Problem Solving Complexity History Sustainability

Problem Solving: Complexity, History, Sustainability Author(s): Joseph A. Tainter Source: Population and Environment, Vol. 22, No.
1 (Sep., 2000), pp. 3-41 Published by: Springer Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27503730 Accessed: 25/10/2010 06:54
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=springer. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Population and Environment.
http://www.jstor.org
Problem Solving: Complexity, History, Sustainability

Joseph A. Tainter United States Department of Agriculture Forest Service
insti Sustainability or collapse follow from the success or failure of problem-solving tutions. The factors that lead to long-term success or failure in problem solving have received little attention, so that this fundamental activity is poorly understood. The ence of problem solving, and thus a science of sustainability, must be historical. Complexity is a primary problem-solving strategy, which is often successful in the short-term, but cumulatively may become detrimental to sustainability. Historical case studies illustrate different outcomes to long-term development of complexity
in problem capacity of institutions to solve problems changes over time, suggesting that a sci
collapse,
sidies. KEY WORDS:
simplification, or increasing complexity
solving.
These
cases
clarify
future
options
for contemporary
societies:
based on increasing energy sub
collapse;
complexity;
problem
solving;
organizations;
sustainability.
to the affairs of problem solving is typically addressed Organizational the moment, its long-term consequences. and we rarely consider Problems, at scales from common of course, perennially confront human existence to the great dilemmas of nations and the world. Human institu challenges because their mem tions, including nations and empires, have disappeared bers did not understand the development of problem (Tainter, solving decision making (March & Simon, 1958; 2000). The fields of organizational March & Olsen, 1986; Simon, 1997), organizational (Aldrich, ecology 1979, Hannan & Carroll, 1992; Baum & Singh, 1994a, 1994b), and learn
2205
Please address correspondence Columbia SE, Albuquerque,
NM
to Joseph A. Tainter, 87106. Interdisciplinary
Rocky Mountain
Research
Station,
A Journal of and Environment: Population Volume 2000 22, Number 1, September ? 2000 Human Sciences 3 Press, Inc.
Studies
4 POPULATION AND ENVIRONMENT
in recent years to clarify ing organizations (Senge, 1990) have done much institutions thrive or stagnate. As Peter Senge (1990, pp. 23, 57) notes, why decision-makers of their actions. Prob rarely foresee the full consequences for a solution that is successful lem solving can have pernicious effects, now can contribute to failure later on. It is important to understand how over time periods from decades systems develop problem-solving stretching to centuries. A science of institutional problem solving is above all a histori cal science. few studies of institutions extend beyond a few Regrettably, of previous efforts at problem solving decades. The vast human experience in organizational remain largely untapped research. This essay mainly concerns problem solving by large institutions, of the successes and failures of nations and empires provide some of which Three such cases, history's most poignant examples. illustrating different are presented. Since the purpose is to un of problem trajectories solving, derstand general principles, the results can be (and have been) applied to or non other problem-solving institutions, such as businesses, agencies, is not to un The purpose organizations (e.g., Tainter, 1997). governmental derstand history per se, but to use history to formulate an understanding of that can clarify our situation today. problem solving
CONSTRAINTS TO ORGANIZATIONAL AND DURABILITY EFFECTIVENESS

factors constrain all large institutions in their development and effectiveness. These include the structure of an institution's problem-solving environment like institutions), the efficiency of internal (including other and limits to human cognition and information processing. transactions, The numbers of a type of organization tend to grow slowly at first, is reached beyond which then accelerate until a point is further growth not possible. this point the numbers will decline then somewhat, Beyond is regulated by two different mechanisms: fluctuate. This process legitimiza tion and competition (Hannan & Carroll, 1992). Proliferation of a type of increases its legitimacy, so that there is less resistance to estab organization more of them. As Renfrew noted in lishing regard to early states, 'The spe in the eyes of its citizens by the existence cific state is legitimised of other states which patently do function along similar linesff (1982, p. 289 [em in original]). At the same time, increasing the numbers of a type phasis of organization ultimately for resources competition increases. mortality hits the limit of available limits further proliferation resources. and Thereafter organizational Certain
5 A. JOSEPH TAINTER
are In a large, complex internal to the organization system, constraints as crucial as those external, and often more immediate. R. H. Coase (1937) argued that business firms exist to reduce transaction costs by internalizing diverse services. Hierarchy always simplifies, and within a firm internaliz their prices. Yet as firms be ing services reduces the cost of establishing come returns to scale. Transaction costs in there are diminishing larger crease as information channels become (Rosen, 1991, p. 82), congested waste further internal transactions increases, and the cost of organizing in the business sector as eas Until recently, hierarchies proliferated grows. states also (Bendix, 1956, p. 216). Ancient ily as they did in government transaction costs. The early Roman Empire, for example, exter experienced nalized parts of its own defense by allowing client states to buffer its periph in time absorbed, ery (Luttwak, 1976). Those states were internalizing de fense and administration, until the costs of continued grew too expansion relative to the benefits of further internalization (Tainter, 1994; see high
below). are always Problem solvers constrained by bounded rationality (March & Simon, 1958; Simon, 1997). The behavior of organizations ap (Aldrich, 1979, p. 4) and is intended to be rational pears to be goal oriented Yet humans can rarely absorb all the complexi (Simon, 1997, pp. 88-89). ties of a problem, and decide on the basis of rules or models that simplify (March & Simon, 1958: 169-171, 203; Simon, 1997, p. 119). complexity in a complex Decision making system may be surrounded by such confu sion as to make tenuous the linkage between and solution problem have system-wide (March & Olsen, 1986, p. 16). Decisions consequences that may manifest themselves later (Senge, 1990, p. 23). years or decades This crucial fact has long been overlooked: in the nineteenth century Her bert Spencer observed than one that, "Every active force produces more cause produces more than one effect' (1972, p. 47 [empha change?every sis in original]). This lesson will emerge clearly in the cases described here. The literature on organizations that leads, then, to several suppositions: institutions that they face problems both of inherently attract challenges; internal structure and cost, and of external threat; and that, with inadequate must devise solutions whose consequences decision-makers understanding, ramify unpredictably.
DEVELOPMENT OF PROBLEM SOLVING

societies and their institutions must, be problem-solving tics, systems. They respond Human among other characteris to challenges that range
6 AND ENVIRONMENT POPULATION
to international crises and global change. Families, exists to solve problems, and to and its agencies?each firms, government Institutions that fail to solve prob continue to exist must do so successfully. lems lose legitimacy and support, as many governments (such as that of the from the mundane former Soviet Union) have learned. is largely unaware that over time societies can Our ahistorical society or Yet in ineffective at confronting become challenges solving problems. earlier societies, such as among the writers of antiquity and the Renais itwas a truism (e.g., Alcock, sance, the idea was not only acceptable, in one of history's most remarkable 1993). The Greek historian Polybius, it foresaw the collapse of the Roman Empire 600 years before predictions, fell (Polybius, 1979, p. 310). actually For nearly three millennia have sought to scholars and philosophers it has been understand why societies fail to preserve themselves. Recently is a primary factor linking problem solving to the that complexity argued success or collapse of societies and institutions. Over the long run itmay be the most 1997, 1996b, important factor (Tainter, 1988, 1995, 1996a, is a of complexity 1999). The evolution 2000; Allen, Tainter, & Hoekstra, the pri significant part of the history of problem solving and accordingly mary focus of this essay. more complex? Human societies often seem to become progressively this is, comprised of more parts, more kinds of parts, and greater integration ancestors of parts. This process began with our hunter-gatherer (e.g., over the past 12,000 years. Price & Brown 1985), and has accelerated There have been episodes like the European Dark Ages when complexity but the trend they interrupt is so constant that we see these peri collapses, ods as aberrations socie (Tainter, 1999). This is curious, for truly complex as old as about four ties are quite recent. Hominids have been discovered not appear until million years, yet the most complex societies?states?did a little more than five thousand years ago. In the full spectrum of hominid is rare. history, complexity seem often to be averse to complexity. We The reasoning behind say "com understood. The so-called ings like "Keep it simple" is universally life" is a favorite topic of journalists and their readers. plexity of modern reason why we have such low participation One in elections is that the com value of a single vote does not appear to offset the cost of mastering stems from the fact plex issues. Much of the discontent with government resent that governments increase the complexity of people's lives. People to such a degree that politicians build governmentally-imposed complexity careers opposing to expose it while it. journalists compete In science, the Principle of Occam's Razor states that simplicity in
7 A. JOSEPH TAINTER
studies is superior to complexity. Tourney, who Christopher explanation has shown that the incorpora in popular American the role of science life, tion of scientific values into American culture has varied with the complex science was so simple that itsmain ity of science (1996, pp. 11 -20). When were fundamental and an inquisitive spirit, itwas education requirements to pursue knowledge of the considered worthy (even divinely sanctioned) it diverged so science grew complex and specialized natural world. When values that public attitudes began to range from sharply from American to hostility. Alexis de Tocqueville commented upon this trend skepticism as early as 1834. has a cost. While we may appreciate Every increase of complexity in some spheres (e.g., art), we are averse when it is ourselves complexity who must bear the costs. People oppose governmentally-imposed complex ity not just because of abstract notions of liberty, but also because of the costs it carries?taxes in levied or time spent filling in forms or standing or is the energy, The cost of supporting complexity labor, time, queues. money needed to create, maintain, and replace a system that grows to have to support specialists, to regulate and more parts and transactions, so that the parts of a system all work harmoniously, behavior and to pro once esti duce and control information. The anthropologist Leslie White mated that a society activated primarily by human energy (bands of hunter for example), could generate only about 1/20 horsepower per gatherers, This is all the energy such (1949, p. 369; 1959, pp. 41-42). capita per year a simple society needs. Today such a quantity of energy can produce scarcely a fleeting moment of industrial life. No society can become more its consumption of high-quality energy (Hall, complex without increasing & Kaufmann, 1992), human labor, time, or money. Cleveland, costs and we are averse to paying for it,why then don't Ifcomplexity we still live as simple foragers? Our ancestors did for nearly all of our his The reason is that although complexity it has great utility in costs, tory. We attribute our success as a species to such things as problem solving. thumb, and a large and richly-networked upright posture, an opposable brain. These attributes allow us rapidly to increase the complexity of our the ability quickly to alter our problem-solving Without problem solving. behavior we would be hardly more capable than other species, which must entrust their continuity to the slow process of biological evolution. The development of complexity is thus one of the wonderful dilemmas of human history. Over the past 12,000 years (when the complexity of we to increase human societies have frequently began significantly) more energy, labor, time, adopted strategies of problem solving that cost and money, and that often go against deep For much of this inclinations. more
time the cost was increased human labor: people worked harder to support complexity. We have done this for a simple reason: most of the time com It is a fundamental tool. In its early phases, plexity works. problem-solving can generate positive feedback and increasing returns (Tainter, complexity we 1999). Confronted with challenges, 1988; Allen, Tainter, & Hoekstra, as more complex often respond by strategies such developing technologies, an institution (specialists, bureaucratic levels, con adding more elements to or regulation of transactions, or trols, etc.), increasing organization gather more information. Each such action represents increas ing and processing comes in part because changes in these Their effectiveness ing complexity. can be enacted dimensions humans may be complexity rapidly. While averse when we personally bear the cost, our problem-solving institutions can be powerful complexity for growth of generators. All that is needed is a problem that requires it. Since problems always arise, com complexity plexity seems to grow inexorably. Since complexity is an adaptive strategy that has problem-solving it can be viewed as an economic invest in com function. Societies costs, In any system of problem the initial strategies tend to be plexity. solving, both effective (they work) and cost-effective (giving high returns per unit of This is a normal economic solu investment). process: simple, inexpensive ones. So in the his tions are adopted before more complex and expensive tory of human efforts to feed ourselves, labor-sparing hunting and gathering to more labor-intensive itself became more gave way agriculture, which intensive as populations grew. is being replaced by industrialized Increasingly, subsistence agriculture more energy than it produces that consumes production (Boserup, 1977). Whenever 1965; Clark & Haswell, 1966; Cohen, possible we pro sources?ones duce minerals and energy from the most economical that are least costly to find, extract, process, and distribute. As Herbert Spencer and others have noted, our societies have changed (e.g., 1972, pp. 39-46) from egalitarian ad hoc leadership, and relations, economic reciprocity, social roles to social and economic differentiation, generalized specializa are the es tion, inequality, and full-time leadership. These arrangements sence of social complexity. food returns (Tainter, solutions may for a time produce positive Complex no society & Hoekstra, 1988; Allen, Tainter, 1999). Unfortunately, (or smaller institution such as an agency or firm) can forever enjoy stable or in specific areas of problem solving. In any increasing returns to complexity size and differentiation exacerbate the problem of organization, increasing internal transaction costs (Coase, 1937). Hierarchies differentiate (Bendix, or problems are perceived. Information be 216) as opportunities 1956, p.
9 A. JOSEPH TAINTER
so that simplified mod comes less coherent as it becomes more abundant, must substitute for the richness of actual processes els (March & Simon, have 1958, p. 203; Rosen, 1991, p. 82; Simon, 1997, p. 119). Decisions unforeseen consequences (Spencer, 1972, p. 47; Senge, 1990, p. 23), and as will be discussed below, often drive up costs. The link between problem is often tenuous and solution (March & Olsen, 1986, p. 16). Because of the problems of transaction costs, rational, omniscient decision makers will the cost of an extra internal transaction reduce internal transactions when The problem equals the cost of an external one (Coase 1937, pp. 394-395). is that decision makers are typically not omniscient, and cannot foretell the future. Thus they inevitably make decisions that inadvertently increase costs. We tend to view the microprocessor as an exception to this industry Law. Microprocessor inMoore's for example, pro problem, exemplified, ducers have enjoyed positive feedback and increasing returns. Yet even this to physical solutions constraints industry must devise ever-more-clever Service 1997), which it cannot do indefinitely as easily as it has to (e.g., cannot forever avoid dimin date. Even economically-rational organizations returns to complexity, and certainly not institutions (such as ancient ishing naive. states) that are economically As highest-return solutions are exhausted, only more costly approaches remain to be adopted. As the highest-return ways to produce resources, conduct and organize transactions, information, process society are pro implemented, adaptive problems must be addressed gressively by more and less effective As the costs of solutions grow, the point responses. costly is reached where further investments in complexity do not give a propor tionate return. Increments of investment begin to yield smaller and smaller return (that is, the return per extra unit increments of return. The marginal of investment) declines. This is the central problem: diminishing returns to complexity. it brings on economic Carried far enough stagnation and ineffective problem In its most severe form it has made societies solving. to collapse, and historically has led to conditions vulnerable that are collo called "dark ages" (Tainter, 1988, 1999). A prolonged quially period of returns to complexity in problem is a major part of diminishing solving a society what makes unsustainable (Tainter, 1995, 1996b; Allen, 1999). Tainter, & Hoekstra, This thesis can be illustrated in two principle areas of problem solving: resources and to follow, information. In the examples producing producing resources and information solve the problems of obtaining in eco people behavior and institutions that are sim ways. They prefer nomically-rational labor and other types of ple rather than complex. They prefer to conserve When them to adopt new institutions or ways of energy. require problems
and diminish their needs, they experience meeting increasing complexity illustrate the evolution of many problem-solv ing returns. These examples returns, initially positive ing adaptive systems: increasing complexity with returns to complexity and increasing costliness. then diminishing Resources
Producing People have
typically pluck the lowest apple first. That is, provided that they and initially use sources of food, raw materials, people knowledge, As that are easiest to acquire, process, and consume. distribute, energy arise in the form of growing consumption and/or exhaustion of problems turn to supplies that are more difficult to resources, people inexpensive this requires greater effort acquire, process, distribute, or consume. Often no greater return (although, as will be shown, sometimes while yielding this is not the case). We are socialized today to think that among the most desirable goals of life are to produce and acquire as much as possible. Yet this is a recent our ancestors less than they were development: typically produced much as many people still do. Hobbes's description of hunter-gatherer capable of, us to think of simple life as "nasty, brutish, and short" has accustomed as a continuous Yet anthropologist Richard subsistence production struggle. Lee found that the !Kung San (Bushmen) of the Kalahari Desert (a landscape not very productive) to obtain need to work only about 2.5 days per week all the food they need (Lee, 1968, 1969). Because of this example, simple leisure society. foragers such as the !Kung have been labeled the original Subsistence agriculturalists also seem to work rather little, and it ispartic that often they produce less than they might. Labor seems ularly noticeable so that subsistence to be abundant, underutilized, and inefficiently deployed, The Kapauku Papuans of New characteristically underproduce. for example, according to research by Leopold Posposil, work about Guinea, two hours a day at agricultural tasks, even during the peak labor season. in the Amazon Basin that Kuikuru men Similarly, Robert Carneiro observed about 2 hours a day on agricultural work and 90 minutes fishing. They spend or resting. With a little extra spend the rest of the day dancing, wrestling, effort they could produce much more than they do. Many households in such societies do not produce even enough to live on; they are supported by others (Sahlins, 1972). Thus farmers working only a couple of hours a day may be than their own. supporting even more households Colonial administrators, confronted with such underproduction (and in of both economics and human diversity), often concluded that ignorance were Yet subsistence the native people they supervised inherently lazy. farmers
11 A. JOSEPH TAINTER
places follow similar strategies, economically developed A. Russia. The Russian economist of pre-revolutionary including peasants V. Chayanov (1966) studied the intensity of labor among 25 farm families in Volokolamsk. Plotting intensity of labor against the relative number of of scale: the larger the found economies workers per household, Chayanov farmers the less effort each person puts relative number of workers per household varies inversely with productive forth. Productive (Sah capacity intensity in which 1972, p. 91). Even under the harsh conditions lived, lins, they Those able to produce the most actually Russian peasants underproduced. leisure more highly than the mar the most. They valued underproduced return to extra labor. ginal To account for this contradiction between the availability of labor and Ester Boserup wrote her the failure to apply it beyond basic sufficiency, of Agricultural Growth classic work The Conditions (1965). The key she return to increasing is the marginal found to persistent underproduction labor?a subtle concept brought forth by the sustained effort of Western economic science, but understood all along by the lazy natives and conser vative peasants. Simply put, while agricultural intensification (in non-mech anized cultivation) causes the productivity of land to increase, it causes the Each extra unit of labor produces less out productivity of labor to decline. per unit than did the first unit of labor. The natives and peasants pro put duce less than they might for the simple reason that increasing production returns to labor. yields diminishing In northern has been amply verified. Boserup's principle general for example, labor applied at an annual rate of about 200 hours Greece, is roughly 15 times more productive (in returns per hour of per hectare labor) than labor applied at 2000 hours per hectare. The latter farmer will certainly harvest more per hectare, but will harvest less per hour of work 1973). (Clark & Haswell, 1966; Wilkinson, Ifextra labor is so inefficient, why undertake it? Boserup suggests (al here her thesis is somewhat oversimplified) that the factor that has though is population driven agricultural intensification historically growth. Phrased in the terms of this essay, growth of population food supply pres straining ents an adaptive problem that can be addressed by intensifying food pro duction?whether by adopting agriculture to supplement foraging (Cohen, In some cases 1977) or by applying greater labor to existing agriculture. subsistence intensification may amount only to the application of labor, in other cases it involves increasing the complexity while of labor (by add ing extra steps such as field preparation, weeding, manuring, fallowing, or irrigation). Both strategies institutionalize higher costs in the production
system.
in more
At its best it Intensification of production leads to several outcomes. the shortfall and all iswell. At itsworst?directed from above by alleviates can desta rulers to seek to maximize for political purposes?it production an entire society vulnerable to col bilize productive systems and make it is serendipitous, lapse. On occasion bringing great increases in prosper ity. There are telling historical examples. to mobilize labor and re Early states and empires had such capacity sources that we still marvel today at the monuments they built. Yet in these seems to have been less information about productive capacity than production often seem not to have understood itself. Rulers developed the capacity of the land and peasants to intensify production. They appear to have felt that compelling peasants to greater labor would always com of land. The result was societies that pensate for the declining productivity underwent of political growth, followed by economic stagna long periods The Third Dynasty of Ur (ca. tion, conquest by another state, or collapse. 2100-2000 b.c.) is a particularly dramatic example. societies In southern Mesopotamia, bringing irrigation to the desert soils initially with prosperity, security, and stability. This was produces high yields along the strategy of the Third Dynasty of Ur. It extended irrigation and encour a complex It established and settlement growth. bureau aged population to collect the revenues generated All was well cracy by high production. for a few generations?at least for the rulers. After a few years of over irrigating Mesopotamian soils, saline ground water rises and ruins the soil. The Third Dynasty of Ur was destroyed by its own strategy for raising revenues?part of its problem solving efforts. Before the Third Dynasty of Ur, in the period ca. 2900 to 2300 b.c., crop yields had averaged about 2030 liters per hectare. By the end of the third millen to 1134 liters. This decline nium b.c. they had declined in production (and in state revenues) seems to have been the problem hence that the Third tried to overcome and increasing gov Dynasty by intensifying production ernmental complexity. Thus as yields declined and costs rose, farmers had to intensify their production to support a costlier state structure. Itwas a course of returns to complexity. clearly diminishing The Third Dynasty of Ur persisted through five kings and then col The state had built an irrigation regime and administrative appara lapsed. tus, and encouraged levels, that could not be sustained without population central government. When the administrative it took apparatus collapsed the countryside with it. By 1700 b.c. yields were down to 718 liters per hectare. More than one-fourth of the fields still in production yielded on average only about 370 liters per hectare. For equal efforts cultivators took as as those 800 years earlier. By the in harvests less than one-fourth large
B.c. the number of settlements had dropped end of the second millennium 40 percent and the settled area had contracted by 77 percent. Popula by tion densities did not grow again to the level of Ur IIIfor nearly 2500 years, a new regime tried again to maximize when (Adams, 1978, production 1988). and increasing Happily, solving problems by intensifying production results. The law of diminish does not always yield catastrophic complexity conse by the law of unintended superseded ing returns is occasionally Richard In one of the most significant works of economic quences. history, to the how the people of England responded Wilkinson (1973) described in the late Middle Ages and deforestation of population problems growth and Renaissance. Population growth throughout this era led progressively to agricultural As forests were cut to pro intensification and deforestation. vide food and fuel for more and more people, the supply of wood no longer sufficed as itonce had. Coal began increasingly to be used for heating and For several reasons this was done reluctantly. Coal was polluting, cooking. Entire new systems had to be de and itwas not to be found everywhere. and railways. Digging a fuel from the ground vised to distribute it?canals costs more than cutting a standing tree. Coal overall cost more per unit of and had to be purchased with cash. Those forced to heat than did wood, a decline on coal, in at least its initial phases of adoption, experienced rely in their financial well-being. the problem of insufficiency of wood Solving returns of diminishing by using coal instead was at first another experience to intensification but were solved their problems, and complexity. People worse off for it. As the importance of coal grew itsmost accessible deposits were de The cost of coal rose. Mines had to be sunk ever deeper until pleted. limited further mining. This was a vexatious problem, but it groundwater In time the steam of the steam engine. stimulated greatly the development to pump water efficiently from mines. The engine was perfected enough came to be institutionalized. coal-based economy The remarkable part of this story is that, with the emergence of an of a distribution network of ca based on coal, the development economy several of the nals and railways, and the refinement of the steam engine, most in place. Coal, elements of the Industrial Revolution were important came returns and declining welfare, which initially produced diminishing returns and to subsidize with further technological refinement increasing The secret of the success was an energy source great growth of welfare. to subsidize far more human activity than is possi that could be developed ble solely by harvesting the products of photosynthesis, such as wood. Solv 1981; Yoffee, ing the problems of extracting and distributing coal raised transaction costs,
but this was more than offset by the prosperity arising from positive feed The outcome could not have been back and technological development. more different from what happened in ancient Mesopotamia. It is one of ironies that industrialism, the great generator of economic history's great in part from solving the problem of resource deple emerged well-being, so often generates poverty and collapse. tion, which resources confronts every human institu The problem of producing tion. Being rational and complexity humans always prefer (i.e., cost)-averse, to use resources that they know can be economically found, harvested, and to pluck the lowest fruit first. As such "first-line" to use. We put prefer resources become resources insufficient, the problem of producing more tends to raise complexity economic and increase costs, and thus decreases Thus most of us now work far more than the two hours per day efficiency. of simple cultivators. On occasion this intensification of production may an unexpected of coal, but often it benefit, as in the deployment generate leads to working income of resources. harder just to maintain a constant
Producing Knowledge
We see in the development of industrialism that producing knowledge steam engines and transportation) has as great a role in (of, for example, resources. We are taught to think adaptive problem solving as producing is a good thing, and for the most part of course that knowledge it is. Yet, or research, we rarely realize except for those who must fund education that knowledge has costs. Moreover, is not always increasing knowledge cost effective. As knowledge its production also be grows more complex, comes subject to returns. Bounded and simple over rationality diminishing further reduce the effectiveness of information (March & Simon, production 1958, p. 203; Rosen, 1991, p. 82; Simon, 1997, p. 119). on As any society increases in complexity it becomes more dependent In 1924 information, and its members require higher levels of education. S. G. Strumilin evaluated the productivity of education in the newly-formed Soviet Union. The first two years of education, Strumilin found, raise a skills an average of 14.5 percent per year. Adding a third year worker's causes the productivity to decline, of education for skills rise only an addi tional eight percent. Four to six years of education raise workers' skills only a further four to five percent per year (Tul'chinskii, Edu 1967, pp. 51-52). cation beyond the first two years in this case yielded diminishing returns. In the United States a comprehensive study of the costs of educa was published by Fritz tion home education (1962). In 1957-58, Machlup of pre-school children cost the United States $886,400,000 per year for
each age class from newborn through five. (This cost is primarily poten In elementary tial income foregone by parents.) and secondary school the costs increased to $2,564,538,462 class (for ages 6 per year per age (33.5 percent of through 18). For those who aspired to higher education in 1960), a 4-year course of study cost the nation the eligible population cost of education $3,189,250,000 per grade per year. Thus the monetary between pre-school, when the most general and broadly useful education takes place, and college, when the learning ismost specialized, increased in the late 1950s by 1075 percent per capita. Yet from 1900 to 1960 the expertise declined productivity of this investment for producing specialized As S. G. Strumi (Fig. 1) (Machlup, 1962, pp. 79, 91, 104-105). throughout in 1924, higher levels of educational lin found in the Soviet Union invest ment yield declining marginal returns. in problem solv ultimate exercise science, humanity's Contemporary shows parallel trends. The knowledge ing, early in a scientific developed to produce. Thereafter tends to be generalized and inexpensive discipline
14 T
12 \^ \ . \ \ (Ph.D./B.A.)/$ per Student x .001
10
A)/$ \ (Ph.D./M
per Student x .01
8 -L
\ (M.A./BA)/$ per Student x.01
\\
6 "\\ 4 -\x V.
2+
0 J-1-1-'-1-1-.-1-.-1
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
FIGURE 1. Productivity of educational investment for producing special ized expertise, U.S., 1900-1960 (data from Machlup, 1962, pp. 79, 91).
the work becomes research tends to Specialized increasingly specialized. be more costly and difficult to resolve, so that increasing investments yield returns. Walter Rostow once argued that marginal pro declining marginal first rises and then falls in individual fields of research (1980, pp. ductivity Even the great physicist Max Planck noted that ". . . with every 170-171). advance the difficulty of the task is increased" (Rescher, 1980, [in science] Rescher has called this "Planck's Principle of Increasing p. 80). Nicholas Effort." As easier questions are resolved, science moves inevitably to more research topics and to more costly organizations (Rescher, 1980, complex suggests that "As science progresses within any of its increase in the over-all resource-cost specialized branches, there is a marked . . ." to realizing scientific findings of a given level [of] intrinsic significance of science must grow exponentially 80). The size and costliness (1978, p. a constant rate of progress (Rescher, 1980, p. 92). Derek just to maintain in 1963 that science was growing faster than either de Sol?a Price observed the population or the economy, and of all the scientists who had ever lived, were still alive at that time (Price, 1963). 80-90 percent pp. 93-94). Rescher Scientists rarely think about the benefit/cost ratio to investment in their research. Ifwe evaluate of our investment in science by the productivity some measure such as the issuance of patents (Fig. 2), however, the histori cal productivity of science appears to be declining. is a controver Patenting 70
j
-Per .. 6Q /~^~~^^\ \v ?. . --' 50 -?^^y \s^ * .Per Expenditures 100 R&D Scientists Engineers Million $ R&D
40 Patent Applications X
~^-.
-^-^^ 30 --
^\^
20
.?. -- """""-"-......
io
-I- -1-
-1-'-1-
-i-'-1-1-1-'-1-'
1942
1944
1946
1948
1950
Year
1952
1954
1956
1958
FIGURE 2. Patent applications in respect 1958 (data from Machlup, 1962, p. 173).
to research
inputs, U.S.,
1942
Schmo sial measure of productivity 1962, pp. 174-175; (e.g., Machlup, in a field of okler 1966; Griliches, 1984), but there is good evidence the return to investment can be readily determined: applied science where Over the 52-year period shown in Fig. 3, the productivity of the medicine. declined by United States health care system for improving life expectancy nearly 60 percent. of the U.S. health care system The declining illustrates productivity of problem-solving systems. Rescher clearly the historical development points out: Once all of the findings at a given state-of-the-art level of investi have been realized, one must move to a more gative technology in a level. ... In natural science we are involved expensive arms race: with every "victory over nature" the technological the breakthroughs which is in lie ahead difficulty of achieving creased. (1980, pp. 94, 97) is declining because the inexpensive dis first. The basic research that led to peni than $20,000. The remaining maladies
The productivity of medicine eases and ailments were conquered cost no more cillin, for example,
17 -r 16 ""^^^
15 -- \ 14 -- \ 13 -- \
Productivity^ \.
Index \
11 -- \ 10 -- \
9 8 --, . . j.| ,, .1 7 .| . ^~^\ \ , ,.|-.L ......... |
1930
1940
1950
Year
1960
1970
1980
FIGURE 3. Productivity of the U.S. health care system, 1930-1982 (data from Worthington [1975, p. 5] and U.S. Bureau of the Census [1983, pp. index = (Life expectancy)/(National health expendi 73, 102]). Productivity tures as percent of GNP).
difficult and costly to cure (Rescher, 1978, pp. 85-86; 1980, p. is conquered, disease the increment to 52). As each increasingly expensive ever smaller. The return to medi life expectancy becomes average marginal cal investment progressively declines. com resources or information, whether Problem-solving, involving evolves along a path of increasing complexity and positive returns, monly returns (Tainter, 1988, 1995, 1996b). A then higher costs and diminishing that follows such a trajectory cannot be sus system of problem-solving tained indefinitely, as the rulers of the Third Dynasty of Ur found to their and popular collective fiscal weakness disaffection dismay. Ultimately cause such systems to be terminated or to collapse. Yet commonly when it is seen as a rational short is decided the solution to a problem upon, term measure. The higher complexity and higher cost of implementing the solution may appear only to be incremental and affordable. As Spencer cumulative would have predicted, are unforeseen, do the damage. and long-term effects, which typically
are more
ADAPTIVE PROBLEM SOLVING: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES

over the has unintended consequences Complexity long term in part it is cumulative. builds on what has because Each increment of complexity seems to grow exponentially. Moreover, gone before, so that complexity to complexity to be a rational re each increment appears at its adoption sponse to a problem. The additional cost seems reasonable and affordable. The fact that the problem was a short-term one is often forgotten, and so comes to grow. This is the key to understanding the develop complexity ment of unsupportable it grows by small steps, each necessary, complexity: each a reasonable solution to a problem. Yet the first case study shows how over long periods of time, complex problem solving grows to cumulatively, a point of such costliness that it becomes This process is a unsupportable. to social and economic Itmay enrich people, stimulus powerful change. impoverish them, or even kill many of them (Tainter, 1988, 1999). are Governments systems that inherently attract chal problem-solving is one reason why they seem always to grow in size and lenges, which It is not strictly correct to talk of institutions having goals (Aid complexity. a metaphor suffers from reification?but all long rich, 1979, p. 4)?such term institutions incorporate mechanisms to ensure their continuity. These to a common set of values, and mechanisms include socializing members upon making the welfare of individuals congruent with or even dependent
19 A. JOSEPH TAINT?R
the continuity of the institution. In this way the members of institutions set, It is rare for an institution that has and work toward, the goal of continuity. to disband. There is survived for a long time, or is intended to, voluntarily the much to learn from the history of problem-solving institutions, of which Roman Empire is one of the best examples. The Western Roman
Empire
one of history's great successes The Roman Empire is paradoxically and one of its great failures (Tainter, 1994). The fact that it could be both in the context of how its main problem-solving institu is understandable economies and army?experienced that tions?the government changing affected millions of people both within the empire and without. ultimately that was The Romans' early success came from a means of expansion Defeated basis, and peoples gave the economic fiscally self-perpetuating. was a strategy with positive some of the manpower, It for further expansion. returns. In 167 b.c., for example, economic the Romans were able to elimi nate taxation of themselves and still expand the empire. size. In the pre reach or even exceed a sustainable Empires eventually industrial era this occurred when the distance from the capital would grow so great that communication with the frontiers became slow and uncertain; or when insurmountable barriers were reached; or when peo geographical or impossible (Tainter, was uneconomical were found whose conquest ples For Rome, the most efficient empire would have con 1988, pp. 148-149). could be administered sisted of the Mediterranean easily by fringe, which sea. Once the Romans had the Mediterranean, though, the lands they held were always threatened by new enemies further inland. To alleviate these into the interior of Asia, to the Danube threats the Romans expanded and and into northwestern Europe. In these places the empire found, its limits of both territory and economy, for administra exceeded, tion by land travel was always less efficient than by sea. Attempts at further central Europe, and Mesopotamia?showed that Scotland, conquest?in would be too costly. Only a salient known as Dacia continued expansion was held across the Danube, from the early second century until the early was 270s. The Romans were correct in the threats that they perceived, for it invasions were from precisely these areas that raids and repeatedly beyond, or even launched in later Cicero once yielded a surplus. for the economics campaign centuries. that of all Rome's conquests, complained only Asia in this exaggeration, There is a point worth examining of empire are seductive but illusory. The returns to any of conquest are highest initially, when the accumulated surpluses
are appropriated. as Thereafter of the conquered the conqueror peoples sumes the cost of administering In the case of and defending the province. Rome these responsibilities lasted for centuries, and had to be paid for from year-to-year agricultural surpluses. The Roman Empire was powered by so an economy with lar energy, which little surplus production per provides 1974, pp. 37-39, 83, 138; Tainter, capita (Jones, 1964, pp. 841-844; is over, the cost of empire 1988, p. 149; 1994). Once the phase of conquest rises and benefits decline. Even the first emperor, Augustus (27 B.c-14 of fiscal shortages, and made up state deficits from his a.D.), complained own purse (Gibbon, 1776-88, 1946, p. 75; Frank, p. 140; Hammond, 15). 1940, pp. 7-9, The government financed by agricultural taxes barely sufficed for ordi arose, typically during nary administration. When expenses extraordinary insufficient. Facing the wars, the precious metals on hand frequently were costs of war with Parthia and rebuilding Rome after the Great Fire, Nero (54-68) began in 64 a.D. a policy that later emperors found irresistible. He debased the primary silver coin, the denarius, reducing the alloy from 98 to 93 percent silver. Itwas the first step down a slope that resulted two centuries later in a currency that was worthless and a government that was insolvent (Fig. 4). After decades of relative stability the empire's position deteriorated Invasions of Parthi (161-180). sharply during the reign of Marcus Aurelius ans from the east and Germans from the north coincided with an outbreak to one-third of the population of plague that killed from one-fourth (Boak, 1955, p. 19; Mazzarino, 1966, p. 152; McNeill, 1976, p. 116; Russell, The empire survived these challenges, but hereafter the 1958, pp. 36-37). In 194-195 the emperor Septimius currency was debased more frequently. inwhat is called the Great Debasement, Severus (193-211), lowered the silver to about 56 percent (Walker, 1978). The half-century from 235 to 284 was a time of unparalleled crisis, the empire nearly came to an end. There were foreign and during which civil wars, which followed one upon another almost without interruption. Over this period there were 26 legitimate emperors, and as many as 50 and Persians invaded usurpers or about 1 insurrection per year. Germans devastated. The em repeatedly. Cities were sacked and frontier provinces in the 260s (temporarily, as it turned out) to Italy, the Balkans, pire shrank and North Africa. By prodigious effort and sacrifice the empire survived the crisis, but at great cost. Itemerged at the turn of the fourth century a.D. as a very different organization. Great changes were needed in the government and the political sys tem. Diocletian Constantine and (284-305) (306-337) responded with
4.00
-r
3.50 3.00 ;
'
'
I?. L^J ^^r^^s
2.50
Grams of 2.00 ?
^?t
mtui I
I ^V\i|
Silver
1.50 -:
"La
100 ":
0.50 ? \
0.00 I
\a
' ' ' I ' ' ' ' I ' ' ' i ' ' ' 1 ' ' ' I ^ ' ' i
50
100
150
Years A.D.
200
250
300
FIGURE 4. Debasement 1974, and unpublished 1978]; 217]). see also
[1982]; LeGentilhomme [1962]; Tyler [1975]; andWalker

Besly & Bland [1983, pp. 26-27]
of the denarius to 269 a.D. (data from Cope on file in the British Museum]; analyses and Tainter
[1969, King p.
[1976, 1977,
[1994,
sweeping political and economic changes that transformed the empire. The was and more highly or government they designed larger, more complex, the size of the army, so that itmay have stood as doubled ganized. They high as 650,000 by the end of the fourth century. To pay for this the govern ment taxed its citizens more heavily, conscripted their labor, and dictated a coercive, state that tabulated It became their occupations. omnipresent and amassed all resources for its own survival. came to be closely internal transactions Many regulated. Diocletian to Rome's first budget, and each year a tax rate was calculated established from a master list of the em the revenue. The tax was established provide and lands, tabulated down to individual households and pire's people re fields. Taxes apparently doubled between 324 and 364. Villages were for the taxes on their members, and one village could even be sponsible held liable for another. The government conscripted men for the army and were made hereditary and services from guilds. Occupations Positions that had once been eagerly sought, such as in city obligatory. as were held responsible for senates, became burdensome leading citizens tax deficiencies. requisitioned
reforms a stable currency could not be found Despite several monetary As masses of worthless coins were produced, (Fig. 5). prices rose higher and higher. In the second century a modius of wheat (about nine liters) had sold during normal harvests for about 1/2 denarius. InDiocletian's Edict on Prices (301 ) the price was set at 100 denarii. In 335 a modius of wheat sold in Egypt for over 6000 denarii, and in 338 for over 10,000 (Jones, 1964, not in the east would pp. 27, 119). Money-changers and the government refused to accept its own rency, of a soldier's pay was provided in supplies rather coins (Meyer, 1987; Van Meter, 1991, p. 47; Jones, convert coins than imperial cur for taxes. Much in the worthless
1964, p. 27; 1974, p. 201; Duncan-Jones, 1990, p. 115; Williams, 1985, p. 79; Mattingly, 1960, 1972, p. 38). pp. 222-223; Hodgett, The tax system supporting the more complex and larger government had unforeseen After the plagues of the second and army consequences. third centuries conditions were never favorable for population to recover. Peasants could not support large families. Despite government edicts, mar lands went out of cultivation. In some provinces, to one-third to up ginal one-half of arable lands came to be deserted by the late empire. There were
12
10
j
-
C/> CO 6 ? -
2+
0 l i i i ??i ? i i ? i i i i i i i i i t i i i i i i i i i i i i i t i i i i i i i i t i , t i i , i i i i i- , i
296
306
316 Years
326 A.D.
336
346
FIGURE 5. Reductions in the weight Van Meter, 1991, p. 47).
of the follis, 296-348
a.D.
(data from
industry, the military, and the civil service. shortages of labor in agriculture, Faced with taxes, peasants would abandon their lands and flee to the pro tection of a wealthy landowner, who was glad to have the extra labor. and in lieu of peasants the landowners offered Feudal relations emerged, or even slaves for military service (McNeill, 1976, p. 116; Rus vagabonds 1976, pp. sell, 1958, p. 140; Boak, 1955; Jones, 1964, 1974; MacMullen, 1984). By 400 a.D. most of Gaul and Italywere owned 182-183; Wickham, by less than a dozen senatorial families (Williams, 1985, p. 214), who had tax demands. the power to defy the government's From the late fourth century the barbarians could no longer be kept out. They forced their way into Roman lands inwestern Europe and North The government destruction. had no choice Africa, initially causing great them as legitimate rulers of the territories they occu but to acknowledge The Germanic pied. kings kept the revenues of these territories and, al defended what was left of the empire, they did not do so reli though they in a negative the fifth century the western empire was ably. Throughout Lost or devastated provinces meant feedback toward collapse. loop tending Lower military income and less military lower government strength. in turn meant that more areas would be lost or ravaged. By 448 strength Rome had lost most of Spain (Barker, 1924, pp. 413-414). After 461 Italy and Gaul had little connection. The empire shrank to Italy and adjacent lands. The most important ruler in the West was no longer the Roman Em in North Africa (Ferrill, 1986, p. 154; peror but the Vandal King, Gaiseric, Wickham, 1981, p. 20). In the 20 years following the death of Valentinian III (455), the Roman came to rely almost to nothing. The government dwindled army proper on troops from Germanic tribes. Finally these could not be paid. exclusively demanded one-third of the land in Italy in lieu of pay. This being They as their the last refused, they revolted, elected Odoacer king, and deposed in 476. The Roman Senate informed in Italy, Romulus Augustulus, emperor in Italywas no longer needed the Eastern Emperor, Zeno, that an emperor 244). (Jones, 1964, p. The strategy of the later Roman Empire was to respond to a near-fatal in the third century by increasing the size, complexity, power, challenge and costliness of the primary problem-solving and government system?the its army. Limited by bounded Roman officials could not foresee rationality, the consequences of this strategy. The higher costs were undertaken not to expand the empire or to acquire new wealth, but to sustain the status quo. The benefit/cost ratio of imperial government declined as it lost both legiti and support (Tainter, 1988, 1994). In the end the Western Roman macy could no longer afford the problem of its own existence. Empire
The Early Byzantine Recovery

Western in The debacle Europe during the fifth century meant the end Roman state, but the Eastern Roman Empire (usually known of the Western as the Byzantine its own emperors, under Empire) persisted changing in the Turks took Constantinople and coming to an end only when greatly 1453. For much of its history it lost territory, so that by the end the state consisted only of the city itself. Yet during the tenth and early eleventh centuries Byzantium was on the offensive, and doubled the territory under its control. There is a lesson in complexity and problem solving in the steps that made this possible. to develop the The most urgent needs of the eastern emperors were economic and to improve the base on which military security depended, effectiveness of the army. Both tasks were begun by Anastasius (491-518). a sound coinage on which He established in the copper denominations commerce. As part of his finan life depended, daily thereby revitalizing cial reforms, Anastasius gave the army cash to buy rations, uniforms, and were evidently arms, rather than issuing these. The allowances generous, so that the army attracted numbers of native volunteers. Barbarian large mercenaries much nomic to be employed, and their generals continued but became a few decades less important (Treadgold, these eco 1996). Within and military reforms had produced such results that Justinian (527 565) could both increase the size of the follis (the most valuable of the Persia, attempt to recover the western copper coins) and, after defeating
provinces.
An army sent to North Africa in 532 conquered the Kingdom of the Vandals within a year. Almost the Byzantine general, Belisa immediately, rius, was sent to reconquer Italy. He had taken Rome and Ravenna, cap tured the Ostrogothic all of Italy south of the Po when King, and conquered he was recalled in 540 to fight the Persians again. In 541, just when the job in Italy seemed about done, bubonic plague It had not been seen before in the Mediterranean, swept over the empire. and took four years to run its course. Like any disease introduced to a the effects were devastating. Just as in the population with no resistance, to fourteenth century, the plague of the sixth century killed from one-fourth one-third of the population. The enormous loss of taxpayers caused immediate financial problems. reserve of 29 million A and Justin (518 gold solidi amassed by Anastasius 527) was soon gone. Army pay fell into arrears, and troops either mutinied or handed conquests (even the city of Rome) back to the enemy. The Ostro Italy goths recovered and retook most of Italy. The field army of Byzantine had to be rebuilt twice. The Moors took much of Byzantine Africa.
The population was so depleted by plague that more barbarian merce naries had to be recruited, and these had to be paid in gold. By debasing the Emperor was able to send an the currency and slashing expenditures, other army to Italy in 552, and even to back a rebellion against the Visi was reconquered by 554, but the lastOstrogoths gothic king of Spain. Italy held out until 561. In 558, though, the plague returned, and again military to conquer only about the southern fifth pay fell short. Justinian managed of Spain. At his death in 565 Justinian left a greatly enlarged empire, but the new and treasury both depleted. conquests proved hard to hold with population in Spain and the Moors in Africa. Within four years the Visigoths attacked The Lombards invaded Italy and took most of the interior by 572. War resumed with Persia. Slavs and Avars (a coalition of tribes related to the Huns) crossed the Danube. The Byzantines again defeated the Persians, but the Slavs raided all the way to Greece. To pay for these wars, the alloy of the gold solidus had to be debased by adding silver, and the weight of the copper follis was regularly reduced (Fig. 6) (Harl, 1996, pp. 195-197). The wars also took a toll on the Persians, and in 590 rebels overthrew the Persian king. The Byzantine put Emperor Maurice Tiberius (582-602) in the the king's son on the Persian throne, but had to attend to problems Balkans. Byzantine troops defeated the Avars and Slavs, and by 599 practi
25
20 +
15 g CO
CD 10 5+
li.iiiM.nl
498
518
538
558
578
598
618
638
658
678
698
718
Years
FIGURE 6. Weight 1996, p. 197). of the Byzantine
A.D.
a.D. (data from Harl,
follis, 498-717
them from the Balkans. But the cally cleared stretched by these conflicts. After the campaigns to send troops to Balkans, there was no money dered his troops to winter north of the Danube. on Constantinople, and killed the emperor. The vowed
to avenge his benefactor and, grasping snatch Byzantine provinces. Thus began a crisis tury and nearly brought the empire to an end. The empire was so disorganized by these troubles that there was a in the Balkans and Asia. The Slavs and Avars breakdown general military overran the Balkans again. The Persians spread through Asia Minor. North on Africa and Egypt successfully rebelled and placed Heraclius (610-641) the Byzantine throne. The empire he took over lay in ruins and was finan cially exhausted. The Persians reached the Bosporus (opposite Constantino richest ple) in 615. In 619 they began the conquest of Egypt, the empire's was from 618 to 626. province. Constantinople besieged In 615 church treasures Existing resources could not fund a recovery. were melted down to meet government from which silver coins expenses, were issued with the inscription "God save the Romans." Heraclius cut the of troops and officials by half in 616. Bronze was needed for arms and pay followed his predecessors armor, so Heraclius by further lowering the of the follis (Fig. 6). Many times the mint simply took larger coins weight in the sixth century, chiseled them into fragments, and restruck each minted as a follis. The strategy was piece clearly inflationary. measures economic Heraclius' bought time for his military strategy to work. He counterattacked with In 626 increasing success starting in 622. was broken, and the the siege of Constantinople the emperor following year into Persian territory. In 627 Heraclius the began to advance destroyed Persian army and in 628 occupied the Persian king's favorite residence. The Persians had no choice but to agree to peace. The Byzantines got all their lost territory returned. The war had lasted 26 years, and resulted in no more than restoration of the status quo of a earlier. generation The empire was exhausted by the struggle and Heraclius's great victory was not to last. Arab forces, newly converted to Islam, broke into imperial territory in 634 and two years later defeated the Byzantine army decisively. had taken 18 years to recover, were lost again. Syria and Palestine, which was taken in 641. The wealthiest were permanently Egypt provinces gone, and soon the empire was reduced to Anatolia, Armenia, North Africa, Sic for the Arabs con ily, and parts of Italy. The Persians fared even worse, their empire completely. quered it (641-668) and throughout the seventh century, the Under Constans
resources were empire's Persia and in the against or Italy. In 602 Maurice marched They mutinied, II Persian King Khosrau at the pretext, began to that lasted for over a cen
to deteriorate. The Arabs built their first fleet strategic situation continued it took the capital of Cyprus. They ravaged Rhodes in 654, in 641, and with and defeated the Byzantine fleet the next year. The Arabs raided Asia Minor itself was besieged each nearly every year for two centuries. Constantinople from 674 to 678. The Bulgars, a new enemy, broke into the empire year in 697. From 717 to 718 an Arab from the north. The Arabs took Carthage for over a year. The city was force besieged Constantinople continuously ambushed reinforce the Byzantines saved in the summer of 718, when was a turning point in a centuries-long ments sent through Asia Minor. It and were never again able to mount struggle. The Arabs had to withdraw such a threat. life In the century before the victory of 718 the political and economic had been utterly transformed. The huge em of the eastern Mediterranean and pire that the Romans had assembled was almost gone. Debasements insti standards and the fiscal and economic inflation had ruined monetary on them. There were no longer standard weights tutions which depended to copper coins and monetary Around 659 exchange was undermined. Constans cut military pay in half again. With army pay by the 660s cut to no longer pumped coins into its level of 615, the government one-fourth 700 most people within or formerly within the empire no the economy. By In most Mediterranean in everyday transactions. lands longer used coins basis. The economy the economy ceased to have a monetary developed manors into its medieval around self-sufficient (Harl, form, organized can scarcely re of the transformation imagine the magnitude to save what was A way of life to which left of Byzantium. the quired had been accustomed for over a mil peoples of the eastern Mediterranean in the previous section, the em lennium had to be given up. As discussed perors of the late third and early fourth centuries had responded to a similar of administration, crisis by complexification. They increased the complexity and the size of the army. This was the regimentation of the population, and paid for by levels of taxation so harmful that lands were abandoned Constans IIand his successors peasants could not replenish the population. on the depleted popula could hardly impose more of the same exploitation tion of the shrunken empire. Instead they adopted a strategy that is truly rare in the history of complex societies: simplification. Arab civil war from 659 to 663 caused the caliph in Syria to purchase a truce. The respite allowed Constans II to undertake fundamental transfor so much revenue that even at one-fourth mations. The government had lost rate it could not pay its troops. Constans' solution was to de the previous a way for the army to support itself. He lacked ready cash but the vise 1996). One
one-fifth of the land in the em imperial family had vast estates?perhaps land abandoned from the Persian attacks. Such There was also much pire. lands were divided among the troops. InAsia Minor and other parts of the themes?were settled in new military empire, divisions of troops?called zones. Soldiers (and later sailors) were given grants of land on condition of at this time that Constans service. Itwas apparently hereditary military the troops to provide their own halved military pay, for he now expected a small monetary Corre livelihood supplement). through farming (with the Byzantine fiscal administration was greatly simplified. spondingly The transformation ramified throughout Byzantine society, as any fun must. Both central and provincial government damental economic change were simplified, and the transaction costs of government were In reduced. into the military. Cities the provinces, the civil administration was merged across Anatolia contracted to fortified hilltops. Aristocratic life focused on little education the imperial court. There was beyond basic literacy and and literature itself consisted of little more than lives of saints numeracy, is sometimes 1988, 1995, 1997). The period (Haldon, 1990; Treadgold, called the Byzantine Dark Age. The results of the simplification were evident almost immediately. The was system of themes rejuvenated Byzantium. A class of peasant-soldiers to no formed across the empire. The new farmer-soldiers had obligations rather than consum landowners, only to the state. They became producers ers of the empire's wealth. formed a new type of army inwhich mili They and the lands that went with it,were passed to the eldest tary obligation, son. From this new class of farmers came the force that sustained the em the Byzantines secured a pire. By lowering the cost of military defense better return on their most important investment. to the Arabs, as forces began to put up stiffer resistance Byzantines in the victories of 678 and 718. The empire began to lose land at evident a much slower rate. The Arabs continued to raid Anatolia but were unable to hold any of it for long. Soldiers were always near at hand. Fighting as they were for their own lands and families, they had much greater incentive of the themes the Arabs made and performed better. After the establishment in Anatolia only when the empire had internal troubles from 695 progress to 717. By 745 Constantine V was able to invade the Caliphate, the first invasion of Arab territory in a generation. successful During the next century, campaigns against the Bulgars and Slavs grad in the Balkans. Greece was recaptured. Pay was the empire ually extended so plentiful that in 867 Michael increased after 840, yet gold became III met an army payroll by melting down 20,000 from pounds of ornaments the throne room. When marines were added to the imperial fleet it became
re against Arab pirates. In the tenth century the Byzantines after 840 the size of the empire of coastal Syria. Overall parts conquered was nearly doubled. The process culminated when Basil II (963-1025) con to the Dan the Bulgars and extended the empire's boundaries quered again to had gone from near disintegration ube. In two centuries the Byzantines in Europe and the Near East, an accomplishment the premier power being won by decreasing the complexity and costliness of problem solving. effective
more
The Development
Arms
of Modern Europe
races are the classic example of returns to complex diminishing nation will quickly match an opponent's in advances ity. Any competitive or so that investments in these armaments, personnel, logistics, intelligence, areas typically yield no lasting or security. In an arms race, each advantage over its rivals, while strives for advantage the rivals strive to competitor counter these and develop advantages of their own. Usually no state can that lasts very long. More and more gain an overwhelming advantage are spent on that most and personnel resources, money, fleeting of prod ucts: military advantage. state continu The costs of being a competitive while the return on investment inexorably declines. All the while ously rise, a state must search continuously for the resources to remain competitive, to deploy those resources effectively. and develop an organization The un in Europe of the last millennium altered not only folding of this process but ultimately changed the entire world. I will outline European societies, the development of this process from the fifteenth through the early nine teenth centuries. From the Europe before 1815 was almost always at war somewhere. twelfth through the sixteenth centuries France was at war from a low of 47 to a high of 77 percent in others. For percent of years in some centuries, England the range was 48 to 82 percent; for Spain, 47 to 92 percent. Even in the most peaceful centuries these nations were at war, on average, nearly every other year. In the whole of the sixteenth century there was barely a decade when Europe was entirely at peace. The seventeenth century en 4 years of total peace; the eighteenth 16 years (Parker, century, joyed only 1988, p. 1; Rasier & Thompson, 1989, p. 40). In the fifteenth century, siege guns ended the advantage of stone in the strategies and technology of defense. tles, and required changes the early fifteenth century, builders designed fortifications that could cannon. A short time later walls were built that could defensive port survive bombardment. By 1560 all the elements of the trace italienne a fortification system of low, thick walls with been developed, angled cas From sup also had bas
was effective but expensive. It In 1553 the tions and extensive outworks. so costly to build such fortifications that no money city of Siena found it was left for its army or fleet. Siena was annexed by Florence, against which, its fortifications had been built (Creveld, 1989, pp. 101-103; ironically, Parker, 1988, pp. 7, 9, 12). Trace italienne fortifications, if one could afford them, were a worthy It could take months or years to capture a place defended investment. in this way. Offensive tacticians responded with more complicated siege and their costs rose as well. A force of perhaps 50,000 besiegers methods, had to be kept in place for weeks or months. Such a force needed 475 tons of food per day, to which was added ammunition, and building powder, From this time on, local lords could not afford to build and de materials. fend an effective fortress, nor to attack one. The resources for war had now to be sought in capitalist towns rather than in the feudal countryside (Crev eld, 1989, 106-108; Parker, 1988, p. 13). The scale of conflict developed from local or regional to national. warfare also developed In the four Open-field greater complexity. teenth and fifteenth centuries massed archers and the pike phalanx made the armored knight obsolete. in turn superseded These were by firearms. To make effective use of firearms took organization and drill. Infantry had to be drawn up in closely coordinated ranks. Those in the rearwould reload the lead musketeers while and quick changes of position fired, gave an of fire (Creveld, 1989, pp. 89-91; uninterrupted application Kennedy, to increase 1987, p. 21; Parker, 1988, pp. 16-20). Tactics were developed the efficiency and effectiveness of firing. Textbooks of military drill were across the continent. and battlefield coordination be published Training came more important: ranks had to open and close on while unedu signal, cated soldiers had to be familiar with what were, at the time, history's most advanced weapons. Victory came to depend not on simple force, but on the right combination of infantry, cavalry, firearms, cannon, and reserves 1988 pp. 18-23). (Creveld, 1989, pp. 92-94; Parker, War came to involve ever-larger segments of society and became pro Several European states saw the sizes of their gressively more burdensome. armies increase tenfold between 1500 and 1700. Louis XIV's army stood at in 1691. Five years later it was at 395,000, and nearly one-fourth 273,000 of all adult Frenchmen were in the military. Between 1560 and 1659 Cas tile lost about eleven percent of its adult male population in the constant wars et al., 1994, p. 13). Each day, a field army of 30,000 (Sundberg needed 100,000 pounds of flour, and 1500 sheep or 150 cattle. Only the cities required more (Creveld, 1989, pp. 112-113; Parker, 1988, pp. largest 2, 45-46, 75).
of these developments, Yet despite or because land warfare became The new technol largely stalemated. There were few lasting breakthroughs. and mercenaries, could be bought by any power with money. No ogies, a nation such as Spain or nation could gain a lasting advantage. When to become France threatened alliances would it form against dominant, wars were slow and tedious, and were 1987, 21-22). Major (Kennedy, often decided small victories and the slow erosion of the by cumulative economic nations quickly recovered, base. Defeated enemy's though, and were soon ready to fight again. Warfare into global evolved of necessity into contests for European competition expanded flanking operations. and influence overseas (Parker, 1988, pp. 43, 80-82). power to sustain the wealth from trade and colonization Europeans employed their ever-more-costly 1987, pp. 24, 27-28, 43, competition (Kennedy, of sea power 52; Tainter, 1992, pp. 110, 124). The development 46-47, and acquisition of colonies became part of the strategy of stalemated Euro warfare. Because of this, European war ultimately and affected pean the entire world. 1914 the nations of Europe, and their off By changed shoots, controlled fully 84% of the earth's surface (Parker, 1988, p. 5). The naval powers of the time were England, the Netherlands, Sweden, France, and Spain. From 1650 to 1680 the five northern Denmark/Norway, tons. In the 1630s increased their navies from 140,000 to 400,000 powers the Dutch merchant fleet required the building of 300 to 400 new ships each year, about half of which were employed in Baltic trade (from which much of its raw material for naval supplies). Between the England imported 1630s and 1650 the Dutch merchant fleet grew by 533 percent (Sundberg et al., 1994, pp. 38, 42). Yet expanding navies entailed further problems of and cost. In 1511, for example, James IVof Scotland increasing complexity commissioned the building of the ship Great Michael. It took almost one half of a year's income to build, and ten percent of his annual budget for was sold to France three years later, and ended its seamen's wages. It days in Brest harbor (Parker, 1988, p. 90). rotting As the size and complexity of armies grew through the eighteenth and were needed, such as sur centuries new fields of specialization nineteenth was necessary to have accurate clocks and statis It veying and cartography. tical reporting. Some eighteenth-century armies carried their own printing became more complex. Staff and administration were presses. Organization as a unit, but could be separated. Armies no longer marched split into smaller elements that traveled, under instructions, on their own. Battles came to last up to several months Par (Creveld, 1989, pp. 114, 117-122; 153). ker, 1988, p. In 1499 Louis XII asked what was needed to ensure a successful cam
paign in Italy. He was told that three things alone were required: money, et al., 1994, p. 10). As military and still more money money, (Sundberg affairs grew in size and complexity finance became the main constraint. in the The cost of putting a soldier in the field increased by 500 percent decades before 1630. Nations spent more and more of their income on In 1513, for example, 90 war, but itwas never enough. England obligated percent of its budget to military efforts. In 1657 the figure was 92 percent. In the mid eighteenth 90 percent of century Frederick the Great allocated his income to war. In 1643, expenditures of the French government, mainly on war, came to twice the annual income (Kennedy, 1987, pp. 58, 60, in the 1540s cost about ten times the crown's income 63). England's wars (Kennedy, 1987, p. 60). its wars through a combination of low population, Sweden financed forest reserves, and eager markets for its products. The major untapped had to rely on credit. Even with riches from states, lacking such advantages, her New World colonies, Spain's debts rose from 6 million ducats in 1556 a century later.War to 180 million inter loans grew from about 18 percent est in the 1520s to 49 percent in the 1550s. Both France and Spain often had to declare bankruptcy, or force a lowering of the rate of interest. From centuries the Dutch, followed by the the sixteenth through the eighteenth to reliable these fiscal constraints by gaining access English, overcame to pay the interest on loans, short-term and long-term credit. Being careful they were granted more favorable terms than other nations. They used this to defeat opponents, France and Spain, that were wealthier but advantage Rasier & Thompson, 1989, pp. poor credit risks (Parker, 1988, p. 63-67; 103). 91,94,96, The wars raised permanently the cost of being a competitive state, and war-induced debt levels persisted long after the fighting ceased. Power nations were never able to dominate for very always shifts, and victorious Rasier & Thompson, 1989, pp. 106, 175-176). Many long (Kennedy, 1987; the futility of European wars, but arms races people of the time understood are especially In 1775 Frederick the Great eloquently difficult to break. described the state of affairs.
The ambitious should consider above all that armaments and military discipline being much the same throughout Europe, and an equality of force between bel alliances as a rule producing all that princes can expect from the greatest ad ligerent parties, of successes, vantages at present is to acquire, by accumulation either some small city on the frontier, or some territory which will not pay interest on the expenses of the war, and whose
does not even approach the number of citizens who population in the campaigns. (Quoted in Parker [1988, p. 149]) perished
the expan in Europe produced no lasting advantages, As land warfare to the global arena was a logical consequence. sion of competition Compe to include trade, capturing overseas territories, establishing tition expanded colonies, attacking adversaries' colonies, and intercepting shipments of bul lion and valuables. Yet even the foreign wealth could not meet the cost of some campaigns. In 1552 the Hapsburg Emperor Charles V spent 2.5 mil lion ducats on a campaign at Metz, an amount equal to 10 times his Ameri was receiving 2 million ducats a year can income. By the 1580s Phillip II from American mines, but the ill-fated armada of 1588 cost five times that Even with this massive transfer of bullion from (Kennedy, 1987, pp. 46-47). in the century following debt grew 3,000 percent the New World, Spain's to fail. Clearly caused Spanish military operations and bankruptcy 1556, if Spain had have failed much earlier (or not been undertaken) would they not been able to draw upon New World wealth. in the form of tech stimulated great complexity European competition of science, political transformation, and innovation, development nological To subsidize European competition it became necessary global expansion. to secure the produce of foreign lands (and later fossil fuels). New forms of into this small part of the resources, were channeled energy, and non-local of global resources allowed European conflict to world. This concentration and costliness that could never have been sus reach heights of complexity For tained with European resources alone (Tainter, 1992, pp. 123-125). better or worse the repercussions of centuries of European war are a legacy inwhich we still participate, and will for the foreseeable future.
PROBLEM SOLVING AND SUSTAINABILITY: DIVERGENT OUTCOMES

to illustrate quite different outcomes to long There is one case of col term, adaptive, organizational problem solving. Roman Empire), one of sustainability lapse (theWestern through simplifica tion (the early Byzantine recovery), and one of sustainable problem solving and energy subsidies (Europe). There are les based on growing complexity sons in these cases for the problem solving efforts of any institution, today or in the future, that is intended to last. These chosen cases were
The Western
Roman
Empire
Roman Empire are that (a) a society or The lessons of the Western institution can be destroyed itself, and (b) by the cost of sustaining in problem solving does its damage subtly, unforeseeably, and complexity over the long term. cumulatively The Roman Empire, like all empires, was founded on the expectation of high returns to conquest. Yet by the second century a.d Rome's enemies other the empire had stopped expanding. stronger while Fighting in took place within the empire itself, and ordinary budgets often creasingly acute not suffice to defend the state. The problems became in the would third century when forces of Persians, Germanic war bands, and contend ing Romans crossed and ravaged the empire. A primary strategy to meet the costs of these crises (mainly military costs) was to debase the currency. There was no choice: the crises had to be contained whatever the true cost had grown to the future. Victories in the late third century gave a respite to implement a longer term strategy, which was to increase the size and complexity of the prob the empire system (government and its army), and to organize lem-solving to produce the resources this required. To gain the required revenues every unit of production was counted, whether land, ship, or cart. Levels person, were established sent to ensure of taxation and the empire's agents were was allowed to interfere. If peasants abandoned collection. their Nothing fields they were returned to work, or the lands assigned to others. Essential were made hereditary. The survival of the empire took prece occupations over the well-being dence of its producers. Each of these controls exacer transaction costs. debased cur irony is that each step to ensure continuity?whether or increased control?was a rational solu rency, larger army, frozen labor, tion to an immediate problem. Had any of these steps not been taken the not have survived as long as it did. Yet each step degraded empire would the well-being of the producers on whom In time the survival depended. lands were abandoned, and the peasant popu system declined, productive lation first declined and then stagnated. Emperors, constrained by bounded In the end the. costliness rationality, could not foresee these ramifications. and complexity of the problem-solving inevitable. system made collapse bated The
The Early Byzantine Recovery

to ordering resources Rulers of the ancient world had been accustomed It took a crisis of unprecedented to and having them delivered. proportions
convince the rulers of this empire that they could no longer live and com as they formerly did. The Byzantines this during the crises pete perceived of the seventh century, during which they lost half their empire and seemed about to lose the rest. The population had not recovered from the sixth when the Persian invasion of the early 600s destroyed urban century plague life inAsia Minor, and both the Persians and later the Arabs took into slav inhabitants as they could catch. Taxes dwin ery as many of the remaining dled and the government could no longer support the army. Arab victory seemed inevitable. The Byzantine Empire responded with one of history's only examples of a complex society simplifying. Much of the structure of ranks and honors, based on urban Civil administration and life, disappeared. simplified in the countryside with the military. Governmental transaction merged costs were reduced. The economy contracted and there were fewer artisans and merchants. Elite social life focused on the cap?tol and the emperor, rather than on the cities that no longer existed. Literacy, writing, and educa tion declined. Barter and feudal social relations replaced the millennium old monetary economy. Most fundamentally, the Byzantine government cut dramatically the cost of its most expensive the army, while it part, simultaneously making more effective. No did peasants have to support themselves and a longer ineffectual army. The army became landholders and producers recently much like the peasants. The land soldiers defended was their own. The kin and neighbors. Accordingly people they defended were they fought better than before and the government a better return on their obtained cost. Almost the army began to perform better. The empire immediately land so rapidly and in time took the offensive. In this case stopped losing was not the problem-solving but simplification after a strategy complexity, of increased complexity. long period
Europe in the case of warring Europe was Sustainability richly complex. Here is a case that had all the of disaster?increasing ingredients complexity, high costs, military stalemate, and an impoverished support population? to the industrial world that we know yet it contributed today and to history's most capable of problem War is such a consumer of systems solving. wealth (as seen in the Roman, Byzantine, and European cases) that modern Europe (and its offshoots and imitators) might never have come to be. War consumes wealth not only through physical destruction, but more insidi the costs of preparing for and it. Complexity and ously through conducting
costs are driven ever higher. European wars had to be supported by a peas If there was ever a political antry that grew ever more desperate. system to collapse that should have been vulnerable itwas from its own costs, of the last millennium. Europe There are two primary reasons why today's prosperity emerged from so forced Europeans many centuries of misery. The first is that the competition to innovate in technological abilities, prowess, organizational continuously and systems of finance. They were forced to become more adept at manipu reason is that they lating and distributing matter and energy. The second stumbled upon great subsidies. Over the ocean they found got lucky: they new lands that could be conquered, and their resources turned to European at war meant that the peoples and govern European prowess advantage. ments of those lands were More rather easily overwhelmed. recently new subsidies and nuclear fuels) were developed that fund complexity, (fossil problem today. Thus from the fifteenth century on solving, and welfare found the resources to develop levels of complexity that would have Europe to support by the solar energy falling on Europe alone. been impossible Without these subsidies this luck), Europe and the world (that is, without would be quite different. today
CONCLUSIONS
We have learned much about the success and failure of institutions from the fields of organizational decision-making, organizational ecology, un and The problems of bounded learning organizations. rationality, costs underlie foreseeable and transaction the approach consequences, here. These fields have been limited, though, to the study of developed In the case of organizations short-term change. such as states, to look for reasons for failure is to look only at the tail end of a proximate long process. must become The science of organizations historical. is a long-term paradox of problem solving. Itfacilitates the Complexity in the short run while resolution of problems the ability to undermining a society or other kind of institu solve them in the long term. Maintaining tion requires that the problem-solving system itself be sustainable. The case studies of this essay allow us to describe possible outcomes to long-term trends in problem solving. 1. The Roman Model. Problem solving drives increasing complexity and costs that cannot be subsidized by new sources of energy. In time there are diminishing returns to problem solving. Problem solving continues by
levels of resources from extracting higher and disaffection of the population weakness solving and initiate collapse.
the productive system. Fiscal in time compromise problem
2. The Byzantine The institution, perhaps no longer having Model. resources to increase complexity, sufficient simplifies. Costs deliberately are greatly reduced and, perhaps more the productive system importantly, It is a strategy that in the Byzantine case allowed is enhanced. for fiscal This is also the strategy employed for expansion. recovery and eventually American firms over the past 20 years, where of by many simplification to competition and re and elimination of costs contributed management
covery.
can lead to ever 3. The European Model. Uncontrolled competition It drives consumption of resources increasing complexity. regardless of It is a risky for the immediate alternative may be extinction. long-term cost, as it seems to have situation that can lead to the collapse of all contenders, in the case of the southern lowland Classic Maya done (Tainter, 1988, The Europeans averted this trap in part through competition-induced 1992). ingenuity, but largely also through luck. is both to understand the con The point of examining these outcomes of complexity and problem solving and to peer into our possible sequences futures. Our societies and institutions have increased greatly in complexity over the past few centuries. This complexity is sustained by our current fossil fuels. We do not know how long this de energy subsidies, primarily can continue. Campbell and Laherr?re (1998) argue that the pe pendency troleum basis for our present complexity may begin to diminish within a few years. We can prepare for this with a full understanding of how prob of the options of (a) complexity systems develop, cognizant lem-solving or (c) growing complexity and diminishing based returns, (b) simplification, on further subsidies. Or we can hope for a repeat of the luck enjoyed by The only thing that Europeans and some of the colonies they established. is certain about the future is that it will present challenges. We can gamble institutions will suffice to meet those challenges, that our problem-solving and accept the consequences if they do not. Or we can increase our chances of being sustainable by understanding itself, the problem solving it develops, trends by which it successful or not. and the factors that make are enormous: The consequences had European luck proved otherwise the in problem dilemma of complexity have been described by solving might a future scholar who would lump Renaissance Europe with the Western Roman Empire as another example of collapse.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Iam pleased to express my thanks to Virginia Abernethy and an anony on an earlier version of this paper. reviewer for comments
mous
REFERENCES
inMesopotamian R. McC. (1978). Strategies of maximization, stability, and resilience of the American and agriculture. settlement, Society society, Philosophical Proceedings 122,329-335. R. McC. of cities. Chicago: Aldine. (1981). Heartland Adams, S. E. (1993). Graecia of Roman Greece. Alcock, capta: the landscapes Cambridge: Cambridge Press. University H. E. (1979). Organizations and environments. Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. Aldrich, Englewood T. W. (1999). Supply-side J. A., & Hoekstra, Allen, T. F. H., Tainter, Systems sustainability. Science and Behavioral Research 16, 403-427. 410-476. In The Cambridge medieval Barker, E. (1924). Italy and the West, history, Volume of the Teutonic Roman Empire and the foundation order (second edition). 1, the Christian H. M. & Whitney, J. P. (Eds.), pp. 392-431. Gwatkin, University Cambridge: Cambridge Press. hierarchies and evolutionary Baum, J. A. C & Singh, J. V. (1994a). Organizational processes: some on a theory of organizational reflections In Evolutionary evolution. of dynamics New York and Oxford: Oxford Baum, J.A. C & Singh J.V. (Eds.), pp. 3-20. organizations. Press. University niches and the dynamics of organiza Baum, J. A. C & Singh, J. V. (1994b). Organizational Adams, tional mortality. American Journal of Sociology 100, 346-380. in industry. New York: Wiley. R. (1956). Work and authority Treasure: Roman coinage of the third century AD. Besly, E. & Bland, R. (1983). The Cunetio London: British Museum. and the fall of the Roman Empire in the West. Ann Boak, A. E. R. (1955). Manpower shortage Press. Arbor: University of Michigan E. (1965). The conditions of agricultural the economics of agrarian change Boserup, growth: under population Aldine. pressure. Chicago: C American J. & Laherr?re, J. H. (1998). The end of cheap oil. Scientific 278(3), Campbell, 78-83. A. V. (1966). The theory of peasant Smith, R. E. F. & Lane, Christel economy. Chayanov, Richard D. Irwin for the American Economic Association. (Trans.). Homewood: M. The economics of subsistence London: Mac (1966). Clark, C & Haswell, agriculture. Bendix, millan. R. H. (1937). The nature of the firm. Econ?mica 386-405. 4(n.s.), and the origins of agricul Cohen, M. N. (1977). The food crisis in prehistory: overpopulation ture. New Haven: Yale University Press. L. H. (1969). The nadir of the imperial Antoninianus in the reign of Claudius II Gothicus, Cope, a.d. 268-270. The Numismatic Chronicle 7, 9, 145-161. L. H. (1974). The metallurgical of the Roman Cope, development Imperial coinage during the a.D. Ph.D. dissertation, first five centuries Liverpool Polytechnic. b.c. to the present. and war, from 2000 New York: Free Creveld, M. van (1989). Technology Press. R. (1990). Structure and scale in the Roman economy. Duncan-Jones, Cambridge: Cambridge Press. University Coase,
the military London: Thames Ferrill, A. (1986). The fall of the Roman Empire: explanation. and Hudson. V: Rome and Italy of the Rome, Volume Frank, T. (1940). An economic survey of ancient Press. Johns Hopkins Empire. Baltimore: University E. (1776-1788). and fall of the Roman Empire. New York: Modern Li The decline Gibbon, brary. Z. (1984). In R & D, patents, Z (Ed.), pp. Introduction. and productivity. Griliches, Griliches, 1-19. Chicago Press. and London: University of Chicago in the seventh century: the transformation of a culture. Cam J. F. (1990). Byzantium Haldon, Press. University bridge: Cambridge C. J., & Kaufmann, R. (1992). Energy and resource quality: the Hall, Charles A. S., Cleveland, Ni wot: University Press of Colorado. of the economic process. ecology M. (1946). Economic in the early Roman Empire. Journal of Economic Hammond, stagnation 6, 63-90. Supplement T. & Carroll, G. R. (1992). Dynamics of organizational density, legiti populations: New York: Oxford Press. and competition. mation, University b.c. to a.D. 700. Baltimore: in the Roman economy, 300 (1996). Coinage Harl, K. W. Johns Press. University Hopkins G. A. J. (1972). A social and economic of medieval London: Hodgett, history Europe. Methuen. a social, economic and administra Jones, A. H. M. (1964). The later Roman Empire, 284-602: tive survey. Norman: of Oklahoma Press. University in ancient economic studies and administrative Jones, A. H. M. (1974). The Roman economy: Basil Blackwell. history. Oxford: P. (1987). The rise and fall of the great powers: economic and military Kennedy, change conflict from 1500 to 2000. New York: Random House. Issues from the Rome mint during the sole reign of Gallienus. Actes du King, C. E. (1982). 9?me Congr?s de Numismatique, 467-485. International Association Louvain-la-Neuve: Internationale des Numismates Professionels. resources. hunters do for a living, or, how to make out on scarce In Lee, R. B. (1968). What Man the hunter, I. (Eds), pp. 30-48. Aldine. lee, R. B. & DeVore, Chicago: in the Kalahari. Natural History Lee, R. B. (1969). Eating Christmas 78(10), 14, 16, 18, 21-2, 60-3. au lile si?cle. Revue Numis Le Gentilhomme, P. (1962). Variations du titre de l'Antoninianus History, Hannon, M. VI S?rie, Tome IV, 141-66. matique Luttwak, E. N. (1976). The grand strategy of the Roman Empire from the first century a.D. to the third. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins Press. University F. (1962). The production and distribution of knowledge in the United States. Machlup, Princeton: Princeton Press. University R. (1976). Roman government's to crisis, a.D. 235-337. New Haven MacMullen, response and London: Yale University Press. can models of decision-making in organizations. J. G. & Olsen, J. P. (1986). Garbage March, on In Ambiguity and command: decision organizational perspectives military making. R. (Eds.), pp. 11-35. Marshfield: Pitman. J. G. & Weissinger-Baylon, March, New York: Wiley. J. G. & Simon, H. A. (1958). Organizations. March, S. (1966). The end of the ancient world. Holmes, G. (Trans.). London: Faber and Mazzarino, Faber. W. H. (1976). Plagues and peoples. Garden City: Anchor/Doubleday. McNeill, reforms of Aurelian Roman Coins and Cul and Diocletian. J. L. (1987). The monetary Meyer, ture 3(2), 20-42. revolution: military innovation and the rise of the West, 1500 Parker, G. (1988). The military 1800. Cambridge: Press. University Cambridge I. [Trans.]). Har (1979). The rise of the Roman Empire. (The Histories, Scott-Kilvert, Polybius mondsworth: Penguin. New York: Columbia Press. Price, D. de Sol?a (1963). Little science, big science. University
T. D. & Brown, J. A. (Eds.). Prehistoric the emergence of cultural com hunter-gatherers: Press. Academic plexity. Orlando: the shaping of the global powers. Rasier, K. & Thompson, W. R. (1989). War and state making: Boston: Unwin Hyman. In An and exploitation. intensification interaction, Renfrew, A. C. (1982). Polity and power: on Melos. M. (Eds.), island polity: of exploitation the archaeology Renfrew, C. &Wagstaff, Press. pp. 264-290. University Cambridge: Cambridge a in of research Rescher, N. (1978). Scientific essay on the economics progress: philosophical Press. of Pittsburgh natural science. Pittsburgh: University on N. (1980). Unpopular of Rescher, essays progress. University technological Pittsburgh: Press. Pittsburgh costs and S. (1991). Transaction In The nature of the firm: internal labor markets. Rosen, Price, O. E. & Winter, S. G. (Eds.), pp. 75-89. and development. Williamson, origins, evolution, New York: Oxford Press. University the poor get richer and the rich slow down. Austin: University (1980). Why Rostow, W. W. of Texas Press. Late ancient Transactions of the American and medieval J. C. (1958). population. 48(3). Society Philosophical Aldine. Sahlins, M. (1972). Stone Age economics. Chicago: Invention and economic Harvard University Press. J. (1966). Schmookler, growth. Cambridge: P. M. of the learning organization. the art and practice (1990). The fifth discipline: Senge, New York: Doubleday. R. F. (1997). Making Science 275, 303-304. Service, compute. single electrons a in admin behavior: Simon, H. A. (1997). Administrative processes study of decision-making istrative organizations. Fourth Edition. New York: Free Press. H. (1972). On social evolution. of Chicago Peel, J. D. Y. (Ed.). Chicago: Spencer, University Russell, Press. H. T., & Doherty, S. (1994). Forest EMERGY basis for U., Lindegren, J., Odum, Sundberg, in the 17th Century. Swedish Scandinavian Journal of Forest Research, power Supplement 1. of complex J. A. (1988). The collapse Tainter, Press. Tainter, J. A. (1992). Evolutionary consequences San Marino: G. (Ed.), pp. 103-130. Center Tainter, J. A. (1994). La fine dell'amministrazione societies. Cambridge: Cambridge University
In Storia d'Europa, Occidente. Volume Turin: Einaudi. Settis, S. (Eds.) pp. 1207-1255. societies. Futures 27, 397-407. of complex J. A. (1995). Sustainability Tainter, as societies In Evolv Introduction: Tainter, J.A. (1996a). systems. complex prehistoric evolving risk in the prehistoric and environmental Southwest. J. A. & Tainter, ing complexity Santa Fe Institute, Studies in the Sciences of Complexity, Tainter, B. B. (Eds.), pp. 1-23. XXIV. Reading: Addison-Wesley. Volume Proceedings societies. InGetting down Tainter, J.A. (1996b). Complexity, problem solving, and sustainable to earth: practical Economics. of Ecological Costanza, R., Segura, O., & Mar applications DC: Island Press. J. (Eds.), pp. 61-76. Washington, tinez-Alier, conflict and sustainable Tainter, J. A. (1997). Cultural development: in Alaska. In Sustainable of boreal forests: hunting development International 155-161. Tainter, Conference of the International Moscow: All-Russian Research and In Companion societies. (1999). Post-collapse subsistence managing of the 7th proceedings Forest Research Boreal Association, pp. Information Center for Forest Resources.
In Effects of war on society. Ausenda, of war. on Social Stress. for Interdisciplinary Research centrale: il collaso Romano in dell'lmpero e antichit?. Secondo: J. & Guilaine, preistoria
of Archaeology. J. A. encyclopedia London: Routledge. Barker, G. (Ed.), pp. 988-1039. In The way the wind blows: J. A. (2000). Global Tainter, change, history, and sustainability. R. J., Tainter, J. A., & Mclntosh, S. K. (Eds.), climate, history, and human action. Mclntosh, New York: Columbia Press. pp. 331-356. University
science: scientific in Ameri C. P. (1996). Conjuring and cultural meanings symbols Press. life. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Stanford: Stanford University Press. (1988). The Byzantine revival, 780-842. Treadgold, W. and its army, 284-1081. Stanford: Stanford University Press. (1995) Byzantium Treadgold, W. state and society. Stanford: Stanford Univer (1997). A history of the Byzantine Treadgold, W. sity Press. in the profitability in public L. I. (1967). of investments Problems education. Tul'chinskii, Soviet Review 8(1 ), 46-54. wars of the 3rd century a.D. and Roman Tyler, P. (1975). The Persian imperial monetary policy, a.D. 253-68. 23. Einzelschriften Historia, U. S. Bureau of the Census States: 1984 (104th edi Statistical abstract of the United (1983). D.C.: U.S. Government tion). Washington, Printing Office. Laurion Numismatics. Van Meter, D. (1991). The handbook of Roman imperial coins. Nashua: to D. R. (1976). The metrology silver coinage, of the Roman Walker, part I, from Augustus Domitian. Series 5. British Archaeological Reports, Supplementary to D. R. (1977). The metrology of the Roman silver coinage, Walker, part II, from Nerva Series 22. Commodus. British Archaeological Reports, Supplementary to D. R. (1978). The metrology of the Roman silver coinage, Walker, part III, from Pertinax Tourney, can Uranius L. A. White, L. A. White, C. Wickham, Macmillan. C. Wickham, ent 103, Antoninus. British Archaeological Series 40. Reports, Supplementary of culture. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. (1949). The science of culture. New York: McGraw-Hill. (1959). The evolution and local society 400-1000. (1981 ). Early medieval Italy: central power
London:
to feudalism. from the ancient world Past and Pres (1984). The other transition: 3-36. an R. G. (1973). Poverty and progress: model of economic Wilkinson, ecological develop ment. London: Methuen. S. (1985). Diocletian and the Roman Williams, recovery. New York: Methuen. N. L. (1975). National health expenditures, 1929-74. Social Security Bulletin Worthington, 38(2), 3-20. states and civilization. of ancient Mesopotamian In The col Yoffee, N. (1988). The collapse states and civilizations. G. L. (Eds.), pp. 44-68. Yoffee, N. & Cowgill, lapse of ancient Tucson: University Press. of Arizona

Problem Solving Complexity History Sustainability

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Problem Solving Complexity History Sustainability

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Problem Solving: Complexity, History, Sustainability Author(s): Joseph A. Tainter Source: Population and Environment, Vol. 22, No.

Problem Solving: Complexity, History, Sustainability

simplification, or increasing complexity

based on increasing energy sub

Please address correspondence Columbia SE, Albuquerque,

to Joseph A. Tainter, 87106. Interdisciplinary

4 POPULATION AND ENVIRONMENT

CONSTRAINTS TO ORGANIZATIONAL AND DURABILITY EFFECTIVENESS

DEVELOPMENT OF PROBLEM SOLVING

6 AND ENVIRONMENT POPULATION

8 AND ENVIRONMENT POPULATION

10 AND ENVIRONMENT POPULATION

Producing People have

12 POPULATION AND ENVIRONMENT

14 POPULATION AND ENVIRONMENT

per Student x .01

\ (M.A./BA)/$ per Student x.01

16 AND ENVIRONMENT POPULATION

18 AND ENVIRONMENT POPULATION

ADAPTIVE PROBLEM SOLVING: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES

20 AND ENVIRONMENT POPULATION

I?. L^J ^^r^^s

FIGURE 4. Debasement 1974, and unpublished 1978]; 217]). see also

[1982]; LeGentilhomme [1962]; Tyler [1975]; andWalker

22 POPULATION AND ENVIRONMENT

FIGURE 5. Reductions in the weight Van Meter, 1991, p. 47).

of the follis, 296-348

24 AND ENVIRONMENT POPULATION

The Early Byzantine Recovery

26 AND ENVIRONMENT POPULATION

28 POPULATION AND ENVIRONMENT

30 AND ENVIRONMENT POPULATION

32 AND ENVIRONMENT POPULATION

PROBLEM SOLVING AND SUSTAINABILITY: DIVERGENT OUTCOMES

34 POPULATION AND ENVIRONMENT

The Early Byzantine Recovery

36 AND ENVIRONMENT POPULATION

the productive system. Fiscal in time compromise problem

38 AND ENVIRONMENT POPULATION

40 AND ENVIRONMENT POPULATION

You might also like