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Basic Actions Author(s): Arthur C. Danto Source: American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Apr., 1965), pp. 141-148 Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of North American Philosophical Publications Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20009161 . Accessed: 10/02/2011 07:36
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American Volume
Quarterly 1965
V.
BASIC ACTIONS
ARTHUR C. DANTO
an iS-event, the in this case its cause.
to know?" said Verity, should we want "Well, why a yawn or causing to give one. herself giving and Their Ways Two Worlds I. Compton-Burnett, I
simply
designate is one
Comparably,
example
the movement
event, effect
of S
of
in my
another
other
event,
causes the stone S to move." "THHE man M of a very A This is a very general description familiar sort of episode. It is so general, indeed, or not M has per? that it does not tell us whether formed an action. The description holds in either case; so it could have been an action. Without are to inquire what features further pausing to have been an action, required for it definitely
let under us note merely the general whether performing that there are actions of "causing has be that fall some? description
to be designated similarly and no less ambiguously an M-event, which is its cause. And this M-event, or not it is an action performed by M, whether is to be described as rather generally) (if correctly
causing ofS. something to happen?namely, the movement
thing to happen."
it unclear performed,
Yet,
or
leaves
been one
of the truth conditions for "causing something to cuts across since this description happen." And
those the two same cases, sense we of may the assume we are employing something expression same the sense stone "causes
to happen"
"causes" that in the man
in both.
just M the causes
Presumably,
S
we
whether
are using
we say or we
I shall now suppose that my original sentence an action performed in fact describes by M the stone S). Of this particular (moving spatial translation of S we may say three distinct and relevant things : that it is (a) an action, performed that was caused to by M ; that it is (b) something this case by M) ; and that it is (c) the (in happen effect of an event distinct from itself (in this case the M-event). That this event can be both (a) and follows from the remarks in the first paragraph. (b) in the special information That?disregarding must hold if (b) does?follows from parentheses?(c) the analysis of causality referred to in the second paragraph. That it is (b) follows, I suppose, from the fact that S is a stone : stones don't just start to
move without something causing them to move.
to move
We
all
must
now
itself. Do
I fear,
three
characterizations
be due
to
to
any
difference
monly ness of
in the concept
that stones
of causality.
never perform is not
It is com?
actions, to
Let us without investigation. that the M-event is both (a) suppose, however, and (b), for itmight well be. Then itmust also be cannot be decided
(c), and there must then be yet another event,
assumed
although men
our
sometimes
original
do. Hence
the indefinite
due any
distinct
yet the same
from
it, which
M-event,
be
raise that
sentence
a further
ambiguity
to certain
in the concept
facts about men, men
of causality,
or to certain
but rather
assumed
question.
It would
facts. The
differences differences
concept
between between
of causality
and performing
allows
us to ignore
I shall persist in speaking of individuals (the man even the stone S) causing things to happen, M, our concept of causality has been classically though
analyzed as a relationship between pairs of events.
we have slid into an infinite regress, damaging or otherwise. But if a given M-event is both (a) and its being (c) (b) and, hence, (c), then ultimately must lead us to a further M-event, which is (a) are (a) and not (b). And unless some M-events are ever (a). That and not (b), noM-events is, if
there are any actions at all, there must be two
to the classical analysis, the movement According of the pebble P is one event, the effect of another I shall, with studied ambiguity, event, which
distinct kinds of actions: those individual M, which he may be to happen; and those actions, M, which he cannot be said
I4I
142
AMERICAN
PHILOSOPHICAL
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happen. The latter I shall designate as basic actions. In this paper, I shall defend (and explore the I regard as consequences of) four theses which to the theory of action : fundamental
(i) (2) (3) (4) If there are are any actions actions. at all, there are basic actions. There Not basic action is a basic action.1 every a is If a is an action then either performed by M, a basic or else it is the effect action of a of M, chain of causes action is a basic the originating of M. member of which
they nor
anything to
I would
happen
want
in this
to say that
new sense
stones cause
of "cause."
Not
actions
that I wish
to men
to restrict
alone. Other
the performance
individuals
of basic
may, for
I wish first to make quite clear the sense in an individual which does not cause his basic an individual M per? actions to happen. When
forms from a a basic that action both stands a, there to a as is no cause event to distinct effect and
all I know, perform them as well. Some theologians have spoken as though everything done by God were a basic action. This would us, of prohibit to course, from saying that God caused anything of the Universe would be a (the making happen soon for reasons which will basic action.) And, emerge, this would make the ways of God inscrut? able indeed. It may be objected, second, that if we take the mark of absence of a cause to be the distinguishing
a basic action, then we must class as basic actions
a great many
on the ticle, other uniform or
events
that we
accept motion instance
should be disinclined,
as actions of of an at all, e.g., par? decay. isolated
is an action performed a basic action, he does to happen. It will be to possible objections It may be objected,
be other senses of
by M.
So when M performs nothing first that causes it to consider two convenient this. first, that there are or may
than the sense men?
perhaps
radioactive
"causes"
is readily deflected. I have not This objection claimed that basic actions are not caused, but only one does not cause it by that a man performing some other action that stands to it as performing
cause to effect. Moreover, the absence of a cause
tioned above, in accordance with which it would be proper to say that M causes his basic actions
to happen. Thus, ?/raising an arm were an instance
would
action,
not
even
be
if
sufficient
basic actions
criterion
were
for a basic
uncaused. It
of a basic action, an individual who does this might still be said to cause it to happen in some sense of "cause" other than the sense that I reject in to basic actions. I accept this objection: application
there we that may should I am be still urging unless happen such other senses exactly the of the class "cause." same of But distinction and I (i) require within
would
actions
serve only
from an the action as actions.
to mark
rest. can be to Of
off a special
class of
what is course, only a basic action. And I have say what are the general
tried
actions, an there
II
should
thesis causes
therefore
that to
be defending
there in this were new
I have avoided
basic might actions, use, or e.g., in
citing unconditional
part "moving because a any limb," was
instances
expression also could
of
I be
no actions
sense, former example, since either.
he
caused
So, unless a
to happen
there stone that
in the original
actions would, performed of the for
used
happen,
to designate
something and in
something
that
that was
not
caused
an action,
to that
un?
much
is
action
anyone
always
(although
men
might
an
still cause
action is not a
stones And
performing sense of
truth-condition
mistakably language
"M's limb
basic This is reflected action. by in the fact that from the bare description
moved," for example, one could not
for "causing
new
something
"cause"
to happen").
not apply
would
whether
an action
be to absolutely
It should,
"M of sense
indeed,
caused a
sentence
a basic action or tell whether M had performed even an action. Nor could one tell this by observing in of the limb without bringing only the motion
differentiating contextual features. I have accord?
happen"?using convenient to
"cause"?
that M
it
an action.
Those
the
who
concept
find
of
ingly contented
"M-event," I required
myself
with
it to be
the neutral
a basic
expression
action when
maintain
causality
to the distinction
between
declaring an instance.
an action as little and have Now I wish to specify some of the differentiating not, would performing use as I do. Neither sense for this new of "cause" four contextual and I shall consider features, 1Thesis in detail inmy paper, "What We Can Do," The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 60 (July, 1963), pp. 435-445. (3) is explored
BASIC
ACTIONS
143
cases, all of which might C-j. M suffers a nervous disorder symptomized by indifferently be so that the say, to a tic: spasmodic laughter. This is comparable, by the same description, an M laughs unpredictably, and for "no reason." Such alone leaves it unclear whether description or not. Of the four so are some is mirthless, of course, but action has been performed laughter instances falling under the two first cases. It may cases, three (C-i, C-2, C-4) will indeed be actions, case and that the entire falls under be argued and of these one (C-4) will be a basic action. The C-2, it as the symptom of a nervous that in identifying four cases together might be termed a declension of I have marked off a class of causes for admits the description. Not every such description disorder, con? the case of the full declension, for some appear never to be M's Still, laughter. requires special a as basic actions at all. "Moving in that M's sideration, laughing here is never an exemplified his laughter C-2 sometimes is. is action, whereas under stone," I should think, never, or not ordinarily, C-4. M has the true power of laughing. By this I exemplified as a basic action, though we have seen that itmay be exemplified by an action. I want to mean that M laughs when he wants to without (in contrast with C-j) having to cause himself to controversial begin with a deliberately example contrast with C-2) someone or without and shall decline the expression "M laughs." laugh; (in C-i. M causes himself to laugh. I am thinking here something having to cause him to laugh; without, as in C-3, suffering from the relevant someone to make of cases where does something finally, nervous disorder. This does not mean that M is himself laugh, and does not simply laugh because to do. Thus I may do is of a of something he happens but only that his abnormality normal, ridiculous and laugh because I find it benign sort; i.e., it is by way of a gift. His laughing something an I did not do this ridiculous thing in order when he may, have he wishes, so, but may object: a stream or what at whom to make myself laugh. Again, I sniff a cartridge of of laughter he direct it to be nitrous oxide, nitrous oxide, not knowing the chosen object ever being a chooses, without but just to find out what it is. But, since it is cause of his laughing. are Instances nitrous oxide, I laugh, though I did not sniff to under rare, C-4 falling perhaps I wish to include only cases but these alone would make myself laugh. qualify as basic actions I do something where ridiculous or sniff from a performed by M when "M laughs" is true. I have of nitrous oxide in order to laugh, identified the case not so much by specifying what private cartridge contextual features must be present, perhaps because I think laughter good for the liver differentiating or because I just enjoy laughing and cannot always but by specifying what differentiating contextual or wait to come for someone features must be absent. Notice and that M's something laughing along cause me to laugh. I definitely want to exclude a here differs markedly from the ability most of us distinct covered
comedian who laughs at some reruns of his antic have of of making or we
films
who excite falling
(unless he had them rerun for this special purpose), and definitely want to include someone
deliberately spasmodic under C-i engages laughter. are rare in auto-titillation to episodes in our Doubtless, in normal adults
amateur
for for
the
sake
pretend
not of I want
irrelevant is culture, but this is irrelevant. Also the fact that people don't laugh at the nitrous oxide they sniff, though they do laugh at the silly faces they pull, for their own delectation, inmirrors.
C-2. Someone or something other than M causes M to
is the typical case for adults and laugh. This children in our culture. It is for my purposes again a stone sense same to irrelevant whether the cause of M's his the in which is causing laughter also its object, or whether it has an object at all (as move is an action. Causing himself to laugh is the it does not if he is tickled or submitted to nitrous action he performed, though of course the des? it is irrelevant whether, to laugh" leaves it in case "M caused himself oxide). Similarly, cription someone causes M to laugh, as case he the former has in the of the whether stone, unclear, an action or not, an action at all. One could mark that that whether, is, he performed performed did what he did in order to make M laugh. For it difference only by bringing in the general differ? is what M does that uniquely concerns us here. of action. features entiating
laughs under C-i, we may say of his three distinct laughing things: that it is (a) an that M action of M's; that it is (b) something causes to happen; and that it is (c) the effect of some event, distinct from itself (anM-event) which is its cause. M's laughing here is an action in just When M
144
AMERICAN
PHILOSOPHICAL
QUARTERLY
In C-2, M does not cause himself to laugh, and one may find reasons for balking at the claim that his laughing, in such a case, is an action of his at
all. a For stone S consider to move, this we argument. may agree When that M the causes action
when
insofar
itwould
as
not otherwise
is an action
have been
already
so. It is only
that blaming
something
is M's. But we of ?'s. So parity M to laughter, by the former, What I must operative, and
C-2 are actions
reject the claim that it is an action suggests that when someone moves this may be an action performed but not an action of M's. do is to show that parity is in? so justify my claim that instances of
in contrast with instances of C-j.
I shall somewhat Well, suggest that artificially M's action here requires this description: what he is not, does is to not not laugh. The double negative in the language of action, a triviality. Logically, is of a proposition of course, the double negative and from a strictly logical that proposition, just point of view, we could say the same thing, albeit causes the more awkwardly, with "The man M
stone S to not not move" as we straightforwardly
someone for doing it, is appropriate. it, or blaming With regard to C-j, however, the laugher stands liable to no special charge of negligence: his fails to be a case of not not laughing, for laughing identification of it as a nervous disorder, or in the syndrome of one, locates it beyond the control of the man who It is, indeed, almost a is so afflicted. case of this : like a hiccough. One might paradigm blame the man for being in a place where his as a negligence, might symptom, easily mistakable break out unpredictably. Or we might blame him for a kind of negligence in "not doing some? again
thing about it," viz., going to a nerve specialist,
C-3
is the matter
this brings
by way
us to C-4. And
comment on
is
Most readers, I think, will resist the suggestion that C-4 is a case of action. There is good reason say with "The man M caused the stone S tomove." for this. For most of us, laughing as a basic action is I wish, in fact, to retain that regular inferential allows us to I shall hope to show why this is so, which feature of double negation unintelligible. and showing it will from not not A to A, but for the case of involve a demonstration of proceed thesis (2). Meanwhile, action I wish to exclude the reverse inference. For the reader might ponder the case of negligence, the precise analogue to this in the case of moving an my double negative marks to a negligence is to be ascribed and whether arm, which admits of a full declension. Thus C-i: M causes his arm to move, someone for is a case i.e., by striking it with investigation. independent
So, pending such investigation, we cannot say, on his than other M arm; causes C-2: M's someone arm from or something e.g., by other striking so his as
that a man
laughs,
that he is
for this reason And with negligence. charged to "not cannot go from "laughs" automatically we ascribe don't since Indeed, laughs."
suffers
disorder, unpredictably,
negligence
my to convention, stone "the Do restated we
to stones,
to not want Someone
it would
from
be
"the
invalid,
stone
given
moves"
quite thus:
is to be than M
I am
arm
certain,
is one of
C-4
the
is the
an
now
standard
causes M in to not not laugh? Perhaps we would, of flaunting usage. What we would be saying, spite is only this : that M was excited to laugh however, and did nothing to inhibit his laughter. And it is
our common assumption that men are normally
to determine in what way this behavior we should have no great difficulty intelligible, seeing why laughing under C-4 is not. seek
is in
in effect, stops capable of doing something which, the flow of laughter from issuing forth in, say, men are called upon to public guffaws. Whether from varies exercise these inhibitory practices hall there is to context: context in the music license to suspend them, to "let oneself go," but at there is not. It is in such contexts only High Mass but blam? that laughter is pronounced a negligence,
ing, surely, does not make of something an action
Ill
Suppose now that moving a stone is an action
to suppose that It is difficult by M. performed a stone admits of a full declension, moving largely because it seems to lack cases for C-3 and C-4. In instances for fact there are difficulties in finding
C-i and C-2 unless we change the sense of possess?
to (M's arm, M's stone) from philosophical I shall be But for the moment legal ownership. ion
BASIC
ACTIONS
*45
stones only with the fact that we move only by causing them to move. This then means concerned
that, in order else to must cause be the motion or of must the stone, something done, happen,
I must make a few preliminary remarks. First, every normal person has just the same repertoire R of basic actions, and having R is what defines a
normal person for the theory of action. Second,
which
stone, Now
is an event distinct
and this which other stands event may
from
to or may the
the motion
cause not be to
of the
effect. a basic
persons
repertoire
may
of
be
basic
positively
actions
abnormal when
includes actions
their
not
it as
action
of M's.
true
But
if it is not,
and
stone
if it remains
is an action
nevertheless
that moving
included in R, and may be negatively abnormal when in R are not included actions included in their Some persons may be both positively repertoire.
and negatively arm. If of no abnormal, e.g., someone who
of his, then there must be something else that M to happen which in does, which causes something turn causes the motion of the stone. And thismay be a basic action or it may not. But now this goes
on forever is performed a case of This means, unless, by M. the agent each at For some point, a every basic action to he action were suppose
laughs as a basic
one capable stone. than basic
action
but who
is paralyzed
in
is
someone's
Such a deprived
our Plainly, our repertoire
entity
like a
a
causing time he
something does a,
repertoire of basic
is greater
being who
of whose
performed
actions were
every possible
basic
action
may with and basic
and all
be con?
do b, which causes a to happen. But dependently then, in order to do b, he must first independently . . .This do c, which causes b to happen. quickly
entails all. If, that the agent could there are perform any no actions action at all at of accordingly,
ceived
the
concerned
agents,
the sort described by "causing there must be actions happen," caused to happen by the man who
And these are basic actions.
But
are any
this argument
actions at all,
is perfectly
there are basic
If there
This is
a proof of thesis (i). Moreover, ifM performs action describable something by "causing
happen," perform an he must action as of what also, part not cause that he does he to happen.
an to
are given to such beings in two distinct senses, each to a sense that of which bears a definite analogy the term has in the theory of knowledge.2 to say that p is (i) In the theory of knowledge, is in part to point a contrast: one is saying given that p is not inferred from some other proposition. when I speak of an action as given, Analogously, to say, in effect, that it is a basic I shall mean
action, and point a contrast with actions we cause
does,
And this is a proof of thesis (4). It would be a proof of thesis (2) if in fact there were actions described as "causing to happen." This would something
then such so not require an action every us to would action accept not is basic. thesis be a (3) basic as true: for and action,
to happen. The notion of givenness is understood this way: p is a starting point for an inference to another and (commonly) different proposition q for which p provides at least part of the evidence.
Analogously, an action a, if a basic action, is a
for the performance of another starting point it is at least part of the cause. action b, of which
"Is caused by" and "is inferred from" are analog?
I do not wish to suggest, however, that the only proof we are entitled to, for the existence of
basic actions, is by that way there of a transcendental de?
ous relations
action,
of knowledge that
and of
respectively.
duction,
intuitive
in a direct
actions,
and
and is
(ii)
between not
It has
basic ultimate,
argued
and a
the distinction
of which, other in kinds one
sentences sentence
which know
action.
actions are basic ones. To show that we do this will clarify one of the ways in which is a controversial instance of a basic laughing
context, is indeed a starting point for an inference to another, may, in a different context, itself be
inferred to, and hence an end point in an in
between runs very deep and theory of action almost analogy indeed, theory of knowledge models for some calculus. Obviously, there are things we can say about actions that do not morphic but this means two models M-? and M-J for a calculus G, and suppose very little. Suppose we have same role in M-i an argument that "book" plays in M-^. It is hardly their both being models against stars or that books are not centers of solar systems. I shall use theory-of-knowledge features as a guide of action. When the analogy to see why it will be interesting it does. gives way,
2 The
as though iso they were hold for cognitions, etc., that "star" plays in the for G that we don't print for structuring the theory
AMERICAN
PHILOSOPHICAL
QUARTERLY
Analogously, be a starting
action and
in
one
with
in the
the negatively
theory of action.
abnormal
person
as defined
it may
in a different one. There is be caused to happen some justice in this latter claim : as we have seen, one cannot tell from the bare description "moving
an even arm" an whether action. a But, basic action is referred now of to, or thinking sentences,
Now
whether two
when
a or
a blind man
uses object of "can"
certain
senses
with
he can
his abnormality.
infer to "x
He must
from
mean
other
either
sentences
that
or
is red"
perhaps some restriction can be put on the kind of can be given in sense (i). If p is sentence which given in one context and inferred in another, there
might nevertheless be sentences which are never
basic and always are inferred. And a corresponding restriction might hold in the theory of action : even if any action that is ever basic might, under a to be caused general description, sufficiently happen in another context, there might be actions In the that never are basic under any description. one such restriction is often of knowledge, theory
defended, namely that basic sentences are those
that his case is not medically that by hopeless, means of a cure he may be restored to that state of normality in which such sentences may be known by him directly and not, as it were, merely by means of inference. Yet there is a true and in fact an analytic sense in which a blind man cannot
know certain what senses whether accounts such are on certain is red, nor, object so much as know of meaning, a means sentence (the non-analytic The of a para? situation usually false). a
lyzedman
says that he
is perfectly
can move
analogous. When
his arm, he must
he sincerely
mean either
verified kind of
the class
or that his situation that he can cause it to move, is not medically hopeless. But, in again a true and
an does analytical not know, sense, does he not cannot move as his arm and so much understand,
of potentially given sentences, a division might be lines of sense-modality, made along the customary i.e., those verified by seeing, or by audition, or by then define an epistemically touch, etc. We might
normal person as one who experiences in all modes.
to move what it means his arm in the way in which a normal person understands this. For this is the kind of understanding that is alone given to
those who have the power be to move their arms in
then be A negatively abnormal person would in at least one such mode, deficient e.g., is blind; and a positively abnormal person then experiences
in has action duce our some some mode "sixth is obvious. second are outside sense." But the The normal analogy means of e.g., repertoire, to the of theory it we
the normal,
cannot
kind of understanding
to a negatively
so much
conveyed
have
due to
experience
the
constitute
normal for points they that
the standard
cognitive
classes various are given part sentences
equipment.
of starting of classes in the acquired. in abnormal
The
points
their having approached it from the point of view of the negatively abnormal. From that point of There view, basic action is hopelessly mysterious. is, however, perhaps no better way of eliciting the of these things than to quality of our knowledge
think of surrounding endeavoring these to actions remove in the the mysteriousness com? thwarted
of the negatively abnormal person. We prehension some sympathy achieve for his plight by may
ourselves someone imagining similarly confronting can who as is positively who abnormal, perform, we at best can cause basic what to action, happen, a
not infer: he is deficient only at the base: might and then not totally deficient (or if he is, then he is cognitively cannot have any empirical knowledge, toutes proportions gard?es, And similarly, impotent).
and then asking him to give us an understanding of his gift. The fact is that we cannot explain to nor can the the negatively abnormal, positively
3 can be given which it were held that only sentences some awkwardness. have the form not always without Suppose Though x . . ." Such a sentence see a reddish is not easily rendered as the of first-person e.g., "I now reports of sense-experience, x had an unmistakable I suppose, if I both knew that something it can be so rendered, of an inference, conclusion though I might feel secure in inferring taste and that whatever has this taste is red. Then, by tasting x and seeing only its silhouette, senses of "see" which would crucial rule this out, and make that I was seeing a reddish x. Of course there are philosophically to say both "I see a reddish *" and "I see the black silhouette of #." it, indeed, self-contradictory
BASIC
ACTIONS
I47
person explain to us, the way in which action is performed (and this must be in the same way as the impossibility appreciated to a blind man what of explaining red literally looks like, or, if you wish, of our understanding what ultra-violet literally looks like). Suppose? abnormal the basic
just to to take one case?a paralytic not asks us what we
arm ifmoving his arm is not already in his reper? toire of basic actions. So in a sense he is right. If he could make the required effort, he could move
his arm. But he cannot make that effort, cannot
in the only
appropriate
with
sense
someone
analogous
situation
should be obliged
because we do not
know or understand what we do, but because we that there is nothing we do know and understand
first. There is no series of steps move we must run
abnormal, say a deaf man. To ask a epistemically deaf man to try to hear a certain sound is rendered inappropriate by the fact that he is deaf. To try
to hear, say, faint and distant music is to make an
through,
recipe, we
and
is implicitly
our
for a
A
cannot
arm.
basic action is perfectly simple in the same sense in which the old "simple ideas" were said to be: out of anything more they were not compounded
elementary than themselves, but were instead the
ultimately
were In do not,
simple elements
then, we we move
out of which
and do, an arm. in
other
another the
ideas
we sense
effortful listening. Only those who can already hear can make count as this effort. And what would in the deaf man's case ?He could trying (listening) cup his ear, could place his ear to the ground, could contort his face and close his eyes. All this, is the pantomime of listening. Had he however, or wagged a finger, it would have been as grinned helpful. For there is no one thing that is better than any other in his situation. It is exactly this way with trying to move an arm. It is appropriate
only to ask someone to try to move his arm when
But
in which
that sense
we
do not know
requires
is inappropriate.
an account, and
It is
our
something
e.g., the
externally
arms are
inhibits
and
normal
cannot
movement,
be moved
which
pinioned,
incapacity for giving any such account is what has and induced among puzzlement, philosophers
others, concerning the moving of an arm (and
freely
move
and without
his arm at these
effort. But
all. cases :
the paralytic
cannot
Consider
But this puzzlement other basic acts generally). that we should be dissipated upon the recognition in the inflected have made a grammatical mistake
language as arm" the normal mitted of action. a case We case for have of C-i, normal But look taken when always standard arms "moving in fact C-4 once an is
(a) I am a normal person who has swallowed takes away the power drug which gradually
move effect, minute an arm, negatively intervals. me, rendering abnormal. It gets harder so long I make and as tests harder at five
a to
it is in full
to move
persons
my arm. And then I reach a point where I cannot move my arm and cannot try to. I have lost the
power of trying, together with the power for doing.
that
there. And failing to find what we ought never to to find, we complain have expected that we do
not we know know. how It we do move that our we arms. cannot But of course the explain its doing. there is no action, distinct For to be put action into the explanans. itself, is only
to thinks it would be spectacular (b) Someone be able to extend and retract his fingernails, the way a cat does with its claws. We tell him it cannot
be done, and he retorts that no one has ever tried,
of
and he means to try. But in what should his trying consist? He could shake his fingers hard, could
order them to extend, there could pray, or could draw
This
basic
is due
actions.
to what
Reference
I am terming
to basic
the givenness of
actions belongs
his
soul up
way, I don't
into a vast
for mean
in the explanantia
done. So the paralytic,
for explaining
as long
how
things are
one,
single wish.
There
is no
rational person.
as he
remains
Just
A paralytic might think there is some effort he is not putting forth, by which, if he did or could put
it forth, he might as a consequence move his arm.
to move his nails and to try to move them with tight gloves on). If a man were prepared (e.g., to suffer some sort of surgery, he might be able to cause his nails to go in and out, but we had not understood that he meant this by "trying." It is after all not the way cats do it. It is more the able
way we move a loose tooth.
But
I want
try to move
his
(c) I am a normal
person,
challenged
to move
148
AMERICAN
PHILOSOPHICAL
QUARTERLY so no action as a
a normal
stone is not
stone.
to imply
some incredible
the
cause
(and
"inner"
cause)
entails,
normal?perhaps
into density, or is fixed to a shaft driven deeply the earth. But I decide to try, and the stone moves a normal stone all along. quite easily, having been that the challenge was not normal. So I conclude the stone It turns out I was being asked to move
"the way cause I move my stone arm." But this is not some?
no refutation I believe, of dualism. For all the distinctions I am thinking of are reproduced within the mental and cut across the world, distinction between If, for in? body and mind. take the description "M images /" stance, we as where / is a mental then it is unclear, image,
it was arm," or, in the case M of has then "laughing" performed a basic an action or "moves or not. an not, The whether if an action, action or
ridiculous
try to cause
it to move
as well.
But
I cannot
be a
try to move
proper
it as
whole
action?that
would
encounter
with nothingness. One can do with effort effortlessly; and "trying," something apart from the as cause to effect. It is the
an cause to appear in M's only what one can do may mind; image C-j: the effort of will, is not M is haunted by an image which spon? appears action that stands to it and unpredictably?a symp? taneously, recurrently, action already and C-4: M tom, of perhaps a psychic disorder; required circumstances. untoward in being simply produces an image, as I and all those with performed are the to do, able i.e., requisite Doing something with effort is not doing two things, alpha rhythms as a basic more than doing something gracefully is doing action.5 any an arm is not then the result I shall not press for a full parity, though I am two things. Moving of an act of will : it is an act of will. But to speak prepared to defend the view that there is a problem of Other Bodies precisely analogous to the problem of an act of will when the going is smooth is to of Other Minds. All I wish to emphasize is that, behave a little like the dypsomaniac who wants to the know what sorts of pink rats ordinary people see.4 whatever there may be between disparities if per? It should be plain now why of mind and the concept of body, men concept laughing, as a basic It is is controversial. inmuch the same way formed may be said to act mentally action, that they may be said to act physically. because whoever could so laugh would be positively Among to have meant when he cannot what he does. the things I take Descartes and we understand abnormal, said that we are not in our bodies the way a pilot In relation to him, we are in just the same position as the paralytic lack a kind is in a ship, is that we do not always do things, as in relation to us. We of gift. pilots must with ships, by causing them to happen.
declension works for, C-i: M may cause an image to appear in his mind, perhaps by taking a drug; C-2: Someone or something other than M
V It is easy enough to sympathize with those who feel an action is not intelligible unless we can find a causal picture for it. But this is only because they to consist in having a have taken intelligibility causal picture. Dominated by this requirement, some such picture, tend to invent they may their inner selves with entities whose populating job it is to serve the automotive functions demanded But I am of intelligibility. by the causal model we do not strain, and that we use the asking that it is natural to use it. causal model only where
That there are actions, like moving an arm,
We order,
do
not
turn,
as some
it were, elaborate
an
inner
wheel
in of and,
turn.
We
directly.
But
is in
then neither
a ship. Or
a pilot
things
similes. Any
philosophical
only
problems
in
we
have with
with
would
reappear
connection
which
do not
really
require
any
other
action
as
anything sufficiently similar to us to be a suitable analogue. But if we find ourselves unintelligible, is similar to us to be helpful nothing sufficiently to be more clear. likely
Columbia University
4 It is not often difficult speak of trying consists in succeeding and trying then could 5 But I am not sure to see why that there are two distinct it should be thought things in the case of trying. It is because we and failing. if is another. And So, if we can try and also succeed, trying is one thing and succeeding be something one's arm, in not-ra,ising since failing consists raising an arm, trying here must different, it. But this is not the important consist sense of the word in raising for the theory of action. hardly we are positively or those who have no images are whether abnormal. abnormal, negatively