis of the otl.rer orientation, it also varieswith the way I interpret his living body. A person without eyes fails to have the entire optical givenness o{' the world. D o u b t l e s s a w o r l d i m a g e s u i t i n g h i s o r i e n t a t i o n e x i s t s .B u t i f I , ascribe it t<; him, I am under a gross empathic deceptiorr. The u'orld is constituted firr him only through the remaining senses, and ir.rreality it may be impossible lbr me empathically to fulfill h i s w t > r l dg i v e n i n e m p t y p r e s e n r a r i o n s . h i s i s s o b e c a u s e f m y T o a c t l r a l ,I i f b - l o n gh a b i t so f i n t u i t i n g a n d t h i n k i n g . B u r t h e s ee m p r y presentationsancl the lack of intuitive fulfillment are given to me. 'fo a still greater extent this applies to a pers()n lacking a sense w h o e n . r p a t h i z e si t h a p e r s ( ) nh a v i n g a l l h i s s e n s e sH e r e e m e r g e s w . the possibilityof enriching ()ur ow,n world in.rage thror-rghanorh-

of empathy for exp.eriencingthe real ()uter cr's, the significance 'I'his significanceis evident in still another resPect' ,r'.,rlcl. Our () l:nPathy as the Condition of the Possibilitlof Constituting Oun Indiuidual ir-t lrom the viewpoint of the zero point of orientation p;ained I must no lt>llgerconsider my owll zero poitlt as the 7.ero cllpathy, clnly u.,i,,t,b|-,tas a spatial pdint arnong many. By this rneans,ar.rd I learlt t() seemy living body as a physicalbody like irv thi, means, , , i h " . . . A t t h e s a m et i m e , o n l y i n p r i m o r d i a l e x p e r i e n c ei s i t g i v e n to llrc as a living body. Moreover, it is given to me as an lnc()mall plctc physical Uoay in outer perception and as different from ' lIt "reiterated empathy"'l-I againinterpret thisphysical otheri.'i boclvasa living body, and so it is that I first am given to myself as a ial p s r c l . r < > p h l ' s i c n c l i v i d u a li n t h e f u l l s e n s e 'l ' h e t h c t o f b e i t t g on a physical body is now col'rstitutivefbr this psvchoii,uncled -fhis reiteratedempathy is at the sametime p h l ' s i c a li n d i v i d u a l . m t h e c o n d i t i r > n a k i n g p o s s i b l et h a t m i r r o r - i m a g e - l i k e g i v e n n e s s o{ myself in mernory artd f'antasyon rvhich u'e have touched the ilrterpretation ot accounts F<lr Probably it als<l severral tintes.s{r which n'e shall not go more deeply' the mirror image itself, int<,r S i n c et h e r e i s o n l y o n e z e r o p o i n t a n d m v p h y s i c a lb o d y a t t h a t o z e r op o i n t g i v e n t o r n e , t h e r e c e r t a i n l y i s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y f s h i f t i n g n,y ,"r. point together with my physical body. A fantasizedshift is alsopoisible which then corrflictswith the real zero point ancl its o o r i e n t i t i o n ( a n d , a s w e s a w ,t h i s p o s s i b i l i t t i' s t h e c o n d i t i < l n { ' t h e :rs possibilitl,of empathy). But t cann()t lclok at n-ry'self'freely at another physical bocly. If in a childhood memory or fantasy I see rnlself irr tl.rebranch of'a tree or on the shore of the Bosportrs, I s e em v s e l fa s a n o t h e r ( ) r a s a n o t h e r s e e sm e . T h i s m a k e se m p a t l r y llossiblefilr me. But its significanceexteltds still f urther. (g) The Constitutionof the ReaLOuter W'orld in Intersubjectite Experience 'l'he u'<lrld I glimpse in fantasy is a notr-existing u'orld because of its c<lnflict u'ith my primordial orientatiotl. Nor d<l I need t<'l l > r ' i n g h i s n o n - e x i s t e n c et o t Fiivennesas I live in fantasy.'I'he s r t o r l c lI g l i m p s ee m p a t h i c a l l yi s a n e x i s t i n g w o r l d , p o s i t e da s h a r " -

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ing being like the world primordially perceived. The perceived world and the world given empathically are rhe same world differently seen. But it is not onlv the same one seen from different sidesas rvhen I perceive primordially and, traversing continuous varieties of appearances,go from one standpoint to another. Here each earlier standpoint motivates the later one, each followinp;one seversthe preceding one. Of course, I also accomplishthe transition from my standpoint to the other's in the same manner, but the ne$' standpoint does not step into the old one's place. I retain them both at the same time. The same world is not merely presented no.u'in one way and then in another, but in both lvays at the same time. And not only is it differently presented depending on the momenary standpoint, but also depending on the nature of the observer. This makes the appearanceof the rvorld dependent on individual consciousness, but the appearing u'orld-which is the same, however and to whomever it appears-is made independent of consciousness. Were I imprisoned within the boundaries of my individuality, I could nor go beyond "the world as it appears to me." At least it u'ould be conceivablethat the possibility of its independent existence,that could still be given as a possibility,would alwaysbe undemonsrrable. But this possibility is demonstrated as soon as I cross these boundaries by the help of empathy ar-rd obtain the same world's second and third appearancewhich are independent of my perception. Thus empathy as the basisof intersubjective experience becomes the condition of possible knowledge of the existing outer world, as Husserl8T and also Roycesspresent it. Non'we can also take a position on other attempts at collstituti n g t h e i n d i v i d u a l i n t h e l i t e r a t u r e o n e m p a t h y .W e s e et h a t L i p p s is completely justified in maintaining thar our own individual, as rn'ell the multiplicity of "I's", occurs on rhe basisof the percepas of'fbreign physicalbodies in which we come upon a consclous tior-r lil-eby the mediation of emparhy. \4/efirst actr-rally consider ourselvesas an individual, as "one 'I' among manv," when rve have learned to consider ourselves by "analogy" wrth another. This theory is inadequate becausehe is content with such a brief indication. He held the foreign indrvidual's physical body in rhe one

hand and his single experiences in the other. In addition, he lirnited them to what is given in "symbolic relation," and then he stopped. He neither showed how these two get together nor part in constituting the individual. demonstrated en-rpathy's our theory in terms of Miinsterberg's intercan also discuss We pretationseto which we really did not find an approach earlier. If \\'e understand him correctly, he concludes that r+'ehave side by side and separate,on the one hand, the other subject'sacts given in co-experiencingand on the other hand foreign physicalbodies and the spatial world given to them in a specific constellation. a liVlrinsterbergcalls this rvorld "idea" lVorstellungl, view we cantake time to refute here). When other subjects approach me not with the content of statements and this content appears to be dependent on the position of their physical bodies in the spatioremporal world, then they and their acts are first bound to their physical bodies. On the basisof our modest demonstrations, we must reject this ingenious theory as an untenable construction. Nlerely considered as such, a physical body could never be interpreted as the "principle of the organization" of other subjects. On the other hand, if there were no possibility of empathy, of transferring the self into the other's orientation, their statements about their phenomenal u'orld woulcl always have to remain unintelligible, at least in the senseof a complete fulfilling understanding in contrast with the mere empty understanding of u'ords. Statementscan fill the breach and supplement where empathy fails. Possibly they may even serve as points of departure for further empathy. But ir-rprinciple they cannot substitute for empathy. Rather, their production assumesthat of empathy. Finally,even if arriving at the idea of a grouping of the spatialu'orld around a particular physical body on the basisof mere statements and the undertaking of a coordination of the subject of these statementsn'ith this physical body were conceivable,it would not be clear at all how one gets from this to a phenomenon of the unified psycho-physicalindividual. And this we now certainly incontestably have. Naturally, this theory appliesjust as little to interpreting our o\\'n living body as a physical body otr rvhose "situation" depends the "content of our ideas."

<7 4>

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(h) The Foreign Liuing Bodl as the Bearer of Voluntary l\'Iouement \4'e have become acquainted with the foreign living body as the bearer offields of sensationand as the center of orientation of the spatial rvorld. Non' u'e find that voluntary movement is another m c o n s t i t u e n to { ' i t . A n i n d i v i c l u a l ' s o v e m e n t sa r e l r ( ) tg i v e n t o u s a s merely mechanical movements. Of course, there are also casesof' l t h i s k i n d . i u s ta s i n o u r ( ) w n m o v e m e n t s . I I g r a s pa n d r a i s eo n e hand rvith the other, the former's movement is given to me as 'I'he m e c h a n i c a i n t h e s a m es e n s e sa p h y s i c a lb o d i ' I l i l i . l simultaa neous sensations constitute the consciousnessof a positiclnal change of my living body, but not of'the experience of "I move." On the contrary, I experierrce this in the other hand, and, furm()\'ement, but also how it thermore, not r>nly its sp<lnt.aneous imparts this to the hand that is moved. Since this spontaneous movement is also interpreted as a mechanical movement outwardly perceived, as well as the same movement, as we already -I-he movement. saw,it is also "seen" as a sp()ntaneous difference betu,een "alive" and "mechanical" movement here intersects with "spontaneous" and "associatedmovement." Perhaps one is 'I'his not to be reduced to the other. intersection is evident, since each "alive" movement is also mechanical at the sirme time. On t h e o t h e r h a n d , s p o n t a n e o u s ( ) v e m e n ti s n o t t h e s a m ea s l i v i n g m spontaneousmovement.,since there is also mechar.rical spontaneous m()vement. For example, suppose a rolling ball strikes another and "takes it along" in its movement. Here lve have the phenomenon of' mechanical spontane<>trs and associatedmovement. N<lw what ab<lut the questi()n of whether there is also alive associatedmovement? I believe this mr"rst denied. Suppose I be take a ride in a train or let someone push me on the ice withor-rt n r a k i n g s l i d i n g m o v e m e n t s m y s e l f ' .I f ' w e n e g 4 l e ca l l t h a t i s n < t t t associated ovement, this movement is only given to me in m changing appearancesof the spatial environment. It could be i n t e r p r e t e d e q u a l l y w e l l a s t h e m < t v e m e n t f ' t h e l a n d s c a p e > ra s r o 'l'hus, m ( ) \ , e m c n to f m y p h y s i c a l b o d y . there are the familiar " o p t i c a l i l l u s i o n s " :t r e e sa r r dt e l e g r a p hp o l e sf l y i n g p a s t ,t h e s t a g e

<75>

trick in n'hich goir-rgalong a road is simulated by moving the scenerv,etc. Associatedmovement can thus only be interpreted as mechanicaland never as alive. Consequently,every alive movement seemsto be a spontaneousmovement. However, we must still distinguish "imparted" movement from movement. \4'e have the phenomenon of an imparted associated mechanicalmovement when a rolling ball does not "take along" a resting one, but "imparts" to it a movement of its ou'n by its impulse (possiblystopping itself). Now, we can perceive such an imparted movement r-rotonly as mechanical,but also experience s i t a s a l i v e .T h i s , h c l r v e v e ri , n o t a n e x p e r i e n c eo f " I m o v e , " b u t o f "being moved." If someone shoves me and I fall or am hurled dorvn an embankment, I experience the lnovement as alive, but f n o t a s " a c t i v e . " I t i s s u e sr o m a n " i m p u l s e , " t h o u g h i t i s " p a s s i v e " or imparted. Movements analogous to our o\{n are found in foreign m()vements. If I see someone ride past in a car, in principle his movement appears no differently to me than the "static" parts of the car. It is mechanical associated movement and is not empathized, but outwardly perceived. Of'course, I must keep his interpretation of this movement completely separate. I represent this to myself empathically when I ransfer myself into his orientation. 'I'he caseis entirelt, different if, for example, he raiseshimself up in the car. I "see" a movement of the tVpe of my sp()ntaneolrs m()vement. I interpret it as his spontaneous movement. As I participate in the movement empathically in the n'ay already suffrcientll' familiar, I fbllon' out the "co-perceived" spontaneous <76> movement's tendency to ful{illment. Finally, I objectify it so that the movement faces me as the other individual's movement. This is h<>'w' foreign living body u'ith its organs is given to the m e a s a b l e t o m o v e . A n d v o l u n t a r y m o b i l i t r . i s c l o s e l yl i n k e d u . i t h t h e o t h e r c o n s t i t L r e n t o f t h e i n d i v i d r . r a lI.n o r d e r t o e m D a t h i z e s alive ntovement in this physical body, we rnust alreadv have interpreted it as a living body. We lr'ould never interpret the spontaneous mo\.ement of'a physicalbodv as alive, even should rve perhaps illtrstrate its difference from irnoarted or associated n)o\,ement t() ourselves by a quasi-empathy'. For exanrple, we rnay "inwardlt'

rliil

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Edith Stein -fhe

IndiaiduaL Constitutionof the Psycho-Physical

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participate in" the movement of knocked and knockinq ball. character of the ball otherwise prohibits the attribution of represented alive movement to it.eo On the other hand, rigid immobility conflicts with the phenom_ e n o n o f t h e s e n s i t i v e i v i n g b o d y a n d t h e l i v i n g o r g a r r i s mi n g e n l eral.er We cannor imagine a completely immobtle living being. That which is bound ro one place completely motionless ls "turned to stone." So far, spatial orientation cannot be com_ pletely separated from voluntary mobility. First of all, the varie_ t i e s o f p e r c e p t i o nw o u l d b e c o m e s o l i m i t e d i f s p o n t a n e o u s o v e m ment ceasedthat the constitution of a spatial world (so far, the individual one) u'ould become dubious. This abolishes rhe pos_ of transference into the foreign living body and so of a libility fulfilling emparhy and the gaining of his orieniation. Thus voluntary movement is a part of the strucrure of the individual and is entirely nonsuspendable.

77>

(i) The Phenomenaof LW Now let us consider a group of phenornena that participate in the structure of the i'dividual i. a specialway: the y appeai i. the living body and also as psychic experiences. I u,ould iike to calthem the specificphenomena of life. They include gro\r,rh,devel_ opment and aging, health and sickness,vigor and sluggishness (general feelings, in our terms, or, as Scheler would say,;feeling ourselvesto be in our living body"). As he has protesred againsi empathy in general, Scheler has very parricularly protested against "explaining" phenomena of life by empathy.ez He wor.rld be e.tirely justified if empathy were a genetic processso rhat the elucidation of this tendency explained away what it was ro eluci_ date, as we mentioned earlier. Otherwise, I see no possibilitv of detaching the phenomena of life from the individuai's other ions t i t u e n t so r o f e x h i b i t i n g a n y t h i n g b u t a n e m p a t h i c c o m p r e h e n sion of them. In considering general feelingsas our own experience,we have seen horv they "fiIl" the living body and rhe soul, horv they defi_ nitely color every spiritual act and every bodily evenr. horv they are then "co-seen" at the living bodyjust as fields of sensationare. 'I'hus, bl his walk, posture, and his every ntovement, \{e also

etc. We bring this "see" "how he feels," his vigor, sluggishness, experieuce to fulfillment by carrying it out c.o-intendedforeign nith him empathically. Furthermore, we not only see such vigor in and sluggishness people and animals, but also in plants. Emfulfillment is also possiblehere. Of course, what I comprepathic hend in this caseis a considerablemodification of my own life. A plant's general feeling does not appear as the coloring of its acts, lirr there is no basisat all to believe such acts are present. Neither do I have any right to ascribe an "awake" "I" to the plant, nor a of reflective consciousness its feelings of life. Even the otherwise constituentsof animals are absent. lt is at least doubtful larniliar and rvhether the plant has sensations,e3 so our empathy is unjustiif we believe we are inflicting pain on a tree by cutting it {red don'n with an ax. A plant is not the center of orientation of the spatial world either, nor voluntarily mobile, even though it is capable of alive movement in contrast with the inorganic. On the other hand, the absence of this constitution does not justify us in interpreting what is present in a new way and distinguishing the phenomena of life in plants from our own. I would not like to offer an opinion on whether we should look at the phenomena of life as essentiallypsychic or only as an essentialbasisfor psychic That phenomena of life have an experienexistence fDaseins).sa tial character in psychic contexts is hardly contestable. No*' perhaps someone will think that I have selectedgeneral feeling as a very convenient example of the psychic nature of phenomena of life. Horvever, this psychic nature must also be demonstrable in other phenomena of life. Scheler has himself directed us to the "experience of life."e5 First calling "lived," isolated, finished experiences "psychic," as he does, seemsto me like a definition not derived from the essence the psychic. The of psychic entity present (the primordial one, according to us) is rvhat is becoming, is experience. What became, rvaslived, and is {rnished sinksback into the stream of the past. We leave it behind us when we step into new experience; it losesits prirnordiality but remains the "same experience." First it is alive and then dead, but not first non-psychicand then psychic. (There is no positive ternr fbr "non-psychic.")Just as solidifying u'ax is first liquid and then hard but still wax, so the same material body remains. There is no

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7'dith

Stein

Constitutionof the Psycho-Physical Indiuidual

71

I c non-psyhic individua .. p:1 I:;.gi:i:: :'

<79>

*h'.r,.Jf.om life. reductionis.non-psych,. t:q';,;;l;t'e came')soul is ':]l:?i of'life asis a^ experience schelern"t-tTPll?:i"d,tl,'.1.'0,,'ihis experience not an and is an and one gf litl cension stages of of discernible ":t"';'..'o.arion objective po-ttTtJ:1^"-t.'n" .;t itfe itself is gi'en to us as such t' development: ]l^t^::l ot tl,',...'ooints, lul','.,.,r., connectin; h igh points' Furand not ^ u t"Tl:tit^t and not the development u:..1r11n rl''*rro thermore,t1.1 the urse,in order to perceive grvc:,,o only its results.is ,, "t.,:",;scious of rhis development, result.we must hrsl "becorr'rau,a, o[our conscious we become i'e" make :!:::'J::'o' :",;;,:-;. are weak' correspondinslv, " strengthwaningyh::,Yt tt'i'.).,-. of conscious an inclination "higher in etc.)Nor is it a presenr, TI:"T: :1.--""-Y;';:;rong.. disappearing,:_lt^T:l"d ll*',,.".f"pn\.r,, *iih that of a plant; mere metap"1"l_':,:::,fff.",li., of io,rtly aefinedsense compreit is a genuine"Tl:fl1_'.1,:n:,i,;.;; the sametype. hingbel,"'5'...hendingthat somet "feelingsick" haslittle to do Bodily ""uit'" u" tio aiit''ts1rt: u bodily injyrl sucha,s brok," in ar rhis ,,srare,, the

"-Til : 1?:'.:i n:

trusted, is no different from the gardener's relationship to his plants, whose thriving he oversees.He sees them full of fresh strength or ailing, recovering or dying. He elucidatestheir condition for himself empathically.ln terms of cause,he looks for the causeof the condition and finds ways to influence it. (h) Cousaliry"iin the Structure of the Indixidual Again, the possibilitvof suchcausalreflecti<tnis basedon enrpa'I'he firreign individual's physical body as such is given as a thv. part of physicalnature in causalrelationshipswith other physical He ob-iects. who pushesit irnparts motion to it: its shape can be changed bi' blows and pressureldifferent illumination changesits are color, etc. But these causalrelatic-rnships not all. As lve knor,r', the foreign phvsical body is not seen as a physical b<tdy,but as a living one. We see it suffer and carry out effects other than the p h y s i c a l P r i c k i n ga h a n d i s n o t t h e s a m ea s p o u n d i n g a n a i l i n t o a . wall, even though it is the sameprocedure mechanically,namely, 'fhe hand senses driving in a sharp object. pain if stuck, and we see this. We must disregard this artificially and reduce this phenomen()n in order to see what it has in common with the other one. We "see" this effect becausewe see the hand as sensitive, into it empathically and so interpret becausewe pro-iectourselves every physical influence on it as a "stimulus" evoking a psvchic resDonse. Along rvith these effects of'outer causes,we comprehencl eff e c t s w i t h i n t h e i n d i v i d u a lh i m s e l l . F o r e x a m p l e , w e m a y s e e a child actively romprng about and then becoming tired and cross. <81 > We then interpret tirednessand the bad mood as the effects of' movement. We have already seen how movements come to givennessfor us as alive movementsand how tiredness comcs to givenness.As rve shall soon see,we alsr>comprehelrd the "bad mood" empathically.Now, lve may not infer the causalsequence from the data obtained, but also exoerience it emnathicallv. For e x a r n p l e ,w e c o m p r e h e r r di n t e r p s y i h i cc a u s a l i t ys i m i l a r l y ' l r , h e n o{'contagionof f'eelingsin others while we we observethe process ourselvesare immune t<l the infectious material. Perhaps when the actr>rsays,"You cal) hear nothing but sobbing and women u'eeping," rve perceive a suppressed sob in all parts of'the atrdi-

;l:;,T wirh"p;in,';;rl":::.f j'iT[':t"ffi|,'.11,[:i:,:1STJ o',n.

t toot can *"],l:',1 also projection. :l :lll:l:l.i.''-y'"rii" .,',fu,r'i. otherando::"9-T^:^glltli""",

traitsin the whole '.rl of single The attentiv-e t"tt glance. "?::il:t ' '.'."'l from the fleering picture which reml l,"i,,ta.n
disease This is *h";;:lr.n""'.1'r,-.*" has of the physician over the lay

peo ^:'*iqi:ffi :lll,illHlJ'.'"",I rsn, H$::l;':;: : -"d: lonser Thus in question'

tTI^::l-p'1,''::;;f this "clinical picture" ir an ,1'".' yellow' sunken cheeks' or he r;': .ur.ln,',,'u 5v he thinks h; -",. unnatural gleamof the eyes. 1 ,, , ^,-,.rts.rnd ,.., t,.,b...,
'"o'" s t y p e so I i l l n e s s e o n w h i c h 3 ]

the cause

Bu,,his.,'i.Tlriftffi H#;i:h:31:?,f :*;*::'1f,

;;1' 3l;3:l;:'ru:.:*ff i r, nil uyi,tur" :; p;;;;'., 13 il:Sf phenomena::i
notproceeclrng'toProJecttorr :;;. with nhose welfare he is ent c i a n ' sr e l a t i o n s h i p o h i s p ; t : " ' '

<80>

level, ?I]::1ni.",)r,. "t thehrstintroductory thtt:111'-1]i":ll' course' Andthephvsi.,1orhe illco.dition,

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Constitution of the P sycho-P hlsicaI I ndiuidual

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2>

ence. And, projecting ourselves into this soul-stirring spirit, lr'ebecome seized by the mood portrayed. In this wa1' we get an being ertacted. inrage of the causalpr()cess Finally, we als<lperceive hou, an individual affects tlre outer u'orld by every action that changesphysical nature, bv impulsive as well as willful <lnes.For example, when I observe the "reaction" to a stimulus when a stone flying ttlward someone is driven from its course by a "rnecharlical" resistancemovelnent, I see a causal pr()cessinto which psychic conrtecting links have been inserted. Projecting myself into the other, I interpret that object as a stimulus and experience the release of the counter-movecan take place unnoticed, but it is entirely ment. (Such processes t u n j u s t i f i e d t o d e s i p ; n a t eh e m a s " u n c o n s c i t t u s " o r a s " p u r e l y s I p h 1 ' s i o k r g i c a l . " ) ' I ' h e n e x p e r i e n c et h e s t . o n e ' d i v e r s i o n f i o m i t s collrse as the effect of'the reacti<lr]. Suppose I see someone act on a decisirln of'will. For example, on a bet he may pick up a heavy load and carry it. Then I empathicall) grasp how the acti()n issuesfrom a volition, here of'the causalProcessand not as a appearing as the primum tnouens connectil'lg link in a seriesof physical causes.We have the effect o f t h e p s y c h i co n t h e p h y s i c a lg i v e n p h e n o m e n a l l ya n d a l s o t h e psychic on the psychic without the mediation of a physical con'I-his necting link. latter is so, for example, in the caseof contae g i o n o f f e e l i n g n o t c a u s e db 1 ' a b o d i l y e x p r e s s i o t t , v e n i { i t i s mediated by a f<lrm of'expressi<tnto make interpretation <lf the experience possible."8 But whether ()r n()t this effect is physically mediated or purely psychic, it certairrly has the sa[le structure as i p h e n o m e n a l c a u s a lr e l a t i o n s h i p s r r p h y s i c a ln a t u r e . N c l l vS c h e l e ri s o f ' t h e o p i n i < l r ri,n a g r e c m e n t w i t h B e r g s o n ,t h a t t h e r e i s a n e n t i r e l y n e r v k i n d o f c a u s a l i t yi n t h e p s y c h i cd o m a i n i n o t e x i s t i n g i n t h e p h y s i c a ld o m a i n . l ' r ' T h i sr l e w k i n d o f ' e f f i c a c y s to consist of the fact that every past experience can itr principle have an effect on everl' f uture one rvithout mediating cc-rnnecting events links, thus without being reproducecl,either. Also c<lmir.rg says that can affect present experience. In a broader sense,he < i p s 1 h i t c a u s a l i t ys n o t d e p e r r d e nrtt n a l i m i t a t i o no f e v e r l e x p e r i ence by rvhat lr'ent bef<rre. Rather, in its dependetrce on the t o t a l i t y r > fe x p e r i e n c e , t d e p e n d so t r t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' se n t i r e l i f e . I t l i

the first place, if we rvere to stick to the last formulation, we rvould have to completely accept the fact that every experience is conditior-redby the entire series of previor-rsexperielrces: B"t Y." also rr'c>ulcl have to accept that every physical occurrence is conditioned by the entire chain of causality.'1|-refundamental difference here is that "the same causeshave the same effects" in the physicaldomain while in the psychicdomain it can be shown that of the "same causes" i5 s55entiallyexcluded' But ih. "pp.u.unce he w'ho strictly supports the relationship of causing to caused experiencecould hardly demonstrate a new kind of efficacy' L.t .rt try to make this clear by examples of what we have in A mind.r00 deliberate decision on a problern put to me contlnues to direct the course of my action long afi er th.e actual decision n'ithout my being "cot-tscious" this as Pr(:sent rn current actlon' of Does this mean that an isolated past experience determines my present experience from that time on? Not at all. This volition <83> that remained unfulfilled for a long timc has not fallen "into sunk back into the forgottenness" during this time, his not ttr"um of the past, beiome "lived lif-e" in Scheler's terms' It has t>nly gone ouf of the mode of actuality cr!'er into that of^nonactuality,out of activity into passivity.Part of the nature of consciousness that the cogito, the act ;n p'hich the "I" lir-es, .is is surrounded by a marginal zone of background experiences ln each moment of experience. These are non-actualities no longer or not vet cogito and therefore not accessibleto reflection, either' ln order to 6. .o-prehended, they must first pass through the firrm of the cogito, which they can do at arrl time. They are still primordially pi.r.nt, even if not actually, and therefore have efficac\'. The unfulfilled volition is not dead, but continues to live in the background of consciousness Lrntilits time comes and it can be realized.Then its effect begins. T'hus, is is not something past which affects the present, bui something that reaches into the Present.l'herefore, we quite agree thaia reproduction of..the volition does not set the aition in motion. 4 nd' indeed, rve rn'ill go even further and say that volition would not. be in a positi<x todo this at all. A forgotten volition cannot have an effect' and a "reproduced" volition is ttot an aliye one. either, but a represelltedone. As such it is urlable to affect anv behavi<lr(as little as

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in a dark room we can Produce the fantasy of a burning lamp to provide the necessarylight for reading)' It must first be relived, lived through again, in order to be able to have an ellect' Future events which "throw their shadows in advance" are no different. Scheler givesan example fromJamesr0rwho, under the influence of an unpleasant logic course he had to teach afternoons, undertook many unnecessary activities the entire day before simply so that he would find no time for the burdensome preparation. Yet he did not "think about it." Every expectation of a threatening event is of this type. We turn our attetrtion to another object to escapethe fear, but it does not vanish. Rather, it remains "in the background" and influences our entire conduct. As a non-actual experience not specifically directed, this fear has its object in the expected event. This is not completely present, but constantly tends toward going over into actual experience, toward pulling the "I" into itself. The fear constantly resists giving itself to this cogito. lts rescueis in other actual experiences that are still blocked in their pure course by that background experience. And of what linally concerns the efficacy of the whole life on every moment of its existence lDaseinsl we must say: Everything living into the present can have an effect, irrespective of how far the initiation of the affecting experience is from "now." Experiences of early childhood can also endure into my present, even though pushed into the background by the profusion of later events. This can be clearly seen in dispositionstoward other persons. I do not "forget" my friends when I am not thinking of them. They then belong to the unnoticed present horizon of my world. My love for them is living even when I am not living in it. It influences my actual feeling and conduct. Out of love for someone, I can abstain from activities which would causedispleasure without "being conscious" of this. Likewise, animosity agairrsta person, inculcated into me in my childhood, catr make au impression on my later life. This is true even though this animosity is pushed entirely into the background and I do not think of this person at all any more. Then, when I meet the animosity again' it can go over into actuality and be dischargedin an action or elsebe brought to reflective clarity and so be made ineffectual. On the

contrary, what belongs to my past, what is temporarily or permanently fbrgotten and can only come to givenness to me in the character of representation by reminiscence or by another's account, has no effect on me. A remembered love is not a primordial feeling and cannot influence me. If I do someone a favor becauseof a past preference, this inclination is basedon a positive opinion of this past preference, not on the represented feeling. All that has been said showsthat the cases Scheler brings up do not prove that there is a difference in the phenomenal structure of efficacy in the physical and in the psychic domains. We have not found a "long-range effect" in the psychic domain. And in the domain of mechanical causality,we also have a parallel accumulation of latent strength and an effectiveness of hidden strength such as we have found here. For example, accumulated electrical energy first "affects" at the momenr of discharge. Finally, we also have analogous circumstances in bodily processes. The appearanceof illness is preceded by an "incubation period" in which the causegives no indication of its presence by any effect. On the other hand, one can ascertain numerous changes in an organism long before one can find their cause. In spite of the similarity of the causalphenomenon, we cannot here deny profound differences between physical and psychic causality. Yet, to demonstrate this we need an exact study of the dissimilar structure of psychic and physical reality. (l) The Foreign Liaing Body as the Bearer of Phenomena of Expression We have become acquainted with the foreign living body as the bearer of a psychic life that we "look ar" in a cerrain way. Now there is still a group of phenomena that disclosea further domain of the psyche to us in a peculiarly characterized way. When I "see" shame "in" blushing, irritation in the furrowed brow, anger in the clenched fist, this is a still different phenomenon than when I look at the foreign living body's level of sensation or perceive the other individual's sensarions and feelings of life with him. ln the latter case I comprehend the one with the other. In the former case I see the one through the other. In the new phenomenon what is psychic is not only co-perceivedwith what is

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b<dilybutexpresseclthrotrghit.'I'heexperienceanditsexpres'I'h' Vischer and portrayed b1' Fr' ,i,r,t are ,.lat"d itl a rtay we fir-rd b e s p e c i a l l v i L i p p s a s t h e s y r n b o l i cr e l a t i o n s h i p ' r ' ) 2 L e r u s m a k e ' i l e a r t h e d i f f e r e n t v i e w p o i n t so n r h i s p r o b l e m of $,.hich Lipps took at different times. In the first editit>n of Grundfragen(1899) he saysthat the ext,ernalizatitlrrs I)thischen lif.earesig,'swhichbec<rmesignificantbecausethevawakeninus 1903lr m e n - r o r i eo f o u r o \ \ n e x p e r i e n c e s . r 0n h i s w r i t i n g s s i n c e s the verv first in both volrtnres <:i Asthetih I, in Leitfaden' frotn ecliti<ln()rr,lntherreweclitionofEthischencrundfragen,andin and otl.rershorter writings-he strongly conteststhis description externalizations as elergetically rejects the interpretatitln of lif'e "signs." Untersuchung,napPears. In the nealrtime, Husser|'s Logische 'fhe betweel word sets firrth the relatior"rship first irrvestigatir>n u n i t i e sr v h i c hc a n n ( ) tb e , a n d m e a n i r r gt h i t t h e r e a r e p h e n < l m e n a l 'fhese expomade at all intelligible by alltrsionslo at) association. revise his views.Frrlm then sitions could have stimulated Lipps tct ()r "svmon he distinguishesbetween "sign" and "expression" -ro sign nleans that srimething per,^y-ihrt something is a bol.,, -fhus smokeis a sign t c e i v e ds a y s o m e t h a t s o m e t h i l ) ge l s ee x i s t s . <lffire.Symbolmeansthatinsomethingperceivedthereissomein thirrg else and, incleed,we co-comprehend something.Psychic here. Arl example which Lipps it. He also used"co-experienced" likes tO bring up fcrr the "svmbolic relation" mav eluciclatethe and:r sad cottntellancerelated ()n the difference. Fio*iur. sadness have smoke on the other? Both casesr0{ orte hand, atrd fire and An obiect Of outer perception leads to something in common: is a something not perceived in the same way' However' there -l'he srnoke indicating fire to presett. given'ess different iina "i and m e i s m v " t h e m e , " 't h e o b i e c t o f m y a c t l l a l t u r n i n g - t o r v a r d ' to proceeclin a further c()ntext. Interul,r"k.n, in me tendencies 'l'he trar]sitiort fiom one esr fl()ws off in a specific direction. carried out in the typical m()tivati()nalfbrm theme to ali()ther is (1-here is alreacly more is, o{: I{ the r>rre then the ()ther is, tclo. e 'l-h s n t o k e r e r n i t t d sm c o f assot'iatiorr. D r e s e n th e r e l h a n n r e r e ) mav also lead us to association'Sadness h.., .r'.,, 1[ough this 'fhe the sad coulltenance is s<lmethingelse' "bei'gto-g,uen;' in

<g7>

sad countenanceis actually not a theme that leadsover to another This occurs in such a way one at all, but it is at one with sadness. that the countenance itself can step entirely into the background, 'f he countenance is the outside of sadness. Together they form a l)atural unity. The difference also becomes clear in single casesrvhere there are actually experiences of the indicator type given. I notice a familiar facial expression in a close acquaintanceand determine that, when he looks like that, he is in a bad mood. But such cases are deviations from the normal case,that of symbolic givenness. Moreover, they already presume a certain symbolic givenness.l05 'I'he indication and the symbol both point beyond themselves n'ithout wanting to or having to. (As we shall see, this distinguishes them both from the genuine sign,) -I'here are differences, however. If I remain turned to$'ard the this is no less"natusmoke and observe how it rises and disperses, ral" than if I go over to the fire. Should I think of the tendencies leading me in this direction as gone, then I certainly no longer have the full perceptual object, but still the same object, an object of the same kind. On the contrary, should I consider the sad countenance as a mere distortion of face, I do not have the same <88> object at all anv more nor even an object of the same kind. This is related to the difference of the possibilitiesof empathy in both 'rases. one case what is presented as empty is fulfilled in proIn gressiveouter perception and in the other through a here necessary pudBaorg eig lill,o yilog, the transition to empathic pro-I'he relationship between what is perceived and what is .jection. presented as empty proves to be an experienceable, intelligible one. It can also be that the symbol does not yet point in a specific direction. Then it is still a pointer into emptinessso that what I seeis incomplete. There is more to it, but I just do not know what ! et. l-hese expositions should make clear what Lipps means by svmbol. But this still does not mean that whatever he irrterprets as a svmbol is really a symbol, and that we alreadl' have a sufficient clistinctionbetween "indication" and "symbol." Symbols for him :rre gestures, movements, resting forms, natural sounds, ano rr'ords.Since he openly uses "gestures" here for involuntary ex-

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description ternalizations, his designation pr()ves c()rrect. The 'I'his gets us certainly cloesnot cover purPoseful externalizations. into the sPhere of sigrrs. For the present I would like tcl neglcct "resting filrms" such as the shape of the hand, c1L^.-1hs "expressionsof fhcial f'eatlrres, expersonality"-artd corlfine mysell tcl the expression<lf'actLlal ilt which there is presumed to lie a periences.Thus movements c " k i n d o l i n n e r a c t i v i t y " ( ) r a " m a n t t e r o f ' f ' e e l i n g " a n h a v ev a r i o t t s his outer habitttsof'a persor.r, mantrer mearringshere. The u'hole posture, can indicate something ttf his of movement artd his persr>nalit.v. l-his would be dealt with in "resting forms" atrd can te omitted here. Further, Lipps thinks that a movement can ' a p p e a r a s l i g h t , f r e e , a n d e l a s t i co r a s c l u m s ya n d r e s t r i c t e d . f h i s of pher.romena life u'hose givennessrve have among the bekrr.rgs Filrally, other feelingscart also be co-comprealready cor)sidered. with movements. For example, I can see a perhended together Horvever, a s)'mbolic relaby son's sadness his gait and POSture. -l'he movement is not presettt here, but an irldicator. ti<tn is not -I'he sadnessis same lvay that the coulltenance is sad. sad in the in the nlovenlellt. On the colltrary, emoti()nal exnot expressed pressionsare on exactly the same plane as visible mttvements of' expression.Fear is at one lvith the cry of fear just as sadnessis 'I'he givertnessof'fear differs fr<tm the u'ith the countetrance. o g i v e n n e s s f t h e c a r o n l y i r t d i c a t e dt ( ) m e b y t h e r o l l i n g o f i t s wheels, as the givennessof sadnessin the c()unteuance differs lrorn thc givennessof fire by the sm<tke.And the material goiltg into the verbal expressionis closely related to emotional expres()r sigps. Cheer-f'ulness sorr()w, calnlttesstlr exciternent, f riendliness ()r rejection can lie in the t<lne of' the voice. Here, too, a symbolic relation is present, y'etthe relationship is veileclby rvhat is due to the word as such. However, it is a complete mistake to designatethe u'ord itsclf'asa symbrtl, t() colrtettd that there is art act of itrterpretation in the speaker's statenlent of the act r>f i , a . i u d g m e n t , s s a d t l e s ss i n h i s c o u n t e n a r l c e t ( ) c o l l t e n d t h a t t h e s < c o m p r e h e t r s i o n > f ' s p e e ci h b a s e d( ) n t h i s . r 0 { ' this, we need a nt<lredetailed investigationof' In order to sh<lu' . t h e g i v e n n e s o l t h e u o r d ( t h a t i s h e a r d a t t d u r t d e r s t o o d )A t t h e s t s a m e t i n r e w e c a t l d i s c u s s h e n a t t t r e o f t h e s i g n i r r g e t t e r a l ,o f '

rn'hichrve have already spoken frequently. For example, signsare the signalsof ships or the flag announcing that the king is in the are not themes themselves, castle.Like signals,verbal expressions but only the intermediate points to the theme, namely, to rhat rvhich they designate.They arouse a tendency to transition that is restricted if they themselvesare made into themes. In the normal caseof comprehension (especially the word), the transition is so of nlomelltary that one can hardly speak of a tendency. Hou'ever, the tendency becomes visible when one is stopped by a foreign \r'ord not understood at first but only containing a hint of its rrreanirrg. What is "sensually perceived" completely recedes in the sign. T'his distinguishesit from the indication that becomesa "theme" irr its full f'actualcontent. On the other hand, the sign is not to be put on the sameplane as the svmbol, for that signified is certainly 'Ihere not co-perceivedlike that comprehended in the symbol. is something more. The signal has a moment of ought, a demand in itself, finally fulfilled in the idea of him who has determined it as a sign. Every signal is stipulated as coltvenrion ar.rddetermined by s()meone for someone. This is lost in the pure symbol. The sad countenance "ought" not to mean sadness, nor blushing shame. Symbolic and signal character are combined in a cerrain way in the purposeful externalization using the syrnbol as a sign. I now n()t only comprehend disapproval in the furrowed brow but it -I'he intends to and ought to announce it. comprehended intention gives the whole phenomenon a new character. Nevertheless, the intention itself can still be given in a symbolic relation, perl.raps a glance,or it can be the result of the situation as a whole. in Nou' what about the u'ord? Does this also have a moment of ought as the signal does?Apparently the word can be there as communicated and, even further, as communicated to me or to arlother, or as merely "thought aloud." For the present t{e can rgnore how the word has these characteristics.At any,rate, they -I'he rureirrelevant to the intelligibility of the rvord. u'ords "Something is burning" mean the same thing to mc n'hen they are merelv called out as rvherrthev are directed to nte or to another. Indeed, nothing of these differences needs to be co-given at all. P a r t o f t h e i r g i v e n n e s ss c e r t a i n l y , r h a s o m e o n ei s s p e a k i n gr h e m , i r

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Edith Stein the speaker is not comprehended in the u'ords. Rather, he is prehended at the same time as they. Nor does this at first play ry role in the words' meaning, but only when it points toward eir intuitive fulfillment. For example, in order to fulfill the eaning of a perceptual statement, I must put myself into the 'Ihus the words can be considered entirely ker's orientation. rhemselveswithout regarding the speaker and all that is going in him. Now what distinguishesthe word from the signal?On the one nd, rve have the signaling thing, the circumstancesof the pro, the bridge that convention has thron'n betn'een them and t is perceivable as this "ought to indicate." The circumstances mselvesremain entirely undisturbed by the fact that the signal them. On the other hand, there is first of all no verbal esignates hysical body fWortkiirperf corresponding to the signaling physirl body lSignalhArperl,only a verbal living body fWortleibl. The I expression could not exist by itself, and neither has it eived the function of a sign from the outside in addition to it is. Rather, it is ahvaysthe bearer of meaning in entirely the me manner n'hether the meaning is really there or whether it is vented. On the contrary, the signal is real. lf it is invented, its nction as a sign is merely invented, too, whereasthere is no such ing as an invented meaning of u'ords. The living body and the I of a word form a living unity, but one permitting to both a latively independent development.l0T signal cannot develop. A nce it has received its designation it continues to convey it nchanged: and the function an act ofchoice has assignedto it, an t of choice can take au'ayagain. Further, it only existsby reason f a creative act completed in it. But as soon as it exists it is vered and independent from this act like any product of human rtistry. lt can be destroyed and cease functioning u'ithout its creator" knou'ing anything about it. If a storm u'ashesau'ay all rail markers in the Riesengebirge,hikers will get lost. This can appen without the RiesengebirgeAssociation,the creator of this 1'stemof signs, being responsible for this, since it believes they re still in the best condition. This cannot happen rr.ith a word, or it is alrvavsborne by a consciousness (which is naturally not hat of'him *,h,, i. speakinghere and nou,).It lives "by the grace"

Indiuidual Constitution of the P sycho-Physical

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of a spirit (i.e., not by reason of the spirit's creative act, but in living dependence on it). The n'ord's bearer can be an individual subject but also a group of possibly changing subjects bound into one by a continuity of experience. Finally, we have the main difference: Words point to the object through the medium of meaning, while the signal has no meaning at all but only the function of being significant. And u'ords do not simply point to the circumstancesas the signal does. What goes into them is not the circumstance, but its logico-categorical formation. Words do not signify, but express,and $'hat is expressedis no longer what it u'asbefore.l08 Naturally, this also applies when something psychic is expressed.Should someone say to me that he is sad, I understand I ihe meaning of the words. The sadness now knolv of is not an "alive one" before me as a perceptual givenness.It is probably as comprehended in the symbol as the table of little like the sadness u'hich I hear spoken is like the other side of the table which I see' ln one caseI am in the apophantic sphere, the realm of propositions and meanings, in the other casein immediate intuitive contact with the objective sphere. Meaning is always a general one. In order to comprehend the object intinded right no'w, we always need a givenness of the intuitive basisof the meaning experiences.There is no such intermediate level between the expressedexperience and the expressing bodily change. But meaning and symbol have something in common which forces them both to be called "expression" repeatedly.This is the fact that together they constitute the unity of an object, that the expressionreleasedfrom the connection $'ith r"hat ls expressed is no longer the same object (in contrast with the signaling physical body), that the expressionproceeds out of and adapts itself to the expressedmaterial. the experiencer0e These relationships are present in simple form in bodily expression;they are doubled in a certain sensein verbal expression: rvord, meaning, ob.ject;and, correlatively, having of the object, logical intention or meaning, and linguistic designation. The function of expressing, through u'hich I comprehend the expressed experience as the expression, is always fulfilled in the experiencein which expressionproceeds from what is expressed'

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Wehavealreadyportrayedthisearlierandalsoused..expression" in a broadened sense. <93>lnthecaseofunderstarrdingthisexperierrcirrgisnotprimorbt'*:-t: dial, but empathized. Of course, we must distinguish^ here' Understanding of a bodily verbal and bodily expression e x p r e s s i o n i s b a s e d o n c o m p r e h e n d i n g t h..1.,' e - i g n l i l ' i n g b o d y efor project myself already interpreted as a |iving body of an .l intotheforeignlivirrgbody,carryouttheexperiencealreadycogiven to me as empty with its countenance, and experlence tne experience ending irl this expression' As we saw,ou..ir-r neglect the speakingindividual i. ttre word. I myself primordially comprehend the meaning of this ideal object in the understanding transition from word to meaning' And as long as I remain in this sphere, I do not need the foreign individualind do not have to empathically carry out his experienceswith him. An rrrtuitive fulfillment of u'hat is intended is also possible through primordial experience' I can bring the circumstancesof u,hich the statement speaks to givenness to myself. I hear the rvords, "It is raining," I understand them without considering that someone is saying them to me' And I bring this comprehension ro intuitive fllfifment wher-rI look out the wiI-rdou,'myself' only if I rvant to have the intuitioD on rvhich the speakerbaseshis statement and his full experience of expression,do I need empathy' Therefore, it should be clear that one does lrot arrive at experlence bv the path leading imnrediately fiom rerbal expression to thit ,.,"'.ar.ririg, the word, insofar as it has an ideal meaning. is not a symbol. But supPosethat there are still other rvaysto get to the rvord. The walto get to meaning is through the pure t1'peof rhe in rvord. Except perh"aps solitary psr,chiclife, we alwaysfind this rvordinsomekindofearthlycloak,inspeech,handwriting'or prirrt. The form can be unnoticed; but it can also push itself ibrward (for example, if it does not clearly reproduce the c<.rnt.ur Of the wnrds). Then it draws interest to itself'arldat the same time to the speakingperson.rr0He appearsto be externalizing or communic:rting *,.rrdr, possibly communic:rting to me. In the latter .,ought" to point out somethillg to me. Now they casethe words are no longer -.r.iy the expressionof somerhing objective, but

r e re a tt,, l',il' a rh sanrimere, :.) illlil: ffi:::"T.X?,:'*TT1I':'i '

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t l t e p e r s ot t ' t t t a t n i ' , , ' l , t '" ' ' o i r . s r r c ha \ a p e r c e p t i r ) l r . . e i \ i o n t h e t r a n s i t i t . rtn t h e s p c a k i l r g . l n s t e a d o f i n v e r b : r. l l l , l , . n i n i r rt h c m e a n i n g o f t h e $ ' o r c l s . , 1 sorll('person and his actscutr'l],,,rr.,i are aln,ays directed t()1vard q u e s t i o n , a r e q u e s r , 0 , , ' n l i , , - l " l ^ t i o n s h i p f t h e s p e a k e rt o . t l ' r e o o t r e a n d t h u s r e f e r , . ' i l l : , . ' ; ; . H e r e r h e s p e a k e r ' si n t e n t i t > t - , 5 h e a r e r ,j t r s t a s a l l g r t ' t ' t t t ' r ' o t h e * o r d s i n t e l l i g i b l e . F r o n l ] 1 , t substanti:rlly assistitr u,ords mean in gener.r'1, "t"i',,irt n,hatthe p r i c r n o i n t r r ' ec t - r n r p r , ' l r . ' t t t ' . , , j , . , o * . b u t ' r v h a tt h e r . m e i n h ' ' t : ' . l l : ; ; ; s s v m b o l si n t h e i r i n f o r m : r t i r q \ \ ' o r d s c a n . o t b e d r ' : l F r ' ' * , = ,, t u t t , b e c a u s e h e y d o n , t . f i r t - r 1 1 t l u n c t i o r t s .e i t h e r .T h i s t s ' ' , . f , , c ( ) m p r e h e n d i n t h i s X p c r l e l l tq . l g '.e' esarerrot l l h e o n l v r r o r t h r f i a i 1 1r ' t " c o m p r e h e n d e d l rt l \ e s e c o n d l l . e c a u s e h e s r' . l , ; o r . o , i ' t , a r r da r e a l s oe n r i r e l id i f f t ' r b t s'ords, but only frur ,1.'t," ."l.ijn i, sl,mbolically giren. At nr.r51 steps i nt o enrll' pres ented frorn, ;lr; .*t Jrnulirution oJ self , , t t e c o u l ds a 1t h a t i l l s l ) "'l',,]; . ' n ls a n a f f e c l d 1 1 e is a n e x p r e s s i \ ' e n ('llh" a "" v i e w w i t h t h e s a m ea t t i t t t : t t . ^ " ' n . " . t h . - r . l v e s t o w h i c h 1 6 . '.,iif l u r ( ) \ e n ) e n tb u t n o t t l l : . t h a t i r r f l e t t i ? t t, t , d l5 " o . , f - . , .a s ia n e x p r e s s i o i l t h e e n r ot ng ( \l)ee(h restifies.\et il . . i :, r . ' . r r o r d i n t o n a t i c l r ra r e a l s oa l ) : r r l , ( " 1 " r o , -o.f t n . , p . . a h , t h e r i s i n g o f t l r e , t c p h a s i s l a c e d o n r h e . t ' l ' l ' 1 , , ] a ' t h a t r h e s ec h a r a c t e r i s t i c s a t r < ; 1 1 1 u p r o i t e i n a q u e s t i o n , . 1 ,. l . irrg. .',, ,f te:tif1 n s c c o n d a r i l v h a v e a r u r r r . t t l l l ; ; ; , c o u l c l t l l l b e i r r v e s t i g a r eid n r r > 1 - s s Natural iy, rheserelar:."1;;I;;;rntio,,, let .rs onie rlore Ir11[. t.'J.,t mere "bec l e t a i l . r rlrt r t e r m s o f r h t s f oli. gi'errnessrom the t ').,,iri.'..irsiderecl so far..\\re seethat rve clear what distinguishr o i r t g - c o - g i v r . n " f r r h a t i t . l ' l l , , L - " r . l u ri s o u r s a r d l y p e r c e i r ' e d t l t l t e o " ( ( ) - p e r c e i r e c l " . 1,1 1 . t ' x p e r i e r t c ct h i s p r o c e t ' ( , " ] : ; ; fr.m rrhar \\as earlit.r. (1)l'r> lcvel ol' ernpathic pr(),('( cr>nsiclered l],,rri,r* in the cases tht' first lt'vel. This r",,t tl." f d o e sn o l p r , r c e e d . r o n t ^ s c | 1 . r nr"a I l r c a p p e . r r a r r c e l l : ( ' l l \ r " r p r t l c e e d sl r o n r h a p p i r l s s s( ) t t 1 1 1 1 ' o . a tiotrs in the u'a1 11'tu1 l;tttf',,, irr..if'.all1 different fiotr1 a t:attsal i. ,,thcr hanrl. rlre yrroct-.r'(ill:i;;. 1 1 . , . , . .i , a d i f f e r e r r t r e l a t i o r r : h i 1 r seqtlence' As wt' sairl t'Jt,,.,r'tf-r^" bet.rveen exerti()ll and-bltrs[betueettshame ,rd lrl,'tt' a n n o u n c e di n t h e l i l r n r 1 ; 1 u,l r l r g .\ \ ' l r i l t ' r ' a u s arle l a ri . r l r ' " ' r " " r " " r .

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if . . . then, so that the givennessof one occurrence (be it psychic o m rn o r p h y s i c a l ) o t i v a t e sa p r o g r e s s i < . t o t h e g i v e n n e s s f ' t h e o t h e r one, here the proceeding clf one experience fiom another is ( ' x p e r i e n c e di n p u r e s t i m m a l t e r r c ew i t h o u t t h e d e t o u r o v e r t h e object sphere. We want to call this experienced proceeding "motivation." All t h a t i s u s u a l l yd e s i g n a t e da s " m o t i v a t i o n " i s a s p e c i a lc a s eo f t h i s m o t i v a t i o n : m o t i v a t i o n < > fc o n d u c t b y t h e w i l l , o f t h e w i l l b y a l'eelirrg.But the proceeding of expression {iom experience is a specialcaseol'this motivati()n, too. Artd we also understand motio v a t i o r ri n p e r c e p t i o n ( t h e g o i n g o v e r l r o m o n e g i v e n n e s s f t h e n o b j e c t t ( ) a n o t h e r ) , o f ' w h i c h H u s s e r ls p e a k s , r r i2 t h i s w a y . V a r i ous attempts have been made to set forth motivation as the cause -I'his is interpretation is untenable fbr, as we sa\{', of r.r'hat psvchic. fiom there is also psychic causality that is clearly distinp;trished motivatioll. On the contrary, motivation belongs essentiallyto 'I-here i s n o o t h e r s u c h c o n n e c t i o n .W e t h e e x p e r i e n t i a ls p h e r e . *'ould like to designate the motivational relationship as intelligible or meaningful in contrast with the causalone. Tb be intelligib l e n r e a n sn o t h i n s m ( ) r e t h a n t o e x p e r i e n c et h e t r a n s i t i o n f i o m ()ne part to another within an experiential rvhole (n()t, to have objectively), and every objective, all ob.jectivemeaning, resides o n l v i n e x p e r i e n c e s { ' t h i sk i n d . A n a c t i o n i s a u n i t y o f i n t e l l i g i b i l o ity or of meaning because its component experiences have an t c x p e r i e n te a b l e r ' < l n n t ' ri 'o n . And experience and expression {irrm an intelligible rvhole in the same sense.I understand an expression, n'hile I can merely bring a sensationto givenness.This leads me through the phen ( ) m e n ( ) no f ' e x p r e s s i o n i n t o t h e m e a n i n p ic o l r t e x t s o f w h a t i s psychic and at the same time gives Ine an imp()rtant means clf ( ( ) r r ( . c itl r g e m P a lh i ( a c ts . (m) The Correctionof Empathic Acts basisfbr what would suspendthe unity of a meaning must b e a c l e c e p t i o n .W h e n I e m p a t h i z e t h e p a i n o f ' t h e i n j u r e d i n kroking at a u'ound, I tend t<l look at his face tcl have my experie n c e c o n f i r m e d i n h i s e x p r e s s i o no f ' s u f f e r i n g . S h o u l d I i n s t e a d a I p e r t : e i v e c h e e r f u l r l r p e a c e l u lc o u n t e l r a n c e , w < l u l ds a v t o n r \ ' 'fhe

self that he must not really be having any pain, fbr pain in its meaning motivates unhappy feelings visible in an expression.Further testing that consists of new acts of empathy and possible inferencesbasedon them can also lead me to another correction: rhe sensualfeeling is indeed present but its expressioll is voluntarily repressed;or perhaps this person certainly feels the pain but, becausehis feeling is perverted, he does not suffer from it but enjoys it. Furthermore, penetration into their meaning contexts assists me in accurately interpreting "equivocal" expressions.Whether a blush means shame, anger, or is a result of physical exertion is actually decided by the other circumstancesleading me to empathize the one or the other. If this person has just made a stupid remark, the empathized motivational context is given to me imIf mediately as follows: insight into his folly, shame, bh-rshing. he clencheshis fist or utters an oath as he blushes, I see that he is angry. If he has just stooped or walked quickly, I empathize a causal context instead of a motivational one. This is all done in immediately without a "differential diagnosis" being necessary the individual case.I draw on other casesfor comparison as little as I need, to consider which of the possiblemeanings of an equivocal word applies in a given context in understanding a sentence. By the correction of the act of empathy, it becomes clear how we understand what is concealedbehind a countenance,of rvhich <97 > we spoke earlier. Formerly, we distinguished the "genuine" expression as such from the "false" one. For example, the conventional laugh was distinguished from the truly amiable one, and alsothe animated one from the almost hardened one still retained even rvhen the actual stimulant causing it has already died away. But I am also able to look through the "deceiving" imitated expression. If someone assures me of his interest in sincerest tones and at the same time surveysme coldly and indifferently or with insistent curiositv, I put no trust in him. The harmony of empathy in the unity of a meaning also makes unfamiliar possiblethe comprehension of expressiveappearances to me from my own experience and therefore possibly not experienceable at all. An outburst of anger is an intelligible, meaningful whole within which all single moments become intel-

Edith Stein

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ligible to me, including those unfamiliar up to rhar point. For example, I can understand a furious laugh. Thus, too, I can understand the tail rvaggingof a dog as an expressionof.joy if its appearanceand its behal'ior othenvise disclosesuch {'eelinqs and its situation warrants them. (n) The Constitutionof the Psychic Indiaidual and lts Signifcance the Correction of Empathl for But the possibility of correction goes furtl'rer. I not only interpret single experiencesand single-meaning contexts, but I take them as announcements of individual attributes and their bearers,just as I take my own experiencesin inner perception. I not only con'rprehend an actual feeling in the friendly glance, but Iriendlinessas an habitual attribute. An outburst of anger reveals a "vehement temperament" to me. In him who penetrates an intricate association I comprehend sagacity,etc. possibly these attributes are constituted for me in a whole seriesof corroborating and correcting empathic acts. Bur having thus gotren a picture ofthe foreign "character" as a unity of these attributes, this itself serves me as a point of departure for the verification of further empathic acts. If someone tells me about a dishonest act by a person I have recognized as honest, I u'ill not believe him. And, as in single experiences, there are also meaning contexts among personal attributes. There are essentiallycongenial and essentiallt,uncongenial attributes. A truly' good man cannot be vindictive; a sympathetic person, not cruel; a candid person, not "diplomatic," etc. Thus rve comprehend the unity of'a character in each attribute, as \4'ecomprehend the r.rnityof a thirrg in every material attribute. Therein we possess motivation for futtrre a experiences.This is how all the elements of the individual are constituted fcrr us in empathic acts. (o) Deceptions Empathl of As in every experience, deceptions are here also possible.But here, too, they can only be unmasked by the same kind of experiential acts or elseby inferencesfinally leading back to such acts as their basis.Many instanceshave already shown us what sources

<98>

such deceptions can have. We come to false conclusions if'we empathically take or-rrindividual characteristic as a basisinstead of our typ.."' Examples are: if r.r'eascribe our impressions of color to the color-blind, our ability to judge to the cl-rild,our aesthetic receptiveness to the uncultivated. If' empathy onll' meant this kind of interpretation of foreign psychic life, one would justifiably have to reject it, as Scheler does. But here he is confronted with what he has reproached in other theories: He has taken the caseof deception as tl-le normal case. But, as rve said, this deceptior) can only be removed again bv empathv. If I empathize that the unmusical person has my enjoyment of a Beethoven symphony, this deception will disappear as soon as I look him in the face and see his expression o{'deadlv boredom. \4Ie can make the same error, in principle, rvhen we <99> infer by analogy. Here our own actual, not typical, characteristic fbrnrs the starting point, too. If I logically proceed from this, I do not reach a deception (i.e., a supposed primordial givennessof u'hat is r-rotactually present),but a false inference on the basisof' an the falsepremise. The result is the same in both cases: absetrce of what is really present. Certainly "common sense"cloesnot take "infererrce from oneself to others" as a usable means of reaching knowledge of foreign psychic life. In order to prevent such errors and deceptions, we need to be constantly guided by ernpathy through outer perception. The constitution of the fbreign individual is founded throughout on 'Ihus the givennessin outer the constitution of the physicalbody. perception of a physical body of a certain nature is a presupposition for the givenness of a psvcho-physicalindividual. On the other hand, we cannot take a single step beyond the physicalbody through outer perception alone, but, as we saw, the individual is only possiblefor a subject of the same tvpe. For example, a Irure "I," for which no living body of its own and no psycho-physical relationshipsare cor-rstituted primordially, could perhaps have all kinds of objects given, but it could not perceive animated, living bodies-living individuals. It is, of course, very difficult to decide what is here a matter of fact and rvhat is necessaryessentially. T h i s r e r l u i r e si t s o u l t i n v e s t i g a t i o n .

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(p) The Signifcanceof the Foreign Indiuidual's Constitution.forthe

Indiaidual Constitutionof Our Own Psychic Now, as r{'esuw on a lower level in crlnsidering the living body a s t h e c e n t e r o 1 - o r i e n t a t i < l n h c c o n s t i t u t i o no f t h e f r r r e i g n i n d i t, n v i d u a l w a sa c o n d i t i o n f b r t h e f u l l c o n s t i t . u t i ( )o f o u r o w n i n d i v i d -Ib u a l . S o m e t h i n gs i m i l a r i s a l s o f o u n d o n h i g h e r l e v e l s . c o n s i d e r < l u r s e l v eis i n n e r p e r c e p t i o n ,i . e . ,t o c o n s i d e rr > u rp s y c h i c" I " a n c l n its attributes, means t() see ()urselves we see another and as he as seeri us.'lhe origir"ral naive attitude of the subject is to be absorbecl in his experience without making it int() an object. We love and hate, rvill arrcl act, are happy' and sad and look like it. We are consciousof'all tl-risin a certain senselr'ithout its being comprehended, beins an object. We do not meditate on it. We do not make it into the t>bjecto{'our attenti()n or even our observatiorr. F u r t h e r m o r e , w e d o n o t e v a l u a t ei t n o r l o o k a t i t i n s u c h a w a v that we can discover n'hat kind of a "character" it manif'ests. On the contrary, u'e do all this in regard to fbreign psychic lif-e. Becausethis life is bound to the perceived physicalbody, it stands before Lrsas an object fr<lm the beginning. Inasmuch as I nolv i n t e r p r e t i t a s " l i k e r n i n e , " I c o m e t o c o n s i d e rm y s e l fa s a n o b j e c t Iike it. I do this in "reflexive sympathy" when I empathicallv comprehend the acts in n'hich my individual is constituted ftrr h i m . F r o m h i s " s t a n d p o i n t , " I l o o k t h r r > u g hr n y b o d i l y e x p r e s s i o n a t t h i s " h i g h e r p s v c h i cl i f e " h e r e m a n i f e s t e da n d a t t h e p s y c h i c a t t r i b u t e sh e r e r e v e a l e d . 'fhis is how I get the "image" the otl'rer has of me, more a c c u r a t e l yt h e a p p e a r a n c e sn w h i c h I p r e s e n tm y s e l ft o h i m . J u s t , i a s t h e s a m et r a t u r a lo b j e c t i s g i v e r ri n a s m a n ! ' v a r i e t i e so f ' a p p e a r a n c e sa s t h e r e a r e p c r c e i v i n g s u h j e c t s s o I c a n h a v e . f u s t s m a n y , a " i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s " t > fm y p s y c h i ci n d i v i d u a la s I c a n h a v e i n t e r p r e t i n g s u b j e c t sr.r ' t O f c ( ) u r s e , a s s o ( ) n a s t h e i n t e r p r e t i r t i o n i s e m p a t h i c a l l r 'l u l f i l l e d , t l r e r e i t e r a t e d e m p a t h i c a c t s i u w h i c h I conrprehend n-ryexperience can pr()ve to be in conflict with the p r i m o r d i a l e x p e r i e n c es o t h a t t h i s e m p a t h i z e d" i n t e r p r e t a t i < t n "i s e x p o s e da s a d e c e p t i < > n .n d , i n p r i n c i p l e , i t i s p o s s i b l e o r a l l t h e A f i n t e r l r r e t a t . i o no f ' m y s e l { ' w i t h n ' h i c h I b e c o m e a c q u a i n t e dt o b e s
\\'r() It g.

But, luckily, I not only have the possibility of bringing my experience to givennessin reiterated emPathy,but can also bring p i r t o g i v e n n e s s r i m o r d i a l l v i n i n n e r p e r c e p t i o n .T h e n I h a v e i t immediately given, not mediated by its expression or by bodily appearances. Also I now comprehend my attributes primordially uird r"rotempathically. As we said, this attitude is foreign to the <l0l> natural standpoint, and it is empathy that occasionsit. But this is not an essentialnecessity.There is also the possibility of inner perception independent from this. Thus in these contexts empai h y d o . r n ( ) t a p p e a ra s a c o n s t i ( u e n t .b u t o n l y a s a n i m p o r t a n t a i c in comprehending our own individual. Tltis is in contrast with the interpretation of our own iiving body as a physical bodv like others, which rvould not be possiblewithout empathy. Empathy proves to have yet another side as an aid to comprehending ourselves. As Scheler has shown us, inner perception contains within it the possibility of deception' Empathy now offers itself to us as a corrective for such deceptions along with further corroboratory or contradictory perceptual acts. It is pos' sible for another to judge me more accurately" than I judge myself and give me clarity about myself. For example, he notices that I look around me for approvai as I show kindness, while I myself think I am acting out of pure gerlerosity. This is how empathy and inner perception rvork hand in hand to give me mvself to mvself.

ChapterIV

Empathy as the Understandingof SPiritual Persons

1. The Concept of the Spirit and of the Cultural Sciences * IGeisteswissenschaften] f , , , * ' e h a ' e c o n s i d e r e dt h e i n d i v i d u a l " 1 " a s a p a r t o f < 1 0 1 > Q,o t,ur.tr., the living body asa physicalbody among others, the \) soul as founded on it, effects suffered and done and aligned in the a c a u s a lt l r d e r . a l l t h a t i s p s y c h i c s n a t u r a l o c c u r r e n c e .c o n s c i o u s ness as reality. Alone, this interpretation cannot be fbllorved through consistently.ln the constitution of the psycho-physical indiviiual something already gleamed through in a number of appeared places that goes beiond these frames. Consciousness not only as i causallyconditioned occurrence, but also as objectconstituting at the same time. Thus it steppedout of the order of' < I 02 > as nature and faced it. consciousness a correlate of' the object world is not nature, but sPirit. We do not want to venture into the new problem arising here in its entirety, not to mention solving it. But neither can n'e avoid it tf we \{ant to take a position on questionsconfronting us in the history of the literature on empathy, questions concerning the of ur.rderstanding foreign personalities.\,ve shall see later how this is related.
*Pleasc'refer t o t h e N o t e . ro n t h e T t a n t l a t i o n . l l . xs ab<lve'

9l

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<103>

First of all, \{e want to determirre how f ar the spint has already individual. We crept into our constitution of the psycho-physical have already taken along the "I" of the foreign living body as a spiritual subject by interpreting this body as the center of orientation of the spatial u'orld, for we have thus ascribed to the foreign and considered living body an object-constituting consciousness All the outer world as its cr>rrelate. outer perception is carried out in spiritual acts. Similarly, in every literal act of empathy, i.e., in every comprehension of an act of feeling, we have already penetrated into the realm of the spirit. For, as physical nature is constituted in perceptual acts,so a new object realm is constituted in feeling. This is the r.r'orldof values. In joy the subject has sonrethingjoyous facing him, in fright something frightening. in fear something threatening. Even moods have their objective correlate. For him u'ho is cheerful, the world is bathed in a rosy bathed in black. And all this is coglow; {br him n'ho is depressed, given u'ith acts of feeling as belonging to them. It is primarily appearancesof expression that grant Llsaccessto these erperiences.As we consider expressionsto be proceeding from experiences, we have the spirit here simultaneouslyreaching into the physical world, the spirit "becoming visible" in the living body. This is made possibleby the psychic reality of acts as experiences of a ps1'cho-physical individual, and it involvesan effect on physical nature. This is revealed still more strikinglv in the realm of the will. What is willed not only has an object correlate facing the volition, but, since volition releasesaction out of itself, it gives what is willed reality; volition becomes creative. Our whole "cultural world," all that "the hand of man" has formed, all utilitarian objects, all works c-rf handicraft, applied science,and art are the realit,r'correlative to the spirit. Natural science(phvsics,chemistry, arrd biology in the broadest sense as the science of living nature, which also includes empirical psychology)describesnatu'I'he ral objects and seeks to clarify their real genesiscausally. and the categorical ontology ofnature seeksto reveal the essence structure of these objects.rr5And "natr,rral philosophy" or (in order to avoid this disreputable rvord) the phenomenology of nature indicates horv objects of this kind are constituted within

Thus it provides a clarifying elucidation of how cor-rsciousness. -fhey themselves make no these "dogmatic" sciencesproceed. iustification of their methods and should do so. The Geisteswissenschaften [cultural sciences] describe the products of the spirit, though this alone does not satisfy them. They also pursue, mostly unseparated from this, u'hat they call "hisThis ir-rcludes cultural history, literary tor1"' in the broadest sense. history, history of language, art history, etc. They pursue the formation of spiritual products or their birth in the spirit. Thel do not go about this by causalexplanation, but by a comprehension that relives history. (Were cultural scientiststo proceed by causal explanation, they rvould be making use of the method of natural science.This is only permissible for elucidating the genetic process of cultural products insofar as it is a natural occurrence. Thus there is a physiology of language and a psychology of language, r,r'hich,for example, investigate what organs have a lead to the fact part in making soundsand what psychicprocesses that one word is substituted for another with a similar sound. only one should not believe These investigationshave their vah.re, that these are true problems of philology or of the history of language.) As it pursues the formative process of spiritual products, we find the spirit itself to be at work. More exactly, a spiritual subject empathically seizesanother and brings its operation to to giverrness itself. Only most recently has the clarification of the method of the been set about seriously.The great cultural sci- <104> cultural sciences entists have indeed taken the right course (as some publications by Ranke andJacob Burkhardt show) and also have been "very well aware of the right course," even if not with clear insight. But if it is possible to proceed correctly without insight into one's procedure, a misinterpretation of one's own problems must necin essarilycauseundesirable consequences the functioning of the scienceitself. Earlier, people made unreasonabledemands of natural science. It was to make natural occurrences "intelligible" (perhapsto prove that nature was a creation of the spirit of God). As long as natural sciencemade no objections to this, it could not develop properly. Today there is the opposite danger. Elucidating causally is not enough, but people set up causal elucidation

Edith Stein absolutely as the scientific ideal. This would be harmless if this interpretation were confined to natural scientists.One could calmlv allow them the satisfactionof looking down on "unsciennot "exact") cultural science,if'the enthusiasmfor tific" (because this method had not gripped cultural scientiststhemselves.Peohave gone ple do not want to be inexact and so cultural sciences along in man), $'aysand have lost sight of their own goals.We find the psychological interpretation of history'r6 advocated in the textbooks on historical method. The study of'this interpretation is emphatically recommended to ]'oung historians by Bernheim, for example, who ranks as an authority in the area of methodology. \4'ecertainly do not maintain that psychologicalfindings can be of no use at all to the historian. But they help him find out n'hat is beyond his scope and do not yield him his real objectives. It is for me to explain psychologicallvwhen I can no longer necessary understand.rrTBut when I do this, I am proceeding as a natural scientist and not as an historian. If I ascertain that an historical personality shou'ed certain psychic disturbancesas the result of < 105> an illness, for example a loss of memory, I am establishing a natural event of the past. This is an historical occurrence as little as the eruption of Vesuviusthat destroyed Pompeii. I can account for this natural event by laws(assumingthat I have such laws),but it does not thus become in the least intelligible. The only thing that one is tcl "understand" is hon, such natural events motivate the conduct of these people. They have historical significanceas "motives." But then one is no longer interpreting them as natural facts to be explained by natural laws. Should I "explain" the u'hole life of the past, I would have accomplishedquite a piece of work irr natural science,but rvould have completelv destroyed the spirit of the past and gotten not one graiu oi historical knowledge. If historians take their task to be the determination and explanation of the psychological facts of the past, there is no longer any historical scrence. Dilthey calls Taine's historical works a horrible example of the results of this psychological interpretation. Wilhelm Dilthey's their true foundation. goal in life was to give the cultural sciences He stressedthat explanatorv psychology was not capable of this

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and rvanted to put a "descriptive and analytic psychology" in its \4Iebelieve that "descriptive" is not the proper u'ord, fbr place.rr8 descriptive psychology is also the science of the soul as nature. Such a psychology can give us as little informatiorr on ho.rvthe proceed as on the procedure of natural science. cultural sciences Phenomenology urges that reflecting investigation of this scienmake clear the method of cultural scienceas tific consciousness as that of natural science. Dilthey is not completely clear n'ell here'. Indeed, he also sees"self consciousness" the way to an episas temological grounding.lre And he recognizes reflective turning o{'the glance toward the procedure of the cultural sciences be to the understanding that makes it possible for us to relive the spiritual lif'e of the past.r20 (We would call this empathic comprehension.) But he finds man as nature or rhe total life of the psvcho-phl,sical individual to be the subject of this undersrand- <106> ing.t:lt Therefore, the science occupied rvith human beings as natllre, i.e., descriptive psychology,is the presupposition of the cultural sciences n the one hand, and on the other hand, what o gir,'es them unity; Ibr cultural sciencesare concerned r,r'iththe single ramifications exemplifying this totality as a rvhole. These include art, morality, law, etc. But nou' the principal difference bet.w'een nature and spirit has been suspended.Exact natural scienceis also presented as a unity. Each one of these scienceshas an abstract Dart of the c<tncrete "natural object" for its object. The soul and the psycho-physical irtdividual are also natural objects.Empathl, lvasnecessary the for corlstitutiolt of these obiects, and so to a certain extent our o\\,n individual was assumed. gut spiritual understanding, lr,hich .w,e shall characterizein still more detail, musr be distinguished from this empathy.'tt But from Dilthey's mistaken expositions, we learn that there must be an objective basis fbr the cultural sciencesbeside the clarification of method, an ontologl, of the spirit corresponding to the ontology of nature. As natural things have Ittt essentialunderll.ing strllcture, such as the fact that empirical sPatialforms are realizationsof ideal geometric forms, so there is also an essentialstructure clf the spirit and of ideal tvpes. Historit a l p e r s o n a l i t i e s r e e m p i r i <a l r e a i i z a t i o n s f t h e s er v p e s .I f e m p a a o

Edith Stein in thy is the perceptual consciousness u'hich foreign Personscome to givennessfbr us, then it is also the exemplary basisfor obtaining this ideal type, just as natural perception is the basis for the eidetic kn<lwledgeof nature. We must therefirre also find access to these problems fiom the point of view o{'our consideratiolls'

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2. The Spiritual Subject <107> Let us first establish u'hat we have already obtained tou'ard knowledge of the spiritual subject in constituting the psychophysical individual. We found the spiritual subject to be an "1" in whose acts an object world is constituted and which itself creates objects by reason o{'its will. If we consider the fact that not every subject seesthe u'orld from the same "side" or has it given in the of same succession appearances,but that everyone has his peculiar "Weltanschauung," we already have a characterizationof the spiritual subject. However, something in us opposes()ur rec()grritionof what is commonly called a person in this "spiritual subject" so strikingly lvithout substratum. Nevertheless,we can characterizeit still further on the basisof our earlier expositions. Spiritual acts do not stand besideone another lvithout relationship, like a cone of'rays with the pure "I" as the point of intersection, but one act experiover from one entially proceeds from the other. The "I" passes act to the other in the form of what we earlier called "motivation." This experiential "meaning context," so strangely excausalrelationcepted in the midst of psychicand psycho-physical ships and without parallel in physical nature, is completely attributable to spirit. Motivation in the lawfulnessof spiritual lif'e. 'I'he is experiential c()ntext of spiritual sub.jects an experienced ( p r i m o r d i a l l yo r e m p a t h i c a l l y ) o t a l i t y o f m e a n i n g a n d i n t e l l i g i b l e t distinguishesmotias such. Preciselythis meaningful proceedin54 vation fiom psychic causality as well as empathic understanding of spiritual contexts from empathic comprehension of psychic a c o n t e x t s .A f ' e e l i n gb y i t s m e a n i l l g m o t i v a t e sa n e x p r e s s i o n , n d e t h i s m e a n i n g d e f i n e st h e l i m i t s o f a r a n g e o f p o s s i b l e x p r e s s i o r t s

.just as the meaning of a part of a sentenceprescribesits possible 'I'his fnrmal and material complements. asserts nothing more than that spiritual acts are subject to a general rational lawfulness. Thus, there are also rational laws for feeling, willing, and conducr < l 0 g > expressedin a priori sciencesas well as laws for thinking. Axiology, ethics, and practice take their placesbeside logic. This rational lawfulnessis distinguishablefrom essentiallawfulness.Willing is essentiallymotivared by a feeling. Therefbre, an 'I'here unmotivated willing is an impossibility. is no conceivable subject with a nature to want something which does not appear to it as valuable. Willing by its meaning (that posits somerhing to be realized) is directed toward what is possible, i.e., realizable. Rationally, one can only will the possible. But there are irrational people who do not care whether what they have recognized as valuable is realizable or not. They will it for its value alone, attempting to make the impossiblepossible.Pathological psychic life ir-rdicates that what is contradictory ro rational laws is really possible for many people. We call this mental derangement. Moreover, psychic lau'fulnesscan here be completely intact. On the other hand, in some psychicillnesses rarional lawsof the spirit remain corrlpletelyintact, for example, in anesthesia, aphasia,etc. We recognize a radical difference between spiritual and psychic anomalies. In casesof the second kind, the intelligibility of foreign psychic life is completely undisturbed; we must only empathize changed causalrelationships.However, in mental illnesswe can no longer understand becausewe can only empathize a causal sequenceseparatelyand not a meaningful proceeding of experiences. Finally, there is still a series of' pathological cases in which neither the psychic mechanism nor rational lawfulnessseemsto b e s e v e r e d .R a t h c r , t h e s e c a s e s r e e x p e r i e n t i a lm o d i f i c a t i o n so f a the frame <lf'rational laws, frrr example, depressior.r following a catastrophic event. Not only is the portion of the psychic life spared by the illness intelligible here, but also the pathological symptom itself'.t:rThese considerationslead us to the conclusi<tn that the spiritual subject is essentiallysubject ro rational lau'sand that its experiencesare intelligibly related. <109>

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3. The Constitution of the Person in Emotional Experiences But even this does not satisly us. Even now, we have not yet reached what is called a person. Rather, it is worth looking into the fact that something else is cr>nstituted spiritual acts besides in the object world so far considered. It is an old psychological t r a d i t i o n t h a t t h e " I " i s c o n s t i t u t e di n e m o t i o n s . r 2W e w a n t t o s e e { what can be meant by this "I" and n'hether we can demonstrate this c<lntentton. Traditionally, psychologistsdistinguish sensatior"rs which I in sense"something," an interpretation u'ith which we do not completely agree, from emotions in which I feel "myself" or acts and s t a t e s f t h e " L " W h a t k i n d o f m e a n i n g c a n t h i s d i s t i n c t i o nh a v e ? o We have seen that all acts are "l" experiences in each one of which we run into the "I" as we reflect. Further, f'eelingis also the f'eelingof something, a S4iving act. On the other hand, every act must als()be looked at as a state of the psychic "l" once this has been constituted. However, there is a deeply penetrating difference in the sphere of experience. In "theoretical acts," such as acts of perception, i m a g i n a t i o n ,r e l a t i n g o r d e d u c t i v et h i n k i n g , e r c . , I a m r u r n e d r o an object in such a \\'ay that the "I" and the acts are not there at 'I'here all. is alwaysthe possibilityof'throwing a reflecting glance ()n these, since they are always accomplished and ready firr percepti()n. But it is equally possiblefor this nor ro happen, for the "1" to be entirely absorbed in considering the object. It is possible to conceive of a subject only living in theoretical acrs having an object world facing it without ever becoming aware of itself and i t s c o n s c i o u s n e s s ,i t h o u t " b e i n g t h e r e " f o r i t s e l f . B u t t h i s i s n o w longer possibleas soon as this sub.jectnot only perceives,thinks, etc., but also f'eels.For as it feels it not only experiencesob.jects, but it itself. It experiencesem()tionsas coming from the "depth 'l'." of its " T h i s a l s om e a n st h a t t h i s " s e l f ' - e x p e r i e n c i n g I " i s n o t "l," for the pure "l" hasno depth. But the "l" experithe pure enced in emotion has levelsof various depths. These are revealed a s e m o t i ( ) n sa r i s e o u t o { ' t h e m . P e o p l ew a n t t o d i s t i n g u i s h e t w e e n" f ' e e l i n g " l F d h l e n l a n d " t h e b f'eeling" tcefuhLl. I do n<tt believe that these trvo designations

<ll0>

indicate different kinds of experiences,but only different "directions" of the same experience. Feeling is an experience u'hen it gives us an object or else something about an object. The feeling is the same act when it appearsto be originating out of'the "I" or unveiling a level of the "I." Yet we still need a particular turning r>fthe glance to make the feelingsas they burst out of the "I," and this "I" itself in a pregnant sense, into an object. We need a turning specificallydifferent from reflection because reflection does not show me something not previously there for me at all. On the other hand, this turning is specificallydifferent from the transition from a "background experience," the act in which an object faces me but is not the object toward n'hich I prefer to turn as the specific cogito, the act in which I am directed toward the object in the true sense.For turning to the feeling, etc., is not a transition from one object givenness another, but the objectifyto Further, in feelings we experience ing of something subjective.r25 ourselvesnot only as present, but also as constituted in such and such a u'ay. They announce personal attributes to us. We have already spoken of persistent attributes of the soul announced in experiences. We gave examples of' such persistent attributes, among others, memory announced in our recollections and passion revealed in our emotions. A closer consideration shows this summary to be most superfi- < 1 1 l > cial, since it is in no way dealing with comparable attributes. They are ontological (in regard to their position in the essentialstructure of the soul) as u'ell as phenomenological (in regard to their constitution in terms of consciousness). would never arrive at We something like "memory" by living in recollection and turning to the recollected object. Also memory is first given to us in inner perception. These are new acts in u'hich the recollection not present fbr us before is "given," and these acts announce the soul and its attribute (or "capacity" fAhigheitl). In "overu'helming o{'my suffering and the .ioy" or "upsetting pain" I become a\,r'are place it occupiesin the "I." This occurs as I undergo the suffering itself without its having been "p;iven" in neu' acts. I do not perc e i v ei t . b u t e x p e r i e n c e t . i we can just as easily objectify these experiOn the contrary, enced attributes as we can the feelings. For example, such an

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lbrthcoming if we want to say someobjecti{ication is necessarily 'fhese objectitying acts are, again, thing about the attributes. giving acts (considering them as acts of perceiving or as merely i n d i c a t i n g )a n d i n t h e m t h e r e a r i s e st h e c o m p l e t e c o i n c i d e n c eo f t h e e x p e r i e n c e da n d t h e p e r c e i v e d" I . " In order to arrive at a cornplete picture, we would have to go -fhis can take place only sugthrough every kind of'experience. gestively here. Sensationsresult in nothing fbr the experienced " 1 . " ' I ' h e p r e s s r r r er,v a r m t h , ( ) r a t t r a c t i o n t r >l i g h t t h a t I s e n s e r e a nothing in which I experience mvself, in no way issue from my "1." On the c()ntrary, if they are made into an object, they "an-Ihe n o u n c e " " s e n s i t i v i t y "t o m e a s a p e r s i s t e n t s y c h i ca t t r i b l r t e . p so-called "sensations of f'eeling" or "sensory I'eelings," such as pleasureilr a tactile impressionor sens()ry pain, already reach into the sphere of the "I." I experience pleasure and pain on the s u r fa c eo f m y " 1 . " A t t h e s a n e t i m e I a l s oe x p e r i e n c em y " s e n s o r y receptiveness"as the topmost or outerm()st layer of my' "1." tuo There are, t.hen,feelings which are "self-experiencing" in a special sense:general feelings and moods. I distinguish general feelings fiom moods because general f'eelings "are bound to the living body," which should not be drawn in here. Ger-reral feelings and moods occupy a special place in the realm of'consciousness, for they are not giving acts but only visible as "colorings" of 'fherefore, giving acts. at the same time they are different becausethey have no definite locality in the "I," are neither experienced ()n the surface of the "1" uor in its depths and expose no l e v e l so f ' t h e " l . " R a t h e r , t h e y i n u n d a t e a n d f i l l i t e n t i r e l v . ' f h e y -I'hey penetrate, or certainly can penetrate, all levels. have someo t h i n g o f t h e o m n i p r e s e n c e f l i g h t . F o r e x a m p l e ,c h e e r f u l n e s s f o character is not an experienced attribute, either, that is localized in the "l" in any way but is poured over it entirely like a bright l u s t e r . A n d e v e r y a c t u a l e x p e r i e n c eh a s i n i t s o m e t h i n g o f t h i s " t o t a l i l l u m i n a t i ( ) n , "i s b a t h e d i n i t . Now we come t() feelings in the pregnant sense.As said earlier, these feelings are alwaysl-eelings of'something. Every time I f-eel, I arn turnecl toward an otrject, something of an object is giverr to me, and I see a level of'the ob-ject.But, in ()rder to see a level of the object, I must first have it. lt ntust be given to me in theoreri-

'I'hus, the structure of all leelings requires theoretical ctl acts. Whett I am.joyful over a g<lod deed, this is how the deed's :rcts. me. But I must know about the or goodrress its positive value f-aces order to be joy{ul svgl i1-kllorvledge is fundamental to cleedin j<ly. An intuitive perceptual or c()nceptual comprehension can also be substituted lor this knowledge underlying the f-eelingof r alue. Furtherlnore, this knowledge belongs among acts that can orrly be comprehended reflectively and has no "I" depth of'any kind. On the contrary, the feeling llased on this knowledge always a i r e a c h e s n t o t h e " l ' s " s t a b i l r t y n d i s e x p e r i e n c e da s i s s u i n go u t o f < I l 3 > And this even takes place during complete immersion in felt it. value. Anger over the loss of'a piece of -jewelry comes fiom a nrore superficiallevel or does not.penetrate as deeply as losing the s;rme object as the souvenir of a loved one. Furthermore, pain over the ltlss of this person himself rvould be evell deeper' This essentialrelationships among the hierarchy oI felt valcliscloses of ues,r:7 the depth classificatiol'r value feelings, and the level classificationof' the person exposed in t.hesef'eelings. Accordirrgly, every time lr'e advance in the value realm, we also make acquisitionsin the realn.rof our own Personality.This c<lrrelatiott nrakesfeelings and their firm establishment in the "I" rationallv about "right" and lau'ful as well as making possible decisi<>ns "u,rorrg" in this domain. If some<tne "overcome" by the lossof' is h i s w e a l t h ( i . e . ,i f i t g e t s h i m a t t h e k e r n e l p o i n t o f h i s " I " ) ' h e s f e e l s" i r r a t i o n a l . " F l e i n v e r t st h e v a l u eh i e r a r c h y o r l o s e s e n s i t i v e insight into higher values altogether, causing him to lack the correlative personal levels. . o ' S e n t i m e r t t s [ l o v e a n d h a t e . t l t a n k I u l n e s s \ ' e n g e a n c ea n i m o s ity, etc.-f'eelings with other people for their ob,iect-are also -fhese feelings, too, are levels. sensit.ive acts exposing persor.ral {rrml1'establishedin various levelsof the "I." For example, love is cleeper thal-r inclination. On the other hand, their correlate is ()ther pe()ple'svalttes.If these values are llot derived values that belong to the pers()nlike other realized or comprehended values, b u t h i s o r v n v a l u e s ,i f ' t h e y c o n t e t o g i v e n n e s si n a c t s r o o t e d i r . r if', ar)other depth than the feeling of non-personal valr-res, accordingly, the,v unveil levels not to be experienced in any way, therl

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the comprehension of'fbreign persons is constitutive of our <lwn pers()n. Now, in the act of'love lve have a comprehendinp;or an -I'his intending of the value of'a pers()n. is not a valuing ftrr any other sake. We do not love a person becausehe does good. His < 1 l 4 > v a l u e i s n o t t h a r h e d o e s g o < t d , v e n i f h e p e r h a p sc o m e s t o l i g h t e f o r t h i s r e a s o n . R a t h e r , h e h i m s e l f i s v a l u a b l ea n d w e l o v e h i m " f < r rh i s o w n s a k e . "A n d t h e a b i l i t y t o l o v e ,e v i d e n ti n o u r l o v i n g , is rooted in another depth fiom the ability ro value morally, 'fhere e x p e r i e n c e di n t h e v a l u e so f d e e d s . are essenliarelationl s h i p sa r n o n g t h e v a l u e f e e l i n g a n d t h e f ' e e l i n eo f ' t h e v a l u e o f i t s r e a l i t y ( f b r t h e r e a l i t l , o f a v a l u e i s i t s e l f ' av a l u e ) ,a n d i t s " I " d e p t h . The depth of'a f eeling of value derermirresthe clepth of a f-eeling based on the cornprehension of the existence of this value. 'fhis seconclf'eeling,holvever, is not of the same depth. pain over the lossof a loved one is not as deep as the love for this person, if the krssmeans that this person ceases exist. As the personal value to o u t l a s r sh i s e x i s t e n c e n d t h e l o v e < l u t l a s t sh e j o i ' o v e r t h e l ( ) v e d a t o n e ' se x i s t e n c es o t h e p e r s o n a lv a l r r ei s a l s oh i g h e r t h a n t h e v a l u e , of his reality, and this former feeling r>f value is rnore deeply r o o t e d . r 2 s u t s h o u l d " l o s s o f ' t h e p e r s o n " m e a n s u s p e n d i n gt h e B person and his value so that possiblvthis empirical person c()nt.inues t() exist, such as in a casewhere "one has been deceived bt,a person," then pain over the lossis synonymouswith suspension of love and is rooted in the same depth. 'I-he c o m p r e h e n s i o no f ' v a l u e si s i t s e l f a p o s i t i v e v a l u e . B u t t o become aware of tl-risvalue, one must be directed toward this c o n t p r e h e n s i o n . n t u r n i n g t o t h e v a l u e , t h e f ' e e l i n go f v a l u e i s I c e r t a i n l y t h e r e , b u t i t i s n o t a n o b j e c t . F o r i t s , a l u e l o b e f ' e l t ,i t must first be made into an object. In such a f'eelingr>fr.'alue the r>f feeling of value (oy over my joy) I become aware of myself in a d o u b l e m a n n e r a s s u b . j e ca n d a s o b - j e c rA g a i n , t h e o r i g i n a l a n d t . the reflected I'eeling of'r'alue rvill take hold in different depths. -I'hus I can enjol' a work o1'arr and at rhe sametime enj,ry my 'I'he e n j o v m e n tc l f i t . e n j o l , m e n to f ' t h e n , o r k < t f a r t w i l l . , r e a s o n ably" be the deeperr.e. we call the "irversi.n" of'this relati.n-l'his ship "perversion." d r > e s o t m e a n t h a t t h e u n r e f l e c t c dl - e e l n i n g m u s t a l w a y s e t h e d e e p e ro n e . I c a n f ' e e l s l i g h t m a l i r . i o u s . j o y b a < I I 5 > a t a n o t h e r ' s m i s f o r r u n ea r r d c a r rs u f f e r d e e p l y i n t h i s s l i g h t m a r i -

does not directly cious.joy.This is rightly so. Depth classification depend on the antithesisof reflected-non-reflected, but, again, on the hierarchy of felt values.To value a positive value positively is lessvaluable than the positive value itself. To value a negative value positively is lessvaluable than the negative value itsell-.lb prefer the positive valuing over the positive value is thus axiologically unreasonable. To put the un-justifiedpositive value behind the negative or.reis axiologicallv reasonable. According to this, the value of our own person seemsto be only reflexive and not constituted in the immediate directedness of experience. We need yet another investigation to decide this. Not only comprehending, but also realizing, a value is a value. We \{'ant to consider this realizing in more detail, not as u'illing and acting, but only its emotional components. In realizing a value, this value to be realized is before me, and this feeling of value plays the role in constituting personality that we have already attributed to it. But, simultaneously with this f-eelingof value, there is an entirely naive and unreflected joy in "creation." In this joy the creation is felt to be a value. At the same time I experience my creative strength in this creation ancl myself as the person who is provided with this strength. I experience creativity as valuable in itself.'fhe strength l experience in creation and its simultaneous power, or the very power of being able tcl create itself, are autonomous personal values and, above all, entirely indeoendent o1'the value to be realized. The naive "feeling of self value" of this creative strength is further shown irr realizing, and in the experience of being able to value. Then, to be sure, values compete; and realize, a neJative the pr>sitivevalue of'nry o\\'n strength can be absorbed in the negative average value of it. Nevertheless,we have an example here of unreflected "self emotiorls" in which the person experiences himself as valuable. Before we go over into the domain of experiencesof the rvill, rvhosethreshold we have already stood upon, \\'e must pr-rrsue still another "dimerrsion" of the significanceof f'eelingsfbr the con- < I l6> 'fhey stitution of personality. not only have the peculiarit,v of' being rooted in a certain depth of the "I" but also of'filling it out t() more or lessof an extent. Moods have already shown us r,r'hat

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this means. We can say that every feeling has a certain mood component that causesthe feeling to be spread throughout the "I" from the feeling's place of origin and fill it up. Starting from a peripheral level, a slight resentment can fill me "entirely," but it can also happen upon a deep joy that prevents it fiom pushing further forward to the center. Nolv, in turn, this joy progresses victoriously from the center to the periphery and lills out all the layers above it. In terms of our previous metaphor, feelings are like different sources of light on whose position and luminosity the resulting illumination depends. The metaphor of light and color can illustrate the relationship between feelings and moods for us in still another respect. Emojust tions can have mood components essentiallyand occasionally as colors have a specificbrightnessover and above their higher or lower degrees of brightness. So there is a serious and a cheerful .joy. Apart from this, however, joy has specificallya "luminous" character. On the other hand, we can still further elucidate the nature of moods from these relationships between moods and feelings. I can not only experience a mood and myself in it, but also its penetration into me. For example, I can experience it as resulting fr<tm a specificexperience. I experience how "something" upsets n.re. This "something" is alrvays the correlate of an act of feeling, such as the absenceofnews over rvhich I am angry, the scratching violin that offends me, the ra'w'deal over which I am irritated. The "reach" of'the aroused mood, then, dependson the "I" depth of'the act of feeling correlative u'ith the height of the felt value. The level to lr'hich I can "reasonably" allorv it to penetrate is prescribed. Along with depth and reach of the feelings,a third dimension is their duration. They not only fill up the "I" in its depth and u ' i d t h , b u t a l s o i n t h e " l e n g t h " o { ' e x p e r i e n c e dt i m e t h e y r c m a i r r i n i t . A n d h e r e t h e r e i s a l s o a s p e c i f i cd u r a t i o n o f ' t h e f e e l i n g dependerrt on depth. FIou' long a feeling or a mood "ma!' remain" in me, filling me out or ruling me, is also subject to rational laws. This dependence of'the person's structure r>nrational lan's, lrou' alreacl\'r'ariouslvclemonstrated,is clearlv disti nguished from the soul's subordinati<)ll,not to reason, but to ltatural la$,s.

\Aremust distinguish their intensity from the depth, reach, and duration of feelings. A slight moodiness can hang on for a long tirne and can fill me out to more or lessof a degree. Further, I can feel a high value less intensive than a lower one and thus be inch,rced realize the lower insteadof the higher one. "Induced!" to Here lies the fact that rational lawfulness has been infringed -fhe upon. stronger feeling properly has the greater value and so this also setsthe u'ill in motion. But it is not alrvays actually so. For example, u'e have already ofien noted that the leastmishap in our environment tends to excite us much more strongly than a catastrophe in another part of the n'orld without our mistaking which event is more significant. Is this because we do not have the intuitional foundations for a primordial valuing in the one caser or is contagion of feeling operative in the other? Anyrvay, we seem to be dealing here with an effect of psycho-physical organizatlon. We have discerned that every feeling has a specific intensity. Now we must still comprehend hou' the stronger feeling guides the will. Hon'ever, we cannot understand the feeling's actual strength any further, but can only explain it causally. Perhaps one could show that every individual has a total measure of psychic strength determining intensity, rvhich intensity may claim every single experience. So the rational duration of a feeling can exceed an individual's "psychic strength." Then it will either expire premature ly or bring about a "psychic collapse." (One u'ould call the first case a "normal" turn, the second case an "abnormal" or <l18> pathological turn. The "norm" under discussionhere is that used bv biologists,not a rational one. Not the feeling, but succumbing to it, is pathological.) Nevertheless,this is not the place to go into this qr-restion more deeply. We must still settle the analysisof experiencesof u'ill. We must also investip;atethe strivings related to them in their possible significance for the constitution of personality. According tcr Pfdnder, strivings seem to have such a significance.He says: Strivings and counter-strivir.rgs existing in the "I" do n o t r e a l l y h a v e t h e s a m ep o s i t i o ni n t h i s " L " N a m e l y , t h i s " I " h a s a n i n d i v i d u z r ls t r u c t u r e : T h e t r u e " I "

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Edith Stein center or the "1" kernel is surrounded by the "I" body. Nor.r', strivings can indeed exist in the "I" but outside of the "I" center in the "l" body. Thus in this sense they can be experienced as eccentric strivings.rl'

Empathy as the Understanding of Spiritual Persons prehended itself and be made into an objective sub.jectof the practical intentions. Thus volition, but not \'oliti<,rn is striving, is in-rmediatelyself-consciot-ts. thus a practical act of determinatir-lr impregnated b1' a d e f i n i t e i n t e n t i o n o f t h e u ' i l l . l t g o e so u t o f t h e " I " center and, pressing forward to the "I" itself, decides the definite future behavior of this self. It is an act ofself determination in the sensethat the "I" is the subject as n'ell as the object of'the act.

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distinctior.r between "I" kernel and "I" body seemsto be in accordance with our distinction between central and peripheral personal levels. Therefore, central and eccentric strivings would burst forth from different levels,have different "I" depths. However, this description does not seem to me correct. The really justified distinction benveen central and eccentric strivirrgsseems to be entirely different. As far as I can see, we are talking about different modalities of accomplishing the act of striving. Central striving is a striving in the form of the cogito: eccenrric strivings are the corresponding "background experiences." But this does not mean that striving has no "I" depth at all. If a noise arousesin me the striving to turn myself toward it, unless I reflect I do not actually find that I experience something here other than the pure "I" on rvhich the "pull" is exercised.Nor do I expcrience it as arising out o1'somedepth or other. On the contrarv. sometimes I experience "sources" from which the striving proceeds,r3('such as a discomfort, a restlessness, something similar. Becausethey or originate in this source, strivings have a secondary depth and constitutive sigtrificancefor personality, namely, if personality's source first becomes visible in striving. Furthermore, the stubbornness and the intensity of a striving rhen turns out ro be dependent on the "I" depth of its s<>urce and thus accessible a to rational lawfuh'ress. Meanwhile, the pure striving that does not arise experientially out of a feeling is neither rational nt>r irrational. According to Pfdnder, willing is ahvays"I" centered in contrast u'ith striving.r3r \4/e agree with him rr'hen we translate this into 'f our interpretation. he volitional decision is alwayscarried out in the form of the "cogito." As rve already kr-rou', this savslrothing about the u'ill as "self'experiencinp;." According to Pfiinder: If it is to be a genuine volitiolt, then our orvn "I" m u s t n ( ) t r t n l y b e t h o u g h t b u t b e i m m e d i a t e l yc < l m -

'Ihe

'fhe We do not completely agree u'ith this analysis, either. object ol' volition is what is u'illed or what. the u'ill posits. In exoeriential terms. a self determination of a future attitude is ,rr"tly pr.t.nt in the rvilling of a future act, not in the simple willing of an attitude to be realized. Thus, in simple willing the "1" is not an object. On the contrary, it is alwaysexperienced on the subject side as follows: "I" shall give being to rvhat is not. At first this is only the pure "I." But becauseevery rvilling is basedon a I'eeling and, further, this f-eelingof "being able to be realized" is linked u'ith every u'illing, every n'illing itrvadesthe personal structure it-t 'I'hus, in every free, a double mar)ner and exposes its depths. i n d u b i t a b l e" I r v i l l " l i e sa n " I c a n . " O n l y a s h y " l r v o u l dl i k e " i s i n harmony lvith an "I cannot." "l will, but I cannot," is nonsense. < 1 2 0 > We must examine the position of theoretical acts still l'Lrrther. First of all, they seem to us to be entirelv irrelevant to personalitv's structure, n()t :lt all rooted in it. \et n'e have already etlcoulltered them il r.nrmberof times and catt presume that thev must be involved in various ways. Every act of feeling as u'ell as every act -fhus a purelv feeling of' r'illing is based on a theoretical act. Nevertheless,from this side theoretical subject is an impossibility. actsonly appear as conditions and not as constituentsof personality. Nor do I believe that simple acts of perception have a greater significance. It is clifferent u'ith definite cognitive acts. Klrorvledge is itself a value and indeed a value aln'avsgraduated accclrd'lhe ing to its object. act of' reflection in u'hich knou'ledge comes and thus alu'aysbecotre a basis fcrr a valr-ritlg; to givennesscun knowledge, like every f'elt value, therefore becomes relevartt for l l e r s o r r a l i ts s t r u (t u r e . r

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to Yet this range of valuesis not merely accessible the reflecting glance. Not only the knou'ledge we have but, perhaps to a still greater extent, the knowled6ienot yet realized is felt as a value. 'fhis f'eeling of value is the source of all cognitive striving and "what is at the bottom" of all cognitive willing. An object proffers itself to me as dark, veiled, and unclear. It stands there as something which demands exposure and clarification. The clarifying and unveiling with their result in clear and plain knowledge stand before me as a penetratingly felt value and drag me irresistibly here, and into them. A range of my own valuesis made accessible a level of my own personality correspondsto it. This is a very deep level repeatedly passingfor the kernel level as such. It really is the essentialkernel of a certain personal type of a definitely "scientific nature." But we can take still more from the analysisof knowledge. We spoke of cognitive striving and cognitive willing. The cognitive processitself is an activity, a deed. I not only feel the value of the cognition to be realized and joy in the realized one, but in the realizing itself I also feel that strength and power we found in other willing and action. Thus u'e have sketched the constitution of personality in outline. We have found it to be a unity entirely based in experience and further distinguished by its subordination to rational laws. Person and world (more exactly, value world) were found to be completely correlated. An indication of this correlation is sufficient for our purposes. Hence, it follou's that it is impossible to formulate a doctrine of the person (for n'hich we naturally take no responsibility here) u'ithout a value doctrine, and that the person can be obtained from such a value doctrine. The ideal person u'ith all his values in a suitable hierarchy and having adequate f'eelings would correspond to the entire realm of value levels. Other personal types would result from the abolition of certain value ranges or from the modification of the value hierarchy and, further, from differencesin the intensity of value experiencesor from pre{'erring one of the several forms of expression, such as bodily expression, willing, action, etc. Perhaps the formulation of a doctrine of types would provide the ontological intended by Dilthey's efforts. fbundation of the cultural sciences

Now u'e still must determine how the foreign person's constitution is in contrast with our own and, furthermore, how the person is distinguished from the psycho-physicalindividual with whose constitution we were occupied earlier. After all the previous investigations, the first task no longer seems to offer any great difficulties. As my own person is consrirured in primordial spiritual acts, so the foreign person is consriruted in empathically experienced acts. I experience his every action as proceeding from a will and this, in turn, fiom a feeling. Simultaneouslywith this, I am given a level of his person and a range of values in 'I'his, principle experienceableby him. in rurn, meaningfully motivates the expectation of future possible volitions and actions. Accordingly, a single action and also a single bodily expression, such as a look or a laugh, can give me a glimpse into the kernel of the person. Further questioltsarising here can be answered when u'e have discussed the relationship between "soul" and "person." 5. Soul and Person We saw persistent attributes in both the soul and the person. But qualities of the soul are constituted for inner perception and tor empathy when they make experiences into objects. By contrast, persons are revealed in original experiencing or in em-I-his pathic projection. is so even if we still need a specialturning of'the glance in order to make the "awareness" into a comprehension, as in these experiences themselves.There are characteristics (or "dispositions") only in principle perceivable and not 'l'his experienceable. is true of the memory announced for the comprehending glance in my recollecrions.'I'hese are rhus psy<:hic in a specific sense. Naturally, personal attributes, such as goodness,readinessto make sacrifices, the energy I experience in my activities, also become psychic when they are perceived in a psycho-physical individual. But they are also conceivable as :rttributesof a purely spiritual subject and continue to retain their -I'hey ()wn nature in the context ()f'psycho-physical organization. rer.'ealtheir special position by standing outside of the causal r>rder.We found the soul u'ith its experiencesand all its charac-

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to teristic:s be dependent on all kinds ol circumstancesthat could be influenced by one another as u'ell as by the states and the character of the living body. Finally, we found it incorporated 'l'he indiviclinto the whole order of'physical ancl psychic reality. d u a l w i t h a l l h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s e v e l o p su n d e r t h e c o n s t a n t i m has such a nature of'such influences so that this persor-r pressi<ln becausehe was exposed t<lsuch and such influences.Under other 'I'here is circunrstanceshe would have developed differently. s o m e t h i n ge m p i r i c a l l yf o r t u i t o u s i n t h i s " n a t u r e . " O n e c a n c o n ceive of it as modified in many ways. But this variabilin is not unlimited: there are limits here. We find not only that the categorical structure of the soul as soul must be retained, but also within its individual form u'e strike an unchangeable kernel, the pers<lnalstructure' I can think of Caesarin a village instead t>f in R<lmeand can think of him transf'erred into the twentieth century. Certainly, his historically settled individuality would then go through some changes, but just as surely he rvould remain Caesar.The personal strtlcture o marks off a range of possibilities f'r'ariation within which the can be developed "ever according to pers()n'sreal distinctiveness circumstances." As we said earlier, capacitiesof the soul can be cultivated by use and can also be dulled. I can be "trained" by practice to en-ioyworks of'art, and the enjoyrnent.can also be ruined by frequent repetition. But only because of my psychophysical organization am I subject to the "power of'habit." A purely spiritual subiect f'eelsa value and experiencesthe correla t i v e l e v e l o f i t s n a t u r e i r r i t . T h i s e m ( ) t i ( ) nc a l l b e c o m e n e i t h e r deeper nor less deep. A value inaccessibleto it remairls so. A does not lose a value it feels' Neither can a psyspiritual sub.ject individual be led by habit to a value firr which he cho-phy'sical l a c k st h e c o r r e l a t i v e l e v e l . l ' h e l e v e l so 1 ' t h e p e r s o n d o n < l t " d e velop" or "deteriorate," but they can only be cxposed or not in the cottrse of psychic development'I-his goes for "irttersubiective" as u'ell as f<rr"itttrasLrbiective" causality.The person as such is not sub.jectt() the contagicln of l f e e l i n g . R a t h e r ,t h i s v e i l st h e t r u e c o n t e n t o f p e r s < l n a l i t y . ' l ' h e i f e in n'hich an irrdividual grrlws uP can breed in him a circumstances g d i s t a s t ef i > r c e r t a i r t a c t i o n s l t o t c o t t f c > r n l i r l t o a r l y t l r i g i r i a l p e r -

sonal attribute, so that it can be removed by other "influences." An instance is authoritative moral education. If he who has been educated in "moral principles" and who behaves according to them looks "into himself." he will oerceive rvith satisfaction a "virtuous" man. This is true until one day, in an action bursting fbrth from deep inside of him, he experienceshimself as someone o{'an entirely different nature from the person he thought him- <124> self to be until then. One can only speak of a person developing under the influence of the circumstancesof lif-eor of a "signilicance of the milieu for the character," as Dilthey also says,r32 inso[ar as the real environment is the object of'his value experiencir.rg and determines which levelsare exposed and which possible actions become actual. So the psycho-physical ernpirical person can be a more or less complete realization of the spiritual one. It is conceivable for a man's life to be a complete processof his personality'sunfolding; but it is also possible that psycho-physical development does not permit a complete unfolding, and, in fact, in different n'ays. He rvho dies in childhood or falls victim of a paralysiscannot unfold " h i m s e l f ' c o m p l c t e l y . A n e m p i r i c a lc o n t i n g e n t i vt.h e r v e a k n e so l s the organism, destroys the meaning of life (if we seethe meaning of'life to be this r-rnfoldingof the person). On the other hand, a stronger orp;anismcontinues to support life when its nreaning is already fulfilled and the person has completely developed himself. The incompletenessis here similar to the fragmentan'character of a rvork of art of which a part is finished and only the raw material for the rest is preserved. A def'ectiveunfolding is also possible in a sound organism. He rvho never meets a person worthy of love or hate can never experience the depths in which -I-o lclve and hate are rooted. him who has never seen a work of art nor gone beyond the rvallsof the city may perhaps fbrever be closed the enjoyment of nature and art together u'ith his susceptibility for this enjovment. Such an "incomplete" person is similar to an unfinished sketch. Finally, it is also cor.rceivable {or the personality not to unfold at all. He u'ho does not feel values himself but acquires all feelings onlv through contagiort from others, cannot erperience "himself." He can become, not a personality, but at most a phantom ol'one.

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Only in the last casecan we say that there is no spiritual person present. In all other casesr+'emust not put the person's nonunfblding on a par with his non-existence. Rather, the spiritual person also exists even if he is not unfolded. As the realization of individual can be called the spiritual person, the psycho-physical the "empirical person." As "nature" he is subject to the laws of causality,as "spirit" to the lal's of meaning. Also that meaningful context of psychic attributes of $'hich we spoke earlier, by virtue of of which the comprehensior-r one attribute reasonably motivates progress to the other, is his only as a personal one. Finest sensitivity to ethical values and a u'ill leaving them completely unheeded and only allowing itself to be guided by sensualmotives do not go together in the unity of a meaning, are unintelligible. And so an action also bids for understanding. It is not merely to be carried out empathically as a single experience, but experienced as proceeding meaningfully from the total structure of the person.l33 6. The Existence of the Spirit Simmel has said that the intelligibility of charactersvouchesfbr " t h e i r o b j e c t i v i t y ,t h a t i t c o n s t i t u t e s h i s t o r i c a lt r u t h . " T o b e s u r e , he does n()t distinguish this truth from poetic truth. A creature of the free imap;inationcan also be an intelligible person. Moreover, h i s t r > r i c ao b j e c t sm u s t b e r e a l . S o m e k i n d o f p o i n t o f d e p i r r t u r e , l such as a trait of the historical character, must be given to me itr order to demonstratc the meaninp;context the object reveals to r>f me as an historical {act. But rf I get possession it, in whatever fflanner, I have an existil.rgproduct attcl not a merely thntasized o n e . I n e m p a t h i cc o m p r e h e n s i o no f ' t h e f o r e i g n s p i r i t u a l i n d i v i d ual, I also have the possibilrtyof bringing his unverified behavior . t < l g i v e n n e s su n d e r c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s S u c h a c t i o n i s d e nranded bv his pers<lnalstruct.ureof rlhich I knou'. If he should actually act differenrly, disturbing influences of psychophysical o r g a n i z a t i o n h a v e h i n d e r e d h i s p e r s o n f r o m b e i n g f r e e l , vl i v e d
ollt.

IDasein),and I may not deliver it as a factual statement. But the mere fhctual statement alone is even less"true historically." The most exact statement of'all that Frederick the Great did from the day of his birth up to his last breath does not give us a glimmer of the spirit which, transfbrming,reached into the history of Europe. Yet the understanding glance may seize upon this in a 'fhe chance remark in a short letter. mere concatenation of f'acts m a k e sa m e a n i n g f u l o c c u r r e n c ei n t o a b l i n d o c c u r r e n c ec a u s a l l y ruled. It neglects the world of the spirit that is no less real or knowable than the natural world. Becauseman belongs to both realms,the history of'mankind must take both into consideration. I t s h o u l d u n d e r s t a n dt h e { i r r m s o f t h e s p i r i t a n d o f s p i r i t u a l l i l - e and ascertain how much has become reality. And it can call on natural science to help explain what did not happen and what h a p p e n e dd i f f e r e n t l y t h a n t h e l a w s o f t h e s p i r i t d e m a n d e d . r 3 { 7. Discussion in Terms of Dilthey (a) The Being and llalue of the Person We have already stressedhou' much our interpretation is like D i l t h e v ' s .E v e n t h o u g h h e h a s n ( ) t m a d e t h e d i s t i n c t i o r .i r p r i n c i n ple between nature and spirit, he also recognizes the rational lawfulnessof spiritual life. He expressesit by saying that being and ought, fhct and norm, are inseparably linked together in the c u l t u r a l s c i e n c e s . i :Ii'ih e r e l a t i o n s h i p s f l i f e a r e u n i t i e s o f ' v a l u e ' o bearing the standardof their estimationin themselves. ut we <127> B m u s t s t i l l d i s t i n g u i s hb e t w e e nr a t i o n a l l a w fu l n e s s n d v a l u e .S p i r i a tual act.s are experientially'bound ilrt() c()ntextsof a definite ieneral lirrm. Peclplecan bring these fbrms to givennessto themselvesby a reflective standpoint and utter them in theoretical propositions. Such propositions cirn als<lbe turned into equivalent pr<lpositions f ought. J'hanks to this forrnal lawfulrress, o spiritual acts are subject to the estimation of "true" or "false." F o r e x a m p l e ,t h e r e i s t h e e x p e r i e n c e du n i t y 'o f a n a c t i o l t w h e n a 'fhis v a l r r i n gm ( ) t i i ' a t e s v o l i t i o r r . a i s c o r r v e r t e di n t o p r a c t i c e a s s ( ) o n l t s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y< l f r e a l i z a t i < l n s g i v e n . F o r m u l a t e d a s a i theoretical prol>osition,rr'ehave here the general rational lau': He

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a B u t s i n c es u c hd i s t u r b i n gi n { l u e n c e s r e p o s s i b l et,h i s s t a t r m e n t a h a s t h e c h a r a c t e r r > f 'a n a s s e r t i < t n b o u t e m p i r i c a l e x i s t e n c e

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a rr'ho f'eels value and can realize it, does so. In normative terms: If' \ . o u f l e e la v a l u e a n d c a n r e a l i z e i t , t h e n d o i t ' r 3 { i E v e r y ' a c t i t > n confornting to this larv is rational or right. However, this determines nothing about the material value of the action; we only h a v e t h e f o r m a l c o n d i t i o n s o f a v a l u a b l ea c t i o n . R a t i o n a l l a w s m t h a v e n r > t h i n g o s a va b o u t t h e a c t i ( ) l l ' s a t e r i a l v a l u e .T h i s m a k e s the rntelligible structures of experience into objects of a possible valuing, too, but these have not so {'ar been constituted in em(except for the particular pathic comprehension as value ob-iects of our orvn value which we class ol unreflected experiences noted).r'r; of (b) Personal Typesand the Conditionsof the Possibility Empathl With Persons As we saw,Dilthey I'urther cotttends that personalitieshave an structure of a typical character. We also agree with experier.rtial t a o in this.Because [ the c<trrelation mong values, he experihim t o f v a l u e ,a n d t h e l e v e l so f t h e p e r s o n ,a l l p o s s i b l e y p e so f encing personscan be establisheda priori from the standpoint of'a universal recognitiorr of worth. Empirical personsare realizationsof t h e s en p e s . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , e v e r y e m p a t h i c c o m p r e h e n s i o n 'E n y o f a p e r s < l n a l i t m e a n s t h e a c q r . r i s i t i oo f s t r c ha t y p e . r Now, in Dilthey and others we find the view that the intelligibili t y o f f o r e i g n i n d i v i d u a l i t yi s b o u n d t o o u r o w n i n d i v i d u a l i t y ,t h a t limits the range t>l'$'hatis ltrr us intelliour experiential structr.rre e g i b l e . O n a h i g h e r l e v c l ,t h i s i s t h e r e p e t i t i o r lo f p o s s i b l e m p a t h i c in deception that we have sh<>wn the constitution o{'the psychophysicalindividual. However, we have not demonstrated that this o b e l o n g st o t h e e s s e n c e f e m p a t h v o r s a i d t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l O f g c h a r a c t e ri s m a d e t h e b a s i s o r e x p e r i e n c i r . r< l t h e ri n d i v i d u a l s . f course, ttl the case tlf the psychophysical individual, we c<luld assert that the typical character was the basis fclr "analogizing" r a t h e r t h a n t h e i n d i v i d u a l r t n e . W h a t c a t t \ \ ' ed o a b o u t t h i s h e r e where every single pers()Il is already hirnself a type? N o n , t y p e sh a v e v a r i o u sl e v e l so f ' g e l t e r a l i t yi n t h e r e a l m < l f t h e g s p i r i tj r r s ta s i n t h e n a t u r a l r e a l m . I n n a t u r e t h e m < l s t e t l e r a lt y p e ,

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t h e " l i v i n g o r g a n i s m , " m a r k e d o f f t h e r a n g e o f ' e m p a t h i cp o s s i b i l -I-he ities. deeper we descended,the greirter becante the number o f t y ' p i c a p h e n o m e n a< l r g a n i s m s a d i n c ( ) m m ( ) n .I t i s n o t m u c h l h 'I'he different here. individual experiential structure is an "eidetic singularity," rhe lowest differentiation of superimposed r g e n e r a lt r p e s . A g e , s e x .( ) c c u p a t i o r s .t ; r l i o n . a t i o r r a l i t y , e n e n t n g t i o n a r e t h e k i n d o f g e n e r a l e x p e r i e n t i a ls t r u c t u r e st o w h i c h t h e i n d i v i c l u a li s s u b o r d i n a t e .S o , a m o n g o t h e r t h i n g s , t h e G r e t c h e n t y p e r e p r e s e n t st h e t y p e o f ' t h e G e r m a n c ( ) u n t r y g i r l o f - t h e s i x t e e n t h c e n t u r y , i . e . , t h e i n d i v i d u a l t y p e i s c o n s t i r u t e dt h r o u g h i t s "participation" in the more generalone. And the topmost type m a r k i n g o f f t h e r a n g e o f ' t h e i n t e l l i g i t r l ei s t h a t o f ' t h e s p i r i t u a l persolr ()r the value experieDcing sub-ject general. i[r I c o n s i d e re v e r v s u b j e c t n , h o m I e m p a t h i c a l l yc o m p r e h e n d i r s experiencing a value as a person rr'hose experiences interlock t h e m s e l v e sn t o a l l i n t e l l i g i b l e ,m e a n i n g f u l u ' h o l e . H o w m u c h o f i his experientialstructure I can bring to my fulfilling intuition d e p e n d so n m y o w l t s t r u c t u r e .I n p r i n c i p l e ,a l l f o r e i g n e x p e r i e n c e permitting itself to be derived fir>m my ()wn pers()nal tructure <129> s can be fulfilled, even if this structure has not yet actualll unfblded. I can experience valrres empathically and disc<tver correla t i v e l e r . e l s f m y p e r s o n ,e v e l t t h o u g h m v p r i m o r d i a l e x p e r i e n c e o has rtot yet presented an opp<lrtunitv filr their exposure. He rvho has never looked a danger in the f'acehimself can still experience h i m s e l f a s b r a v e o r c o w a r d l y i n t h e e m p a t h i c r e p r e s e n t a t i o ro 1 ' r a n o t h e r ' ss i t u a t i o n . B ! c o n t r a s t ,I c a n n o t l i r l f i l l w h a t c < l n f l i c t s i t h r n y o w n e x p e r i w e n t i a l s t r u c t u r e . B u t I c a n s t i l l h a r . , et g i v e n i n t h e m a n n e r o f i e m p t y p r e s e n t a t i o l t I c a n b e s k e p t i c a ln t y s e l fa n d s t i l l u n d e r s t a n c l . t h a t a n o t h e r s a c r i f i c e s l l h i s e a r t h l y g o o d s t o h i s f i r i r l ' r I s e eh i m a . b e h a v e i n t h i s u ' a y a n c l e r n p a t h i z ea v a l u e e x p e r i e n c i n g a s t h e m ( ) t i v e f < l r h i s c < l r r c l u c t . ' l ' h e o r r e l a t e o f t h i s i s n o t a c c e s s i b l e< r c t me, causing me t() ascribe to him a personal level I clo n()t m),self' p ( ) s s e s sr.r t h i s w a v l e m p a t h t c a l l v a i n t h e t v p e o 1 ' h o m oe l i g i o s u . s I g r b l n a t u r e i i r r e i g r rt ( ) m e , a n c l I u n c l c r - s t a n id e v e n t h ( ) u g h r v h a t t n c r , r ' l lc o n f i o n t s m e h e r e r r ' i l la l u , a y sr e m a i n u n f u l h l l e d . A g a i n , s u p p ( ) s e t h e r s r e g u l a t e t h e i r l i v e s e n t i r e l y b y t h e a c q u i s i t i o no f o

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material goods, allon'ing everything else to take second place, w h i c h I c o n s i d e ru n i m p o r r a n t . ' I ' h e n I s e e t h a t h i g h e r r a n g e so f value that I glimpse are closeclto them; and I also understand these people, even though they are of a different type. N<xv we see what .justification Dilthey has for saying, "-I'he i r r t e r p r e t i v e a c u l t l ' o p e r a t i n gi n t h e c u l t r r r a ls c i e n c e ss r h e r v h o l e f i person." Only he who experienceshimself as a person, as a meaningful rvhole,can understand <lther persons.And we also seewhy R a n k e * ' ' ' l d h a ' e l i k e d t o " e r a s e " h i s s e l f i n r > r d e rt . s e et h i n g s "as they were." 'I'he "self is the individual experientialstructure. The great master of those who kn<tw recognizes in it the source of deception fr<>ntwhich danger threatens us. If u,e take the self as rhe standard, we l<tckourselvesinto the prison of our individuality. Others become riddles for us, or still \\,()rse,we r e m o d e l t h e m i n t o o u r i m a g e a n d s o f a l s i f ' y i s t < l r i c atlr u t h . r 3 l ) h 8. The Significance of Empathy for the Constitution of Our Own Person We also see the significanceof knowledge of f<rreignpersonali t y f o r " k n o w l e d g e o f s e l f i n r v h a t h a s b e e n s a i d .W e n o t o n l y Iearn to make us <lurselvesint<l <lbjects,as earlier, but through e m p a t h y u ' i t h " r e l a t e d n a t u r e s , " i . e . ,p e r s o n so f o u r t y p e , u , h a t i s "sleeping" in us is developed. By empathv with differenrlv composed personal structures we become clear ort rvhat \4,e are n()t, u'hat u,e are more <tr less than others. 'fhus, together with self k n < l w l e d g ew e a l s oh a v e a n i m p o r t a n t a i d t o s e l fe i , a l u a t i o n S i n c e , . t h e e x p e r i e n c eo f ' r , a l u ei s b a s i ctlo ( ) u r o r r ' nv a l u e ,a t t h e s a m et i m e as nerv valuesare acquired by empathy, our o\\,n r_rnfamiliar values becomc visible. Wherr \\'e empathically run inro ranges of value closed to us, we become consciousof our own cleficiencl or disr.'alue. Every compreherrsi<ln different personscan become the of b a s i s l { ' a n n d e r s t a n d i n go f v a l u e .S i r r c e i,n t h e a c t o f ' p r e f - e r e n c e < u o r d i s r e g a r d ,v a l r r e s f i e n c o m e t o g i v e r r n e s sh a t r e m a i n u n n ( ) o t ticed in themselves, learn to assess u'e ourselvesc<lrrectlyn<tu,and then. We learn to see that we experietrce ourselves as having rn()re or lessvalue in t'r>ntparison u,ith ()thers.

9. The Question of the Spirit Being Based on the Physical Body We have one m()re important question yet to discuss.We came individual. In to the spiritual person through the psycho-physical w constituting the ilrdividr"ral, e ran into the spirit. We moved freely irr the context of spiritual life without recourse to c()rpore- < l3l > ality. Once having penetrated into this labyrinth, \.\'efound our w a y b y t h e g u i d e l i n eo f " r n e a n i n g , " b u t w e h a v e s o f a r n o t f o u n d other entrance than the one we used, the sensuallyperceivar.ry a b l e e x p r e s s i o ni n t o u n t e n a n c e s . t c . o r i n a c t i o n s . e I s i t e s s e n t i a l l ' y ' n e c e s s atrh a t s p i r i t c a n o n l y e n t e r i n t o e x y c h a n g e w i t h s p i r i t t h r o u g h t h e m e d i u m o f c o r p o r e a l i t y ?l , a s individual, actually obtain information about the psycho-physical s p i r i t u a l l i { ' e o f o t h e r i n d i v i d u a l si n n o o t h e r w a y . O f ' c o u r s e , I k n o w o [ m a n y i n d i v i d u a l s ,l i v i n g a n d d e a d , w h o m I h a v e n e v e r seen. But I know this from others whom I see or through the medium of their works which I sensuallyperceive and which they by have pr<-rduced virtue of their psycho-physicalorgarrization. meet the spirit o{'the past in various forms but alwaysbound We 'I'his is the written or printed word or the word to a physicalbody. hewed into stone-the spatial f<rrm become stone or metal. But does nclt live communion unite me with contemporary spirits and tradition unite me immediately with spirits of the past without bodily mediation? Certainly I feel rnyself to be r-rner.r,ithothers and allow their emotions to become motives for my willing. However, this does not give me the others, but already presupposes (And I consider as my ()wn that which penetrates their giverrness. into me from others, living or dead, without my knowing it. This no establishes exchange of spirits.) But now how is it with purelr spiritual personsthe idea of whom certainly contains no contradiction in itselP Is no exThere have been people who change between them conceivable? thought that in a sudden change oftheir person theyexperienced the effect of the grace of God, others who felt themselvesto be guided in their conduct by a protective spirit. (We do not have to think just of Socrates' 6atp6unu,which certainly should not be

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taken so literally.) Who can say whether there is genuine experience present here or whether there is that unclearnessabout our own motives rvhich u'e found in considering the "idols of self knowledge"? But is not the essential possibilityof genuine experience in this area already given with the delusionsof such experience?Nevertheless,the study of religious consciousness seemsto m e t o b e t h e m o s t a p p r o p r i a t em e a n so f a n s u ' e r i n g u r q u e s t i o n , o just as, on the other hand, its answer is of most interest for the domain of religion. However, I leave the answering of this question to f urther investigation and satisfymyself here u'ith a "non liquet." "lt is not clear."

PersonalBiography
E d i t h S t e i n , r t , a s o r n o n O c t o b e r 1 2 , l 8 9 l i n B r e s l a u ,t h e b f I, daughter of the deceasedmerchant Siegfried Stein and his wif'e Auguste, n6e Courant. I am a Prussian citizen and Jewish. Frorr.rOctober 1897 to Easter 1906 I lvent ro the \riktoriaschule (municipal lyceum) in Breslau, and from Easter 1908 to Easter l9ll to the Breslau Girls' Secondarv School [Studienanstalt reaLgymnasiaLer Richtungl affiliated wirh it. Here I passed my s c h o o l c e r t i f i c a t ee x a m i n a t i o n . I n O c r o b e r l 9 l 5 I o b t a i n e d t h e leaving certificate of a humanistic gymnasium by taking a supplementary examination in Greek at Johannes Gymnasium in Breslau. From Easrer l9l I to Easter l9 t 3 I studied philosophy,psychology, history and German philology ar rhe University of Breslau, then for fbur more semestersat the University rrf Gcittingen. In pro January l9l5 I passed the Staatsexamen farultate doiendi in philosophical propaedeutics,historf, and German. At the end of this semester, I interrupted my studies and was for a time engaged in the serviceof the Red Cross. From February to October l9l6 I replaced an indisposed secondary school reacher ar tl-re above mentioned Girls' Secondary School in Breslau. 'fhen I moved to Freiburg in Br. in order to work as ProfessorFlusserl's assistant. At this time I would to extend my sincere thzrnks all those to who have offered me stimulatiorr and challenge during my srudent days, but above all, to those of'my teachersand student associates through whom an approach to phenomenologicalphilosophy was opened to me: to Professor Husserl, Dr. Reinach, and the Gdttingen PhilosophicaSocietv. l I l9

Notes
l. English translation: Phenomenologl of Perception, trans. by Colin 'fhe Smith (Nen'York: Humanities Press, 1962). 2. English translation: The Nature of Sympathy,trans. by Peter Heath (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954). 3. Edmund Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenologl, trans. by W. R. Boyce Gibson (second edition; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952). References in brackets are to the sectionsin this edition to which E. Stein seemsto be referring. 1. Cf. Ideas, op. cit., Section 60. 5. Cf. p. 23 of the original; p. 22 this ed. 6. Cf. p. l0 of the original; p. I I this ed. 7. cf. p. l0 of the original;p. 10 this ed. 8. Cf. p. 46 of the original; p. 44 this ed. 9. Cf. p. 46 of the original; p. 42 this ed. 10. Cf. p.47 of the original;p. 43 this ed. I l. Cf. p. 44 of the original; p. 40 this ed. 12. Cf . p. 46 of the original; p. 43 this ed. 13. Loc. cit. 14. Cf. p. 48 of the original; p. 44 this ed. 15. Cf. p. 7l of the original;p. 63 this ed. 16. Cf. p. 95 of the original; p. 84 this ed. 1 7 . C f . p . 1 0 8 o f t h e o r i g i n a l ;p . 9 7 t h i s e d . 18. Cf. p. 83 of the original;p. 73 this ed. 19. Cf. note 3. 20. I cannot hope in a fen'short words to make the goal and method of phenomenology completely clear to anyone who is not familiar n'ith it, but must refer all questions arising to Husserl's basic work, the Ideen. 'I'he use of the term "primordiality" for the act side of experience 21. may attract attention. I employ it becauseI believe that it has the same character as one attributes to its correlate. I intentionally suppressmy usual expression, "actual experience," because I need it fbr another

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phenomenon and wish to avoid equivocation. (This othcr phenomenott is "act" in the specific sense of experience in the fr>rm of "cogito," of "bein g-turned-torvard. ") 22. Of course, going over past expericnces usually is an "abr-6g6" of the original course of experience.(In a feu'minutcs I can recapitulatethe vears.) This phenomerron itself merits an investigation of its "t :::;tt 23. On the concept o[ neutralization, ci. Husserl's Ideen, p. 222ff. [Section109] 24. It has been stressedrepeatedlv that the "objectification" of the ernpathizedexperience, in contrast rvith my <-rwn experience,is a part of the irrterpretation of foreign experience, for example, by Desoir (Beitriige, p. a77). On the other hand, when [F. A.] Lange (\l'esender Kunst, p. 139 tr.) distinguishesbetween the "subjective illusion of motion," or the motion we intend to perform when faced with an object, and the "object," or the motion we ascribe to the object (perhaps a presented horseman), these are not t\\'o independent vieu'points on u'hich cornpletelyopposing theories could be built (an aestheticof ernpathy and one of illusion) but are f he two phasesor forms in u'hich empzrthv can be accomplishedas u'e have described them. 25. [B.lGroethuysen has designated such feeling related to the f'eelirrgs of others as "f'ellorv feeling" (Das Mitgef)hl, p. 233). Our use of "fellon' feeling," not directed to$'ard foreign f'eelings but toq'ard their correlate, must be strictlv distinguishedfrom his usage.In fellow feeling I am not.joyful over the joy of the other but over that over which he is i o v fu l . ' io. UOt, Annahmen,p. 233tr. after) 27. Scheler interprets the understanding of in- (or, as he say's, f eeling (empathl') and fellorv feelirrg in the same \ra\. Srmpathiegefuhle, p. 4f. IEnglish translation, The Nature of Sympathy, London: Peter Heath, l 9541 28. Scheler clearly emphasizesthe phenomenon that different people can have strictly the same f'eeling (Slmpathiegefi)hle, pp.9 and 31) and stresses that the various subjectsare thereby retained. However, he does not consider that the unified :rct does not have the plurality of the individuals Ibr its subject, but a higher unitl.based on thenr. 29. Das \lesen und die Bedeutungder Linfuhlung, p. 33tr. AnaLyse Anschauung. 30. Zur psychologischen d.erasthetischen investigationhere does rlot nrean an inr esti31. Genetic-psychological gation of the developmental stagesof the psvchic individual. Rather, the

stageso1' ps-vchicdevelopment (the types of chikl, youth, etc.) are in-Iir us genetic psychologyand psycholcluded in descriptive psychology. ogy which explains causallyare synonymous.On the orientation of psycf. chology to the concept of cause in exact natural scietrce, p. 5 1 in the follorving. We distinguish betu'een the two questions:(l) What pst'chrtlogical mechanism functions in the experience of empathy?(2) How has the individual acquired this mechanismin the courseof his development? In the genetic theories under discussionthis distinction is not alrvavs strictlv made. p. 32. Scheler criticizes the theory of imitation (Slmpathiegefuhle, 6tr.) a He takes exception to it as fbllou,s:(l) Imitation presupposes comprehencling expression as expression,exactly rvhat it is to explairr. (2) We also understand expressionsthat we cannot imitate, fbr exarnple, the expressivenlovements of animals.(3) \4Iecomprehend the inadequacyof an expression, an impossibility if the comprehension occurred by an imitation of the expression alone. (4) \,Vealso understand experiences unfamiliar to us from our o\\'n earlier experience (fbr example, ntortal 'fhis terror). would be impossible if understanding n'ere the repnrduction of our own earlier experiencesaroused bf imitation. These are all objections dilfrcult to refute. 33. For a detailed analysis of the contagion of feeling, see Scheler 'fhe (Slmpathiegefi)hle, 11tr). p. only divergence from our view is the contention that the contagion of feelinp;presupposesno knowledge of the {breign experience at all. could investigatewhich of these 34. A discussionof "mass suigesti()n" two (empathl or wmpathl) is present and to what extent. 35. Scheler raises the point that, in contrast rvith after-f-eeling(our empathy), svmpathy catr be based on rernaining in ml orvtt reproduced (Stmpathieexperiencesthat prevents genuine svmpathv from prevailing,. p.2a{'.) Ctfrhk, in 36. Bieseexagpierates the opposite direction by asserting,"All associations rest.on our abilitv and cornpulsion to relate everything to us to human beings . . . , to suit the ob-iect ourselvesin bqdy and soul." (Das und der Anthropomorphismus der Asthetik.) in Assoziationsprinzip 37. On the intelligibility of expressions,see Part III of this l'ork, S e c t i o r7 . l c t t e r l . p . 7 5 . r 38. Cf. Part IlI, p. 58. ' ' S v m b o l b e g r i f f .. . , " p . 7 6 f i ' . 39. Begriindung, p. 1Otr. lllusion und ihre pnchologische 40. Die iisthetische .1l For example, one of the ob.iections raised againstthis theory is that

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it sals nothing of u'herein this analogy of our own to the foreign body shall consist,the basisof the inference. Only in [G. T.]Fechner do I find p. a sericrusattempt to ascertain this. Zur Seelenfrage, 49f. and p. 63. 42. On the sensein which analogiesare justified, see Part III, p. 59. 43. See especially the appendix to Sympathiegefuhle. 44. Cf . Slmpathiegefihle,p. 124ff. Idole, p. 31. 45. Idole, p. 52. 46. Idole, p. 42tr. 4 7 . C f . I d o l e ,p . 1 b 3 . p. 18. Resentiment. 421. 4 9 . I d o l e ,p . 6 3 , I 1 8 t r 5 0 . I d o l e ,p . l l 4 f . p. 51. IdoLe, 45ff., Philos.d. Lebens, 173 and 215. A discussion p. here of of rvith Husserl's, his r:r>ncept act, which apparentli- does not coir-rcide lvould take us t<lo far. 52. Idole, p. 7lf. (note). 53. On the nature of reflection, seeparticularly Ideen,p.72tr. ISection

381
p. 54. IdoLe, I l2{'. 55. I also think that Scheler is inexact n'hen he sometimescallsthe false estimation of my experience and of myself that can be based on this deception, a deception of perception. 'fhe 56. There are differenceshere, ofcourse. non-actuallyperceived feeling, in contrast with the feeling not perceived, certainly is perceived and is an object. On the contrarv, feeling has the privilege of remaining consciousin a certain manner even when it is not perceived or comprehended, so that one "is au'are of" his feelings. Geiger has precisely analyzed this special manner in which feelings exist in Beuusstsein aon Cefihlen, p. 15Ztr 57. Idole, p. 137tr. 58. Idole, p. 1.14ff. 59. Idole,p.130f. 60. Idole, p. 7 5. 6I. [H.l Bergson orients himself to this duration of experiences by sayingthat the past is preserved.All that we experienced endures on into the present, even if only a part of it is currently conscious.(Eaolution cr?atrice,p. 5) lCreatiueEaolution, Neu' Ycrrk: Henrv Holt and Company, l9l ll 'fhese levelsof'simple noticing, qualitative noticing, and analyzing 62. observation onty apply to inner perccptiorr and not to reflection, as Geiger savsin the work cited.

63. Scheler himself stresses the representationalcharacter of comprehended fcrreig'experiences (sympathiegef)hre,p. b),but does r-ror.,rr-,,,"rn himself with it further and does not return to ii at the crucial point (in thc appendix). 64. It is easy ro see thar this is precluded in principle. 65. Corrrpare [K.J osrerrei ch, phiinomenologxedei lch, p. 122f. with ()ntersurhungen p. 359tr. Husserl, Logisrhe II, 66. I believe that this explains the experience of the "person going two ways." For example, in his well-known poem, Heine strolls io rrl uelo'ed's house and sees himself standing befbre the door. This is thc double way of having oneself given in mimory or fantasy.Later we shail c o n s i d e rt o w h a r e x r e n ra " s e l f " - h a ' i n g i s a c t u a l l yp r e s e n ti n e i t h e r c a s e . Cf'. Part II of this work, p. l0 and p. 63 followins. 6 7 . N a r u * r l l y ,* e s h r u l d f r r r do u i u h a t k i n d o i " t " , h i , c o u r d b e a r r d whether a world, and what kind of one, could be given to it. 68. whether a consciousness only exhibiting ."nio.y data and no acrs of.the "I" could be regarded "I"-less courd ceriainty stitt ne pondered. In this case,we could also speak of an "animateci" bui "I"-lesi living body. But I do not believe such an interpretation possible . 69. The expositions in the follou,ing parr will clarify this point. 70. For more on causality,cf. below, p. 71. 71. In order to prevent misunderstanding, I want.to emphasize that r take "expressio." in the above sense and 'erbar lor some"*pr.rrtn t h i n g f u n d a m e n t a l l ld i f f e r e n r .A r t h i s p o i n t r c a n n o r g o i n t o r h e d i f f e r ence but want to call atte'tion to it at the outset to uuoid equivocation. 72. wt do not need to consider here whether expressivemovemenrs are presented as originally purposeful actions, as Darrn,int.hi.ks, or as un.onscious and purposeless,as Klages supposes.(Die Ausd,rucksbewegung und ihre diagnostische l/enttertung, 293) At all events, Klages ulro ,t.Ir..i p. the high correlation betu'een the appearance of expressi-onand action. He.saysall naive doing and achieving proceeds fromexperience as easily and as involuntarily as expressivemovements. He considers this instinctive form of action to be the original one, first graduailv suppressedby volition. (p. 366) In his famous treatise "Uber den Ausdruck der Gemiitsbewegungen', Darrvin describes bodily appeara'ces that correspond to certaii uff".,., basing his description on acute observation. Then he seeksto exnound the psycho-physical mechanism bv which these boclily p.o..r.., o..u.. He neither considersthe descriptive difference benveen expression and the appearanceof accompaniment, nor does he seriouslyaik how these processesare the expressions of the affect they evoke.

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ior Jrlr"t<l'i,irrro p 56), nan'rely, hold t<r not haue*'l'tatwe specificallv .'; ;; inner life' But here we do
e exprt:ssion: its mottvatton'

4 J. - , tl= ' t C 'o.h-n u s e s t h e t e r m . . e x p r e s s i o n ' ' i n y e t a n o t h e r a n d s t i l l l r r o a d e r ., , ^ , - - ^ r - . r ^ * everything "outer" in rvhich lve Per^,,^-.,r},in- "n'rter" in rvhich we Der-

35] d ' Z i . ' C t . H u s s e r l 'ls e e n , p . 6 6 I S e c t i o n

76. Ir may ,".-

consider physical bodies and their movements "as il-' thel *'ere livin5l bodies. This empathizing of'movement in the physical body plays a big role in the literature on aestheticemDathv. 91. E,veIr plants do not possess voluntary m()vemetlts of'atrimals, if the they still essentially possess the phenomenon of grorvth so that they are comprised of not merely mechanical movement. Ir-r addition, thev evidence heliotropisr-r-r other alive movetnents. and 92. Sympathiegef)hle, L2l. p. 9 3 . C e r t a i r r p h e n o m c n a c o m e t ' l o s e t o a c k n o r r ' l e d g i n gs e n s i t i v i t vt r , light and possiblya certain sensitivityto touch in plants, but I would like to reserve.judgmenton this. 9 4 . T h i s r t o t t l d m a k e p h e r t o m e n ao f l i [ e c o n c e i r a b l e a s n o n - p s r c h i c and plants conceivableas soullessliving organisms. 95. Philosophie Lebens,p. 172tr. des 96. Cf. Philosophie Lebens. des 9 7 . " C a u s a l i t y "h e r e d e s i g n a t e sh e r e l a t i o n s h i po f d e p e r r d e n ( c i n t u t itively comprehended and not the relationship determinable exactly physicalll'. 98. On the question of causality,cf. above, p. 2l . 99. Cf. Idole, p. 124f.; Philosophie Lebens, 218ff.: Rentenhtsterie, des p. p . 2 3 6 f. C f ' . i n t h e f b r e g o i n g , P a r t I I , p . 3 3 . 100. We shall here ignore the question of whether "effectiveness" arisesin the form of causalityor of motivation. l0l. PsychoLogie, p.224. [The Principlesof Pslchologl, Nerv lork. Henrl Holt & Co., 1890.1 102. Even if "co-perceiving" does not fullv characterize the phenome-l-he experieuces non of expression,it is still important lbr expression. u'e comprehend in expressiveappearances are fused rvith the phenomder ena of expression. \'olkelt has stressed this particularlv (Systetn 'I-he countenances AsthetihI, p.2541.,307). body's limbs and psychic themselvesseem to be animatedl the osvchic seems to be visible' For example, cheerfulnessis visible in laughter.jol' in the radiant eyes"fhe unity of'experience and expressiorris such an inner one that language fiequently desip;nates the one by the other: being overcome, weighed d<rwn,uplified. (Cf. Klages,Die Ausdruchsbru'egung und ihre diagnostische Verutertung, 28af'.). p. 103. Op.ril.,p. 13. 104. As rvill be shou'n later, the terms "sign" IZeichenl and "exPressiorr" [Azsdruck) are not suitable here. Therefore, 1\'e shall speak ot' "indication" lAnzeithenland "symbol" lSlnholl. -I'he following elucidations of the concepts of "indication," "sign," and "exPressit>tl" are

lllfi. 0."r.*",t""

o:o fo" ;;..;, ur.,'ully - "i in other " i:1"-": .t1i:11-o:?: 1::-:l: -tf beendoneto keepthe This hasnot.onlv ;;;Jt;i;Lrrpose'
burden:10t from beingfurther "i]tt-T:til,:::::;:,"::l:

the .on,pi.uous that we have completely omitted

that it ts but also for material reasons' I do not believe :;'^:';;;;r.. 'f the o [ a n i m n r e d i a t e l ye r p e r i e n c e d s u b o r d i n a t i o r r ,., tpeak Lfi.'I -I'his means that the occurrence to a unified PurPose' ::;.;?r;ttt:al either' irr the ;i pu|"po" does not come into consideration' :;l;;;t' of a foreign ir.rdividual' comprehension .-"^Jfti. Zi. Cf. aboveP.42ff' 6' 78. Cf'. Part II of this rvork, P' 'I'he phenomenon of fuiion mav make a genetic explanation of 79. experience and not emnrrhv possible.We must only return to our own of foreign outer experience rvith our speak immedlatelv or the fusion

"Uf,.',rrrm der.lsthetih P' 241ff' I, p' (Zur earlier, T'l Fechner Seelenfrage' mentioned tG' ;i. ;. alreadv
the general type forming thebasis +Si., Oal has encleavored to lay dou'n is not proper to speak of empathy in of animation' (It f.i, ufirrr"*ptions of his particular statements i.i-.j w. .u,-,r,,r, go into an examination justified in do-we \tant to decide here rvhether he is N"i,tt"r i.r.| in this type' ir.rcluding the vegetable kingdom , ;i-age" ILB;ldlisa poor metaphor for the interpretattotr bi. r ti *.r.d does t.rotpresent the rvorld to us' but rve .,ii1" ,putiut world, for utt itug" see it itself from one side' "Si.-Cf. ff' [Sections27 and the analysisin Husserl's Ideen,p' 48f'' 60

331 8 4 . C t . a b o v eP . 4 t f f . 85. Cf. Part II, P. l8i. 86. Cf.above, P. 10. l5ll 87. Cf. Ideen'p.279 and317' [Section and SoeialConsciousness Nature' AS. Cf. Self Consciountess, Cf. Part Il, P. 35f. 89. same time a physical body.and S,O.Si,t." everv living body is at the at the same time mechanical' it is possible to everv alive movemerlt ls

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129

in his Seminar Exercisesof the closelv related to Husserl's expositions W i n t e r S e m e s t e ro f l 9 l 3 - 1 4 ' that thinking o{'this-u'hen he concedes 105. IT.l Lipps is Ptt;;i; empathy' a supplemerlt,to "o.r..prio,t" 1i'rfahiunglis

at IK.]Jaspers,"Uber kausaleand verstindliche Zusammer]hdnge :,::1i 124. For evidence of'this vien' in the writing of well-known psvcholodes gists, see IT.] 6sterreich, Phiinomenologie lch, p. 8tr'' cf' [P'] Natorp' too, AllgemeinePsychologie, 52. P. 125. il{oreover, the same turning is also needed to "objectify" the correlate of an act of f'eeling.(Cf. Husserl'sIdeen,p' 66). [Section 35] For example, it is accomplished bv the transitior.r from valuing, the primordial f'eelingof a value, to the value judgment' 126. I cannot entirelv agree with [M.] Geiger u'hen he denies sensory 'I"' (Phiinomenologie des aesthetischenfeelings all "participation in the ot Genusies,p.6l3f.). If, as one must, one distinguishesthe pleasantness I do not see how one can sensationfiom the pleasure it gives me, then strike the "I"-moment from this pleasure' Of course, I-reithercan I see Geiger's distinction betu,een pleasure ar-rd enjoyment insofar as it is ba."d o,, participation in the "l," Further, I cannot acknou'ledge that there is no negatiue counterpart to enjoyment (such as displeasure t<l dislike to liking). It seemsto me that a more detailed analysis pleasr.rre, snould be able to expose suffering as the negative counterPart ofenjoyment. 1 2 7 . O n t h e h i e r a r c h y of values, cf. Scheler Der Formolismus in der Ethih usu., p. a88ft". between height and duration of values, cf. 128. On the relati<-rttship Scheler.op. (it.. p. 492ff'. 129. XIotiaund Motiuation,p. 169. 1 3 0 . t A . l P f ; i n d e r ,o P .c i t . ,P . 1 6 8 . l 3 l . P f l n d e r , o P .c i t . ,P . 1 74 . 132. Beitriige zum Studium der Indiuidualit'tit, p. 327tr' der. 133. Me1,er also nores the "necessity" of re-experiencing (stilgesetz Poetih,p. ZOff.;, t"t without keeping the lau'fulness of meaninS;and t ausal law[ulnes) separaled has characterized the relationship 134. E. u. Hartmann in his,{stftstiA and the spiritual individual sornewhatas n'e the psvcho-physical betrveen have tried to-do it here. (II, p. 190tr , 200tr ). For him everv individual is an empirical realization of an "individual idea'" 135. Beitriigesum Studium der Indiuidualitiit, p. 300' 'fhere is a corresponding ontic lawfulnessto which the correlate 136. of these acts, the relationshipsof value and ought, are subject' (What is valuable ought to be.) But rve need rlot io into this here' 1 3 7 . S e e a b o v e ,p . 1 0 3 f . 138. The fact that everv individual and every one of his concrete

artlculatlon' meaning u'hen there is a constant here casesin which signals We can leave t'"' "f considetatiorl 108. used as sigr'rals' function as words or words are character-ot 't''" p' l+z; t\,'"*et"ttive" 109. Klages stresses$p" as such in contrast with its commuits r>riginal'preualerrce h;;r;-.-;h

o" u"':::':Xf::^:r, 4,,r, u, Ii'0.-'Cr. *,n p.'i'bivi[igi"n' rr ]fl;*. ", the meanlng in tone rvher-r 107. A change

"fi;::1"ilii^."

will writtenandprintedwords be or sirnplicitv'

discussion'''.nt1.s",'n5l.,"lq':::l ";1ti:t;*""trast withLipps, Dohrn's

r'u' trtt: differetrce of clearlv enrphasizing him on artistrc ptt"r"utioltl a meaning content and as the externalizalanguage as the expressionof tl.'l-tt content (oP'-!'j''.p' 5lfl tion or testrmony to an experiential connection,hehasth""tteti'-edpoetictypesasdifferingformsolexternalization' l12. Ideen,P. 89' [Section 471 calls attentiol to this kind of'emI13. RoettecU"ttp"'iln p' Zdl "t'o of deception in the realm of ;t i;; ** pathic deceprio" 1u"a ""t"" otherwise reliable exPerience)' as at all when Janles savsthat man,has I 14.'rhus it rs not r,l'i".o.t.., *ho kno*' him (Psychologte' are individuals rTrany"social selves" ";;;;t "social self'" to utt"pt the designation p. 178); orrly we d" ""t;;;; f'actualand essenbetween i-att artd essence' I15. On th",tt"t'or"hip cf' Husserl's ldeen' chap' l' tial science, as nut,r.utty we always intend psychology I 16. lf this i, p.n,.r,'J-r,..", prevailir.rg todav' ,h.,.turr't.ul scieirtifrc psychologv advocatedby Scheler' 'fhis very energe.trcaliy rs an rnterPretation I17. Psychologte' zengliedernde und I|8. Ideen iber eitte'besthreibende p' l17 ' itsi . l':lnlritung in die Geistesuissenschaften'

r 2 0 . o p . c f t . , p .l 3 6 f ' l 2 r . O P .c i t ' ,P ' 4 7' (p 122, In his earlier mentionedSammelreferat .481'""19:-1i::t:,::Ot oI asthe merehavingpresent somethat stressed relivirlgunderstanding he could from empathy'Naturally' bt thing psychic,.,.t,-,,t distinguishJ at.thatporllt' detailedanalysis a not urldertake nlore madein modernpsychopathology 123. Similaraiui"cril"t ft;;;"t;

130

Edith Stein

onll' once does trot co^ttexperiencesis plainly an experience happening o{'p"t"'nol structure because the content of'a arjdi., the typicalner. in principle be the same' number .tf'rir"ur't',, of consciousnesscannot of the corlcePtof type as at frrst 139. Of course, Dilthey also conceives very obvious in his description not spiritual, but as Psychic'This becon.res of *'iti.h, for the most Part' consists a definite peculiar.rf ,nf p.r.,i. ,yp. lireliness of perceppry.h,r-pivsical organization: sharpnessand ity nf: etc' (Die Einbildungshraft des of tion arrd memories, ,,-tt"'-t"tity experience ' 'Dichters,p. inaicali 3aatr.). On the contrarv, other traits.he Presents 1f1 'I'his is seen in the expresston personal structure p"l"fi".ily oi'a typicat of' fantasv' ({Jber die Einof experietrce in the creative perfbrmance bildungshraft der Dichter, p' 66f')

Index
a b r ? g 03 0 , 1 2 2 n . 2 2 action55-56,62, 108 aesthetic52, 87, I 28 n. I I l, I 30 n s 139 -ofempath1 2l,68, 122n.24 - o f v a l u e s5 0 altruistic l5 a n a l c r g v 1 , 2 6 - 2 7, 5 9 , 6 1 , 7 0 , 8 7 , 2 l14 anticipation 35, 57 apophantic 8l a p p e a r a n c e , l l ,6 1 , 6 4 , 6 5 , 8 5 , 8 8 89 a s s o c i a t i o n4 9 , 5 9 , 7 5 , 7 6 -empathy bv 21, 22, 24-26 attitude 35, 88 a t t r i b u t e4 0 , 8 6 - 8 9 , 1 0 0 , I I I , I l 2 awake 60, 69 bearer -ofattriblrtes40,86 o f ' e x p r e s s i o n sx i x , 3 7 , 7 5 , 8 l -of meaning 80 -of voluntary movements 66 Bergsorr 2, 124 n.6l 7 Bernheim 94 B i e s e1 2 3 n . 3 6 Burkhardt,J.93 c a p a c i t y5 0 , 5 6 , I l 0 c a t e g o r i e s4 0 causalitv -chain of 72 -rnechanical xxii, 75 psychic 2,96, 105 7

- p s y c h o - p h y s i c a l- 5 , 5 3 , 5 6 , 7 I , 49 1 7 5 . 9 6 ,l l 2 , c a u s e x i i - x x i i i5 3 , 7 0 - 7 3 8 3 - 8 6 . x , 91.109 - g e n e t i c r r v e s t i g a t i o f '2 l . 5 l , 9 2 i n -natural scientific xxi, I 22 n. 3 I character 86 c o g i l x i x , x x , 1 5 . 1 6 ,3 3 , 1 2 , 6 2 , 7 3 , o 7 4 ,9 9 , 1 0 6 ,1 2 2n . 2 l C o h n , J .1 2 6n . 7 5 82 communication

consclousness -stream oi 38, 39, 130 n. 138 -transcendentrl xiv, rvi-xvii, 29 conventiot.t 79 correction of empathic acts 84-86, 89 c r e a t i v i t y5 6 , 8 0 , 8 1 , 9 2 , 9 5 , 1 0 3 , 1 3 0n . 1 3 9 D a r H ' i n1 2 5 n . 7 2 deception I 5, 62, 84, 85, I 02, I I 6, I l8 o f d i r e c t i o n3 1 , 3 2 -of empathr' 86-89, I l4 of inner perception 3 l, 32 l)escartes xvii, xx l)essoir 122 n. 2,1 D i l t h e r 9 . 1 ,9 5 , 1 0 8 , I I I , I 1 3 . I 1 4 , I 1 6 , 1 3 0n . 1 3 9 d i s p o s i t i o n4 0 , 7 4 , 1 0 9 D r > h r n1 2 8 n . I I I e r r c o u n t e rI 9 e n e r g y ' 1 0 ,5 l

l3t

lq9

Index
genetlc

Index
- e x p l a n a t i o n 1 2 , 2 1' 2 6 ' 1 2 2 n 3 l ' 1 2 5n . 7 l -process 68 gesture 22, 21, 59, 61, 77 God I l, 50,93, I l7 Groethulsen 122 n.25 habit I 10 Hartmann 129 n. I34 history93-96, I 12-l l3' I 16' I 17 horizon 7'1 Husserl x, xiii, xiv' xvi' 2, 30, 6'{, ?6, 84, I 19, 122n. 23, 125n' 65, 1 2 6n n . 7 5 & 8 3 , t 2 8 n l I 5 ' 1 2 9 n.125 J a m e s 7 . 1 .1 2 8 n . I 1 4 J a s p e r sl 2 8 n . 1 2 3 kernelol the "l" 101, 106, 108, 109 K l a g e s1 2 5 n . 7 2 , 1 2 7 n . 1 0 2 , 1 2 8 n. 109 k n o w l e d g ex v i , x v i i , x x , 1 4 , 1 9 , 2 1 , 2 5 , 2 7 .i 0 , 8 7 , 9 6 , t 0 l , 1 0 7 ,1 0 8 , t 1 6 , 1 2 3n . 3 3 Lange 122 n. 24 lau fulness -essential97 -rratural94,104, ll2 -ontic 129n. 136 - r a t i o n a lx x i i , 9 7 , l 0 l , 1 0 4 , 1 0 6 , 1 0 8 ,I l 3 - 1 4 , 1 2 9 n . 1 3 3 levels -of accon.rplishing mpathy I0. I2, e 1 5 ,1 7 ,1 9 , 2 0 , 3 4 , 5 9 , 7 0 -of generalitl l l4 - o f t h e " 1 " x x i i , 9 8 , 1 0 0 - 0 2 ,1 0 5 0 7 , 1 0 8 ,l l 0 , l l 4 , l l 5 -of oUects 100 lite -corrtinuumoI 70,73 -phenomena of 68-7 l, 78 L i p p s5 , I l - 1 8 , 2 2 , 3 7 , 6 0 , 6 4 , 7 6 7 8 , 1 2 8 r r n .1 0 5& I I 1 logicxxii, 8l m e a n i n g 7 6 - 8 6 ,9 7 , I l l , l l 7 -context xxi, xrii, 84-86, 96, I I 2, ll5 Meirrong 1.1 m e m o r yx , 8 - 1 0 , 1 2 , 1 6 , 1 8 , 2 9 , 3 3 , 3 4 , 4 5 , 5 2 , 6 3 , 7 6 , 9 9 , 1 0 9 ,1 2 5 n . ti6 N { c r l e a u - P o n t vx i v l\le1el 129 n. 133

133

environnlent 66 e x p e c t a t i o n7 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 8 ' 3 3 ' 3 ' 1 ' 7 ' t exPerience -apPropriate l21 -background xxiii, l 5' 33' 73' 74' 99, 106 - c o n t i n u i t Yo J l I , l 8 enrichment of 18 -firll l2 ,srream of 8-9, 27, '10' 69' 73 7 expressitrn , 22, 25, 37' 51-51'7586, 92. 96, 108,I 17, 130n l39 -bodill 26,2'i , tt|.72, 109 - p s y c h i c2 6 , 2 7

- a l i v e4 8 , 6 6 - 6 9 , 7 l , 1 2 6 n . 9 0 , I 2 7 n.9l -associated 66^68 -empathized l6 -expressive 8, 125 n.72 7 imparted 67, 68 - m e c h a n i c a l . 1 8 ,6 6 - 6 8 , 7 2 -of the body4I, 15,46,49,55,57, 59 -voluntarv 66-69 m t r t i v a t i o nx x i i , 6 , 2 3 , 4 1 , 5 2 , 5 4 , 64, 76, 84-86,96-97, 109, I 12, 126n. 74, 127n. 100 m o t i v e3 2 , 3 3 , 1 1 5 , I 1 7 , I l 8 Mrinsterberg x, 35, 65 n a t u r e x x i , 5 7, 7 1 , 9 1 , 9 2 , 9 5 - 9 7 , lll -humar.r I l0 -natural latcs 9-1 Natorp 129 n. 124 neutralization xviii, I non-actualityxxiii, 29, 33, 53, 54, 6 2 , 7 3 , 1I orielrtation of - c e n t e ro f 6 l , 6 3 , 6 6 , 6 7 , 6 9 ,8 8 , 9 2 - z e r o p o i n t o [ x i x - x x i , , 1 3 .5 7 , 6 l - 6 3 Osterreich125 n.65. 129 n. 124 perception xviii, 16, 19-20,27, -13, 44,68,98,t07, rt7 - b o d i l v v s . o u t c r x x i . ' 1 2 - 4 6 ,4 8 . 5 , 1 . 5 7 . 5 8 , 6 0 - 6 2 ,6 6 , 6 7 -empath\ :rn act ol l I -inncr 26-34,40, 99 -outer vs.inner xix. xxi, 7, 26-30, 3 9 - 4 2 , 7 6 , 7 8 , 8 3 , 8 6 , 8 8 - 8 9 ,9 2 , 109 -perceptual context 25 vs.krtorrledge 5,27 2 p e r s o n a l i t y 2 , 1 5 ,3 7 , 7 8 , 9 1 , 9 5 , 1 1 0 2 , 1 0 3 , 1 0 6 - 0 8 ,I I 1 , I 1 4 penersion 85, 102 Pfinder105,106

i a n t a s y8 - 1 0 , 1 8 , 3 4 , 4 7 , 4 9 , 5 2 , 5 8 , 61, 63, 74, I 12, 125n. 66, 130n' 139 F e c h n e r1 2 4 n . ' 1 1 , 1 2 6 n . 8 1 } ? e l i n gx x i i , 6 0 , 8 ' 1 ,9 2 , 9 8 - 1 0 3 ' 1 0 9 ,l l I , 1 1 7 -and enrotion 98 - a t t d e x p r e s s i o n5 2 - 5 4 , 9 6 -assumPtion of 14, 20 o ccrntagion f 23, 29, 3l' 7 l' 72' 104,110,111,123n.33 -[ellou' 122 n.25 -general 49, 56, 68, 69, 75' 100 1 of accomPaniment 7, 50, 5l ' 6l -ofoneness xviii, 16, 17' 24 -plimordial 29, 75 -represented 75 -sensati()ns f 48 o - s e n s u a l4 8 , 5 5 , 8 5 , 1 0 0 spiritual '19,50. 5'l -transferencc of 23 -raluel0l,l02 Freud xxiii I i r s i o nx i x , x x i , 2 5 , 4 5 , 4 9 , 5 8 , 1 2 7 n.102

id.ea(Vorstellung)l8' 20' 65 , i m a g e 2 - 1 , ' 1 46 l - 6 3 , 7 2 ' 8 8 im itation - i n n e r 1 2 , 1 6 , 2 l - 2 - 1 ,8 5

lncllcailoll / /-/d

i n f e r c n c e8 5 , 8 6 , 8 7 -bv analogy 26-27 ' 87 -by association 5 2 i n t e n s i t v x x i i . l ' 1 -I 5 ' 1 0 8 of feelings10, 105 -o1'tendencies106 intention79-83, 102' 10E intentionality xvii, xx, 8' 15, b4' b7 intersubjective -causality I 10 -experience 63-64 -knorvledge xvii c intrasub.jective ausalitvI I0 intuition xvii, 25, 115 -inner 34 -outer 47 intu itive -act 19, 30, il4 - c o m p r e h e n s i o n7 , 6 0 , 8 1 ' 1 0 1 -firlfillment 62, 80, 82 -plivenr-ress l9 idea 20 -pcrception 58 -representa(ion 2'1,58

(lebsattel 52 Geiger 19, 124 nn. 56 & 62' 129 n. 126

\ { i l t ,J . s . 2 6 t t r o o 3 5 . . 1 9 , 6 0 , 7 1 . 91 0 0 ,1 0 3 d 2, 04,105 n r o t i < r7 r , 1 2 2n . 2 4 rl

134
phenomenologicalreduction xiv, xvi, xvii, 3, 6, Z0 philosophy 1,38,92 2 Prandtl 25 presentation 64 -enrptl l 15 p r i m o r d i a l7 - l l , I 3 , 1 9 , 2 0 , 3 2 , 3 4 , 57, 59, 6l_63, 69, 73, 75, 82, 878 9 , g i i , 1 0 9 ,l 1 5 p r o j e c t i o n2 0 , 2 5 , 5 8 , b g , 6 1 , 7 0 - j 2 , 77,82,83,109 P s v c h o l o g yx v i i i , . 1 5 ,5 2 - d e s c r i p t i v e2 2 , 9 5 -ger.rerrc viii, 21, x 22, 93-94 purpose 126, n. 76 R a n k e9 3 , I t 6 r e f l e c r i o n4 2 , 5 3 , 6 2 , 7 3 , 9 5 , 9 8 , 9 9 , 103,107,108 -r's. rnner perception 29_34 l e l t e r a ( r ( ) no l e n r p a t h l , x x i . l g , 6 3 . 88 r e p r e s e r ) t a t i ox v i i i , 7 , B , 1 0 , 1 3 , n lB, 20,21,30,39, 47,52,57,58, 68, 7b, l15, l25 n. 63 r c p r e s s r o n8 5 r e p r o c l u c t i < r n S , b 2 , 6 0 . 7 2 . 7Z Z r e s i s t a n c e5 b R o e t t e c k e n2 8 n . l l 3 l Royce 64 S c h e l e rx . x i v , x x i i , 2 7 _ 1 4 , 6 8 _ 7 0 , 72-75,87,89, I 22 nn. 32, 33 & 3 5 , 1 2 4n . 5 5 , 1 2 5n . 6 3 , 1 2 9n n . 1 2 7& 1 2 8 science -a prtori 97 - c r r l r u r a9 l - 9 6 , l 0 g , l li3, ll6 - r r a r u r a lx v i i , 3 , 5 1 , 9 3 _ 9 5 ,I 1 3 , l Z 3 rr.3l scll30, 38, 39, 83, 103,I 16, 125 n. 66 s e r r s : r t i Ox i x - x x i , 4 2 _ 5 0 ,5 6 , 5 g - 6 1 n -helds ot 44, 57, 58, 66, 6g - s e r r s u ae m p a t h r l 5B, 5g, 7l

Index Index
Siebeck26 sign 76-80 s i g n a l 7 9 - BI Simmel I l2 s i t u a t i o n6 5 , 7 g Smith, Adam l4 S o c r a r e sI I 7 s p i r c e i x - x x i , 4 2 , 4 3 , 4 6 , 4 7 , S g ,b l x , 63 -bodl'xix, .13 o u t er x t x , ' 1 3 ,. 1 6 srandpoinrxvii, fi4, gg -natural 89 s t a t e m e n t s ,u n d e r s t a n d i n g o t . 6 5 Stern, P 25 srimulus 8,Z1,72 4 s r r i r i n g5 5 , 1 0 5 - 0 g Stumpf ,tr4 s u b j e c t i v eg g s l ' m b o l ,i n L i p p s I 2 , 6 1 , 6 5 , 7 6 _ g 3 slmparh\xviii,14, 16,17,24,123 n.35 -reflexive 18,88 94 t e n d e n c y5 5 , 5 6 therne 76, 7g theoretical -acr33,98, l0l, 107 -corrtcnrplation l6 -proposition I I3 t i n i e 7 3 . 7 1 , 1 0 7 . 1 2 4n . 6 l -and memorv 8-10, 94 t r a n s c e n d e n c e1 5 , 3 0 t r : l n s f e r e n c ei r t r r 1 3 , 2 3 , 6 5 , 6 7 , 6 g r r a n s l r i o n7 6 , 7 9 , 9 9 tlpe xxii,59, rj7, 70, 82, 87,95-96, 1 0 8 , I t 4 - 1 6 ,1 2 8 n . I I I v a l u ex x i i , 7 , 1 5 , 9 2 , 9 7 , l 0 l _ 1 6 . 1 2 9n . 1 2 5 -emparhic 3l -cleccption 33 - l . r i e r a r c h lc i f l 0 l , 103, 105, l0g - p r i n r o r d i a lJ 1 , 3 1 , 3 2 , I29 n. l2b 'faine

Ig

- r a n g t ' o f 1 0 8 ,I I 6 verification 86 Vischer76 V o l k e h2 5 , 5 9 , t i t t ,1 2 7n . t 0 2 v c i l i t r o x i x , x x i i , 1 8 ,3 0 , 3 5 , 4 0 , 4 2 , n 5 2 - 5 6 7 2 , 7 3 , 8 . 1 9 2 , 1 0 3 ,1 0 7 , , , 1 0 8 .l l 3 . l l 7 w i l l 5 3 - 5 7 , 2 , 8 1 , 9 2 ,9 6 , 9 7 , I 0 : - r 7 0 7 , 1 0 9 ,I l ?

\\Iitasek 20 llord 76-83, 85 n'orld -cultural 92 -natrrralxli, rvii, xxi, I l3 - o f t l . r em i n d I l 3 phenomenal 05, 96, 98 - s p a r i a l( ) u r e rx x i , 1 3 - 4 7 , b 2 , 6l-66, 68, 69,72, r-4,92 -r'alue l0B bb, b7

ing their rvay'.l' li''e is .rraile'lc ,',uu-qh'-i,,,olcli.c.cszrn v.cari.n olllccs' or fr.rn rhe Vrcati.n r)irecrt.r'sofficc, Irl2rrf)armer Roacl, H u b e r r u s ,W I 5 3 0 3 3 .

antomi' i",r,.' cr ist' c.TiX.iT:I'T:l*:"i::,1,,:" #,:.],?l.lill

The Institute .f carmelitt: Stucrics prornot.s rcse^rch a'cr pubrication in thc |ierd oi' carnrclitc spiritualitr-, I,. ,rr.,,-rrt arc f)isr.alcecr Carnrclitcs, part of a R.nra. "r, Catholic ,,,,,'_.,n;,r,_lriars, nuns ancl l;rity-w,jro are hc.irsto thc teat.hino ,"a ,rrl, ,rf ljl.e ol.-l.cnr:s:r ol..Jesus and John ol rhe Cross